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This file contains:
Section 3 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
"The Presidency, Executive Staffing, and the Federal Bureaucracy" study by Laurin L. Henry. Section 3 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 28 pgs. [Report], 9/5/1967
Section 4 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Memo from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to RN RE: Executive Office of the President. 11 pgs. [Memo], 11/11/1968
Section 5 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
1968-1969 Presidential Transition report. 25 pages plus cover page and 4 page index. 30 pgs. [Report], 11/25/1968
Tab divider "EXHIBITS" for Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Exhibit A of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 10 pgs. [Report], 11/25/1968
Exhibit B of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Report], 10/25/1968
Exhibit C of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Report], 10/25/1968
Exhibit D of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs. [Report], 10/25/1968
Section 6 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Summary Sheet - Federal Personnel Problem. Section 6 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 17 pgs. [Report], 11/24/1953
Section 7 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Reprint from The American Political Review "The Selection of Federal Political Executives" by Dean E. Mann, The Brookings Institute, March 1964. Section 7 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs. [Other Document], N.D.
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WHSF: Returned, 20-4
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This file contains:
Section 3 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
"The Presidency, Executive Staffing, and the Federal Bureaucracy" study by Laurin L. Henry. Section 3 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 28 pgs. [Report], 9/5/1967
Section 4 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Memo from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to RN RE: Executive Office of the President. 11 pgs. [Memo], 11/11/1968
Section 5 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
1968-1969 Presidential Transition report. 25 pages plus cover page and 4 page index. 30 pgs. [Report], 11/25/1968
Tab divider "EXHIBITS" for Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Exhibit A of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 10 pgs. [Report], 11/25/1968
Exhibit B of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Report], 10/25/1968
Exhibit C of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Report], 10/25/1968
Exhibit D of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs. [Report], 10/25/1968
Section 6 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Summary Sheet - Federal Personnel Problem. Section 6 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 17 pgs. [Report], 11/24/1953
Section 7 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg. [Other Document], N.D.
Reprint from The American Political Review "The Selection of Federal Political Executives" by Dean E. Mann, The Brookings Institute, March 1964. Section 7 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs. [Other Document], N.D.
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Section 3 tab divider for "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
09/05/1967
Report
"The Presidency, Executive Staffing, and the
Federal Bureaucracy" study by Laurin L.
Henry. Section 3 of "1968-1969 Presidential
Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 28
pgs.
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Section 4 tab divider for "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
11/11/1968
Memo
Memo from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to RN
RE: Executive Office of the President. 11
pgs.
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Section 5 tab divider for "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
11/25/1968
Report
1968-1969 Presidential Transition report. 25
pages plus cover page and 4 page index. 30
pgs.
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Page 1 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Tab divider "EXHIBITS" for Section 5 of
"1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by
Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
11/25/1968
Report
Exhibit A of Section 5 of "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 10 pgs.
20
4
10/25/1968
Report
Exhibit B of Section 5 of "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
10/25/1968
Report
Exhibit C of Section 5 of "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
10/25/1968
Report
Exhibit D of Section 5 of "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs.
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Section 6 tab divider for "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
11/24/1953
Report
Summary Sheet - Federal Personnel Problem.
Section 6 of "1968-1969 Presidential
Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 17
pgs.
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Page 2 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Section 7 tab divider for "1968-1969
Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B.
Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20
4
N.D.
Other Document
Reprint from The American Political Review
"The Selection of Federal Political
Executives" by Dean E. Mann, The
Brookings Institute, March 1964. Section 7
of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by
Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs.
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Page 3 of 3
3
THE PRESIDENCY, EXECUTIVE STAFFING, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
Laurin L. Henry
University of Virginia
Prepared for delivery at the 1967 annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Pick-Congress
Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9. Copyright, 1967, The
American Political Science Association.
ABSTRACT
Although the personnel function has been a relatively underdeveloped aspect of
the Presidency, trends of recent years and the preferences of President Johnson are
leading to what is probably a permanent expansion of presidential role.
In seeking executive branch responsiveness, two crucial groups are the principal
presidential appointees and top career executives. Recent research on these groups
demonstrates that they represent an educational elite and something of a socio-econo-
mic elite as well. Careers have tended to be department-oriented.
After years of debate and experimentation, the essential role of the political
executive in directing the bureaucracy has been affirmed. Although reorganization
proposals to give the President a single personnel administrator have not succeeded,
President Johnson has unofficially consolidated administration of both career and po-
litical personnel in the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, retaining an active
interest himself.
Simultaneous increase in presidential domination of the party and in the demands
on top political executives have led to increasing emphasis on programmatic and
managerial qualifications in recruiting. The last few administration have seen a rapid
trend toward centralization and rationalization of the presidential recruiting function,
with the employment of a computer index the latest innovation. President Johnson
seeks actively to use the appointing power to strengthen his policy control of the
agencies.
The results so far seem to be a strengthening of tendencies toward educational
elitism, and the appointment of increasing numbers of men who have made careers
either in other political executive or civil service posts.
President Johnson displays strong interest in strengthening the higher career
service through executive development schemes, and frequently reminds the service of
its government-wide obligations. A new Executive Assignment Plan has some potential
for increased inter-agency mobility of top career executives but probably will not tie
the career men directly to the Presidency as some have wished.
Although temporary regression may occur in the next administration, a net
accretion of presidential function machinery in the personnel field seems certain.
Whether this routinization of function has added permanently and significantly to
presidential policy control, or merely constitutes a belated response to bureaucratic
growth, is not clear.
THE PRESIDENCY, EXECUTIVE STAFFING, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
Laurin L. Henry
University of Virginia
Prepared for delivery at the 1967 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago,
September 5-9. Copyright, 1967, The American Political Science
Association.
We academic observers of the Presidency have tended to be a little puzzled
by the perennial underdevelopment of the personnel function of the office. Although
aware of at least some of the reasons why, we have nevertheless regretted the
apparently unsystematic way in which decisions about appointments were made and
the disfunctional nature of some of the activities Presidents have permitted subordi-
nates to carry on in their names. We have usually felt that a little more White House
sophistication and attention to illing the top political and career posts would
produce substantial benefits for the President both in improved management and
leadership of the respective executive agencies and in overall responsiveness to
presidential direction and control of the bureaucracy. For what it may be worth,
I can report that we now have a President who seems to take seriously his duty as
the government's chief personnel officer. Whether all of us will like the results is
)a different matter.
My purpose here is to examine the methods of filling the most strategic
executive positions in light of newly available data from other studies and my own
limited inquiry into recent and current developments that have not been fully re-
ported. My initial suspicion--hypothesis if you will--was that changes of permanent
significance for the power position and institutional apparatus of the Presidency might
be occurring. My findings are that in the past two decades some developments in
the political and administrative position OI the Presidency have opened the way. to
an important expansion of presidential role in the personnel area. The current
President is striving by personal effort and sponsorship of institutional innovations
to take advantage of these opportunities. How far he can go, how firmly he can
establish these innovations, will depend on a number of things including the duration
and future political standing of the present administration. Proceeding at least
partly along lines that have had expert and bipartisan support for years, the Presi-
dent's efforts have not become sharply controversial'so far, although certain
aspects of his strengthened control are producing some partisan and bureaucratic
anxieties. These anxieties may increase and lead to a pause and possible re-
trenchment by the President's successor, whoever and whenever he may be. How-
ever, my own feeling is that any retrenchment is likely to be modest and temporary
henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
and that much of what has happened will last. We are seeing another of those
accretions of presidential role, responsibility, and apparatus with which each
incumbent endows and binds his successors.
Let us look first at some of the characteristics of the executive bureaucracy
and some previous efforts to define and advance the President's interest therein, and
then at recent developments with respect to executive staffing.
The Federal Bureaucracy and the Presidential Interest
Out attention in this paper will be concentrated on two groups of executives
that seem most crucial for the President. First, there are the principal political
executives of the administration. These include the department heads, under and
assistant secretaries, principal members of the White House and Executive Office
staffs, heads and deputies of the leading non-cabinet agencies, chiefs of a few of
the major bureaus or services within the departments, and for some purposes the
members of the principal regulatory commissions. Depending on the strictness of
the definition, one counts to between 150 and 250 of these principal officials
before entering the zone of several hundred lesser presidential appointees such as
ambassadors, federal attorneys, members of minor boards and commissions, and
otherss who are traditionally considered more important for patronage than for
policy reasons. The White House currently calculates that the President appoints
526 full time executive branch officers, 489 judicial branch officials, and almost
1700 "others" including members of 145 part time and temporary advisory bodies,
for a grand total of about 2700 presidential appointees. 1 This of course excludes
several thousand foreign service officers and members of uniformed corps whose
presidential commissions are routine and nominal.
Second, we will give attention to the so-called "supergrades" the 4,400
positions at levels GS-16,-17, and -18 of the classified civil service. According to
Civil Service Commission tabulations, about 3/4 of the supergrades are occupied
by career men appointed under full merit procedures--the elite of our permanent
civil service. The remaining thousand or SO are in various special schedules and
exempt categories, with the incumbents ranging from people who are essentially
careerists despite their formal classification to the most outright political birds of
passage. (We leave aside the three or four thousand positions comparable to
the supergrades in other pay systems" outside the General Schedule such as the
FBI, AEC, TVA, postal field service, VA medical service, and overseas agencies;
these special categories have defied systematic study and rationalization for years,
and no help for it here.)
Characteristics of Executives
In recent years several research studies have greatly enriched our under-
standing of the backgrounds, career lines, appointment processes, and actual jobs
- 2 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
that top federal executives hold. In 1957, Paul David and Ross Pollock produced
an interesting analysis of alternative systems for staffing the political and career
executive positions, with special attention to the tendency of the two kinds of
jobs to blur into one another with respect both to functions and to status. 2 Marver
Bernstein's study of the functions of the political executives provided valuable in-
sights into the political-administrative milieu at upper levels of the executive branch.
It emphasized the demanding nature of the jobs, the increasing requirements for
substantive and managerial expertise, and the complexity of the relationships in-
cumbents must maintain with the White House, department heads, Congressmen,
"opposite numbers" in other agencies, interest representatives, and career staffs. 3
John Corson and Shale Paul recently have scrutinized the functions of upper career
executives and identified an interesting trichotomy of types--program managers, sup-
porting staff managers, and professionals who are essentially practicing within the
government. 4
There is a great deal of new data about the social and educational origins of
government executives. In 1963, Warner, Van Riper, Martin, and Collins published
a study of over 10,000 political and career civilian executives and over 2,000 top-
ranking military officers. 5 Two years later, Brookings issued a study by Mann and
Doig of the careers and processes of appointment of political executives at the
assistant secretary level since the New Deal, 6 and is about to release a more de-
tailed analysis by David Stanley of some of the same data, widened to include
regulatory commissioners and extended through the early Johnson appointees. 7 We
also have further data on top career executives in a separate study by Stanley. 8
These studies are not precisely comparable because of differences in methods,
but the results are quite consistent. Warner and associates found that although
somewhat over 20% of the civilian executives were "upwardly mobile" sons of
tenant farmers, laborers, and skilled workers, and about the same number were sons
of white collar workers and independent farmers, over half were from business and
professional families. The eparation of data on political and career executives in
this study is not complete, but the data seem to indicate that the political executives
include a considerably greater proportion of the sons of large business owners,
executives, and professional men, while the career executive group has a flatter
social profile with more persons of farmer, working class, and white collar origins.
Even among the civil service executives, however, sons of businessmen were over-
represented by a factor of five as compared to the general population, and sons of
professional men by a factor of four. 9 These findings of relatively high occupational
backgrounds of the upper bureaucrats are consistent with data on religious preferences
from the Brookings study showing a disproportionately high percentage of Protestants--
and especially the so-called "high status" Episcopalian and Presbyterian denomi-
nations--among political executives. 10
The key to advancement--the process through which even the well-born
have to qualify and "the less advantaged young men have their chance to catch up--
- 3 -
is education. Warner et.al. reported that as of 1959, 78% of career executives and
90% of political executives had graduated from college, and 45% of the career execu-
tives and 75% of the political executives had graduate or professional degrees. The
difference in advanced degrees was largely accounted for by the high proportion
(39.9%) of law school graduates among the political executives. 11 The Brookings and
the Corson and Paul data show even higher levels of education for the two groups in
12
more recent samples.
