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Exit Interview
With
RONALD H. WALKER
On
December 29, 1972
ARCHINES NATION AND 1985 SCRIPTA LITTERA MANET RECORDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
Transc.
p. 32, from last open, ...presidential
12/29/1972
A
protection detail." to first open, "one of these
people
2
Transc.
p. 77, from last open, "...I took" to first open
12/29/1972
A
" who was black."
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Exit Interview: Ronald H. Walker, December 29, 1972
FOLDER TITLE
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Exit interview with Ronald H. Walker
conducted by Susan Yowell
in Room 348 of the Old Executive Office Building
on December 29, 1972
SY:
from you is a history of how the advance staff was
set up from, right after the election in '68. How you
organized the advance staff.
RW: Well, the first six months of the Nixon administration,
in 1969, the travel arrangement was handled kind of
totally by Dwight Chapin. He was the appointments
secretary, the travel coordinator, the individual that
made the assignments for the various trips the
President made. Then I just happened, by happenstance,
to be one of the advance men that had more or less
survived and done a fairly good job in 1968 during the
campaign. I guess, quickly, to recall what that first
six months was about, would be to look at the
Inauguration itself, which was handled by a number of
advance men, specifically, [J.] Roy Goodearle, John
Nidecker, Nick CL. Nicholas] Ruwe, myself, and Bill
[William R.] Codus (who handled the Capitol). These
were names that had been in and about the Nixon
campaign organization for many years. I was
relatively a newcomer, but did come back and help on
the Inauguration. I ended up advancing members of the
First Family, specifically Mrs. Nixon, and then working
with the various [Inaugural] balls that evening.
Shortly after the Inauguration I went back to Texas,
where I was living at that time, temporarily, and was
1
recalled back to Washington to accept a position, since
I had more or less terminated my tenure with the Hudson
Company in Los Angeles. They put me on a payroll at
Commerce, thereby allowing me to participate, at John
Ehrlichman's request, and Ed [Edward L.] Morgan, who
was, I think, originally designated to possibly be the
President's chief advance man for that first European
trip.
On that first European trip, we went out in
January [1969], the latter part of January or the first
part of February. Just quickly, once again, Dan
[Daniel T.] Kingsley did Brussels, I did London, Roy
Goodearle did Germany, Nidecker did West Berlin, [Henry
C.] Cashen did Rome and the Vatican, and Morgan
anchored it in Paris. When we returned, I pursued a
follow up conversation and interview that I'd had with
Secretary [Walter J.] Hickel. I eventually accepted
that position, at the urging of members of the White
House, to become a special assistant to Hickel,
arranging all his travel, programing him,
speechwriting, his everyday appointment schedule,
trying to get him organized in a fashion similar to
what I was accustomed to with the President. I
continued to be available to Dwight, upon call, to do
various advances. I didn't do a lot, but those that I
did do, in retrospect, I guess I did well. Because I
kept moving up it seemed.
2
That summer, the summer of '69, the President made
his first around the world trip, commencing with the
Apollo XI splashdown, off of Johnson Island, where he
went overnight in the Hornet, and received the Apollo
XI astronauts. From then he preceded on to Manila, to
Bangkok, from there he jumped over to Saigon, and then
into New Delhi, which I handled. And then [I]
coordinated and helped Dick CW. Richard] Howard, who
was doing Lahore, Pakistan. Dick had not had much
experience in advancing, and had none on the
international side. After that we proceeded on into
Romania, from Romania into Mildenhall, England where he
met with Prime Minister [Edward] Heath, no the Prime
Minister at that time was Prime Minister [Harold]
Wilson, and then into Washington. On that flight
Dwight discussed with me the possibility of taking over
as the President's chief advance man. At this time
they had none.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: And starting to build a new team of advance men,
concentrating specifically on advancing a President, as
opposed to advancing a candidate, and there is a great
deal of difference. We did not pursue it all that
quickly. I went back with Hickel. Sometime within the
next couple of months there was an occasion when the
President went to the redwoods in California, Eureka,
California to dedicate the Lady Bird Johnson Redwood
3
Grove. The former President [Lyndon B.] and Mrs.
Johnson were there, and the President and Mrs. Nixon.
I did that advance and it was a good one. It so
happened that Hickel was the master of ceremonies, and,
because Hickel had been so good to the White House in
making me available and was a Cabinet officer, we
happened to have been able to have returned from there
to San Clemente on board Air Force One. On that
flight, Bob CH. R.J Haldeman talked to the Secretary,
and Dwight talked to me about assuming this position.
The Secretary and I overnighted at the Newporter, in
southern California, and had dinner together that
night and discussed it. The next morning we flew back
commercially, all the time discussing the pros and
cons. His attitude was that, if this is what the
President needs, by all means, you should go and do it.
So, after Dwight returned from San Clemente with the
President, Dwight and I got together, and I decided to
accept the position. That was in about October, the
dates escape me. But I say that because I felt, after
numerous conversations with the older advance men that
had been around, that one of the first things that I
had to do was to get a handle on what so many other
people had been attempting to do. Not devoting full
time to it. For example, there was Chuck [Charles E.]
Stuart, who had been assigned as special projects
officer, special projects person, for Bob Haldeman.
4
And one of his roles [was] to go out and find new
advance men. So there were an awful lot of people that
were trying to find new advance men. There were also a
number of people, in and around the United States of
America, that were writing letters, or letters were
being written on their behalf, to the White House,
saying that this young man, this young woman, would be
excellent advance material
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
for the President. So I immediately got in touch
with everyone--Morgan, Nidecker, John Whitaker, Ken
[Kenneth R.J Cole, Ruwe, Goodearle, Chuck Stuart,
Dwight--and took all the mail, the correspondence, the
phone calls, and started assimilating it. But I also
realized one of the first things that I needed, in
order to make the goal as I saw it, in order to start
training new men and building a new corps of advance
men that would eventually be the nucleus of a
presidential campaign in 1972, would be to write a
manual. An all-encompassing manual that in no way, the
individual that had access to that, which I controlled
very, very heavily, quite tightly, that they could
become an advance man by virtue of having read it. But
that it was a foundation in order to start building the
type of men that we needed to move the President. I
stayed at the Department of Interior, Secretary Hickel
made an office available to me, and a secretary. I
5
began to take the 1968 campaign manual, using that as a
starting point, but by the time it was all completed,
very little out of the 1968 campaign was applicable. I
spent the next three to five months putting that manual
together. The manual will speak for itself, and
that'll be part of the Archives.
SY: And you said before that the files 00 reflect the
changes in the manual
RW: That's correct.
SY:
that it would show that earlier versions and the
changes that have been made.
RW: That's correct. All that material and everything will
remain in the advance office, because this will be an
ongoing thing for the next four years.
SY: Of course, yes.
RW: And it will be needed for the new people that come.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
to replace me. After I had gotten the manual--and
the manual, primarily working on the manual was, well,
was me; I wrote it. Then Steve [Stephen B.] Bull and
Dwight and I spent many many hours going through,
section by section, with them adding various input,
changing certain formats as we decided, maybe, that
there was a better way to do it. The manual, I
envisioned from the very outset, should be a living
repository of thoughts and new concepts and new ideas.
In no way should it become a stagnant, dead, this is
6
the only way you can do it.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: And it did prove to be just that. Because we made any
number of changes and there were [appendices] that were
made. It's probably the best material on advancing a
President, or for that matter, a candidate of any sort,
as long as you take and make it applicable. Whether
it's a city councilman, or a mayor, or a state
congressman, or a state senator, or a governor, or
national Senator or Congressman, and then eventually a
President. Probably the best documented piece on
advance work that's ever been done. O.K., that was
done. Still in Interior, but in February of 1971 I
moved to the White House. I took up residence with
Hugh Sloan, on the first floor of the EOB [Old
Executive Office Building].
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: I had a desk, and that was it.
SY: You did not have a secretary?
RW: No.
SY: You didn't bring a secretary from Interior?
RW: Not initially. I started working with Dwight and Steve
internally, working at that time with John Davies, who
was a special assistant to the President for tours and
White House functions. I handled movement into the
President's office and out of the President's office.
I handled the Rose Garden affairs, the South Lawn, the
7
North Lawn, north portico, all the things that were
internally being done. The Medal of Honor ceremonies.
To look at it from the standpoint of an advance, from
doing it for the President, making sure that everything
was precise, crisp, well organized, well executed, and
everybody's in the right place at the right time to
make things [unintelligiblel. It was being done well,
but I think that
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
...we got it going better. That was about as much time
as I spent messing around in the White House. It was
not my forte. I didn't particularly care for it. My
forte was building, finding these men, and getting out
on the road and making it happen out there, where you
had no resources. You had to pull everything together
yourself.
SY: Did you work at all with Mr. Sloan, with Hugh Sloan?
RW: Yes, I did. Primarily from the standpoint of
scheduling, not internally, but anything that had to do
with external events. Whether it be in the city of
Washington or outside, in the country. I started
interviewing before the first of the year in 1969, on a
come-what-may basis. I felt that it was my obligation
to any young man, or young woman.
The record will show that we had no women advance
types. By virtue of the type of work, it was a
fundamental decision that we made very early in the
8
game. I felt very strongly that a female could not do
the things that we were asking to be done for the
President of the United States. But I did support, and
support very strongly, the concept of having female
advance types handle Mrs. Nixon and the girls. That
eventually transpired. It eventually proved, through
the girls themselves and Mrs. Nixon, that they
preferred to have men. That's another whole story.
But there was a school that was held for the girls,
Connie [Constance C.] Stuart ran it and I helped her,
and I spoke at it. But they handled a pretty heavy
trip of Mrs. Nixon to about four or five states, and I
guess the results were less than perfect.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Well, anyway, I started interviewing, and I had the
philosophy that it was necessary to--I had the personal
obligation to anyone that wanted to be an advance man
for the President of the United States, to at least
talk to him and give him the courtesy of having had the
opportunity to speak with a presidential advance man
[banging table for emphasis]. Then I made my
evaluations. But I talked to every one of them.
I'll talk about it in my own language and
everything. Some of them were, no way were they the
caliber of people that I felt could be representing the
President of the United States out and about this
country, or internationally. Whether it was
9
appearance, whether it was their attitude, or whether
it was what they were hopeful of getting out of it, on
their own behalf, as opposed to putting into it on
behalf of the President of the United States. One of
the strongest feelings that I had was that they had to
have an instilled passion for anonymity. Because, only
in doing what we have done over the last three and a
half years (and done it most effectively) has it been
accomplished by virtue of that obscurity, and working
behind the scenes, and letting the people that we
organize to be front runners get the credit.
My general philosopy was that it would be very
simple for a Ron Walker, or a Mike Duval [Michael
Raoul-Duvall, or a [W.] Dewey Clower, or a Jon Foust,
or a Bill [William] Henkel to go into Chicago, call on
Colonel Riley [sp?], which was protocol, who was the
chief of staff for Mayor [Richard J.J Daley. Make that
courtesy call, and then turn to the Republican
organization, say, "O.K., this is what we're going to
do." Turn to Governor [Richard B.] Ogilvie's office
and say, "O.K., this is what we're going to do. I'm
going to have a press conference at four o'clock this
afternoon, lay out the schedule and do everything, you
know, and I'll be on television tonight and I'll be
King Kong.' Now this is the way that most of [John F.]
Kennedy's advance men and Johnson's advance men worked.
They went in with big "hoolihaw" [phonetic] and, you
10
know, and a lot of clout, and a lot of open coverage.
They'd leave; the underlings would do the work. They'd
come back a day or so before the event, take all the
credit for it, and blow town. Well, you don't make
many friends that way. Not me personally, but you
don't make many friends for the President of the United
States that way.
The way to go about doing it, this is what we
ended up doing, was to go in there, make the courtesy
calls on a very low key, low fashion basis. Find out
who your key contact is going to be, who's going to be
the front runner. Determine very quickly--you had to
have that quick decisionmaking ability, or [be] a good
reader of men and women, to know, initially, whether
the guy was a shaker and a mover, whether he was just
going to be a grandstander and a lip service type guy
that was going to end up taking all the credit. [Who
would] want to sit on the platform, or want to
introduce the President, and not want to do any work.
You had to make these evaluations and do it very
quickly because, in many cases, you only had maybe
twenty-four hours, seventy-two hours, four or five
days, to do that advance. In the period of about a
five day advance you can find yourself having anywhere
from seven or eight hundred to two thousand volunteers
that are participating in that. Whether they're
blowing up balloons or cutting confetti, or driving
11
cars, or handing out handbills, making telephone calls,
doing all these things that are 50 vitally necessary in
order to turn out a crowd, in order to have people
where you want them at the right, precise time. Then
you let the locals
"Locals" is a bad term, that we
never used. "Local" is an applicable word,
SY: Hmm.
RW:
...
but it sort of leaves a bad taste in their mouths.
We would call it, you know, the community, or the
people that are living in that location that will be
the main host committee, or whatever the case may be.
It was a good philosophy because it worked.
Another point that I always made to my advance men
was there should never be a town that you go into that
you should not be able to return to again. Or, that
another advance man cannot return to and not be looked
at in a bad light because of the mistakes and the
sorriness with which you handled that advance. You
know, you should be a diplomat, and you should know how
to convince people to do things that they may not
necessarily want to do. But in the long run they end
up doing it because you made them feel that it was
their idea, and they ended up doing it because it was
their idea. All the time knowing very well what your
game plan was. Well, I'm sidetracking, but I think the
point's well made.
But, anyway, I started interviewing men. I talked
12
to hundreds of guys. I would talk to them on the
phone, I exchanged letters, I started setting up a
correspondence section of anyone that wanted to write
to me and ask, had to send me a resume and a picture.
And from that we would start progressing. I initially
pulled together, again the number escapes me, but the
early part of June in 1970, I had the first advance
seminar. Now, "advance seminar" was a term that I
categorized because I did not feel it should be an
"advance school". That sounds too much like you're
training guys to go out and be political hacks, or how
to go out and get the political hacks. Or you're
teaching them things that really aren't right. There's
a bad, bad feeling among many politicians, about an
advance man: they're con artists, they're young
whipper-snappers, they're "BS" artists, they're
probably a product of a political hack environment.
Whether they'd been a lobbyist, or an aide to a
Congressman or a Senator, or an aide to a mayor or a
governor, or whatever the case may be. They know all
the political ins and outs, and how to get around
something, you know. They slap them on the back, and
they talk percentages in the precincts, and what the
black vote's going to do vis-a-vis the Jewish vote, and
all that kind of stuff. I said, "Forget it!" I didn't
want any political hack moving on behalf of the
President of the United States. If a guy had never
13
done anything in politics, he started off better with
me than the guy that had [pounds table for emphasis].
Because I didn't come out of a political background,
and by virtue of that I think it gave me a great
insight as to what advancing was all about. My mission
was pure and simple: to go in there and to organize a
community like that community had never been organized
before in their lives. And realizing that I was
probably the first contact that that community had ever
had with the office of the presidency. And in a
favorable light. I would probably be, for the most
part, [for] all those volunteers that would be doing
that work, the only contact, or the closest contact,
that they would ever have to a President or the office
of a President. I had to clean up my language; I
happen to be a great, earthy individual. But I had to
present the best light that I knew how, and I did it,
and I demanded nothing less from the men that worked
for me [pounds table]. Now these men did not get paid
by me. For the majority of them were volunteers.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Which again, is a kind of a different bag. But, in
June of that year, I had the first advance seminar.
And there were about thirty-some-odd guys in there. In
going back through that list, which has been a constant
problem that I've experienced over the last three
years, is that you go out and you find these good men,
14
and you train them in the art of being an advance
man
It is an art. There's no doubt about it. It
takes a unique type of individual in order to do the
things that you ask that man to do. It takes great
sacrifice. It takes guts, because you have to talk
your boss into being able to take time off and go and
do this. You have to learn; you worry. Your stomach
knots up. You worry about whether the crowd's going to
be at the airport, or whether it's going to be along
the motorcade route. You worry about whether your
reception committee's going to be there. You worry
about getting the schedule done. You worry about all
these kinds of things, and it's a very snort period of
time. There's one thing you always experience: that's
finality. Because, the moment the President arrives
back, and he gets on that airplane, on the "Spirit of
'76", and those wheels lift off, it's either been a
good advance, or it's been a bad advance. There is no
middle area in my mind. So, you know when that plane
lifts off, if you've had a good stop [pounds table], if
it's been a good drill. And, boy, there's nothing, no
feeling like that in the world if it's gone well.
There's also no feeling in the world if it's gone bad.
Because, only you will hate yourself more than anybody
else could ever hate [pounds table]. There's always
that feeling on the airplane, at least I felt this way,
15
that it was a great empathy for those guys on the
ground. And everyone else on that plane had been
around long enough in politics, or with the President,
through advancing or movement, that they also snared
that same empathy. But not that guy on the ground
[pounds table]. He knew he had blown it [pounds
table]. We had very few that were ever blown. As a
matter of fact, if I had to go back, I would say there
were, under my tenure, there were never any blown. We
had some mistakes, we had some problems, but we didn't
blow it. The President was never embarrassed, with the
exception of San Jose.
Out of that school I can take names like Dick
Howard, who ended up working for Herb [Herbert G.]
Klein, and eventually with Chuck [Charles W.] Colson,
who I lost advancing. Gordon Strachan, who ended up
working for Bob Haldeman. Dave [David N.J Parker, who
ended up working for Dwight. Jack Pettit, who ended up
being, becoming the general counsel of the FCC [Federal
Communications Commission]. I can go through the list,
but it seemed that it was an ongoing practice that we
would find these men, they would be good men, they
would be recognized on the road or their talents would
be recognized. Someone would say, "Gee, that's a sharp
guy." The next thing I'd know, he was gone. But, I
always felt that that was an obligation that I had, not
only to the President, but to the office of the
16
President. In order to get these good men into various
slots.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
...and locations, so that the President's machinery
runs just as well everyplace else as it does. It gave
me a great pride, sense of pride, to have found these
men, and have them be callen "Walker's Raiders,' or
"The Roadrunner's Raiders." And then have them move on
in. And all through the White House now there are guys
that we found, and we trained. They came out of the
advance operation, and now they're doing their own
thing.
[Recorder turned off]
[Recording resumed]
RW:
...was last time that I did. You shouldn't feel that
way.
SY: Well, that's the first time it's happened to me, and I
had everyone try to console me. When I went back I
found out that Steve [Stephen] Hess, when he and [Earl]
Mazo were doing his book [Nixon: A Political Portrait]
they did one of these with the President that didn't t
work.
RW: Oh!
SY: [Laughter]. So, and we have
RW: And he probably was less concerned about it than they
were.
SY: Well, they called him up and told him, and he was great
17
about it, apparently.
RW: I'm sure he was.
SY: Terry Good talked with Steve Hess when he left, I guess
it was the White House Conference on Youth, and he
[Hess] told him the story. The other thing that
happened with one of the people with the other
[presidential] libraries, a man from the [Harry S]
Truman Library went up to New York to interview, I
think it was Rosenberg [sp?], made the trip to New York
just to talk with him. Came back on the metro[liner]
and the electrical
RW: System erased it?
SY:
...system just scrambled it, just completely. Before
there had been any transcription made or
But we
have paranoia about those things not working, you know.
RW: You know what might be a suggestion for you, just put
this in the back of your, you know, just put it back in
there and think about it.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: The White House Communications Agency..
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
has got tremendous recording facilities and the
technicians to handle it.
SY: Right.
RW: And if you're going to do anything with somebody that's
a real heavy, you might want to call General [Albert]
Redman.
18
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: And just say, "Sir, I'm going to be conducting this
interview with Bob [Robert H.] Finch or, you know, ...
SY: Hmm.
RW: with Bob Haldeman, or whatever the case it's going
to be,
SY: Hmm.
RW:
...and I'd like to have one of your men come in and set
this up for me...
SY: Right.
RW: ...and be there to monitor it.
SY: We have used, they, well, it's their tape. And we have
used them for minor repairs and things like that.
They're very helpful.
[Unknown woman entered]
[Conversation unrelated to interview]
[Unknown woman left]
SY: One thing that you touched on before, which I wanted to
have, is something on how you went about recruiting the
people you were interviewing, as opposed to their
RW: Well, I think I was talking about the first seminar,
wasn't I?
SY: Right.
RW: That was really kind of a turning point for me.
Because it was the culmination of the initial game plan
that I had laid out for myself. I think I told you
this: I'm a great game planner, in that I don't
19
consider myself the all time great smart guy. So I
give a great deal of time to programing how I want
something to go about. It's probably one of the
reasons that I was a good advance man. Because I'm a
stickler for details; I'm a perfectionist in what I do,
and I know what has to be done.
So, I laid this thing out, I talked to all these
guys. Then I had this first seminar. Well, I
conducted this first seminar here, at the White House,
in the Indian Treaty Room. Shortly before that,
Rosamond Gitzen, (G-I-T-Z-E-N) who was a bureaucrat in
the Department of Interior, had been my secretary with
Hickel, was detailed over to me. She and I went
upstairs the day before that weekend. It was the
first, second weekend in June, and I started a pattern
that eventually went through the next two and a half
years. I did it on a Saturday and a Sunday, which
allowed guys to fly in and spend Saturday with us, and
Sunday. And then go home and be back to work on
Monday, SO they didn't miss any work. We went up with
the White House Communications Agency and set up the
Indian Treaty Room. I make this point only to show,
eventually, how we progressed, really. I set that
whole thing up myself. Everything from the water
glasses, filling the water pitchers, and putting the
glasses out there, to the pads and the paper. Then,
the school commenced on Saturday morning.
20
A little background on what I did. Shortly before
that school, and during the process of time that I was
screening and interviewing all these men, I made calls
on Bob [Robert H.] Taylor, who was the head of the
Presidential Protection Detail, the Secret Service; on
Al Redman, General Redman, the White House
Communications Agency; Don [James D.] Hughes, who was
the military aide to the President; Ollie [Oliver R.
Atkins, who was the President's photographer;
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
at that time it was Jim [James] Keogh, who was the
President's speechwriter; Pat [Patrick J.] Buchanan, at
that time, who had the News Summary; well, I could go
on. [I] made calls on these people, saying, "O.K.,
this is what I'm attempting and going about doing."
One of the things that I had had brought to my
attention quite early, when I was made to be the
President's chief advance man, was that in the past,
during the other administrations, specifically going
back to Kennedy (because that's when advance men
started really coming into their own, was the 1960
campaign)
Nixon, well, Murray Chotiner was the
first guy that conceived of a guy going out and making
these arrangements. He was the guy that did it. Then,
Kennedy did it better than Nixon did it in 1968. Now,
Bob Haldeman might take exception to that, but I think
the record shows that he ended up having at least more
21
money, more clout, and better manpower on the road for
him [in 1960] than Nixon did [in 1968]. There's an
awful lot of background information that can
substantiate that statement. Again, I say, Haldeman
might take exception to it. Just a side note that the
record may not show, is that, and Bob may allude to
this later, but Bob only had about fifteen advance men.
