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NSSM 104
SRG mtg 12-9-70.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Copy of HAK's memo DU
Redefinition of advanced Computers
dtd 4/21/71 in NSSM 103 forder
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
December 17, 1970
For HAK
PRESIDENT'S FRIDAY BRIEFING
7034439
Diego Garcia: The initial reaction around the Indian Ocean
litterol to the announcement of our intention to set up a small
communications facility on Diego Garcia has been fairly much as
expected. Most of the governments díd not seem to be particularly
disturbed, at least at first blush, although there did seem to be
considerable suspicion that we would be developing more than an
10d
austere facility. The most negative reaction not unexepectly
came from Somalia which was "strongly opposed." The Indians,
in what appeared to be a prepared respensezv statement, also
registered a negative response insisting that Diego Garcia was a
"base" and deploring the whole operation.
We have not yet heard the last word on Diego Garcia since there
is likely to be a second, and in some cases more important, wave
of reaction. When the final results are all in we should have
an interesting test of sentiment around the Indian Ocean to against
which to ludge
possible naval moves we might wish to make in the future.
(Saunders/Hoskinson)
Att: Letter from T. L. Eliot, Jr. -- December 16, 1970
Enclosure: summary of reactions to notifications regarding
plans for Diego Garcia
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7024429
Indian Ocean
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
17004
December 16, 1970
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Reactions to Notifications Regarding
Diego Garcia Project
I enclose for your information a summary of
reactions to notifications regarding plans for
Diego Garcia.
Theodre L. Dict pe. Elit
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
As stated.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Summary of Responses to Notifications Regarding Plans
for Diego Garcia as of 12 noon, 16 December 1970
1. In general, the responses were favorable or non-
commital. There were, however, two countries, India and
Somalia which responded in a strong negative fashion. A
number of posts have not reported.
2. Favorable responses were received from -
Australia (expressed strong approval)
Iran
Singapore
Malawi
Japan
3. Unfavorable responses were received from -
India: Eric Gonsalves, Joint Secretary, Ministry
of External Affairs, expressed GOI regret since Diego
Garcia "base" will increase tension in area and earlier
decisions on BIOT had probably contributed to Soviet build-
up in Indian Ocean. Gonsalves deplored manner in which
US/UK decision reached in disregard of views of India, the
non-aligned nations and UNGA resolutions. Gonsalves stated
there was regrettable lack of consultations with India on
a subject of direct concern to Indian security. He charged
US had been taken in by the UK. Gonsalves stated the GOI
would express its regrets and views in Upper House of
Parliament on December 18 in response to a pending question.
Gonsalves refused to accept Political Counsel characteri-
zation of Diego Garcia as austere Naval communication facility.
Gonsalves concluded that the facility will undoubtedly have
some actual and more potential military capability and that
other littoral states will also react adversely.
Reaction to UK High Commissioner: Similarly
negative and disgruntled.
Somalia: Acting Head of Foreign Office was
courteous in tone to the Ambassador but strongly disapproving
in content. Somali official said he refused to believe there
was any need for this facility, given other means of communi-
cations. Moreover, his government was strongly opposed to
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
anything which involved additional big-power installations
in the Indian Ocean, as, indeed, it was opposed to present
installations.
4. Non-Committal responses were received from -
Indonesia
Kenya (UK reported receiving response "It's fine
with us")
South Africa
Pakistan
Thailand
Malagasy Republic
Saudi Arabia
Uganda
New Zealand
Tanzania
Zambia
5. Unreported responses -
Burma
Kuwait
NATO (NAC)
Ethiopia
Malaysia
Portugal
France
Mauritius
6. US Notification Delayed
Bahrein
Ceylon (Ambassador to follow-up UK on December 17;
Reaction to UK notification was non-committal)
Maldives
Seychelles
7. From among the nations responding favorably or non-
committally there were questions as well as concerns or
speculations on a variety of aspects including bearing of
the project on Indian Ocean security, Soviet presence in the
region, relationship to Vietnam, future claims to sovereignty
over Diego Garcia, relocation of inhabitants and US/UK cost
sharing, future Chinese missile tests, use of satellites for
communications, arms to South Africa, the Heath visit to
Washington and the January Commonwealth Conference. Posts
report answers to questions were available from the guidance
provided prior to notification.
8. With regard to the United Kingdom the following is
pertinent.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
Parliamentary Reaction: The Commons did not get
to Diego Garcia in the Prime Minister's oral Question
and Answer period yesterday (December 15), so Heath
submitted his announcement for the record. It is
therefore too early to report on Parliamentary reaction.
Press Reaction: Almost all British papers today,
December 16, carry the Diego story, for the most part on
inside pages. In general, papers link the facility to
the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
They also note that the announcement comes shortly before
the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. Some stories
also refer to the issue of arms for South Africa, and
differ on whether the Diego announcement supports the case
for arms sales, or makes the sales less necessary.
9. With regard to the Soviet Union the following is
pertinent.
Moscow has not yet reacted directly to the announcement
on Diego Garcia. Prior to the announcement there was a
limited amount of propaganda attention to Diego Garcia,
based mainly on Western press stories.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
548
PAGE 01 STATE 194511
3
81
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
fis
7
BEHR
BERGSTEN
66634
CHAPIN
DRAFTED BY : PM ISO JLFROM
HOLDRIDGE
APPROVED BY PM ISO CAPT FROM
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ISA I&L MR. BANDJUNIS
SAUNDERS
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OSD PA CAPT BARBER
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ISA COMP - MR. SOUTH (SUBS) OP61 CAPT LEDDICK
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S PRS - MR. KING (INFO) AF P - MR. BARY (INFO)
VAKY
EA RA - CAPT LONG (INFO)
S S -0 : MR. BRIMS
Wright
R 280209Z NOV 70
097973 anderson
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
S EC R E T STATE 194511
EXDIS
SUBJECT: DIEGO GARCIA
REF: Ao STODDART/FROM OPLINGER TELECON, NOV 24
B. LONDON 9729
C . STATE 191767
1. CONGRESS APPROVED DEFENSE MILCON APPROPRIATIONS BILL
WITH FUNDS FOR BIOT MODEST COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY (REINDEER
STATION) INCLUDED. THIS OF COURSE INDICATES THERE WAS NO
RPT NO REQUEST TO CONGRESS TO HOLDUP DECISION PENDING
INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGIC REVIEW.
2. EVEN WITH THIS ACTION WE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO HOLD OFF
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 4 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF THE
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 194511
S
PRESS AND PARLIAMENT UNTIL AFTER NOTIFICATION TO OTHER
GOVERNMENTS AS MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN USG AND HMG. IN
MEANTIME AGREED PRESS LINE IS TENABLE AND ACCURATE AS
APPORTIONMENT REQUEST MUST BE APPROVED BY OMB BEFORE
FUNDS MAY BE EXPENDED ON PROJECT. THIS PROCESS COULD TAKE
SEVERAL WEEKS WE PLAN TO HEW TO PREVIOUSLY AGREED LINE
IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES.
3. WE PLAN TO FORWARD PACKAGE TO YOU IN NEXT FEW DAYS
SETTING FORTH PROPOSALS IN THE AREAS OF NOTIFICATION TO
GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, RELOCATION OF WORKERS FROM
DIEGO AND UK MANNING LEVELS FOR THE FACILITY. FAIRLY
DETAILED CONSTRUCTION PLAN AS TO TIMING, SHIPS, AIRCRAFT
S
AND PERSONNEL INVOLVED WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN PACKAGE.
IN ANTICIPATION OF FAVORABLE APPORTIONMENT DECISIONS WE
EXPECT AUTHORIZE YOU TO CONSULT NEXT WEEK WITH HMG AND
OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR OUR PROPOSALS.
4 . AS FOLLOW UP TO LAIRD-CARRINGTON MEETING NOV 24,
SECDEF WILL SEND LETTE TO MOD FORMALLY REQUESTING BRIT
PARTICIPATION IN FACILITY. JOHNSON
S
SECRET
of
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 216
S
PAGE 01 TEHRAN 05011 191812Z
3
46
ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
041822
R 190925Z NOV 70 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2780
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
S
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
COMIDEASTFOR
CINCUSNAVEUR
S ECR ET TEHRAN 05011
EXDIS
SUBJECT: FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MIDEASTFOR
REF : STATE 187449
10 IN CONSIDERING TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF APPROACH TO SHAH
RE FUTURE OF COMIDEASTFOR, PRIMARY CONCERN MUST OBVIOUSLY BE
S
TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY OF NEGATIVE REACTION/OBJECTIONS.
20 WE BELIEVE TWO POINTS IN DEPT'S THINKING AS DESCRIBED
PARA 5 REFTEL WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THAT END, VIS:
(A) WE SOULD INFORM (RATHECETHAN SEEK APPROVAL OF) LITTORAL
STATES RE OUR PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH BAHRAIN MIDEASTFORS CONTINUED
USE OF FACILITIES ON BAHRAIN. APPROACH OF THIS NATURE WILL PROVIDE
SHAH WITH OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT WITHOUT REQUIRING HIS SPECIFIC
APPROVAL OF USG POLICY DECISION TO MAINTAIN MIDEASTFOR IN PERSIAN
GULF. WE BELIEVE HE MIGHT PREFER NOT GIVE SUCH "APPROVAL",
PARTLY TO AVOID REDUCE POSSIBLE ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM SOVIETS
AND RADICAL ARABS, PARTLY TO KEEP OPEN HIS OWN OPTIONS FOR FUTURE:
(B) WE SHOULD INFORM IRAN FIRST AND THEN, BARRING STRENUOUS
OBJECTIONS, INFORM SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS WE WOULD, IN ADDITION,
S
URGE THAT SHAH BE TOLD WE APPROACHING HIM FIRST BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH
GULF OF IMMENSE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO FREE WORLD INCLUDING MANY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
S
PAGE 02 TEHRAN 05011 191812Z
OF OUR NATO ALLIES AND JAPANI, WE RECOGNIZE IRAN'S VITAL AND
PARAMOUNT INTEREST IN FUTURE OF GULF.
