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This file contains:
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Preparing For the Post-Election Transition. 30 pgs. [Memo], 8/15/1968
Letter draft from NR to Virgil Pinkley RE: Pinkley's address before the Wilshire Rotary Club. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/9/1969
Typed copy of hand-written letter from Virgil Pinkley to Rose Mary Woods RE: Passing along an enclosure. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Typed copy of hand-written letter sent from Mexico City from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: address to the Wilshire Rotary Club. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Hand-written letter from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: address to the Wilshire Rotary Club. 3 pgs. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Wilshire Rotary Club of Los Angeles newsletter. Vol. XXXVII, No. 12. 2 pgs. [Newsletter], 12/4/1968
Letter from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: The selection of Herbert Klein. 1 pg. [Letter], 11/27/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary of memorandum regarding background press briefings for London and Paris, European interests in U.S. policy and opportunities to develop lines of communication. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: background press briefings for London and Paris, European interests in U.S. policy and opportunities to develop lines of communication. 16 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary of memo regarding the London Institute for Strategic Studies. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: The London Institute for Strategic Studies. 5 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
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26126156
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WHSF: Returned, 7-3
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document
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1
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26126156
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document
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WHSF: Returned, 7-3
description
This file contains:
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Preparing For the Post-Election Transition. 30 pgs. [Memo], 8/15/1968
Letter draft from NR to Virgil Pinkley RE: Pinkley's address before the Wilshire Rotary Club. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/9/1969
Typed copy of hand-written letter from Virgil Pinkley to Rose Mary Woods RE: Passing along an enclosure. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Typed copy of hand-written letter sent from Mexico City from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: address to the Wilshire Rotary Club. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Hand-written letter from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: address to the Wilshire Rotary Club. 3 pgs. [Letter], 12/29/1968
Wilshire Rotary Club of Los Angeles newsletter. Vol. XXXVII, No. 12. 2 pgs. [Newsletter], 12/4/1968
Letter from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: The selection of Herbert Klein. 1 pg. [Letter], 11/27/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary of memorandum regarding background press briefings for London and Paris, European interests in U.S. policy and opportunities to develop lines of communication. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: background press briefings for London and Paris, European interests in U.S. policy and opportunities to develop lines of communication. 16 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary of memo regarding the London Institute for Strategic Studies. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/30/1968
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: The London Institute for Strategic Studies. 5 pgs. [Memo], 11/30/1968
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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1
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26126156
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6b016243015431fc
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
7
3
08/15/1968
Memo
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Preparing
For the Post-Election Transition. 30 pgs.
7
3
01/09/1969
Letter
Letter draft from NR to Virgil Pinkley RE:
Pinkley's address before the Wilshire Rotary
Club. 1 pg.
7
3
12/29/1968
Letter
Typed copy of hand-written letter from
Virgil Pinkley to Rose Mary Woods RE:
Passing along an enclosure. 1 pg.
7
3
12/29/1968
Letter
Typed copy of hand-written letter sent from
Mexico City from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE:
address to the Wilshire Rotary Club. 1 pg.
7
3
12/29/1968
Letter
Hand-written letter from Virgil Pinkley to
RN RE: address to the Wilshire Rotary Club.
3 pgs.
7
3
12/4/1968
Newsletter
Wilshire Rotary Club of Los Angeles
newsletter. Vol. XXXVII, No. 12. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
7
3
11/27/1968
Letter
Letter from Virgil Pinkley to RN RE: The
selection of Herbert Klein. 1 pg.
7
3
11/30/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary
of memorandum regarding background press
briefings for London and Paris, European
interests in U.S. policy and opportunities to
develop lines of communication. 2 pgs.
7
3
11/30/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE:
background press briefings for London and
Paris, European interests in U.S. policy and
opportunities to develop lines of
communication. 16 pgs.
7
3
11/30/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: Summary
of memo regarding the London Institute for
Strategic Studies. 1 pg.
7
3
11/30/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellsworth to RN RE: The
London Institute for Strategic Studies. 5 pgs.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Page 2 of 2
August 15, 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NIXON
PREPARING FOR THE POST-ELECTION TRANSITION
Until November, you will be preoccupied with winning the election.
A few steps tellon now, however, can give you a headstart on meeting the
wholly different, and almost impossible, demands that face a President-
elect.
There are only ten-plus weeks between election and Inauguration.
Within that period, and in many cases within the first few weeks of it,
you will face some of your most crucial decisions.
First, you will have to make a few dozen top appointments. You
will entrust the nation's fate and your own place in history to
men you may not know, after a selection process necessarily less
thorough than that of any professional firm, business organization,
or university.
Second, you must initiate the alterations in government organization
most critical for your objectives.
Third, you must formulate the substantive positions necessary to make
best use 3£ the "Loneymoon period," to engage the enthusiasms of a
divided nation, and 20 deal with carly crises.
2.
The quality of your administration may be determined in the ten
weeks before you take office.
Advance preparations are therefore imperative. But there are CITO
problems. First, you and your immediate staff must give top priority
to the campaign. Second, advance preparations might be misunderstood IS
overconfidence of victory. (There would be little risk of such misunder-
standing if it were known that both major candidates were undertaking
advance preparations.) Both problems can be overcome if you entrust
these preparations to discreet and trusted personal advisers not immersed
in the campaign.
The four areas requiring advance work are personnel, substantive
program, government organization, and transitional arrangements.
I We recommend that you now ask at least one person to begin
identifying pos ible appointees for specific key positions. If his
activities are to be of real use to you, a personnel adviser must enjoy
your complete trust. He should have a wide circle of acquaintances and
possess good judgment about people and about the qualities needed for
effective government service. In addition, he must understand the
particular qualities demanded by particular positions. He must be known
to be a man of great integrity with no tendency to "play favorites."
Hopefully, he would be intimate enough so that you and he could discuss
specific individuals in candid detail. He ought also to enjoy the full
confidence of your staff.
It should be understood by the advisor and by any others who might
learn of his activities that he does not select, but only gethers names
3.
and information for you. This adviser might or might not be useful
in the post-election period when you may wish to entrust larger scale
recruitment to a different person, possibly one now more actively
engaged in your campaign. Two or three pre-election advisers, acting
separately, might be equally or even more useful. We describe in a
later section those key appointments which require decisions almost im-
mediately after the election. If you undertake this preliminary effort,
you will be much better prepared for that ordeal.
II We recommend that you request substantive studies on issues which
may be in crisis during the first three to six months of 1969, issues
likely to demand some carly response from your administration, and issues
otherwise likely to be important in your first year program, particularly
those to be stressed in your Inaugural Address and other early messages.
To some extent, the campaign apparatus is now doing this, but additional
steps outside the campaign effort may be vital for three reasons: First,
there are issues which may be important to you as President, but which
are not important campaign issues. Second, campaign priorities usually
preclude the pursuit of issues in sufficient depth or concreteness to
provide for specific executive actions or legislative proposals. Third,
such an effort might enlist participants or consultants who would not be
available for the campaign itself. It is difficult to identify the issues
worthy of special pre-election inquiry, but we offer some suggestions in
a later section.
III No recommend that you solicit selected studies on as ernment
organization. The success of your administration in carrying out your
4.
policies will depend primarily on the quality of people selected. The
division of responsibilities among executive departments and between the
departments and the White House Stalf could, however, influence your
choices for particular posts. You may need to determine how you expect
to handle national security policy or welfare-urban-labor-transportation
problems even before you make your major Cabinet and Staff appointments.
Your personal preferences and working habits will determine the kind of
White House Staff that would best serve you and would bear strongly on the
other questions as well. You will have little time to pursue or even
discuss these questions before the election, but prior staff work in these
three areas at least (national security, urban problems, White House Staff)
should facilitate the actions you must take immediately after November 5.
You might, for example, wish to ask a man experienced in each area to
recommend sensible approaches that could be implemented within existing
statutory authority and thus be of immediate relevance to you. We offer
further observations later.
IV We recommend that prior to the election you prepare administrative
arrangements for the transition period. You will need someone to deal with
the old administration after the election, or, if President Johnson sug-
gests it, earlier. You and your appointees will also need advice on useful
past transition experiences and on methods of moving smoothly and efficiently
into power. These are clearly temporary functions. More generally, you
will need starf services other than t. se required during the compatign and
similar to there you will soon need = House. We would be pre-
pared to offer suggestions in a lacer meme mdun.
5.
I
APPOINTMENTS
1. An impossible task. In the brief period between election and
Inauguration, you will have to select must of the several hundred top-
level appointees upon whom the fate of your administration will largely
depend. No President-elect can know beforehand more than a handful of
men qualified For these posts. Many of those he chooses will be
strangers. The number of appointments to be made, coupled with the
shortness of time, impairs the selection process. Further complicating
the President-alecr's almost impossible task is pressure to reward faith-
ful service to campaign or party. The authors--who have never felt the
heat--believe that the dissatisfaction of disappointed office-seekers and
their supporters are transient and minor compared to the harm to the
country, and to the President, resulting from appointees of modest com-
petence or mere acceptability. The next President's responsibilities are
too grave to be entrusted either to the bureaucracy or to the merely
competent.
A. Large Scale Talent Hunt
2. You will need a large-scale talent hunt primarily for the several
hundred sub-Cabinet posts you must fill. For your Cabinet, you will
probably draw on your intimate advisers and other major political figures.
These sources in turn may suggest => you paople whom you will want to use,
but whom you my know casually, 1f a: all. It may be instructive to
6.
recall that the original Cabinets of your predecessors included men not
at cil well-known to the President-alect. (Ruck, McNamara, and Day
fall into this category among Kennedy's 1960 appointees, Ceorge Humphrey
is the obvious example in Eisenhower's 1952 Cabinet.)