But of that group of advance men, there was John
Ehrlichman; John Warner, who is now Secretary of the
Navy; John Whitaker, who has just recently been named
Undersecretary of Interior; Sherm [Sherman E.] Unger,
who, I believe, is in the administration or has been;
and then some other ones.
But the general feeling was that the political,
which is what they call [unintelligible], or the
pols[?], which were the political advance men.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
would go out and play all kinds of games with the
support people. Now this may go back to the individual
caliber of the President, Kennedy or Johnson, because
they, in their own right, were different types of
personalities than is President Nixon. Johnson was
very flighty. He, I think, became very, very nervous
about his life, after the Kennedy assassination, and
then assuming the office of the presidency. He would
be going to Denver, he would take off in Air Force One,
and in the air he would decide that he didn't want to
22
go to Denver, he wanted to go to Chicago. Well, that's
just ludicrous when it comes to trying to move a man,
because you've got helicopters in Denver, you've got
the cars in Denver, you've got the security setup,
you've got the program going and stuff. And then, all
of a sudden, you know, to take a four hour trip and cut
it to two, and land
You know, they don't have
cars. Then he'd be all upset and everything because
the proper facilities weren't there for him. Well, of
course, we've never had that situation with the
President, with President Nixon.
Taylor indicated that one of the things that you
can do that will assist everybody else, is to keep, to
establish the type of office that is a liaison and a
coordinator of all the support elements: i.e. the
Secret Service; the White House Communications Agency,
which provides the podium, the flags, the seals, the
sound equipment, the lights, the radios, the base
stations, all the things that not only we as a staff
need, that the President needs in order to maintain
that continuity of the office of the presidency, but
the security need. The helicopter needs, all that kind
of stuff. If they don't have as much information as
you can give them, within reason, and within security
purposes, or however tight we wanted to keep it
internally, staffwise, they can't perform their
mission. If they aren't performing their mission,
23
stuff is going to go wrong, and, if something goes
wrong, there's the high possibility that the
President's going to be embarrassed. And that is
wrong. The same with the Secret Service. If you
change routes, or all of a sudden an advance man says,
"No, I don't want to go down that highway; I want to
get off on this crossroad over here, because there's
some nice farms and stuff." Well, they don't have
those crossroads and stuff programmed. Now, granted,
you've got the element of surprise, that you can move
down, but that element of surprise leaves me awfully
cold. Because there's been, indeed, built-in danger in
doing anything that you.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: have not programmed and planned.
Well, apparantly the Kennedy advance men and the
Johnson advance men did just exactly what I just said
we didn't want to do. But I initially
[unintelligiblel, that it would be great for me to go
down and tell Bob Taylor this, or tell Al Redman this,
or tell Don Hughes this, or whoever the case was going
to be, but I had to prove it first. I had to prove
that we weren't going to screw them. At a given point
in time, when the President's airplane lands, and all
of a sudden this is all in the plan and everything, I
say, "Nope, we're not going to do that. We're going to
do something else." Because that's what they had
24
experienced in the past.
So it took a great deal of time to nurture and to
change the attitude. Fine, maybe Bob Taylor was
convinced, because he knew me personally, he knew that
I wouldn't "BS" him. But the point I'm trying to make
is that it was those other agents, those site agents
that are down there. You go on a one stop, you've got
five or six agents there. You've got the lead agent,
you've got the airport agent, you've got the motorcade
agent, you've got the hotel site agent, you've got the
event site agent. All of those guys had dealt with
political type advance men before, and they had this
sort of stuffy, bad feeling in their throat, or in
their stomach, every time one of us came around. Well,
I could sense this immediately. By the same token, the
[White House] Communications Agency, the military
aides
Of course, we had all our own new military
aides. To develop a rapport, internally, a team type
effort
Look, it's not going to be Ron Walker's
advance. It's going to be our advance. You're just as
important as I am. Only, I talk to the President's top
staff, and I brief them, and I write the schedules, and
I am the focal point of all communications. I will
tell you, as soon as I can tell you, everything. Don't
push me. By the same token, I expect to know
everything that you're doing. That's the only way we
can opperate. By doing that it's an open line of
25
communications. You got a problem, you tell me. I got
a problem, and it's in your area, I'm going to talk to
you about it. All areas concern me. I'm the focal
point. I am the President's representative. I have to
know what's going on. I'm not going to go talk to the
police, that's your job. In the past administrations
an advance man would go in, he'd call on the chief of
police, and do all the kinds of stuff and everything,
and the Secret Service agent [would] come in and he had
to tear down what that guy had built. Well, that's not
right. It's not right for me, or any other advance
man, to go to a military installation.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: ...and go and talk to that Commanding General and say,
"Sir, we're going to land Air Force One here. We're
going to park all our airplanes out here, and I want
you to turn the base personnel out, and I want your
band out there to play "Hail to the Chief"." No, why?!
I've got a military aide that can do that. It's his,
it builds his position, it builds his stature. I'm not
going to make a career out of Secret Service or the
Communications Agency, or the military. So, why do I
need it? I mean, if that's, and that goes back to that
passion for annonymity...
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: ...and that low profile. Give the people that have to
do the job the credit and the clout to do that job
26
with. It's going to make your job easier, because you
got somebody else out there doing it for you. This is
delegating of authority. Well, that's another
sidelight.
But that's the kinds of attitudes that we had to
overcome. I can't think of the number of cities or
military installations that we went to that somebody
had been there before us, and they went, "Yech!!" They
just [could] hardly stand it. "Here comes another
political hack advance man. He's going to come in here
and tear our base apart, or tear our city apart, and
then just walk out in a cloak of darkness one night,
with this hanging bag over his head, where nobody can
see him." So those were the kinds of attitudes we had
to overcome. We did it. We had not done it just prior
to that school, that first advance seminar, in June of
1970. But that was one of the things that I talked
about greatly. I talked for two solid days, and that's
got to be a drag, for a guy sitting there and listening
to one guy go--well, I don't claim to be the best
public speaker in the world but I did know advancing
better than anybody else in that room. I also invited
the Secret Service to come and speak. I also invited
the White House Communications Agency to come and
speak. I also invited the military aides office to be
represented. They spoke on behalf of all the
helicopters: Marine One and Army One. They spoke on
27
behalf of Air Force One. They spoke on behalf of the
doctors. They spoke on behalf of the bomb shelter and
the "football", and the things that have to be an
ongoing process when the President moves someplace.
Well, I wasn't the expert in those areas, so why should
I be sitting up there talking about them? Well, that
broke the ice.
From that point on, it kind of seemed that it was
a team. Those guys that left that school left with
that kind of attitude. I may be the President's
representative, but I'm not King Kong! Those guys
don't work for me, they work for the President of the
United States. I just happen to be a coordinator, or
his representative, to make sure everything is pulled
together and tied in a nice little knot. When he
arrives we untie it [clap], and it all falls out just
perfectly. And that's eventually how it
Well, a unique thing happened immediately
following that school that really set this thing
flying. Or set the complex, or the organization that I
was conceiving. Honor America Day, July the fourth
1970. Within the next week of that seminar Dwight
called me and wanted me to meet with Bill [J. Willard]
Marriott, Sr., who was the chairman of Honor America
Day, and Jeb Magruder. Dwight said, "Look, Ron's got
these thirty-some-odd guys, they're sensational,
they're our advance men, they know how to build crowds
28
and stuff. The President wants that Honor America Day
to be the biggest happening on a Fourth of July ever in
Washington, D.C. Let's let them have it." Well, it
was just like a gift from heaven. I took all thirty of
those guys, and they ranged from all the way up into
upper state New York, down into Virginia. We had some
in from Chicago and that area, but most of them were in
the east coast, the Washington area. I thought I
should go after my first element of men, [they] should
be in the government and up and down this coast here,
where I can get to them quickly, as opposed to going
out into the midwest and to the southwest and to the
far west. So that's what I had. I turned those guys
loose. Crowd raising, handbills, leaflets, telephone,
boiler room operations, and they just set up mini
presidential advances. But they couldn't use the name
of the President.
So, it not only gave them the opportunity to go
out and try their wares or what I tried to teach them
[pounds table], but they had to be innovative, they had
to be imaginative, and they had to have a lot of guts
to go about that job [pounds table]. It's great to go
out there and say, "The President of the United States
and Mrs. Nixon will be arriving at Tupelo, Mississippi
airport at four o'clock next week." That's clout! I
mean, that's the President of the United States! We
didn't have anything going except, at that point in
29
time, an Honor America Day ceremony. Well, we started
programming. We got Bob Hope, we got.... Then, of
course, Honor America Day speaks for itself. We had
the better part of 400,000 people that were here for
that event that night. Those guys did one hell of a
job. I mean, it would never have happened, it would
never have happened if it hadn't been for those advance
men. They set up regional offices. We put up an
office in downtown Washington, we put two or three out
in Maryland, we put some out in Virginia. We had
offices in Philadelphia, we had offices in New York.
We had trains that came from New York, down through
Philadelphia, huge trains full of people. That's where
Peter Brennan, we met Peter Brennan, who's now the
Secretary of Labor.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: We met him the first time. He had a whole train of
hardhats and brought them down. We had [H.] Ross Perot
from Texas that rented two airplanes and flew them in.
It was that kind of, "Give me a job, and by God, I'll
get it done! [pounds tablel. There's nothing I can't
do!" If the guy had that kind of attitude, and had a
little more going for him, we'd won. Yes?
[Recorder turned off]
[Recording resumed]
RW: Well, anyway, Honor America Day was a real plus. It
not only took what I'd been building for a year, or
30
working for for a year, but it just highlighted it.
The President and his staff were in California, and
I'll never forget as long as I live, out from that
Ellipse, that night, when at two o'clock in the
afternoon, for a program that was going to start at
eight, there were hundreds of people arriving with
picnic lunches. That were going to sit on that ground
there for four and five hours, six and seven hours. We
had, it was the damndest happening, probably, this city
had ever seen, from a standpoint of [an] outpouring of
love of America. Now, they've had outpourings of hate
for America, but that was a real happening. Everybody
took notice, and everybody gave us credit for it. So,
from that point on, it just started to really go.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: We did some trips in between that time. But then the
next thing that happened was the off-year election that
Fall. By that time I had managed to get my own office,
and Rosamond and I were set up, now, on the first
floor, but over on the Seventeenth Street side of the
EOB. We were there in a four office complex with Hugh
Sloan and his office, and my secretary in my office.
Well, we went about
I was caught, I was caught in
1970, because I had not prepared
Everybody had
said the President was not going to campaign. Well, I
hadn't had any more seminars. I had continued to
recruit, but I did not have any other trained men,
31
SANITIZED
other than what came out of that first seminar. Well,
all of a sudden, the President decided to start moving.
It was a great lesson for me. Thank God it was an off
year election, because I didn't have enough advance men
that were trained. We did large political rallies. We
ended up doing something like twenty-seven stops in two
weeks. At one point in time I had everybody committed
on the east coast, and I had to fly to the west coast
and handle five states, by myself, until the President
had finished up some of these stops on the east coast,
and I could bring some of those men over to handle
those stops.
At that point in time we came up with what we
called a pre-advance. It was just prior to that.
Where we took a Jetstar, and we took the key people
that had to make decisions on the road. Those people
were myself, as the head of the pre-advance team, a
Secret Service agent, and normally it was a senior
representative from the presidential protection detail.
[NAME RESTRICTED] or [NAME RESTRICTED] or
[NAME RESTRICTED]
" one of those people, Dick
[Richard E.] Keiser. Oftentimes Bob Taylor went.
There was a White House Communications Agency, General
Redman, he always went. There was Tim [Timothy G.]
Elbourne, who was from the press standpoint. And a
military aide. Those were the key people that had to
go in, do a site survey, find out what the hell it was
SANITIZED
32
all about, what was going on. We had a game plan of
what we wanted to do, we had to find a place to make it
happen. Was the airport conducive to building a crowd?
Was the motorcade route conducive to building a crowd?
Where was the rally going to be held? Determining
whether, what site was the best site to do it.
Oftentimes, it wasn't always possible, but I would like
to have had what we ended up calling the "lead advance
man", which was the guy that had the overall
responsibility [pounds table], to be on the site when
we arrived [pounding], or go with us. So that he was
there [pounding]. That was the guy that was going to
have to execute what decisions we were making
[pounding]. It's pretty difficult to go and do that
and not have a guy with you to know what you're talking
about, and the reasons behind it. So, that's when we
came up with the concept.
Well, we did the pre-advances on all twenty-seven
of those stops. Some of them, we would leave at seven
o'clock in the morning, and not get back til two or
three o' 'clock the next morning, and then leave again at
seven and go do some more pre-advances. So, I had to
run the advance office all by myself, with Rosamond:
be on the phone, talk to all these guys, talking
through their problems, the questions they had. Answer
their questions. We had no tour desk. We had no
liaison, internally, to be getting information. So I
33
worked very closely, by phone, with Dwight. It was
less than ideal Well, we learned a great deal coming
out of that. Out of that campaign I hired Mike Duval,
Dewey Clower, Bill Henkel and Jon Foust, who eventually
became known as the senior advance men.
SY: Up until that time then, the '70 campaign, you were the
only
RW: That's correct.
SY:
advance man on the White House payroll.
RW: That is correct.
SY: The first one.
RW: Now, initially these guys were not hired on the payroll
of the White House. We slotted them into the various
Departments and agencies.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: They were detailed in to us. There were some good
advance men out of the '70 campaign, and there were
some bad ones. I did a great weeding out process of
that. As a result of that, I probably ended up, I
probably had, on the record, twenty or twenty-two guys.
Many of them couldn't get out, which was a problem I
had. But, I probably cut half of them. The reasons
were, they weren't buttoned down, they just weren't the
caliber of man we were looking for. So then, all of a
sudden, it became necessary to start going and finding
more again.
Well, going into 1971, we set about interviewing
34
anybody and everybody that we could get our hands on.
Talking to friends, talking to relatives, talking to
anybody we could talk to, to try and find the kinds of
guys we were looking for. We started putting together
a team. We had more weekend seminars, started training
guys. I got those four men then, started going through
the manual, and revising it. The changes that had
transpired since the initial publication that I had.
Diagrams we went into much more detail with diagrams.
Sandy [Sanford L.] Fox helped us on getting the
diagrams of airports. We had four, five, six different
types of airport diagrams that a guy could set up. We
had different types of motorcades. We talked about the
parade-type motorcade, the confetti-type motorcade, the
balloon-type motorcade, a standard motorcade, all that
kind of stuff. So we really started to refine the
things that we had sort of haphazardly pulled together.
The next seminars and stuff that we had, I let the
senior advance men [pounding] start handling certain
portions of them. Each, in [his] own right [pounding],
[was] good in certain areas. For example, Clower was
an excellent hotel man [pounding]. Foust was extremely
good at crowd raising, as was Henkel. Duval was an
exceptionally fine organizer [pounding]. So I took
these innuendos and stuff like that, and
Of course
that year we had, well, we did an awful lot that year.
Those guys stayed busy. We trained other guys, got
35
them out on the trips. At that point in time we
started taking three and four trainees on a trip.
Those guys were the leads, and eventually, we'd get
three for four guys out there. Maybe two of them had
the moves that we wanted. Another two didn't. We
always told them, "Thanks very much. It gave you a
great chance, and you may end up being president of
Chase Manhattan Bank, but you're just not
It may
not be your bag, but it's not our bag for you either."
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Well, that brought us through that year, we got through
it. We had another European trip that year. Out of
the 1970 campaign I hired Karen Rietz. She had been
working for Murray Chotiner; the campaign was over;
Murray had left the White House; and I hired Karen.
The early part of 1971, for the most part, was a game
plan time. We had no office space. These four guys
were on my payrolls, and they bounced around from
various open office to open office. They had no phones
or anything, and, at the end, they ended up in my
office. That was a pretty hectic time. There were
five guys, five of us sharing my office.
SY: Hmm.
RW: Shortly after the first of the year we staked out this
area on the third floor. We put together a game plan
as to how we saw the advance office growing. We knew
it had to grow in order to get ready for 1972. We also
36
knew that we had to go about finding a lot of men fast,
and training them. Realizing that it's going to take
at least a half a dozen stops, or drills, what we call
a drill, in order for a guy to be a seasoned advance
man.
In order to be a lead advance man, a guy should
have experience in an airport rally, building crowds.
That's probably the most important thing an advance man
has to do, to know how to build crowds, turn out
people. You can have the all time great hall, you can
have the all time great balloons, all time great signs
and everything, but if you've got empty seats, man,
it's a disaster! So I'd rather have a hall that's just
overflowing into the streets, [people] bumping into one
another, and not have any signs or balloons or a great
band or anything. Now, if you can pull all that stuff
together, then you've got a happening. But go for the
crowds, go for the people, get them in there. That's
the backbone of a good advance. Those kind of guys you
don't make. They're born with it. They just know how
to go about doing something like that. Well, those are
the kind of guys that we tried to find. We had a
European trip. The latter part of that year we
continued to have advance seminars. We started game
planning. The types of things the President should do
in 1971, that he couldn't do in 1972, because [it was]
a political year. So we put together what we called a
37
"blockbuster". We took every conceivable state, every
conceivable thing that a President could do that was
presidential [pounding], that was not political
[pounding]: a park, a prison, anything like that.
Believe it or not, by the time 1971 was over, we'd done
the better part of ninety-five percent of them
[pounding]. The blockbuster is in the file here. But
it was to try and hit fifty states, and do it in
1971
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
counting on the first two years of the
administration,
SY: Hm hmm. [Unintelligiblel.
RW:
and we did it. If you' 11 recall, the latter part of
1971 we hit all fifty states.
But then we started working on China. I'll never
forget it, when I was in San Clemente, at the end of
the summer of 1971. We'd ended up doing a series of
stops on the way out. We were out there for the
summer. All of a sudden, it was a Friday afternoon, I
got a call from Dwight. I was laying next to the pool
at the San Clemente Inn. He said, "Get dressed and get
over here." I went over, and all of a sudden I walked
into the conference room, and there was the advance
team. Which by this time had become happenstance. It
was a great love for us. We were doing our jobs and
they were doing theirs, 'cause we had problems,
38
along There were some agents that were fired,
there were some advance men that were fired. But we
had developed what I had initially set out to do, so
now it was a team. "Can't tell you what's going to
happen, but the President's going to make a move, to
Burbank, where he's going to address the nation," that
evening. When we went down we had like two hours to do
it. Landed a helicopter, drove a motorcade, got down
to Burbank, get in and set the whole damned thing up,
got staff offices set up, offices, telephones. The
White House Communications Agency had to get their
phones in there and everything. The President walked
out and said he's going to visit China [pounds table].
Said Henry Kissinger's just gotten back. Well, you
could have knocked me down with a feather!
SY: That was the first time?
RW: Right, the first I knew about it.
SY: [Laughter].
RW: Well, from that point on, it became very much our
business. Because we spent the next three months in
the bomb shelter, organizing and pre-planning, and
getting ready for the China trip.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Then, before the China trip he announced he was going
to Russia in the spring, SO....
We continued to have the seminars, we continued to
build a team. I was shooting for seventy-five men. We
39
ended up with fifty very solid men. Probably another
twenty-five or thirty that we sent to the Committee for
the Reelection [Committee to Reelect the President] for
their advance operation. We did China. We came back.
I had to make a decision, at that point, because, while
we'd been in China, the Committee for the Reelection
had started and they were having problems. The
problems were that they had had a big rally in New
Hampshire and a big rally in Florida, and they'd been
bust. Just disasters. But we had not been involved.
So Haldeman told me to find out what was going on.
Dwight asked that I meet with Magruder and those people
and find out
Well, I went over and met with them
and knew just exactly what had happened: they didn't
know what the hell they were doing. So I came back,
and I had to make recommendations. Well, the
recommendation was made, among some other ones, but I
knew what it was when I said it. I'm going to have to
take one of my full time men.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
and send him over there to head their advance
operation. I sent Jon Foust. Jon did a hell of a JOD,
but I also sent a lot of men with him. Bill [William
E.] Moeller. Now, in January of 1971, I decided what
we had to start doing, was approaching various
companies that were inclined and favorable toward the
President. I took Bill Henkel and Mike Duval, and gave
40
them a crash course in meeting with the president and
chairman of the board of various companies, on how to
interview. We went to New York, after making contact
with probably a dozen of the President's friends, and
went and saw the president of the board, chairman of
the board, and told him that what we were doing was
starting to build a presidential advance team. We were
looking for bright, young men. I did a mailer, and
sent them to all kinds of people. I went back and
contacted every advance man out of 1968, to find out if
they were interested, what they were doing, if they had
any thoughts. We've got a file of advance men in there
that numbers somewhere in the vicinity of around
fourteen hundred men.
SY: Hmm.
RW:
that we personally talked to. Those guys [the
senior advance men] took off, and for the next three or
four months they traveled all over this country,
interviewing. Meeting with the president of that
board, and he, in turn, going back into his
organization and finding one, two, three young men.
That was the backbone of how we went about building
this organization.
Then the European trip came up, and then the
presidential travel. Puerto Vallarta, Mexico came up.
Other movements came up, and then China. We didn't
have the time. I needed these guys. So then I
41
solicited Fred [Frederic V.] Malek. Then he and John
Clarke went about a nationwide search of manpower for
us. They did a hell of a job. John Clarke probably
talked to five hundred men; of those we probably talked
to a hundred; of those we probably picked thirty-five.
Some of those were some of our best advance men. The
only thing they lacked was experience. It was very
difficult, because the President wasn't moving in 1972,
except for international. That's how we built it.
We've had four seminars this year. The last seminar I
programed to end on the first of June. After the first
of June we were finished. No more interviews, no more
talking to people.
In the meantime I hired Julie Rowe, Marsha
Griswold. We hired Julie Rowe out of Rochester, New
York. She helped in the advance office, she was a
school teacher, she did a hell of a Job, came back down
here. We had steps, [unintelligible due to table
pounding] doing this. I hired Terry [Terrence]
0' Donnell, I hired Tom [Thomas] Hart, I hired John
Gartland, I hired Jim [James L.] Kolstad, I hired Allen
Hall. These are all men that
I....
We just all of a
sudden we went from a one man operation, to a two man
operation, to a five man operation, to a six man
operation, and all of a sudden it was up to, at one
point in time, counting the First Family operation,
toward the latter part of the 1972 campaign, we
42
probably had twenty-five people up here. We moved into
these offices, designed them so they were functional.
Mark Goode moved up, Tim Elbourne moved up. Mark Goode
came on as a television consultant, which we felt we
needed, because we didn't have the expertise in
television. We needed a real solid television guy
[pounding]. We found Bill [William H.] Carruthers and
Mark Goode at the Anaheim rally at the end of the 1970
campaign. It was the last rally that he did for
[George L.] Murphy. And
SY: Was, is that office under this office then?