Federal political executives not only have a great many degrees, but they have
them from good institutions. Considering the large number of degree-granting colleges
in this country, it is remarkable that data on undergraduate colleges of political
executives since 1933 show that 19% came from Yale, Harvard, or Princeton, 6% were
from other Ivy League institutions, and 15% more were concentrated in a dozen other
colleges including such leading private institutions as Chicago, Stanford, and North-
western, and such major state universities as Wisconsin, Michigan, California,
North Carolina, and Minnesota. The convergence at major private and state 13 universi-
ties was even sharper among those earning graduate or professional degrees.
To be sure, many poor lads manage to graduate from high-status institutions.
Nevertheless, the implication in these figures of predominantly high socio-economic
status origins is supported by the report that 17% of the political executives studied
by Brookings received pre-college education at one of a list of eighteen select prepara-
tory schools in the Northeast. 14 A boy who goes to Groton and Harvard has a vastly
greater chance of becoming an assistant secretary than his counterpart who attends
the local public high school and a nearby state or private college. What accounts for
the difference? No doubt it is partly a difference in character or quality of education
at the elite institutions; partly a matter of acquiring motivation, outlook, and expecta-
tions for a career that may lead to high public position; and partly a matter of making
the friendships and connections that will ease the way to the sort of career expected.
Disentangling the elements of "merit" and "privilege" in such a career line is no easy
matter.
Career executives are educated at a more diverse set of institutions than their
political superiors. Leading numerically in the Warner analysis of this group were
such urban universities as George Washington and City College of New York. Al-
though such leading state universities as California and Wisconsin were among the
top producers, the bulk of degrees were spread widely among the nations's state,
municipal, and private institutions. Although the Ivy League was well represented,
no Ivy League college ranked among the firstten.
15
The pathways to the top are also fairly clearly marked, especially for the
career executives. The great majority of those who reach supergrades enter the
service relatively young and arrive at the supergrades in their late 40's and early
50's after a career in one or two agencies. According to Stanley's data, less than
5% had served in more than three federal agencies, and Carson and Paul pointed out 16
that a high percentage of the interagency transfers occur relatively early in the careers.
- 4 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
The narrowness and "closed" nature of the multiplicity of career ladders comprising
the federal service is further underlined by what career executives report about how
they got their present jobs. They tend to be either straight promotions or movements
outward and upward to higher positions as a result of prior acquaintance or service
with people who are in position to hire them.
17
Political executives, of course, end to enter federal service after estab-
lishing other careers. Although there have been some variations from administration
to administration, the distribution of prior occupations of political executives has
been quite stable. From Franklin Roosevelt through the early Johnson appointees,
24% of the political executive appointees had primary occupations in business, 26%
in law practice, 7% in education, 2% in science or engineering, and 6% in miscellaneous
private pursuits. However, 36% came from primarily public service careers, including
4% from elective public service, 22% from federal appointive service, and 9% from
state or local appointive service. Until recently, the main variations from these
patterns have been in the administrations of President Truman, who relied unusually
heavily on appointees with long government service, and of President Eisenhower,
who drew less from government and more from business 18
Other breakdowns of Brookings data emphasize the tendency for political
executive appointments to go to individuals who have pursued "in and out" if not
continuous federal careers. Out of 1, 567 appointments (some individuals receiving
two or three), 29% went to persons who had held other political executive posts in
the same agency, 8% had held political executive jobs in other agenices, 24% had
held lower level non-career appointments in the same agency, 37% had held lower
level non-career posts in other agencies, 14% had held career jobs in the same
agency, 11% had held career jobs in other agencies, 6% had been in Congress, 1% on
the federal bench, and 7% had held national party office. Only 15% had had no.
discernible previous national-level political or administrative experience.
19
The Mann-Doig study sheds important light on the typical route to political
executive office. It has been mainly a departmental system. Despite their formal
status as presidential appointees, most assistant secretaries and the like have re-
ceived their appointments as a result of prior service in the agency, personal ac-
quaintance with other departmental officers, and other experience and connections
revolving around the agency's substantive program. Despite efforts of most Presi-
dents to put a personal stamp on their administrations in the initial staffing, the
bulk of appointees, especially after the administration had been in office for some
time, were program rather than President or party oriented.
20
Our information is perhaps least satisfactory concerning the personalities
of political and career executives and the attitudes they have about their careers
and their political and administrative roles. The Brookings study by Stanley indicates
that the very top career executives have strong positive motivations for "getting things
accomplished" in the public service and feel that although they might make more money
-
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
elsewhere their work would be less interesting professionally and lack the satisfactions
of service. This study found a remarkable amount of satisfaction of top career execu-
tives with the basic outlines of the system in which they had risen to the top, and
surprisingly few or specific ideas about how it might be improved--except of course
by more pay. The attempts to develop psychological profiles of federal executives
in the Warner book are perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of that study. 21
In summary, the federal high bureaucracy is overwhelmingly white and male
and predominantly Protestant in its composition. Although a considerable number of
men of blue and white collar origins manage to qualify by educational achievement,
the greater number come from upper middle and professional class families who find
it relatively easier to inspire and finance their sons through a few of the nation's
leading universities whose alumni dominate the service. The non-tenured political
executives who are supposed to keep the career services responsible are even less
socially, ec.onomically, and educationally representative of the nation as a whole
than the career men. The careerists tend to rise to the top on narrow ladders of de-
partmental or functional specialization. The political executives tend to have broader
experiences, but there are increasing elements of careerism in this group as well,
and the appointment process often has amounted to presidential acceptance of the man
who rose to the top of the whirlpool of departmental interests.
How has the legitimacy of such a group been maintained? In large part, no
doubt, it is because federal executives, although not mirroring the nation, have repre-
sented much of what the nation has admired and aspired to. Whether that is still
true, in this summer of urban discontent, is not entirely clear. Although the bu-
reaucracy is also responsible to Congress and the courts, the nation's most active
agent in this respect is the popularly elected President. How does the system for
choosing these men affect the President's ability to direct and lead the executive
establishment?
Defining the President's Interest
A strong presidential interest in the higher appointments has always been
recongized, but there have been constantly changing and frequently controversial
views of how that interest should be defined and advanced. For the most part,
Nineteenth Century Presidents used the appointing power to reward electoral
supporters and consolidate their partisan and factional positions. The rise of the
merit system removed increasing numbers of lower level appointments from the
patronage area, which was generally acceptable to the President as long as scandal
was avoided, a sufficient number of appointments were available for his own purposes,
and the remainder were denied his enemies. Both the presidential appointments and
the non-presidential but exempt positions continued to be used primarily for patro-
nage purposes well into the New Deal period.
- 6 -
The Brownlow Committee, which had the gift of prophesy about a great many
things, defined the President's interest largely in terms of an extension upward of
the merit system and sharp curtailment in the number of presidential appointees.
The Committee's staff study of personnel administration, by Floyd Reeves and Paul T.
David, called for limiting the presidential appointments in each department to the
secretary, under secretary, and possibly a handful of staff assistants. A sharp line
was to be drawn between these political appointees and the career service, which
in each department was to he ad up in an executive officer--the equivalent of the
permanent undersecretary--supported by assistant executive officers and bureau
chiefs all on a career basis. 22 The political assistant secretaries apparently were
to be eliminated altogether.
The Committee itself did not go quite SO far. It affirmed the need for a
"sufficient number of high policy-determining posts at the disposal of a newly
elected President to enable him and his administation to control the service. 23
The Committee defined the policy determining posts as including the department heads
and under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and the most important bureau chiefs.
It also discussed the ill effects on both the President and the department head of
having the President make subordinate appointments within the department. It
proposed to extend the merit system upward within the departments, with exceptions
to be made "only in the case of such of the highest positions as the President may
find to be principally policy-determining in character " The Committee recommended
further that all positions in the departments then filled by presidential appointment
should be filled by the department or agency head "except under secretaries and
officers who report directly to the President or whose appointment by the President
is required by the Constitution. 24 By implication, the assistant secretaries were
to be the department head's appointees. For control of the departments, the Committee
apparently was willing to rely mainly on the President's hierarchical authority running
to the department heads and to leave appointments below that to either the department
head or the merit system. Although the Committee recommended that the staff of
the central personnel agency and the personnel offices of the operating departments
should be regarded collectively as a unified career service of personnel administra-
tion 25 there was little to suggest that the Committee thought of the bulk of the
civil service as anything but a collection of departmental career services. Indeed,
the idea of the permanent executive officer at the apex of each department im-
plicitly strengthened the idea of the departmental career service.
Subsequent history unfolded in several ways that were unforeseen. Although
the next twenty years saw a gradual reduction in the presidential appointments at
lower levels, the number of top departmental officers appointed by the President did
not shrink but rather expanded. Continued growth of the government and the ex-
perience of World War II and Korea led to recognition of need for more assistant
secretaries, not less, and by the mid '50's the typical department had four or five
where it had had one or two in the '30's.
- 7 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
Moreover, some long-range trends in the position of the President and the
character of the bureaucracy were producing important changes in the political
executive jobs. With the increasing domination of his party by the President, there
was considerably less necessity and tendency to use these positions for traditional
partisan and factional purposes; in fact the evolving nature of the government put
a premium on substantive knowledge and managerial skills instead of old-fashioned
political credentials gained by party organization and campaign service. There was
a brief resurgence of interest in patronage at the advent of the Republican administration
in 1953, but this soon spent its force, and by the end of the Eisenhower era it was
widely recognized that traditional considerations were becoming almost irrelevant in
the filling of these jobs.
The Second Hoover Commissions's Personnel Task Force report and recommenda-
tions in 1955 both crystallized the implicit agreements of the previous twenty years
and set many of the goals for the next twenty, although there remained much disagree-
ment about the particular methods. The experience of the Eisenhower transition had
demonstrated, and the Commission affirmed, that the continuity and neutrality of
the career service could be maintained only by the insulation provided by a substantial
number of political appointees who would take the heat and change with the administra-
tion. The Task Force's use of the term political executive" and the spelling out of
their functions served to legitimatize the existence and need for such people. The
Task Force also emphasized that political executives should be considered agents of
the President, with no apparent worries about diluting the department head's authority
with presidential appointees serving under him. 26
With reference to the career employees, the Commission stated forcefully
an idea that had been creeping into the discussion for some time--the need for in-
creased mobility among agencies and if possible the development of a corps of career
executives of government -wide orientation and experience rather than narrow de-
partmental outlook. About the methods to achieve these objectives there was and still
is considerable disagreement. The Commission's wish to draw a sharp line between
political and career executive positions, and to establish a Senior Civil Service of
career executives who would hold rank in their persons like military or foreign service
officers and leave control of their careers to a centralized assignment process de-
signed to provide mobility and diversity of experience, proved controversial and im-
possible of realization.
Search for an Organizational Link
During this evolution of doctrine about the President's interest in the personnel
system, efforts to establish an organizational focal point to guard that interest have
taken a variety of forms--none of them long lasting.
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
The Brownlow Committee, enunciating a doctrine of 'positive personnel
management, "recommended converting. the three-man, bipartisan Civil Service
Commission into a Civil Service Administration which would be one of the principal
staff arms of the President in the new Executive Office. The agency would be headed
by a single Administrator chosen under merit procedures but serving at the pleasure
of the President; a seven-man Board attached to the Administration would provide
advice and serve as watchdog over the merit system but would have no direct re-
sponsibility for personnel management. The function prescribed for the Administration
had to do entirely with consolidation, extension, and management of the career
services. Any staff work in connection with presidential appointments presumably
would be left to the departments or handled by the expanded White House staff, but
the Committee did not describe these arrangements.
27
The bipartisan Commission proved to be politically untouchable. Even when
establishment of the Executive Office was finally authorized, in 1939, the Commission
was excluded from the President's reorganization authority and left intact. One of
FDR's six new administrative assistants was designated as Liaison Officer for Per-
sonnel Management with responsibility for linking the President and the Commission
and for coordination of personnel matters not under Commission jurisdiction. This
office was manned by a former civil servant and seems to have confined its attention
to the career services. In Roosevelt's time, presidential appointments were managed
by other White House functionaries or the President himself.
In the Truman administration, White House staff work on political and career
personnel was merged in the person of a presidential assistant, Donald Dawson, who
does not seem to have dealt very strongly with either, although there were attempts
toward the end of the administration to develop a set of files and procedures to put
the screening of presidential appointees on a somewhat more rational basis than ever
before. The First Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended more presidential in-
volvement with the career services and a reorganization of the Civil Service
Commission to place responsibility for its administration on the Chairman, who
would also be designated Personnel Adviser to the President. Later in 1949 the
"strong chairman" scheme was installed at the Commission by reorganization plan,
but the chairman was not given additional duties as presidential adviser.