A well-conducted pre-and post-clection talent hunt could turn up
prospects for Cabinet as well as sub-Cabinet posts. Its major targets,
however, would be potential sub-Cabinet Presidential appointees. In ad-
dition, your Cabinet and Agency heads might find the results of this
research of use to them in making their own important personnel selections.
3. A committee. Unless you have available an ideal recruitment
chief, you might proceed by appointing a small screening committee. This
method offers the advantages of multiple sources and multiple evaluations.
You might think in terms of three to five men of roughly equal
stature. Elder statesmen beyond personal ambition would be useful, but
they may be somewhat out of touch with younger generations. But also suf-
ficiently beyond ambition for these purposes are many persons established
in secure and relatively prestigious positions (such as a substantial
industrialist or financier; senior professor, or leading partner in a major
law firm). Your adviser or advisers--whether or not a committee is used--
need a wide personal acquaintance in industry, finance, the professions,
government, universities, etc.
You may wish to instruct your personnel advisers to consider not
only registered Republic as but also qualified independents and even
Democrats. (It is particularly important not to insist unduly on political
7.
credentials for younger persons, lest the opportunity be lost--as in
1953-1930--to draw new vitality into the party.) They should seck not
only the more senior people who would be appropriate Presidential ap-
pointees but the younger men who might be their deputies and assistants,
or who might be useful later in the administration.
The places to look are many. Among the more obvious sources are
(1) foundations, (2) boards of directors of national companies (and as-
pecially of the insurance companies that often expend considerable effort
to secure broadly qualified and public spirited national representation),
(3) metropolitan law firms, (4) major investment banking firms and other
financial institutions, (5) universities, and (6) such business organi-
zations as the Committee for Economic Development. The latter may be of
particular aid in identifying able middle-level corporate executives.
B. Seminers with Prospective Appointees
4. The traditional method by which Presidents-elect have selected
appointees has been the private interview. In some instances, your
interests could also be served by arranging for a few seminars to be con-
ducted by small groups, including some possible appointees.
The format of such seminars should not be uniform. To one on
domestic and international financial matters, three to six men might be
invited; most would be "experts" in the sense of having qualifications for
appointment to the Treasury, Commerce, or the Council of Economic Advisers.
They could IC ive invitations and be given agenda a week or 30 in advance.
In an hour or two with such = group. you could inform yourself on complex,
:
8.
technical subjects, and at the same time obtain impressions of how in 000
men might perform as of your administration.
In a less technical area, you might alternatively invite a few
possible appointues to join you in a briefing session conducted by repre-
sentatives of the departing adninistration. You could find it profitable
to see how these men interact with experts and with each other. This
device is available before the election as well as later, and it could
both extend the range of your knowledge and spare you some fruitless
private interviews.
C. Appointment Priorities
5. Earlier the better. To be ready to operate the government upon
its inauguration, the new administration must be formed as much before
January 20 as possible. The new appointees need time to familiarize
themselves with the fundamentals of their offices before assuming actual
responsibilities, to get to know one another, to extricate themselves from
their previous occupations, and to make the necessary personal moves. Al-
though it was once customary to announce the Cabinet on Inauguration Day,
major appointments should now be made as soon as possible after the election.
We have invide
gories and arbitrarily placed the dividing line at fifteen days after the
election. All major appointments should be completed by mid-December.
6. Superior positions first. It is generally preferable to name a
department's Secretary before naming its Assistant Secretaries. This
might seen obvious, but President Kennedy unled the opposite in ord to
"plant his own men" in the departments and thes provide ilternative
0.
channels to the departments. The Kennedy effort did not accomplish
that purpose but tended to impair effective working relationships within
the departments; the Secretary's position was made ambiguous both with
respect to his nominal subordinates and with respect to the White liouse.
That is not the way to make the departments effective entities (and es-
pecially not in State with its chronic organizational difficulties). The
President-elecu should, of course, participate in selecting major depart-
mental appointees especially the Deputy or Undersecretary. But we
believe he will achieve a more effective administration if he accords
the Secretary-designate some role in this process.
7. Criteria for immediate appointments. Before naming the positions
that should be filled immediately--a list that is meant to be suggestive
rather than definitive- we enumerate some relevant criteria. Prompt ap-
pointment seems required for positions with one or more of the following
characteristics:
(1) The agency is concerned with matters in which decisions are
required and in which wrong decisions may have disastrous consequences.
Here the appointee must be given the utmost time to prepare. (State,
Defense, and perhaps Justice)
(2) The agency is so complex, so ill-organized, or so poorly
staffed- or all of these--that successful mastery by the new administration
requires the longest possible preparation. (State, Defense, and, depending
on your plans, NEW, HUD, or Transport tion)
(3) For these OZ other reasons, couly proper III under-
taken by secon: and third level Provide Lul apportunes WHOSE ment
10.
requires some attention from = Sccretary-dasignate.
(4) The agency is likely to be confronted by early urgent
demands for executive action or legiclative recommendations such that
concrete agency preparations must begin at once. (Treasury and others)
(5) The position is SO prestigious or of such controversial
policy importance that the leading political figures in the party are
regarded as contenders. Until such positions are assigned, the President-
elect will have difficulty obtaining impartial advice regarding the many
other posts he must fill.
(6) The position requires early appointment for psychological
or symbolic reasons. (UN Ambassador)
8. Early staff appointments. Your own staff needs for the transition
period must be attended to. Summarizing matters of great complexity, we
would suggest that you will need one assistant or more for each of nine
functions. Since you will require permanent White House Staff to handle
all but two of these functions, you might appoint to your transition staff
men whom you are considering using in the same roles after January 20. The
transition period can then give you an opportunity to find out in advance
whether they have the special capacities needed to help you carry your
post-Inauguration responsibilities. The functions to be performed for you
both during the transition and later are:
a) Management of your calendar and of administrative arrangements
for yourself and your staff. This could be your permanent Appointments
Secretary.
B) Contact with the press and advice on public relations. One
11.
man usually performs both functions and he could become your permanent
Press Secretary.
c) National security liaison and advice--a role similar to that
performed by Rostov for Johnson, Bundy for Kennedy, and Gray and Goodpaster
for Eisenhower.
d) Liaison for and "trenslation" of military and intelligence
documents.
e) Personnel advice. There might be need for two persons: one
concerned with the general talent hunt and the other handling patronage
recommendations.
1) Oversight of task forces and similar substantive work. This
might be done by a general aide for policy and programs--by a man with
the breadth of jurisdiction (though not necessarily the powers) of a
Sherman Adams or Theodore Sorensen. This function could be divided among
several men who would also collect ideas and prepare initial drafts of
your Inaugural Address and later public messages. Actual assignments
More
depend, of course, on many factors including the distribution of literary
talent.
This CO 1' to
done by your permanent Congressional lisison assistent(s).
The following functions need to be performed only during the
transition and for a short time thereafter. You might assign them to men
whose visdom you want but who, because of business commitments, age,
health OF 5022 other reason, will not accept low-toth. politment..
ii) Advice on organization and sion.
12.
i) Advice on transition questions and transition contact with
the old administration.
Among decisions which you vill have to work out before or
during the transition period will be some regarding organization of your
White House Staff. You will have to determine how much access each secio-
tant is to have and, for example, whether there is to be a staff coordinator
like Adams. You will have to decide whether your best interests will be
served by giving each assistant a strict functional assignment or by using
them to some extent interchangeably. Since the purpose of the White House
Staff is to give the President the extra eyes, cars, and hands he needs for
his incredibly difficult task, your decisions on these questions and others
related to them could have profound effects on your presidency. We hope to
describe the issues in greater detail in a subsequent memorandum.
9. Early appointments in the national security area. Most of the
following positions meet several criteria for early appointment: *
a) Secretary of State and two Undersecretaries. The qualities
you seek will depend in part on your conception of his office. See Par. 21
below. **
* Lest we presumptuously state the obvious, we relegate to the footnotes
our limited observations on the qualities needed for certain offices.
** Also, we believe it important that the top team in State have the capa-
city to advise the President, to guide the Department, to deal with friends
and critics in Congress, and generally to explain administration policies
in ways that will maximize public understand and support. Dulles, Herter,
and Rusk such of but the lack of confidence,
communication, and team spirit at the top of the on State
Departm is procedent.
10.
b) Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary. ***
c) Central Intelligence Agency Director. If you intend to
appoint a new Director during your first few months, he should be ap-
pointed early. You might wish to continue Mr. Helms, who is a CIA
official with, we understand, an excellent reputation. That course
requires no immediate action; you would simply have to ask him sometime
before Christmas to stay on and to announce that fact. (Either an in-
definite resppointment or a commitment of six months or so would seem
courteous in such a case.)
d) Ambassador to the United Nations. If you wish to continue
the symbolic importance of this position and to fill it with a prominent
figure, then the appointee will have to be named about the same time as
the other high national security officials.
e) The JCS. The terms of both General Wheeler, the Chairman,
and General McConnell, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will expire
in 1969. Following the precedent set by President Eisenhower, you could
indicate before Inauguration, or even in November, your choices for these
posts, or you could defer action. Your decisions both on individuals
and on timing will require careful consideration. These decisions will
be taken as indicative of many of your policies. They will also be read
as suggestive of your basic attitude toward the military establishment
and can influence the amount of cooperation you and your appointees
*** The presc ption 10 Culfford's
reputed abili
CCS
reputed analy dell ability.
14.
obtain from the inner reaches of the Pentagon. Many complex issues
are involved, especially if, as a result of your decisions on Vietnam,
or for other reasons, you were to contemplate asking the other two chiefs
to step down or to take other posts. (Admiral Moorer's term as Chief of
Nevel Operations runs to 1971; General Westmoreland's as Chief of Staff
of the Army to 1972.) We are prepared to submit an additional memorandum
on this subject.
f) The field commander in Vietnam? We raise the question because
reconfirmation or replacement might have significant effects in Saigon or
Paris and on your concepts for the conduct of the war within Vietnam.