30 WE SEE FOUR OTHER POINTS RE SUBSTANCE OF APPROACH WHICH, IN
OUR VIEW, WOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF NEGATIVE REACTION FROM SHAH:
(A) WE SHOULD ADVISE HIM THAT OUR PLANS FOR CONTINUED USE
OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES BY MIDEASTFOR ARE INDEFINITE IN TERMS OF
TIME AND THAT IRAN WILL, OF COURSE, BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF ANY
FUTURE CHANGES:
(B) WE SHOULD EXPRESS: THE HOPE THAT MIDEASTFOR'S CONTINUED
USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES WILL ENBALE MIDEASTFOR (IF THIS IS SO
DESIRED BY GOI) TO PLAY MODEST ROLE IN ASSISTING DEVELOPMENT OF
S
EXPANDING IRANIAN NAVY IE.G., THROUGH JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES):
(C) WE ARE CONFIDENT BAHRAIN WOULD LIKE USG TO CONTINUE USE
OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES BY CGQIDEASTFOR: AND
(D) ANY ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO CONTINUE USE OF BAHRAIN
FACILITIES WILL BE PLAYED BY USG IN VERY LOW KEY, BOTH PRIVATELY
AND PUBLICLY.
EXPIR
4. IN DISCUSSING WITH SHAH RATIONALE OF CONTINUATION OF
MIDEASTFOR IN GULF I WOULD PLAN TO REMIND HIM OF HIS STATEMENT
TO ME ON OCT 3 RE IMPORTANCE OF US PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST
(PARA 6 OF TEHRAN 4336) AND THEN POINT OUT (PARTICULARLY IF SHAH
OBJECTS OR DEMURS) THAT WHEREAS FOR SIXTY YEARS FOLLOWING DEST-
RUCTION OF RUSSIAN IMPERIAL NAVY BY JAPANESE IN 1905 NO RPT NO
RUSSIAN NAVAL VESSELS HAD VISITED GULF , IN LAST 2-1/2 YEARS THERE
HAVE BEEN FIVE VISITS BY GROUPS OF RUSSIAN WARSHIPS WHICH HAVE
INCLUDED GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, SUB-
MARINES, ETC. FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS ARE CONSTRUCTING PORT WITH NAVAL
FACILITIES FOR IRAQ AT UMM QASR WHICH COULD OBVIOUSLY SERVE AS HOME
PORT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS, AS WILL
PORT OF MAS-AL-MATRUH WHICH SOVIET CONSTRUCTING IN EGYPT. FINALLY,
WHETHER ONE LIKES IT OR NOT, IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT SOVIETS
INTEND TO HAVE SOME FAIRLY CONTINUOUS NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN
OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF. IF WE WITHDRAW MIDEASTFOR, WE WOULD
IN EFFECT BE ABANDONING GULF TO SOVIETS SINCE IT WOULD NOT
SEEM VERY LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE FOR US TO CONTINUE OUR MODEST
PRESENCE THERE FROM ANY OVER-THE-HORIZON PORT. WE WOULD ASSUME
THAT SHAH WOULD ALSO SHARE OUR STRONG AVERSION TO SEEING SOVIETS
PROVIDING ONLY FOREIGN NAVAL PRESENCE IN GULF.
S
5. ON TIMING OF APPROACH TO SHAH, MY OVERRIDING CONCERN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ATHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EXP
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
S
PAGE 03 TEHRAN 05011 191812Z
RELATES TO USG POSITION RE IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF 7TH AND 8TH
SQUADRONS FO F4S: AND WHICH I UNDERSTAND HE INTENDS TO RAISE
WITH ME. IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AN AFFIRMATIVE AND
FORTHCOMING RESPONSE FROM SHAH RE MIDEASTFOR, I WOULD BE
EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE APPROACH UNTIL I AM IN POSITION
TO ASSURE SHAH WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION THAT USG APPROVAL FOR F4S
WILL BE FORTHCOMING IF AND WHEN GOI HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
FINANCING ACQUISITION.
6. FINALLY, I BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE (ALTHOUGH
EXPIR S EXP S EXP
THIS IS HARDLY VITAL IF WE COULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT: (A) BAHRAIN
RULER, DURING FORTHCOMING VISIT TO: TEHRAN (ABOUT DECEMBER 20,
.
SEE TEHRAN'S 49541 WOULD TELL SHAH DIRECTLY OF HIS WISH TO HAVE
USG MAKE EARLY AND POSITIVE DECISION RE CONTINUED USE OF BAHRAIN
FACILITIES BY MIDEASTFOR : AND (B) OUR APPROACH TO SHAH FOLLOWED
SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WOULD MEAN
POSTPONING APPROACH TO SHAH FOR ABOUT A MONTH. GP = 3.
MACARTHUR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
RAFS-24
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
RECEIVED
Keynedy
4
*
RESEARCH STUDY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MATTAYA OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
COUNCILURITY
Wh
December 3, 1970
THE SEYCHELLES: WESTERN DOTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The British colony of the Seychelles comprises 92 islands in
the Indian Ocean 1,000 miles east of Tanzania and 600 miles north-
east of Madagascar. Its population is 50,000. The island of
Diego Garcia--where a British/American joint naval facility may be
located--is administered from the Seychelles. With somewhat in-
creased Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and the Heath
government's effort to justify arms sales to South Africa on the
grounds of a communist threat to the area, political developments in
the Seychelles are of more than usual interest.
ABSTRACT
The conservative Seychelles Democratic Party, led by
James Mancham, won the national elections held in the
British colony of the Seychelles in November 1970. Mancham
will become Chief Minister of the Indian Ocean islands for
five years under the new constitutional arrangements which
give increased self-government to the Seychellois. The
Seychelles are unlikely to become independent under Mancham's
leadership since he favors total integration with the UK.
The islands, presently dependent on British subsidies and
the export of copra, may experience greater economic growth
when a new international airport is completed in 1971,
facilitating increased tourism. If economic development
This report was produced by the Bureau
SECRET
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from
normal substantive exchange with other
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
agencies at the working level, it has not
been coordinated elsewhere.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
- ii -
does not occur at the hoped-for rate, the less conservative
Seychelles People's United Party (which won five out of the
fifteen seats in the Assembly) may greatly increase its
strength.
US interests in the area are almost entirely strategic. A
satellite tracking station in the Seychelles and the possibility of
constructing defense facilities on the island of Diego Garcia (administered
separately from the Seychelles, but with offices in the Seychelles' capital)
make it desirable that the Government of the Seychelles be friendly to
the United States. The new government, under pro-Western local leadership
and ultimate British control, promises to be sympathetic to US interests
for the foreseeable future.
INR/Africa
Director : William C. Harrop
Analyst : Alison Palmer
Ext.
: 22297
Released by:
Dem
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Seychellois Assume Broader Political Responsibilities.
Under a new constitution (which should be fully implemented
before the end of 1970), the Legislative Assembly of the British
Indian Ocean colony of the Seychelles consists of 15 elected members
plus a Speaker and three ex-officio members. The Council of
Ministers (Cabinet) has a Chief Minister and several other ministers,
all appointed by the Governor from the Assembly, plus three ex-
officio members. While the Governor retains control of defense,
foreign affairs, and internal security and has the right to veto
legislation, the new government has greater powers than any local
government has ever had.
Coming at a time of accelerating economic change, this increased
political power in the hands of the Seychellois involves some risks
to local stability. Each of the two major political parties depends
heavily for support on labor unions which include almost all of the
colony's 7,000 wage and salary earners. If enough new jobs are not
forthcoming as a result of economic development, labor leaders may
decide they have little to lose by pressuring their respective party
leaders--through boycotts and unofficial or official strikes--to take
a more radical stance. In the past such activities have pitted the
Seychellois against the British government. Under the new constitution,
the Chief Minister will have to decide whether to turn down such
demands, risking the loss of labor's support for his party, or accede
to them, leaving the possibility of a veto by the Governor.
New Chief Minister Mancham is a conservative, young, British-
trained lawyer. His Seychelles Democratic Party won 10 of the 15
Legislative Assembly seats in November's national elections. His
principal aim is to achieve total integration of the Seychelles with
Britain, even though the British government has indicated that it
is very unlikely to grant such status. Mancham receives support from
the upper middle class as well as from some labor unions. In
personality Mancham is somewhat flamboyant, and it is difficult to
predict how he will react to the day-to-day responsibilities of Chief
Minister. He may be sobered by the intractability of the Seychelles'
economic problems. Since the British are unlikely to grant all the
aid the Seychellois want, Mancham may find himself in a difficult
situation.
The opposition party, the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP),
is led by Albert Rene, who is also a young, British-trained lawyer.
While Rene is often referred to as a radical, his policies are only
slightly to the left of the SDP's ultra-conservatism. When he first
formed the SPUP in 1964, Rene called for immediate independence. But as
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
- 2 -
he found this idea was unattractive to many Seychellois, he now
espouses independence "sometime in the future." He has also tried
to sell the idea that the Seychelles should join the OAU and the
East African Community after independence, but these ideas are
equally unacceptable to many Seychellois, most of whom do not
consider themselves Africans. Rene has lately tended to play down
these points in favor of economic issues; he criticizes the UK for
not having done more for development and is trying to create the
image of SPUP as the party of the working people.
Both the SDP and the SPUP are essentially one-man parties, and
their role during the next five years is uncertain. Mancham should
be fully occupied with his new responsibilities as Chief Minister,
and Rene may find it difficult to keep the SPUP from lapsing into
dormancy until it is time to start campaigning for the 1975 elections.
The Seychelles' third party was a one-woman operation started shortly
before the 1970 elections by Hilda Delhomme. Her Seychelles Party (SP)
won no seats in the election but may have helped Rene's SPUP by
diverting votes from the SDP. Whether Madame Delhomme will try to
create a political base for 1975 is unknown.
The large copra plantations are owned by a handful of descendants
of early European settlers, known locally as the Grands Blancs.
Historically, they have invested most of their profits outside the
Seychelles and have shown little interest in participating publicly
in political activities. However, they are a powerful influence be-
hind the scenes and, under the new constitution which gives the
Seychellois a greater say in internal policies, the Grands Blancs may
decide it is time to play a larger role in local affairs. They will
need to establish a new and more attractive image to counteract their
old reputation for aloofness from the problems of other Seychellois,
who are mainly mulatto. Despite this cleavage, it is economic and
political factors, rather than color, which divide different interest
groups (both Mancham and Rene are light-skinned). There is so far no
significant racial problem.
