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This file contains:
Paper detailing the career of Dr. Lee A. duBridge. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Handwritten paper regarding duBridge. Author unknown. 2 pgs. [Other Document], N.D.
From a Pete to a Ted RE: passing on information to a Bob. 1 pg. [Memo], N.D.
From T.F. Walkowicz to RN RE: scientific fact and military decision-making. 3 pgs. [Letter], 12/1/1961
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26125823
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WHSF: Returned, 1-10
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doc
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document
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1
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id
26125823
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document
title
WHSF: Returned, 1-10
description
This file contains:
Paper detailing the career of Dr. Lee A. duBridge. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Handwritten paper regarding duBridge. Author unknown. 2 pgs. [Other Document], N.D.
From a Pete to a Ted RE: passing on information to a Bob. 1 pg. [Memo], N.D.
From T.F. Walkowicz to RN RE: scientific fact and military decision-making. 3 pgs. [Letter], 12/1/1961
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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5db8edd4d0f1d559
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
1
10
N.D.
Other Document
Paper detailing the career of Dr. Lee A.
duBridge. Author unknown. 1 pg.
1
10
N.D.
Other Document
Handwritten paper regarding duBridge.
Author unknown. 2 pgs.
1
10
N.D.
Memo
From a Pete to a Ted RE: passing on
information to a Bob. 1 pg.
1
10
12/01/1961
Letter
From T.F. Walkowicz to RN RE: scientific
fact and military decision-making. 3 pgs.
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Page 1 of 1
RE: Dr. Lee A. duBridge
1. duBridge is an outstanding scientist, administrator, and
educator. His performance as Director of the M.I.T.
Radiation Laboratory (development of military radars)
during World War II was truly magnificent.
2. During the post-World War II period, duBridge has been a
prominent member of a small but powerful group of scientists
who have dominated advising U.S. policy makers on scientific
matters. This group, at various times and in various ways,
has sought to "slow down the arms race" by promoting ideas
which would weaken the U.S. unilaterally vis-a-vis the
U.S.S.R. For example:
a. The group opposed the U.S. H-bomb program and
campaigned against the recruitment of good
scientists for the Livermore H-bomb Laboratory,
even after President Truman made a firm decision
to go ahead with the program.
b. During the pre- and post-Sputnik period, this
group campaigned strongly to "limit space to
civilian, purely-scientific, endeavors,"
minimizing potential space weapons development.
The recent Soviet development of an orbital
bombing system, with no comparable U.S. program,
now makes apparent the dangers inherent in such
a policy. When the U.S. military were working
to be given a role in the U.S. space program,
duBridge belittled them publicly by referring
to them as "space cadets."
3. The above two examples are not exhaustive. To summarize,
duBridge is a great American man of science, who has been
naive and idealistic regarding the Soviet drive for military
power and world domination.
COMPIDENTIAL
file
From Shaws
68 : ~ Sept. re duBidge
He vi "67 too old to 4 office
Ip assest of Sr e Tech
Chen of Pres Se adv. Com
Chun of Fed Com to Se + Tee
Dr of 01 of Sc s Tee.
+
Letters dated any 4 & 19, 1954
to See of Del to effect he
docan't have much use to See.
73I.
3
Mar 4, 1954 he wrote a letter ts
RN in the strength of which
RN contacted 7BI re Oppie
4
June 4, 1954 Le wrote Strams
using the AE Comminan should
Import Oppie. He testiled that
Oppies associations were of the
past trivial". and said rishs were
5
the never stepped toward
to join Accentist for Rx.
6
Hei an Establishment man,
s if his there , there won't
be much of a change.
,
is
writing
a
Lether
an which
This would be a " ong
supr tant defeat." He would
hope the decision can be
depered till other facts can
be marshalled.
ROOM 5600
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
196
To: Pete
FROM: Ted
Bot should read this?
Please return again. .
Myonly
PMF- Tes. $ 125 many amozing
}
120 East End Avenue, 7A
New York 28, New York
things
down
time
In
1
may
December Pete 1, 1961
the
Sir:
3
I feel it my duty to inform you that a
conviction has crystallised among many reputable scientists and
others concerned with United States military policies that the
scientific advice being tendered the Chief Executive in military
matters is not as objective as it should be.