10. Early specintments in foreign operations.
a) The Ambassador to Moscow is an important bridge between the
two governments. Not only are his functions important, but he may also
be a symbol to the Russians of your administration's prospective atti-
tudes. Moscow is no place for an inexperienced academic or other amateur.
Unless early inquiries persuade you otherwise, you will want to consider
reconfirming the present ambassador as a symbol of continuity. If there
is to be a change, the new appointee must be highly qualified. In any
event, an early announcement would be desirable to permit the new ap-
pointed to consult fully with his predecessor.
b) Ambassador to Saigon. This post will remain important for
the foresceable future. If you intend to continue the incumbent, it could
be vise to ice 1: early to preserve his offer 1veness in Shigon. IS
you :- ite a ch. Age necessary as a yuhol of the popular mandate
15.
for change in Viatnan policy-the successor should have a maximum time
DO prepare.
c) Paris negotinuing team with North Vietnom. Your actions
here will appear to signal the direction of your policies toward the
negotiations and the war. You will want to consider with your Vietnam
experts the appropriateness or manner of changing the Paris team. If
you continue them for the near future as a symbol of a continued "tough"
negotiating position (if that would be its meaning), it would be advisable
to announce your decision quickly.
d) Ambassador to Paris. The country is important to us, but
its government is so highly sensitive and difficult to deal with that an
early appointment is advisable.
e) Ambassadors at large. These positions, as such, do not
require immediate attention unless you have particular functions in mind.
f) Most other ambassadorships can probably be deferred until
after Inauguration in favor of more pressing work. A few caveats are,
however, in order: (1) The State Department's views on the relative
urgency of other positions should be considered. Bonn and Tokyo, for
example, might be thought to require early attention, as might London,
Prague, Warsow, Rio, or the special ambassadors to NATO and the OAS. (2)
The governments notreceiving immediate attention may feel slighted and
undervalued by the United States. To preserve feelings, you might dis-
patch special envoys to explain the delay and give assurances of our
interest. (3) Most embassadora would be asked to continue (ii) indefinitely,
16.
state
need
(11) for a for months, or (iii) briefly. This will present few problems
for career officials who would stay or for political hecks who won't be
missed. Others may require gentle treatment if you wish them to remain.
(4) The longer such posts remain unfilled, the greater will be the
pressure for political appointments. Your Secretary of State-designate
could form an advisory committee to identify the ambassadors who should
be dropped quickly (former political appointees of modest quality), those
who should be retained (the best career people and those non-career
ambassadors who have served with unusual distinction), and to screen
names proposed for vacated posts.
11. Early "donestic" appointments.
2) Budget Director. This agency's name does not connote the
breadth of qualities required by the office. The Budget Bureau and the
White House Staff provide the President's principal protection against
departmental and congressional special pleading. Only with their help
can he make the executive apparatus serve his purposes. The Budget
Director should be the one man in government with an outlook virtually
as broad as that of the President, and he must be able to judge not only
costs but also relative importance among competing programs. The office
needs a man of wisdom and vision with understanding of many policy issues.
Though no particular professional background is vital, all testimony we
have taken suggests that economists have proved unusually effective in
this post. An carly appointment is crucial to master the current budget
and to gain oncly use of the inveluable resources of the Durlet Bureau.
17.
b) Secretary of the Treasury.* It is likely that the problems
of balance of phyments, taxation, and the general state of the economy
will argue for a November appointment, If the economic front is quiet,
however, it may be possible to delay this appointment until December.
c) Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. This post
should be filled early if the Treasury is. The Department is a powerful
agency and its Secretary has tended to consider himself the President's
primary economic adviser. In any case, it may be useful to have the
Chairman of the CEA at hand from the beginning.
d) Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and/or Secretary
of Housing and Urban Affairs. ** The new administration has two problems
in this area: it will encounter strong demands for action and legislative
recommendations to deal with the "urban crisis." Because it is important
* A Republican administration enjoys the presumptive confidence of the
financial community. Thus, your appointment need not be specially directed
to assuring them. But a different audience may need reassurance: your ap-
pointee should not only understand compensatory fiscal policy; he should be
able to speak the language and perhaps even appeal to the economists and
economic critics who do most of the popular and serious writing in this
area and who thus tend to shape the general reception of an administration's
economic program--often in the long-run as well as the short. This
"criterion" is almost certain to be satisfied by your CEA Chairman.
** These are critical agencies for the new administration. This is the area
of key and explosive domestic challenges with the least assurance of "solu-
tion" in principle or legislation in practice. Innovations are necessary,
but innovations (e.g., the "negative income tax") may be costly and ir-
reversible even though experience or later analysis may prove them unwise.
Yet, the pressure for action from politics and "the streets" will be enor-
mous. And it i- a 3 wiblican administration in sticular that needs to win
deceptance, = E, an. CC Isuand in the area. pension at
least as much attention cad 00 are customerily to the State
18.
to respond and because 1 failure to push affirmative proposals will
force it into on unhappy defensive posture, the new administration must
be ready to move. Secondly, a Republican Precident has a strong need to
demonstrate concern with poverty, urban decay, and associated problems.
An early appointment could dramatize your concern. Certain outstanding
appointments could induce opposition critics to "wait and see" and to
give the administration a chance "to prove itself." And the earlier the
appointments are made, the sooner you can begin to ask your administration
for results.
e) Secretary of Agriculture. There seems to have been a sweeping
partisan turnover of Agriculture personnel in 1961. If similar turnover
is to occur in 1969, the Secretary should be appointed early to allow time
for departmental recruiting and orientation.
12. Other appointments.
3) A :torney General.* He is involved in matters that are in-
trinsically and politically of great importance: civil rights, criminal
and Defense .ointments--and even more because the qualities required are
even rarer. It will be difficult to find the men who can manage the depart-
ments, who can delegate but not too much, who can both reign and rule, who
can react and appraise but who can also innovate and generate enthusiasm,
who can refrain from bucking every, demand up to the White llouse, who have
sufficient idealism and clarity of purpose to demonstrate "concern" and
"commitment" and indeed to push for improvement but who are also suffi-
clent team players to accept intra-administration "defeat" without leaking
all or resigning in a huff. Whether such persons exist outside of heaven,
WC cannot say.
* The Attorney General be a much локе
which is
behav:
;=
of
their
Suprome
(
ONE
:
19.
procedure, riot control, organized crime, the FRI. The course of the
campaign, in percicular, may require an early appointment for symbolic
purposes. Nevertholess, the Attorney General has relatively less need
than, for exa plc, the Secretary of Defense to master the technicalities
of ongoing problems, or to prepare for early crises (at least if riots
remain infrequent during the winter).
b) Secretary of Labor. Appointment before Thanksgiving would
source of their problem: they relied for advice on an Attorney General who
did not learn or approciate the significance of on appointee's judicial
philosophy but who relied insucad on others' conclusionary appraisale of
quality and political opinions. A President may have his most lasting im-
pact through his judicial appointments (including the lower courts); the
Attorney General will have a role in that process. It is important to have
on Attorney General who will do you and the nation credit in that role. To
do so with ap ropriate attention to Senatorial and other patronage requests
requires great judgment and finesse. (2) The Solicitor General's office
traditionally attracts brilliont talent from law firms and law schools.
With appropriate leadership from the Attorney General, the Department can
do the same both at the level of Presidencial appointees and below. This
resulting reservoir of high-powered talent can multiply the Department's
effectiveness and also serve, by loan or otherwise, other departments and
the White House. (3) The Attorney General's rectitude, vigilance, and
readiness to inquire can give you an important defense against corruption
within the government.
*This position has commonly been viewed as "labor's voice in the Cabinet.'
When important matters are at stake, however, union leaders want to deal
with you and your representative. And, of course, neither management nor
Congress will respect a mere union labor spokesman, whatever his title.
To advise you, to serve as a buffer and (when appropriate) mediator on
industrial relations matters, to supervise the mediation services, and to
deal (as appropriate) with the National Labor Relations Board--your ap-
pointee must be tolerable to labor but probably not a union man. You
might find the right man in industrial relations; among respected arbi-
trators, mediators, or umpires; or even in & Business School, Economics
or Law faculty.
20.
not seem necessary unless (1) there is or might be pressure for federal
involvement in important national strikes in progress or prospect before
March, or (2) you intend to take a very early position on "wage-push"
inflation.
c) Secretary of Transportation.* Nothing inherent in this post
requires that appointment be made in November rather than December.
There is a serious organizational problem on the domestic welfare
front. As one interim approach, you might insist that the Secretaries of
HEW, HUD, Labor, perhaps Transportation, and perhaps others form a sub-
group of the Cabinet and work very closely together to formulate and
implement policy. If that is to be done, it should be done from the begin-
ning and calls for roughly simultaneous appointments. Thus, if one is
appointed early, all should be. (Alternatively, if you intend to give one
Secretary primary responsibility for the overlapping welfare functions of
the several departments, he could be appointed early and the others late.)
* A trouble-avoiding holding operation may not be too difficult in this
department. It will not be easy, however, to find a man who can promote
innovation and cope with it in the effort to keep the country livable not-
withstanding its expanding and increasingly-concentrated population. More
common than creativity, but still rare enough to emphasize is the strength
to stand up to the special interests, such as the "highway lobby" or the
protagonists of the merchant marine or supersonic transports. He will also
have to consider the desirability of new steps to consolidate or coordinate
Executive Branch operations with those of the "independent" Civil Aero-
nautics Boards and Interstate Commerce Commission. Whether new steps would
be both wise and politically practicable is not clear, but your appointee
should be one who can both answer the question and carry out any necessary
supps.
