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be expected to press Cairo, on the basis of two-thirds of
the elments being discussed and no formulas on the gut issues
of withdrawal, borders and demilitarized zones.
4. The Israeli cabinet has undoubtedly been discussing this
situation all day Sunday. We can expect leaks. It is important
therefore that, if necessary, we be able to defend our position
domestically on the basis of a total package, whtch includes
the proposal for direct negotiations which will be made on
Monday. Direct negotiations is the central demand of the
current domestic campaign against our talking in the two and
four power contexts.
If we delay for a few days, there is apt to be a protracted
delay. The reason is that it will take time to respond to any
long letter and in the meantime we will be under increasing
pressure in the Four-Power talks to begin to crystallize
formulations which go beyond those which we are considering with
Dobrynin. We have an opportunity to being to turn the screws
on the Soviets after tomorrow's meeting, and we should begin
to do so on the basis of the proposals which are fully
protective of Israel's position.
I see signs of Israeli concern, particularly in light of the
known Soviet intervention with the UAR in recent days that it
should continue to abide by the cease-fire, that the Soviets in
fact are moving toward us.
We can agree to a delay of several days after tomorrow's meeting
because Dobrynin will need some time to get Moscow's specific
reactions. We would leave open the date of the next meeting
with him. Moreover, the formulas being discussed with Dobrynin
are clearly ad referendum to governments. We will be able
to continue to take into account any specific Israeli views
on substance during the course of subsequent talks with Dobrynin.
I am in fact pleased that the Israelis have apparently made up
their minds that we are serious and that they had better begin
to express their specific views to us rather than reiterate
their fundamental objections to the two-power and Four-Power
talks and snipe from the sidelines.
NEA?JJSisco
SECRET
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"ocrText": "be expected to press Cairo, on the basis of two-thirds of\nthe elments being discussed and no formulas on the gut issues\nof withdrawal, borders and demilitarized zones.\n4. The Israeli cabinet has undoubtedly been discussing this\nsituation all day Sunday. We can expect leaks. It is important\ntherefore that, if necessary, we be able to defend our position\ndomestically on the basis of a total package, whtch includes\nthe proposal for direct negotiations which will be made on\nMonday. Direct negotiations is the central demand of the\ncurrent domestic campaign against our talking in the two and\nfour power contexts.\nIf we delay for a few days, there is apt to be a protracted\ndelay. The reason is that it will take time to respond to any\nlong letter and in the meantime we will be under increasing\npressure in the Four-Power talks to begin to crystallize\nformulations which go beyond those which we are considering with\nDobrynin. We have an opportunity to being to turn the screws\non the Soviets after tomorrow's meeting, and we should begin\nto do so on the basis of the proposals which are fully\nprotective of Israel's position.\nI see signs of Israeli concern, particularly in light of the\nknown Soviet intervention with the UAR in recent days that it\nshould continue to abide by the cease-fire, that the Soviets in\nfact are moving toward us.\nWe can agree to a delay of several days after tomorrow's meeting\nbecause Dobrynin will need some time to get Moscow's specific\nreactions. We would leave open the date of the next meeting\nwith him. Moreover, the formulas being discussed with Dobrynin\nare clearly ad referendum to governments. We will be able\nto continue to take into account any specific Israeli views\non substance during the course of subsequent talks with Dobrynin.\nI am in fact pleased that the Israelis have apparently made up\ntheir minds that we are serious and that they had better begin\nto express their specific views to us rather than reiterate\ntheir fundamental objections to the two-power and Four-Power\ntalks and snipe from the sidelines.\nNEA?JJSisco\nSECRET"
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