To say this is not to impugn the patriotism
or the motives of those who tender the advice. Rationalism and
idealism accord with the scientific spirit and their pulls are
understandably strong. The only question is whether with some
advisers these pulls may be so strong, in certain particulars of
scientific policy, as to wasken their concentration on the strictly
technical considerations which are, after all, the specific
responsibility of the President's Scientific Advisers. Many
scientists and other technical men, and I among them, have become
convinced that the scientific advice going forward to the highest
organs of Government has been so weakened too often.
It is a fact that, as regards certain areas
of national action and particularly those related to the nuclear
side of strategy, U.S. scientists have divided into two generally
opposed groups, and one group - the one whose reasoning I share -
is convinced that its views and recommendations are not now being
given adequate representation in the resolution of strategic policies.
I. DISARMAMENT. AN EXAMPLE OF OPPOSED VIEWS
As regards the general proposition, both groups
started out with the same basic objectives: to slow down the arms
race, and to maintain U.S. military strength until diplomacy produced
an inspected disarmament. Where the groups divided was over the
question of what would constitute the "science" in the policies to
be recommended to the Government in pursuit of these aims.
One group - the one that has been and is dominant
in Government councils - is made up predominantly of scientists who
either actively opposed the American development of the thermonuclear
bomb or are sympathetic to colleagues and friends who did. A compelling
factor in their opposition, quite apart from their lack of enthusiasm
- 2 -
for the technical feasibilities, was a conviction, powerfully
advocated, that if the United States abstained from developing
the weapon, the Soviet Union might also abstain. This was a
case, as events were quickly to demonstrate, of an excessively
hopeful and totally unrealistic political judgment by scientists
to accompany an excessively pessimistic technical judgment.
More recently, members of this same group
urged the Government into the nuclear test ban on the premises
that (1) cheating would be easy to detect and the cheater would
be found out; (2) the art of nuclear weaponry had already been
pushed to the point where further advances were no longer mili-
tarily consequential; and (3) the ban would have the additional
effect of permanently freesing the American superiority in nuclear
technology.
The other group challenged all three premises.
It held, but unavailingly, that the premises were without real
scientific basis.
The straight scientific judgment, as distinct
from the politico-scientific judgment, was again vindicated in
essential particulars. It has been proved that nuclear cheating
is possible and a danger to us, and that the control system relied
upon by the first group is not a safeguard for the nation. It
has also been proved, and unfortunately not by the United States,
that significant gains in nuclear weaponry are not only possible
but in hand. Finally, it is now an established fact that the
moratorium, far from protecting the American nuclear superiority,
was exploited by the Russians to whittle away the margin and per-
haps even to eliminate it in some critical particulars.
On the face of the past judgments, by the
dominant group of scientists, it would seem that a way must be
found to bring the countervailing scientific view more forcefully
into policy making.
As matters now stand, the second group con-
siders itself all but excluded from that process. To the degree
that it is drawn upon by the President's Science Advisory Committee,
it energes only as a hopelessly over-balanced minority on a com-
mittee or advisory panel, the findings of which - according to
fairly widespread cynicism - are foreshadowed by the built-in majority.
- 3 -
II. SUGGESTED ACTION
Inssmuch as scientific opinion now diverges
on a number of grave issues, the requirement is to make certain
that the advice of the second group - the outs - no longer goes
forward simply as a dissent that has been overpowered in advance.
This other source of advice should be heard by the higher authorities.
It has been scientific. Moreover, it has been right.
It is reasouring to observe that you are
already sware of this basic problem, and have just recently con-
sulted directly with leading members of the second group of
scientists. A further step towards a permanent solution, of
course, would be to give the leading members of the second group
appropriate representation on the President's Scientific Advisory
Committee. Another possibility would be so to arrange debate on
controversial technical issues before the higher authorities as
to allow this other group to present its views as an organically
independent position, and not as an appendage to the "majority"
view.
The matter, in any case, is a serious one.
It calls for further action. Perhaps a good way to begin would
be for you to ask men intimately familiar with the schism among
the scientists to make recommendations. In this comection, I
have specific suggestions to make, and would be glad to present
them, if you should so desire.
Respectfully yours,
T. F. Walkowics
The President
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.