RW: Well, I have a genuine relationship, in that nobody
works for me, we all work together.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Actually, Timmy works for Ron [Ronald L.] Ziegler.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Mark Goode actually reports to Dwight Chapin. I report
to Dwight Chapin.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But what Dwight would do is say, "O.K. Ron, here it is,
bang, go." Then I would get with Mark and get with Tim
and get with the Secret Service and the White House
Communications Agency and bang, bang, bang, we were
off.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Then we started staffing out; we started getting the
reports; we started getting it in writing, 50 that the
43
decisions were in writing, and they could go through in
a very simple format
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: ...yes/no. Here are the options, approve/disapprove.
So that, contrary to what we had in 1970, which was
just a hodgepodge of nothing. We're lucky we didn't
screw it up. We were probably so well organized in
1972 that we were too organized. But I vowed to myself
that I'd never get caught like I got caught in 1970
[pounding]. So I planned for the maximum! And as it
ended up, we ended up doing the minimum, but....
That's where we are now.
SY: Well, if you'd go back just a little bit and talk
about, you've mentioned coordinating with Mark Goode's
office, and you've mentioned helping out with the First
Lady's advance staff and the Committee [to Reelect the
President]. Were there other areas that you went into,
such as those?
RW: Well, I think it, I think the revealing thing is that
the advance office and I would have to admit that it
was probably by design of me, is that I instilled in
everyone here, to include Mark and inlcude Timmy, who
eventually became a part of our operation that the
advance office is a unique kind of office [pounding].
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: For example, we did restaurant surveys, we did
limousine surveys, we did hotel surveys in Washington
44
[pounding]. We did surveys in probably twenty of the
major cities in America. We've got more information
[pounding], we've got more contacts around this country
[pounding], for a centralized office, than probably
anybody else in the White House. We're the liaison for
the Department of the Interior for all their guest
houses. If anybody in the White House wants to go to
the Virgin Islands, or wants to go to Camp Hoover, or
go to Cape Cod, or Grand Tetons in the national parks
and stuff, they have to come to this office. And then
we, in turn, have developed the relationship with the
Interior Department that we act as the liaison for it
[pounding].
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: If anybody has guests coming into town and they're
looking for a hotel, something like that, it came to a
point where, Jesus, if you want to ask questions of
somebody, call the advance office. Well, that's the
way I felt like this office should operate. We should
work very closely with the speechwriters to make sure
they've got the proper information. We should work
very closely with Dick [Richard A.] Moore. So that
Dick Moore, who does the color and travels with the
President on the airplane, has constant communication
with the advance man. If there's a football player
that just broke his neck the night before, in a game;
or if a football team just won a national championship,
45
or a state championship, or a city championship, and
stuff; or if a policeman just got his back blown off by
a bomb that went off, or just got shot, or something
happened; or a young man saved some little kid's life;
or some little kid's saved an old man's life; those
kinds of things that the President, when he steps off
of that plane and steps up to a mike, he can say,
"Geez, it's great to be in Fargo. And I see that we've
got the Fargo High School here. You guys just won your
basketball game last night. What was the score? 82 to
72. Sensational! I'm really happy for you, but I feel
badly for the other kids "cause they lost," and
that
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
all of a sudden you see five thousand people go,
"Gee, this guy really cares."
The people that we, the press office, we damn near
wrote their press schedules for them, for all the press
corps. You take Ollie Atkins. We, the advance man got
to the point where he could pick where the best shots
were going to be for Ollie to get different pictures
than the wires were going to get. So Ollie would walk
off that plane, and the first thing he would want to
know is where the advance man is. "Where do I go, what
do I do?" There'd be a ladder for him, where he could
step up on the top of that ladder and get a whole
different perspective of a picture, for the West [Wing
46
of the White House] basement, or for the President, or
whatever the case was. Those were the kinds of things
we started doing. We would take it to the point of the
traveling staff. What their personal things were when
you had an overnight. With Mort [Lyndon K.J Allin, we
took the responsibility of getting the News Summary,
and getting the News Summary distributed on the road.
We worked it out with the White House Communications
Agency. We took the dex machines out of the
communications department and started having one of
those, every advance man had a dex machine in his
office. We had a dex machine in this office right
here. So there was constant communication between this
office and that. Every morning we could see the
buildup coming in for the President. Four days before
it was an article, two days before it was the headline.
The day before it was a whole front page. We got that
stuff dexed to us. So we knew what was happening.
From the time I walked off that plane as the chief- by
that time I was the tour director, running the entire
tour-I'd walk off that plane [snaps fingers], I'd know
as much about that advance and that city as the advance
man, who was on the ground.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Except I hadn't been there. So there were very few
questions that I couldn't answer.
SY: Hm hmm.
47
RW: There were very few needs that wouldn't be met. And we
just, I just had the attitude that there is nothing
that we can't do. If it comes to the point where we
say we can't do it, there are going to be damn few
other people that can do it.
By the same token, the relationship that we
developed in the field, with the Republican National
Committee [RNC], with the Committee for the Reelection.
We give the Committee for the Reelection a great deal
of support, manpower-wise and advice and counsel.
, Cause we're the experts, we're the pros. We've done
things that other people have never done in a lifetime.
When you take China, you take Russia, we put on a
convention. When it was a dull convention, we made it
a happening. Fine, Ken [Kenneth S.] Rietz brought
three thousand kids down here, but we orchestrated
those three thousand kids. If you want to try
something sometime, try and orchestrate three thousand
kids! Or try and get them into a convention, on the
floor, when the RNC didn't want them in there. Well,
two sessions during that 1972 convention we made happen
that would have been nothing but "blaah" [phonetic] if
it hadn't been for those kids. The first night was
Mrs. Nixon's night, when they just blew the roof right
off of that place, and probably helped us capture the
better part of forty-five percent of the youth vote
around this country, that [George S.] McGovern was
48
saying he had.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: It was that kind of activity. If a guy says we can't
get them on the floor, which Ody Fish said, screw Ody
Fish! If I have to go pick locks and pull every con
trick I know, I'll blow five or six hundred kids into
that hall, and watch my smoke! That's what we did.
They didn't like it. Dick [R.L.] Herman and Bob
[Robert J.] Dole and those guys didn't like it. Well,
tough bananas! It was the right thing to have done and
we did it [pounding]! If we'd sat back on our haunches
and let, listened to those guys, nothing would have
happened. It would have been a "thppt" [phonetic],
stinky convention.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Now that's the kind of activity, that's the kinds of
things that I felt so strongly that we should do.
Something needs to be done, and it's the right thing to
be done, by God, it's going to happen. I don't care
who we step on, who we run through, what corners we
have to cut. It's going to happen.
SY: Hm hmm. Something we mentioned last week. You did say
that both Jon Foust, over at the Committee and, was it
Bill [William R.] Codus, who handled First Family?
RW: Right.
SY: They worked independently?
RW: Right, well, yes. When I sent Jon Foust to the
49
Committee, I knew it wasn't going to be easy on Jon.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: He was going in because of some, other people couldn't
do the job. It was, that was exactly the case.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: He had a rough time. Because he was an outsider, and
he was one of the President's advance men, that was
come over there to do a job that they couldn't get done
themselves. So those people that had been hired to do
those kind of jobs immediately, probably, had a great
deal of animosity,
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
not only toward me, but obviously toward him,
because he's the guy on the scene. So I took other
advance men and started assigning them to him. Good
guys that we found. Like, we took one of our best
advance men and made him his chief of staff, as I had
done with Mike [Michael R.] Schrauth.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Mike Schrauth was the chief of staff of our office. He
was the center focal point of everything. Nothing
happened in this office that I didn't tell Mike about,
or the advance man didn't have to come back in to Mike.
The men in the field talked to Mike. When it came down
to a day before the trip or the morning of the trip, I
got on my conference phone with that advance man, and
we went through that thing from nut to bolt. Just so
50
that I knew what they were doing, and I could
sharpshoot and say, "What about this, what about
that?", and everything else.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Mike had run shotgun on it up to that point. Well, we
did the same thing for Foust. We sent him Bill
Moeller. From there we gave him Tim Austin, we gave
him Ed Caneer [sp?], we gave probably a half a dozen
other guys, maybe even a dozen. Then he went about
taking some of the names that we had discarded, not
because they weren't good, but because we'd found
better. We gave him that whole package, and from that
he built his own advance men over there, of around
fifty-some-odd guys. Those guys were help, were much
more busy than we were, but yet I was not about to
release any of those guys. If there were occasions
that, like that kick-off weekend, that they went out
and canvassed all around the country and stuff, where
all the Cabinet officers and the girls went out and
everything. He used every one of our men for that
weekend. So he had something like a hundred and some-
odd guys out in the various states.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But for the most part, those were my men. And I
guarded them and held them very close, because I never
knew when something was going to happen.
SY: Hm hmm.
51
RW: So that was Jon's bag over there. By the same token, I
knew a year ago that, at a point in time, the First
Family operation, under Connie [Stuart], would be hard
pressed to handle the First Family during a campaign.
Now, Connie would not like this comment, but this was
something that I felt. Dwight and I talked about it
long and hard and we knew it was going to be a very
touchy situation, obviously, SO we went about doing it
as quietly and as convincingly as we could. We took
Bill Codus; he did a number of things for Mrs. Nixon in
and around the city. I had Allen Hall, who I'd
designated to handle
We took on Julie [Nixon
Eisenhower] first.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Julie said she wanted somebody from my office to handle
her trips and stuff. Allen Hall was the one that did
that. From that, Tricia [Nixon Cox] moved in. Dave
Parker ended up doing their scheduling, Allen Hall
executed, using our advance men, again.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: So we got Bill Codus. Bill Codus did a few things for
Mrs. Nixon. Bill Codus went to Hawaii to do the
[Kakuei] Tanaka thing. Bill Codus went to Russia and
did that. He handled her on the stops. So that was
kind of building the rapport for Bill Codus. Came
back, Bill Codus went in, talked to Mrs. Nixon, and it
was set. So, from that standpoint, we had Bill Codus,
52
who was handling Mrs. Nixon and, really, the girls. He
brought with him Marylou Sheils from State Department,
and Steve [Stephen J.] McCarthy. I gave him Dan Searby
out of the convention, he worked Mrs. Nixon at the
convention also. I also hired Kathy [Kathleen M.
Tindle. Kathy Tindle was going to be on my staff, but
I moved her into the operation of the First Family.
Allen Hall remained in that operation. Allen Hall
eventually became the man that handled Eddie [Edward R.
F.] Cox. He did more traveling than all the rest of
them put together.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: So that organization worked very close in hand with
ours. All our files and all our information and all
our advance men were available to the First Family,
lock, stock and barrel. All the surrogates and stuff,
Jon Foust handled. There were occasions when we were
in slack periods and stuff, that I did make the
presidential advance men available to him and, with
rare exceptions, they were always ready, willing and
able to do so.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: All total, tripwise, this time those advance men
probably averaged six events apiece. All total, this
office, during the 1972 campaign, include the things we
did for the Committee for the Reelection, plus the
President, plus the members of the First Family,
53
numbered somewhere in the vicinity of around a hundred
and twenty-five.
SY: Hm hmm. Do you see the office
RW: Yes.
SY: ...decreasing greatly in size and ?
RW: Yes. You can go back through all the reports and
everything that I wrote gearing up to 1972, the plan
for the advance office for 1972. I knew we were going
to need a lot. We ended up getting a lot, and it
worked. Just little things which I'm sure you would
understand, but many people wouldn't, a xerox. Try and
do forty schedules, fifteen or twenty page schedules, I
mean, from the standpoint of when they eat lunch to
when they can go to bed, damn near. We finally got the
xerox up here, and that kind of stuff. Well, that
stuff will remain, but now it's not necessary, because
he's a President again. He's not a lame duck
President, but he will never run for office again. So,
the tenure of this office is going to have to be
retained. The magnitude of what it's going to
encompass now will be just as important as it was for
when he went to the [Harry S Truman] funeral, day
before yesterday. There's already a backbone and a
great foundation established here.
Bill Henkel, who I've named as my successor, was
one of the senior advance men. The reason I named
Bill, because he was the youngest of the group, but
54
more importantly, I felt that the other ones were older
and should be moving on into bigger and better things.
Whether they stay in government, or whether they get
out of government. Bill is a very organized type of
individual, as I am. He's also very personable, which
I may or may not be. But that's the kind of person
that should be here. It shouldn't be a heavy,
hardhanded guy that's going to be demanding and
forceful, because it's not that kind of an operation.
It's the kind of operation that you tell us what needs
to be done and we'll go about doing it, and we'll do it
the best that we know how. It's that kind of an
operation. Bill can do that. There's going to be some
heavy travel, but what you've got now is a hard core of
about fifty men that are trained, ready, willing and
able to do anything they can.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
... for a member of the First Family or the President of
the United States. Many of these men will stay in
private industry, private enterprise, where they were
when they were working for us. Many of them will
probably join the government. Many of them may or may
not be able to 00 any more advancing. But the point
is, that there will be a nucleus to call upon. You
don't have to worry about the Hatch Act now, which we
had to concern ourselves about. One point I did not
[make] is, by May of 1971, all the men that I named,
55
that were on my full time staff, were being paid by the
White House. They'd gone on the White House rolls.
Approaching the last three or four months of the
campaign, those, there were certain members that they
had to take a leave of absence, or they had to quit
their companies, in order to come and do this,
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
that we put on the payroll of the Committee. So,
the way I envision the office moving is that you will
have a whether he'll be a commissioned officer as I
was, I don't know. I was a special assistant to the
President. I don't know whether that's going to happen
or not.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But, he will be the chief advance man, and most likely
the tour director. What he will need then, is a
combination senior advance man and desk man. The desk
man is very important. A senior advance man is very
important. It may be that he hires a combination of
two and they rotate between being senior advance man
and participating in these
These will be two new
men now, that will not have been here for the last four
years. Because what I would like to see Bill be able
to do, in a year, is to move out and go and be able to
do something on his own. The two men that he hires
now, one would take over as the chief advance man and
the other one would become the desk man. Then they
56
might hire another senior advance man that would be
able to do the pre-advances, to work here and about the
White House
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: ...or on the road, or whatever the case be. All the
time being able to call upon the men that have been
proven and experienced. In the meantime, continuing to
look, not as heavily as we did, but for new and more
types of guys that can be advance men for this next
four years.
SY: Hm hmm.
.W: I am convinced that the core of the people that we had
in 1972, regardless of who the candidate will be in
1976, can probably, more than likely, well....
Can
almost rest assured will be called upon, in some
capacity, to perform a mission for the next candidate.
Now, that's going to have to be their decision, it's
going to be a personal decision for them. By the same
token, the 1976 convention, plus, you know, what
happens in the meantime. You've got the Bicentennial
coming and I can conceive of an awful lot of
presidential advance men being involved in the
Bicentennial, because that's the kind of things these
guys can do, and do well.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: They're action oriented, they get a job done, you know,
"Give it to me." It's like the Inauguration. I've
57
got, right now, probably fifteen guys that are over at
the Inauguration. And what are they handling? They're
handling the things nobody else would want to handle:
the parade, the seating, the building of those
platforms out there, the platform here, the swearing-in
ceremony. The things you get your hands dirty with.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But the office is going to have to be.... The White
House has become, the people in the White House have
become accustomed to knowing that if there's anything
that needs to be disseminated, in regard to a
presidential trip, they call the advance office.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: And if we don't know, we'll find out. But most of the
time we know.
SY: One other thing, to skip around a little bit, but I
wanted to ask you about again. You mentioned when you
were doing the advance manual, you had the '68 campaign
manual and you worked with Steve Bull and Dwight
Chapin. Were there other people from previous
administrations that you had contacted?
RW: No.
SY: Or, other people, like Murray Chotiner, who...?
RW: I spent a lot of time talking to Murray.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But here, you see, here was the thing. Steve Bull had
done a little bit of advancing, but not much.
58
SY: Hmm.
RW: But Steve thinks like an advance man thinks. Dwight
thinks like an advance man thinks. Dwight had not done
much advancing. Dwight was the aide to the President
during the 1968 campaign, had been with him for two
years before that. Steve only did one advance for a
President, and that was under my tenure, with me, he
did it with me. And that was Massena, New York. Well,
it was a real education for Steve, because he no longer
had to go out and rent his own cars. He no longer had
to go out and rent his own sound system, or his own
lights, and get volunteers to drive the cars. Make
sure gas was in the tanks, which I told you last time,
I think.
SY: Right.
RW: It's all done for you now. But there was a much--I'd
been through both of those. So, right now I'm the only
guy around, that's involved in presidential travel,
that has experienced both sides of the fence. When I
leave, that [leaves] a big void [in] this office. But
I'll always be called upon, I know I'll always be
available if there's anything that's needed.
SY: Hmm.
RW: But it's not needed now anymore. When it is going to
be needed, if a guy goes out and it's going to be a
[Charles R.] Percy, or a George Bush, or a Bill
[William E.] Brock, or somebody like that, that has no
59
relationship with the White House, or the White House
facilities, to call upon. If it's [Spiro T.J Agnew,
he'll obviously take with him the Vice President's
facilities and support and everything. So, that's,
that's what it's going to be like.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: The only thing that Dwight and Steve added to the
manual, which was really needed from my standpoint, was
what the personal staff thought. The Bob Haldemans,
the John Ehrlichmans, and then what the President
[unintelligible].
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Which were things that, when you're out on the road
I had my own checklist, and that checklist told me
about all kinds of things that would necessarily
never
The President, well, he just is way, so far
above that he'd never even worry about it. He just
considers that stuff's being done. That's the great
relationship that we had. The President knew that we
were out there. He knew that the job was being done
for him, and he knew that it was being done better than
it had ever been done for anybody else. He didn't have
to worry about that stuff. That's the way he should,
when he got off that plane he should have known that
the only thing he's going to have to be told is where
he goes to speak, where he should work the fence. The
car, when he turns around, the car is going to be
60
there. When he gets out, somebody's going to meet him.
Somebody will take him through to where he's going to
have to go next. He'll go on to a briefing room. At
that point we' 11 tell him about who he's going to be
speaking to, where it is, how he gets there. That kind
of activity he didn't have to worry about. He knew it
was going to be there. He knew his speech was going to
be on the platform, he knew the sound system was going
to work, he knew the lights were going to be there, he
knew the camera positions were going to be correct. He
knew the head-on camera, if it was going to be live,
was going to be in the right place. He, just those
kinds of things. The flags were in the right place.
His chair was there, it was labeled. Mrs. Nixon would
be taken care of. If he worked a crowd, he knew that
Mrs. Nixon would be taken care of. Those kinds of
things are the things that the President didn't have to
worry about. That was our job.
SY: Hm hmm. It certainly has worked.
RW: It worked.
SY: Do you have a permanent address? If not a permanent
home address, but an address of family or, where you
might be reached over the next ten years if an oral
history project really is gone into more depth, to talk
about things like, oh, the China experience?
Hopefully, we will, at some point, get back to staff
members. At this point we're so glad to have some
61
record of what you've just been telling me.
RW: Right, I understand. Well, I really don't [have a
permanent address]. But I think you' 11 always have my
address.
SY: All right.
RW: We're not going to
SY: Well
RW: Right now you've got my home address here and,
SY:
...
obviously right now it won't be any problem. You
can be reached at Interior, but
RW: Right. And you have my home address here.
SY: Hm hmm. Hm hmm.
RW: And, Rose Mary [Woods?] will always know where I am. I
mean, that's just a relationship that I'll never lose.
And the White House Communications Agency, most of the
operators will always know where I am.
SY: O.K. Well, that shouldn't be any problem then.
RW: No.
SY: But
RW: I don't plan on going underground.
SY: [Laughter].
RW: When the New York Times attacked me I....
SY: Yeah, and as I was saying, hopefully, at some point, we
can come back to people and talk in more detail on
individual events, or specific, more specific
areas.
RW: Well, I would be very happy
...
I think one of the,
62
just one final note that I'll make is that,
SY: All right.
RW:
I think one of the reasons that the advance office
has worked, and worked so well, is that-- I have a
cliche, I have a lot of them. I've looked at us as
being little guys that ran around putting all the fires
out. There were other people building them, the
President building his, [Henry A.] Kissinger building
those, the front runners, the heavy hitters,...
SY: Hm hmm.
RW:
what I would call them. What our mission was--I had
a hard time, on many occasions, biting [my] tongue.
For five years of my life, I have worked behind the
scenes. I've worked out of the third floor of this
office, I've gone into a city and I've worked out of a
hotel room. I've moved out under the cloak of
darkness, never talking to press, never letting them
know what I do. Never having a, granting an interview.
Almost to the point of where I hide. As a result of
that, that's the way the other advance men work. I set
the example, in that I trained them. A guy that didn't
want to follow my example, I fired him. Now how do you
fire a volunteer? You don't, you just tell him, "Don't
come, don't call me, I'll call you. =
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: But those are the kind of men that we had. I think the
President
...
The last rally we did, 1972, was in
63
Ontario, California. Why did we do Ontario,
California? Well, I like to be first to admit that I
didn't know why we were doing Ontario, California.
I've done twenty-five advances in California, and, if I
had to pick a place to do an airport arrival, it sure
as hell wouldn't have been Ontario. But, if you go
back to Six Crises, on November the sixth, 1960, the
President had a rally in Chicago, late evening. Got on
his plane and flew to California. He arrived there at
something like three a.m. in the morning, and he
arrived in Ontario airport. They had a torchlight
rally for him. There were something like fifteen
thousand people there. The next day the election
result, and he lost. Well, it was very obvious why we
went back to Ontario. We vowed that was going to be
the biggest happening that the President had ever had
in his life, because it was going to be his last, his
last, in his name, political rally the man would ever
go to. Mike Duval was the senior representative and
Homer Luther was the lead advance man. We did two
other stops that day, Greensboro, North Carolina, and
we probaly had twenty-five thousand people in
Greensboro, North Carolina. They broke the ropes and
completely engulfed Air Force One. Ollie has pictures
of that that are the most incredible sight that you
have ever laid your eyes on. Because Ollie stood
inside the door of Air Force One, had the President and
64
Mrs. Nixon waving, the back of their heads, and all you
can see, for as far as the eyes will go, is heads. It
is the most incredible thing, I mean, if I had had to
plan that [pounds table], I, excuse me,
SY: [Laughter] That's all right.
RW:
I couldn't, I could never have planned it better.
