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This file contains:
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Dealing with the Old Administration. 18 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Handwritten note from Dwight Chapin to Kay RE: copying and sending a letter to Roy Price. 2 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Letter from Billy Graham to RN RE: moral and spiritual leadership on the part of the President, and Julie's wedding. 3 pgs. [Letter], 11/25/1968
Postmarked envelope from Billy Graham to NR. 2 pgs. [Other Document], 11/25/1968
Letter from W. Clement Stone to RN and PN RE: attending Julie's December 22 wedding and reception. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/4/1968
Titled "My Own Opinions" by unknown author RE: Vietnam, law and order, monetary controls, and industry. 5 pgs. [Report], N.D.
Memo from R. G. Kleindienst RE: Republican National Committee. 5 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Memo from Harlow to RN RE: Chairmanship of the National Committee. 2 pgs. [Memo], 12/2/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Bebe Rebozo RE: Rebozo and RN's visit to Fisher Island and the James L. Knight telegram. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Letter from Col. Sherwin T. Winfree to RN RE: Congratulations and an invitation to visit Fisher's Island. 1 pg. [Letter], 11/6/1968
Telegram from James L. Knight to RN RE: Congratulations and invitation to use Knight's fishing boat or house boat. 1 pg. [Other Document], 11/8/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Request for possible candidates for Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Request for possible candidates for Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg. (Not scanned.) [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Question about the routing of State Department recommendations to Ambassador Murphy with handwritten notations. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Question about the routing of State Department recommendations to Ambassador Murphy with handwritten notations. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
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26126158
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WHSF: Returned, 7-4
core
doc
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document
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1
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26126158
sourceUrl
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document
title
WHSF: Returned, 7-4
description
This file contains:
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Dealing with the Old Administration. 18 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Handwritten note from Dwight Chapin to Kay RE: copying and sending a letter to Roy Price. 2 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Letter from Billy Graham to RN RE: moral and spiritual leadership on the part of the President, and Julie's wedding. 3 pgs. [Letter], 11/25/1968
Postmarked envelope from Billy Graham to NR. 2 pgs. [Other Document], 11/25/1968
Letter from W. Clement Stone to RN and PN RE: attending Julie's December 22 wedding and reception. 1 pg. [Letter], 12/4/1968
Titled "My Own Opinions" by unknown author RE: Vietnam, law and order, monetary controls, and industry. 5 pgs. [Report], N.D.
Memo from R. G. Kleindienst RE: Republican National Committee. 5 pgs. [Memo], N.D.
Memo from Harlow to RN RE: Chairmanship of the National Committee. 2 pgs. [Memo], 12/2/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Bebe Rebozo RE: Rebozo and RN's visit to Fisher Island and the James L. Knight telegram. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Letter from Col. Sherwin T. Winfree to RN RE: Congratulations and an invitation to visit Fisher's Island. 1 pg. [Letter], 11/6/1968
Telegram from James L. Knight to RN RE: Congratulations and invitation to use Knight's fishing boat or house boat. 1 pg. [Other Document], 11/8/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Request for possible candidates for Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Request for possible candidates for Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg. (Not scanned.) [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Question about the routing of State Department recommendations to Ambassador Murphy with handwritten notations. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Question about the routing of State Department recommendations to Ambassador Murphy with handwritten notations. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/3/1968
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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26126158
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
7
4
N.D.
Memo
Memo from unknown to RN RE: Dealing
with the Old Administration. 18 pgs.
7
4
N.D.
Memo
Handwritten note from Dwight Chapin to
Kay RE: copying and sending a letter to Roy
Price. 2 pgs.
7
4
11/25/1968
Letter
Letter from Billy Graham to RN RE: moral
and spiritual leadership on the part of the
President, and Julie's wedding. 3 pgs.
7
4
11/25/1968
Other Document
Postmarked envelope from Billy Graham to
NR. 2 pgs.
7
4
12/04/1968
Letter
Letter from W. Clement Stone to RN and PN
RE: attending Julie's December 22 wedding
and reception. 1 pg.
7
4
N.D.
Report
Titled "My Own Opinions" by unknown
author RE: Vietnam, law and order,
monetary controls, and industry. 5 pgs.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Page 1 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
7
4
N.D.
Memo
Memo from R. G. Kleindienst RE:
Republican National Committee. 5 pgs.
7
4
12/02/1968
Memo
Memo from Harlow to RN RE:
Chairmanship of the National Committee. 2
pgs.
7
4
12/03/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Bebe
Rebozo RE: Rebozo and RN's visit to Fisher
Island and the James L. Knight telegram. 1
pg.
7
4
11/06/1968
Letter
Letter from Col. Sherwin T. Winfree to RN
RE: Congratulations and an invitation to visit
Fisher's Island. 1 pg.
7
4
11/08/1968
Other Document
Telegram from James L. Knight to RN RE:
Congratulations and invitation to use
Knight's fishing boat or house boat. 1 pg.
7
4
12/03/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman
RE: Request for possible candidates for
Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg.
7
4
12/03/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman
RE: Request for possible candidates for
Governor of the Virgin Islands. 1 pg. (Not
scanned.)
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Page 2 of 3
Box Number Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
7
4
12/03/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman
RE: Question about the routing of State
Department recommendations to
Ambassador Murphy with handwritten
notations. 1 pg.
7
4
12/03/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman
RE: Question about the routing of State
Department recommendations to
Ambassador Murphy with handwritten
notations. 1 pg.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Page 3 of 3
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. NIXON
DEALING WITH THE OLD ADMINISTRATION
Introduction and Summary
Relations between Presidents and Presidents-Elect of different parties
have always been delicate and often strained. Frequently the President's
natural disappointment at his party's defeat has been tinged with personal bitter-
ness because his administration and policies have borne the brunt of his succes-
sor's campaign salvos. Nor has graciousness been an inevitable characteristic
of Presidents-Elect. Even the most sympathetic historians of the New Deal find
little to applaud in F.D.R.'s cavalier treatment of Hoover in 1932.
Yet cooperation is essential for several reasons. At least part of the public
will be offended if either fails to show courtesy and consideration. National unity
is hardly served by permitting a hard-fought campaign to merge into post election
feuding. And, of course, much of the machinery for preparing a new President
for the transfer of power can be utilized only with the concert of his predecessor.