Economic Prospects Are Less Than Exciting.
With fish in the sea and coconuts on the trees, no Seychellois
starves, although he can avoid malnutrition only by purchasing
imported rice, flour, and other foods. However, the population growth
rate of 2 percent per year and the shortage of arable land (population
density: 700 per square mile) means that survival by subsistence
farming cannot go on indefinitely. Self-sufficiency in food
production might be achieved by an effective family planning program
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
- 3 -
coupled with government take-over of some arable land now devoted to
the production of copra, which accounts for 75 percent of the
colony's exports. However, 95 percent of the population is conservative
Catholic; this contributes to the difficulty of implementing family
planning
programs. The copra plantation owners also_would
expect compensation for expropriation, but the British government is
unlikely to provide any additional financial aid for this purpose.
It is already subsidizing the Seychelles at the rate of $1 million
per year.
London is clearly hoping that the new British-financed airport
will stimulate a tourist boom which may make the Seychelles viable.
If population growth can be brought under control, if some increase
in local food production is achieved, and if the tourist industry
generates sufficient jobs, a level of economic growth acceptable to
the Seychellois may be achieved. These are a lot of "ifs", and
meanwhile the presently apathetic population will probably become
increasingly discontented.
Employment opportunities are limited. Many Seychellois have
emigrated to East Africa, although they maintain some ties with their
homeland. Productivity of workers in the Seychelles is low; as new
jobs are created by the increased tourist trade, employers may tend
to import more highly-qualified workers rather than try to improve
local productivity. In such circumstances, labor union leaders will
certainly react sharply and demand imposition of strict controls,
including requirements to train locals.
Good Relations with the West Likely to Endure; Ties to Southern Africa
May Increase.
The new constitution, which will presumably be in force for
several years, leaves control of foreign policy in the hands of the
British Governor. Both Mancham and Rene are pro-West, although Rene
has said he thinks the Seychelles would be in a better position
economically if it were free to accept aid from both East and West.
Both men have visited the United States on leader grants, and both
men have been friendly in their dealings with American officials. Under
these circumstances, the present pro-West posture of the Seychelles
Government may be expected to continue.
The new government of the Seychelles will be interested in
attracting tourists from Africa, including white residents from the
Republic of South Africa, Mozambique, and Rhodesia. This may lead to
a desire to build up closer commercial ties with white-dominated areas.
Since the Seychellois do not consider themselves African, they will
probably be relatively insensitive to criticism they may incur from
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- 4 -
Black African countries for doing business with governments in
southern Africa. The only possible Black African retaliation would be
to harass or even expel the several thousand Seychellois living and
working there. This would place a dual economic burden on the Seychelles:
finding employment for the displaced persons and replacing the revenue
from emigrant remittances.
What Matters to the United States
The US has two tangible interests in this area: a satellite tracking
facility located outside the capital city of Victoria, and a 50-year
agreement with the UK for use of the island of Diego Gracia located in
the British Indican Ocean Territory (BIOT), which is administered separately
from the Seychelles, but with its offices based in Victoria (see map). The
Seychellois consider the tracking station to be an asset because it
employs several hundred local workers. Diego Garcia is a potential site for
communications and support facilities for joint US-UK defense activity in
the Indian Ocean. The future of this project is still uncertain, but if
it is implemented, Seychellois now working on copra plantations in Diego
Garcia would be removed (the British government is looking into re-employment
possibilities for them elsewhere). Funds for military construction on
Diego Garcia are under consideration. Assuming that the facility is eventually
constructed, Seychellois leaders (some of whom protested the "loss" of this
island when it was placed under the administration of the BIOT in 1966),
would likely press the US for more aid. Present US aid consists of a PL-480
food program and a handful of college scholarships and leader grants.
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CONFIDENTIAL
24305
The Indian Ocean Area - Soviet and Chinese Capabilities,
Intentions and Opportunities
Soviet Canabilities at Present
The Soviet Squadron in the Indian Ocean, though it
cannot always be at operational readiness, has the capability
of being the most powerful naval force in the area. With
their facilities at airfields in the UAR the Russians can
fly reconnaissance, air cover and strike missions over the
Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The port
facilities which they have acquired, e.g. in Aden and through
fisheries agreements with 13 countries in the area, could
help to maintain their military presence. Aid agreements
and political support have given the Russians additional
influence in a number of countries, e.g. India and PRSY.
With these resources the Russians are capable of giving aid
and comfort to friendly governments or opposition parties in
such a way as to intimidate their domestic opponents and to
inhibit Western intervention. They have also as modest
capability to interfere with the large amount of Western
shipping in the area. But the most important capability
they have so far achieved is a foot in the door, that is to
say the capability of expanding their power and influence
SO that it might come to rival that which Britain formerly
exercised in the area.
Soviet Potential Capabilities
2. With the Suez Canal open and Alexandria available as a
naval base, it will be easier end cheaper for the Russions
to maintain their presence and operational efficiency in the
Indian Ocean and hence their naval superiority there. They
will also be able to reinforce it more quickly. If they were
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to acquire a naval and air base within the area, e.g. Aden,
their operational readiness and power would be still more
enhanced. They would be better able to shadow Western
surface forces in the area: they would also be better able
to threaten Western shipping and they could effectively deny
certain parts of the sea to it: they would have a consid-
erable capability to intervene in internal security situations
in favour of their friends: they might thus be able to secure
pro-Russian governments in such countries as Mauritius, PRSY
and Somalia. Finally they would be able to place consider-
able inhibitions on Western freedom of action while at the
same time increasing their own options.
Chinese Activities and Intentions
3. In the next .5 years the Chinese will not make much
headway in the Indian Ocean area as a. whole, although they
will make a major effort to secure the success of the Tanzam
Railway, will take a close interest in Pakistan, India,
Ceylon and PRSY, and will enter into relations with nearly
all the countries in the area. Just as the Russians have
an anti-Chinese motive and will be spurred on by Chinese
activities, so the Chinese have an anti-Russian incentive.
The objectives of the two countries are different and the
Chinese will probably be more interested than the Russians
in creating political instability and fragmentation in the
area. China will probably not be in a great hurry, if only
because her resources are SO comparatively slender.
2
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Soviet Intentions and Opportunities
4.
The Russians are acquisitive of power for its own
sake. They think of it like money in the bank - if you
have it people respect you. You can always use it if you
want - or not use it. It gives you freedom of choice. The
Russians are determined to be a super power on the American
scale. They intend to have their views taken into account
when anything important is done anywhere. They want a
finger in every pie. Little by little they intend to
accustom the world to this situation and to the reality of a
Soviet military presence. They will exploit the freedom
of the air and of the sea. They will probe Western
reactions and seek opportunities to enlarge Soviet influence.
These are the main intentions underlying the expanding
Soviet power in the Indian Ocean area. At present the
Russians are operating on an experimental basis. If the
results look good they will press further.
5.
Soviet policy is opportunistic in the sense that it is
looking for opportunities to enlarge Russian power and to
damage Western and Chinese interests. It is also opportun-
istic in the sense that the Russians are prepared to deal
differently with the different parts of the area. The
Soviet leadership (as apart from the Soviet Navy) probably
do not see the area as a unit. Despite the growing amount
of Soviet merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean the
Russians do not have a very strong defensive reason for
exercising military power in the area, The defence of
the homeland is the first priority of Soviet 'efence policy
and at present the security of the USSR is not directly
menaced from the Indian Ocean area. Thus as things stand
3
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the Indian Ocean area does not have a very high place in
Soviet military priorities. The gains they seek there
are primarily political. Their first priority in the
area may be to drive the West out of the Arab countries
and to acquire the use of local naval and air facilities,
leading on eventually to the establishment of subservient
governments. Their second priority may be to gain as
much control as possible over every aspect of Indian
policy and in this they will not neglect Pakistan and
Ceylon. Their third priority may be to acquire the use
of naval and air facilities and to encourage the form--
ation of friendly governments in other stragetic countries
e.g. Mauritius and Somalia. But in trying to recreate for
themselves something approaching the former British
dominance in the area, the Russians will not be bound by
pre-determined priorities. They will probe where there
seems to be weakness and take opportunities as they find
them, for example, social and political instability in
Mauritius, or black/white tension in Southern Africa. They
will be on the lookout to create opportunities both by
overt and also by covert means, e.g. to supplant the
Chinese in Tanzania or to overthrow the Sultan of Muscat
and Oman. With some luck and depending on the Western
response, the Russians could before long be a highly
influential power in the area; they might well dominate
critical parts of it. They are already well on the road
to this goal.
December. 1970
4
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Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean
February 15, 1972
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Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean
CONTENTS
Page
1
I. Summary and Conclusions
II. Introduction
9
A. Purpose and Scope
9
10
B. Assumptions
C. Background
13
15
III. Issues
A. Bases and Support Facilities
15
B. Distinguishing Among Naval Activities
20
23
C. Surge Capabilities
D. Possible Precedents
29
E.. Caveat Clauses
33
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1
Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean
I. Summary and Conclusions
Separate statements concerning the summary and
conclusions of this paper were prepared by the State,
ACDA and CIA representatives and the OSD and JCS
representatives.
A. The following views are those of the State, ACDA
and CIA representatives.
1. A US-Soviet agreement to avoid competition by
limiting their permanent naval deployments in the Indian
Ocean may prove to be in the US interest. While the US
plans to upgrade MIDEASTFOR qualitatively, it does not now
plan to increase the size of that force or to make other
permanent deployments. The Soviet Union may continue to
increase its deployments, as it has in the last few years.
Hence, it may be in the US interest to bind the Soviets to
a level comparable to our own.
2. The Indo-Pak war and the surge of the Enterprise
task force, which were not considered in this study, could
affect the timing of any US initiative with the Soviets
for naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. It would be
best to await further clarification of the situation on
the subcontinent and in the area before undertaking such
an initiative, although a naval limitation understanding
with the Soviets might well form part of our efforts to
normalize the situation in the area.
3. A US-Soviet agreement to limit their permanent
naval presences need not affect either our right or our
ability to "surge" temporarily into the Indian Ocean if
we needed to and as we have done with the Enterprise.