The "two-hat" arrangement was officially established early in the Eisenhower
administration when Commission Chairman Philip Young was also designated as
Personnel Adviser to the President. In his White House capacity Young took over the
aspects of merit systems coordination that had been handled by the Dawson office.
Although according to some reports he had more to do with patronage and presidential
appointments than met the eye, Young's White House duties were mainly with the
various career services. Meanwhile, a succession of other White House special
assistants had primary responsibility for the political appointments. However, under
Eisenhower doctrine which placed primary responsibility on the department and agency
heads for recommending appointments in their bailiwicks; the White House office
never developed into a powerful force in its own right, serving for the most part as a
checkpoint for recommendations and political clearances.
- 9 -
The Second Hoover Commission Personnel Task Force, reporting in 1955,
criticized the "two-hat" system, alleging at least potential incompatibility of the two
roles. As Chairman of the Commission the incumbent had to symbolize and guard the
merit system; as presidential adviser he "must consider all sorts of personnel questions
which may be far afield from the cafeer service, and he is subject to more patronage
pressure than he would be as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission alone. 28
Perhaps in response to this criticism, a little later in the administration when Young
resigned and the Chairmanship of the Commission was awarded briefly to a congressional
lame duck, the two functions were split again. A former Assistant Secretary of Laber,
Rocco Siciliano, served as White House special assistant for personnel matters for
most of the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, dealing primarily with the
career services. About 1958, when a bill sponsored by Democratic Senator Joseph
Clark proposed to establish a single personnel administrator similar to the old
Brownlow recommendation, the administration backed away.
President Kennedy did not keep a White House assistant for personnel in a
role like the one Siciliano had played. He looked to his Civil Service Commission
Chairman, John W. Macy, Jr., both for administration of the Commission and the
classified service under its jurisdiction and for general advice on career systems
(with some help from the Budget Bureau). Kennedy did, however, institutionalize
the President's interest in the presidential appointments to a greater extent than any
of his predecessors. Before inauguration, Kennedy used the frequently described
Talent Scout group to help identify potential appointees for his administration. He
interested himself not only in the top but in what he considered the crucial appointments
at second or third levels in some departments. By inauguration day the Talent Scout
group was scattered, but one of the chief scouts; Ralph Dungan, was established as
a special assistant on the White House staff. 29 Dungan gradually built up a staff
of several professional level people to assist in the screening and recruitment of
presidential appointees. Personnel, however, was not Dungan's exclusive concern;
he had other more or less standing areas of interest, including foreign aid and Latin
American affairs. At least in the beginning, there was an attempt at functional
separation between the aides who were supposed to be concentrating on identification
of quality talent for the crucial policy and administrative posts, without too much
regard for political considerations, and another group that was primarily concerned with
keeping general files of jobs, vacancies, recommendations, and appointments to the
large number of low-level or honorary and part time posts that were considered the
bread and butter of White House patronage. We will look at the Kennedy staff operation
in greater detail in a moment.
When Dungan left the White House after the Johnson succession and the 1964
election, arrangements were re-cast in their present form. Although he did not receive
an additional commission or White House title, Chairman Macy was given special
duties as the President's chief adviser on presidential appointments. Macy now
supervises White House staff work on appointments at all levels, including both
the "quality" and the "political acceptability" aspects.
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
Thus we now have, unofficially, a federal personnel administrator and adviser
with wider scope of responsibility than any predecessor seen in the flesh or envisaged.
Although Macy is commonly said to wear two hats, by comparison with Brownlow's
Civil Service Administrator or such previous figures as Philip Young, he wears three
or four. That is, he combines (1) his official role as Chairman and principal ad-
ministrator of the general classified service under the Civil Service Commission, with
(2) additional duties as presidential adviser on civil service problems in other
merit systems, (3) identifier and preliminary recruiter of presidential appointees at
all levels, and (4) staff man with responsibility for securing most of the evaluations
and political clearances on prospective appointees. Macy performs these functions
under the continuous scrutiny of LBJ himself, whose interest in all kinds of personnel
matters, both political and career, is such that it is only slight exaggeration to say
that the President himself is the government's chief personnel officer.
Staffing the Presidential Appointments
Apparently all Presidents have felt occasional impulses to bring more system
and rationality into the process of decision on appointments. The nature of the
problem and need has been defined in different ways at different times. Franklin
Roosevelt is said to have become weary of the "same old faces" from around
Washington and New York and to have yearned for the fresh talent that he was sure
must be somewhere out there in Arkansas or Wyoming or Minnesota if he only had
ways of finding it. To be sure, the Democratic Senators and Committeemen could
always supply names, but such recommendations could not be relied on for appoint-
ments that counted for anything except patronage, and there never seemed to be time
30
to dig out good new people in advance of the time that important vacancies arose.
President Truman, who most of the time dealt from a position of weakness in
factional and public support, had to cope both with the problem of equitable distri-
bution of patronage and with an apparently genuine shortage of well-qualified people.
willing to accept important posts in the military, foreign affairs, and economic
mobilization agencies during the Korean period. It was about this time that the
"government executive problem" first began to be cast in modern terms. 31
The job
of, say, assistant secretary of the Air Force, demanded so much substantive or
managerial ability that traditional sources of political recruitment could produce no
qualified candidates; but the qualified prospects who could be located by other means
tended to be unmotivated for the job, often had potential conflicts of interest, and
usually little or nothing in the way of political credentials--indeed, often were for one
reason or another politically untouchable. It was in this period that Dawson and his
assistant, Martin Friedman, made the first important attempt to build up a set of
files on individuals who had been recommended or had come to their attention.
According to Dean Mann, this office never became effective with respect to the
hard-to-f jobs It served mainly as 2 clearinghouse for information and did
little in the way of evaluation or active recruitment. "Moreover, it focused
attention on meeting the demands of those whose stakes were political in nature rather
than on the promotion of effective policy leadership. "32
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
The Eisenhower administration's efforts in this respect suffered from changing
objectives and were largely abortive. In the re-inaugural Hotel Commodore period,
some of Eisenhower's associates, with the aid of a management consulting firm,
attempted to identify the key jobs that would have to be filled and to locate high
quality prospects--usually businessmen who combined Eisenhower support credentials
and executive talent--to fill them. This operation had a good deal of success in making
the first round of executive appointments. However, the key people in it did not
join the White House staff, and shortly after inauguration control of appointments
began to slip in two directions. One the one hand, in the interest of party harmony
Eisenhower committed himself to greater attentiveness to party and congressional
sources in the making of appointments, so that powerful senators and committeemen
were increasingly in position to exercise vetoes and occasionally virtually to
demand that certain people be taken care of. On the other hand, Eisenhower firmly
believed in the administrative principle of giving subordinates control of the means
to fulfill their responsibilities, so that it was increasingly left to the department
heads to find and evaluate prospects, carry on the necessary political maneuvers,
and make recommendations to the White House which ordinarily would be followed.
The center of gravity on appointments remained in the departments, and the White
House personnel office, as before, served mainly as clearinghous with occasionally
some wider latitude in filling the lesser presidential appointments that did not clearly
fall within the scope of a department. The effect of all this was to accent the
natural centrifugal tendencies of the system. It produced in the first Eisenhower
administration a considerable number of appointees who were politically incongruous
with the objectives being enunciated from the White House, and in the second
administration, after partisan and patronage pressures had eased, an aggregation of
appointees who were mainly department or agency oriented and inclined to look with
suspicion on White House efforts at policy leadership.
33
The Kennedy Experience
The Kennedy inner circle set out with enthusiasm and a fair measure of
sophistication to place what were usually referred to as "our kind of guys" in the
principal positions. I have already referred to the pre-inaugural Talent Scout
operation in which Robert Kennedy, Sargent Shriver, Ralph Dungan, and several
other staff men extending the search for prospects beyond the usual political sources
to include the best law firms, foundations, universities, non-profit organizations,
and business organizations. The Talent Scouts scattered after inauguration but
were replaced by a lower-keyed personnel activity at the White House under Dungan's
supervision. In summer of 1961, Dan H. Fenn, Jr., a young faculty member from
the Harvard Graduate School of Business, joined the staff as the principal executive
recruiter. Fenn, in turn, gathered a staff that varied from two to four assistants--
mostly relatively young men from the career service. 34
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
Fenn's group set its goal as the identification of "quality" prospects for the
principal policy and managerial posts. The lower-level, traditional patronage po'sts
and the usual sources of political referrals were to be left to others. Fenn intended
to operate at the level where the job sought the man and to let others judge, when the
right man had been found, whether he was politically acceptable.
It was recognized that, next to the President, the department head had the
strongest interest in the appointment. Department heads were encouraged to make
their own recruiting efforts a nd recommendations to the President. The President
and his staff might not accept departmental recommendations and might make counter
suggestions, but would not ordinarily force subordinates on the department head.
Where the department head was cooperative, Fenn tried to work with him in defining
the character of the job and the kind of man sought and scouting up prospects for
his consideration. Where the department was not cooperative, Fenn tried to have
alternatives available to give the President directly if he wanted them. It was not
assumed that the eventual choice should always originate with the White House
recruiters. The aim was to guard the presidential interest and keep the departments
on their toes by always having well-qualified alternatives to put up against the
kinds of candidates who might emerge from departmental search or be proposed by
other political and interest group sources.
Prospects for consideration were identified in various ways--scrutiny of the
many available lists of persons active in politics, business, education, and public
affairs; personal suggestions by department and White House staff members; political
referrals; and an occasional volunteer who was sufficiently impressive to be taken
seriously. Also, as an aid in checking the qualifications of prospects and securing
new suggestions when needed, Fenn developed a list of trusted persons all over the
country who were used as contacts and references. This list, classified by geo-
graphic area and field of activity, was heavily relied on for evaluations. Dossiers
on individuals who had passed at least preliminary screening went into a file of
several hundred prospects which was supposed to be kept up to date. The "ready file"
emphasized individuals with wide experience and general managerial talent, who
might be fitted into a variety of posts but was also classified by general fields of
interest. There was a special category of "bright young men" of limited experience
but high motivation and adaptability who might be fitted into junior posts as needed.
Typically, when the prospects for a vacancy had been narrowed down to two or
three, a more intensive check of references and credentials was made, someone in
the White House (usually not of the Fenn group) was asked to determine political
acceptability, and inquiries were made as to the prospects likely availability: When-
ever possible these things were done quietly and indirectly, to avoid disappointing
the unsuccessful, but occasionally there was no alternative to calling a man in to
discuss the possibility of an appointment. When a tentative choice had been made
or ratified by the President, someone on the staff would talk to the candidate to make
sure he would accept the appointment if formally offered; the idea was to avoid em-
barrassing both the President and the man by a direct refusal of a presidential offer.
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
Actually, according to the staff, turndowns at the late screening stage were rare;
if the staff work was done right, people who pretty clearly would not be available
were spotted early and removed from consideration.
Although one cannot be certain on the basis of the limited information available,
it appears that the Dungan-Fenn recruiting activity functioned with a fair degree of
success through most of the Kennedy administration. The presidential interest, as
conceived by the staff, was made operative in the appointment process in a stronger
way than ever before. It was, of course, mid-administration and a time of relatively
low turnover, but nevertheless-a considerable number of promising under and assistant
secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, commissioners, and directors of special
programs were seeded into the federal system. The office also proved its utility in
special projects of particular interest to the President, such as attempts to get more
Negroes into upper administrative levels and to re-staff the much battered foreign
aid agency.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Fenn staff operated under some
conditions that definitely limited its impact. For one thing, it appears that al-
though President Kennedy understood the importance of placing his men rather than
the department's, the Senate's or the interest group's men in the important jobs, his
personal interest in appointments tended to be selective rather than comprehensive
and sustained. He might take great pains with the choice of, say, an ambassador to
Paris, but deal rather casually with a bureau chief in Interior. For another thing,
Fenn did not ordinarily deal with the President directly, but usually through Dungan,
who had several responsibilities in addition to personnel and, although an old and
trusted Kennedy staff man, may not have had quite the access to the President en-
joyed by such persons as O'Donnell and O'Brien--or Robert Kennedy. Under these
circumstances, the Fenn group never established an exclusive right to the inside
track with the President on appointments. The President continued to permit--or
perhaps encourage--other members of his staff to dabble in recruiting on occasions,
and more than once the Fenn group discovered that an important position had been
committed to someone they had not realized was under consideration. Finally, the
Fenn activity suffered from blurred jurisdiction with another personnel group under
Dungan's supervision. Usually referred to as "the Dorothy Davies operation," this
was a staff activity and set of files from which names were pulled for lesser presi-
dential appointments, more or less honorary commissions and advisory bodies, and
the presidential patronage generally. The distinction in principle between executive
recruiting and political appointments proved difficult to maintain in practice and in
the minds of the clienteles with which the White House had to deal.