Thus it is in your interest that the interregnum be a time when old hatchets are
buried and the grinding of new axes postponed.
Both because he has more to gain and because the task is easier for him,
the burden of maintaining good will between Administrators falls to the President-
Elect. The outgoing Administration has valuable information, experience, and
- 2 -
advice that you and your team will want to tap. To make cordial advances, to
overlook minor irritants, to soothe the President's wounded pride -- all these are
small prices to pay for such resources.
Pre-election Period. In order to exploit fully the opportunities for an effective
transfer of responsibility allowed by cooperation between the two Administrations,
you should consider the following actions:
- Appoint a counterpart to President Johnson's designee, Charles Murphy,
experienced in the operations of the Executive Branch and able to bargain with
Murphy on equal terms.
- Ask your designee to decide upon the requests to be made of the incumbent
Administration.
- Initiate planning for transition matters not directly related to relations with
the old Administration.
Post-election Period. Post-election customs are clear. President Johnson
will doubtless suggest an early meeting to set the tone of transitional cooperation
and lay the broad outlines of the actions you will take together. In summary to
be elaborated later -- you will want to touch the following points:
- Security clearances: You should make arrangements for expediting security
clearances for your appointees.
- Current and background information: You should seek access to such Admin-
istration information as daily intelligence reports, briefings and memoranda on
current problems, and appropriate "cable traffic. " You should also request other
information, to be described below, that may be difficult to obtain later or less
valuable unless studied in advance and acted upon early.
:
- 3
- National security and budget cooperation: You should plan for early and
close cooperation on national security affairs and the budget process.
- Orientation of appointees: You should arrange for the general orientation
of your appointees: briefing of new officials by the predecessors, access to career
staff and files, clerical and professional assistance, and perhaps ground-rules
to be established for an "open office" policy.
I. Pre-election contacts
1. It will be very much to your advantage to accept President Johnson's
invitation to begin discussions now about the transition. After Election Day you
will want as much cooperation as you can get from the outgoing Administration.
The more you get, the more effectively you and your appointees can govern after
January 20.
You cannot ask much prior to November 5. Whomever you designate to
negotiate with the Administration can, however, lay the groundwork for fulfilling
your many post-election requirements.
You must first therefore choose an individual to act for you in these nego-
tiations. President Johnson's appointee, Charles Murphy, is an affable but very
tough Southerner, long experienced in Washington. He acted for Truman in the
1952-53 transition, served in Agriculture and on the C.A.B. under Kennedy and
Johnson, returned to the White House recently as a Special Assistant, and reportedly
represented Johnson in Chicago during the democratic Convention. Your designee
must be able to deal with Murphy on equal terms. It seems essential that he possess
not only personal shrewdness and bargaining abilities, but experience in the total
operations of the Executive Branch, preferably in the Executive Office.
- 4 -
2. You should develop with your designee a catalogue of your transitional
needs. For both political and administrative reasons, these will fall into three
general categories: (a) services that can be performed, at least in part, by the
outgoing Administration prior to November 5; (b) post-election cooperation that
can be plotted and arranged prior to the election; (c) post-election services that
need not, or should not, be discussed with the incumbent Administration until
after the election. In subsequent sections of this memorandum, we suggest
several cooperative efforts and services you may want to request and, where
important, try to indicate the time when action is most usefully initiated.
3. Although not directly related to dealings with the old Administration,
certain other transitional matters bear a short comment. In order to coordinate
later cooperation with the Administration and to make maximum use of interregnum
preparation, you should begin thinking about designees to perform two functions.
First, you will need some person(s) to direct and organize your transition activi-
ties in general. This man would conceivably play much the same role as Henry
Cabot Lodge did for Eisenhower in 1952-1953. Second, you may want to select a
transition planner, whose task will be to perform "think work" about the transition.
The services of Richard Neustadt for Kennedy in 1960-61 suggest the nature of his
responsibilities.
II. The Immediate Post-Election Period
A. Meeting with the President.
4. The President will probably contact you shortly after November 5 and
suggest an early meeting. In order to gain maximum lead time for the transition,
:
- 5 -
you should accept the earliest possible date. Preliminary negotiating at the staff
level can settle many details of agenda and format, which then need not occupy the
time of the principals. *
5. You and the President may wish to issue a joint statement after your
meeting. The ideal statement would leave everything open and yet obviate any
appearance of friction which might result if the President later feels compelled to
emphasize that his power continues unimpaired until January 20 or if you later
wish to disclaim responsibility for interregnum Executive actions. A suggestion
follows:
The President and President-Elect had a full, friendly
and useful discussion. They and their associates will
cooperate in every appropriate way in order to insure
a smooth and effective transfer of responsibility on
January 20. They will continue to consult as they
think desirable and are confident that such coopera-
tion can be achieved without impairing the orderly func-
tioning of the Executive Branch in carrying out the
President's Constitutional responsibilities.
B. Principals' tone shapes transition.
6. You and the President will have to take strong and positive action to
surmount the impediments to effective cooperation that have traditionally charac-
terized transitions. Many in Government will feel that they and their policies
were treated unjustly during the campaign. Some new people will act as if they
*
For bargaining purposes, you will want these "White House negotiators" to be
aware not only of your various needs for the transition, but of their relative
priority. In addition, you will want to think about the general format of the
meeting. You may wish, for example, to request the presence of key members
of both Presidential staffs, either for purposes of coordination or in the hope of
exposing subordinates to the spirit of cooperation shown by the principals.
- 6 -
were already in office. New appointees have been known to assume that their
predecessors were fools or scoundrels or both and to show no regard for past
decisions, present reasons, or future insights. Some incumbents may attempt to
"sell" their policies to the new people. And the new people may feel that they are
being asked to commit themselves prematurely.
By frankly anticipating these characteristic attitudes, you can try to offset
them. Hopefully, SO will the retiring President who must set the example of
neither preempting his successor unnecessarily nor deferring all action in critical
areas. And if he, who has suffered campaign criticism, is willing to act respon-
sibly and constructively, his subordinates can be encouraged to do the same.