We could do it again - if this seemed advisable and
effective -- even if we had concluded an agreement with
the Soviets similar to those considered in this study,
since only permanent deployments would be limited. On
the other hand, frequent surges, even though called
"temporary", would vitiate an agreement.
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2
4. The Soviets do not have direct land access to South
Asia and would have to cross international borders to send
ground forces to intervene there. Such a move would entail
serious international political risk with implications far
beyond local effect in the Indian Ocean area. There is no
evidence that the Soviets are prepared to take those risks.
5. Relative geographic propinquity may give the Soviets
some advantage over us in influencing states of the Indian
Ocean area -- although great power "influence" is based on
a whole array of factors in addition to geography. Nonethe-
less, if geography somewhat favors the Soviets, they should
not also be allowed the additional advantage of a greater
naval presence as well.
6. In accordance with the terms of reference in Dr.
Kissinger's memorandum of October 28, the study analyzed
certain specific issues of non-strategic naval limitations
and their comparateive impact on the US and USSR. These
issues and the conclusions of the analyses are as follows:
a. Bases and Support Facilities
A prohibition on bases would probably favor the
Soviets. They have developed a modus operandi which allows
them to support their forces without a base structure
comparable to ours. Although we have not developed such a
modus operandi in the case of MIDEASTFOR, it would be
possible to maintain that force without a base, if we were
willing to spend the extra resources involved in deploying
another auxiliary ship to the area. However, for a number
of reasons primarily political in nature, it is important
that the base at Bahrain be retained. It is also important
that Diego Garcia be retained, at least as a communication
facility.
b. Surge Capabilities
"Surge" capabilities involve the insertion of forces
from outside the area. They would not be affected by an
agreement limiting permanent naval deployments within the
area.
Surge capabilities depend on the location and
nature of the forces surged. US forces would probably
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3
come from the Seventh Fleet, as recently demonstrated
by the surge of the Enterprise. The Soviets would most
likely send their forces from their Pacific Fleet based
at Vladivostok as they also did recently or, if the Suez
were reopened, from their Mediterranean squadron. In
the latter case surging forces of the two sides would
arrive at about the same time. In the former, US forces
from the Seventh Fleet would arrive sooner. A Soviet
surge force cannot match the amphibious and air capa-
bilities of a US surge force; thus the Soviets would not
have the same capability to project power ashore.
C. Possible Precedents
A US decision, in agreement with the Soviets,
to exercise restraint in naval deployments to the Indian
Ocean would not be a limitation on our rights with respect
to the international waters of the world. Those rights
are based on principles of international law and on the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and cannot be
affected by a bilateral US-USSR agreement to limit their
own naval deployments. The US and the Soviet Union would
not be "legislating" for others. Limitations of the
nature considered in this paper could be structured SO as
not to establish precedents adverse to our interest in
freedom of the seas or the Law of the Sea. In fact,
voluntarily accepted restraints would tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the rule of law.
d. Distinguishing Naval Activities
Distinguishing between naval activities might be
done in terms of time in the area, or in terms of specific
types of activities (e.g., transits, visits, training
exercises, maneuvers, port visits). An agreement which
attempted to sanction some but prohibit other types of
activities might be difficult to formulate and might
establish an undesirable precedent.
A generalized understanding (Option 1) would
probably not require definition of naval activities, in
terms of time or otherwise. On the other hand, for
reasons of both policy and precedent, an agreement which
placed specific limitations on sailing days or number of
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4
ships (Options 2, 4 and 5) in terms of time in the area
should only limit their "permanent presence". This could
be defined as naval deployments in the Indian Ocean for
X months or longer. Transits or visits of shorter duration
would not be limited. The US would remain free to
introduce forces for a temporary period.
e. Caveat Clauses
Various caveat or escape clauses which recognize
the right of withdrawal under certain circumstances should
be part of any specifically worded naval limitation agree-
ment. A generalized understanding limiting US-Soviet
naval competition in the Indian Ocean would require less
caveating and might not require a specific "escape clause".
7. Options
Two types of options have been considered in this study,
as they relate to the above issues:
a. A Specifically Worded Agreement
Such an agreement would place numerical limitations
on the total number of certain types of ships and limitations
on total ship days. Only permanent deployments would be
limited; short term visits and transits would be allowed.
The agreement would include an escape clause. Bases and
SSBNs would not be limited. This type option would present
obvious problems of negotiability since the Soviets would
probably press for limitations on bases and submarines.
Also, a 'formal and detailed agreement, in contrast to a
general understanding, would seem to be disproprotionate to
the magnitude of the problem it would seek to solve.
b. A General Understanding
Potentially undesirable features of a specifically-
worded non-strategic naval limitation could be avoided
or minimized by casting an agreement in general terms. A
general understanding would place inhibitions on sharp
increases in the level of Soviet naval forces, while
allowing us the flexibility to match low level increases.
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5
Such an agreement might consist of declarations of
restraint by the US and USSR, with the definition of
"restraint" being part of the negotiating record.
B. The following views are those of the OSD and JCS repre-
sentatives.
1. OSD and JCS representatives believe that recent events in
the Indian Ocean area make it inadvisable to enter into a
dialogue with the Soviet Union on naval arms limitations at
this time. It is certain that the Indo-Pak war will have
significant effects on political relationships and major
power influence in the area. It is not at all clear, how-
ever, what these effects will be. Until the results of the
recent war can be better assessed, it would not be prudent
to undertake discussions with the Soviets leading toward
closing of some of the US political and military options in
the area. To a lesser (but still important) degree, this ar-
gument also applies to the UNGA resolution declaring the
Indian Ocean a "zone of peace.
2. Further, aside from recent events, OSD and JCS repre-
sentatives believe that neither a specifically worded agree-
ment nor a general understanding (Option 1) with the USSR which
places restrictions on naval activity in the Indian Ocean would
be in the best interests of the United States for the following
reasons:
a) The USSR occupies a central geographic location while
the US does not. They are less dependent on overseas sources
of supply and are less involved with overseas allies. Primarily
for these reasons, the Soviets have developed a naval strategy
designed to disrupt our sea lines of communication. and to ob-
struct the projection of our sea power ashore. In the political
arena, they have traditionally pressed for the concept of closed
seas, which would transform the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas
contiguous to the Soviet Union into "Soviet lakes" and facilitate
achievement by the Soviet Union of military and political pre-
ponderance in these areas.
The naval strategy of the US on the other hand, is de-
signed to maintain control of the vital sea lines of communica-
tion on which we and our allies depend and to project military
force inland from the sea when necessary. Thus any agreement
or understanding which would place "equal" restrictions on the
US and Soviet naval forces would tend to support the Soviet
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6
strategy. Likewise, any agreement or understanding which would
advance the principle of closed seas to the detriment of free
seas would tend to work to our disadvantage and establish a
damaging precedent.
b) Any agreement or understanding (Option 2) reducing or
limiting US naval forces in the Indian Ocean would be viewed
by the littoral nations as reflecting a lessening of US in-
terest in the area at a critical time. The importance of
MIDEASTFOR has increased now that the British have withdrawn
their forces from the Persian Gulf area. The Trucial States
in particular view MIDEASTFOR as a stabilizing influence between
the Arab world and the expanding Iranian interest in the Persian
Gulf area.
c) Any agreement or general understanding (Option 1)
that would place restrictions on the use of naval forces in
the Indian Ocean area could serve to complicate efforts to
settle the situation in the Middle East. At the present
time the options available to negotiators include the possible
use of US naval forces. However, the flexibility afforded
by this range of options could be reduced by placing restrictions
on the number, size or time on station of naval units in the
Indian Ocean area.
d) A naval arms limitation agreement or even a general
understanding (Option 1) with the USSR in the immediate after-
math of the Ceylonese peace zone resolution would be viewed by
many as major power accession to pressure by littoral states
and as a tacit acceptance of the principle that coastal states
have a right to regulate activities of other nations in high
seas areas adjacent to their territorial waters. Such negotia-
tions would thus weaken the US position on Law of the Sea, would
lead to additional pressures at the 1973 Law of the Sea Con-
ference to limit naval uses of the high seas even further and
could cause us to fail in achieving our overriding ocean policy
objective -- to preserve the freedom of the sea in the largest
possible area of the world's oceans.
e) The incorporation of a caveat or "escape" clause could
not adequately serve our national interests in regards to limi-
tations of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area. The invocation
of an escape clause would have a political price which might be
significant in any specific instance. Since the US in all likeli-
hood would be more reluctant than the Soviets to implement the
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7
escape provisions of an agreement, the delay involved in con-
sidering the decision would operate to give the USSR a time ad-
vantage.
f) Naval units can be deployed around the world without
crossing national boundaries. To enter into an agreement or
understanding that in any way restricts the use of naval forces
would be to give up an option of great flexibility and value to
US national security interests.
g) A naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean would
not necessarily serve to hinder or dampen the efforts of either
the US or USSR in seeking greater influence with the littoral
states of the Indian Ocean area. The problem involves the
various means of access to the sub-continent area. A naval
limitation in the Indian Ocean would not reduce competition
equally since the Soviets would still have a distinct advan-
tage by being part of the Euro-Asian continent. In addition,
we cannot overlook the military and political power of the
Chinese and their influence in the sub-continent.
h) Finally, OSD and JCS representatives do not believe
it would be feasible to have meaningful discussions with the
Soviets since SSBN's will not be included in any such negotia-
tions. It is not realistic to believe that the Soviets would
seriously discuss limitations on their anti-submarine forces
without demanding similar restrictions on our SSBNs. If talks
are started, we expect that the Soviets would press hard to
include SSBNs and would propagandize in an effort to bring
maximum pressure on the US to accommodate the Soviet demands.
