Ask the Scholar
Page 7 of 181
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
2
ROK and U.S. Forces in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and armed
infiltration of rear areas. The number of North Korean person-
nel especially trained for activities related to armed infil-
tration is expanding rapidly and is now estimated by the Defense
Intelligence Agency to be between 30,000 to 40,000. With
respect to conventional forces, it is considered that North
Korean Army capabilities are roughly equivalent to those of
the ROK Army. However, the North Korean Navy, with 4 "W"
class submarines and 11-12 guided missile boats, would appear
to have a tactical advantage over the South Korean Navy which
is primarily a coastal patrol force consisting of destroyer
types, amphibious transports, and various mine warfare, patrol,
and amphibious ships. The North Korean Air Force is clearly
superior to the ROK Air Force. In addition, the North Koreans
have taken significant actions to modernize their conventional
forces and to harden key military and industrial installations,
and, evidently, desire to maintain a high level of tension with
its accompanying danger of miscalculation. Accordingly, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important to improve the
readiness of ROK/US Forces to cope with this aggressiveness.
4. (S) An assessment of the ROK Military Assistance
Program (MAP) shows that the attainment of the desired ROK
military posture is being delayed by the inability of the MAP
to fund investment costs as well as operation and maintenance
costs. The fiscal constraints imposed in successive program
years are having a "snowballing" effect on ROK force moderni-
zation, resulting in serious deficiencies in the combat capa-
bilities in ROK Forces relative to the North Korean threat.
This situation will be aggravated by the continuation of the
existing MAP dollar guidance for the ROK.
5. (S) Two special programs (in addition to the regular
MAP) have been implemented during the past year to improve the
capabilities of the ROK Forces; i.e.:
SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 7
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 9be56ea44a2be0ad
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 559236013
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "559236013",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Spain Vol. I thru February 1970 [1 of 2]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"imageCount": 181,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "559236013",
"label": "Spain Vol. I thru February 1970 [1 of 2]",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "559236013",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Spain Vol. I thru February 1970 [1 of 2]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_001.jpg",
"imageCount": 181,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236013",
"naId": 559236013,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 7,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236013_Page_007.jpg",
"mediaId": "9be56ea44a2be0ad",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n2\nROK and U.S. Forces in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and armed\ninfiltration of rear areas. The number of North Korean person-\nnel especially trained for activities related to armed infil-\ntration is expanding rapidly and is now estimated by the Defense\nIntelligence Agency to be between 30,000 to 40,000. With\nrespect to conventional forces, it is considered that North\nKorean Army capabilities are roughly equivalent to those of\nthe ROK Army. However, the North Korean Navy, with 4 \"W\"\nclass submarines and 11-12 guided missile boats, would appear\nto have a tactical advantage over the South Korean Navy which\nis primarily a coastal patrol force consisting of destroyer\ntypes, amphibious transports, and various mine warfare, patrol,\nand amphibious ships. The North Korean Air Force is clearly\nsuperior to the ROK Air Force. In addition, the North Koreans\nhave taken significant actions to modernize their conventional\nforces and to harden key military and industrial installations,\nand, evidently, desire to maintain a high level of tension with\nits accompanying danger of miscalculation. Accordingly, the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff consider it important to improve the\nreadiness of ROK/US Forces to cope with this aggressiveness.\n4. (S) An assessment of the ROK Military Assistance\nProgram (MAP) shows that the attainment of the desired ROK\nmilitary posture is being delayed by the inability of the MAP\nto fund investment costs as well as operation and maintenance\ncosts. The fiscal constraints imposed in successive program\nyears are having a \"snowballing\" effect on ROK force moderni-\nzation, resulting in serious deficiencies in the combat capa-\nbilities in ROK Forces relative to the North Korean threat.\nThis situation will be aggravated by the continuation of the\nexisting MAP dollar guidance for the ROK.\n5. (S) Two special programs (in addition to the regular\nMAP) have been implemented during the past year to improve the\ncapabilities of the ROK Forces; i.e.:\nSECRET"
}