You, in turn, cannot be too emphatic in urging your appointees to take
advantage of their predecessors' valuable experience in coping with their depart-
ments, their constituencies, and their particular Congressional committees. In
the past, incoming officials have forfeited much of the advantage to be gained in
tapping this source of information and advice. In 1952, for example, Charles
Wilson neglected entirely to profit from the experience of Robert Lovett. Eight
years later, the Kennedy Administration retained General Andrew Goodpaster
through the transition period but made little effort to draw upon his experience.
Those of your appointees who served in the Eisenhower Administration would do
well to recall how little their own readiness to assist their successors was appre-
ciated. If you can convince your appointees that the advice of former officeholders
is a valuable resource not to be wasted, you will have taken a major step toward
an effective and efficient transition.
:
-7-
III. Clearance of New Appointees
7. Arrangements must be made for investigating the personal background of
your appointees for two reasons. First, some of your appointees will need the
immediate security clearances necessary for direct access to classified informa-
tion of the Johnson Administration. Nor will you yourself wish to entrust classified
materials to your people, either before or after the inauguration, without the assur-
ance of at least preliminary clearance. Second, you will probably want to continue
the practice of investigating all potential Presidential appointees -- regardless of
their need for classified data -- in order to assure yourself of their personal
suitability for high government office.
8. The timing problem: Investigations not begun before the election require
attention. Obviously, the process should be initiated as early as possible to avoid
the delays incident to overloading the investigative agencies.
9. General procedure: (a) The reports on those needing pre-inaugural
access to classified information must first be examined by the Administration --
perhaps the White House itself -- which can then relay both its decisions and the
reports to you. Exposing such reports to the Administration may be politically
undesirable but is probably unavoidable. It seems unlikely that the information
thus revealed would be misused by the clearing officials. (b) Unless you receive
direct access to the investigative agencies, reports on persons not in the preceding
category must also be channeled through the Administration. Here, however, the
Administration is merely a conduit to you; it has no need to examine the content of
the report. You should arrange for the Administration, therefore, to transmit to
you the unopened reports on persons not requiring pre-inauguration security
clearances.
- 8
10. In both the pre-election and post-inauguration periods, the problem can
be mitigated through the use of temporary clearances. You will have to determine
the availability, limits, and conditions for such clearances.
IV. Information for the President-Elect and his designees.
A. Current information.
11. You should request the kind of military, diplomatic, and foreign intelli-
gence provided routinely for the President. Such information will give you back-
ground for decisions you will have to make after January 20th. Also it should help
you to establish early guidelines for distinguishing presidential from departmental
"business." " And it may permit you to judge the form and adequacy of such informa-
tion for your needs.
12. You will, of course, need a staff to sit astride this information flow,
direct your attention to the matters most relevant for you, and otherwise absorb
and use this flow. * Let us emphasize that your most useful and significant infor-
mation may come not via formal transmissions from the old administration but
via your own people working closely with incumbent counterparts -- as discussed
later in this memorandum.
13. You should request a channel for obtaining appropriate briefings and
memoranda on current problems for yourself and your people. The Administration
would probably offer some on its own initiative but you should clear the way for
making your own specific requests for information and analysis on both substantive
matters and on transitional and organizational topics. **
*
Your basic needs for a transition staff were noted in our August 15 memorandum;
a later memorandum will address itself to White House organization.
**
Whether you should seek authority to request data directly from the departments
or from departmental staff is discussed in a later section.
:
9 -
Details are not crucial in your initial dealings with the Administration; they
can be worked out later. What you must establish at the outset is the basic prop-
osition that the President-Elect is entitled to full access and that government infor-
mation should move freely to you and your designees. Whatever you can do to
create an atmosphere of willing cooperation and respect for the President's own
responsibilities will facilitate the flow of information.
14. One of your most difficult and critical problems during the transition
will be the gaining of mastery (insofar as mastery is possible) over national security
affairs. You may want to request President Johnson to assign you one or more
career officials qualified to brief you during the transition period on military,
intelligence, diplomatic and related matters. The person(s) selected would be
appropriately cleared, sufficiently knowledgeable to interpret and amplify informa-
tion received about substantive and agency problems, and sufficiently experienced
and senior to be respected by both sides for intelligence and discretion. Such a
person would know when it is appropriate to seek further information from the
staffs with which he is familiar and when not to do SO.
15. You might want to request access to some "cable traffic" into the White
House as a preliminary exposure to later responsibilities. Your personal staff
for national security matters, to take one example, could serve as an effective
recipient of this information to promote their own education and as a conduit to you.
B. Other information, especially from the White House and Executive Office.
16. You should ask President Johnson to arrange some way of giving access
(controlled by him) to national security materials that might be available, or
readily available, only in White House files which leave with the retiring President.
- 10 -
a) One aspect of this request is easily presented and justified:
Eisenhower-Khrushchev conversations were covered completely only in the White
House files which left with President Eisenhower. President Johnson would
doubtless agree that a new President must know what the preceding President said
to foreign officials.
b) Your request should, if possible, embrace a second and more
elusive matter: There might be "limited distribution" or other closely held docu-
ments or memoranda that are conveniently assembled only in White House files. *
c) Perhaps you can do no more than to (1) raise the problem, (2) express
confidence that President Johnson will do everything he properly can to make sure
that his successor is fully informed on significant national security matters, and
(3) leave the details to be worked out by your national security adviser(s) and
their incumbent counterparts. This reinforces another point: Unlike President
Kennedy's adviser, McGeorge Bundy, who did not begin work until January or
assemble his staff until later, your national security staff should be appointed
early and begin performance as soon as possible.
*
It is conceivable, for example, that complete details of various contacts with
foreign officials on Vietnam matters may be so sensitive and restricted that full
information vital to the new President might not be readily known to carry-over
personnel or readily revealed by surviving files. In other cases, important
material might be contained in permanent departmental files but yet not readily
accessible because dispersed among voluminous other materials.
- 11 -
17. You should ask to see Task Force reports prepared for the President
and not yet released to the public. You could point out that work by thoughtful
people should not be wasted. You should, however, state your willingness to
accept any limitations imposed by President Johnson as to acknowledgment, attri-
bution, or quotation, and defer to his wishes regarding any reports which he might
issue publicly himself or use in late messages and speeches.