These factors may or may not have something to do with the fact that shortly
before President Kennedy's death it was announced that Fenn was leaving the White
House for a seat on the Federal Tariff Commission. For several months thereafter
Fenn's staff carried on under Dungan's direct supervision Late in 1964, Dungan left
and it was announced that Chairman Macy of the Civil Service Commission would assist
the President with the re-staffing of the administration that would be required as the
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Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
President entered the full term to which he had been elected. Although, as noted
above, Macy received no White House title, he did assume direction of Dungan's
personnel staff. Since then there has been a gradual change of methods and an
almost complete turnover of men on that staff, with only one of the principals going
back to Dungan's time.
The Johnson Approach
The Johnson-Macy recruiting effort, as developed through mid-1967, differs
35
in some important ways from the operation under Kennedy.
The change begins with the President himself. President Johnson's personal
involvement is intense, continuous, and comprehensive. There is apparently some-
thing of the old professional politician.'s natural interest in jobs, but also a grasp
of the importance of appointments. in both controlling current policy and shaping the
future of the government. Johnson, it is said, feels keenly that every presidential
appointee represents the President in more than just a nominal sense. This leads
him to scrutinize with care not only the principal departmental appointees but also
the lesser and more or less honorific appointees and those that have traditionally
been left largely to the principal department concerned. (It also leads him to what
some consider excessive concern that his appointees be loyal supporters of the
administration across the entire range of its policies, not just in their own areas of
responsibility.) LBJ's appetite for staff work is said to be insatiable: there is a
constant demand for more names, new names, more information about prospects, and
re-thinking of the requirements of the job being filled. No matter how thoroughtly
the staff has investigated a prospect, the President is likely to make a few phone
calls on his own or to send the recommendation back for checking an idea that has
emerged from his own memory of people and events in Washington over the last thirty
years. If, as the papers say, he becomes furious at leaks or premature speculation
he regards as intended to probe his intentions or force his hand, that is consistent
with the remainder of the pattern.
This strong presidential interest had led to high status for the personnel
man. Macy deals directly with the President on a daily basis. Furthermore, he and
his staff seem to have established, if not the right to the last word, at least the
expectation that they will get their word in on virtually all personnel decisions.
Recommendations reaching the President from other sources are routinely sent to the
Macy staff for comment and further evaluation. Having learned this, the department
heads increasingly send their recommendations to the President through Macy or, better
yet, work with the Macy staff in an effort to reach joint recommendations.
As before, the departments are encourated to take thought of their own personnel
needs. Such trusted department heads as McNamara, who has a reputation for
competence in this in many areas, iven a good deal more latitude than
others. But it is clear that the center of gravity on personnel decisions has shifted
noticeably in the direction of the White House. This apparently is clearly the case
- 15 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
with ambassadorial appointments and may also be true of the federal judges.
The previous attempts at distinction between responsibility and procedures
for handling the major and minor, the "quality" and the patronage presidential
appointments have been given up. The same staff processes all the appointments
including the investigation of both personal ability and politcal factors. Although
this may mean more politics in some appointments, it means less in others. The
custom of congressional clearance--or at least prior notification--is still followed,
but the routine and mechanical clearances of all appointments through the national
committee and state organizations that have been customary in some administrations
are not part of the process. The President dominates the party organization and is
determined to control the administration; he issues the political clearances.
In addition to Macy, who divides his time between the Commission and the
White House, the present staff consists of four professionals who have more or less
standing assignments to keep in touch with and recruit for particular clusters of
agencies, plus a fifth man who is responsible both for overseeing the files and records
and for dredging up names in large batches for various part-time and temporary ad-
visory boards, commissions, and delegations. As before, the staff is composed
of relatively young career types. It is clearly understood that no one holds these
jobs too long and turnover in about two years is the norm.
The procedural core of the system is a set of files on some 30,000 people, of
which about half are considered active and kept more or less up to date. The present
staff considers that one of its principal accomplishments has been the consolidation
into a single system of the various sets of files on prospective personnel which pre-
viously had been officially and unofficially kept around the White House. The Macy
group claims now to be tied into the presidential paper flow in such a way that every
White House communication that might bear on personnel gets scanned for infor-
mation that may be used to start a new file or add to an existing dossier. Recommenda-
tions and evaluations are cross-filed both by recommender and recommendee. Other
inputs come from scanning of newspapers, documents, and other sources in which
significant information about the lives and careers of prospects might be recorded.
Files on individuals who have been under active consideration are of course heavier
with informal notes, and evaluations.
Although insiders credit the idea to Dungan, the Johnson staff has installed
the most publicized innovation in the process--a computer. The key to the files is
a set of computer tapes which store basic information on each individual in the files.
The computer holds mostly standard and public biographical data, with each indivi-
dual coded for fields of interest by the job code used in the Census of Manufactures.
The evaluative material is in the files, not the computer. Thus it is an exaggeration
to suggest, some have done that the Johnson administration is "selecting people
by computer. The personnel staff may start the canvass of possibilities for a given
position by asking the computer for names of, say, midwest college presidents, or
16°-
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
electronics executives with Department of Defense experience. When the list is
compiled, the staff then can pull the files to see which ones merit further scrutiny.
But there still remain the problems of knowing what kinds of lists to ask the computer
for, how to obtain and weight evaluations and judgments about the individuals whose
names are spewed out, and when to shift the search into new categories of personnel.
In addition to the "talent bank" of prospects the office also has--for the first
time, it is claimed--a complete and current inventory of presidentially appointed
positions, and a matching list of incumbents, both on computer tape.
Recent Johnson Appointees
What effect is the Johnson system having? The exact nature of the linkage
between the system for screening appointees and the qualitative character of the
product is to some degree conjectural. There may be those who will argue that the
kinds of appointees who emerge are determined by the President's predilections, his
political situation, and the nature of the market in which he seeks to recruit, and
that the personnel recruitment system has at most a marginal influence. Personally,
I suspect it is more than that, but at any rate it is clear that the Johnson appointees
now being produced by the system differ in some discernible ways from the Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and early Johnson appointees.
The Stanley-Mann Brookings data analyses the backgrounds of over 1,000
principal political executives since the New Deal, with comparisons of the Roose-
velt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson appointees through March 30, 1965 3.6
Using definitions and methods as nearly identical to Brookings as possible, my re-
search assistant, Mr. Joseph Rudolph, has analyzed 100 Johnson appointees since
the Brookings cut-off date--a group that includes virtually all the Johnson appointees
at the indicated levels between March 1965 and June 1967.
It is commonly said in Washington that Johnson has a preference for people
he regards as fellow professionals in the running of the government. This is borne
out by data on the recent Johnson appointees showing a sharp rise over the Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, and early Johnson appointees in the proportion whose prior careers
had been primarily in some form of public service. Tabulation of principal prior
occupations showed "public service" for 43% of the later Johnson appointees, which is
6% higher than for his earlier appointees, 10% higher than Kennedy's, and 14% higher
than Eisenhower's. Of the 43%, the great majority--38%-- were from federal
appointive service. Elective political careerists at 3% and non-federal appointive
careerists at 2% were fairly consistent with previous groups.
Although exceeding FDR, Eisenhower, and Kennedy in the proportion of
appointees with long experience in public office, Johnson still is not relying on
insiders to quite the same extent as Truman, who made 52% of his appointments from
public service careerists. Johnson's recent appointees also show some important
- 17 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
differences from previous groups in the distribution of occupations of those who were
drawn from the private sector. Business and law practi are sharply down, while
education, science and engineering are up as sources of talent.
Analysis of the kind of federal positions previously held by recent Johnson
appointees showed a distribution rather similar to previous appointee groups, with
perhaps a slightly greater tendency to promote political executives from both
career and subordinate political posts within the same agency rather than across agency
lines. The percentage of recent Johnson appointees from career to political ranks
was 31%--about the same as for the Truman, Kenneday, and early Johnson groups but
much higher than Eisenhower. Of those with prior federal administrative service,
the median years of service was 5.0 for those whose service was in the same agency,
and 5.8 years for those whose service was in a different agency. These figures, too,
are not as high as those for the Truman administration but noticeably higher than
others since.
The conclusion that Johnson in relying to an increasing extent on persons who
are essentially Washington careerists in either political or civil service is bolstered
by data on the geographic locations in which recent Johnson appointees had their
principal careers prior to appointment. The South Atlantic region, which includes
Washington, D.C., was up to 57%, which is an all-time high for any administration,
including Truman's. Washington itself accounts for 55% of Johnson's recent
appointees (as compared to 45% for Truman, 19% for Eisenhower, 31% for Kennedy,
and 34% for early Johnson appointees). Of the other regions, only New England and
the West South Central (and you know what state that includes) areas seem to be
holding their own as sources of Johnson appointees.
The trend toward higher levels of education which has been apparent in the
political executives of all recent administrations, continues through the Johnson
appointees. The men who never went to college, a group that has been dwindling
rapidly among political executives in recent years, are completely unrepresented in
the recent Johnson appointees, 96% of whom finished college and have at least
bachelor's degrees. Even more impressive is the fact that 75% of the recent group
have graduate or professional degrees. Of the recent Johnson appointees, 43% were
law graduates, which corresponds to the average of recent administrations. The sharp
increase in advanced training comes mainly from those who have earned masters
and doctorates of various kinds, including science, engineering, medicine, social
science, and public administration. A full 26% of Johnson's recent appointees have
earned doctorates.
It is interesting to note that tendencies toward educational elitism seem to be
increasing under one of our more equalitarian presidents. As compared to other
appointee groups, Johnson's recent executives show even higher concentration of
undergraduate preparation at the leading colleges. The percentage from the "Big Three"
(Yale, Harvard, and Princeton) was 25.5% which is similar to the early Johnson appoin-
tees and substantially higher than previous administrations, including Kennedy's. The
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
icentage from the whole Ivy League, including the Big Three, was up to 36.2%,
wher than ever before. And the concentration at a list of 18 leading private and
ublic institutions reached 50%. Among the leading institutions, in the most recent
16 of appointees Yale declined and lost first place to Harvard, but remained ahead
Princeton, which declined but still held third place. Of the other private in-
mutions, Stanford, Columbia, and Cornell were up, while Dartmouth and Chicago
down. Among the public universities, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan
old their places, several others declined or were unrepresented altögether, and
one--Texas--increased significantly. The concentration at the leading insti-
Itions for graduate and professional degrees was about the same as for previous
.cups, about three-quarters coming from one of the 18 leading schools.
Thus,
ne quest for quality seems to lead inevitably to the establ shment.
The Presidency and the Career Services
Now let us look briefly at the higher levels of the civil service, where some
nportant developments have occurred in the past decade and a half and even more
important ones may be in the making.
In retrospect, one of the crucial events was the creation of the supergrades--
ne addition of levels GS-16, 17, and 18 at the top of the civil service. Established
very limited numbers in 1949 andsteadily increased to the present 4, 400, these
ositions have provided appropriate recognition, pay, and status for obviously im-
contant jobs near the apex of the federal establishment which are not filled by
residential appointment. Without them, the promotion and salary structure of
he civil service would have been SO compressed that the service could not have
*tained personnel of the caliber it has, and the number of presidential positions
yould have had to be greatly enlarged. Some might argue that this would be a
road thing, but that is not the course of history. Because they are by definition
Vecial, the establishment and filling of each supergrade position is subject to
"crutiny and approval by the Civil Service Commission on a case by case basis.
The Commission is required to make sure that appropriate procedures have been
Wowed in every appointment to the 3/4 of the supergrade jobs that are under full
Terit coverage, and even for the remainder that are exempt or occupied at the
Beasure of the agency head, the Commission must be satisfied that the agency's
thoice has reasonable credentials for a job at that level of responsibility. Thus
77 have an identifiable group of elite positions, large enough to justify some syste-
Totic attention but small enought to permit fairly effective central supervision. Small
"Onder that the Second Hoover Commission thought of creating a presidentially
Missioned corps of civilian officers to occupy these positions as a solution to
many of the problems of status, tenure, mobility, and policy fragmentation.