21.
d) Postmaster General. Appointment before Thanksgiving is
not required unless you must take a position in your first few months
on the proposal of the recent Presidential Commission that the postal
service be performed not by a regular government department but by a
public corporation. If delay would impode reform, your appointee cannot
begin soon enough to appraise the substantive merits and political possi-
bilities of reform.
e) Secretary of Commerce. There is less need for appointment
before December. The basic question is whether you can make something
more of this post than it has been in recent decades. If you are consider-
ing merging the Labor and Commerce Departments, your appointees should be
made aware of this at the time of appointment.
f) Secretary of the Interior.* Again, early action may not seem
necessary.
g) White House Scientific Adviser. The "scientific community"
attaches great importance to this post and became very restive about
President-elect Kennedy's intentions until the post was filled in 1961. The
same sensitivity can be expected today. A strong and relatively early,
though not necessarily immediate, appointment can reassure this community
of your respect for them and help gain their respect for your White House
and thus facilitate the recruitment of top scientific talent in Defense
and elsewhere.
* In addition to the usual fun: dons,
who
can
in
L.IC
face
of
in
1-'s
as
well
if
1.
.00
much.
And the man who can please public and private power percissus and keep
the oil and mineral interests off the President's back will be doubly
precious.
22.
h) FDI Director. Unless you are persuaded that you want Mr.
lloover to continue, judicious silence about this post should give him
smple opportunity (which he might welcome in view of his age) to indi-
cate that he does not wish reappointment. If a new appointment is to
be made, it must receive the greatest care, for you cannot later remove
the Director without being charged with "political misuse" of an agency
that should be "above politics." For an agency long subject to single
control, there is reason to appoint ar. outsider who could look at the
Bureau with a fresh eye. At least, there should be no automatic presump-
tion that a present Bureau official would be better than a first-rate
urban police chief, an effective administrator not now in police work, or
an elder statesman who could serve for a short period, reassure the public
and give you a breathing spell in which to assert your control over this
important but currently semi-sovereign agency. Although your Attorney
General should probably have a voice in the appointment, its importance
requires your close attention.
1) White House liaison with the academic community. Your two
predecessors had resident academics in the White House presumably in the
hope of generating a sympathetic chronicle and a bridge to "intellectuals"
at large. The first function is unsure (compare Schlesinger with Goldman)
and the second silly. You reach "intellectuals" not by having a special
communicator for that purpose, but by the actions and statements of
your administration. By all means, do not neglect academics in your
operating and Stalf appointments. And, of course, their in pre-
23.
and post-Inauguration took forces is both (1) an effective and easy way
to impress "intallectuals" and (2) useful on the morits.
13. Immediate action by not appointees. Many of your appointees
will need time--perhaps six to eight weeks--to extricate themselves from
other affairs. Even so, all appointees should be asked to begin immedi-
ately, if only on a part-time basis, not only to familiarize themselves
with their new jobs, but to confer with members of the outgoing adminis-
tration, meet the civil servants who will work for them, and learn the
routine of their agencies.
D. Political Criteria Generally; Holdover Personnel
14. Political considerations have an inevitable place in appointments.
Many excellent candidates will also enjoy excellent political credentials.
But not all those with political support will be worthy of important res-
ponsibilities.
a) Though judgeships need no special caveat since everyone
understands their importance, regulatory agencies do. They are often
viewed as convenient "dumping grounds" for persons of minimum qualifications,
the assumption being that a commission of five or seven members can carry a
few weak members. Often, however, most of the members turn out to be weak.
Even when this is not the case, the weak appointees vote, and not always
wisely. It has reached the point where well-qualified men frequently
decline to serve on regulatory commissions. To correct that situation, the
new President yould need to instruct his personnel recruiters in unequivocal
24.
terms and, in order to induce = good man to join an agency, he may have
to give assurances that he will fill future vacancies with men of
similar high quality.
b) There are positions--often wasteful and unnecessary- of
some prestige that can be filled with persons of minimum quality without
undue damage to you or to the nation. A thorough (and secret) pre-
and post-election sttempt to identify such positions would be useful
to you.
15. Some personnel and patronage advisers have, in past administra-
tions, appeared to insist on political credentials for every Presidential
appointee and for every lower position at the disposal of such appointees.
Such an approach will deprive your administration of valuable services and
will miss the opportunity to win independents to the Republican cause.
There is obviously reason to avoid highly partisan Democrats, but inde-
pendents and even nominal Democrats should be welcomed with open arms even
as Presidential appointees and especially at lower levels. And if academics
who supported Democrats are excluded from task forces and from consultation,
an important resource will be lost.
16. Continuing old officials.
a) At least one Presidential appointee in each agency should be
asked to remain for a few days after Inauguration in order to provide each
department with an "Acting Secretary" to perform the formal departmental
function: chat connot be performed by your appointees prior to their of-
ficial Senate confirmation.
:
25.
b) Some Presidential appointens in the outgoing administra-
tion are essentially career then of a quality you will wish to retain.
(This is especially likely in such departmental positions as the Assistant
Secretary for idministration--who will be useful for a few months at least.)
c) Some non-career officials of the outgoing administration
might be of such outstanding quality that you would want them to stay. Your
pre-and post-election personnel advisers should make the effort to identify
any such persons.
d) The preceding considerations are applicable with even greater
force to those non-Presidential appointees occupying positions that are at
the disposal of the new administration.
II
SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PLANNING
17. We have refrained thus far from mentioning the Bay of Pigs, though
that episode dramatizes the dangers facing an administration that takes
office ill-prepared for the exercise of power. We refer to it now because
it illustrates some problems almost certain to face you in your early
months in office.
(1) Elements in the bureaucracy will refurbish and attempt to
sell ideas studied and rejected by the previous administration or, as in
the case of the Bay of Pigs plan, represent as beyond the point of no
return programs about which the previous address istration had, in fact, been
skeptical, reserved, or undeclied.
26.
(2) Your appointees will be less willing then later to 30
against what seems a consensus among departmental experts. As with the
Bay of Pigo plan, they may feel hesitant to express doubto. In other
instances, they may hositate to question bureaucratic advice that soue-
thing or the other chanot be done.
(3) Your appointees will be less prone than later to recommend
courses of action involving risks of public or Congressional criticism.
With each hoping for maximum accomplishments, each will be reluctant to
see you incur political costs except in behalf of his program. After six
months or so, your appointees will hopefully have become not only more
realistic but more conscious of how their departmental interests fit into
the whole program of the administration.
18. From mere mention of these problems, several obvious conclusions
emerge:
(1) Your appointees should identify as quickly as possible the
hobby horses of otherwise valuable and trustworthy men in the permanent
government. They should also make every effort to learn from their prede-
cessors the exact status of issues likely to arise between January and
July, 1969.
(2) Your appointees will need to acquire as much advance knowledge
as possible about higher-level personnel in their agencies and about the
major issues which they are apt to face in the settling-in period.
(3) To cope with the third problem, your appointions will need
better understanding than has been the CASE in C. year of what the
President expende--of what you expect.
27.
This means that you will need to make a number of early
decisions about policy issues and to communicate these decisions as
clearly as pensible to your prospective and actual appointees. These
decisions will concern not only policy positions, many of which will be
developed during the campaign, but also relative priorities, tactics to
be followed (i.e., a push for legislation, an effort first to stimulate
public pressure, or simple administrativa action), and desired timetables
(O.S., some symbolic action on cities before the summer even if high
priority measures have to come later).
19. With this as prologue, we suggest below some of the more obvious
issues on which you might want to initiate serious pre-election study, with
= view to helping you make the tough decisions on policy and tactics which
you will want to make as soon as possible after November 5:
(1) A first group of issues would be those which could be in
crisis in early 1969: Vietnam, Thailand, Berlin and East Europe, the Middle
East, urban "ghettos," federal-state-local welfare programs, monetary
policies, threats to wage-price stability, and the balance of payments.
(2) A second group consists of issues with continuing or long
range ramifications requiring early decisions. This category does not
admit easy definition and is perhaps better described by example. General
defense and space programs, NATO, ABM, manned bombers, relations with Cuba
and Red China, long-range anti-crime policies, and relations with regulatory
agencies all illustrate in several ways matter) upon which you may h ve to
make Cirly cl Mces that will : in motion programs 1 the length of
your administration.
28.
(3) A third group of issues would be in those areas 11 Vitch
you plan early legislative proposals. You, of course, know what these
will be; any guesswork on our part would be irrelevent.
A considerable body of experience exists with regard to
task forces and how to set the most out of them. We would be happy to
prepare a summary on this subject if it would be of use.
III
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
20. In a number of key policy areas your ability as President to
formulate, coordinate, and execute programs will depend on putting into
particular posts men who can do what you want the occupants of these posts
to do. Given the number of high level officials that must be named soon
after the election, you might usefully have some pre-election attention
given to the division of responsibilities most compatible with your purposes
as President. The following paragraphs will identify two major issues
bearing on your prospective appointments.
A. Responsibility for National Security
21. Prior to choosing your Secretary of State, you might well consider
the extent to which you will want your Secretary to be your principal
adviser on all foreign policy problems, including military, financial and
economic policy. This decision will affect both the qualities you will
seek in a Secretary, and the breadth of sharter the
National Security odviser on your own staff.
29.
You face many alternatives, each involving complex considern-
tions. We are prepared to develop a further memorandum on the subject.
a) Manuhile, it is important to recognize that if you choose
to give your S: cretary of State a broader mandate, the consequence will
be twofold: First, the Secretary-designato must be a man who wants this
role and who understands what he has to do =0 perform it effectively.
Second, the State Department would have to recruit a staff of men able to
think of foreign policy not merely in terms of diplomacy, but in much
broader terms.
b) If State does not perform this role, such a staff must be
part of the White House or National Security Council staff under the
direction of a national security adviser. Thus, resolution of this
issue affects not only the requirements for a Secretary of State, but also
those for your national security adviser and their personal staffs.