3. The OSD and JCS representatives conclusions as regards
limitations on Indian Ocean bases and support facilities, dis-
tinguishing between various naval activities and US and USSR
surge capabilities are as follows:
a) Any agreement or understanding that restricted bases
and support facilities in the Indian Ocean area would favor
the Soviets. The Soviets to date have not relied on establish-
ment of a specific base in the area. Their present modus
operandi allows them to operate by relying on their support
ships in the area rather than local area facilities. Conversely,
it would be very expensive for the US to maintain any presence
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8
in the Indian Ocean if denied acces to base facilities. The
expense would involve the reassignment of a considerable num-
ber of ships from other forces both for rotational purposes
and logistics.
b) The question of distinguishing naval transits from
exercises, "show of force" maneuvers and rotation of naval
forces, and of distinguishing all of these from a permanent
presence in the area would be goth difficult and argumenta-
tive. Any definition distinguishing between mobile force and
premanent presence would, of necessity, be restrictive. Ac-
knowledging this type of restriction is not in our national
interest. Basically, it is inconsistent with our view of
freedom of the seas. Further, it could later lead to un-
desirable applications in other ocean areas of higher US in-
terest.
c) A comparison of the impact of deployment limitations
in terms of surge capability and reaction time on US and USSR
non-strategic naval forces tends to favor the US at the present
time. However, the likely opening of the Suez Canal coupled
with the present Soviet/Egyptian relationship would give the
Soviets a decided advantage in the more economically important
western part of the Indian Ocean area. The US would be re-
stricted in the use of an open canal primarily because of the
size of our aircraft carriers. The possibility also exists that,
with Egypt in control of passage through the canal, our ships
could be delayed by passage procedures. The Soviets would not
be similarly restricted.
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9
Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean
II. - Introduction
A. Purpose and Scope
This paper responds to Dr. Kissinger's memorandum
of October 28, 1971 which requested further analysis of non-
strategic, surface ship naval arms limitations in the Indian
Ocean. It focuses on specific issues raised by such naval
limitations in relation to Options 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the
NSSM-110 follow-on and compares the resulting impact on the
capabilities of US and Soviet forces. Option 1 calls only for
a general understanding between the US and Soviet Union to
exercise restraint in naval deployments. The limitations con-
tained in the other options are:
Element
Limitation
2
4
5
Bases
No bases
No bases
-
Surface Combatants*
4
8
5
Tonnage/size*
14,000
14,000
14,000
Ship days*
1,000
2,000
--
Embarked Troops*
--
--
100
This paper does not duplicate the background and analysis in
NSSM's 104 and 110 which are more comprehensive, especially
with regard to political considerations.
* The limitations might apply to all ships in the area or
only to permanently deployed units. This paper recommends
they apply only to the latter.
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B. Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made.
1. The postulated level of Soviet activity is
as assessed in NSSM's 104 and 110 and NIE 11-10-71 of 15
December 1971. During the Indo-Pak war, the Soviets tripled
the size of their Indian Ocean force. By late December the
total reached 25 ships including 12 combatants. *
2. The recommendations of the follow-on study "Proposal
for a US Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 1972" re-
main US policy.
3. The level of the US national interest in the Indian
Ocean is as stated in NSSM-110.
4. "Non-strategic" naval forces include surface com-
batants such as cruisers, but specifically exclude SSBN's. **
It is difficult to detect and localize nuclear submarines;
once they are detected however, it is possible, with the
exception of the "H" class, to distinguish SSBN from non-
SSBN submarines.
NIE 11-10-71 estimated that in the absence of a crisis or
US strategic naval presence, the number of Soviet combatants
would grow to 5-7 over the next five years. If the Suez
Canal were reopened, it estimated that that figure might
reach 7-13.
** Carriers, which the Soviets might view as a strategic
system, would not be allowed as part of our permanent
presence due to the tonnage limits in Options 2, 4 and 5.
They would be allowed as part of surging or transiting
forces.
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5. The terms "agreement" and "understanding" are
used inter-changeably, in order not to predetermine the
form of limitation.
6. The limitations discussed would apply only to
the naval forces of the US and USSR.
7. The Indian Ocean is an area bound by Cape
Agulhas in the Southwest, Tasmania in the Southeast, a
line through the Straits of Malacca north of Singapore
in the East, Bal el Mandeb in the Northwest and the 60th
parallel in the South. The Persian Gulf is within this
area. For a discussion of alternative definitions see
page 16.
In addition to the foregoing, the following assump-
tions were made by the OSD and JCS representatives in pre-
paring their views:
8. "Non-strategic" naval forces specifically exclude
SSBN's. Because the movement and presence of all nuclear sub-
marines are difficult to determine, all submarine limitations
have been excluded from consideration.
9. The term "agreement" is taken to mean the result
of negotiations under Options 2, 4 or 5 while the term
"understanding" is the result of action taken under Option 1.
10. It should not be assumed that the Red Sea is not
part of the Indian Ocean as has been done in Item 7. It is
not realistic to place arbitrary boundaries on the Indian
Ocean which would exclude vital contiguous areas such as the
Red Sea.
11. The reopening of the Suez Canal would benefit
the Soviet Union more than it would the US. Therefore,
any arms control agreements reached with regard to the
Indian Ocean should take into account the likely reopening
of the Canal during the life of the agreement.
12. The USSR's increased visibility in the Indian
Ocean includes not only its growing naval presence, but
also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for
the Soviet fishing fleet, a large merchant fleet, and in-
creased diplomatic and trade relations.
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POLAND
Moscow
Viadivostok
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
RUMANIA
MONGOLIA
NORTH
BUIGARIA
KOREA
Peking
SOUTH
KOREA
TURKEY
See
CYPRUS
Mersa
SYRIA
Matruh
LEB
IRAQ
CHINA
Alexandria
AFOHANISTAN
JORDAN
IRAN
5002
Canal
U.A.R.
KUWAII
BHUTAN
WEST PAKISTAN
9
Bahrain
New Delhi
NEPAL
TAIWAN
Persion
QATAR
Cult
TRUCIAL
EAST PAKISTAN
HONG KONG
STATES
U.K.)
INDIA
SAUDI ARABIA
.
Y
BURMA
Port
NORTH
LAOS
Sudan
VIETNAM
OMAN
Vishakhapatnam
THAILAND
AI Hudaydah
TEMEN
SUDAN
SOUTH
YEMEN
AMBODIA VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
F.T.A.
(Fr
Aden
Socotra
Berbera
Laccadive is.
Andarnan Is.
SOMALIA
India
(india)
ETHIOPIA
Trincomalee
CEYLON
Nicobar 15.
(india)
BRUNEI
(U.K. S
MALDIVE ISLANDS
Malacca Strait
MALAYSIA
UGANDA
Mogadiscio
Singapore
KENYA
Chisimaio
Seychelles
INDONESIA
TANZANIA
Zanzibar
CHAGOS
ARCHIPELAGO
Diego Garcia
Sunda Strait
(U.K.)
Lombok Strait
A
Diego Suarez
Christmas 1.
ZAMBIA
Coces is.
(Australia)
COMORO is
MALAWI
(Australia)
Fr.
Cargados Carajos
Darwin
MAURITIUS
Port Louis
RHODESIA
MALAGASY
REUNION
(U.K
REP
(Fr.)
MOZAMBIQUE
Northwest Cape,
(Port.)
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
AUSTRALIA
SOUTH
Perth
AFRICA
Amsterdam 1.
Cockburn Sound
(Fr.) St. Paul 1.
Crezet 15.
0
1000 NAUTICAL MILES
(Fr)
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560674 11-71 CIA
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13
13. As industries in both China and Japan continue to
exapnd, both countries will probably become more interested
in securing their access to the natural resources in the
Indian Ocean area. A limitation on US naval forces in the
area would degrade the stabilizing influence of the US at
a time when the interest and influence of other major powers
would be increasing.
C. Background
The US Government has been studying the subject of
naval forces in the Indian Ocean and is presently assessing
the impact of limiting the use of such forces through arms
control.
In a conversation with Gromyko on July 28,
Ambassador Beam referred to Dobrynin's informal approach to
Secretary Rogers of March 26 and informed Gromyko that the
US agrees "in principle with the proposition that it would
be in our mutual interest to avoid military competition in
the area," and that "it would be useful for us to know more
about what the Soviet side has in mind.' Gromyko said that
he was not briefed on the subject but would look into the
matter.
The OSD and JCS representatives note that the
Soviets have not raised the subject of the earlier Dobrynin
conversation since Ambassador Beam's talk with Gromyko. Further,
in the judgment of NIE 11-10-71, the Soviets are probably not,
at this time, prepared to enter into a formal understanding
with the US on a mutual limitation of military forces solely
in order' to reduce the risk to themselves of political con-
flict or military confrontation with the US or to avoid a
costly competition.
In the past several months international political
activity centered first on the Ceylonese proposal for an Indian
Ocean "zone of peace" and then on the Indo-Pak war. The
Ceylonese resolution, which calls upon the great powers to
enter into consultations with the Indian Ocean littoral states
to halt expansion of their military presence and to take action
to eliminate "any manifestation of great power military presence
in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power
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14
rivalry", was adopted in the UNGA by a vote of 61-for, 0-
against, 55 abstaining, in December. All major maritime
powers abstained. It is too early to assess fully the
political effects of these two events.
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III. Issues
A. Bases and Facilities
1. Problems of Definition
What bases or other facilities do we and the Soviets
have in the Indian Ocean? A clear-cut, meaningful compari-
son in this regard is very difficult since our two navies
operate according to different modi operandi. The Soviets,
who depend on support from tenders using international
anchorages*, do not control any facility in the area. The
US Navy, which utilizes the "homeport" concept, in part to
solve growing personnel retention problems, has acquired
physical facilities on Bahrain.
There are reports that the Soviets may be contemplating
establishing a base at Alula, Somalia. Also, in March 1969,
MarshalGrechko reportedly made a request for Soviet naval
access to Indian facilities. In the wake of the Indo-Soviet
friendship treaty and Soviet support for India in the recent
Indo-Pak war, India might reconsider its refusal of that re-
quest, although there is no evidence of such reconsideration
nor of a new request. Such facilities would make it easier
for the Soviets to increase the size of their deployed naval
force which presently rotates on a three-month cycle. How-
ever, the Soviets currently possess nothing similar to Bahrain
or Diego Garcia.
So far as the US is concerned, the facilities at Diego
Garcia are intended to serve as a communications link and
not as a support base for combatant forces, and even som
littoral states such as Ceylon seem inclined to accept our
view that Diego Garcia is not a base. In view of the
stationing and lease agreement we nave negotiated with
Bahrain, our facilities at Bahrain fit even the tightest
definition of "base". In both cases, however, the criterion
we use internally is probably not as relevant as Soviet or
These are in the vicinity of Socotra; at Fortune Bank
near the Seychelles and Cardagos Shoals north of Mauritius
where mooring buoys have been laid; and in the Maldives
area.