It's completly engulfed that plane.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Well, that's a happening that you could never plan, for
security reasons and all kinds of other reasons. We
hadn't been airborne more than an hour, the President,
Bob Haldeman came back and got me out of the staff
section. I went up, and I had never met with the
President in his office on Air Force One. As a matter
of fact, I had had very little relationship with the
President, because that was not my job. My job was to
make sure everything was going right. Steve Bull
talked to the President of the United States. Why
should the President of the United States have to worry
about talking to four or five guys? There's just no
reason for it. If I had been an egotistical bastard I
could have pushed my way in to talk to the President in
order to get in the pictures and stuff like that. You
know, at least SO my mother and father would see me on
the front page. I just, I, it was just not in me to do
that.
SY: Hm hmm.
65
RW: If I had an advance man that did it, I'd fire him
faster than greased lightening. I'd say, "Sir, you' 11
never do another advance for me, period." But he
called me up, Dwight and Bob and I went into his
office, in this little office on Air Force One, and he
started talking about Greensboro and what great people
they were. Then he started saying what a fine job that
I had done [unintelligible]. Good, bright young men,
what a great job had been done and how much he had
appreciated it. And he made one comment, he said,
"It's too bad that we really didn't have a tough
campaign so that your guys could have, that they could
have really done their thing." And then Bob said,
"Sir," he said, "you're absolutely correct. Ron has
put together a hell of a team. I think you'd have been
very proud had they had the opportunity to do it for
you." He said, "Well, we didn't need it." And I said,
"Sir, that's just as important to me as if we had
needed it."
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Well, you know, it's probably one of the greatest
thrills of my life. But then we landed in Ontario that
night, and I probably had fifteen advance men assigned
to that one stop. That's a lot of advance men. What
we did, we broke it down into sectors. We assigned,
maybe, a five mile radius to one advance man, and he
had his own phone bank and his own handbill operation.
66
We may have had five or six sectors, where one advance
man or two advance men were working. And, I'm telling
you, we turned out the better part of fifty thousand
people.
SY: Hmm.
RW: It was the most incredible sight I have ever laid my
eyes on. We had torches....
The back of that plane--I
knew it was going to be my last advance, or my last
stop, the last stop as a tour director, and after that
is was all over. I'd already turned in my resignation,
I'd had already said, "After 1972, November the
seventh, I'm finished, I've had it."
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: He, they opened the back end of that plane and all I
could think was, "God almighty! Three and a half years
of my life [snaps fingers] building something like
this, and then what a happening to end it on." And I
can remember just
I was always the first one off
the back of the plane. All I could do when that plane,
that door opened, was to put my head in my hands and
just go, "Wow!" The next morning
[End of reel one]
[Reel two begins]
RW: Well, anyway, the morning, I guess, let's see, this was
Sunday morning, 50 it had to be the fifth we did the
Ontario event. We flew from the east coast to
Greensboro, Albuquerque. Albuquerque, again, was
67
another sensational stop. We had about fifteen to
twenty thousand people there. And then out of
Albuquerque we flew on in, to arrive in Ontario. I
think we called the rally for six o'clock. Maybe seven
o'clock, I don't know, anyway the files will show what
time it was. So that was the fourth. The next morning
was the fifth, which was Sunday. I called a meeting at
ten o'clock, ended up being ten-thirty, in the
conference room in the Western White House, of the
advance men that had participated in that evening's
event. Those advance men were Duval, who was the
senior representative
Let me just make one other point right quick. All
during the time we were building this advance
operation, I was the expert. Haldeman felt better,
Dwight felt better and, I'm sure, if the President knew
about it, he would have felt better, that on every stop
I was on the ground. I may not get in there until the
night before, but we'd call a countdown meeting. The
countdown meeting transpired the evening before the
event. It pulled everybody in that had anything to do
with anything, as far as that event was concerned.
They went through it from the time that airplane was
approaching, fifteen minutes out, until it was fifteen
minutes gone. It was the movements, the diagrams of
the airport, the diagrams of the motorcade route, the
cars, the radios in the cars, you know, everything.
68
Just everything that was going to happen was talked
about in that countdown meeting. So if there was any
problem, if an agent said, "Now wait a minute, there
are ropes and barrels in that area?" "Unh uh, they're
not there." Well, Timmy could say, "I want to move my
press through that area." It got it right on the
table, right now. Well, this was something I did a
long time ago, during my first advances, I said, "By
God, I'm going to get everybody that has got anything
to say about this trip, and I'm going to get them in
one room, and we're going to sit down and we're going
to talk it over. Because that's how things will go
wrong [pounding]." Well, I would always get in there
for that countdown meeting. Well, as "The Roadrunner,"
which was my code name, when I hit the ground, it was
immediate fear, because, I had been there probably four
or five times before. There wasn't anything that one
of these guys was going to experience that I hadn't
experienced before, and probably got in trouble for, or
at least made a mistake. Or had corrected the mistake
before it became a problem.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: I had a great tendancy, and it was part of my style, to
instill great fear. When I got into there, that son of
a bitch had better be buttoned down. Excuse my
language. It'd better be buttoned down to the point
where [snaps fingers] it's right, now. Well, it got to
69
a point where I couldn't physically do it, because I
had responsibilities here, I had responsibilities as
far as all kinds of
But I didn't need to do any
more, because what I had, was I had three Ron Walkers,
or three senior advance men. Duval, Clower and Henkel.
And so, during [1972] these men were me. They would go
in and be there, sometimes they were there for the
entire trip. But they would let the lead advance man
run it. They'd be more of a sounding board for advice
and counsel and everything else. Well, it worked.
Yeah, some people may say, in going back, that we had a
hell of a lot of men involved in a presidential stop.
Well, it took that. We proved that it was the right
way to do it. Now, we may have been able to do it with
less men and have the same results. I'll never want to
chance it. I'll never chance it, and I wouldn't have
chanced it then. But that worked.
Well anyway, Duval was the senior representative
on the Ontario stop. Homer Luther was the lead, and
with him, he had Peter Jarvis, Peter Murphy, Wayne
Whitehill, John Pitchess, Jim Kolstad, Jack [John E.]
Packard, Tom Hart, and some others. Sandy [Sanford R.J
Abbey was with them. Phil [Philip H.] Martyr was with
them. I'm going around the table when we, well those
were the guys that came in the next morning. I had
picked up "Red" [B. M.J Cavaney and Dewey Clower in
Albuquerque and taken them into California. So they
70
were in the room also. I kind of suspected that Dwight
was up to something. About an hour before, Dwight
called me and he said, "What time is your meeting?" I
said, "Well, it's at ten-thirty." He said, "Oh, I
thought it was at ten.' And I said, "No, it's at ten-
thirty." He said, "Well, the President is probably
going to do a drop by." And I thought, "Geez, that's
sensational." So we went in, and I started my meeting,
and I didn't tell any of these guys. All of a sudden
the door opened, Steve Bull stepped in and said,
"Gentlemen, the President of the United States."
Well, these guys had worked for the President,
Mike, in his case, for three years, some of the other
ones for two years, and then some, most recently, this
year, had never met the President. Mike had met him,
but just a handshake and a thanks after an advance. A
good advance, I normally would take them on the plane
and the President could at least shake their hand and
say thank you. I always felt that I should do it in
the plane, as opposed to doing it on the ground,
because on the ground everybody was looking. Here's a
guy that's been on the ground for four or five days,
that's talking for the President of the United States.
All of a sudden I walk up and introduce him to the
President of the United States, they're going to think,
"I thought this guy knew the President all along,
=
SY: [Laughter].
71
RW: ..."I thought he was drinking buddies with him. = So,
that was kind of an awkward situation, so I always took
them on the back of the plane, and then, as he was
coming to his quarters, I'd have them there in the
aisle.
The President came in very relaxed. The Gallup
and Harris polls had come out that morning and, he was
something like twenty-seven points ahead; he was just
very relaxed and very calm. He talked for about
twenty, maybe twenty to twenty-five minutes. And he
said, "I know what you men do, what you have to do. I
know what sacrifices you've had to make and I know what
it must be doing to your families." He said, "I know
it's difficult for your wife to think about you out
there with all those cute little "Nixonaires" and
"Nixonettes" and everything." He said, "I know how
hard you have to work." He said, "I know the traumatic
experience it is to have to stand on an airport and
worry about whether the crowd's going to show up, or
whether it's going to rain, or whether the sun's going
to shine, and everything." Well, it was just here is
the President of the United States standing there
talking to a group of little guys, that had done a hell
of a job for him, but never asked for anything. Never
asked for anything, period. The rewards they got were
something that you couldn't buy in a store, or anybody
could ever give you. It was something that they
72
earned, and they
It was something they' 11 carry
with them the rest of their lives. But, to have the
President stand there and talk to them about the things
they had been doing, made them realize, "Yes, here's a
man that does know what we have to go through. He
may not know the minute details and stuff like that,
but at least he has an empathy with what our job is. =
He talked about, well, for a long time. He went into
what the last four years has meant, and what the next
four years will mean to America. [About] how the
opportunity to be a part of this was really the only
thing that mattered. That they'd been a part of
something that's really bigger than him, or any
individual in that room, and for that they should carry
away a great sense of accomplishment and a great
contribution to something that was far bigger than all
of us. So that kind of wrapped up my career right
there.
SY: I guess SO. Well, just very briefly, but is there
anything which stands out at this point? I realize
that perspectives will change over the next few years
when you have
Is there anything which stands out
as being of particular interest that you might want to
talk about later, in more depth? Any of the trips,
which might be outstanding, or any. ?
RW: Well, I've done some three hundred, I've done over
three hundred advances for the President.
73
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Every one of them I learned something. Every one of
them was a new experience. And they're--yeah, fine,
you go into a rally, and a rally's a rally, and you
can't change a rally. But, there were different
people. There were different associations, different
friendships made. If I had to--and I have thought
about this. There are probably three or four things,
maybe a half a dozen. You have to take and divide it
into two sectors. One of them is the domestic side of
advancing.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: And the other is the international. The international
side is something that, really, one can never truly
explain. What it's all about. Because you all of a
sudden find yourself really an ambassador for the
President, and yet still a con artist. Yet you're
dealing with some pretty fair con artists themselves.
I would say, probably, well, it would, beyond any
doubt--the one international advance that I had, out of
the ten or so that I did, was China.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: I could talk, again, the better part of the day about
China. It was probably the most unique experience that
any person in the last twenty-five years has ever had.
I happen to have shared that, I happen to have been at
the focal point of that experience. Because I spent
74
seven weeks in that country as the President's
representative, with no ambassador, no embassy, and
having to handle the better part of a hundred, [up] to
eventually four hundred, people. That would be the
internat--, or course Russia, again, you'd have to
slash it, but in Russia you had an embassy.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Russia had had foreign dignataries, you know heavy
dignataries visit their country before. The largest
party that China had ever had was thirty-five. To
include the head of state, plus press and everything,
thirty-five. We came blowing along with four hundred
people. So that's the international side. I could
talk about China and Russia, China probably more than
anything else. I could talk about India. Did England,
did Italy, did Ireland, did Mexico, did the Apollo XIII
splash down in Hawaii, which was really a domestic, but
it was, well, I think as close as you can do
Did
Canada.
Domestically, I think the two or three, four
things that stand out most vivid in my mind, was the
Apollo XIII splash down, which we only had twenty-four
hours to do it. It's when those astronauts almost
died. The President flew out and presented the
Medal of Freedom. Incredible experience on my behalf,
because I moved mountains to make that thing happen.
The Whitney Young funeral in Lexington, Kentucky, as
75
funny as it might seem. I'll bet I've done at least a
half a dozen funerals, include the [Charles] DeGaulle
funeral. But Whitney Young was, obviously, black; he
had a very unique organization that he was president
of. They were hard core blacks, and they were not very
inclined to deal with whites at all. Probably one of
the toughest advances, on a short period of time, short
notice, that I've ever had to do. Because they took
the body from New York into Louisville, where it laid
in rest for an evening, and then they had a motorcade.
And at one point they were talking about somewhere in
the vicinity of between five and ten thousand cars
being a part of that motorcade in the fifty mile drive
from Louisville to Lexington, Kentucky, where the
funeral would transpire. The President wanted to be
there for the funeral. Well, how do you have the
President of the United States come when the motorcade
is going to be--I mean, there's no telling when the
motorcade's going to arrive. The President sat in his
Oval Office and I sat on the phone in Lexington,
Kentucky, and never left my hotel room, because I had
Vern [Vernon C.] Coffey. I picked my, I got to the
point, because I was King Kong, where I could pick my
advance team, I could pick my agent.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: I could pick my military aide. I could pick my
communications officer, which is a very agreeable
76
SANITIZED
position to be in. But I took Vern Coffey, who was
black. I took [NAME RESTRICTED], who was black. And
probably two or three other black agents. And they
became, actually became site advance men for me. We
discussed this, and we knew it. And we knew that was
the best way to go about doing it. I had to make a
call, a judgment call, as to where that cortege was.
The President would walk out of his office at my
signal. "Mister President, we're ready to leave."
Walks out of his office, gets in his airplane, his
helicopter, goes to Air Force One, flies to Lexington,
Kentucky, Bluegrass Airport. [I had to] make that
call, where the President didn't have to sit on that
plane for an hour, or two hours.
SY: Hm hmm.
RW: Or three hours. Even a half hour I would have been
sweating blood. Well, I called Mike Schrauth in, I had
Mike Duval with me. I put Mike Schrauth in a wire
service car with a telephone. He was there at four
o'clock in the morning in Louisville, watching the
procession. I was on the radio with him for something
like eight hours. I had a telephone in my ear, or the
girl that, the volunteer secretary that I had there was
monitoring it for me. He rode in that motorcade. He
had driven that thing twice, and he had, we'd had
fourteen checkpoints of how much time it took to get
from here to there, driving at forty miles an hour,
SANITIZED
77
bang to bang to bang. I mean, just nothing left to
chance, except whatever they did. I called that snot
and the President was in within ten minutes. The
President landed, the governor met him. He went up and
spent a few minutes with the governor [snaps fingers],
came off and got into his car, and the motorcade
arrived and ours arrived, just like that.
SY: Hmm.
RW: After that advance the President called me. The first
phone call I ever got from the President. He told me
what a fine job I'd done, and he knew how difficult the
situation was and everything. Those blacks just did
not like us, uh huh, simple as that. That's one
domestic advance. Apollo XIII was another.
SY: Well, I'm sure there're so many individual incidents
and things that can be...
RW: Well, I've talked long enough.
SY: ...interesting. Well, thank you SO much. We.
[End of interview]
78
Name index
to exit interview with Ronald H. Walker
conducted by Susan Yowell
in Room 348 of the Old Executive Office Building
on December 29, 1972
Name
Page number
Abbey, Sanford R.
70
Agnew, Spiro T.
60
Allin, Lyndon K. ("Mort")
47
Atkins, Oliver R. ("Ollie")
21,46,64
Austin, Tim
51
Brennan, Peter
30
Brock, William E.
59
Buchanan, Patrick J.
21
Bull, Stephen B.
6-7,58-60,71,
Bush, George H. W.
59
Caneer, Ed [?]
51
Carruthers, William H.
43
Cashen, Henry C.
2
Cavaney, B. M. ("Red")
70
Chapin, Dwight
1-2,4,6-7,16,28,34,38,40,43,52,
58-60,66,68,71
Chotiner, Murray
21,36,58
Clarke, John E.
42
Clower, W. Dewey
10,34,35,70
Codus, William R.
1,49,52
Coffee, Vernon C.
76
Cole, Kenneth R.
5
Colson, Charles W.
16
1
Cox, Edward F.
53
Cox, Tricia Nixon
52
Daley, Richard J.
10
Davies, John
7
DeGaulle, Charles
76
Dole, Robert J.
49
Duval, Michael
SEE Raoul-Duval, Michael
Ehrlichman, John D.
2,22,60
Eisenhower, Julie Nixon
52
Elbourne, Timothy G.
32,43,44,69
Finch, Robert H.
19
Fish, Ody
49
Foust, Jon
10,34-35,40,49,51-53
Fox, Sanford L.
35
Gartland, John
42
Gitzen, Rosamond
20,33
Good, Terry
18
Goode, Mark
43-44
Goodearle, J. Roy
1-2,5
Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")
4,16,19,21-22,40,60,66,68
Hall, Allen C.
42,52,53
Hart, Thomas
42,70
Heath, Edward
3
Herman, R. L.
49
Henkel, William
10,34-35,40,54-55,70
Hess, Stephen
17-18
Hickel, Walter J.
2-4
2
Hope, Bob
30
Howard, W. Richard
3,16
Hughes, James D.
21,24
Jarvis, Peter
70
Johnson, Claudia Taylor
4
Johnson, Lyndon B.
4,10,22
Keiser, Richard E.
32
Kennedy, John F.
10,21-22
Keogh, James
21
Kingsley, Daniel T.
2
Kissinger, Henry A.
39,63
Klein, Herbert G.
16
Kolstad, James L.
42,70
Luther, Homer
64,70
Magruder, Jeb Stuart
28,40
Malek, Frederic V.
42
Marriott, J. Willard, Sr.
28
Martyr, Philip H.
70
Mazo, Earl
17
McCarthy, Stephen J.
53
McGovern, George S.
48
Moeller, William E.
40,51
Moore, Richard A.
45
Morgan, Edward L.
2,5
Murphy, George L.
43
Murphy, Peter
70
Nidecker, John
1-2,5
3
Nixon, Mrs.
1,4,9,48,52-53,61,65
O'Donnell, Terrence
42
Ogilvie, Richard B.
10
Packard, John E.
70
Parker, David N.
16,52
Percy, Charles R.
59
Pettit, John W. ("Jack")
16
Pitchess, John
70
Raoul-Duval, Michael
10,34-35,40,64,70-71
Redman, Albert
18,21,24
Rietz, Karen
36
Rietz, Kenneth S.
48
Riley, Colonel [sp?]
10
Rosenberg [sp?], [first name unk. ] 18
Rowe, Julie
42
Ruwe, L. Nicholas
1,5
Schrauth, Michael R.
50-51,77
Searby, Dan
53
Sheils, Marylou
53
Sloan, Hugh
7-8
Strachan, Gordon
16
Stuart, Charles E.
4-5
Stuart, Constance C.
9,52
Taylor, Robert H.
21,23-25,32
Tindle, Kathleen M.
53
Truman, Harry S.
54
Unger, Sherman E.
22
4
Warner, John
22
Whitaker, John
5,22
Whitehill, Wayne
70
Wilson, Harold
3
Woods [?], Rose Mary
62
Young, Whitney
76
Ziegler, Ronald L.