22. In any event, there are perennial organizational problems within
the State Department which in the past have prevented it from being as
useful to the President as it might be. In particular, the relationships
among foreign service and non-foreign service men, the regional desks and
functional bureaus, and the foreign service on the one hand and program
groups such as AID on the other, need to be rationalized. The Secretary-
designate must understand that you care about the efficiency of State and
that he must address this problem, or at least entrust it, to an Under-
secretary with delegated power. You will want to be sure that your
top team in State has the interests and recources 20 ? 20.5 Noth the
policy and the management taxks.
30.
5. Organizing to That with Univer Affairs
23. The ability of the federal government to respond to urban
problems 15 reduced by the diffusion of responsibility and power in
this area among many governmental departments and agencies. No matter
how much responsibility is transferred to states or localities, the
federal government will remain concerned with inter-urban transportation,
assistance to local police, and other forms of grants-in-cid. Moreover,
the transfer of other responsibilities will require considerable study
and, at best, will take time. In short, the problem will continue.
24. The major issues here are whether and to what extent federal
responsibility for dealing with urban affairs should be centralized,
and if so, whecher the contralization should occur within the existing
departmental framework, within the White House or Executive Office staff,
within some other agency, or within a super-department created by merging
existing departments and agencies. Any such steps would, of course, affect
your personnel requirements for Justice, HUD, OEO, and White House assist-
ant (s) primarily concerned with urban affairs.
25. If you contemplate reorganization requiring Congressional action,
preliminary studies looking toward proposals for legislation might well be
undertaken prior to election. And If, as you have indicated, you are to
provide encouragement to the development of locally owned housing and
business in black communities and to enlist private industry in efforts to
rebuild the ghettos, then pre-alection studies of how the M = House could
P-x
Pinkley - spl
January 9, 1969
RMW/ma
Dear Virgil:
Judging from the success of your
address before the Wilshire Rotary Club
you should stay on the circuit and talk
to as many Rotarians as possible.
You may be sure I appreciate
your asking everyone to unite behind the
administration and to pray for the
success of our policies. In this connec-
tion, I want you to know how much I have
appreciated your friendship and wise
counsel through the years, and I hope
as you travel around the country you will
continue to pass along your suggestions
and thoughts from time to time.
with warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Mr. Virgil Pinkley
73155 Ironwood Drive
Palm Desert, California 92260
Copy of hand-written letter
December 29, 1968
Dear Rose Mary:
Perhaps you will be kind enough to pass along the
enclosed.
I am brushing up on my Spanish as I do each time I
come to this colorful and fascinating city. The same applies to my
trips to Italy.
Before long I hope to be in Washington and to have the
pleasure of seeing you at that time.
Meanwhile, my most cordial regards.
Virgil Pinkley
Miss Rose Mary Woods
Administrative Assistant to
President-Elect
Richard M. Nixon
New York City, N. Y.
fir
will
Copy of hand-written letter (sent from Mexico City)
run
December 29, 1968
Dear Dick:
Before coming down here ten days ago, I addressed the
Wilshire Rotaty Club.
I took the liberty of speaking on the Nixon Foreign
Policy; its objectives and why.
At the conclusion there was a standing ovation and
requests to speak to eight Rotary Clubs, including ones in Edmonton
and Calgary, Canada, and Honolulu.
At the close I pleaded for everyone to unite behind you
and your administration, to pray for the success of your domestic
and foreign policies and your personal health and safety.
Also, hope that commentators and columnists would not
pre-judge you, that they would recite the actual record correctly and
would indeed be fair, balanced and objective!
My warmest personal regards and salutes from Mexico.
Abrazos Amigo
Virgil (Pinkley)
Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President-Elect of the
United States
P. O. Box 1968
New York City, N. Y.
CN
B
HOTEL MARIA ISABEL
12/29/08
BALSA
PASEO DE LA REFORMA 325
MEXICO, D.F.
Dear Rose may: :-
Perhaps you will be bind
enough to pass along the enclosed.
I am brusling up on my
Spanish as I do each time I come
to The this colorful and fascinating city.
name applies to my trips to staly
Before long I hope to be in
Washington and to have the pleasure
of seeing you of that time.
meanwhile, my
administrative miss Rose may Woods Vargil Pinkley
assistant to
President - Elect
Rediand m. min
new yours City, n.y.
CN
B
HOTEL MARIA ISABEL
12/29/68
BALSA
PASEO DE LA REFORMA 325 MEXICO, D.F.
Dear Dib
Before coming down here ten days
ago. Wilshire Rotary Club
the: mixin Foreign Policy; sto objectives
I tool the liberty of splating on
and why.
oration and requests to splab to
at the conclusion there was a standing
Edmonton hight Rotory clubs, including are in
Honolulu and Colgany, Canda, and
at the close epleaded for everyone
to unite behind you and your
administration, to pray for the sucless
of your domestic and foreign policies
and your personal health and safety.
3
B
HOTEL MARIA ISABEL
BALSA
PASEO DE LA REFORMA 325
MEXICO, D.F.
-2-
also, hope that commentators
and columnist would not pre-judge
you, that they would recite the
actual record convertly and would
indeed be fair, bolanced and
objective!
my warment personal regards
and salutes from mexico
abragos amigo
mr. Rachard m mixan
Virgil
President - Elect of
United State
P.O.Box 1968
new yours City, N.Y.
U-S.A.
Wilshire Rotary Club of Los Angeles
AMBASSADOR
Official Publication of Club No. 2412
Meets Wednesday Noon
Ambassador Hotel
3400 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90070
VOL. XXXVII
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1968
NO. 12
LET'S
MAKE
IT
—
100%
December 4, 1968
by GUSTAVE M. PLOCHERE
December 11, 1968
Chairman of the day: RALPH O. WILCOX
Chairman, Attendance Committee
VIRGIL M. PINKLEY
The chance is here to establish a
WILLIAM RODERICK, Director
"U.S. AND THE WORLD TODAY"
100% club attendance record. Christ-
LOS ANGELES HIGH SCHOOL
This outstanding correspondent
mas Day, December 25 is on Wednes-
A CAPPELLA CHOIR
joined the United Press in London in
day; our club will
1929, becoming Chief Editor in 1937,
be dark, and we do
Today we are happy to have stu-
General European Manager in 1943,
not have to make
dents from L.A. High, the oldest sec-
and Vice President in 1944.
up for that week.
ondary school in Southern California,
He introduced United Press Services
founded in 1873. The 45 member L.A.
to many European and Middle East
To accomplish our
High A Cappella Choir will present
areas.
100% goal we can-
ceremonial carols by Benjamin Brit-
For years he was a radio personali-
not have a single
ten and other selections in observance
ty and his personal friends and inter-
exception. We will
of the Holy Season.
view guests include Dwight Eisenhow-
make a concerted
er, President Magsaysay of the Philip-
effort to urge our
Their conductor is William Roderick,
pines, and Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek.
members to make
Chairman of the Music Department.
He has received many awards, in-
Bud Plochere
up through the use
He is a graduate of the University of
cluding the Medal of Freedom, which
Indiana and has lived in Los Angeles
is the highest award given by the Uni-
of postcards or
since 1959. Last year he was on a
ted States Government to civilians.
phone calls. This is our committee's
leave of absence studying composi-
Dwight Eisenhower has written, "So
task, but we need your help.
tion in Mexico.
far as I can now recall, the earliest
serious suggestion that I might be-
If one cannot attend Wilshire's regu-
In addition to their appearance at
come a presidential candidate one
lar meeting, here is what you can do.
Wilshire Rotary today the choir is
day was made by Virgil Pinkley in
Make up for the three Wednesdays,
scheduled to perform at Christmas
1943. Pinkley, then a newspaper cor-
December 4, 11 and 18. This is how:
concerts at L.A. City College and L.A.
respondent in the North African thea-
attend Wilshire (or other club) on
High. This is a fine group of dedicated
ter of World War II, came to see me
students.
shortly after the Allies in the Mediter-
Wednesday, December 4; make up
ranean had succeeded, at long last,
on Thursday, December 5 (for Wed-
in sweeping North Africa clean of
nesday, December 11) and take off
Axis Forces, overrunning Sicily, and
for any destination in the afternoon
landing in Italy.
immediately following the meeting.
day morning, December 24, and yet
"Mr. Pinkley, remarking on the
If you make up at any club on Tues-
your attendance for the month is
magnitude of these operations, ob-
day, December 24 (for Wednesday,
100%.
served that in view of a practice that
had all but become an American tra-
December 18) you will be carefree
Let's all shoot for a 100% goal this
dition, I would, as a wartime com-
for almost a full 19 days, from Thurs-
month with that Wilshire ENTHUSI-
(Turn to Page 2)
day afternoon, December 5 to Tues-
ASM!
OFFICERS
and
DIRECTORS
THE WILSHIRE ROTARY AMBASSADOR
MYRON W. REED, JR.
President
1967-1969
1968-1970
Frank H. Hirata
Editor
FRANK E. CARROLL
Vice President
Hugh N. Becket
Robert E. Alshuler
J. Robert Creighton
Co-Editor
JOSEPH E. LEHMAN
Secretary
Donald A. Dewar
George F. Freeberg
DONALD K. TRAVERSE
Treasurer
Kent Harris
Donald R. Hinkley
Hugh N. Becket
Robert E. Lynds
DENNIS MURPHY
Sergeant-at-Arms
Edward M. Lee
George N. Tibbetts, Jr.
Wayne Burnette
James W. Magoffin
Henry R. Chew
William M. Rambo
President, Rotary International
Governor, District 528
E. F. Dublin
Donald F. Warren
KIYOSHI TOGASAKI
A. RONALD BUTTON
Joe James Houser
Laurin L. Wood, Jr.
