Ask the Scholar
Page 28 of 94
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TP-6
SECRET/EXDIS
- 3 -
a. Another Arab-Israeli war would increase the risk of a
US-USSR collision, by accident if not by design.
b. As long as the Arab-Israeli stalemate continues, it will
be difficult for the US--perhaps the West--to maintain a sound position
in the Near East.
2. We believe that the major powers can play a useful role in
helping to reduce tensions. But given their differing views, it is necessary
to determine how much common ground they share before trying to determine
precisely what that role might be. One way to see where the common
ground lies is to discuss some of the general principles which must govern
an Arab-Israeli settlement:
a. The parties to the Arab-Israeli war must somehow
participate in the negotiation of the terms of a settlement.
Comment: We must have a clear understanding of how
far the big powers should try to go. There has been a lot of talk about an
imposed settlement, which we do not believe possible in the literal sense.
The French now say there are some things outsiders must do, others that
the parties themselves must do. Our notion is that outsiders can help by
agreeing on the general principles that must govern a settlement and
helping thereby to set up a framework within which the parties themselves
can begin exchanging substantive views. They may want to weigh in on
specific issues as negotiations proceed, but doing so too soon would, at
least, risk alienating Israel. Since it falls to us to deliver Israel and Israel
insists on local negotiation, we must protect maximum Israeli participation
in negotiation.
b. The objective of negotiations is a binding agreement.
Comment: The French and British seem to be thinking
more in terms of a settlement enforced by international guarantees and
international forces. The Israelis will not be satisfied with that. We have
our own reason for not wanting to lean exclusively on those crutches
SECRET/EXDIS
Page data
- Page
- 28
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 2f1c3078a658e4c2
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 559236010
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "559236010",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"imageCount": 94,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "559236010",
"label": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "559236010",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"imageCount": 94,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"naId": 559236010,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 28,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_28.jpg",
"mediaId": "2f1c3078a658e4c2",
"ocrText": "TP-6\nSECRET/EXDIS\n- 3 -\na. Another Arab-Israeli war would increase the risk of a\nUS-USSR collision, by accident if not by design.\nb. As long as the Arab-Israeli stalemate continues, it will\nbe difficult for the US--perhaps the West--to maintain a sound position\nin the Near East.\n2. We believe that the major powers can play a useful role in\nhelping to reduce tensions. But given their differing views, it is necessary\nto determine how much common ground they share before trying to determine\nprecisely what that role might be. One way to see where the common\nground lies is to discuss some of the general principles which must govern\nan Arab-Israeli settlement:\na. The parties to the Arab-Israeli war must somehow\nparticipate in the negotiation of the terms of a settlement.\nComment: We must have a clear understanding of how\nfar the big powers should try to go. There has been a lot of talk about an\nimposed settlement, which we do not believe possible in the literal sense.\nThe French now say there are some things outsiders must do, others that\nthe parties themselves must do. Our notion is that outsiders can help by\nagreeing on the general principles that must govern a settlement and\nhelping thereby to set up a framework within which the parties themselves\ncan begin exchanging substantive views. They may want to weigh in on\nspecific issues as negotiations proceed, but doing so too soon would, at\nleast, risk alienating Israel. Since it falls to us to deliver Israel and Israel\ninsists on local negotiation, we must protect maximum Israeli participation\nin negotiation.\nb. The objective of negotiations is a binding agreement.\nComment: The French and British seem to be thinking\nmore in terms of a settlement enforced by international guarantees and\ninternational forces. The Israelis will not be satisfied with that. We have\nour own reason for not wanting to lean exclusively on those crutches\nSECRET/EXDIS"
}