43
5
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"ocrText": "Exit Interview\nWith\nRONALD H. WALKER\nOn\nDecember 29, 1972\nARCHINES NATION AND 1985 SCRIPTA LITTERA MANET RECORDS\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nRICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTransc.\np. 32, from last open, ...presidential\n12/29/1972\nA\nprotection detail.\" to first open, \"one of these\npeople\n2\nTransc.\np. 77, from last open, \"...I took\" to first open\n12/29/1972\nA\n\" who was black.\"\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nExit Interview: Ronald H. Walker, December 29, 1972\nFOLDER TITLE\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential\nPolicy\ncommercial or financial information.\nB. National security classified information.\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate\ncompiled for law enforcement purposes.\nan individual's rights.\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\ninvasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nExit interview with Ronald H. Walker\nconducted by Susan Yowell\nin Room 348 of the Old Executive Office Building\non December 29, 1972\nSY:\nfrom you is a history of how the advance staff was\nset up from, right after the election in '68. How you\norganized the advance staff.\nRW: Well, the first six months of the Nixon administration,\nin 1969, the travel arrangement was handled kind of\ntotally by Dwight Chapin. He was the appointments\nsecretary, the travel coordinator, the individual that\nmade the assignments for the various trips the\nPresident made. Then I just happened, by happenstance,\nto be one of the advance men that had more or less\nsurvived and done a fairly good job in 1968 during the\ncampaign. I guess, quickly, to recall what that first\nsix months was about, would be to look at the\nInauguration itself, which was handled by a number of\nadvance men, specifically, [J.] Roy Goodearle, John\nNidecker, Nick CL. Nicholas] Ruwe, myself, and Bill\n[William R.] Codus (who handled the Capitol). These\nwere names that had been in and about the Nixon\ncampaign organization for many years. I was\nrelatively a newcomer, but did come back and help on\nthe Inauguration. I ended up advancing members of the\nFirst Family, specifically Mrs. Nixon, and then working\nwith the various [Inaugural] balls that evening.\nShortly after the Inauguration I went back to Texas,\nwhere I was living at that time, temporarily, and was\n1\nrecalled back to Washington to accept a position, since\nI had more or less terminated my tenure with the Hudson\nCompany in Los Angeles. They put me on a payroll at\nCommerce, thereby allowing me to participate, at John\nEhrlichman's request, and Ed [Edward L.] Morgan, who\nwas, I think, originally designated to possibly be the\nPresident's chief advance man for that first European\ntrip.\nOn that first European trip, we went out in\nJanuary [1969], the latter part of January or the first\npart of February. Just quickly, once again, Dan\n[Daniel T.] Kingsley did Brussels, I did London, Roy\nGoodearle did Germany, Nidecker did West Berlin, [Henry\nC.] Cashen did Rome and the Vatican, and Morgan\nanchored it in Paris. When we returned, I pursued a\nfollow up conversation and interview that I'd had with\nSecretary [Walter J.] Hickel. I eventually accepted\nthat position, at the urging of members of the White\nHouse, to become a special assistant to Hickel,\narranging all his travel, programing him,\nspeechwriting, his everyday appointment schedule,\ntrying to get him organized in a fashion similar to\nwhat I was accustomed to with the President. I\ncontinued to be available to Dwight, upon call, to do\nvarious advances. I didn't do a lot, but those that I\ndid do, in retrospect, I guess I did well. Because I\nkept moving up it seemed.\n2\nThat summer, the summer of '69, the President made\nhis first around the world trip, commencing with the\nApollo XI splashdown, off of Johnson Island, where he\nwent overnight in the Hornet, and received the Apollo\nXI astronauts. From then he preceded on to Manila, to\nBangkok, from there he jumped over to Saigon, and then\ninto New Delhi, which I handled. And then [I]\ncoordinated and helped Dick CW. Richard] Howard, who\nwas doing Lahore, Pakistan. Dick had not had much\nexperience in advancing, and had none on the\ninternational side. After that we proceeded on into\nRomania, from Romania into Mildenhall, England where he\nmet with Prime Minister [Edward] Heath, no the Prime\nMinister at that time was Prime Minister [Harold]\nWilson, and then into Washington. On that flight\nDwight discussed with me the possibility of taking over\nas the President's chief advance man. At this time\nthey had none.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: And starting to build a new team of advance men,\nconcentrating specifically on advancing a President, as\nopposed to advancing a candidate, and there is a great\ndeal of difference. We did not pursue it all that\nquickly. I went back with Hickel. Sometime within the\nnext couple of months there was an occasion when the\nPresident went to the redwoods in California, Eureka,\nCalifornia to dedicate the Lady Bird Johnson Redwood\n3\nGrove. The former President [Lyndon B.] and Mrs.\nJohnson were there, and the President and Mrs. Nixon.\nI did that advance and it was a good one. It so\nhappened that Hickel was the master of ceremonies, and,\nbecause Hickel had been so good to the White House in\nmaking me available and was a Cabinet officer, we\nhappened to have been able to have returned from there\nto San Clemente on board Air Force One. On that\nflight, Bob CH. R.J Haldeman talked to the Secretary,\nand Dwight talked to me about assuming this position.\nThe Secretary and I overnighted at the Newporter, in\nsouthern California, and had dinner together that\nnight and discussed it. The next morning we flew back\ncommercially, all the time discussing the pros and\ncons. His attitude was that, if this is what the\nPresident needs, by all means, you should go and do it.\nSo, after Dwight returned from San Clemente with the\nPresident, Dwight and I got together, and I decided to\naccept the position. That was in about October, the\ndates escape me. But I say that because I felt, after\nnumerous conversations with the older advance men that\nhad been around, that one of the first things that I\nhad to do was to get a handle on what so many other\npeople had been attempting to do. Not devoting full\ntime to it. For example, there was Chuck [Charles E.]\nStuart, who had been assigned as special projects\nofficer, special projects person, for Bob Haldeman.\n4\nAnd one of his roles [was] to go out and find new\nadvance men. So there were an awful lot of people that\nwere trying to find new advance men. There were also a\nnumber of people, in and around the United States of\nAmerica, that were writing letters, or letters were\nbeing written on their behalf, to the White House,\nsaying that this young man, this young woman, would be\nexcellent advance material\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nfor the President. So I immediately got in touch\nwith everyone--Morgan, Nidecker, John Whitaker, Ken\n[Kenneth R.J Cole, Ruwe, Goodearle, Chuck Stuart,\nDwight--and took all the mail, the correspondence, the\nphone calls, and started assimilating it. But I also\nrealized one of the first things that I needed, in\norder to make the goal as I saw it, in order to start\ntraining new men and building a new corps of advance\nmen that would eventually be the nucleus of a\npresidential campaign in 1972, would be to write a\nmanual. An all-encompassing manual that in no way, the\nindividual that had access to that, which I controlled\nvery, very heavily, quite tightly, that they could\nbecome an advance man by virtue of having read it. But\nthat it was a foundation in order to start building the\ntype of men that we needed to move the President. I\nstayed at the Department of Interior, Secretary Hickel\nmade an office available to me, and a secretary. I\n5\nbegan to take the 1968 campaign manual, using that as a\nstarting point, but by the time it was all completed,\nvery little out of the 1968 campaign was applicable. I\nspent the next three to five months putting that manual\ntogether. The manual will speak for itself, and\nthat'll be part of the Archives.\nSY: And you said before that the files 00 reflect the\nchanges in the manual\nRW: That's correct.\nSY:\nthat it would show that earlier versions and the\nchanges that have been made.\nRW: That's correct. All that material and everything will\nremain in the advance office, because this will be an\nongoing thing for the next four years.\nSY: Of course, yes.\nRW: And it will be needed for the new people that come.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nto replace me. After I had gotten the manual--and\nthe manual, primarily working on the manual was, well,\nwas me; I wrote it. Then Steve [Stephen B.] Bull and\nDwight and I spent many many hours going through,\nsection by section, with them adding various input,\nchanging certain formats as we decided, maybe, that\nthere was a better way to do it. The manual, I\nenvisioned from the very outset, should be a living\nrepository of thoughts and new concepts and new ideas.\nIn no way should it become a stagnant, dead, this is\n6\nthe only way you can do it.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: And it did prove to be just that. Because we made any\nnumber of changes and there were [appendices] that were\nmade. It's probably the best material on advancing a\nPresident, or for that matter, a candidate of any sort,\nas long as you take and make it applicable. Whether\nit's a city councilman, or a mayor, or a state\ncongressman, or a state senator, or a governor, or\nnational Senator or Congressman, and then eventually a\nPresident. Probably the best documented piece on\nadvance work that's ever been done. O.K., that was\ndone. Still in Interior, but in February of 1971 I\nmoved to the White House. I took up residence with\nHugh Sloan, on the first floor of the EOB [Old\nExecutive Office Building].\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: I had a desk, and that was it.\nSY: You did not have a secretary?\nRW: No.\nSY: You didn't bring a secretary from Interior?\nRW: Not initially. I started working with Dwight and Steve\ninternally, working at that time with John Davies, who\nwas a special assistant to the President for tours and\nWhite House functions. I handled movement into the\nPresident's office and out of the President's office.\nI handled the Rose Garden affairs, the South Lawn, the\n7\nNorth Lawn, north portico, all the things that were\ninternally being done. The Medal of Honor ceremonies.\nTo look at it from the standpoint of an advance, from\ndoing it for the President, making sure that everything\nwas precise, crisp, well organized, well executed, and\neverybody's in the right place at the right time to\nmake things [unintelligiblel. It was being done well,\nbut I think that\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\n...we got it going better. That was about as much time\nas I spent messing around in the White House. It was\nnot my forte. I didn't particularly care for it. My\nforte was building, finding these men, and getting out\non the road and making it happen out there, where you\nhad no resources. You had to pull everything together\nyourself.\nSY: Did you work at all with Mr. Sloan, with Hugh Sloan?\nRW: Yes, I did. Primarily from the standpoint of\nscheduling, not internally, but anything that had to do\nwith external events. Whether it be in the city of\nWashington or outside, in the country. I started\ninterviewing before the first of the year in 1969, on a\ncome-what-may basis. I felt that it was my obligation\nto any young man, or young woman.\nThe record will show that we had no women advance\ntypes. By virtue of the type of work, it was a\nfundamental decision that we made very early in the\n8\ngame. I felt very strongly that a female could not do\nthe things that we were asking to be done for the\nPresident of the United States. But I did support, and\nsupport very strongly, the concept of having female\nadvance types handle Mrs. Nixon and the girls. That\neventually transpired. It eventually proved, through\nthe girls themselves and Mrs. Nixon, that they\npreferred to have men. That's another whole story.\nBut there was a school that was held for the girls,\nConnie [Constance C.] Stuart ran it and I helped her,\nand I spoke at it. But they handled a pretty heavy\ntrip of Mrs. Nixon to about four or five states, and I\nguess the results were less than perfect.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Well, anyway, I started interviewing, and I had the\nphilosophy that it was necessary to--I had the personal\nobligation to anyone that wanted to be an advance man\nfor the President of the United States, to at least\ntalk to him and give him the courtesy of having had the\nopportunity to speak with a presidential advance man\n[banging table for emphasis]. Then I made my\nevaluations. But I talked to every one of them.\nI'll talk about it in my own language and\neverything. Some of them were, no way were they the\ncaliber of people that I felt could be representing the\nPresident of the United States out and about this\ncountry, or internationally. Whether it was\n9\nappearance, whether it was their attitude, or whether\nit was what they were hopeful of getting out of it, on\ntheir own behalf, as opposed to putting into it on\nbehalf of the President of the United States. One of\nthe strongest feelings that I had was that they had to\nhave an instilled passion for anonymity. Because, only\nin doing what we have done over the last three and a\nhalf years (and done it most effectively) has it been\naccomplished by virtue of that obscurity, and working\nbehind the scenes, and letting the people that we\norganize to be front runners get the credit.\nMy general philosopy was that it would be very\nsimple for a Ron Walker, or a Mike Duval [Michael\nRaoul-Duvall, or a [W.] Dewey Clower, or a Jon Foust,\nor a Bill [William] Henkel to go into Chicago, call on\nColonel Riley [sp?], which was protocol, who was the\nchief of staff for Mayor [Richard J.J Daley. Make that\ncourtesy call, and then turn to the Republican\norganization, say, \"O.K., this is what we're going to\ndo.\" Turn to Governor [Richard B.] Ogilvie's office\nand say, \"O.K., this is what we're going to do. I'm\ngoing to have a press conference at four o'clock this\nafternoon, lay out the schedule and do everything, you\nknow, and I'll be on television tonight and I'll be\nKing Kong.' Now this is the way that most of [John F.]\nKennedy's advance men and Johnson's advance men worked.\nThey went in with big \"hoolihaw\" [phonetic] and, you\n10\nknow, and a lot of clout, and a lot of open coverage.\nThey'd leave; the underlings would do the work. They'd\ncome back a day or so before the event, take all the\ncredit for it, and blow town. Well, you don't make\nmany friends that way. Not me personally, but you\ndon't make many friends for the President of the United\nStates that way.\nThe way to go about doing it, this is what we\nended up doing, was to go in there, make the courtesy\ncalls on a very low key, low fashion basis. Find out\nwho your key contact is going to be, who's going to be\nthe front runner. Determine very quickly--you had to\nhave that quick decisionmaking ability, or [be] a good\nreader of men and women, to know, initially, whether\nthe guy was a shaker and a mover, whether he was just\ngoing to be a grandstander and a lip service type guy\nthat was going to end up taking all the credit. [Who\nwould] want to sit on the platform, or want to\nintroduce the President, and not want to do any work.\nYou had to make these evaluations and do it very\nquickly because, in many cases, you only had maybe\ntwenty-four hours, seventy-two hours, four or five\ndays, to do that advance. In the period of about a\nfive day advance you can find yourself having anywhere\nfrom seven or eight hundred to two thousand volunteers\nthat are participating in that. Whether they're\nblowing up balloons or cutting confetti, or driving\n11\ncars, or handing out handbills, making telephone calls,\ndoing all these things that are 50 vitally necessary in\norder to turn out a crowd, in order to have people\nwhere you want them at the right, precise time. Then\nyou let the locals\n\"Locals\" is a bad term, that we\nnever used. \"Local\" is an applicable word,\nSY: Hmm.\nRW:\n...\nbut it sort of leaves a bad taste in their mouths.\nWe would call it, you know, the community, or the\npeople that are living in that location that will be\nthe main host committee, or whatever the case may be.\nIt was a good philosophy because it worked.\nAnother point that I always made to my advance men\nwas there should never be a town that you go into that\nyou should not be able to return to again. Or, that\nanother advance man cannot return to and not be looked\nat in a bad light because of the mistakes and the\nsorriness with which you handled that advance. You\nknow, you should be a diplomat, and you should know how\nto convince people to do things that they may not\nnecessarily want to do. But in the long run they end\nup doing it because you made them feel that it was\ntheir idea, and they ended up doing it because it was\ntheir idea. All the time knowing very well what your\ngame plan was. Well, I'm sidetracking, but I think the\npoint's well made.\nBut, anyway, I started interviewing men. I talked\n12\nto hundreds of guys. I would talk to them on the\nphone, I exchanged letters, I started setting up a\ncorrespondence section of anyone that wanted to write\nto me and ask, had to send me a resume and a picture.\nAnd from that we would start progressing. I initially\npulled together, again the number escapes me, but the\nearly part of June in 1970, I had the first advance\nseminar. Now, \"advance seminar\" was a term that I\ncategorized because I did not feel it should be an\n\"advance school\". That sounds too much like you're\ntraining guys to go out and be political hacks, or how\nto go out and get the political hacks. Or you're\nteaching them things that really aren't right. There's\na bad, bad feeling among many politicians, about an\nadvance man: they're con artists, they're young\nwhipper-snappers, they're \"BS\" artists, they're\nprobably a product of a political hack environment.\nWhether they'd been a lobbyist, or an aide to a\nCongressman or a Senator, or an aide to a mayor or a\ngovernor, or whatever the case may be. They know all\nthe political ins and outs, and how to get around\nsomething, you know. They slap them on the back, and\nthey talk percentages in the precincts, and what the\nblack vote's going to do vis-a-vis the Jewish vote, and\nall that kind of stuff. I said, \"Forget it!\" I didn't\nwant any political hack moving on behalf of the\nPresident of the United States. If a guy had never\n13\ndone anything in politics, he started off better with\nme than the guy that had [pounds table for emphasis].\nBecause I didn't come out of a political background,\nand by virtue of that I think it gave me a great\ninsight as to what advancing was all about. My mission\nwas pure and simple: to go in there and to organize a\ncommunity like that community had never been organized\nbefore in their lives. And realizing that I was\nprobably the first contact that that community had ever\nhad with the office of the presidency. And in a\nfavorable light. I would probably be, for the most\npart, [for] all those volunteers that would be doing\nthat work, the only contact, or the closest contact,\nthat they would ever have to a President or the office\nof a President. I had to clean up my language; I\nhappen to be a great, earthy individual. But I had to\npresent the best light that I knew how, and I did it,\nand I demanded nothing less from the men that worked\nfor me [pounds table]. Now these men did not get paid\nby me. For the majority of them were volunteers.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Which again, is a kind of a different bag. But, in\nJune of that year, I had the first advance seminar.\nAnd there were about thirty-some-odd guys in there. In\ngoing back through that list, which has been a constant\nproblem that I've experienced over the last three\nyears, is that you go out and you find these good men,\n14\nand you train them in the art of being an advance\nman\nIt is an art. There's no doubt about it. It\ntakes a unique type of individual in order to do the\nthings that you ask that man to do. It takes great\nsacrifice. It takes guts, because you have to talk\nyour boss into being able to take time off and go and\ndo this. You have to learn; you worry. Your stomach\nknots up. You worry about whether the crowd's going to\nbe at the airport, or whether it's going to be along\nthe motorcade route. You worry about whether your\nreception committee's going to be there. You worry\nabout getting the schedule done. You worry about all\nthese kinds of things, and it's a very snort period of\ntime. There's one thing you always experience: that's\nfinality. Because, the moment the President arrives\nback, and he gets on that airplane, on the \"Spirit of\n'76\", and those wheels lift off, it's either been a\ngood advance, or it's been a bad advance. There is no\nmiddle area in my mind. So, you know when that plane\nlifts off, if you've had a good stop [pounds table], if\nit's been a good drill. And, boy, there's nothing, no\nfeeling like that in the world if it's gone well.\nThere's also no feeling in the world if it's gone bad.\nBecause, only you will hate yourself more than anybody\nelse could ever hate [pounds table]. There's always\nthat feeling on the airplane, at least I felt this way,\n15\nthat it was a great empathy for those guys on the\nground. And everyone else on that plane had been\naround long enough in politics, or with the President,\nthrough advancing or movement, that they also snared\nthat same empathy. But not that guy on the ground\n[pounds table]. He knew he had blown it [pounds\ntable]. We had very few that were ever blown. As a\nmatter of fact, if I had to go back, I would say there\nwere, under my tenure, there were never any blown. We\nhad some mistakes, we had some problems, but we didn't\nblow it. The President was never embarrassed, with the\nexception of San Jose.\nOut of that school I can take names like Dick\nHoward, who ended up working for Herb [Herbert G.]\nKlein, and eventually with Chuck [Charles W.] Colson,\nwho I lost advancing. Gordon Strachan, who ended up\nworking for Bob Haldeman. Dave [David N.J Parker, who\nended up working for Dwight. Jack Pettit, who ended up\nbeing, becoming the general counsel of the FCC [Federal\nCommunications Commission]. I can go through the list,\nbut it seemed that it was an ongoing practice that we\nwould find these men, they would be good men, they\nwould be recognized on the road or their talents would\nbe recognized. Someone would say, \"Gee, that's a sharp\nguy.\" The next thing I'd know, he was gone. But, I\nalways felt that that was an obligation that I had, not\nonly to the President, but to the office of the\n16\nPresident. In order to get these good men into various\nslots.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\n...and locations, so that the President's machinery\nruns just as well everyplace else as it does. It gave\nme a great pride, sense of pride, to have found these\nmen, and have them be callen \"Walker's Raiders,' or\n\"The Roadrunner's Raiders.\" And then have them move on\nin. And all through the White House now there are guys\nthat we found, and we trained. They came out of the\nadvance operation, and now they're doing their own\nthing.\n[Recorder turned off]\n[Recording resumed]\nRW:\n...was last time that I did. You shouldn't feel that\nway.\nSY: Well, that's the first time it's happened to me, and I\nhad everyone try to console me. When I went back I\nfound out that Steve [Stephen] Hess, when he and [Earl]\nMazo were doing his book [Nixon: A Political Portrait]\nthey did one of these with the President that didn't t\nwork.\nRW: Oh!\nSY: [Laughter]. So, and we have\nRW: And he probably was less concerned about it than they\nwere.\nSY: Well, they called him up and told him, and he was great\n17\nabout it, apparently.\nRW: I'm sure he was.\nSY: Terry Good talked with Steve Hess when he left, I guess\nit was the White House Conference on Youth, and he\n[Hess] told him the story. The other thing that\nhappened with one of the people with the other\n[presidential] libraries, a man from the [Harry S]\nTruman Library went up to New York to interview, I\nthink it was Rosenberg [sp?], made the trip to New York\njust to talk with him. Came back on the metro[liner]\nand the electrical\nRW: System erased it?\nSY:\n...system just scrambled it, just completely. Before\nthere had been any transcription made or\nBut we\nhave paranoia about those things not working, you know.\nRW: You know what might be a suggestion for you, just put\nthis in the back of your, you know, just put it back in\nthere and think about it.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: The White House Communications Agency..\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nhas got tremendous recording facilities and the\ntechnicians to handle it.\nSY: Right.\nRW: And if you're going to do anything with somebody that's\na real heavy, you might want to call General [Albert]\nRedman.\n18\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: And just say, \"Sir, I'm going to be conducting this\ninterview with Bob [Robert H.] Finch or, you know, ...\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: with Bob Haldeman, or whatever the case it's going\nto be,\nSY: Hmm.\nRW:\n...and I'd like to have one of your men come in and set\nthis up for me...\nSY: Right.\nRW: ...and be there to monitor it.\nSY: We have used, they, well, it's their tape. And we have\nused them for minor repairs and things like that.\nThey're very helpful.\n[Unknown woman entered]\n[Conversation unrelated to interview]\n[Unknown woman left]\nSY: One thing that you touched on before, which I wanted to\nhave, is something on how you went about recruiting the\npeople you were interviewing, as opposed to their\nRW: Well, I think I was talking about the first seminar,\nwasn't I?\nSY: Right.\nRW: That was really kind of a turning point for me.\nBecause it was the culmination of the initial game plan\nthat I had laid out for myself. I think I told you\nthis: I'm a great game planner, in that I don't\n19\nconsider myself the all time great smart guy. So I\ngive a great deal of time to programing how I want\nsomething to go about. It's probably one of the\nreasons that I was a good advance man. Because I'm a\nstickler for details; I'm a perfectionist in what I do,\nand I know what has to be done.\nSo, I laid this thing out, I talked to all these\nguys. Then I had this first seminar. Well, I\nconducted this first seminar here, at the White House,\nin the Indian Treaty Room. Shortly before that,\nRosamond Gitzen, (G-I-T-Z-E-N) who was a bureaucrat in\nthe Department of Interior, had been my secretary with\nHickel, was detailed over to me. She and I went\nupstairs the day before that weekend. It was the\nfirst, second weekend in June, and I started a pattern\nthat eventually went through the next two and a half\nyears. I did it on a Saturday and a Sunday, which\nallowed guys to fly in and spend Saturday with us, and\nSunday. And then go home and be back to work on\nMonday, SO they didn't miss any work. We went up with\nthe White House Communications Agency and set up the\nIndian Treaty Room. I make this point only to show,\neventually, how we progressed, really. I set that\nwhole thing up myself. Everything from the water\nglasses, filling the water pitchers, and putting the\nglasses out there, to the pads and the paper. Then,\nthe school commenced on Saturday morning.