THE WILSHIRE ROTARY AMBASSADOR
Wilshire History Thru Prez:
Introducing New Member:
DATES TO REMEMBER
LORRY SCHOTTKE
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 18:
MY IMPERFECT YEAR
Annual Family Christmas Party.
1953-1954
Welcome to Lorry Schottke who re-
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 25:
cently became a member of Wilshire
No weekly meeting.
by JOHN L. CHAMBERLAIN
Rotary, and spon-
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1969:
sored by Fran Lore.
"Relax-make some mistakes! They
No weekly meeting.
won't like you if you are perfect." This
Lorry is a native
FRIDAY, JANUARY 17:
advice from Ollie Hammond sure
Angeleno, born in
Wilshire Rotary Swingo Party.
December 1914. Af-
helped to "break
JANUARY 19-25:
ter finishing his sec-
the ice." It is human
Rotary International
ondary education in
nature to seek per-
Magazine Week.
East Los Angeles
fection, especially
schools, Lorry at-
JANUARY 25-26:
as President of a Ro-
tended Sawyers
State Bowling Tournament.
tary Club, but folks
School of Business,
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29:
seem happier if you
studied Engineering
L.A. Kings-Toronto Mapleleafs
Lorry Schottke
make some boo-
and Business Ad-
Hockey Game.
boo's, which I had
ministration at Pasadena City College
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4:
no trouble doing.
and Alexander Hamilton Institute.
Wilshire Rotary Club Assembly.
Vic Lautz, as Vice
He attended the Senior National
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23:
President and Chair-
War College at Fort McNair, Wash-
Anniversary of The Founding of
John Chamberlain
man of the Club
ington, D.C., and now holds the rank
Rotary.
of Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve.
Service Committee was a great back
MARCH 16-23:
He served in the Pacific Theatre dur-
up man. Kenn Zinn, our Secretary, kept
World Understanding Week.
ing World War II as a fighter pilot.
the records well, and Dick Yeamans,
THURSDAY, MARCH 27:
After the war he remained on active
Treasurer, took good care of our mon-
District Conference Golf
duty and flew the Berlin Airlift until
Tournament.
ey. Dal McCauley, a Director, was
1950, thus establishing a flying record
Chairman of the International Service
of over 11,000 hours.
MARCH 28-30:
Committee. Hal Francis was a Direc-
District Conference.
In civilian life, which began in
for and Chairman of the Community
MAY 25-30:
1950, he has continuously served as
Service Committee and Kyle Fagin,
the Chairman of the Board of Direc-
Rotary International Convention.
also a Director, was Chairman of the
tors of Sho-Fel Industries, Inc., manu-
TUESDAY, JUNE 3:
Vocational Service Committee.
facturers of aircraft, space and mis-
Rotary Day at Races.
sile hardware and commercial assem-
FRIDAY, JUNE 6:
It was a busy year. Two Club As-
blies.
District Golf Tournament.
semblies instead of the usual one. A
His civic activities include Past Mas-
great turn out for the District Assem-
ter of James A. Garfield Lodge #556
bly and we were hosts to the District
WILSHIRE COMMUNITY
F. & A.M. 1966, Past Commander
Convention which was held at the
Aviators Post-American Legion, Past
SERVICE CITED
Ambassador Hotel with good friend
Chairman of the Aeronautics Commis-
John English as Chairman. The Dis-
Congratulations to Don Hinkley and
sion of the State of California, and
trict had become too large so we be-
his Community Service Committee for
Past Chairman of Boy's State in Cali-
being introduced in
came 160A with Charles Titus, a UCLA
fornia.
the Club News Col-
professor, leading our 28 clubs, as
Our new Rotarian Lorry resides in La
umn of the Novem-
Governor.
Canada with his Rotary Ann "Betsy",
ber issue of Gover-
We lost, by death, two great Ro-
and has three daughters and 3½
nors Letter written
tarians early that year, Past Presi-
granddaughters, if you understand
by A. Ronald But-
what that ½ means.
dent and Charter member Ray Walk-
ton, Governor of
er and Doug Jackson. Scanning the
(Editor's note: Two other new mem-
District 528. Projects
1953-54 club bulletin, edited by Cy
bers, Morton Rible and Robert K.
on Campfire Girls,
Middleworth, I found that Howard
Byerts will be introduced at a later
Pop Warner Foot-
Dippell, according to Dad Al, gradu-
date.)
ball, Los Angeles
ated from USC, and proud Floyd Rible
Don Hinkley
High School and
introduced son Morton (a new mem-
Project PICD were given recognition.
ber now) who had just made Eagle
then took to the trees in the Cocoanut
Scout.
Grove.
Virgil Pinkley
We won a few district awards, but
(Continued from Page 1)
At the Christmas party for our
the really wonderful thing to me was
mander of large and successful mili-
youngsters the headline Act was "THE
the way all the members "turned too"
tary groups, inevitably be considered
BIG SURPRISE." This turned out very
when help was needed.
as a strong presidential possibility.
literal when "Cheetah" the trained
Being President of the Wilshire Ro-
Virgil, I said, you've been standing
"Chimp" came unglued in the middle
tary Club was far and away the
out in the sun too long."
of her performance on roller skates,
greatest thing that ever happened to
Mr. Pinkley now owns and is presi-
started running over the kids and
me.
dent of Ad Service Publications.
Page Two
subject
ADVERTISING ART
TYPESETTING
ROTARY OFFSET
PRINTING
AD SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
1717 South Chico Street / South El Monte, California 91733 / Phones: El Monte 579-0060, Los Angeles 686-1135 or 686-1136
November 27, 1968
President-elect Nixon
New york City, New York
Dear Dick:
The entire mass media is delighted with your selection of Herbert
Klein for this new and important job. He is the right man in the
right place.
I know you will give him the authority and backing which is essential
for a stand out performance. There has long been a need for such
a job.
You are fully aware of what damage can be inflicted on you and your
administration if any credibility gap should develop.
Sometime if you desire, I can present some ideas on this vital
matter which effects everything you attempt to do at home or
abroad.
It is great that you are spending Thanksgiving with the General.
It will be one of the highlights for him---and and all of you.
Everything about Julie's forthcoming wedding reflects good taste
and good judgement.
with warmest regards and highest esteem.
Cordially,
Virgil
Pinkley right
VP/nlg
November 30, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE:
I.
Background press briefings, London and Paris
II
European interests in U.S. policy
III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication
This is a brief summary of the accompanying memorandum.
I. Background press briefings, London and Paris: The
elite of the international press of London and Paris have been
briefed as to our "line" on the election strategy which resulted
in a genuinely national and centrist victory for Nixon because
of Nixon's wise, perceptive and strong campaign.
II. European interests in U.S. policy: Europeans, while
seeing the need for a special relationship between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., are deeply concerned to make sure that their interests
are represented as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship develops. They
would appreciate it if Nixon could visit Europe before he visits
Moscow; they very much appreciate Nixon's intention to insure
thorough preparation before the U.S.-U.S.S.R. heads of state
meeting.
NB: It might be a good idea to assign as Ambassador to
NATO a figure who is thought to have clout with Nixon, such as
Scranton, and give him the main job of making sure the Europeans
feel in on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. developments.
-2-
III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication:
Not only some of the elite members of the press of London and
Paris, but also the Institute for Strategic Studies can be
used immediately to send messages. For example, I told the
French press that Nixon is looking forward to establishing
close relations with the De Gaulle government immediately.
I also indicated that Nixon would be skeptical of calling
an international monetary conference until such time as there
seemed to be a consensus on the direction such a conference
should take and until there seemed to be a reasonable chance
for such a conference to be successful.
I'm sure these messages will be passed on.
November 30, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE:
I. Background press briefings, London and Paris
II. European Interests in U.S. Policy
III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication
Pursuing Safire's memo of November 20, I ate dinner
in London Wednesday evening, November 27, with the top
political or diplomatic or general editorial writers from:
Sunday Times, Daily Mail, London Sun, The Economist, London
Times, BBC, Sunday Telegraph and Daily Express.
The following day, Thursday, November 28, I ate
lunch in Paris with similar figures from France-Soir,
Europe I (a radio station), Le Figaro, L'Express, French
TV News and Le Monde.
Killian of the Daily Express and Worsthorne of the
Sunday Telegraph in London and Andre Fontaine of Le Monde
in Paris all asked me to convey their personal congratulations
and good wishes.
The thought behind Safire's memorandum was that we
should establish a line on the election, its salient points,
and its interpretation. This was done, and it was seemingly
well received, although there was also naturally intense
-2-
interest in plans and thinking for the future.
Part I of this memo will cover the line that was set;
Part II will cover the areas of greatest interest insofar
as future plans and thinking are concerned; Part III will
cover the need to exploit these types of journalists as
communication channels (not in terms of what they print
but in terms of their direct and indirect Government con-
tacts) in the conduct of international politics.
Part I: The American Presidential Campaign, 1968.
The Nixon Presidential campaign of 1968, guided to
success through the most complicated and turbulent political
year in modern American history, showed Nixon to be a wise
and strong political leader. The shape of the victory estab-
lished Nixon as the winner of a truly national and centrist
mandate.
(1) The Primaries. The decision to enter the primaries
involved very high risks but the brilliant and substantial
victories in all the primaries succeeded in effectively
abolishing the "loser image", proved Nixon's popularity, and
laid the groundwork for the handling of issues in the
general campaign, both as to content and technique. Nixon
won every primary he entered (and he entered all of them
except those like D. C. and West Virginia, of no significance
in the Republican Party, or those like California that had
bona fide favorite son Governors), with 70 percent of the
-3-
vote or more. The two salient pr imary victories, however,
were New Hampshire and Oregon. In New Hampshire, the
Nixon appeal was so strong that the popular and energetic
Romney, who had just been reelected by an overwhelming
margin as Governor of Michigan, one of our major industrial
states, and who had the total backing of the Eastern Estab-
lishment of the Republican Party, was forced to withdraw
from the race before election day in order to minimize the
size of the humiliation of his defeat.