18. You should ask for reorganization studies completed or underway in the
Budget Bureau or in the Departments.
19. You will want to specify certain useful personnel information that could
easily be assembled by the Bureau of the Budget: available Presidential and
Departmental appointments (to the extent not published elsewhere), expiring term
appointments, Presidential powers with respect to various classes of appointees,
personnel policy decisions that need to be made within the first three months, etc.
20. You should request the preparation of a memorandum on technical opera-
tions of the White House, office and mansion budget, accounting, permanent
personnel, customs, etc. This should be supplemented by personal consultation
between incoming and outgoing officials. In addition, William Hopkins, the
Executive Clerk, is a great storehouse of information on these matters.
21. The preceding enumeration of reports must not disguise the important
truth that your best source of information lies not on paper but in people. Present
(and former) members of the White House Staff are perhaps the most valuable
resource of all for a new Administration. The unique experience and responsibility
of Presidents seem to forge a common bond among them notwithstanding differences
- 12 -
of party or policy. Presidential staffs should find a similar bond arising from the
special institution they serve. The insights, experience, and occasionally the
negative example of incumbent and former staff members can be extremely illum-
inating for new people. And a common loyalty to the Presidency should be enough
to encourage the future staff to seek and the present staff to offer candid discussion
of the Office and its problems.
V. Orientation of New Appointees.
A. National Security and Budget observers.
22. Since you will need to master, at the earliest possible moment, the
massive flow of communications and advice relating to national security policy,
you should give high priority to obtaining from the outgoing administration permis-
sion for your prospective Special Assistant(s) for national security affairs to work
with their incumbent counterpart(s), and, if possible, immediately nearby, hope-
fully in adjoining offices. If such an arrangement is not offered by President
Johnson, you should request it. The terms of your understanding with the outgoing
President should not preclude your designating more than one person for this
function. Even if you choose to centralize responsibility on your own staff, your
designee will want assistance to help in learning procedures, in mastering substan-
tive issues, and perhaps in examining files soon to be removed.
23. In addition, your Administration must become familiar -- promptly and
in depth -- with the Budget Bureau and its current work on the 1970 budget. Apart
from intimate intra-Administration considerations of peculiarly partisan matters,
- 13
it would be helpful for your Director (or other designee) and a few key staff to
observe as much of the budget preparation process as they can absorb. In this
way, your appointees can understand the nature of current issues, can help you
make preliminary judgments about the issues you want to re-examine after
Inauguration, and can better handle the new or repeated departmental requests
confronting them in early 1969. Close cooperation during the transition period
has become traditional in Budget, and it is a salutary tradition. In the unlikely
event that the Administration fails to offer cooperation in this area, you should
request it.
B. General orientation of appointees.
24. To reiterate a key point, you will find no greater resource in the out-
going Administration than the expertise and experience of its staff and appointees.
In the past, incoming officials have generally suffered to learn the same lessons
time and again because they have not profited from their predecessors' experience.
On the whole, this seems attributable more to mistrust of the predecessors rather
than to any unwillingness of the latter to be helpful. Of course, not everyone can
be equally helpful. Of course, much that is said will have to be discounted by
different interests and circumstances. But the fact is: outgoing officials are a
valuable resource that should be utilized by the incoming officials during the transi-
tion period.
25. You should press the old Administration to encourage Secretaries,
Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Administrators, and other Presidential
appointees to receive their counterparts and to acquaint them with the administrative
practices and substantive issues of their agencies.
:
- 14 -
a) You can expect the office of each Presidential appointee to have
prepared an appropriate "briefing book" on administrative and substantive matters.
Even excessively voluminous and routinely bureaucratic products can be useful to
the appointee (or his special assistant). Even the routine product can identify such
basic information (often unknown to new appointees) as both the "hot" and recurring
issues facing the agency, the identity and arguments of important interest groups
concerned with each issue, and the relevant Congressional considerations.
b) On such topics, you should advise your appointees to seek the views of
the incumbents. The direct exchange can be more sharply focused and more candid.
c) Furthermore, you should recommend that your appointees ask outgoing
officials (on a discreet and informal basis) for their views on the agencies' career
people. (We would hope that some information of this type would have been gathered
in the pre-election period.) The new official with a different policy outlook may
react differently, but incoming and outgoing officials will often have a common
reaction -- independent of policy -- to a subordinate's qualities. In time, the new
people may learn, as did their predecessors, that a subordinate is analytical,
concerned, diligent, articulate, concise, skeptical, discreet, or the opposites.
While the new official will not want to be bound by the predecessor's opinions, the
latter's views can accelerate the process of testing and appraising. And, of course,
subordinates are most useful to one who knows what discounts and premiums to
apply to their work.
26. Some incumbent officials may value their successors or their agencies
sufficiently to open their offices to their successors, letting them read much of
the paper traffic and to observe conferences and meetings with subordinates and
- 15 -
outsiders. Whether any particular official makes such an offer will depend upon
his work and working habits and the mesh of personalities. This assumes that the
"open office" approach occurs to him both as a possibility and as one to which the
President would not object. It follows, therefore, that if the President makes no
mention of the subject to you, you should diplomatically suggest its usefulness.
You should urge him, if agreeable, to authorize such cooperation perhaps by
mentioning it in a Cabinet discussion of transitional arrangements. Some such
approach as this is almost imperative in the State and Defense and perhaps else-
where, depending on your plans.
27. These approaches are not without this danger: such one to one interaction
between incumbents and new appointees may unconsciously and uncritically tend to
freeze existing patterns of organization, allocations of responsibility, or ways of
seeing problems. We see two possible countermeasures: First, you can make
your appointees conscious of the issue, demand critical thinking about it, and warn
that organizational arrangements are subject to review and revision. Second, it
may be possible to postpone the appointment of some Assistant Secretaries in
those departments which can be efficiently managed at the outset without the full
complement of Assistant Secretaries. If so, your primary appointees would have
more time for a thorough personnel search and for a careful review of effective
organizational possibilities within the department.
28. Pre-inauguration access of appointees to the departmental staffs will
probably be opposed by the old Administration which might fear a premature
transfer of staff loyalty. Because no categorical rule can cope entirely with
- 16 -
individual and departmental variations, such contacts are best left to be worked
out agency by agency. At the Presidential level, you should limit yourself to two
requests:
a) Your study groups and task forces may feel particular need for access
to relevant departmental files and experts. Fully knowledgeable outside experts
are, to be sure, often available. But where this is not the case, the government
experts may be essential for thorough appreciation of the data and correct analysis.