Roger Jones has given us in a recent article good summary and commentary
'n, the trends of the past decade. 38 As Jones points out, the Government Employees
Teaining Act of 1958 was key to many subsequent developments. This Act provided
the first general authorization of government sponsored and financed training throughout
- 19 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
the federal service. It encouraged not only specific job-related skill training at
lower levels but also special training and development for higher professional and
executive personnel, to be provided either in-service or in appropriate academic
institutions. Under the stimulus of this Act and follow-up nagging by the Civil Service
Commission, many agencies in the course of examining and justifying their needs for
higher level training, began for the first time to take stock of their career executive
personnel, their qualitative and quantitative needs in future years as compared to
the replacements coming up the ladder, and the problems of quality recruiting,
turnover, and attrition. This led not only to a great burst of new training activities
but placed it in a context of serious manpower planning and efforts to institutionalize
in most agencies the delicate processes of identifying, developing, promoting, and
using the top career executives. Concurrently, examination of the attractiveness
of the service and problems of recruiting and attrition helped clinch the argument for
another landmark Act, the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962, which declared the
principle that federal pay rates should be comparable to private enterprise pay for
the same levels of work and actually brought that principle to realization for most
of the service, although falling somewhat short at the highest career levels.
Although they lent at least nominal presidential support to these measures,
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both worried, although in different ways,
about the responsiveness of the career service to legitimate political control. The
Republicans feared at the outset tha their policies might be sabotaged for ideological
reasons and established Schedule C to enlarge the number of positions at the top of
the service occupied at the pleasure of the department heads. As time went by, the
Eisenhower people discovered that civil servants in most cases were at least as
tractable as Republican patronage appointees, and lived increasingly comfortably with
the bureaucrats. Kennedy and his associates entered with little burden of ideological
suspicions but became increasingly frustrated by what they regarded as plain bureau-
cratic immobilism in many agenices. They went along with the idea of improving the
quality of the higher civil service but they remained dubious about getting effective
policy leadership from this group and convinced of the necessity of a sizable and vital
corps, of political executives.
As compared to his predecessors, President Johnson seems to have far more
faith in the careerists and hovers over the civil service with unmistakable personal
interest. He has promoted large numbers of career men to presidential posts and
indicated that he thinks this is a good thing to do. He presides over special recog-
nition and awards, ceremonies with obvious enjoyment. He has stepped up the
pressure on the Commission and the agencies to employ more Negroes and more
women. One might also interpret as evidence of presidential interest the custom
begun in this administration of treating almost every civil servant being promoted
to a supergrade job to a visit to the White House, interview with presidential aide
Marvin Watson, and in some cases a tour of the premises and handshake with the
President or Vice President if they happen to be available. Administration sources
aver that these visits come only after the individual has been chosen and do not
constitute any kind of political clearance; this, it is said, is positive personnel
- 20 -
Executive Stairing
management because it builds morale and reminds departmental officers of their tie
with the President who symbolizes the government as a whole.
President Johnson also is supporting some important measures that are still
pending at this moment. Two bills now before Congress would greatly increase public
service training at all levels. One bill provides for a national program of graduate
fellowships for public service training, in some respects analogous to the NDEA
program for increasing the nation's supply of college teachers, plus an auxiliary
program of grants to educational institutions for development of their resources and
training programs. Another bill, which owes much to the sponscrship of Senator
Muskie of Maine, would authorize sizable federal grants to state and local govern-
ments for training and other improvements in their civil services, as well as per-
mitting intergovernmental cooperation in training and occasional detailing of personnel.
If these bills do not fall victim to wartime economy impulses, they should produce
important long-range benefits for the public service--not to mention a boom in
academic public administration programs.
Training and executive development activities are to be stepped up within
the service. In April 1967 President Johnson issued an Executive Order which put
into effect most of the recommendations of a blue ribbon presidentially appointed
task force on this subject. 39 Perhaps the most interesting provision is f.or a new
federally operated center to provide advanced study on a full-time residential basis
to selected federal executives at the highest levels. This institution, for which
the Civil Service Commission is now planning actively, will climax several years
of discussion of the need for what has usually been called a "federal staff college"
to have a role for civilians somewhat analagous to that played for military officers
by the National War College.
The lact development to be noted is a new Executive Assignment System
for supergrade positions which will go into effect in November after a year of Civil
40
Service Commission preparation.
Although the details are complex, the essentials
of the system are about as follows:
1. No involuntary assignment of personnel by a central agency; continued
recognition of the right of agencies to make basic decisions, following merit pro-
cedures, about recruiting and promotion to their supergrade jobs, and of the rights
of individual employees to hold tenure in their existing jobs and make their own
decisions about what alternative proferred jobs they will accept.
2. Continued Civil Service Commission scrutiny of agency decisions, with
a prospect of increased pressure on the agencies not to promote from within to
supergrade lev is without careful examination of alternatives who might be available
through outside recruiting or voluntary transfer from other agencies.
3. Requirement that agencies periodically submit and review wih the
Commission executive staffing plans covering current and long-range needs and
steps to be taken to meet them by executive development, training, outside recruiting,
and promotion.
- 21 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
4. Staffing of a new Bureau of Executive Manpower at the Commission in
sufficient depth to permit a responsible officer to work closely and continuously with
each agency on preparation and implementation of its staffing plan, and on filling
of its key vacancies at supergrade level.
5. Establishment of an Executive Inventory containing personnel data on all
individuals holding positions at levels GS-15 through 18 (and counterparts in other
pay systems), this information to be coded to permit rapid indentification by computer
of all individuals who might be referred to an agency for a particular vacancy as well
as general analyses of the characteristics of the top-ranking federal work force.
6. Recognition, through a sub-category of Non-Career Executive Assignments,
of continuing need for a small number of supergrade positions filled by special pro-
cedure and occupied at the pleasure of the agency heads--although appointees
must still stand Civil Service Commission quality inspection.
According to the Commission, personally prepared questionnaires from about
21,000 of the 26,000 executives whose qualifications will eventually be in the
Inventory have now been received and coded SO that referrals can start any time.
However, one hears in Washington a certain amount of grumbling about the length
and personal nature of some parts of the questionnaire, as well as reports of foot-
dragging by some well-established old hands who are not particularly interested in
having their credentials handed about or being urged to change jobs. The appeal of
the system is mainly to those who are young, ambitious, and don't mind another FBI
full field investigation.
How much additional interagency mobility this will produce is of course
conjectural. Undoubtedly it will make additional opportunities available to career
men who might be interested in moving and help break up some of the more outrageously
closed agency promotion systems. However, the prevailing mode of thought these
days seems to be far more tolerant of the one-or-two-agency career than it used to
be; the ideal of the br oadly competent general executive seems harder and harder
of realization Although it is the computerized inventory that is attracting the
most attention, my personal guess is that the agency staffing review and the rapport
between the agency and its liaison officer at the Commission is more crucial.
According to the Commission, career executive staffing at the upper levels is now
an active concern of top-ranking political executives of most agencies, under con-
sistent personal pressure from both Chairman Macy and the President. One hope that
the pressure continues until the habit is formed.
The Executive Assignment Plan and related developments mark a significant
shift of ground from most of the debates and reform efforts aimed at the higher civil
service since World War II. The essence of it, if I read the history correctly, is
that we have given up trying to reform the civil service by tinkering with formal status.
Politicians, civil servants; and reformers all seem relatively unconcerned these days
- 22 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
about the line between political and career appointments. National affluence has
dulled hunger for patronage and the wariness of bureaucrats, and department heads
will take good men from whetever they find them. We have quit trying for a system
that will force either civil servants or agencies to accept involuntary interagency
transfers. We have given up trying to achieve greater formal tenure security for in-
dividuals, as in the rank-in-the-man senior civil service scheme proposed by the
Second Hoover Commission, or somewhat less as recently proposed by the Committee
for Economic Development. 41 In effect, we have decided to rely for mobility on
a combination of natural turnover (the Commission tells us that almost one out of
every four supergrade jobs turns over each year anyway) and the working of an
expanded, improved, less monopolistic, better policed free market in which agencies
and potential employees can find each other. And regardless of how much interagency
movement this leads to, improved training and agency executive development plans
will make everyone better off and happier with what he has.
What will all of this do for the President? Mr. Johnson apparently regards
these things as making an important contribution to development and better utilization
of the upper career service. To the extent that they lead to more intelligent, more
bradly trained, more potentially mobile civil servants with a government-wide rather
than parochial view, they should strengthen the Presidency as against the centri-
fugal forces we know so well. But the benefits to the President will be indirect.
It seems to have been decided, implicitly or explicitly, that an essentially agency-
based system will suffice and that no specific organizational link to the Presidency
is required except through the Civl Service Commission. Although presidential aides
may dabble in career appointments from time to time, the President's own participa-
tion is best given in the form of support for general institutional improvements. If
this seems less presidential control than some might wish, it may be as much as
the system can politically survive.
Summary and Prospect
As we have seen, our current President participates actively in personnel
matters, both political and career, and for the first time has unified personnel adr
ministration on the President's behalf under a single subordinate. Although some
aspects of President Johnson's interest may be peculiar to him personally, much
of this presidential involvement--especially the centralization of staff work on
presidential appointments--continues a trend visible under his predecessors.
The trend of the past generation toward greater domination of his party
by the President has expanded his political latitude in making top executive appoint-
ments, but at the same time the increasingly complex nature of the executive branch
has narrowed the range of institutional sources from which effective subordinates
can be chosen. The last two incumbents have developed and begun to mechanize
systematic
canvass
of
the
nation'
areas
where
potentially
effective
appointees
- 23 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
may be found. It is not clear that these efforts are bringing much greater diversity
in the body of appointees, although they are lessening somewhat the long-time
dependence on lawyers. So far, they appear to have accelerated a trend toward
domination of the government by an educational elite many of whose members began
with distinct socio-economic advantages. They appear also to have accelerated a
trend toward careerism in the holding of presidential appointments, and an increasing
fusion of the top of the career system with the presidentially appointed group.
Although President Johnson shows more signs than His predecessors of wishing to
identify with the higher civil service and make it his personal instrument, the
reforms he is sponsoring, significant as they are, amount to acceptance and improve-
ment of the inherited basic system; the sometime dream of a government-ranging
presidential corps of high career officers seems to be fading rapidly.
How firmly may one project these trends into the future? Another four years
by Democratic control might etch current practice into presidential concrete. On the
other hand, although members of the administration resent the suggestion, many aspects
of the current situation remind one sharply of the Truman administration. If a party
turnover should occur next year, it would undoubtedly bring about a resurgence of
interest in patronage, concern about the neutrality of the higher career service, and
installation of a more diverse set of less experienced presidential appointees in the
top positions. Macy's multiple-hat role would probably be fragmented.
Yet I suspect that any successor administration, whatever its initial impulses,
will soon find itself approximately where we are now. The requirements of running
the executive branch become more and more stringent, and qualified executives no
more plentiful. Active presidential control of political appointments, backed up
by White House staff work, is a feasible and perhaps necessary means of finding
talent and countering centrifugal tendencies of the system. This much, I believe,
is a presidential job from now on. Whether it will give future Presidents significantly
more control over the executive branch than was enjoyed by their predecessors is not
clear. I doubt that many personnel officers have found that routinization of their
function leads to an increase in their personal discretion and control-of events.
- 2:4
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
Footnotes
1. In preparation of this paper I have had the benefit of interviews during the summer
of 1967 with several members of the White House staff and other governmental officials
whose anonymity probably should be preserved.
2. Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for Government (Washington: The
Brr todkings. Institution, 1967).
3. Marver H. Bernstein, The Job of the Federal Executive (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1958).
4. John J. Corson and R. Shale Paul, Men Near the Top (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1966).
5. W. Lloyd Warner, Paul P. Van Riper, Norman H. Martin, and Orvis F. Collins,
The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
6. Dean E. Mann with Jameson W. Doig, The Assistant Secretaries (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1965).
7. David T. Stanley with Dean E. Mann and Jameson Doig, Men Who Govern: A
Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1967). I am indebted to friends at Brookings for access to the page
proof of this imminently forthcoming book.