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16
littoral nations' perceptions. They can be expected to
define both Bahrain and Diego Garcia as bases. The
Soviets, of course, seek to reinforce such perceptions
by their propaganda. They have already begun such a
campaign, hitting particularly hard at Diego Garcia which
they evidentialy fear will become a base for SSBNs.
Thus, the Soviets would probably claim that both Bahrain
and Diego Garcia are bases that would have to be closed
under any agreement that prohibited bases in the Indian
Ocean.
But what is the Indian Ocean? Are Bahrain and Diego
Garcia within that area? While the definition in the "assump-
tions' section is generally agreed, some geographers contend
that the Persian Gulf is not a part of the Indian Ocean but a
separate body of water. Although such a contention is hard
to defend in the face of the fact that the Gulf has no outlet
other than the Indian Ocean, it could be argued that the
Persian Gulf as well as Red Sea should be excluded. The Red
Sea, with outlets to both the Mediterranean (at Suez) and the
Indian Ocean (at Bab el Mandeb), is an access between those two
bodies of water rather than an adjunct of either. In geo-
graphic terms, its character is more ambiguous than that of the
Persian Gulf.
Political and military advantages would accrue to one
side or the other depending upon how the area were defined.
For example, if bases should be prohibited and if the limits
generally agreed to by geographers were adhered to, use of
Singapore would be allowed but transformation of Diego Garcia
into a base would be prohibited as would acquisition of new
facilities (e.g., by the Soviets in Somalia and India) within
the area from the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman south to
the 60th parallel. If, as seems likely, the Persian Gulf
were included in the area under consideration, the special
facilities on Bahrain would have to be included in the area.
If limits of the area were drawn at Bab el Mandeb, thus
exempting the Red Sea, MIDEASTFOR could be homported at Massawa;
Ethiopia. The Soviets, of course, would also be free to
continue to use Red Sea ports such as Port Sudan. In the
unlikely event the Red Sea were included, negotiations of a
conventional naval limitation in the Indian Ocean might
become bogged down in Middle East issues.
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Thus, it appears that in any discussion of bases in the
Indian Ocean the status of Bahrain and Diego Garcia would be
raised by the Soviet Union. It also seems likely that any
agreement banning bases in the "Indian Ocean" would: 1) end
our special facilities at Bahrain; 2) at least "freeze" the
present status of Diego Garcia; and 3) preclude the establish-
ment of any true Soviet bases in India or elsewhere.
The OSD and JCS representatives agree with the point
that the Soviets would probably claim that both Bahrain
and Diego Garcia would have to be closed under any agree-
ment that prohibited bases in the Indian Ocean. However,
they believe that the current status of both facilities
should be protected. In addition to its present role as
a communications link, Diego Garcia will provide a reduced
lead-time capability for subsequent expansion to meet
other defense requirements should such a course of action
later prove to be in the national interest. The facilities
at Bahrain have been used by MIDEASTFOR since 1948. To
move the force outside the Indian Ocean would place it at
a considerable distance from its major operating areas
and especially from the one of greatest importance, the
Persian Gulf.
The OSD and JCS representatives feel that any agree-
ment on a naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean that
did not include the Red Sea would not be realistic from
a strategic point of view. Additionally, any agreement
which prohibited bases would probably not prohibit the
use of the facilities of the littoral nations. Thus
the US would probably give up Bahrain and Diego Garcia
and use the facilities at Singapore or Massawa while the
Soviets would give up nothing and possibly use the
facilities in India or Somalia. They would, of course,
be careful not to refer to either as a Soviet base.
2. Impact on the U.S.
a. Bahrain
Regardless of the value of MIDEASTFOR, how important
is Bahrain to it? If denied use of Bahrain, the following
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could result.
Operations. To maintain an acceptable state of
readiness without Bahrain, an oiler and repair ship would
be required to provide POL and upkeep services with a
consequent increase in MIDEASTFOR from 3 ships to 4 ships.
With all ships deploying for about a four-month period**
in MIDEASTOFR area, this would involve an annual total
of about 12 ships (six DDs, three AD/ARs to be used as
flagship, and three AOs) instead of 7 at present. The
loss of Bahrain's support services, such as pierside
unkeep/maintenance accommodations and logistic support
facilities would make maintaining the operational effective-
ness of the force more difficult. But such repairs and
pierside upkeep would also be obtainable at Singapore
where we are negotiating for the use of Sembawang repair
facility. In any event, major repairs requiring docking
are not now obtainable at Bahrain nor would they be
obtainable from a deployed repair ship.
In the opinion of the OSD and JCS representatives,
the use of the facilities at Singapore by MIDEASTFOR does
not present a realistic alternative to those at Bahrain.
Singapore is 3650 miles and 9 1/2 sailing days away from
the Persian Gulf area. Additionally, the capability
of Bahrain to accommodate additional ships on short
notice has eased the problems involved in the scheduling
of port visits by the MIDEASTFOR ships. Problems arise
when a visit to a particular port is unexpectedly can-
celled or when it is felt that the frequency or duration
of MIDEASTFOR visits to an area is creating a false
indication of increasing US interest. In the past when
The impact could be softened by alternative basing of
MIDEASTFOR just outside the area (e.g., at Singapore
or at Massawa).
Prior to the closure of Suez, MIDEASTFOR's two destroyers
were rotated from the Sixth Fleet on just such a
schedule.
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19
either problem has occurred and no other port was
available, the practice has been to send the ships to
Bahrain. Without Bahrain considerable time might
have to be spent at anchor in international waters
because of the non-availability of ports to visit.
Political. MIDEASTFOR's mission is primarily political
in nature, namely to shore up the pro-Western Arab states
in the Persian Gulf and to show the flag elsewhere in the
Indian Ocean. The latter objective might actually be
better achieved without Bahrain. By utilizing indigenous
facilities and purchasing local fuel and provisions, the
visibility of our presence would be enhanced. The with-
drawal of MIDEASTFOR from the Gulf would undoubtedly be
viewed by the pro-Western Arab states there as a sign of
decreased US interest. This would be a cause of concern
to the weaker Arab states in the Gulf who have considered
MIDEASTFOR as a counter-balance against Iran. In view
of Arab sensitivities about Western imperialism and neo-
colonialism, however, it is far less certain that these
same states feel as positively about having MIDEASTFOR's
base on their soil. As a matter of fact, public
recriminations in the area about the US-Bahraini stationing
and lease agreement suggest that they may have strong
negative feelings in this regard. For its part, Iran
would probably prefer the removal of both the base and
the force.
b. Diego Garcia
The communications facility now under construction at
Diego Garcia will provide an improved communications
capability in the Indian Ocean area but not "base"
facilities. There would be a political cost involved in
transforming Diego into a base in view of our repeated
public statements that it is not and that we have no
intention to make it one.
If the US were denied the use of Diego Garcia as a
small communications facility, the immediate impact would
be in the lack of a satisfactory communications capability
in the Central Indian Ocean - Bay of Bengal area, Additon-
ally, expansion of the currently planned communications
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facilities on Diego Garcia would enhance the effectiveness
of HFDF surveillance in the Indian Ocean area by a factor
of over 50%. Current approved plans for Diego Garcia
include the construction of a specialized ocean surveillance
capability using a combination of sonar systems. This
capability will be provided within the approved manpower
authorization and military construction (MILCON) program
for Diego Garcia.
3. Impact on the Soviets
Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean would be limited
to their present inefficient mode if an agreement were
concluded banning bases in the area. Soviet operations
in 1969 and 1970 showed that to maintain an average
number of 3 combatants and 4 survey and space related
ships in the Indian Ocean they used an annual total of 9
combatants and 15 hydrographic or space related auxiliaries,
all supported by 5 oilers and 4 miscellaneous auxiliaries.
Soviet combatants are able to spend about four months
in the Indian Ocean even though they have no bases there,
but they spend a great deal of the time sitting at anchor
probably because of fuel and maintenance restrictions.
The Soviets would have to provide more oilers or borrow
more heavily than they do now from their merchant tanker
fleet to do much more in the way of exercising their
combat units in the Indian Ocean.
With the present foreign basing outside of the Indian
Ocean, the Soviets are at a disadvantage because the US
can operate its Indian Ocean naval force from Subic Bay
in the Philippines or even from Japan, Guam, or Singapore,
while Vladivostok is the nearest Soviet naval base to the
Indian Ocean. Also the Soviet Navy in the Pacific has
been hampered somewhat by the Soviet Pacific Fleet's poor
record of ship availability and an apparent insufficient
amount of naval repair facilities in the Soviet Far East.
B. Distinguishing Among Various Kinds of Naval Activities
The purpose of this section is to consider what types
of naval activities might be included in or excluded from
an Indian Ocean arms control agreement and how such
activities might be defined. A generalized understanding
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(Option 1) might not require any definition. However,
options which specifically limit ship days and/or number
of ships would require some definition to make clear what
ships would be included in whatever limits would be imposed.
There are two ways to distinguish between naval activities.
Though difficult and perhaps undesirable, this might be
done by defining specific types of activities permitted
or prohibited (e.g., transit, training exercises, visiting
ports, etc.). A simpler and more acceptable way of
distinguishing between activities would be to define them
only in terms of time in the area.
The great variety of naval activities makes comprehensive
definitions of types of activities difficult to formulate
and perhaps undesirable. An agreement which sanctioned
certain types of naval activity but limited other types
might establish an undesirable precedent and might
constitute a basis for encroachment upon naval activities
elsewhere.
The OSD and JCS representatives agree with the points
made above concerning the undesirability of defining
specific types of naval activities. It should, however,
be emphasized that this undesirability stems from the
possible establishment of a precedent that there are
certain types of naval activity which are acceptable and
certain which are unacceptable on the high seas. The
security of the United States depends, inter alia, on
freedom of the seas, which is only limited by the
requirement that it be exercised with reasonable regard
for the rights of others. In particular, any international
agreement or generalized understanding (Option 1) to
limit or reduce high seas freedoms could undermine long
term US security interests. A principle of unacceptable
activities on the high seas which might be set in the
Indian Ocean could have critical ramifications for
national security if extended to other, more important,
ocean areas (e.g., the Mediterranean or Caribbean).