You should specify these situations as clearly as you can and request access rele-
vant to them. (They will be relatively few in number.)
b) You should seek agreement in principle that agencies lend a suitable
"expert or two" to the new officials or task forces when they request them and
when such aid can be provided without disrupting the current work of the agency.
29. General pre-inauguration access to files (as distinct from staff) might
be rejected altogether if sought at the Presidential level. Since permanent depart-
mental files will be available later, the Administration may hesitate to grant early
access. You should ask no more than authority to make arrangements on a case-
by-case basis with each department. In light of your hopes to include younger men
in the intimate workings of Government, you might seek permission to designate
relatively junior persons -- prospective special assistants to high officials -- to
study relevant files and other background information which they can later bring to
bear in giving post-inauguration assistance to their chiefs. In other situations,
such work might make it possible to delay the appointment of some Assistant
Secretaries, as discussed earlier. This technique could prove extremely valuable
- 17 -
in selected offices where orientation of new appointees is difficult. Possible
examples are the Secretariat and a few other offices in the State Department as
well as I.S.A. and Systems Analysis in Defense.
30. You should arrange quite early to have at least one incumbent official
remain as Acting Secretary in each Department. He will exercise formal statutory
power until the new Secretary and his team are confirmed (which might not occur
on Inauguration day or the next).
31. There are certain technical areas where you may expect a briefing from
the Administration. If one is not offered, you should request the following informa-
tion:
a) To what extent will departmental office space be available? In 1960-
61, ten new officials were housed in State and two in each of the other Departments.
To accommodate any larger number might well prove disruptive but if an "open
office" policy is in effect, new officials would have to be housed nearby. In other
situations location may not be crucial if adequate information is available.
b) What funds are available to the President-Elect under the Transition
Act for personnel, supplies, consultants, travel, and office space?
c) To what extent can the various departments help to absorb the
expenses of transition by lending office space and clerical and professional
assistance?
VI. The Handling of Crises
32. If a crisis arises during the transition and the response of the President
will have major continuing consequences (e.g., American response to a Chinese
invasion of Vietnam), the President will doubtless want to consult you since yours
will be the longer burden.
- 18
You probably have little choice but to assume that the President acts in
good faith when he calls upon you. The public would expect you to consult with
the President in a time of national emergency. You will have been receiving and
digesting information before and after the election; your confidence in the data
will be proportional to the variety of your sources. Nevertheless, you may
hesitate to share the responsibility, even symbolically, without clearly adequate
information or time for deliberation, without decision-making authority, and
without the inescapable mandate of office.
No one can tell either principal his duty. This much is clear: the President
can see that you are kept fully informed and invite you to express your views. You
may wish to decline and in most cases this is a real option. However, there may
be a crisis of such proportions that silence or the standard formulations of concern
are inadequate responses. Then if you have a clear policy view, there is every
reason to state it. Beyond this we do not venture.
Dwight Chapin
Staff of Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
Z
(212) 661-6400
Personal Aide
Memo:
Kay- mule a Xeroy
their letter and send the
of the first two page of
to Roy Pric - Call Key of
ash him Culus to mil to.-
- then file the beth
Under Our daily - Pay 5.-
Thabac
10
Rose
Bill Crahm
Special
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11
NIP
Juny
but
BILLY GRAHAM
RN
November 25, 1968
Dear Dick:
Since the election I have been flooded with
calls, telegrams and letters from hundreds
of people from various walks of life giving
their ideas and suggestions that they want
to be passed on to you.
In nearly all the communications I receive
there is one recurring theme -- the need
for moral and spiritual leadership on the
part of the President. Many of them make
reference to the overwhelming importance
of your forthcoming Inaugural address.
There is evidence to support the fact that
the reason former President Kennedy got off
to such a great start was the tremendous
impact of his Inaugural address.
In reviewing the "Thoughts of Chairman Mao",
the Illustrated London News points out:
"He makes no promise of prosperity, comfort
or ease. The Western politicians offer the
1
voter a widening range of social benefits
with higher pay and greater security, but
Mao wastes no time in talk about benefits.
His call is instead for sacrifice, economy
and work, and this surely is the strength
I
of Marxism, considered as the chief Oriental
religion of our time. Its high priest
"
promised little and asked for much.
Dick, this also was the theme of the message
of Christ. He offered self -denial and hard-
ship. The young people of our generation
- 2 -
will respond to a tough and hard challenge.
I find in my addresses at colleges and univ-
ersities that the more difficult I make the
challenge the greater the response. They
want you to "tell it as it is". This is the
secret of de Gaulle. In two memorable
speeches this year he has challenged the
French people with tough speeches, and, to
the amazement of everyone, they have risen
to the challenge.
Also in your Inaugural address I am sure you
will have a strong spiritual emphasis. In
times of crisis our leaders have always dir-
ected our thoughts toward God. Carl Sandburg
said that one of the reasons Abraham Lincoln
became SO great in history is because he quoted
more Scripture than any other President. Even
the non-religious people respect this. As
Bill Moyers said in a letter to me this week:
"What we need is unconventional leadership
that comes from deep within a man's own con-
science.
When Solomon ascended the throne of Israel
he prayed: "Give therefore thy servant an
understanding heart to judge thy people, that
I may discern between good and bad: for who is
able to judge this thy SO great a people?
I am sure that the overwhelming problems we
face at home and abroad are beginning to
weigh heavily upon you. Dear friend, you do
not have to bear these alone. God's promise
to leaders that trust Him is: "I will be
with thee: I will not fail thee, nor forsake
thee. Be strong and of a good courage"
(Joshua 1:5-6).
I am amazed at the number of people who say
they are praying for you daily. I, too, have
a strange burden on my heart to pray for you
almost constantly. There is never an hour
that passes but what I do not stop in that
hour and say a prayer for you, that God will
- 3 -
give you skill and wisdom in handling the
complicated problems that are facing you.