8. David T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1964).
9. Warner, et.al., esp. pp. 12-13.
10. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 14-16.
11. Warner, et.al., pp. 107-110.
12. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 17-20.
13. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
14. Ibid. pp. 20-21.
15. Warner, et.al., pp. 131-136.
16. Corson and Paul, P. 14 and Appendix B; Stanley, pp. 31-33.
- 25 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
17. Stanley, pp. 56-57.
18. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 31-33.
19. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
20. Mann and Doig, PP. 64-124, esp. pp. 91-99.
21. Stanley, pp. 59-65; Warner, et.al., pp. 191-250.
22. President's Committee on Administrative Mangement, Report With Staff
Studies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 121-122.
23. Ibid., p. 8.
24. Ibid. pp. 9.
25. Ibid., p. 10.
26. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Personnel and Civil Service, and Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).
27. President's Committee on Administrative Management, pp. 11-12.
28. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service, Ps 144.
29. Laurin L. Henry, "The Transfer of Power" and "The New Administration" in
Paul T. David (ed.), Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-61 (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1961); Mann and Doig, pp. 269-270.
30. This is the author's recollection from conversations several years ago with
James H. Rowe, Jr., who worked on appointments as a Roosevelt Administrative
Assistant.
31. John J. Corson, Executives for the Federal Service (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1952).
32. Mann and Doig, p. 269.
33. Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Transitions (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1960), pp. 639-686; Mann and Doig, pp. 87-123.
26 -
Henry, Presidency and Executive Staffing
34. This account of the Kennedy staff operation is based on interviews with Fenn
and others who participated, August 1967.
35. This account of the Johnson staff operation is based on interviews with
several participants and close observers, August 1967.
36. The data on previous appointees, with which Johnson's recent appointees
are compared in the immediately following paragraphs, is from Stanley, Mann,
and Doig, op.cit.
37. These figures are roughly consistent with a breakdown provided by a White
House staff member, who indicated that through 1966, the origins of Johnson's
appointees in all categories were:
Federal Government
45%
Civil Service
21%
Foreign Service
19%
Legislative Branch
2%
Military
2%
Business
15%
Law
16%
Universities
14%
Unions
1%
State and Local Government
9%
38. Roger W. Jones, "Developments in Government Manpower: A Federal Perspec-
tive," XXVII Public Administration Review (June 1967), pp. 134-141.
39. Presidential Task Force on Career Advancement, Investment for Tomorrow
(Washington: U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1967); Executive Order 11348 and
accompanying Statement by the President, April 20, 1967.
40. Executive Order 11315 and accompanying Statement by the President,
November 17, 1966; U.S. Civil Service Commission, "The Executive Assignment
System," and "Questions and Answers on the Executive Assignment System"
(mimeographed releases, November 1966). Interview, Mr. Seymour Berlin,
Director, Bureau of Executive Manpower, August 8, 1967.
41. Improving Executive Management in the Federal Government, a statement
by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development,
(New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1964), p. 48.
- 27 -
4
November 11, 1968
To:
Richard M. Nixon
From: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
I have conferred with Charles S. Murphy, Coun-
selor to the President, and Mr. William J. Hopkins, Ex-
ecutive Assistant to the President, with regard to the
appropriation for and expenditure of funds by the Execu-
tive Office of the President. Additionally, I have con-
sulted relevant Federal statutes and Congressional ap-
propriations to ascertain the extent of funds available
to the Executive Office.
Chapter 2, Title 3 of the United States Code
provides for the term of office and compensation of the
President. As authorized by that statute, the Congress
made certain appropriations for the Executive Office of
the President for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969
in passing Treasury, Post Office and Executive Office Ap-
propriation Act, 1969 (Public Law 90 - 350; 82 Stat. 190).
Title III of that Act, "Executive Office Appropriation
Act, 1969, contains the relevant provisions.
Compensation of the President
The compensation of the President for his ser-
vices is fixed by 3 U.S.C. § 102 in the aggregate amount
of $100, 000 a year, to be paid monthly, and in addition
an expense allowance of $50,000 to assist in defraying ex--
penses relating to or resulting from the discharge of his
official duties, for which expense allowance no account-
ing, other than for income tax purcoses, shall be made by
him. The statute also entitles the President to the use
of the furniture and other effects belonging to the United
States and kept in the Executive Mansion. The Executive
2
Office Appropriation Act, 1969 provides an appropriation
of $150,000 for the compensation of the President, in-
cluding an expense allowance at the rate of $50,000 per
annum.
Traveling Expenses
3 U.S.C. § 103 provides that there may be ex-
pended for or on account of the traveling expenses of
the President such sum appropriated by Congress not ex-
ceeding $40,000 per annum. This sum when appropriated
may be expended in the discretion of the President and
accounted for on his certificate solely. $40,000 for
traveling expenses of the President was included in "The
White House Office, Salaries and Expenses' budget of the
Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969.
The White House Office, Salaries and Expenses
The Executive Office Appropriation Act. 1969,
provides $3,229,000 for expenses necessary for the White
House Office, including but not to exceed $250,000 for
services of experts and consultants, at such per diem
rates for individuals as the President may specify, and
other personnel services without regard to the provi-
sions of law regulating the employment and compensation
of persons in the Government service. The total amount
also includes newspapers, periodicals, teletype news ser-
vice and travel, and official entertainment expenses of
the President, to be accounted for solely on his certi-
ficate. Attached hereto as Table I is an itemized list
of Salaries and Expenses of the White House Office.
Table I indicates that an estimated $2,454,000
was expended for personnel compensation for 255 employees
in fiscal 1968 and an estimated $2,707,000 would be ex-
pended for 255 employees in fiscal 1969. The increase
over 1968 is attributable to salary increases. Included
in this number of employees are Special Assistants, Ad-
ministrative Assistants, staff personnel, secretaries,
messengers and mail room messengers. Compensation of the
military aides and the staff of the National Security
Council are not included in this budget.
3
The President is authorized by 3 U.S.C. § 105
to fix the compensation of six administrative assistants
and eight secretaries or other immediate staff assistants
in the White House Office at rates of basic compensation
not to exceed that of Level II ($30,000 per annum) of the
Federal Executive Salary Schedule. Attached hereto as
Table II is a list of eleven individuals on the White
House staff currently receiving $30,000 per year payable
out of the White House Office, Salaries and Expenses. As
indicated above, a maximum of $250,000 may be expended for
experts or consultants at such per diem rates for individ-
uals as the President may specify, and other personal ser-
vices without regard to the provisions of law regulating the
employment and compensation of persons in the Government
service. We have been informed that it is possible to in-
clude within this group over and above the fourteen Spec-
ial and Administrative Assistants additional personnel at
a maximum of $30,000 per year.
3 U.S.C. § 107 provides that employees of the
executive departments and independent establishments of
the executive branch of the Government may be detailed
from time to time to the White House Office for temporary
assistance. At the present time there are a total of 185
personnel on detail in the White House, over and above the
255 personnel listed in the budget. This group is com-
posed of assistants, secretarial personnel and lower sal-
ary staff. These persons are not included in the White
House Office budget.
Special Projects
The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969
provides $1,500,000 for expenses necessary to provide
staff assistance for the President in connection with
Special Projects, to be expended at his discretion and
without regard to such provisions of law regarding the
expenditure of Government funds or the compensation and
employment of persons in the Government service as he
may specify. However, no more than 20% ($300,000) of
4
this appropriation may be used to reimburse the appropria-
tion for "Salaries and expenses, The White House Office",
for administrative services. No more than $10,000.of
this appropriation may be allocated in the Executive Of-
fice of the President for official representation expenses
of the President. Attached hereto as Table III is the
Special Projects budget. With regard to reimbursement for
salaries and expenses no funds for salaries and expenses
were reimbursed in 1967. It is estimated that $50,000
will be reimbursed for both 1968 and 1969.
In general, these Special Projects funds are
used to provide consultants or special assistants to the
President for projects that may arise from time to time,
essentially of a non-emergency nature, such as foreign in-
telligence activities, consumer interest programs, con-
sultant and special assistant services.
Any funds not expended lapse at the end of the
fiscal year and may not be carried over. In fiscal 1967
$775,000 lapsed and in fiscal 1968 an estimated $150,000
lapsed.
Operating Expenses, Executive Mansion
The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969
provides $823,000 for the care, maintenance, repair and
alteration, refurnishing, improvement, heating and light-
ing, including electric power and fixtures, of the Execu-
tive Mansion and traveling expenses, to be expended as the
President may determine, and official entertainment ex-
penses of the President, to be accounted for solely on his
certificate. The estimate for 1969 personnel compensation
is $575,000 for 80 employees. Additional needs for per-
sonnel and expenses are met by the General Services Admin-
istration. The grounds of the White House are cared for
by the National Park Service. The White House Police
and the Secret Service salaries and expenses are budget-
ed out of the Department of the Treasury. The Treasury
Department Appropriation Act, 1969 (Public Law 90 - 350;
82 Stat. 190) provides a total of $20,900,000 for ne-
5
cessary expenses for the operation of the United States
Secret Service, including salaries, purchase and hire of
passenger motor vehicles, hire of aircraft, and purchase,
repair and cleaning of uniforms. Additionally, motor
vehicle needs of the White House staff are provided by
the Military Transportation Corps. Attached hereto is
Table IV containing the Budget of Operating Expenses,
Executive Mansion.
Bureau of the Budget, Salaries and Expenses
The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969
provides $10,000,000 for expenses necessary for the Bur-
eau of the Budget.
Council of Economic Advisors, Salaries and Expenses
$880,000 has been appropriated for necessary
expenses of the Council.
National Security Council, Salaries and Expenses
$664,000 has been appropriated for expenses
necessary for the National Security Council, including
services of experts and consultants. 3 U.S.C. § 105 pro-
vides that the President may fix the compensation of the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council at
a rate not to exceed Level II.
Emergency Fund for the President
$1,000,000 has been appropriated for emer-
gencies affecting the national interest, security, or
defense which may arise at home or abroad during the
current fiscal year. No part of this appropriation is
available to finance a function or project for which a
budget estimate or appropriation was transmitted.
Expenses of Management Improvements
$350,000 has been appropriated for expenses
necessary to assist the President in improving the man-
6
agement of executive agencies and in obtaining greater
economy and efficiency through the establishment of
more efficient business methods in Government opera-
tions. The allocation is to remain available until ex-
pended. We have not been informed what portion of this
fund has been expended to date. The expenditure of
this fund is entirely under the management of the Direc-
tor of the Bureau of the Budget. The President, of
course, may direct the Director to conduct studies us-
ing this appropriation.
Physical Plant
The working White House staff occupies the
West Wing, a three story structure including basement.
The first floor accommodates twelve staff personnel
plus secretaries, the second floor accommodates approxi-
mately thirteen persons plus secretaries and the base-
ment houses five personnel plus the Army Signal Corps.
The East Wing of the White House is occupied
by the staff of the First Lady and would include the
Social Secretary and the Press Secretary of the First
Lady. Also housed in the East Wing are Presidential ad-
visors with whom the President is not in daily contact.
Mr. William J. Hopkins, Executive Assistant
to the President has informed us that a plat of the White
House Offices has been prepared and will be delivered to
us by Charles S. Murphy on November 11, 1968.
TABLE I
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SALARIES AND EXPENSES
OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
1967 actual
1968 estimate
1999
estimate
Personnel compensation:
11.1
Permanent positions
1,891
2,164
2,407
11.3
Positions other than permanent
215
200
200
11.5
Other personnel compensation
165
90
100
Total personnel compensation
2,271
2,454
2,707
12.0
Personnel benefits
140
137
157
Travel expenses of the President
40
36
40
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons
22
23
25
23.0 Rent, communications, and utilities
103
100
110
24.0 Printing and reproduction
160
95
102
25.1 Other services
2
2
3
26.0 Supplies and materials
59
60
65
31.0 Equipment
18
13
20
99.0
Total obligations
2,815
2,920
3,229
PERSONNEL SUMMARY
Total number of permanent positions
250
250
250
Full-time equivalent of other positions
It
5
5
Average number of all employees
255
255
255
Average GS grade
7.6
7.6
7.7
Average GS salary
$8,108
$8,108
$8,552
Average salary of ungraded positions
$4,891
$4,891
$5,526
PROGRAM AND FINANCING (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Program by activities:
10 Administration (cost-obligations)
2,815
2,920
3,229
Financing:
25 Unobligated balance lapsing
140
89
-40
New obligational authority
2,955
3,009
3,229
FINANCING AND EXPENDITURES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Relation of obligations to expenditures:
71 Total olbligations (affecting expenditures)
2,815
2,920
3,229
72 Obligated balance, start of year
147
183
188
74 Obligated balance, end of year (-)
-183
-188
--193
90 Expenditures.
2,779
2,915
3,224
Expenditures are distributed as fellows:
01 Out of current authorizations
2,632
2,732
3,036
02 Out of prior authorizations
147
183
188
Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and
Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations
For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3,
at 152 (1968)
TABLE II
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - SALARIES AND EXPENSES
Personnel Receiving $30,000 Per Annum
Special Assistant to the President
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
S. Douglas Cater, Jr. (Vacant)
Special Assistant to the President
George E. Christian
Special Assistant to the President
E. Ernest Goldstein
Deputy Press Secretary to the
Wyatt Thomas Johnson, Jr.