\n20\nA little background on what I did. Shortly before\nthat school, and during the process of time that I was\nscreening and interviewing all these men, I made calls\non Bob [Robert H.] Taylor, who was the head of the\nPresidential Protection Detail, the Secret Service; on\nAl Redman, General Redman, the White House\nCommunications Agency; Don [James D.] Hughes, who was\nthe military aide to the President; Ollie [Oliver R.\nAtkins, who was the President's photographer;\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nat that time it was Jim [James] Keogh, who was the\nPresident's speechwriter; Pat [Patrick J.] Buchanan, at\nthat time, who had the News Summary; well, I could go\non. [I] made calls on these people, saying, \"O.K.,\nthis is what I'm attempting and going about doing.\"\nOne of the things that I had had brought to my\nattention quite early, when I was made to be the\nPresident's chief advance man, was that in the past,\nduring the other administrations, specifically going\nback to Kennedy (because that's when advance men\nstarted really coming into their own, was the 1960\ncampaign)\nNixon, well, Murray Chotiner was the\nfirst guy that conceived of a guy going out and making\nthese arrangements. He was the guy that did it. Then,\nKennedy did it better than Nixon did it in 1968. Now,\nBob Haldeman might take exception to that, but I think\nthe record shows that he ended up having at least more\n21\nmoney, more clout, and better manpower on the road for\nhim [in 1960] than Nixon did [in 1968]. There's an\nawful lot of background information that can\nsubstantiate that statement. Again, I say, Haldeman\nmight take exception to it. Just a side note that the\nrecord may not show, is that, and Bob may allude to\nthis later, but Bob only had about fifteen advance men.\nBut of that group of advance men, there was John\nEhrlichman; John Warner, who is now Secretary of the\nNavy; John Whitaker, who has just recently been named\nUndersecretary of Interior; Sherm [Sherman E.] Unger,\nwho, I believe, is in the administration or has been;\nand then some other ones.\nBut the general feeling was that the political,\nwhich is what they call [unintelligible], or the\npols[?], which were the political advance men.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nwould go out and play all kinds of games with the\nsupport people. Now this may go back to the individual\ncaliber of the President, Kennedy or Johnson, because\nthey, in their own right, were different types of\npersonalities than is President Nixon. Johnson was\nvery flighty. He, I think, became very, very nervous\nabout his life, after the Kennedy assassination, and\nthen assuming the office of the presidency. He would\nbe going to Denver, he would take off in Air Force One,\nand in the air he would decide that he didn't want to\n22\ngo to Denver, he wanted to go to Chicago. Well, that's\njust ludicrous when it comes to trying to move a man,\nbecause you've got helicopters in Denver, you've got\nthe cars in Denver, you've got the security setup,\nyou've got the program going and stuff. And then, all\nof a sudden, you know, to take a four hour trip and cut\nit to two, and land\nYou know, they don't have\ncars. Then he'd be all upset and everything because\nthe proper facilities weren't there for him. Well, of\ncourse, we've never had that situation with the\nPresident, with President Nixon.\nTaylor indicated that one of the things that you\ncan do that will assist everybody else, is to keep, to\nestablish the type of office that is a liaison and a\ncoordinator of all the support elements: i.e. the\nSecret Service; the White House Communications Agency,\nwhich provides the podium, the flags, the seals, the\nsound equipment, the lights, the radios, the base\nstations, all the things that not only we as a staff\nneed, that the President needs in order to maintain\nthat continuity of the office of the presidency, but\nthe security need. The helicopter needs, all that kind\nof stuff. If they don't have as much information as\nyou can give them, within reason, and within security\npurposes, or however tight we wanted to keep it\ninternally, staffwise, they can't perform their\nmission. If they aren't performing their mission,\n23\nstuff is going to go wrong, and, if something goes\nwrong, there's the high possibility that the\nPresident's going to be embarrassed. And that is\nwrong. The same with the Secret Service. If you\nchange routes, or all of a sudden an advance man says,\n\"No, I don't want to go down that highway; I want to\nget off on this crossroad over here, because there's\nsome nice farms and stuff.\" Well, they don't have\nthose crossroads and stuff programmed. Now, granted,\nyou've got the element of surprise, that you can move\ndown, but that element of surprise leaves me awfully\ncold. Because there's been, indeed, built-in danger in\ndoing anything that you.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: have not programmed and planned.\nWell, apparantly the Kennedy advance men and the\nJohnson advance men did just exactly what I just said\nwe didn't want to do. But I initially\n[unintelligiblel, that it would be great for me to go\ndown and tell Bob Taylor this, or tell Al Redman this,\nor tell Don Hughes this, or whoever the case was going\nto be, but I had to prove it first. I had to prove\nthat we weren't going to screw them. At a given point\nin time, when the President's airplane lands, and all\nof a sudden this is all in the plan and everything, I\nsay, \"Nope, we're not going to do that. We're going to\ndo something else.\" Because that's what they had\n24\nexperienced in the past.\nSo it took a great deal of time to nurture and to\nchange the attitude. Fine, maybe Bob Taylor was\nconvinced, because he knew me personally, he knew that\nI wouldn't \"BS\" him. But the point I'm trying to make\nis that it was those other agents, those site agents\nthat are down there. You go on a one stop, you've got\nfive or six agents there. You've got the lead agent,\nyou've got the airport agent, you've got the motorcade\nagent, you've got the hotel site agent, you've got the\nevent site agent. All of those guys had dealt with\npolitical type advance men before, and they had this\nsort of stuffy, bad feeling in their throat, or in\ntheir stomach, every time one of us came around. Well,\nI could sense this immediately. By the same token, the\n[White House] Communications Agency, the military\naides\nOf course, we had all our own new military\naides. To develop a rapport, internally, a team type\neffort\nLook, it's not going to be Ron Walker's\nadvance. It's going to be our advance. You're just as\nimportant as I am. Only, I talk to the President's top\nstaff, and I brief them, and I write the schedules, and\nI am the focal point of all communications. I will\ntell you, as soon as I can tell you, everything. Don't\npush me. By the same token, I expect to know\neverything that you're doing. That's the only way we\ncan opperate. By doing that it's an open line of\n25\ncommunications. You got a problem, you tell me. I got\na problem, and it's in your area, I'm going to talk to\nyou about it. All areas concern me. I'm the focal\npoint. I am the President's representative. I have to\nknow what's going on. I'm not going to go talk to the\npolice, that's your job. In the past administrations\nan advance man would go in, he'd call on the chief of\npolice, and do all the kinds of stuff and everything,\nand the Secret Service agent [would] come in and he had\nto tear down what that guy had built. Well, that's not\nright. It's not right for me, or any other advance\nman, to go to a military installation.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: ...and go and talk to that Commanding General and say,\n\"Sir, we're going to land Air Force One here. We're\ngoing to park all our airplanes out here, and I want\nyou to turn the base personnel out, and I want your\nband out there to play \"Hail to the Chief\".\" No, why?!\nI've got a military aide that can do that. It's his,\nit builds his position, it builds his stature. I'm not\ngoing to make a career out of Secret Service or the\nCommunications Agency, or the military. So, why do I\nneed it? I mean, if that's, and that goes back to that\npassion for annonymity...\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: ...and that low profile. Give the people that have to\ndo the job the credit and the clout to do that job\n26\nwith. It's going to make your job easier, because you\ngot somebody else out there doing it for you. This is\ndelegating of authority. Well, that's another\nsidelight.\nBut that's the kinds of attitudes that we had to\novercome. I can't think of the number of cities or\nmilitary installations that we went to that somebody\nhad been there before us, and they went, \"Yech!!\" They\njust [could] hardly stand it. \"Here comes another\npolitical hack advance man. He's going to come in here\nand tear our base apart, or tear our city apart, and\nthen just walk out in a cloak of darkness one night,\nwith this hanging bag over his head, where nobody can\nsee him.\" So those were the kinds of attitudes we had\nto overcome. We did it. We had not done it just prior\nto that school, that first advance seminar, in June of\n1970. But that was one of the things that I talked\nabout greatly. I talked for two solid days, and that's\ngot to be a drag, for a guy sitting there and listening\nto one guy go--well, I don't claim to be the best\npublic speaker in the world but I did know advancing\nbetter than anybody else in that room. I also invited\nthe Secret Service to come and speak. I also invited\nthe White House Communications Agency to come and\nspeak. I also invited the military aides office to be\nrepresented. They spoke on behalf of all the\nhelicopters: Marine One and Army One. They spoke on\n27\nbehalf of Air Force One. They spoke on behalf of the\ndoctors. They spoke on behalf of the bomb shelter and\nthe \"football\", and the things that have to be an\nongoing process when the President moves someplace.\nWell, I wasn't the expert in those areas, so why should\nI be sitting up there talking about them? Well, that\nbroke the ice.\nFrom that point on, it kind of seemed that it was\na team. Those guys that left that school left with\nthat kind of attitude. I may be the President's\nrepresentative, but I'm not King Kong! Those guys\ndon't work for me, they work for the President of the\nUnited States. I just happen to be a coordinator, or\nhis representative, to make sure everything is pulled\ntogether and tied in a nice little knot. When he\narrives we untie it [clap], and it all falls out just\nperfectly. And that's eventually how it\nWell, a unique thing happened immediately\nfollowing that school that really set this thing\nflying. Or set the complex, or the organization that I\nwas conceiving. Honor America Day, July the fourth\n1970. Within the next week of that seminar Dwight\ncalled me and wanted me to meet with Bill [J. Willard]\nMarriott, Sr., who was the chairman of Honor America\nDay, and Jeb Magruder. Dwight said, \"Look, Ron's got\nthese thirty-some-odd guys, they're sensational,\nthey're our advance men, they know how to build crowds\n28\nand stuff. The President wants that Honor America Day\nto be the biggest happening on a Fourth of July ever in\nWashington, D.C. Let's let them have it.\" Well, it\nwas just like a gift from heaven. I took all thirty of\nthose guys, and they ranged from all the way up into\nupper state New York, down into Virginia. We had some\nin from Chicago and that area, but most of them were in\nthe east coast, the Washington area. I thought I\nshould go after my first element of men, [they] should\nbe in the government and up and down this coast here,\nwhere I can get to them quickly, as opposed to going\nout into the midwest and to the southwest and to the\nfar west. So that's what I had. I turned those guys\nloose. Crowd raising, handbills, leaflets, telephone,\nboiler room operations, and they just set up mini\npresidential advances. But they couldn't use the name\nof the President.\nSo, it not only gave them the opportunity to go\nout and try their wares or what I tried to teach them\n[pounds table], but they had to be innovative, they had\nto be imaginative, and they had to have a lot of guts\nto go about that job [pounds table]. It's great to go\nout there and say, \"The President of the United States\nand Mrs. Nixon will be arriving at Tupelo, Mississippi\nairport at four o'clock next week.\" That's clout! I\nmean, that's the President of the United States! We\ndidn't have anything going except, at that point in\n29\ntime, an Honor America Day ceremony. Well, we started\nprogramming. We got Bob Hope, we got.... Then, of\ncourse, Honor America Day speaks for itself. We had\nthe better part of 400,000 people that were here for\nthat event that night. Those guys did one hell of a\njob. I mean, it would never have happened, it would\nnever have happened if it hadn't been for those advance\nmen. They set up regional offices. We put up an\noffice in downtown Washington, we put two or three out\nin Maryland, we put some out in Virginia. We had\noffices in Philadelphia, we had offices in New York.\nWe had trains that came from New York, down through\nPhiladelphia, huge trains full of people. That's where\nPeter Brennan, we met Peter Brennan, who's now the\nSecretary of Labor.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: We met him the first time. He had a whole train of\nhardhats and brought them down. We had [H.] Ross Perot\nfrom Texas that rented two airplanes and flew them in.\nIt was that kind of, \"Give me a job, and by God, I'll\nget it done! [pounds tablel. There's nothing I can't\ndo!\" If the guy had that kind of attitude, and had a\nlittle more going for him, we'd won. Yes?\n[Recorder turned off]\n[Recording resumed]\nRW: Well, anyway, Honor America Day was a real plus. It\nnot only took what I'd been building for a year, or\n30\nworking for for a year, but it just highlighted it.\nThe President and his staff were in California, and\nI'll never forget as long as I live, out from that\nEllipse, that night, when at two o'clock in the\nafternoon, for a program that was going to start at\neight, there were hundreds of people arriving with\npicnic lunches. That were going to sit on that ground\nthere for four and five hours, six and seven hours. We\nhad, it was the damndest happening, probably, this city\nhad ever seen, from a standpoint of [an] outpouring of\nlove of America. Now, they've had outpourings of hate\nfor America, but that was a real happening. Everybody\ntook notice, and everybody gave us credit for it. So,\nfrom that point on, it just started to really go.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: We did some trips in between that time. But then the\nnext thing that happened was the off-year election that\nFall. By that time I had managed to get my own office,\nand Rosamond and I were set up, now, on the first\nfloor, but over on the Seventeenth Street side of the\nEOB. We were there in a four office complex with Hugh\nSloan and his office, and my secretary in my office.\nWell, we went about\nI was caught, I was caught in\n1970, because I had not prepared\nEverybody had\nsaid the President was not going to campaign. Well, I\nhadn't had any more seminars. I had continued to\nrecruit, but I did not have any other trained men,\n31\nSANITIZED\nother than what came out of that first seminar. Well,\nall of a sudden, the President decided to start moving.\nIt was a great lesson for me. Thank God it was an off\nyear election, because I didn't have enough advance men\nthat were trained. We did large political rallies. We\nended up doing something like twenty-seven stops in two\nweeks. At one point in time I had everybody committed\non the east coast, and I had to fly to the west coast\nand handle five states, by myself, until the President\nhad finished up some of these stops on the east coast,\nand I could bring some of those men over to handle\nthose stops.\nAt that point in time we came up with what we\ncalled a pre-advance. It was just prior to that.\nWhere we took a Jetstar, and we took the key people\nthat had to make decisions on the road. Those people\nwere myself, as the head of the pre-advance team, a\nSecret Service agent, and normally it was a senior\nrepresentative from the presidential protection detail.\n[NAME RESTRICTED] or [NAME RESTRICTED] or\n[NAME RESTRICTED]\n\" one of those people, Dick\n[Richard E.] Keiser. Oftentimes Bob Taylor went.\nThere was a White House Communications Agency, General\nRedman, he always went. There was Tim [Timothy G.]\nElbourne, who was from the press standpoint. And a\nmilitary aide. Those were the key people that had to\ngo in, do a site survey, find out what the hell it was\nSANITIZED\n32\nall about, what was going on. We had a game plan of\nwhat we wanted to do, we had to find a place to make it\nhappen. Was the airport conducive to building a crowd?\nWas the motorcade route conducive to building a crowd?\nWhere was the rally going to be held? Determining\nwhether, what site was the best site to do it.\nOftentimes, it wasn't always possible, but I would like\nto have had what we ended up calling the \"lead advance\nman\", which was the guy that had the overall\nresponsibility [pounds table], to be on the site when\nwe arrived [pounding], or go with us. So that he was\nthere [pounding]. That was the guy that was going to\nhave to execute what decisions we were making\n[pounding]. It's pretty difficult to go and do that\nand not have a guy with you to know what you're talking\nabout, and the reasons behind it. So, that's when we\ncame up with the concept.\nWell, we did the pre-advances on all twenty-seven\nof those stops. Some of them, we would leave at seven\no'clock in the morning, and not get back til two or\nthree o' 'clock the next morning, and then leave again at\nseven and go do some more pre-advances. So, I had to\nrun the advance office all by myself, with Rosamond:\nbe on the phone, talk to all these guys, talking\nthrough their problems, the questions they had. Answer\ntheir questions. We had no tour desk. We had no\nliaison, internally, to be getting information. So I\n33\nworked very closely, by phone, with Dwight. It was\nless than ideal Well, we learned a great deal coming\nout of that. Out of that campaign I hired Mike Duval,\nDewey Clower, Bill Henkel and Jon Foust, who eventually\nbecame known as the senior advance men.\nSY: Up until that time then, the '70 campaign, you were the\nonly\nRW: That's correct.\nSY:\nadvance man on the White House payroll.\nRW: That is correct.\nSY: The first one.\nRW: Now, initially these guys were not hired on the payroll\nof the White House. We slotted them into the various\nDepartments and agencies.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: They were detailed in to us. There were some good\nadvance men out of the '70 campaign, and there were\nsome bad ones. I did a great weeding out process of\nthat. As a result of that, I probably ended up, I\nprobably had, on the record, twenty or twenty-two guys.\nMany of them couldn't get out, which was a problem I\nhad. But, I probably cut half of them. The reasons\nwere, they weren't buttoned down, they just weren't the\ncaliber of man we were looking for. So then, all of a\nsudden, it became necessary to start going and finding\nmore again.\nWell, going into 1971, we set about interviewing\n34\nanybody and everybody that we could get our hands on.\nTalking to friends, talking to relatives, talking to\nanybody we could talk to, to try and find the kinds of\nguys we were looking for. We started putting together\na team. We had more weekend seminars, started training\nguys. I got those four men then, started going through\nthe manual, and revising it. The changes that had\ntranspired since the initial publication that I had.\nDiagrams we went into much more detail with diagrams.\nSandy [Sanford L.] Fox helped us on getting the\ndiagrams of airports. We had four, five, six different\ntypes of airport diagrams that a guy could set up. We\nhad different types of motorcades. We talked about the\nparade-type motorcade, the confetti-type motorcade, the\nballoon-type motorcade, a standard motorcade, all that\nkind of stuff. So we really started to refine the\nthings that we had sort of haphazardly pulled together.\nThe next seminars and stuff that we had, I let the\nsenior advance men [pounding] start handling certain\nportions of them. Each, in [his] own right [pounding],\n[was] good in certain areas. For example, Clower was\nan excellent hotel man [pounding]. Foust was extremely\ngood at crowd raising, as was Henkel. Duval was an\nexceptionally fine organizer [pounding]. So I took\nthese innuendos and stuff like that, and\nOf course\nthat year we had, well, we did an awful lot that year.\nThose guys stayed busy. We trained other guys, got\n35\nthem out on the trips. At that point in time we\nstarted taking three and four trainees on a trip.\nThose guys were the leads, and eventually, we'd get\nthree for four guys out there. Maybe two of them had\nthe moves that we wanted. Another two didn't. We\nalways told them, \"Thanks very much. It gave you a\ngreat chance, and you may end up being president of\nChase Manhattan Bank, but you're just not\nIt may\nnot be your bag, but it's not our bag for you either.\"\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Well, that brought us through that year, we got through\nit. We had another European trip that year. Out of\nthe 1970 campaign I hired Karen Rietz. She had been\nworking for Murray Chotiner; the campaign was over;\nMurray had left the White House; and I hired Karen.\nThe early part of 1971, for the most part, was a game\nplan time. We had no office space. These four guys\nwere on my payrolls, and they bounced around from\nvarious open office to open office. They had no phones\nor anything, and, at the end, they ended up in my\noffice. That was a pretty hectic time. There were\nfive guys, five of us sharing my office.\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: Shortly after the first of the year we staked out this\narea on the third floor. We put together a game plan\nas to how we saw the advance office growing. We knew\nit had to grow in order to get ready for 1972. We also\n36\nknew that we had to go about finding a lot of men fast,\nand training them. Realizing that it's going to take\nat least a half a dozen stops, or drills, what we call\na drill, in order for a guy to be a seasoned advance\nman.\nIn order to be a lead advance man, a guy should\nhave experience in an airport rally, building crowds.\nThat's probably the most important thing an advance man\nhas to do, to know how to build crowds, turn out\npeople. You can have the all time great hall, you can\nhave the all time great balloons, all time great signs\nand everything, but if you've got empty seats, man,\nit's a disaster! So I'd rather have a hall that's just\noverflowing into the streets, [people] bumping into one\nanother, and not have any signs or balloons or a great\nband or anything. Now, if you can pull all that stuff\ntogether, then you've got a happening. But go for the\ncrowds, go for the people, get them in there. That's\nthe backbone of a good advance. Those kind of guys you\ndon't make. They're born with it. They just know how\nto go about doing something like that. Well, those are\nthe kind of guys that we tried to find. We had a\nEuropean trip. The latter part of that year we\ncontinued to have advance seminars. We started game\nplanning. The types of things the President should do\nin 1971, that he couldn't do in 1972, because [it was]\na political year. So we put together what we called a\n37\n\"blockbuster\". We took every conceivable state, every\nconceivable thing that a President could do that was\npresidential [pounding], that was not political\n[pounding]: a park, a prison, anything like that.\nBelieve it or not, by the time 1971 was over, we'd done\nthe better part of ninety-five percent of them\n[pounding]. The blockbuster is in the file here. But\nit was to try and hit fifty states, and do it in\n1971\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\ncounting on the first two years of the\nadministration,\nSY: Hm hmm. [Unintelligiblel.\nRW:\nand we did it. If you' 11 recall, the latter part of\n1971 we hit all fifty states.\nBut then we started working on China. I'll never\nforget it, when I was in San Clemente, at the end of\nthe summer of 1971. We'd ended up doing a series of\nstops on the way out. We were out there for the\nsummer. All of a sudden, it was a Friday afternoon, I\ngot a call from Dwight. I was laying next to the pool\nat the San Clemente Inn. He said, \"Get dressed and get\nover here.\" I went over, and all of a sudden I walked\ninto the conference room, and there was the advance\nteam. Which by this time had become happenstance. It\nwas a great love for us. We were doing our jobs and\nthey were doing theirs, 'cause we had problems,\n38\nalong There were some agents that were fired,\nthere were some advance men that were fired. But we\nhad developed what I had initially set out to do, so\nnow it was a team. \"Can't tell you what's going to\nhappen, but the President's going to make a move, to\nBurbank, where he's going to address the nation,\" that\nevening. When we went down we had like two hours to do\nit. Landed a helicopter, drove a motorcade, got down\nto Burbank, get in and set the whole damned thing up,\ngot staff offices set up, offices, telephones. The\nWhite House Communications Agency had to get their\nphones in there and everything. The President walked\nout and said he's going to visit China [pounds table].\nSaid Henry Kissinger's just gotten back. Well, you\ncould have knocked me down with a feather!\nSY: That was the first time?\nRW: Right, the first I knew about it.\nSY: [Laughter].\nRW: Well, from that point on, it became very much our\nbusiness. Because we spent the next three months in\nthe bomb shelter, organizing and pre-planning, and\ngetting ready for the China trip.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Then, before the China trip he announced he was going\nto Russia in the spring, SO....\nWe continued to have the seminars, we continued to\nbuild a team. I was shooting for seventy-five men. We\n39\nended up with fifty very solid men. Probably another\ntwenty-five or thirty that we sent to the Committee for\nthe Reelection [Committee to Reelect the President] for\ntheir advance operation. We did China. We came back.\nI had to make a decision, at that point, because, while\nwe'd been in China, the Committee for the Reelection\nhad started and they were having problems. The\nproblems were that they had had a big rally in New\nHampshire and a big rally in Florida, and they'd been\nbust. Just disasters. But we had not been involved.\nSo Haldeman told me to find out what was going on.