However, simple definitions based on time in the
Indian Ocean may be acceptable and adequate. Based on
time in the Indian Ocean, naval deployments can be
divided into three categories: (1) transit; (2) short-
term visits; and (3) permanent presence.
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A US-Soviet agreement could cover all ships in the
Indian Ocean except those in "transit". Such transit
is important for the Soviet Union as well as the US.
Not having any large combatant building yards, only
one submarine yard and insufficient repair facilities on
their Pacific coast, the Soviets must rely on inter-
fleet transfers across the northern route (closed in
winter) or across the Indian Ocean to maintain their
Pacific Fleet. "Transit" might be defined as simply
as passage from Atlantic to Pacific exits or vice versa
within a specified period of time. Transits routinely
include activity which could be called maneuvers or
exercises. A destroyer, for instance, needs to exercise
its fire control systems, guns, and radar equipment. A
carrier with its embarked air wing maintains operational
proficiency and readiness by the regular launching and
recovery of aircraft. It would not be desirable to
prohibit these activities by more restricted definitions
of transit.
"Short-term visits" (perhaps of less than 1 month)
might be either prolonged transits or visits other than
transits. (i.e., failing to cross the Indian Ocean).
These visits might also acquire the character of per-
manent presence, depending on how they were rotated.
The history of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean includes many examples of short term visits and
for this reason it can be argued that it might be
desirable to include such visits in the limits of an
agreement. However, the US interest seems to dictate
that short-term visits like the recent one of the
Enterprise task force not be constrained. The agree-
ment should therefore be written with a rather narrow
and tightly drawn definition of "permanent presence."
On the assumption we want to retain the option of
"transit" and "short-term visits,' the limitation should
only be to "permanent presence" or permanent deployments"
with all other naval acitvities permitted. "Permanent
presence" could be defined as including all naval ships
in the area for longer than a given period of time,
perhaps 1 month. A US-Soviet agreement which limited the
permanent presence of their naval ships would include US
MIDEASTFOR and the Soviets' principal rotational units.
Other naval activities on the part of the US and Soviets
would remain unrestricted.
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The OSD and JCS representatives concur in the
desirability of retaining the option of "transit" and
"short term visits. They also believe, however, that
limitations on "permanent presence" are not desirable.
In any event, a definition of "permanent presence"
based on a period of time in the Indian Ocean as short
as one month would be clearly infeasible from an
operational standpoint. A "rather narrow and tightly
drawn definition" of "permanent presence" would not
leave "other naval activities" unrestricted as has
been stated. For example. it might prove desirable to
deploy ships to the Indian Ocean to observe a series
of Chinese missile tests. These ships would be
restricted to a particular time in the area by the
definition of "permanent presence." Of course, the
ships could be rotated frequently to stay within the
time limit but this would greatly increase the costs
and assets required for the operation.
C. Surge Capabilities.
There is a potential for crisis in the nations of
the Indian Ocean littoral which could make temporary
increases in their naval presence desirable for the US
or USSR. Both the Soviets and ourselves have found
it advantageous to maintain relatively modest forces
by surging from outside the area. What is the comparative
capability?
Although this analysis treats surge and reaction time
of naval forces, the Soviet and Chinese capability to
base tactical aircraft and land forces in their own
adjacent territory cannot be ignored. Nor can the
capability of the US to put forces in or stage them
through Turkey and Iran or Thailand. It would be well,
however, not to allow the limited capabilities of both
sides in this regard to cloud the issues of naval arms
control being discussed in this paper. The Soviets,
for example, could not easily or lightly introduce land
forces into the area. The Soviets in South Asia would
have to cross international borders to intervene with
ground forces. Such a move would entail serious inter-
national risks; there is no evidence the Soviets would
take such risks. It would almost certainly be viewed
by the US as a serious escalation and could also lead
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The Analysis of reaction times is unrelated to the
type of agreement in force, or even of whether or not
there is an agreement. Surging forces are entering from
outside the area, and the steaming time from a point
outside the area to another inside the area is a function
of the capability of a ship's engineering plant rather
than of the terms of agreement.
The following assumptions have been made in developing
the analysis:
-- Advance warning of an impending situation to which
the US/USSR would react would be available to both sides
at approximately the same time.
-- Due to the proximity of the Seventh Fleet and
since CINCPACFLT now has responsibility for the Indian
Ocean, US surge forces most likely would come from the
Seventh Fleet. Under existing circumstances, the most
meaningful comparison is one matching the Seventh Fleet
against the likely source of a Soviet surge -- their
Pacific Fleet. If the Canal were open, a comparison
between Soviet and American resources in the Mediterranean
would also be useful.
The OSD and JCS representatives are concerned that
since a reopened Suez Canal would remain under Egyptian
control and considering the Soviet influence with Egypt
and their antagonism to the US, US access to the Canal
in reaction to a situation in the Indian Ocean would not
be assured while Soviet naval units would have free
access.
-- European political consideration militate against
other than small-scale diversion of Sixth Fleet assets to
the Indian Ocean without replacement. The Soviet Medi-
terranean Squadron is probably subject to a similar con-
straint vis-a-vis the Soviet client states.
The OSD and JCS representatives feel that the nearness
of Soviet and Chinese land masses is a factor that
is not ignored by the countries bordering the northern
part of the Indian Ocean and can not be ignored when
considering an arms limitation in the Indian Ocean area
which would apply to naval forces only. Any limitation
which placed equal restriction on naval forces would not
place equal restrie at the Presidential in the area.
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Though the Soviets would probably not move théir Me-
diterranean Squadron into the Indian Ocean without first
considering the effects on their Arab friends, the OSD
and JCS representatives do not believe that their commit-
ments to the Arabs are nearly as significant as ours are
to NATO.
An illustrative situation, a requirement for a
"show of naval force" in the vicinity of Bombay has been
chosen for specific examination. The magnitude of the
US show of force can vary from two or three destroyers
to a large amphibious force and/or an Attack Carrier
Strike Group depending upon the objectives to be achieved.
The Soviets could provide a limited amphibious capability
and/or a surface force of several modern warships.
However, the Soviets could not match the capabilities
of the forces the US surged. *
An amphibious assault ship such as the USS TRIPOLI --
which deployed as part of Task Force 74 in the Indian
Ocean -- embarks a battalion landing team of 2,000
men with accompanying equipment and helicopters. An
attack aircraft carrier embarks between 80-90 fighter
and attack aircraft for support. The Soviets have
nothing comparable. They generally have one of their
ten ALLIGATOR class LSTs deployed in the Indian Ocean,
and such a ship could embark as many as 550 men with
organic equipment. However, such a force would have
difficulty making an opposed landing without air
support.
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The time and distance factors from possible points of
origin for naval forces to provide a show of force in
the vicinity of Bombay are as follows:
TO BOMBAY FROM LIKELY SURGE SOURCES
STEAMING TIME (DAYS)
ORIGIN
DISTANCE
@ 18 KTS
@ 20 KTS
Central Med via Cape Good Hope
10,664
24.7
22.3
Central Med via Suez*
4,165
9.9
9.0
Alexandria via Suez*
3,200
7.4
6.6
Black Sea via Cape Good Hope
11,484
26.6
23.9
Black Sea via Suez*
3,853
9.3
8.4
Singapore
2,441
5.6
5.0
Vladivostok
5,445
12.6
11.3
Subic Bay
3,766
8.7
7.8
*Allows 8 hrs canal transit
The steaming times shown above and discussed below
are extusive of time lost for refueling. The US has an
advantage. in this area. The US Navy normally can replenish
underway at speeds of about 16 knots along the proposed
track given suitable weather conditions. The fast pumping
rates built into our ships will cause only minor delays if
replenishment ships are prepositioned or rendezvoused with
the surge unit. Approximately one hour per ship (on the
average) per refueling will be required by US ships. This
time is as high as 3 hours for an aircraft carried and
varies with wind and sea conditions.
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The Soviets on the other hand must either lie-to
for refueling or travel at very slow speeds (less than
5 knots). Through the use of such limited techniques
as the "single hose" method, approximately 6-8 hours
per ship, per refueling will be lost by Soviet ships in
transit.
In practical terms, the above refueling considerations
mean that, if both sides surged with a four-ship force
(including a carrier for the US), the Soviets would lose
24-36 hours per refueling while the US would lose only
5-6 hours.
Intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are
placing emphasis on replenishment at sea and have just
begun using the alongside method and refueling or more
than one ship at a time. Therefore, their refueling
capabilities will probably improve in time (i.e., over
the next decade).
Under Option 5 both the US and USSR would retain
naval forces in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis and
bases would not be affected. If existing Indian Ocean
forces were in the vicinity of Bahrain and Socotra at the
time of a crisis, Soviet forces would probably arrive
slightly sooner due to the increased state of readiness
afforded by their modus operandi. Follow-on forces would
be provided from outside the area. The optimum sources
of US augmentation of MIDEASTFOR would be from the Sixth
or Seventh Fleet. An augmenting force from Subic Bay
would require 8-9 days to close Bombay; or, from the
Central Mediterranean, 9-10 days. However, if the force
were in the vicinity of Singapore Straits, this time
would be reduced to about five days. Soviet augmentation
from the vicinity of Vladivostok would require 11-13 days,
while forces from the Eastern Mediterranean would require
about seven days if the Canal were open.
For any prolonged operation the avilability of ports
or bases for fuel and other support (whether our own or
third country) would be highly desirable. The Soviets,
lacking the US logistic force structure would be even
more dependent upon shore support facilities for sustained
operations.
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The above examination leads to the following
conclusions:
-- Surge capabilities and reaction times are a
function of location, duration, and intensity of operations.
-- With the canal remaining closed and with the US
using Seventh Fleet assets, the US has a clear initial
advantage over Soviet naval forces from whatever source.
-- Should the US utilize Sixth or Seventh Fleet assets
and the canal is open, the initial surge capability for
both the Soviets and US would be nearly equal in the Central
Indian Ocean. The US, however, would enjoy an advantage
in the Eastern Indian Ocean.
-- If deemed necessary the US and Soviet navies both
have the capability to operate independently for limited
periods any place in the Indian Ocean.