In Oregon, where Dewey "stopped" Stassen in 1948 after
Stassen had swept all the primaries, where Rockefeller had
won his only Republican primary victory in 1964, and where
both Rockefeller and Reagan in 1968 had truly full scale
media and organizational campaigns conducted in their behalf,
Nixon surprised everyone by winning with nearly 70 percent
of the votes.
(2) The Convention. Nixon's success through the
primaries assured him of more than enough convention dele-
gates to win the nomination, and even to be able to afford
some erosion in delegate strength. For this reason, and also
to be able to ask for and receive genuine unity throughout
the Party, Nixon adopted a Convention strategy of avoiding
controversy. The fundamental strategy of Rockefeller and
Reagan, on the other hand, had to be a strategy of seeking
-4-
to find controversial issues that would force delegates away
from Nixon and into either the Rockefeller or the Reagan
camp. Nixon's strategy of avoiding controversy at that point
and seeking accommodation while suffering some erosion none-
theless proved to be successful in that he did receive
the nomination and was able to ask for and receive, immediately
after the Convention, widespread Party unity.
(3) Agnew. The selection of Agnew seemed wise at the
time of Miami and in retrospect appears to have been brilliant.
A Tower or a Reagan would have lost, for the ticket, Ohio
and Illinois and California --- or at least two of those.
Their presence on the ticket might have won Texas, but that
would not have been enough.
On the other side, a Lindsay or a Rockefeller on the
ticket would have caused the loss of Tennessee, Kentucky,
North Carolina, Virginia and South Carolina (the "border states"
with 54 electoral votes) plus Florida with 14, as against the
possibility of capturing Pennsylvania with 29. It would not
have been enough.
NB: A fascinating observation on the difference
between the French reaction and the British reaction to this
particular analysis: the French understood perfectly and
expressed admiration, whereas the British felt the personal
-5-
amd political shortcomings of Agnew, as perceived by them,
and as those shortcomings seemed to speak to his ability
to be President, should have ruled him out. Of course, at
this point I put on a hard sell for Agnew's intelligence,
character and personality, but the British would have
picked somebody else even though they recognize it would
have endangered the election.
(4) The strategy of the Democrats, as foreseen by
Nixon at the very beginning of the general election campaign.
Nixon foresaw that the Democratic Party would come back
together. He knew that Kennedy and O'Brien would be able to
bring most of the East back; he knew that at some point in
time, during the campaign, McCarthy would endorse Humphrey
with something less than full enthusiasm but nonetheless
substantial effect; and he knew that the leadership of orga-
nized labor would generate very great activity, and with
very great effect, to recapture for the Democratic ticket
those rank-and-file members whose sentiments were with Wallace
in September. In fact, all these things did happen; but the
fact that Nixon had foreseen them and designed his own basic
campaign strategy to account for them, permitted him to win
anyway.
(5) The effect of the bombing half. The bombing halt
had been foreseen; when it did come, its effect was massive.
-6-
In fact, Lou Harris has said since the election that he was
convinced on the day before election day that Nixon had
been beat by the bombing halt.
The Nixon camp, at the beginning of the campaign, had
in mind McNamara's statements immediately before the 1966
Congressional election about reducing the draft and about
troops being home by Christmas. Thus, a major peace move
of some kind was to be foreseen, and a bombing halt would be
the most likely. The Humphrey camp, it was known, anticipated
the bombing halt announcement almost every day starting with
Humphrey's Salt Lake City speech.
Nixon, of course, was able to appeal to the electorate
on the war and peace issue by his call for negotiation (from
strength) instead of confrontation, and also by his support
for the bombing halt expressed in mid-October in the Johnstown,
Pennsylvania speech and thereafter. In any case, Nixon
steadfastly maintained his cool and in the final analysis the
nation got both the bombing halt and a Nixon Presidency.
(6) Nixon's basic strategy. Nixon adopted a so-called
"big states" strategy designed to concentrate most of his
time and the funds of the campaign, and the Surrogate Candi-
date activity in the big electoral vote count states: Califor-
nia, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,
-7-
and New Jersey. Of these, he won four: New Jersey, Illinois,
Ohio, and California -- and he won all of those by very
substantial margins of 40,000 or more, not by miniscule
margins of under 10,000 as had been the case with the key
Kennedy states in 1960.
A secondary part of the Nixon strategy was aimed at
the border states which he won. A third part of his
strategy was to campaign to the Negroes in the country by
means of continuous references to his Black Capitalism
program and by continuous references to justice whenever
law and order were mentioned. Nixon never thought he would
get a substantial percentage of the Negro vote, but he wanted
to be in a position to be able to communicate with them as
President.
The result of the Nixon strategy now is that Nixon has
won a truly national election -- unlike Wilson's election
when he carried only New Hampshire in the East, and unlike
the election Humphrey was trying to win, i.e., without any
support in the South or the West.
Conclusion: Thus, Nixon has won a truly national and
centrist victory. As Joseph Kraft and others have pointed
out, he is now in a position to govern effectively.
-8-
Part II: The Areas of Greatest Interest Insofar as
Future Plans and Thinking are Concerned.
This section reflects areas of strong interest and
conveys the substantive views not only of the elite of the
London and Paris press, but also of the staff at the Insti-
tute for Stratègic Studies, Mr. Minos Zombanakis (a Greek
citizen who represents the Manufacturers Hanover bank in
London, continental Europe and the Middle East. He sends
his personal congratulations and good wishes to RN. RN
will remember meeting him in Rome the spring of 1967), as
well as at least a portion of the Harriman/Vance staff in
Paris.
(1) The Europeans (and the British regard themselves
as Europeans in this context) recognize that the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. have special responsibilities and therefore
need to have a special relationship. They hope that the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. pursue the Nixon formula for detailed nego-
tiations: first at the Ambassadorial level, then at the
Foreign Minister level, and finally, when appropriate at the
highest level -- covering Vietnam, the Middle East, and
strategic weapons.
However, the Europeans feel that they have interests
that require consideration as these matters develop between
the two super powers, and they should be kept au courant and
even, to the extent possible, should be involved and represented,
-9-
in some way, in the new developments.
For example, while the Russians hope and expect Nixon's
first trip abroad to be very soon after his inauguration, and
to Moscow, such a trip would be inconsistent with Nixon's
emphasis on preparatory talks at lower levels; it seems to
me that the best opportunity for an early Nixon trip abroad
would be if the Paris peace talks should reach a stage that
would make it appropriate for a Presidential visit.
In any case, Europe is on the way to Moscow, SO to
speak, both geographically and politically. A visit to
Europe before a visit to Moscow would be one way to symbolize
the Nixon concern for the interests of the nations of Europe.
Another way would be to send as Ambassador to NATO a
prestigious figure who was also known to be close to Nixon.
Such an individual could authoritatively and continuously
keep the nations of Europe fully informed and their interests
adequately represented, in connection with the development
of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.
In fact, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow (e.g. Thompson,
Beam, Alexis Johnson or whatever top professional RN sends
there), together with the Ambassador to NATO (e.g. Scranton),
and RN, should think of themselves as a three-way system in
this context, with a need for close communication between
the NATO man and the Moscow man, and the need for the NATO
man to understand his particular responsibility in handling
the Europeans being of particular importance.
-10-
(2) The Middle East. The two salient facts with regard
to the Middle East today are, first, the high level of Soviet
activity in the Middle East, and second, the serious instability
that is afflicting the Arab world.
The Soviet activity is thought to be motivated by three
impulses: (1) the traditional desire for Russian access through
the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean, (2) as a reaction
to a recent McNamara speech in Athens where he announced the
intention to increase NATO activity in the eastern Mediterra-
nean, and (3) penetration of the petroleum zones in northern
Africa, Arabia and Iran.
The Soviets of course are very large in Egypt and the
Yemen; Nasser is regarded as having very little ability to
control Egypt but for the presence of Soviet help --- student
riots, etc.
Without getting into the subtleties of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, there is strong and widespread hope in Europe that
RN will not feel that he has to be too hasty in fulfilling
his campaign promise to provide the Israelis with phantom
jets. It is specifically felt that to send them in before
the Israelis need them would only provoke the Russians into
accelerating their build up in that area. In any case, it
is doubted that the Arabs and the Israelis will agree to a
settlement of their disputes at any time in the foreseeable
future. If a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict comes
-11-
about, it will have to be on the basis of a give-up by the
Israelis of the occupied territory in exchange for a
permanent recognition by Egypt (others will follow) of the
right of Israel to exist as a state, but this will probably
have to be imposed from the outside on the respective states
by the United States and the U.S.S.R.
(3) The Monetary Crisis. There is a great deal of
talk in Europe, in the press and elsewhere, about the need
for a world monetary conference, a latter day Bretton Woods.
No one, however, claims that there is any agreement or
consensus about what direction the conference should move in.
Burns, on his recent trip, created some misunderstanding when
he said that most academics in the United States would favor
flexible exchange rates. It had to be clarified later that
he himself did not favor flexible exchange rates.
Government-imposed austerity in Britain is causing
severe political backlash, and the French feel that they are
in for a year of great difficulty, what with inflation and
trade union demands.
With regard to these matters, insofar as Nixon's moves
in the next few weeks are concerned, it would be well to keep
in mind that Burns is very highly regarded in Europe as a
sensible pragmatist. Nixon is said to be receiving advice from
others in this area who are not so sensible. There is
very high regard for Charles Coombs of the New York Federal
-12-
Reserve and considerable sentiment would support his
appointment as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs since he is already the de facto leader of U.S.
policy and operations in this field and to put him in the
strong public position of de jure leadership would strengthen
respect for United States leadership in this critical area
all over the world. The present Treasury team is regarded
with contempt.