\nDwight asked that I meet with Magruder and those people\nand find out\nWell, I went over and met with them\nand knew just exactly what had happened: they didn't\nknow what the hell they were doing. So I came back,\nand I had to make recommendations. Well, the\nrecommendation was made, among some other ones, but I\nknew what it was when I said it. I'm going to have to\ntake one of my full time men.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nand send him over there to head their advance\noperation. I sent Jon Foust. Jon did a hell of a JOD,\nbut I also sent a lot of men with him. Bill [William\nE.] Moeller. Now, in January of 1971, I decided what\nwe had to start doing, was approaching various\ncompanies that were inclined and favorable toward the\nPresident. I took Bill Henkel and Mike Duval, and gave\n40\nthem a crash course in meeting with the president and\nchairman of the board of various companies, on how to\ninterview. We went to New York, after making contact\nwith probably a dozen of the President's friends, and\nwent and saw the president of the board, chairman of\nthe board, and told him that what we were doing was\nstarting to build a presidential advance team. We were\nlooking for bright, young men. I did a mailer, and\nsent them to all kinds of people. I went back and\ncontacted every advance man out of 1968, to find out if\nthey were interested, what they were doing, if they had\nany thoughts. We've got a file of advance men in there\nthat numbers somewhere in the vicinity of around\nfourteen hundred men.\nSY: Hmm.\nRW:\nthat we personally talked to. Those guys [the\nsenior advance men] took off, and for the next three or\nfour months they traveled all over this country,\ninterviewing. Meeting with the president of that\nboard, and he, in turn, going back into his\norganization and finding one, two, three young men.\nThat was the backbone of how we went about building\nthis organization.\nThen the European trip came up, and then the\npresidential travel. Puerto Vallarta, Mexico came up.\nOther movements came up, and then China. We didn't\nhave the time. I needed these guys. So then I\n41\nsolicited Fred [Frederic V.] Malek. Then he and John\nClarke went about a nationwide search of manpower for\nus. They did a hell of a job. John Clarke probably\ntalked to five hundred men; of those we probably talked\nto a hundred; of those we probably picked thirty-five.\nSome of those were some of our best advance men. The\nonly thing they lacked was experience. It was very\ndifficult, because the President wasn't moving in 1972,\nexcept for international. That's how we built it.\nWe've had four seminars this year. The last seminar I\nprogramed to end on the first of June. After the first\nof June we were finished. No more interviews, no more\ntalking to people.\nIn the meantime I hired Julie Rowe, Marsha\nGriswold. We hired Julie Rowe out of Rochester, New\nYork. She helped in the advance office, she was a\nschool teacher, she did a hell of a Job, came back down\nhere. We had steps, [unintelligible due to table\npounding] doing this. I hired Terry [Terrence]\n0' Donnell, I hired Tom [Thomas] Hart, I hired John\nGartland, I hired Jim [James L.] Kolstad, I hired Allen\nHall. These are all men that\nI....\nWe just all of a\nsudden we went from a one man operation, to a two man\noperation, to a five man operation, to a six man\noperation, and all of a sudden it was up to, at one\npoint in time, counting the First Family operation,\ntoward the latter part of the 1972 campaign, we\n42\nprobably had twenty-five people up here. We moved into\nthese offices, designed them so they were functional.\nMark Goode moved up, Tim Elbourne moved up. Mark Goode\ncame on as a television consultant, which we felt we\nneeded, because we didn't have the expertise in\ntelevision. We needed a real solid television guy\n[pounding]. We found Bill [William H.] Carruthers and\nMark Goode at the Anaheim rally at the end of the 1970\ncampaign. It was the last rally that he did for\n[George L.] Murphy. And\nSY: Was, is that office under this office then?\nRW: Well, I have a genuine relationship, in that nobody\nworks for me, we all work together.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Actually, Timmy works for Ron [Ronald L.] Ziegler.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Mark Goode actually reports to Dwight Chapin. I report\nto Dwight Chapin.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But what Dwight would do is say, \"O.K. Ron, here it is,\nbang, go.\" Then I would get with Mark and get with Tim\nand get with the Secret Service and the White House\nCommunications Agency and bang, bang, bang, we were\noff.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Then we started staffing out; we started getting the\nreports; we started getting it in writing, 50 that the\n43\ndecisions were in writing, and they could go through in\na very simple format\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: ...yes/no. Here are the options, approve/disapprove.\nSo that, contrary to what we had in 1970, which was\njust a hodgepodge of nothing. We're lucky we didn't\nscrew it up. We were probably so well organized in\n1972 that we were too organized. But I vowed to myself\nthat I'd never get caught like I got caught in 1970\n[pounding]. So I planned for the maximum! And as it\nended up, we ended up doing the minimum, but....\nThat's where we are now.\nSY: Well, if you'd go back just a little bit and talk\nabout, you've mentioned coordinating with Mark Goode's\noffice, and you've mentioned helping out with the First\nLady's advance staff and the Committee [to Reelect the\nPresident]. Were there other areas that you went into,\nsuch as those?\nRW: Well, I think it, I think the revealing thing is that\nthe advance office and I would have to admit that it\nwas probably by design of me, is that I instilled in\neveryone here, to include Mark and inlcude Timmy, who\neventually became a part of our operation that the\nadvance office is a unique kind of office [pounding].\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: For example, we did restaurant surveys, we did\nlimousine surveys, we did hotel surveys in Washington\n44\n[pounding]. We did surveys in probably twenty of the\nmajor cities in America. We've got more information\n[pounding], we've got more contacts around this country\n[pounding], for a centralized office, than probably\nanybody else in the White House. We're the liaison for\nthe Department of the Interior for all their guest\nhouses. If anybody in the White House wants to go to\nthe Virgin Islands, or wants to go to Camp Hoover, or\ngo to Cape Cod, or Grand Tetons in the national parks\nand stuff, they have to come to this office. And then\nwe, in turn, have developed the relationship with the\nInterior Department that we act as the liaison for it\n[pounding].\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: If anybody has guests coming into town and they're\nlooking for a hotel, something like that, it came to a\npoint where, Jesus, if you want to ask questions of\nsomebody, call the advance office. Well, that's the\nway I felt like this office should operate. We should\nwork very closely with the speechwriters to make sure\nthey've got the proper information. We should work\nvery closely with Dick [Richard A.] Moore. So that\nDick Moore, who does the color and travels with the\nPresident on the airplane, has constant communication\nwith the advance man. If there's a football player\nthat just broke his neck the night before, in a game;\nor if a football team just won a national championship,\n45\nor a state championship, or a city championship, and\nstuff; or if a policeman just got his back blown off by\na bomb that went off, or just got shot, or something\nhappened; or a young man saved some little kid's life;\nor some little kid's saved an old man's life; those\nkinds of things that the President, when he steps off\nof that plane and steps up to a mike, he can say,\n\"Geez, it's great to be in Fargo. And I see that we've\ngot the Fargo High School here. You guys just won your\nbasketball game last night. What was the score? 82 to\n72. Sensational! I'm really happy for you, but I feel\nbadly for the other kids \"cause they lost,\" and\nthat\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nall of a sudden you see five thousand people go,\n\"Gee, this guy really cares.\"\nThe people that we, the press office, we damn near\nwrote their press schedules for them, for all the press\ncorps. You take Ollie Atkins. We, the advance man got\nto the point where he could pick where the best shots\nwere going to be for Ollie to get different pictures\nthan the wires were going to get. So Ollie would walk\noff that plane, and the first thing he would want to\nknow is where the advance man is. \"Where do I go, what\ndo I do?\" There'd be a ladder for him, where he could\nstep up on the top of that ladder and get a whole\ndifferent perspective of a picture, for the West [Wing\n46\nof the White House] basement, or for the President, or\nwhatever the case was. Those were the kinds of things\nwe started doing. We would take it to the point of the\ntraveling staff. What their personal things were when\nyou had an overnight. With Mort [Lyndon K.J Allin, we\ntook the responsibility of getting the News Summary,\nand getting the News Summary distributed on the road.\nWe worked it out with the White House Communications\nAgency. We took the dex machines out of the\ncommunications department and started having one of\nthose, every advance man had a dex machine in his\noffice. We had a dex machine in this office right\nhere. So there was constant communication between this\noffice and that. Every morning we could see the\nbuildup coming in for the President. Four days before\nit was an article, two days before it was the headline.\nThe day before it was a whole front page. We got that\nstuff dexed to us. So we knew what was happening.\nFrom the time I walked off that plane as the chief- by\nthat time I was the tour director, running the entire\ntour-I'd walk off that plane [snaps fingers], I'd know\nas much about that advance and that city as the advance\nman, who was on the ground.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Except I hadn't been there. So there were very few\nquestions that I couldn't answer.\nSY: Hm hmm.\n47\nRW: There were very few needs that wouldn't be met. And we\njust, I just had the attitude that there is nothing\nthat we can't do. If it comes to the point where we\nsay we can't do it, there are going to be damn few\nother people that can do it.\nBy the same token, the relationship that we\ndeveloped in the field, with the Republican National\nCommittee [RNC], with the Committee for the Reelection.\nWe give the Committee for the Reelection a great deal\nof support, manpower-wise and advice and counsel.\n, Cause we're the experts, we're the pros. We've done\nthings that other people have never done in a lifetime.\nWhen you take China, you take Russia, we put on a\nconvention. When it was a dull convention, we made it\na happening. Fine, Ken [Kenneth S.] Rietz brought\nthree thousand kids down here, but we orchestrated\nthose three thousand kids. If you want to try\nsomething sometime, try and orchestrate three thousand\nkids! Or try and get them into a convention, on the\nfloor, when the RNC didn't want them in there. Well,\ntwo sessions during that 1972 convention we made happen\nthat would have been nothing but \"blaah\" [phonetic] if\nit hadn't been for those kids. The first night was\nMrs. Nixon's night, when they just blew the roof right\noff of that place, and probably helped us capture the\nbetter part of forty-five percent of the youth vote\naround this country, that [George S.] McGovern was\n48\nsaying he had.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: It was that kind of activity. If a guy says we can't\nget them on the floor, which Ody Fish said, screw Ody\nFish! If I have to go pick locks and pull every con\ntrick I know, I'll blow five or six hundred kids into\nthat hall, and watch my smoke! That's what we did.\nThey didn't like it. Dick [R.L.] Herman and Bob\n[Robert J.] Dole and those guys didn't like it. Well,\ntough bananas! It was the right thing to have done and\nwe did it [pounding]! If we'd sat back on our haunches\nand let, listened to those guys, nothing would have\nhappened. It would have been a \"thppt\" [phonetic],\nstinky convention.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Now that's the kind of activity, that's the kinds of\nthings that I felt so strongly that we should do.\nSomething needs to be done, and it's the right thing to\nbe done, by God, it's going to happen. I don't care\nwho we step on, who we run through, what corners we\nhave to cut. It's going to happen.\nSY: Hm hmm. Something we mentioned last week. You did say\nthat both Jon Foust, over at the Committee and, was it\nBill [William R.] Codus, who handled First Family?\nRW: Right.\nSY: They worked independently?\nRW: Right, well, yes. When I sent Jon Foust to the\n49\nCommittee, I knew it wasn't going to be easy on Jon.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: He was going in because of some, other people couldn't\ndo the job. It was, that was exactly the case.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: He had a rough time. Because he was an outsider, and\nhe was one of the President's advance men, that was\ncome over there to do a job that they couldn't get done\nthemselves. So those people that had been hired to do\nthose kind of jobs immediately, probably, had a great\ndeal of animosity,\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nnot only toward me, but obviously toward him,\nbecause he's the guy on the scene. So I took other\nadvance men and started assigning them to him. Good\nguys that we found. Like, we took one of our best\nadvance men and made him his chief of staff, as I had\ndone with Mike [Michael R.] Schrauth.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Mike Schrauth was the chief of staff of our office. He\nwas the center focal point of everything. Nothing\nhappened in this office that I didn't tell Mike about,\nor the advance man didn't have to come back in to Mike.\nThe men in the field talked to Mike. When it came down\nto a day before the trip or the morning of the trip, I\ngot on my conference phone with that advance man, and\nwe went through that thing from nut to bolt. Just so\n50\nthat I knew what they were doing, and I could\nsharpshoot and say, \"What about this, what about\nthat?\", and everything else.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Mike had run shotgun on it up to that point. Well, we\ndid the same thing for Foust. We sent him Bill\nMoeller. From there we gave him Tim Austin, we gave\nhim Ed Caneer [sp?], we gave probably a half a dozen\nother guys, maybe even a dozen. Then he went about\ntaking some of the names that we had discarded, not\nbecause they weren't good, but because we'd found\nbetter. We gave him that whole package, and from that\nhe built his own advance men over there, of around\nfifty-some-odd guys. Those guys were help, were much\nmore busy than we were, but yet I was not about to\nrelease any of those guys. If there were occasions\nthat, like that kick-off weekend, that they went out\nand canvassed all around the country and stuff, where\nall the Cabinet officers and the girls went out and\neverything. He used every one of our men for that\nweekend. So he had something like a hundred and some-\nodd guys out in the various states.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But for the most part, those were my men. And I\nguarded them and held them very close, because I never\nknew when something was going to happen.\nSY: Hm hmm.\n51\nRW: So that was Jon's bag over there. By the same token, I\nknew a year ago that, at a point in time, the First\nFamily operation, under Connie [Stuart], would be hard\npressed to handle the First Family during a campaign.\nNow, Connie would not like this comment, but this was\nsomething that I felt. Dwight and I talked about it\nlong and hard and we knew it was going to be a very\ntouchy situation, obviously, SO we went about doing it\nas quietly and as convincingly as we could. We took\nBill Codus; he did a number of things for Mrs. Nixon in\nand around the city. I had Allen Hall, who I'd\ndesignated to handle\nWe took on Julie [Nixon\nEisenhower] first.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Julie said she wanted somebody from my office to handle\nher trips and stuff. Allen Hall was the one that did\nthat. From that, Tricia [Nixon Cox] moved in. Dave\nParker ended up doing their scheduling, Allen Hall\nexecuted, using our advance men, again.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: So we got Bill Codus. Bill Codus did a few things for\nMrs. Nixon. Bill Codus went to Hawaii to do the\n[Kakuei] Tanaka thing. Bill Codus went to Russia and\ndid that. He handled her on the stops. So that was\nkind of building the rapport for Bill Codus. Came\nback, Bill Codus went in, talked to Mrs. Nixon, and it\nwas set. So, from that standpoint, we had Bill Codus,\n52\nwho was handling Mrs. Nixon and, really, the girls. He\nbrought with him Marylou Sheils from State Department,\nand Steve [Stephen J.] McCarthy. I gave him Dan Searby\nout of the convention, he worked Mrs. Nixon at the\nconvention also. I also hired Kathy [Kathleen M.\nTindle. Kathy Tindle was going to be on my staff, but\nI moved her into the operation of the First Family.\nAllen Hall remained in that operation. Allen Hall\neventually became the man that handled Eddie [Edward R.\nF.] Cox. He did more traveling than all the rest of\nthem put together.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: So that organization worked very close in hand with\nours. All our files and all our information and all\nour advance men were available to the First Family,\nlock, stock and barrel. All the surrogates and stuff,\nJon Foust handled. There were occasions when we were\nin slack periods and stuff, that I did make the\npresidential advance men available to him and, with\nrare exceptions, they were always ready, willing and\nable to do so.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: All total, tripwise, this time those advance men\nprobably averaged six events apiece. All total, this\noffice, during the 1972 campaign, include the things we\ndid for the Committee for the Reelection, plus the\nPresident, plus the members of the First Family,\n53\nnumbered somewhere in the vicinity of around a hundred\nand twenty-five.\nSY: Hm hmm. Do you see the office\nRW: Yes.\nSY: ...decreasing greatly in size and ?\nRW: Yes. You can go back through all the reports and\neverything that I wrote gearing up to 1972, the plan\nfor the advance office for 1972. I knew we were going\nto need a lot. We ended up getting a lot, and it\nworked. Just little things which I'm sure you would\nunderstand, but many people wouldn't, a xerox. Try and\ndo forty schedules, fifteen or twenty page schedules, I\nmean, from the standpoint of when they eat lunch to\nwhen they can go to bed, damn near. We finally got the\nxerox up here, and that kind of stuff. Well, that\nstuff will remain, but now it's not necessary, because\nhe's a President again. He's not a lame duck\nPresident, but he will never run for office again. So,\nthe tenure of this office is going to have to be\nretained. The magnitude of what it's going to\nencompass now will be just as important as it was for\nwhen he went to the [Harry S Truman] funeral, day\nbefore yesterday. There's already a backbone and a\ngreat foundation established here.\nBill Henkel, who I've named as my successor, was\none of the senior advance men. The reason I named\nBill, because he was the youngest of the group, but\n54\nmore importantly, I felt that the other ones were older\nand should be moving on into bigger and better things.\nWhether they stay in government, or whether they get\nout of government. Bill is a very organized type of\nindividual, as I am. He's also very personable, which\nI may or may not be. But that's the kind of person\nthat should be here. It shouldn't be a heavy,\nhardhanded guy that's going to be demanding and\nforceful, because it's not that kind of an operation.\nIt's the kind of operation that you tell us what needs\nto be done and we'll go about doing it, and we'll do it\nthe best that we know how. It's that kind of an\noperation. Bill can do that. There's going to be some\nheavy travel, but what you've got now is a hard core of\nabout fifty men that are trained, ready, willing and\nable to do anything they can.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\n... for a member of the First Family or the President of\nthe United States. Many of these men will stay in\nprivate industry, private enterprise, where they were\nwhen they were working for us. Many of them will\nprobably join the government. Many of them may or may\nnot be able to 00 any more advancing. But the point\nis, that there will be a nucleus to call upon. You\ndon't have to worry about the Hatch Act now, which we\nhad to concern ourselves about. One point I did not\n[make] is, by May of 1971, all the men that I named,\n55\nthat were on my full time staff, were being paid by the\nWhite House. They'd gone on the White House rolls.\nApproaching the last three or four months of the\ncampaign, those, there were certain members that they\nhad to take a leave of absence, or they had to quit\ntheir companies, in order to come and do this,\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nthat we put on the payroll of the Committee. So,\nthe way I envision the office moving is that you will\nhave a whether he'll be a commissioned officer as I\nwas, I don't know. I was a special assistant to the\nPresident. I don't know whether that's going to happen\nor not.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But, he will be the chief advance man, and most likely\nthe tour director. What he will need then, is a\ncombination senior advance man and desk man. The desk\nman is very important. A senior advance man is very\nimportant. It may be that he hires a combination of\ntwo and they rotate between being senior advance man\nand participating in these\nThese will be two new\nmen now, that will not have been here for the last four\nyears. Because what I would like to see Bill be able\nto do, in a year, is to move out and go and be able to\ndo something on his own. The two men that he hires\nnow, one would take over as the chief advance man and\nthe other one would become the desk man. Then they\n56\nmight hire another senior advance man that would be\nable to do the pre-advances, to work here and about the\nWhite House\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: ...or on the road, or whatever the case be. All the\ntime being able to call upon the men that have been\nproven and experienced. In the meantime, continuing to\nlook, not as heavily as we did, but for new and more\ntypes of guys that can be advance men for this next\nfour years.\nSY: Hm hmm.\n.W: I am convinced that the core of the people that we had\nin 1972, regardless of who the candidate will be in\n1976, can probably, more than likely, well....\nCan\nalmost rest assured will be called upon, in some\ncapacity, to perform a mission for the next candidate.\nNow, that's going to have to be their decision, it's\ngoing to be a personal decision for them. By the same\ntoken, the 1976 convention, plus, you know, what\nhappens in the meantime. You've got the Bicentennial\ncoming and I can conceive of an awful lot of\npresidential advance men being involved in the\nBicentennial, because that's the kind of things these\nguys can do, and do well.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: They're action oriented, they get a job done, you know,\n\"Give it to me.\" It's like the Inauguration. I've\n57\ngot, right now, probably fifteen guys that are over at\nthe Inauguration. And what are they handling? They're\nhandling the things nobody else would want to handle:\nthe parade, the seating, the building of those\nplatforms out there, the platform here, the swearing-in\nceremony. The things you get your hands dirty with.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But the office is going to have to be.... The White\nHouse has become, the people in the White House have\nbecome accustomed to knowing that if there's anything\nthat needs to be disseminated, in regard to a\npresidential trip, they call the advance office.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: And if we don't know, we'll find out. But most of the\ntime we know.\nSY: One other thing, to skip around a little bit, but I\nwanted to ask you about again. You mentioned when you\nwere doing the advance manual, you had the '68 campaign\nmanual and you worked with Steve Bull and Dwight\nChapin. Were there other people from previous\nadministrations that you had contacted?\nRW: No.\nSY: Or, other people, like Murray Chotiner, who...?\nRW: I spent a lot of time talking to Murray.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But here, you see, here was the thing. Steve Bull had\ndone a little bit of advancing, but not much.\n58\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: But Steve thinks like an advance man thinks. Dwight\nthinks like an advance man thinks. Dwight had not done\nmuch advancing. Dwight was the aide to the President\nduring the 1968 campaign, had been with him for two\nyears before that. Steve only did one advance for a\nPresident, and that was under my tenure, with me, he\ndid it with me. And that was Massena, New York. Well,\nit was a real education for Steve, because he no longer\nhad to go out and rent his own cars. He no longer had\nto go out and rent his own sound system, or his own\nlights, and get volunteers to drive the cars. Make\nsure gas was in the tanks, which I told you last time,\nI think.\nSY: Right.\nRW: It's all done for you now. But there was a much--I'd\nbeen through both of those. So, right now I'm the only\nguy around, that's involved in presidential travel,\nthat has experienced both sides of the fence. When I\nleave, that [leaves] a big void [in] this office. But\nI'll always be called upon, I know I'll always be\navailable if there's anything that's needed.\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: But it's not needed now anymore. When it is going to\nbe needed, if a guy goes out and it's going to be a\n[Charles R.] Percy, or a George Bush, or a Bill\n[William E.] Brock, or somebody like that, that has no\n59\nrelationship with the White House, or the White House\nfacilities, to call upon. If it's [Spiro T.J Agnew,\nhe'll obviously take with him the Vice President's\nfacilities and support and everything. So, that's,\nthat's what it's going to be like.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: The only thing that Dwight and Steve added to the\nmanual, which was really needed from my standpoint, was\nwhat the personal staff thought. The Bob Haldemans,\nthe John Ehrlichmans, and then what the President\n[unintelligible].\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Which were things that, when you're out on the road\nI had my own checklist, and that checklist told me\nabout all kinds of things that would necessarily\nnever\nThe President, well, he just is way, so far\nabove that he'd never even worry about it. He just\nconsiders that stuff's being done. That's the great\nrelationship that we had. The President knew that we\nwere out there. He knew that the job was being done\nfor him, and he knew that it was being done better than\nit had ever been done for anybody else. He didn't have\nto worry about that stuff. That's the way he should,\nwhen he got off that plane he should have known that\nthe only thing he's going to have to be told is where\nhe goes to speak, where he should work the fence. The\ncar, when he turns around, the car is going to be\n60\nthere. When he gets out, somebody's going to meet him.