President
Special Assistant to the President
James R. Jones
Special Counsel to the President
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the
Mike N. Manatos
President
Associate Special Counsel to the
W. DeVier Pierson
President
Legislative Counsel to the President
Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President
Larry Eugene Temple
Executive Assistant to the President
William J. Hopkins
TABLE III
SPECIAL PROJECTS
PROGRAM AND FINANCING (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
1967 actual 1968 estimate 1969 estimate
Program by activities:
10 Financing: Administration (cost-obligations) (object class 25.1)
725
1, 350
1,500
25 Unobligated balance lapsing
775
150
40
New obligational authority
1, 500
1,500
1, 500
Relation of obligations to expenditures:
71 Total obligations (affecting expenditures)
725
72 Obligated balance, start of year
1,350
1,500
48
74 Obligated balance, end of year
31
31
-31
-31
-31
90
Expenditures
Expenditures are distributed as follows:
742
1,350
1,500
01 Out of current authorizations
694
02 Out of prior authorizations
1,319
1,469
48
31
31
Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and
Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations
For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3,
at 152 (1968)
TABLE IV
OPERATING EXPENSES, EXECUTIVE MANSION
OBLIGATIONS BY OBJECT
Actual
Estimate
Estimate
Increase (+)
1967
1968
1969
or
Decrease (-)
11.0
Personnel compensation
$578,000
$545,000
$575,000
+$30,000
12.0
Personnel benefits
32,000
35,000
37,000
+2,000
23.0 Rent, communications, and utility services
51,000
52,000
52,000
25.1
Other services
41,000
55,000
98,000
+43,000
26.0 Supplies and materials
163,000
124,000
130,000
+6,000
31.0 Equipment
3,000
43,000
-1-40,000
Total obligations
865,000
814,000
935,000
+121,000
PERSONNEL SUMMARY
Total number of permanent positions
75
75
75
Full-time equivalent of other positions
12
9
9
Average number of all employees
77
76
80
Average salary of ungraded positions
$6,430
$6,756
$6,756
PROGRAM AND FINANCING
Total obligations
$865,000
$814,000
$935,000
+$121,000
Reimbursements from other accounts
-173,000
-112,000
-112,000
Unobligated balance lapsing
+6,000
-6,000
Appropriation
692,000
708,000
823,000
+115,000
Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and
Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations
For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3,
at 152 (1968)
WHITE HOUSE APPROPRIATION REQUESTS
The Director, Bureau of the Budget, appears before the designated Appropriations Subcommittees to defend
the appropriation requested for the Bureau of the Budget itself and for the following White House accounts:
Account
Type of
1969 Appropriation
Title
Appropriation
Enacted
Purpose of Account
Compensation of the
Compensation of the President including an
President
Annual
$ 150,000
expense allowance.
White House Office
Provide staff assistance and administrative
Salaries and expenses
Annual
3,229,000
services for the White House Office.
White House Office
Provide staff assistance for the President in
Special Projects
Annual
1,500,000
connection with Special Projects. Not to exceed
20 percent of the appropriation can be used for
White House Office salaries and expenses.
$10,000 can be made available for official
reception and representation expenses of the
Executive Office.
Emergency Fund for
Provide for emergencies affecting the national
the President
Annual
1,000,000
interest, security, or defense. No part of this
appropriation is available to finance a function
or project for which a budget estimate or
appropriation was transmitted.
Expenses of Management
No-year
350,000
Expenses necessary to assist the President in
Improvement
(available
improving the management of executive agencies
until
and in obtaining greater economy and efficiency
expended)
through the establishment of more efficient
business methods in Government operations.
1968-69
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION
INDEX
Page
I.
Introduction
1
II. The Transition
1
A. Pre-Election Period
1
1. Organizational and substantive studies
1
2. Plans for a personnel search
1
3. Contact with the Johnson Administration
1
B. Immediate Post-Election Period
2
1. Presidential Transition Act of 1963
2
2. Location of President-Elect and Staff
3
3. Johnson-Nixon Meeting
3
a. Security Clearance
4
b. Current Information for the President-
elect
4
C. Other Presidential Information
4
d. National Security and Budget Observers
5
e. Orientation of Appointees
5
f. The Handling of Crises
5
g. News Release
5
4. Key Items
6
a. Clearance of New Appointees
6
b. The Handling of Crises
7
C. The Administration's First Months
7
D. Task Forces
7
III. Appointments - Key Positions to be Filled
8
A. The White House Staff - Pre-Inaugural Period
8
1. Special Assistant (for Programs and Policy)
8
2. Special Assistant (for National Security
Affairs)
10
3. Personnel Adviser
12
4. Appointments Secretary
12
5. Press Secretary
12
6. Correspondence Secretary
12
Index - 2
Page
7.
Chief of Staff
13
8.
Staff Secretary
14
9. Cabinet Secretary
14
10. Administrative Assistants to the President
14
11. Armed Forces Aide to the President
15
12. Congressional Liaison
15
13. Scientific Adviser
15
B. The Executive Office - Pre-Inaugural Period
16
1. Bureau of the Budget
16
2. Council of Economic Advisers
17
3. National Security Council
17
4. The Central Intelligence Agency
18
C.
Executive Office
18
1. Budget Director
18
2. Chairman and Members of the Council of
Economic Advisers
19
3. Executive Secretary of National Aeronau-
tic and Space Council
19
4. Director of Office of Economic
Opportunity
19
5. Director of Office of Emergency Planning
19
6. Director of Office of Science and
Technology
19
7. Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations
19
8. Executive Secretary of National Council
on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development
19
9. Executive Secretary and Chairman of
Consumer Advisory Council
19
D. Executive Departments, Commission, Agencies
and Boards
20
1. Appointments in General
20
a. Retaining Career Officials
20
b. The Appointments Process
20
C. Personnel Policy
20
2. Cabinet Appointments
21
Index -3
Page
E. Relations with the Military
22
1. Replacement of Incumbent Joint Chiefs
22
of Staff
2. Presidential Military Adviser
22
IV.
Relations with Congress
23
A. Organization of Congress
23
B. Program
23
C. Future Relationship with Congress
24
D. Patronage
24
V.
Control of the Republican Party
24
A. National Chairman and Staff
24
B. Patronage
25
Conclusion
25
EXHIBITS
A. White House Offices.
Roosevelt White House Office
i
March 10, 1945
Truman White House Office
ii
September 20, 1945
Truman White House Office
iii
July 1, 1952
Eisenhower White House Office
iv
July 1, 1953
Eisenhower White House Office
v-vi
June 1, 1960
Index 4
EXHIBITS (continued)
Page
Kennedy White House Office
vii
June 1, 1961
Kennedy White House Office
viii
June 1, 1963
Johnson White House Office
1x
June 1, 1964
Johnson White House Office
X
October 14, 1968
B. Johnson Executive Staff - October 14, 1968.
xi
C. Executive Departments - October 14, 1968.
xii
D. Chairmen of Principal Independent Agencies -
October 14, 1968.
xiii-xiv
MEMORANDUM ON TRANSITION
October 25, 1968
I. Introduction
There are about seventy-five days between Election
Day and Inauguration Day. The immediate tasks are the desig-
nation of capable and responsible leadership to the Executive
Branch, the identification of the functions of that Branch,
and the acquisition of information about key governmental
issues.
II. The Transition
A. Pre-Election Period
Work should begin on three principal fronts:
1.
Organizational and substantive studies beyond
those immediately required for campaign purposes should
be started as soon as possible.
2.
Plans for a personnel search for prospective
departmental and agency appointments should be finalized.
3.
Contact with the Johnson Administration on
matters related to the transition should be pursued.
In response to President Johnson's invitation, a
good working arrangement has been established with Charles
2
Murphy, the White House designee.
There have been meetings with the Bureau of the
Budget, the General Services Administration and the
United States Civil Service Commission. Each is pre-
pared to aid in the transition.
A list of Presidential appointments and current
vacancies has been obtained. A statement on the ex-
piration date of statutory Presidential Reorganiza-
tion Powers and other special powers has been re-
quested. FBI clearance procedures for Presidential
appointees and others are being explored to expedite
security and Presidential clearances as soon after
after Election Day as possible.
B. Immediate Post-Election Period
1. Presidential Transition Act of 1963
Sponsored by Kennedy, this law vests in the
Administrator of General Services the authority, upon
request, to provide to the President-elect and the
Vice-President-elect services and facilities, includ-
ing office space, payment of salaries, travel expenses,
communications services, printing and binding, and
postage. An appropriation provides $375,000 for the
President-elect and $75,000 for the Vice-President-
elect for expenses incurred during the period between
election and inauguration.
3
The Administrator has set aside 12,500 square
feet of floor space in the Kennedy Federal Office
Building (#7) on 17th Street, Washington, D.C. for
the use of the President-elect after election without
charge. It is excellent space and offers no problem
as to security.
There is no government space available in New
York but space can be obtained on a rental basis and
therefore subject to a charge for its use.
Office furniture and fixtures will be furnished
at a very nominal cost. In addition, transportation,
including airplanes, will be available without charge
to the newly elected President and Vice President.
Telephone and telegraph will also be supplied by the
Government at reduced tariff.
2. Location of President-Elect and Staff: Both
Clifford and Murphy strongly recommend that Washington
be established as the headquarters for the new Adminis-
tration not only because of convenience and nearness
to the seat of government but equally important because
of the public image created thereby. This is, of course,
a matter of personal preference.
3.
Johnson-Nixon Meeting
The President will undoubtedly initiate contact
with the President-elect. He presumably will suggest
4
an early meeting. If precedent is followed, an
agenda will be prepared by Murphy and Lincoln after
consultation with the principals. If not, you might
want to give some thought to the topics to be ex-
plored at such meeting.
Such an agenda should include the following
points:
a. Security Clearance - Final arrange-
ments for expediting security clearances for
appointees.
b.
Current Information for the President-
Elect - Arrangements to receive such Administra-
tion information as daily military, diplomatic and
foreign intelligence reports, briefings and memo-
randa on current problems and "cable traffic."
C.
Other Presidential Information - Arrange-
ments to obtain copies of personal memoranda of
Presidential meetings with foreign officials, op-
erating information from outgoing Presidential
staff, Task Force reports prepared for the Presi-
dent and not publicly released, reorganization
studies in the Departments, Agencies or in the
Bureau of the Budget, personnel information re-
5
lating to appointments, terms and vacancies,
memorandum on technical operations of the White
House Office.
d.
National Security and Budget Observers -
Arrangements for early and close cooperation on
national security affairs and the budget process.
e.
Orientation of Appointees - Arrange-
ments for briefing of new officials by their
predecessors, access to career staff and depart-
mental information, clerical and professional
assistance, and establishment of ground rules
for access to policy discussions.
f.
The Handling of Crises - A procedure
should be established to facilitate coordination
between the principals in the event a crisis OC-
curs.
bi
News Release - It may be useful for the
President and President-elect to issue a joint
statement after their meeting. The substance of
such a statement could be along these lines:
The President and President-elect had a
full, friendly and useful discussion.
They and their associates will cooperate
in every appropriate way in order to in-
sure a smooth and effective transfer of
responsibility on January 20. They will
6
continue to consult as they think desir-
able and are confident that such coopera-
tion can be achieved without impairing
the orderly functioning of the Executive
Branch.
3.
Key Items
Two items on the proposed agenda are particu-
larly significant.
a.