I will be leaving for the Far East on December
7. During the Christmas holidays I will be
preaching to the troops in Vietnam. If I
could do anything for you by way of conveying
a private message to President Thieu or
General Abrams, or carry a personal greeting
to the troops in your behalf, I would be de-
lighted.
I will be returning around January 1 and if
it is convenient with you, would like to see
you wherever you may be on Sunday, January 5.
Perhaps we could go to church together and
have a brief chat afterwards.
I am assuming that you are still counting on
me to deliver the Inaugural prayer. However,
I have not heard from Senator Dirkson, Mr.
Marriott, or any member of the committee,
though I suppose I will in due course. I
consider your invitation to lead this prayer
one of the greatest honors of my entire life.
Naturally I am terribly disappointed that I
will not be able to be at the wedding. Julie
was sweet and gracious to invite me to lead
a prayer, but I had already committed this
trip to General Abrams and I am sure she
understands. I would have cancelled any-
thing else in order to be with you and the
family on December 22.
With warmest greetings and affection, I am
Billy Cordially yours,
Mr. Richard M. Nixon
810 - 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021
BLACK MOUNTAIN, PM 25 NC
U.S.
AIR
10c MAIL
1968
28711
VIA AIR MAIL
CORREO AEREO
Mr. Richard M. Nixon
PAR AVION
810 - 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021
BILLY GRAHAM
MONTREAT, NORTH CAROLINA 28757
W. CLEMENT STONE
5050 NORTH BROADWAY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60640
December 4, 1968
Mr. & Mrs. Richard Nixon
810 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York
Dear Dick & Pat:
Mrs. Stone and I are looking forward to attending the
wedding and the reception on Sunday, December 22nd.
It was a pleasant surprise to meet you, Dick, at the
entrance of the Pierre yesterday morning. The cab
driver was so excited in seeing you that he kept talking
about it all the way down to the American Foundation of
Religion and Psychiatry headquarters. He said he was
going to call his wife as soon as we got out of the cab.
I don't believe I have ever seen anyone more pleasantly
excited about seeing a famous personality than that cab
driver. I really should have taken his name and address
so that you could send him a card or a picture. On the
other hand, this might have caused heart failure if he
became any more excited than he seemed to be in that
pleasant moment.
With kindest personal regards and every good wish,
I remain
Yours sincerely,
WCS/mc
MY OWN OPINIONS
Bobot
1.
VIETNAM
The halt in bombing was entirely unrealistic.
The action was
motivated entirely by political reasons. I do not believe that any bi-
lateral agreement with Hanoi was arrived at to justify the action taken.
We have gone on record against a coalition form of government.
Our
aim is for coexistence of North and South Vietnam government. Every-
thing points to the fact that Hanoi will not agree but should there be an
agreement, we would have on our hands a very sick government probably
for two generations.
Our faith in the ability of South Vietnam to get along
on its own is nil.
The proposed conference in Paris presents an almost
impossible situation as far as an amicable and just agreement is concerned
-- a long drawn-out affair without any conceivable satisfactory results.
We should put a time limit on the conference of, say, from three to four
months with the assumption that if there be no material progress toward the
objectives, there would be resumption of bombing.
Bombing should be
far more intensive than before and with far less discrimination as to targets.
My opinion is that the real answer to a fairly quick and perhaps satisfactory
peace arrangement must be made in Moscow quid pro quo. Soft words
with a big stick must be behind all the dealings.
2. LAW and ORDER
Fear of apprehension, conviction and subsequent penalty is without
2 -
question the major and all important deterrent of crime whether it be
small or big in character. A sizable increase in police force, im-
proved training perhaps under a code developed by the FBI, with income
in keeping with the responsibility, and completely unfettered with full
right to gain convincing evidence for convictions.
Each one of these
points should receive due consideration.
The excessive corruption of the large systems of the large
cities must come to an end.
This applies not only to the judicial
systems but likewise involves the offices of district attorneys. Why are
the nomination and election of judges, particularly of the lower courts,
in the hands of district political leaders? Should it not be possible for
the Bar Association to be responsible for nominating men of character
and ability? This possibly could be done, if legalized, by appointed task
committees in the various sections of our country, meaning members of
the Bar Association.
There should be an increase in the number of
judges all the way through.
There is too great a waiting period between
the committing of a crime and going before the bar of justice. Public
the
interest wanes with the weeks and the months, and public has much to do
with the proper carrying out of law. Long waits oftentimes mean re-
duced sentences and even many non-guilty verdicts.
Money plays too
much of a factor in the mills that grind out justice.
Sentences
Federal responsibility and control should be stretched to the ut-
most in the case of criminals for the simple reason that it is more honest
- 3 -
and exacting than that of the States. All of the heinous crimes that
come within Federal control should have mandatory sentences with terms
that are actually frightening, and the judiciary of the States should be
urged to adopt the idea of mandatory sentences.
The murderers of Dr.
King and Senator Kennedy by political maneuvers of their attorneys will
come to trial God knows when. Quickness of trial and punishment
would have a very salutary effect on criminals. Riots in the cities with
arson and looting, and even killing going on with practically no hard-line
action taken on the part of the police has proven to be a real breeding
place for crimes on the streets and burglarizing in general.
In colleges and universities whenever and wherever the law is
broken, there should be forcible action, quick trials and proper punish-
ment. If all colleges and universities would agree to completely black-
list all of the militant leaders and followers that have been guilty of
illegal assemblies and breaking of the laws, the impact of such action
would go quite far in controlling the untoward situations that exist in the
schools.
3. MONETARY CONTROLS
Here we have a very complex problem due to the fact that in
practically every country the value of money is linked almost directly
with the economic situation which exists. The countries of Europe,
some of which have a vital influence much further reaching than their
borders, are definitely in trouble.
The United States of Europe is now
- 4 -
only a dream that has completely faded out.
The common market has
failed to reach its objectives and the countries involved are to a great
extent striving solely to protect their own interests.
The United States
with its dollar controlling somewhere around 85% of all the financial deal-
ings of the world has a great responsibility. Any slip on the one hand
or failure to act on the other, could and would bring chaos to the world.
What is the answer? To be a good answer it must have to do with the
preservation of the economies of the world rather than the singling out of
one or another country that is in trouble.