(4) Vietnam. Two salient facts should be known with
regard to the Harriman/Vance mission in Paris. One, the
mission has received no guidance on the President-elect's
wishes. Absolutely none. Second, the South Vietnamese
deeply fear that they are going to be sold out. They are
still stalling in sending personnel to Paris. For example,
secret bilaterals were to have begun today, Saturday,
November 30, between the U.S. and Hanoi with regard to
physical and procedural arrangements for the initial pro-
cedural four-way conversations. South Vietnam personnel
were supposed to be in Paris by now SO that they could be
kept informed, but they had not shown up as of Friday.
The fact that Nixon had seen Kissinger three times
in the past week had been noted by the members of the Harri-
man/Vance mission. Kissinger is said to be one who really
knows what's going on.
-13-
The Soviets, by the way, played a major catalytic
role in working out the bombing halt understanding.
Also, when the record is made available to the new
administration and is examined with care, it will be clear
that the bombing halt agreements could have been made much
earlier than they actually were. This is something to be
kept in mind for February and March, on the political side.
(NB: Holbrook said he assumed Nixon's objective would
be to settle the Vietnam conflict by means of negotiations
as distinguished from settling it by means of military esca-
lation, but the settlement would have to be on an honorable
basis -- i.e., on a basis that would not make it appear
that Nixon had sold out what his predecessor had fought for.
I told Holbrook that was extremely well put. Holbrook
suggested that such a formulation might end up with a
statement by us that, since our presence in South Vietnam
was designed to protect the South Vietnamese from the
foreign invasion, we would withdraw our troops from South
Vietnam if, as, and when they withdraw their troops from
South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This will cause very
substantial problems with the Saigon regime, but the feeling
is we are going to have to force the Saigon regime in various
ways to accept more of the responsibility for their own fate.
-)
-14-
(Thoughts on the selection of the Ambassador to
Saigon: He should be young and strong. His job will be
far more debilitating than any Cabinet job. He should be
someone who is particularly close to the President's thinking,
knows what the President wants. He should be one who is
profoundly skeptical. Bunker, for example, has been too
easily hoodwinked by the lying, cheating, coniving leaders
of the South Vietnamese Government. He need not be a
person who has had great diplomatic experience or who has
credentials as an expert on Southeast Asia or South Vietnam.
(There do not seem to be any genuine experts on Southeast
Asia or South Vietnam.) Mitchell?)
Part III: Use of Journalists as Communication Channels.
The London Institute for Strategic Studies,
because of its unique structure and mode of operation can
serve as an extraordinarily effective channel of international
communication, when one is needed outside of regular govern-
ment channels. The same thing can now be said of the elite
of the international press in London and Paris.
First, with regard to the press: obviously they are
not set up on a structured basis as is the ISS, but there
is now in existence a certain good feeling, a feeling of
confidence and reliability that exists among and between the
-15-
following particular individuals, out of the groups I met
with in London and Paris: Roy Lewis of the London Times,
Nancy Balfour of The Economist, Henry Branden of the Sunday
Times, Bruce Rothwell of the Daily Mail, Andre Fontaine of
Le Monde (now editor, formerly foreign editor), Jean-Jacques
Faust, Assistant Editor of L'Express, and Andre Rabache,
Editor of France Soir (formerly foreign editor). These
people can be used, not so much with regard to what they
write, as for their channels of communication to officials
of their own governments as well as elite journalists and
officials of foreign governments.
The Institute, however, is much more readily structured
to serve these purposes immediately. Their financing is
all non-government and is truly international, flowing mostly
from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in this country,
the Wolfson Foundation and the Nuffield and Leverhulme Trusts
in the U.K. and the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany. In
addition, their staff is international, including British,
Americans, Germans, Japanese and Australians. Their member-
ship is international, including government officials,
politicians, corporations, and members of the press. All
their work is unclassified and all their sources are supposedly
unclassified. In any case they operate on that basis. But
-16-
they have marvelous access on a global basis. For example,
the morning I was there they had had a staff consultation
with a general from the Israeli general staff. The Associ-
ate Director, Kenneth Hunt, had just returned from Vietnam
where he had been out in the field fighting with the marines.
This is against the law but his contacts are such that it
had been no problem for him to get into that position. Also,
they move in the circle of academic, quasi-academic and
government think tanks everywhere, including RAND, IDA,
Princeton, Harvard, MIT in the U.S.; Chatham House in England,
the government-sponsored institutes in France, Yugoslavia,
Poland and Czechoslovakia and the privately financed insti-
tutes in Germany, Japan and Australia.
Thus, quite apart from the possibility of modeling an
in-house White House institute on similar lines, which will
be the subject of a separate memorandum, this institute can
be exploited immediately, even in the transition period as
a fast and respectable means of communication about intentions, etc.,
with regard to international strategic matters.
Kissinger, by the way, can be immediately useful in
this as he is most highly regarded by the London Institute
staff and apparently moves widely among all of the similar
institutes listed above.
November 30, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE:
The London Institute for Strategic Studies
Summary
I. This is an organization which is unique in the
field of think tank type of operations.
It is international; it is small; it has no relation-
ship with any government, and it is conveniently located,
geographically, in the sense that London is a convenient
and regular jet transfer point between continental Europe
(including Russia) and North America.
II. In a general way, the Institute suggests itself
as a model for a White House executive office institution,
although such an in-house institution would have to be
radically different in basic ways from the London Institute.
III. The facilities and personnel of the London Insti-
tute can be exploited much more heavily than they have been.
November 30, 1968
The London Institute for Strategic Studies
I. The ISS is unique.
The London Institute is unique in a number of ways.
First or all, it is truly international. It is international
in its financing. Following is a table of its sources of
funds for 1967-68:
SOURCE
1967-68
(in pounds)
A - Basic Finance
Ford Foundation (U.S.)
39,275
Rockefeller Foundation (U.S.)
4,167
Wolfson Foundation (U.K.)
500
Membership
14,750
Donations
3,285
Investments
1,000
Agency fees
500
Publications (net)
500
Total - Basic Finance
63,977
B - Specific Grants
Rockefeller Foundation
(Third World Studies)
6,875
Nuffield Trust (U.K.)
(Library)
2,250
Leverhulme Trust (U.K.)
(Junior Research Associate)
1,025
Wolfson Foundation (U.K.)
(Middle East Studies)
2.450
Wolkswagen Foundation (Germany)
(European Security)
7,970
European Institutes
550
Total - Specific Grants
21,120
GRAND TOTAL
85,097
-2-
Its staff is also international, including members
from the U.K., the U.S., Germany, Japan and Australia.
Its "membership" is international, including corpor-
ations as well as individual members, newspapermen, governments,
etc., from over 40 different: nations.
"Members" pay a small annual dues of under $200.
This entitles them to come to "meetings" at which papers
are presented, to use the library, to consult the staff on
a limited basis, and to receive publications -- books, papers,
etc.
And, of course, the distribution of the Institute's
material is international.
None of the other think tanks in the world are as truly
international. Some of the other institutes are actually
supported by their governments; others, such as some of the
academic institutes in this country, are supported entirely
by funds which flow from or relate to the interests of one
particular nation.
That the Institute is centrally located from the
standpoint of jet travel these days back and forth between
Europe and North America is self-evident.
The Institute is not tied to any government, whereas
our Rand and IDA in this country and other institutes in
other countries are. Also note the London Institute does no
contract work.
-3-
And, finally, the London Institute is unique in that
it has a very small staff: four permanent staff and eight
visiting staff, for a total of twelve. Obviously, with such
a small staff, every staff member must possess extraordinary
ability; the projects undertaken must be so unique in concept
that they are non-competitive with projects being undertaken
by other, larger, think tanks; and yet the output must be
relevant enough to policy makers to keep the Institute's
output in demand; and all the staff must be good enough not
to make any mistakes (certainly not very many) since a bad
project for the year by one staff member would mean an eight
and me-half percent error in the Institute's work for the year.
II. The Institute as a model.
Obviously, this kind of institute could not function
in the White House, or anywhere else within a government. At
the same time, our government already has the Rand Corporation
and IDA doing this kind of work on a very large scale, and
with access to classified information, and all done from the
standpoint of the best interests of the United States. More-
over, we have the gigantic Brookings Institution located in
Washington and designed to provide high government officials
with the best in thought on economic and social issues, research
on such matters, etc.
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However, in a way roughly similar to the way which
the top management of many top corporations have provided
themselves with small groups of "wild birds", so also the
President might provide himself with a small staff of no
more than three or four men whose assignement would be to
(a) keep in touch with the ten or twelve top men in this
field on a worldwide basis (Kissinger, Bucham, Sjnederek,
etc.), and (b) develop material based on their own intui-
tion and research.
III. Greater Use of the Institute.
Immediately, through the United States "membership"
in the London Institute (two officers of our embassy in
London have been provided with "memberships" by our govern-
ment) the Institute could be asked for a consultation or a
short paper on some aspect of policy that is going to require
some immediate action. For example, the Institute could be
asked to prepare a quick paper, from a totally unbiased
point of view, and without reference to the interests of
any one country, on the subject of the adequacy of the
inspection provisions of the Non-proliferation Treaty, not
only in terms of the possibility of nations evading inspection
but also in terms of their effect on the international politics
involved in getting further ratifications. Also, the question
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of inspection is obviously going to loom very large in any
talks with the U.S.S.R. with regard to strategic weapons.
The Institute might be asked to suggest guidelines on this
point. (None of these items was either suggested by or
discussed with the Institute or anyone else. This is strictly
my own idea. In fact, as I reflect on it, it would probably
be better to have such a request not come from our London
embassy "members" but from some corporate or individual
"member".)
Also, the Institute, through its widespread press and
academic contacts, can be exploited to send signals and
messages on a pretty far-ranging basis and into powerful and
influential circles.