\nSomebody will take him through to where he's going to\nhave to go next. He'll go on to a briefing room. At\nthat point we' 11 tell him about who he's going to be\nspeaking to, where it is, how he gets there. That kind\nof activity he didn't have to worry about. He knew it\nwas going to be there. He knew his speech was going to\nbe on the platform, he knew the sound system was going\nto work, he knew the lights were going to be there, he\nknew the camera positions were going to be correct. He\nknew the head-on camera, if it was going to be live,\nwas going to be in the right place. He, just those\nkinds of things. The flags were in the right place.\nHis chair was there, it was labeled. Mrs. Nixon would\nbe taken care of. If he worked a crowd, he knew that\nMrs. Nixon would be taken care of. Those kinds of\nthings are the things that the President didn't have to\nworry about. That was our job.\nSY: Hm hmm. It certainly has worked.\nRW: It worked.\nSY: Do you have a permanent address? If not a permanent\nhome address, but an address of family or, where you\nmight be reached over the next ten years if an oral\nhistory project really is gone into more depth, to talk\nabout things like, oh, the China experience?\nHopefully, we will, at some point, get back to staff\nmembers. At this point we're so glad to have some\n61\nrecord of what you've just been telling me.\nRW: Right, I understand. Well, I really don't [have a\npermanent address]. But I think you' 11 always have my\naddress.\nSY: All right.\nRW: We're not going to\nSY: Well\nRW: Right now you've got my home address here and,\nSY:\n...\nobviously right now it won't be any problem. You\ncan be reached at Interior, but\nRW: Right. And you have my home address here.\nSY: Hm hmm. Hm hmm.\nRW: And, Rose Mary [Woods?] will always know where I am. I\nmean, that's just a relationship that I'll never lose.\nAnd the White House Communications Agency, most of the\noperators will always know where I am.\nSY: O.K. Well, that shouldn't be any problem then.\nRW: No.\nSY: But\nRW: I don't plan on going underground.\nSY: [Laughter].\nRW: When the New York Times attacked me I....\nSY: Yeah, and as I was saying, hopefully, at some point, we\ncan come back to people and talk in more detail on\nindividual events, or specific, more specific\nareas.\nRW: Well, I would be very happy\n...\nI think one of the,\n62\njust one final note that I'll make is that,\nSY: All right.\nRW:\nI think one of the reasons that the advance office\nhas worked, and worked so well, is that-- I have a\ncliche, I have a lot of them. I've looked at us as\nbeing little guys that ran around putting all the fires\nout. There were other people building them, the\nPresident building his, [Henry A.] Kissinger building\nthose, the front runners, the heavy hitters,...\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW:\nwhat I would call them. What our mission was--I had\na hard time, on many occasions, biting [my] tongue.\nFor five years of my life, I have worked behind the\nscenes. I've worked out of the third floor of this\noffice, I've gone into a city and I've worked out of a\nhotel room. I've moved out under the cloak of\ndarkness, never talking to press, never letting them\nknow what I do. Never having a, granting an interview.\nAlmost to the point of where I hide. As a result of\nthat, that's the way the other advance men work. I set\nthe example, in that I trained them. A guy that didn't\nwant to follow my example, I fired him. Now how do you\nfire a volunteer? You don't, you just tell him, \"Don't\ncome, don't call me, I'll call you. =\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: But those are the kind of men that we had. I think the\nPresident\n...\nThe last rally we did, 1972, was in\n63\nOntario, California. Why did we do Ontario,\nCalifornia? Well, I like to be first to admit that I\ndidn't know why we were doing Ontario, California.\nI've done twenty-five advances in California, and, if I\nhad to pick a place to do an airport arrival, it sure\nas hell wouldn't have been Ontario. But, if you go\nback to Six Crises, on November the sixth, 1960, the\nPresident had a rally in Chicago, late evening. Got on\nhis plane and flew to California. He arrived there at\nsomething like three a.m. in the morning, and he\narrived in Ontario airport. They had a torchlight\nrally for him. There were something like fifteen\nthousand people there. The next day the election\nresult, and he lost. Well, it was very obvious why we\nwent back to Ontario. We vowed that was going to be\nthe biggest happening that the President had ever had\nin his life, because it was going to be his last, his\nlast, in his name, political rally the man would ever\ngo to. Mike Duval was the senior representative and\nHomer Luther was the lead advance man. We did two\nother stops that day, Greensboro, North Carolina, and\nwe probaly had twenty-five thousand people in\nGreensboro, North Carolina. They broke the ropes and\ncompletely engulfed Air Force One. Ollie has pictures\nof that that are the most incredible sight that you\nhave ever laid your eyes on. Because Ollie stood\ninside the door of Air Force One, had the President and\n64\nMrs. Nixon waving, the back of their heads, and all you\ncan see, for as far as the eyes will go, is heads. It\nis the most incredible thing, I mean, if I had had to\nplan that [pounds table], I, excuse me,\nSY: [Laughter] That's all right.\nRW:\nI couldn't, I could never have planned it better.\nIt's completly engulfed that plane.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Well, that's a happening that you could never plan, for\nsecurity reasons and all kinds of other reasons. We\nhadn't been airborne more than an hour, the President,\nBob Haldeman came back and got me out of the staff\nsection. I went up, and I had never met with the\nPresident in his office on Air Force One. As a matter\nof fact, I had had very little relationship with the\nPresident, because that was not my job. My job was to\nmake sure everything was going right. Steve Bull\ntalked to the President of the United States. Why\nshould the President of the United States have to worry\nabout talking to four or five guys? There's just no\nreason for it. If I had been an egotistical bastard I\ncould have pushed my way in to talk to the President in\norder to get in the pictures and stuff like that. You\nknow, at least SO my mother and father would see me on\nthe front page. I just, I, it was just not in me to do\nthat.\nSY: Hm hmm.\n65\nRW: If I had an advance man that did it, I'd fire him\nfaster than greased lightening. I'd say, \"Sir, you' 11\nnever do another advance for me, period.\" But he\ncalled me up, Dwight and Bob and I went into his\noffice, in this little office on Air Force One, and he\nstarted talking about Greensboro and what great people\nthey were. Then he started saying what a fine job that\nI had done [unintelligible]. Good, bright young men,\nwhat a great job had been done and how much he had\nappreciated it. And he made one comment, he said,\n\"It's too bad that we really didn't have a tough\ncampaign so that your guys could have, that they could\nhave really done their thing.\" And then Bob said,\n\"Sir,\" he said, \"you're absolutely correct. Ron has\nput together a hell of a team. I think you'd have been\nvery proud had they had the opportunity to do it for\nyou.\" He said, \"Well, we didn't need it.\" And I said,\n\"Sir, that's just as important to me as if we had\nneeded it.\"\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Well, you know, it's probably one of the greatest\nthrills of my life. But then we landed in Ontario that\nnight, and I probably had fifteen advance men assigned\nto that one stop. That's a lot of advance men. What\nwe did, we broke it down into sectors. We assigned,\nmaybe, a five mile radius to one advance man, and he\nhad his own phone bank and his own handbill operation.\n66\nWe may have had five or six sectors, where one advance\nman or two advance men were working. And, I'm telling\nyou, we turned out the better part of fifty thousand\npeople.\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: It was the most incredible sight I have ever laid my\neyes on. We had torches....\nThe back of that plane--I\nknew it was going to be my last advance, or my last\nstop, the last stop as a tour director, and after that\nis was all over. I'd already turned in my resignation,\nI'd had already said, \"After 1972, November the\nseventh, I'm finished, I've had it.\"\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: He, they opened the back end of that plane and all I\ncould think was, \"God almighty! Three and a half years\nof my life [snaps fingers] building something like\nthis, and then what a happening to end it on.\" And I\ncan remember just\nI was always the first one off\nthe back of the plane. All I could do when that plane,\nthat door opened, was to put my head in my hands and\njust go, \"Wow!\" The next morning\n[End of reel one]\n[Reel two begins]\nRW: Well, anyway, the morning, I guess, let's see, this was\nSunday morning, 50 it had to be the fifth we did the\nOntario event. We flew from the east coast to\nGreensboro, Albuquerque. Albuquerque, again, was\n67\nanother sensational stop. We had about fifteen to\ntwenty thousand people there. And then out of\nAlbuquerque we flew on in, to arrive in Ontario. I\nthink we called the rally for six o'clock. Maybe seven\no'clock, I don't know, anyway the files will show what\ntime it was. So that was the fourth. The next morning\nwas the fifth, which was Sunday. I called a meeting at\nten o'clock, ended up being ten-thirty, in the\nconference room in the Western White House, of the\nadvance men that had participated in that evening's\nevent. Those advance men were Duval, who was the\nsenior representative\nLet me just make one other point right quick. All\nduring the time we were building this advance\noperation, I was the expert. Haldeman felt better,\nDwight felt better and, I'm sure, if the President knew\nabout it, he would have felt better, that on every stop\nI was on the ground. I may not get in there until the\nnight before, but we'd call a countdown meeting. The\ncountdown meeting transpired the evening before the\nevent. It pulled everybody in that had anything to do\nwith anything, as far as that event was concerned.\nThey went through it from the time that airplane was\napproaching, fifteen minutes out, until it was fifteen\nminutes gone. It was the movements, the diagrams of\nthe airport, the diagrams of the motorcade route, the\ncars, the radios in the cars, you know, everything.\n68\nJust everything that was going to happen was talked\nabout in that countdown meeting. So if there was any\nproblem, if an agent said, \"Now wait a minute, there\nare ropes and barrels in that area?\" \"Unh uh, they're\nnot there.\" Well, Timmy could say, \"I want to move my\npress through that area.\" It got it right on the\ntable, right now. Well, this was something I did a\nlong time ago, during my first advances, I said, \"By\nGod, I'm going to get everybody that has got anything\nto say about this trip, and I'm going to get them in\none room, and we're going to sit down and we're going\nto talk it over. Because that's how things will go\nwrong [pounding].\" Well, I would always get in there\nfor that countdown meeting. Well, as \"The Roadrunner,\"\nwhich was my code name, when I hit the ground, it was\nimmediate fear, because, I had been there probably four\nor five times before. There wasn't anything that one\nof these guys was going to experience that I hadn't\nexperienced before, and probably got in trouble for, or\nat least made a mistake. Or had corrected the mistake\nbefore it became a problem.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: I had a great tendancy, and it was part of my style, to\ninstill great fear. When I got into there, that son of\na bitch had better be buttoned down. Excuse my\nlanguage. It'd better be buttoned down to the point\nwhere [snaps fingers] it's right, now. Well, it got to\n69\na point where I couldn't physically do it, because I\nhad responsibilities here, I had responsibilities as\nfar as all kinds of\nBut I didn't need to do any\nmore, because what I had, was I had three Ron Walkers,\nor three senior advance men. Duval, Clower and Henkel.\nAnd so, during [1972] these men were me. They would go\nin and be there, sometimes they were there for the\nentire trip. But they would let the lead advance man\nrun it. They'd be more of a sounding board for advice\nand counsel and everything else. Well, it worked.\nYeah, some people may say, in going back, that we had a\nhell of a lot of men involved in a presidential stop.\nWell, it took that. We proved that it was the right\nway to do it. Now, we may have been able to do it with\nless men and have the same results. I'll never want to\nchance it. I'll never chance it, and I wouldn't have\nchanced it then. But that worked.\nWell anyway, Duval was the senior representative\non the Ontario stop. Homer Luther was the lead, and\nwith him, he had Peter Jarvis, Peter Murphy, Wayne\nWhitehill, John Pitchess, Jim Kolstad, Jack [John E.]\nPackard, Tom Hart, and some others. Sandy [Sanford R.J\nAbbey was with them. Phil [Philip H.] Martyr was with\nthem. I'm going around the table when we, well those\nwere the guys that came in the next morning. I had\npicked up \"Red\" [B. M.J Cavaney and Dewey Clower in\nAlbuquerque and taken them into California. So they\n70\nwere in the room also. I kind of suspected that Dwight\nwas up to something. About an hour before, Dwight\ncalled me and he said, \"What time is your meeting?\" I\nsaid, \"Well, it's at ten-thirty.\" He said, \"Oh, I\nthought it was at ten.' And I said, \"No, it's at ten-\nthirty.\" He said, \"Well, the President is probably\ngoing to do a drop by.\" And I thought, \"Geez, that's\nsensational.\" So we went in, and I started my meeting,\nand I didn't tell any of these guys. All of a sudden\nthe door opened, Steve Bull stepped in and said,\n\"Gentlemen, the President of the United States.\"\nWell, these guys had worked for the President,\nMike, in his case, for three years, some of the other\nones for two years, and then some, most recently, this\nyear, had never met the President. Mike had met him,\nbut just a handshake and a thanks after an advance. A\ngood advance, I normally would take them on the plane\nand the President could at least shake their hand and\nsay thank you. I always felt that I should do it in\nthe plane, as opposed to doing it on the ground,\nbecause on the ground everybody was looking. Here's a\nguy that's been on the ground for four or five days,\nthat's talking for the President of the United States.\nAll of a sudden I walk up and introduce him to the\nPresident of the United States, they're going to think,\n\"I thought this guy knew the President all along,\n=\nSY: [Laughter].\n71\nRW: ...\"I thought he was drinking buddies with him. = So,\nthat was kind of an awkward situation, so I always took\nthem on the back of the plane, and then, as he was\ncoming to his quarters, I'd have them there in the\naisle.\nThe President came in very relaxed. The Gallup\nand Harris polls had come out that morning and, he was\nsomething like twenty-seven points ahead; he was just\nvery relaxed and very calm. He talked for about\ntwenty, maybe twenty to twenty-five minutes. And he\nsaid, \"I know what you men do, what you have to do. I\nknow what sacrifices you've had to make and I know what\nit must be doing to your families.\" He said, \"I know\nit's difficult for your wife to think about you out\nthere with all those cute little \"Nixonaires\" and\n\"Nixonettes\" and everything.\" He said, \"I know how\nhard you have to work.\" He said, \"I know the traumatic\nexperience it is to have to stand on an airport and\nworry about whether the crowd's going to show up, or\nwhether it's going to rain, or whether the sun's going\nto shine, and everything.\" Well, it was just here is\nthe President of the United States standing there\ntalking to a group of little guys, that had done a hell\nof a job for him, but never asked for anything. Never\nasked for anything, period. The rewards they got were\nsomething that you couldn't buy in a store, or anybody\ncould ever give you. It was something that they\n72\nearned, and they\nIt was something they' 11 carry\nwith them the rest of their lives. But, to have the\nPresident stand there and talk to them about the things\nthey had been doing, made them realize, \"Yes, here's a\nman that does know what we have to go through. He\nmay not know the minute details and stuff like that,\nbut at least he has an empathy with what our job is. =\nHe talked about, well, for a long time. He went into\nwhat the last four years has meant, and what the next\nfour years will mean to America. [About] how the\nopportunity to be a part of this was really the only\nthing that mattered. That they'd been a part of\nsomething that's really bigger than him, or any\nindividual in that room, and for that they should carry\naway a great sense of accomplishment and a great\ncontribution to something that was far bigger than all\nof us. So that kind of wrapped up my career right\nthere.\nSY: I guess SO. Well, just very briefly, but is there\nanything which stands out at this point? I realize\nthat perspectives will change over the next few years\nwhen you have\nIs there anything which stands out\nas being of particular interest that you might want to\ntalk about later, in more depth? Any of the trips,\nwhich might be outstanding, or any. ?\nRW: Well, I've done some three hundred, I've done over\nthree hundred advances for the President.\n73\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Every one of them I learned something. Every one of\nthem was a new experience. And they're--yeah, fine,\nyou go into a rally, and a rally's a rally, and you\ncan't change a rally. But, there were different\npeople. There were different associations, different\nfriendships made. If I had to--and I have thought\nabout this. There are probably three or four things,\nmaybe a half a dozen. You have to take and divide it\ninto two sectors. One of them is the domestic side of\nadvancing.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: And the other is the international. The international\nside is something that, really, one can never truly\nexplain. What it's all about. Because you all of a\nsudden find yourself really an ambassador for the\nPresident, and yet still a con artist. Yet you're\ndealing with some pretty fair con artists themselves.\nI would say, probably, well, it would, beyond any\ndoubt--the one international advance that I had, out of\nthe ten or so that I did, was China.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: I could talk, again, the better part of the day about\nChina. It was probably the most unique experience that\nany person in the last twenty-five years has ever had.\nI happen to have shared that, I happen to have been at\nthe focal point of that experience. Because I spent\n74\nseven weeks in that country as the President's\nrepresentative, with no ambassador, no embassy, and\nhaving to handle the better part of a hundred, [up] to\neventually four hundred, people. That would be the\ninternat--, or course Russia, again, you'd have to\nslash it, but in Russia you had an embassy.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Russia had had foreign dignataries, you know heavy\ndignataries visit their country before. The largest\nparty that China had ever had was thirty-five. To\ninclude the head of state, plus press and everything,\nthirty-five. We came blowing along with four hundred\npeople. So that's the international side. I could\ntalk about China and Russia, China probably more than\nanything else. I could talk about India. Did England,\ndid Italy, did Ireland, did Mexico, did the Apollo XIII\nsplash down in Hawaii, which was really a domestic, but\nit was, well, I think as close as you can do\nDid\nCanada.\nDomestically, I think the two or three, four\nthings that stand out most vivid in my mind, was the\nApollo XIII splash down, which we only had twenty-four\nhours to do it. It's when those astronauts almost\ndied. The President flew out and presented the\nMedal of Freedom. Incredible experience on my behalf,\nbecause I moved mountains to make that thing happen.\nThe Whitney Young funeral in Lexington, Kentucky, as\n75\nfunny as it might seem. I'll bet I've done at least a\nhalf a dozen funerals, include the [Charles] DeGaulle\nfuneral. But Whitney Young was, obviously, black; he\nhad a very unique organization that he was president\nof. They were hard core blacks, and they were not very\ninclined to deal with whites at all. Probably one of\nthe toughest advances, on a short period of time, short\nnotice, that I've ever had to do. Because they took\nthe body from New York into Louisville, where it laid\nin rest for an evening, and then they had a motorcade.\nAnd at one point they were talking about somewhere in\nthe vicinity of between five and ten thousand cars\nbeing a part of that motorcade in the fifty mile drive\nfrom Louisville to Lexington, Kentucky, where the\nfuneral would transpire. The President wanted to be\nthere for the funeral. Well, how do you have the\nPresident of the United States come when the motorcade\nis going to be--I mean, there's no telling when the\nmotorcade's going to arrive. The President sat in his\nOval Office and I sat on the phone in Lexington,\nKentucky, and never left my hotel room, because I had\nVern [Vernon C.] Coffey. I picked my, I got to the\npoint, because I was King Kong, where I could pick my\nadvance team, I could pick my agent.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: I could pick my military aide. I could pick my\ncommunications officer, which is a very agreeable\n76\nSANITIZED\nposition to be in. But I took Vern Coffey, who was\nblack. I took [NAME RESTRICTED], who was black. And\nprobably two or three other black agents. And they\nbecame, actually became site advance men for me. We\ndiscussed this, and we knew it. And we knew that was\nthe best way to go about doing it. I had to make a\ncall, a judgment call, as to where that cortege was.\nThe President would walk out of his office at my\nsignal. \"Mister President, we're ready to leave.\"\nWalks out of his office, gets in his airplane, his\nhelicopter, goes to Air Force One, flies to Lexington,\nKentucky, Bluegrass Airport. [I had to] make that\ncall, where the President didn't have to sit on that\nplane for an hour, or two hours.\nSY: Hm hmm.\nRW: Or three hours. Even a half hour I would have been\nsweating blood. Well, I called Mike Schrauth in, I had\nMike Duval with me. I put Mike Schrauth in a wire\nservice car with a telephone. He was there at four\no'clock in the morning in Louisville, watching the\nprocession. I was on the radio with him for something\nlike eight hours. I had a telephone in my ear, or the\ngirl that, the volunteer secretary that I had there was\nmonitoring it for me. He rode in that motorcade. He\nhad driven that thing twice, and he had, we'd had\nfourteen checkpoints of how much time it took to get\nfrom here to there, driving at forty miles an hour,\nSANITIZED\n77\nbang to bang to bang. I mean, just nothing left to\nchance, except whatever they did. I called that snot\nand the President was in within ten minutes. The\nPresident landed, the governor met him. He went up and\nspent a few minutes with the governor [snaps fingers],\ncame off and got into his car, and the motorcade\narrived and ours arrived, just like that.\nSY: Hmm.\nRW: After that advance the President called me. The first\nphone call I ever got from the President. He told me\nwhat a fine job I'd done, and he knew how difficult the\nsituation was and everything. Those blacks just did\nnot like us, uh huh, simple as that. That's one\ndomestic advance. Apollo XIII was another.\nSY: Well, I'm sure there're so many individual incidents\nand things that can be...\nRW: Well, I've talked long enough.\nSY: ...interesting. Well, thank you SO much. We.\n[End of interview]\n78\nName index\nto exit interview with Ronald H. Walker\nconducted by Susan Yowell\nin Room 348 of the Old Executive Office Building\non December 29, 1972\nName\nPage number\nAbbey, Sanford R.\n70\nAgnew, Spiro T.\n60\nAllin, Lyndon K. (\"Mort\")\n47\nAtkins, Oliver R. (\"Ollie\")\n21,46,64\nAustin, Tim\n51\nBrennan, Peter\n30\nBrock, William E.\n59\nBuchanan, Patrick J.\n21\nBull, Stephen B.\n6-7,58-60,71,\nBush, George H. W.\n59\nCaneer, Ed [?]\n51\nCarruthers, William H.\n43\nCashen, Henry C.\n2\nCavaney, B. M. (\"Red\")\n70\nChapin, Dwight\n1-2,4,6-7,16,28,34,38,40,43,52,\n58-60,66,68,71\nChotiner, Murray\n21,36,58\nClarke, John E.\n42\nClower, W. Dewey\n10,34,35,70\nCodus, William R.\n1,49,52\nCoffee, Vernon C.\n76\nCole, Kenneth R.\n5\nColson, Charles W.\n16\n1\nCox, Edward F.\n53\nCox, Tricia Nixon\n52\nDaley, Richard J.\n10\nDavies, John\n7\nDeGaulle, Charles\n76\nDole, Robert J.\n49\nDuval, Michael\nSEE Raoul-Duval, Michael\nEhrlichman, John D.\n2,22,60\nEisenhower, Julie Nixon\n52\nElbourne, Timothy G.\n32,43,44,69\nFinch, Robert H.\n19\nFish, Ody\n49\nFoust, Jon\n10,34-35,40,49,51-53\nFox, Sanford L.\n35\nGartland, John\n42\nGitzen, Rosamond\n20,33\nGood, Terry\n18\nGoode, Mark\n43-44\nGoodearle, J. Roy\n1-2,5\nHaldeman, H. R. (\"Bob\")\n4,16,19,21-22,40,60,66,68\nHall, Allen C.\n42,52,53\nHart, Thomas\n42,70\nHeath, Edward\n3\nHerman, R. L.\n49\nHenkel, William\n10,34-35,40,54-55,70\nHess, Stephen\n17-18\nHickel, Walter J.\n2-4\n2\nHope, Bob\n30\nHoward, W. Richard\n3,16\nHughes, James D.\n21,24\nJarvis, Peter\n70\nJohnson, Claudia Taylor\n4\nJohnson, Lyndon B.\n4,10,22\nKeiser, Richard E.\n32\nKennedy, John F.\n10,21-22\nKeogh, James\n21\nKingsley, Daniel T.\n2\nKissinger, Henry A.\n39,63\nKlein, Herbert G.\n16\nKolstad, James L.\n42,70\nLuther, Homer\n64,70\nMagruder, Jeb Stuart\n28,40\nMalek, Frederic V.\n42\nMarriott, J. Willard, Sr.\n28\nMartyr, Philip H.\n70\nMazo, Earl\n17\nMcCarthy, Stephen J.\n53\nMcGovern, George S.\n48\nMoeller, William E.\n40,51\nMoore, Richard A.\n45\nMorgan, Edward L.\n2,5\nMurphy, George L.\n43\nMurphy, Peter\n70\nNidecker, John\n1-2,5\n3\nNixon, Mrs.\n1,4,9,48,52-53,61,65\nO'Donnell, Terrence\n42\nOgilvie, Richard B.\n10\nPackard, John E.\n70\nParker, David N.\n16,52\nPercy, Charles R.\n59\nPettit, John W. (\"Jack\")\n16\nPitchess, John\n70\nRaoul-Duval, Michael\n10,34-35,40,64,70-71\nRedman, Albert\n18,21,24\nRietz, Karen\n36\nRietz, Kenneth S.\n48\nRiley, Colonel [sp?]\n10\nRosenberg [sp?], [first name unk. ] 18\nRowe, Julie\n42\nRuwe, L. Nicholas\n1,5\nSchrauth, Michael R.\n50-51,77\nSearby, Dan\n53\nSheils, Marylou\n53\nSloan, Hugh\n7-8\nStrachan, Gordon\n16\nStuart, Charles E.\n4-5\nStuart, Constance C.\n9,52\nTaylor, Robert H.\n21,23-25,32\nTindle, Kathleen M.\n53\nTruman, Harry S.\n54\nUnger, Sherman E.\n22\n4\nWarner, John\n22\nWhitaker, John\n5,22\nWhitehill, Wayne\n70\nWilson, Harold\n3\nWoods [?], Rose Mary\n62\nYoung, Whitney\n76\nZiegler, Ronald L.\n43\n5"
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