One of the great problems
that we face today is the lack of any outstanding leader in any country of
Europe, the Middle East and even the Far East. Real leadership has
never been so much in demand nor have the times ever been so critical.
4. INDUSTRY
The greatness of our country has been due to industry. Our
boys in the first World War, in the second World War, in Korea and Viet-
nam have fought valiantly and we have had good generals and admirals,
but all these wars have been won at home by industry. And industry as
a whole in our country has been and is headed by very capable, hard-
thinking and hard-working people. We are faced at the present time by
runaway unionism. The unions have become so large, so wealthy and
powerful that they are threatening the very fiber of our democratic form
of government. The unions have blackmailed both the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations.
The unions have been mainly responsible for
!
- 5 -
the terrifically growing rate of inflation.
We have long since passed
the point where increased production has matched increased wages and,
so, the vicious circle -- higher wages and the value of the dollar de-
valuates alarmingly fast.
The public has borne its suffering not only
in the loss of value of its money but also in all types of inconvenience,
even the fear of calamities occurring, due to public workers, police,
firemen, garbage collectors et al., threatening to strike or actually
striking.
The time has come when proper action must be taken to
control all unions that have to do with not just the interests of employees
but the public at large.
There must be some form for compelling arbi-
tration. There must also be some way for Congress to make it permissi-
ble for the States at large to legally enact bills of the Taft-Hartley charac-
ter.
This is indeed a most pressing obligation for the new Administration.
12/6/68
MEMORANDUM
FROM: R.G. Kleindienst
RE:
Republican National Committee
I. INTRODUCTION
It will be the purpose of this memorandum to discuss
two topics. First, the technical or mechanical
problems involved in changing the Office of Chairman
of the Republican National Committee. Second, the
political ramifications thereof.
II. THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF CHANGING
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE R.N.C.
A. The Election of the Present Chairman
The Chairman of the Republican National Committee is
elected by the members of the Republican National
Committee. The members of the R.N.C. in turn are
elected by the Republican National Convention, although
having been "nominated" by their own states according
to the varying procedures and customs of the several
states. As a result of the action of the past
convention, the Republican State Chairman of each
state and the District of Columbia is a member of
the R.N.C.
The present Chairman was elected at the last meeting
of the R.N.C., which was held on August 9, 1968, at
Miami Beach, Florida. At the same time, four
Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary and the Treasurer were
elected. The Chairman and the other Officers are
elected for a term cò-terminus with the R.N.C., or
four years, and at the 1972 convention.
For several years and at least as far back as 1960,
the R.N.C., by Resolution, has authorized the
Contd/
Memorandum
Page No. 2
Chairman to do several things, inter alia:
(a) To appoint the Executive Committee
at a time that he shall select;
(b) To appoint such Committees and
Assistants as he deems advisable
or necessary;
(c) To appoint the Assistant Chairman
(a woman);
(d) To appoint the General Counsel.
Similar resolutions were adopted by the R.N.C. on
August 9th 1968. To this date, the Chairman has
made no new appointments to the Executive-Committee
nor has he appointed any new Committees or Assistants.
The only change has been that of General Counsel.
Effective December 1, 1968, Fred Scribner will be
re-appointed.
The Chairman, following custom, intends to call a
meeting of the R.N.C. on Friday, January 17, 1968,
at Washington D.C.
This meeting is prompted by
the Inauguration. Hotel rooms for all members
have been reserved; nearly a full attendance can
be anticipated.
B. The Method of Removal of the Chairman
Without the voluntary resignation of the Chairman,
his removal could come about as a result of a
motion from a member of the R.N.C. Such a motion
could take the following form: "I move that the
Office of Chairman be declared Vacant". If such
a motion was successful, the next motion would
be in order: "I move that the Senior member of
this Committee in years of age appoint a committee
of five persons to wait upon the President-Elect
for the purpose of determing his wishes as to the
designation of a suitable person to be elected as
Chairman of the R.N.C. "
Ideally, an appropriate motion should be made by
which all other offices of the R.N.C. be likewise
Contd/
Memorandum
Page No. 3
declared vacant, followed by election of their
successors and by the adoption of resolutions
similar to those adopted on August 9, 1968 at
Miami Beach authorizing the Chairman to take
certain actions and do certain things. (see above.)
III. THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
REMOVAL AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. The Time or Times of Removal
In my opinion, the best or most suitable time of
removal would be at the time of the Inauguration.
The reasons are obvious. First, it would coincide
with the new administration. Second, if removal
became controversial, it would be submerged in
the other events and festivities of the Inauguration.
The next best time would be several months - say,
six - after January 20th. This would coincide
with the end of the so-called "honeymoon period"
of the new administration.
B. Direct Approach to and the Voluntary Resignation
by the Chairman
The best solution would be the "voluntary" resignation
of the Chairman, following a meeting with an
emissary from the President-Elect. The Chairman
does not want to resign as of January 20, 1969,
for reasons solely of personal image and pride. He
would be foolish not to do so upon request.
Whether he would openly resist is a matter of
conjecture. I personally do not think he would
incur the fight. The selection, however, of a
suitable person to approach him is of vital
importance. It should not be a prospective successor.
It should be a person close to the President-Elect
and also knowledgeable about the Party. The approach
should be made as soon as possible - within days.
Contd/
Memorandum
Page No. 4
C.
Plan of action if the Chairman refuses to
voluntarily resign.
The reason I recommend an immediate approach to the
Chairman is to permit adequate time to plan an action
for his removal. While it is my personal opinion
that more than a majority of the members of the
R.N.C. would, as a practical political matter if for
no other reason, support the President-Elect over
the Chairman, there is no reason to take this for
granted. Being reminded that the members of the
R.N.C. will be completely absorbed in patronage
matters between now and January 20th, an effective
tool of persuasion is handed to the Staff of the
President-Elect and friendly members of the R.N.C.
in the weeks between now and then. This is the
principal reason for an immediate approach to the
Chairman - so that the force of this persuasive
tool will not be diminished.
D. The Kind of a New Chairman
I believe the new Chairman, in addition to being
loyal to and compatible with the President, should
project youthfulness and dynamic-articulate vigor.
Within the next four years, young people are going
to be more and more politically significant and
the persons of "the old politics" (such as myself)
are going to become less and less significant.
