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TP-6
SECRET/EXDIS
February 19, 1969
MASTER TALKING PAPER
MIDDLE EAST
Background
Here is where we stand in making up our minds on what course to
take in the Mid-East and how the European trip fits into that process:
A. The President has decided to take the initiative in trying to
restore order to the Near East. The Europeanswill welcome this.
B. The decision is still to be made between an all-out effort now
for a general settlement (involving Israel, Jordan, UAR, Lebanon) and
a judgment that a general settlement is so unlikely now that we should
concentrate for the moment on certain high-priority objectives short of
a general settlement. The Europeans will favor going for a general
settlement now. But we are the ones who will be expected to deliver
Israel, SO they may not have considered the implications of Israeli
intransigence in this election year as carefully as we must. They may
also be quicker to espouse an Arab or Soviet compromise.
C. The President's purpose in Europe is to see how much of a
common view he can establish, especially with Wilson and de Gaulle, on
the major principles that would govern a general settlement.
1. The short-term objective is to draw the UK and France as
close as possible to our view vis-a-vis the USSR.
2. The mid-term objective is to create as uniform as possible
an international climate for Near East negotiations, if any.
3. The long-range objective is to lay the groundwork for sound
international guarantees for a Near East settlement, if any.
D. When the President returns, he will want to be in a position to
decide (1) whether we are prepared to pay the costs of trying for a general
settlement now in the face of Israel's probable election-year inability to
compromise and, if so, (2) what combination of diplomatic tracks offers
the best hope of success.
European Concerns: What they will say.
The British and French line is similar but for different reasons.
Both believe that the Mid-East crisis requires urgent attention from the
big powers and that a Near East settlement is urgent.
SECRET/EXDIS
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"ocrText": "TP-6\nSECRET/EXDIS\nFebruary 19, 1969\nMASTER TALKING PAPER\nMIDDLE EAST\nBackground\nHere is where we stand in making up our minds on what course to\ntake in the Mid-East and how the European trip fits into that process:\nA. The President has decided to take the initiative in trying to\nrestore order to the Near East. The Europeanswill welcome this.\nB. The decision is still to be made between an all-out effort now\nfor a general settlement (involving Israel, Jordan, UAR, Lebanon) and\na judgment that a general settlement is so unlikely now that we should\nconcentrate for the moment on certain high-priority objectives short of\na general settlement. The Europeans will favor going for a general\nsettlement now. But we are the ones who will be expected to deliver\nIsrael, SO they may not have considered the implications of Israeli\nintransigence in this election year as carefully as we must. They may\nalso be quicker to espouse an Arab or Soviet compromise.\nC. The President's purpose in Europe is to see how much of a\ncommon view he can establish, especially with Wilson and de Gaulle, on\nthe major principles that would govern a general settlement.\n1. The short-term objective is to draw the UK and France as\nclose as possible to our view vis-a-vis the USSR.\n2. The mid-term objective is to create as uniform as possible\nan international climate for Near East negotiations, if any.\n3. The long-range objective is to lay the groundwork for sound\ninternational guarantees for a Near East settlement, if any.\nD. When the President returns, he will want to be in a position to\ndecide (1) whether we are prepared to pay the costs of trying for a general\nsettlement now in the face of Israel's probable election-year inability to\ncompromise and, if so, (2) what combination of diplomatic tracks offers\nthe best hope of success.\nEuropean Concerns: What they will say.\nThe British and French line is similar but for different reasons.\nBoth believe that the Mid-East crisis requires urgent attention from the\nbig powers and that a Near East settlement is urgent.\nSECRET/EXDIS"
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