-- For long term operations, Soviet logistic problems
would be eased in the Western Indian Ocean with the canal
open due to availability of facilities in Alexandria, Port
Said and Mersa Matruh. In the Eastern Indian Ocean, access
to Singapore would ease our problems. Additionally, both
sides would probably have access to some third country
ports and bases within the area for fuel, supplies, and
repairs.
The preceding examination is based on the assumption
that the limitations of Options 2, 4 and 5 apply only to
forces defined as a "permanent presence". The OSD and
JCS representatives note that if the nature of the
operations being performed by the surging forces requires
their presence in the area longer than the time specified
in the definition of "permanent presence" (one month was
suggested by the State, ACDA and CIA representatives) then
decision must be made to either terminate the operations
and depart the area or invoke an escape clause and face
the probable accusations of escalation.
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D. Possible Precedents
Any non-strategic naval arms limitation arrangement
in the Indian Ocean involving surface combatants and bases
should be examined not only from the standpoint of the
effect it would have on the US and Soviet naval balance
within the area but also on precedents it might create
in other contexts and for other regions. Such precedents,
if in fact they did arise, would be essentially of either
a Law of the Sea or a political nature.
1. Law of the Sea
While the Ceylonese "zone of peace" scheme
might be viewed as an attempt to establish a special regime
in the nature of a "closed sea" and to confer upon the
littoral states of the area and the UNGA the "right" to
limit the use of the Indian Ocean, the types of limitations
discussed in this paper clearly involve nothing more than
voluntary restraints on the part of two countries on the
level of their permanent naval presence. A bilateral
Soviet-American understanding on the Indian Ocean could
not presume to bind other nations not party to the under-
standing nor could it affect the general validity of
freedom of the seas which is based on customary international
law as codified in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
A US-Soviet understanding to exercise restraint in naval
deployments does not involve unilateral assertions of
jurisdiction over the high seas affecting, say the 200
mile territorial issue or unilateral closing of high seas
areas (e.g., Peter the Great Bay).
It is possible, of course, that the Soviet Union
would claim otherwise and would attempt to draw analogies
between, say, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. *
* In view of their own interests in the Mediterranean, it
appears unlikely that Soviets would actually try to draw
such an analogy.
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This need not succeed, however, since, in the absence of
some domino theory for the oceans, we should be able to
find acceptable ways of saying "no" to any Soviet proposal
based on an Indian Ocean precedent. The Soviets share
with us an interest in avoiding unilateral extensions of
jurisdiction over ocean space and they join us in favoring
a multilateral solution to ocean problems at the 1973 LOS
Conference. As a great power with increasing maritime
interests and resources, the Soviet Union would also stand
to lose from a narrowing of freedoms of the seas. In this
regard, for example, in an October 31 commentary on the
Indian Ocean, Radio Moscow supported the position that the
Straits of Malacca are "part of the worlds's oceans and
may be used by all the nations."
In any event, we will wish to be alert to protect
ourselves against contentions on the part of the Soviet
Union or third countries that one or another undesirable
precedent had been set, in order to insure that an Indian
Ocean limitation not conflict with our objectives at the
1973 LOS Conference or with our oceans policy in general.
The OSD and JCS representatives view the foregoing
precedent in the wider, more important, context of freedom
of the seas. NSDM 122 recognizes national security as the
preeminent US oceans policy interest. This interest
consists chiefly of guaranteeing the mobility of US forces
to operate on, under, and over the high seas. The US
has historically been well served by the doctrine of
freedom of the seas which is embodied in the 1958 Geneva
Convention of the High Seas. US atomic tests in the South
Pacific, the deployment of submarine detection devices,
the patrols of the US Polaris/Poseidon force, the patrols
of SAC bombers, the maneuvers of the Sixth and Seventh
Fleets, US assistance to Lebanon, South Korea, and South
Vietnam, the recent deployment of Seventh Fleet units to
the Indian Ocean--all of these activities have relied in
whole or in part of the freedom of the high seas for their
lawful execution.
A bilateral agreement or even a generalized under-
standing (Option 1) with the USSR in the aftermath of the
recently adopted Ceylonese resolution that the Indian
Ocean be declared a "zone of peace" is inconsistent with
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our overriding objective--to preserve freedom of the
seas in the largest possible area of the world's oceans--
and in preserving the unhampered right of transit between
one part of the high seas and another part. Such an
agreement or understanding would be viewed by many as
major power accession to pressure by littoral states
and a tacit acceptance of the principle that coastal
states have a right to regulate activities of other
nations in high seas areas adjacent to their territorial
waters.
Negotiations which limit mobility of US forces might
encourage similar proposals for other areas of the world's
oceans. For instance, the possibility of demilitarization
of the Mediterranean has been mentioned by Spanish
representatives. If a principle of closing oceans to
military operations were to be accepted by the international
community, the US would be unable to prevent its application
to ocean areas where the US has strategic interests of the
highest order.
A naval arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union
would affect the negotiating tactics of the US and other
states in a number of ways. For instance, we are seeking
Indonesia's acceptance of the US position with respect to
free transit through and over straits. If we were to agree
to naval limitations, Indonesia might clearly conclude that
we had little need on security grounds for free transit
through her straits and stiffen her opposition. The
Philippines, closely allied to Indonesia in LOS matters
as an archipelago state, would be less inclined to support
us.
An Indian Ocean naval limitations agreement would also
improve prospects for those countries which seek to post-
pone the 1973 Conference because they feel that delay will
mean further gains in current LOS positions which they
support (e.g., 200-mile claims). The Latin American 200-
mile group might well be joined by others who would seek
further naval limitations, which in effect would restrict
freedom of navigation, with the result that the Conference
would be delayed. Thus it would be far more difficult, if
not impossible, to attain the national security objectives
which the President's oceans policy is meant to achieve.
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2. Political
One Soviet objective might be to use an agreement
on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean to further their
claim to global naval parity. Such a claim by the Soviets
would have little "cutting edge". Global naval parity is
a reflection of our relative naval strengths. This would
not be affected by an agreement limiting deployments in
the Indian Ocean.
The OSD and JCS representatives feel that "relative
strength" is often a matter of perspective. If an agree-
ment of even a generalized understanding on a naval arms
limitation in the Indian Ocean was reached with the USSR,
the littoral states would probably see this as being based
on naval parity. In addition, the Soviets would probably
push this theme in their propaganda. This intent is
indicated in Brezhnev's June 11 speech.
Another negative precedent might arise if a naval
arms limitation agreement were allowed to take precedence
over our mutual defense commitments or interfere with our
ability to honor such commitments. Since the limitations
contained in Options 1, 2, 4 and 5 would apply only to
permanent presence and not to surge forces, no problem
could be created in this regard. Acceptance of limitations
on their naval deployments by the US and Soviets might be
viewed by littoral states as reflecting a lessening of
US--and Soviet--interest in the area. On the other hand,
it might also be viewed as a step by the superpowers to
prevent the escalation of local conflicts and by widely
welcomed for this reason.
Again, the OSD and JCS representatives do not agree
that applying the limitations in Options 2, 4 and 5 only
to "permanent presence" completely removes the restrictions
from surge forces. It is true only as long as the surge.
force moves into and out of the area within the time
specified in the definition of "permanent presence. If
a defense commitment required an US presence in the area
longer than that time then an escape clause would have to
be invoked and the political costs accepted.
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E. Caveat Clauses
A conventional naval limitation in the Indian Ocean
would serve essentially as a peacetime limitation on naval
force deployments to the area. It could serve the purposes
of improving the state of US-Soviet relations, responding
to regional concerns, and avoiding escalation involving
resources that might be better used in more important
areas. The intention is not to tie our hands in the event
the Soviet Union or some third party should try to take
advantage of the agreed constraints in such a way as to be
harmful to our national interests. Neither is it the
intention to set legal or political precedents that would
harm those interests elsewhere or in the future.
Any naval arms limitation agreement in the Indian
Ocean should include an adequate provision allowing us to
withdraw from or suspend the limitation agreement, if that
should prove necessary. Restricting limitations to per-
manent presence, as is the case with the limitations
discussed in this paper, makes it unlikely that such a
necessity would arise.
In the opinion of the OSD and JCS representatives
restricting the limitations of an agreement or under-
standing to "permanent presence" simply makes the
possibility of invoking of an "escape clause" less
likely than if the limitations applied to all the ships
in area. Anytime a force was required for any reason
to be in the Indian Ocean longer than the time specified
in the definition of "permanent presence", the limitations
in the agreement would apply and an "escape clause" would
have to be invoked.
Of course, any caveat language should not be so
sweeping as to vitiate the spirit and purpose of an agree-
ment. We cannot, for example, sign such an agreement and
expect to retain undiminished flexibility in the exercise
of naval power within the area. The purpose of an agree-
ment would be to restrict that very flexibility in return
for an equivalent restriction on Soviet flexibility. In
the final analysis, the best guarantee of Soviet compliance
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with the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement
can be the value that they attach to it. Quite a few
adjustments can be made if the parties are genuinely
interested in doing so. Alternatively, no mechanisms
will be of much use if a signatory feels he has to act
unilaterally in contravention of the agreement. It must
also be borne in mind that the taking of such action,
regardless of the wording of an "escape clause", could
confront inhibiting political considerations not the
least of which would be that such action, if taken during
crisis, could be considered escalatory.
In light of these general considerations, the
following caveat clauses might be considered:
-- Nothing in this agreement can or does abridge
the inherent right recognized under Article 51
of the Charter of individual and collective
self-defense if an armed attack, including a
nuclear attack, occurs against a member of
United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security.
-- Nothing in this agreement can or does con-
flict with or affect the provision or effective-
ness of treaties entered into earlier by either
Party.
-- Nothing in this agreement can or does affect
the freedoms of the sea based on the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and other
applicable principles of international law.
-- Neither Party shall seek to circumvent the
provisions or effectiveness of this agreement
through third countries.
-- Either Party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from or
suspend its adherence to this agreement if it
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decides that events, related to the subject
matter of this agreement, have jeopardized its
supreme interests. It shall give notice to the
other Party of its intention to withdraw from
or suspend its adherence to this agreement.
Such notice shall include a statement of the
events it considers have jeopardized its supreme
interests.
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AB A
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AB B
Gary
Rpt an 104 NSSM
of 12-3-74
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