Let's put Boss Daley on the one side and a youthful
and dynamic image of the Republican Party on the
other side In addition, the President should
be entitled to an articulate attractive person
explaining, standing-up for and even defending
the Administration. President Johnson, for all
his alleged political skill, forgot to do this
these past four years and the Democratic Party
became impotent and irrelevant.
IV. CONCLUSION
I believe action of one kind or another in the immediate
future is imperative.
Contd/
Memorandum
Page No. 5
I believe the plan of action should be communicated
on a general basis as soon as possible, because I
further believe that the subject matter of this
memorandum neither can nor would engage in an open
contest but will and could engage in a contest of
confusion and indecision.
RGK/tl
MEMORANDUM
December 2, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
HARLOW
John Sears and I have carefully reviewed present plans respecting
the chairmanship of the National Committee. These are our views:
1. The National Chairman must be one with whom you can work satis-
factorily and will perform the "spokesman" role you desire; obviously,
therefore, Ray Bliss must be replaced.
2. The timing of this action is critically important. If this is
done before Inauguration -- indeed, before, say the next regularly
scheduled National Committee meeting (approximately mid-February)
-- the resentments that will be kindled will, we believe, be severe
and very harmful to you. We strongly urge that this matter be so
handled as not to injure you.
3. We are both persuaded that Bliss' immediate removal and his re-
placement by Wilkinson and Chotiner will "blow the lid off." I am
gravely concerned over the likely adverse reactions.
4. This is not -- I repeat --- a suggestion that Bliss not be re-
placed; rather, it is a pleading that it would be done in an accep-
table way. The way to do it with the least friction is not too
complicated. It consists of these steps:
A. Plan to replace Bliss at the next National Committee meeting
in February or soon thereafter.
B. Telephone Bliss and request him to visit you in New York, ex-
plain to him in person the circumstances that have arisen, assure
him of your determination that his replacement will be done in a
way that will protect him from personal embarrassment, and that he
should then meet with the press and lay to rest the stories that he
is being forced out. As to this move, I will, if desired, lay the
groundwork for this discussion by talking privately with Bliss in
Washington.
C. Without in any way derogating Murray Chotiner (whom I barely
know), it does seem to me that his appointment to the Committee
under existing circumstances would be a serious reverse for you
personally. I have a strong suspicion that it would revive a lot
of old canards that you have most successfully laid to rest, par-
ticularly this year.
MEMORANDUM TO RN / 2
December 2, 1968
I regret the feeling of compulsion that prompts me to send this
memorandum when I feel sure you will not be pleased by what it
says.
I do feel, however, that I owe it to you to report frankly when
I am convinced that an action that is about to be taken can be
very harmful to you. This is such an instance.
We believe also that an it timed
removal now of Polise would
block any chance for Willinson
to be successful.
December 3, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bebe Rebozo
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
I believe you and RN visited Fisher's Island
since November 6. Please let me know whether or not
we need to write a note to Gar Wood.
With regard to the James L. Knight telegram,
is he someone we should call or can you call and express
RMN's appreciation for offering the use of his fishing
boat and/ or house boat.
P.S. you have a room at
the Pline as requested!
COL. SHERWIN T. WINFREE
369A NORTH ROYAL POINCIANA BOULEVARD
MIAMI SPRINGS, FLORIDA 33166
887-3782
November 6, 1968
Mr. Richard 11. Nixon,
President-Elect, United States of America
Key Biscaune Hotel,
Key Biscayne, Fla.
Dear Mr. Tresident:
On behalf of Mr. Gan Wood and myself, may I offer our
warm con ratulations on a victory well deserved and a
battle honestly Cought., St gives us both creat personal
pleasure to call you Mr. President
On Mr. Woods behalf, may I express the hope that you
ane Bebe can spare the time Crom your busy schedule
for a visit to Fisher's Island during your "R&R"
on Key Biscaune. It would give Mr. Wood creat
pleasure to persona by extend his congratulations.
Thank God that America has regained her sense of
balance and that we may look Conward to a turning
point to reality. Though no one man can solve all
the unsolvable problems that face us as a Nation and
as a World, I'm sure that we now have a President
who will break the Credibility Gap, and stand side
by sise with the American people on an intellis ent
approach to luture greatness of the United States
of America.
Sincerely,
Sherwin T. Wintree olog
Sect. to Gar Cood
STW/m
CLASS OF SERVICE
WESTERN UNION
SYMBOLS
This is a fast message
DL=Day Letter
Funless its deferred char-
NL=Night Letter
acter is Indicated by the
proper symbol.
TELEGRAM
Behe?
LT
International
Letter Telegram
R
The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination
120P EST NOV 8 68 AD2 17
SSD186 A MZB193 PDB MIAMI FLO 8 103P EST
1968 NOV 8 PM I 24
RICHARD NIXON
CARE GEORGE A SMATHERS BAY LANE KEY BISCAYNE FLO
CONGRATULATIONS ON THE GREAT WIN. HAVE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY
TO REACH YOU BY PHONE TO PROPOSE THAT PAT AND THE KIDS MIGHT
LIKE TO USE MY FISHING BOAT RERUN OR THAT ALL OF YOU MIGHT
GET SOME USE OUT OF OUR HOUSE BOAT JIMIANA. WE HOPE TO SEE
YOU DOWN HERE FREQUENTLY so PLEASE KNOW THESE FACILITIES ARE
YOURS MOST ANY TIME. IF ANY INTEREST NOW MY PRIVATE TELEPHONE
350-2411 CAN GET THINGS MOVING QUICKLY. BEST REGARDS
JAMES L KNIGHT
(111).
SF1201(R2-65)
December 3, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
Would you please advise me who should receive
letters suggesting possible candidates for Governor of the Virgin
Islands.
Flamgin
Rose,
December 3, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
With regard to State Department appointments --
when persons are recommending someone who is presently in the
foreign service to be considered for appointment as Ambassador
or to at least be kept where they are -- do these now go to Ambassador
Murphy?
yes
December 3, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
With regard to State Department appointments --
when persons are recommending someone who is presently in the
foreign service to be considered for appointment as Ambassador
or to at least be kept where they are -- do these now go to Ambassador
Murphy?
Yes