Clearance of New Appointees
The President-elect in cooperation with
the President must make appropriate arrangements
to investigate the background of new appointees
in order to assure the Johnson Administration that
persons to be given access to classified informa-
tion have security clearance. It is also wise to
establish the practice of investigating all pros-
pective Presidential appointees regardless of
their need for access to classified information.
Especially for the first category, the
process must begin as early as possible. As to
these, the Johnson Administration should properly
examine the report, make its decision and forward
the report to the President-elect. As to the second
category, the present Administration should order
the check and send the FBI report unopened to the
President-elect.
7
b.
The Handling of Crises.
In the event of a crisis of major
proportions during the transition period, the
President will undoubtedly consult with the
President-elect. The Nation would normally ex-
pect this but there is no requirement by prece-
dent or otherwise that the President must abdi-
cate his constitutional authority and duty to
decide or that the President-elect must join
in or be bound by the President's decision.
C.
The Administration's First Months
Pockets of resistance to the President in-
evitably tend to exist in the Departments, in Congress
and in the Party. It goes without saying that the
President-elect should assume the reins of power and
leadership in his own hands, as soon as possible.
D.
Task Forces
In addition to the selection of capable people,
the President-elect should appoint task forces in at
least two Departments: State and Defense.
President Kennedy made a mistake by having
too many task forces (approximately 29 in number), in
addition to numerous departmental studies conducted by
McKinsey & Company.
8
President Johnson has directed (through
Murphy) each Department and Agency to prepare a
volume on organization, function, budget and person-
nel and a second volume on pending issues. The Bureau
of the Budget likewise is to prepare a similar study
on each Department and Agency. This material will be
available through Murphy after election.
The Brookings Institution has in preparation
a volume on important issues confronting the new Admin-
istration and has promised to deliver a galley proof
by November 1, 1968. The title of the study is "Agenda
for the Nation. "
III. Appointments - Key Positions to be Filled
A. The White House Staff - Pre-Inaugural Period
A skeleton staff should be chosen, briefed and
prepared to move into operation the day after the election
or shortly thereafter. This staff must be capable of
discharging a variety of duties and the following key
senior positions are suggested:
1. Special Assistant (for Programs and Policy)
This is the key policy post on the staff and
should in addition have primary responsibility for
speeches, messages, proclamations, review of Executive
Orders and similar tasks.
9
This position on the President's Staff was
initiated during the war by President Roosevelt
who appointed Judge Samuel I. Rosenman as Special
Counsel to the President. President Truman abolished
the position but later resurrected it by appointing
Clark M. Clifford as Special Counsel. Charles S. Murphy
succeeded Clifford. In addition, John R. Steelman,
the Assistant to the President, aided in coordinating
Federal agency programs and policies.
Under President Eisenhower this function was
performed by Staff members reporting through Governor
Sherman Adams and later General Persons.
President Kennedy used Theodore Sorensen as
Special Counsel to focus from the beginning on the
State of the Union message and to continue to advise
on questions of program and policy. This role under
President Johnson is now occupied by Joseph A. Califano,
Jr. as Special Assistant to the President.
The Special Assistant should have a staff to
assist him and access to the Administrative Assistants
as they are appointed. The Special Assistant's draft-
ing group should begin as soon as possible to collect
ideas for and to prepare initial drafts of the Inaugural
Address to be given on January 20, and, following that,
10
a State of the Union message which will present the
President-elect's legislative program. These messages
should be tied in closely with the Budget, and there-
fore it would be wise to bring into this group, on a
temporary basis, an experienced man with background
in the Bureau of the Budget. The President-elect may
later choose to divide the responsibilities of this
position among other staff personnel, but initially,
the responsibilities for the described functions
should be delegated to one individual.
2.
Special Assistant (for National Security Affairs)
It is imperative that the President-elect have
on his staff an adviser or advisers to brief him on de-
velopments involving national security. This Special Assist-
ant serves as liaison between the President and the National
Security Council and supervises the staff of the National
Security Council.
Additionally, the Special Assistant brings to
the President's attention issues which the President may
want to explore with the Secretary of State; briefs the
President on current military, diplomatic and foreign
intelligence; serves as a general point of contact be-
tween the White House and the operating departments con-
11
cerned with National Security; and briefs the Presi-
dent on impending problems which have not yet reached
crisis proportions.
The duties of this position were performed
under President Roosevelt by Harry L. Hopkins, Special
Assistant; Admiral Leahy, Chief-of-Staff to the Com-
mander-in-Chief; and Judge Rosenman. W. Averill
Harriman assumed this role under President Truman,
serving in the specially created position of Director
for Mutual Security. Under President Eisenhower, Adams
and later General Goodpaster handled these duties.
President Kennedy named McGeorge Bundy to the National
Security Adviser's job and President Johnson appointed
Walt W. Rostow upon Bundy's departure.
It is suggested that the implementation of
the positions for Special Assistants for Programs and
Policy and for National Security should not be permitted
to develop into chief of staff functions. These posi-
tions should not block access to the President.
The following are additional staff positions
which should be filled as soon after election as possible.
Some may be only temporary but most will later become
the official White House Staff.
12
3.
Personnel Adviser
The President-elect should have an assistant
to coordinate the recruiting and screening of top per-
sonnel.
Attached hereto is a list of high priority
positions to be filled prepared from a computer tabula-
tion listing provided by the Chairman of the United
States Civil Service Commission.
4.
Appointments Secretary
This individual keeps the President's calendar,
coordinates his time, assists in determining priority of
visits, supervises the making of travel arrangements,
ceremonies and official functions. The position requires
an assistant and a secretary.
5.
Press Secretary
A vital job requiring the talents and diplomacy
of a highly skilled individual to serve as the President's
spokesman to and liaison with the press. He will need
one deputy who can speak in his name, and preferably two,
and an appropriate staff. He should be one of your ad-
visers on public relations.
6.
Correspondence Secretary
He has responsibility for the President's cor-
respondence, refers inquiries to Departments for answer,
and functions in cooperation with the Staff Secretary and
13
Executive Clerk in handling volume mail. He will need
some staff personnel.
The Staff of the White House is the President's
personal staff and should conform in size and function
to his needs. It is suggested that initially the
President-elect's staff be kept small and versatile.
The staff can be expanded later. Back-up resources in
the Bureau of the Budget and in the Council of Economic
Advisers are available.
Each Administration has, in addition to the
regular White House staff assistants, acquired by assign-
ment from Departments and Agencies, a large pool of back-
up personnel.
For example, the Johnson White House Office
is served by 2500 persons. We are seeking to obtain
more detail on their functions.
7.
Chief of Staff
President Eisenhower found the Chief of Staff
organization well suited to his method of operation.
Others have rejected it as inadequate. It is suggested
that a system that permits all senior persons on the
staff access to the President and provides for regular
meetings with staff encourages much desired intra-staff
communication. Staff should share in the government-
wide perspective of the President.
14
The President's staff should include the
following senior positions in addition to those enumer-
ated above:
8.
Staff Secretary
"Monitor" of White House staff work, keeping
track of documents requiring action, of assignments re-
quiring execution, of decisions reached in Cabinet meet-
ings, legislative leaders' meetings, and elsewhere.
Coordinates and synchronizes the work of the staff. The
staff secretary works closely with the White House Execu-
tive Clerk (normally a non-political position), who
handles and records all formal papers and documents for
President's action or attention.
9.
Cabinet Secretary
Handles general liaison with Cabinet officers
and other agency heads, investigating grievances and
adjusting minor differences not requiring Presidential
intervention. Attends Cabinet meetings and keeps minutes
of proceedings.
10.
Administrative Assistants to the President
The White House staff should have at least six
Administrative Assistants. Several should be capable
writers, to assist in speech writing and to be available
for direct assignment by the President to other jobs.
The other Assistants should have roving assignments as
15
directed by the President. One Administrative Assist-
ant could be permanently assigned to the recruitment
and processing of top level appointees to significant
policy positions, after the groundwork has been done
initially by the Personnel Adviser.
11. Armed Forces Aide to the President
This post should be held by a regular military
officer and is useful for ceremonial and housekeeping
functions, travel and similar responsibilities.
12. Congressional Liaison
Assists in formulating Administration strategy
for achieving a legislative program and advises on Ad-
ministration policy-making on what Congress is or is not
likely to do. He also serves as a conduit for legisla-
tors to the President.
13. Scientific Adviser
Assists President and his advisers in analyzing
and understanding complex technical questions on the
weapons, space, disarmament, drug, mining, agricultural,
and related fields.
In addition to the above White House staff posi-
tions, the President requires other personnel such as the
household staff, the Secret Service, communications room,
switchboard, files, the mail room, personnel office, and
related services, all of which will carry over in their
16
present form and with much the same personnel. Also
required are the social secretary and such other
staff as the President's wife may require who will
have to be brought in.
Attached to this memorandum are lists of the
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson White
House office staffs for purposes of comparison.
B. The Executive Office - Pre-Inaugural Period
1.
Bureau of the Budget
As indicated above, contact has already
been initiated with the Director and Deputy Direc-
tor of the Bureau of the Budget. There is a criti-
cal need for the President-elect, as his first ap-
pointment, to designate an individual or individuals
to serve a liaison function with the Bureau. Presi-
dent Eisenhower's designation of Joseph W. Dodge
within ten days after the election in 1952 to work
with the outgoing Budget officials did much to in-
crease the effectiveness of the new Administration
during its early months.
The Bureau has indicated that considera-
tion of the most important budget matters relating
to the departments and agencies will be taken up
between Election Day and Thanksgiving.
17
The Budget liaison man may be a new
Presidential staff member on loan or the President-
elect's ultimate choice for the Director's position.
The Bureau is preparing 21 Department
and Agency Highlight Summaries, which identify
main aspects of program and policy, budget legis-
lation, and organization and management of which
incoming management should be informed at an early
date, 75 Issue or Topical Papers and a series of
Basic Reference and Descriptive Papers covering
the various functions of the Bureau. These papers
will be made available through Murphy the day after
election.
2.
Council of Economic Advisers.
The President-elect should promptly desig-
nate an individual to act as liaison with the present
Council of Economic Advisers and with the Bureau of
the Budget on economic matters. Access should be
given to the Treasury Department. This individual
could be the new Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers.
3.
National Security Council
The National Security Council is composed
of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director
18
of the Office of Emergency Planning. As indi-
cated above, the President-elect should at his
meeting with the President make arrangements to
permit a representative of the President-elect
to observe National Security Council meetings and
to facilitate close cooperation between the
President's White House advisers in this area
and their designated counterparts.
4.
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency is under
the direction of the National Security Council. The
Director of the CIA is probably the most important
man in the intelligence establishment. The President-
elect might consider retaining the current Director,
a career man, for several months at least and then
replace him if he was found unsatisfactory. If so,
this should be announced before inauguration.
C. Executive Office
The key positions are:
1.
Budget Director
The Budget Director is a direct arm of
the Executive (not even Senate confirmation for
his appointment is required). Under his direction,
the Bureau of the Budget is a source of sophisticated
19
economic analysis and a potential participant
in positive policy making. In addition, the
Bureau can serve as the most effective way of
controlling the departments and shaping of Presi-
dential policy. A strong Director is essential.
2.
Chairman and Members of the Council of
Economic Advisers
The Council serves a valuable function
to keep the Department of the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve from overpowering the President,
and to estimate and define the differences between
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
The following agencies constitute the re-
maining bodies located within the Executive Office
of the President. They need no priority attention
from the President-elect at this time.
3.
Executive Secretary of National Aeronautic
and Space Council
4.
Director of Office of Economic Opportunity
5.
Director of Office of Emergency Planning
6.
Director of Office of Science and Technology
7.
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
8.
Executive Secretary of National Council on
Marine Resources and Engineering Development
9.
Executive Secretary and Chairman of Con-
sumer Advisory Council
20
Attached hereto is a list of the key
appointive positions making up the Executive Office.
D. Executive Departments, Commission, Agencies and Boards
1.
Appointments in General
a.
Retaining career officials. Some of the
posts to which the President-elect may make appoint-
ments are now held by very capable people, some of
whom served under the Eisenhower Administration and
who will not find it difficult to serve loyally under
a new Republican Administration.
b.
The Appointments Process. The President-
elect will normally fill Cabinet positions from his
intimate advisers and other major political figures.
As to the others, the President-elect
should utilize the skills of an individual or in-
dividuals with wide acquaintanceship in the fields
of government, law, business, education, and founda-
tions to conduct a talent hunt for the several hundred
sub-cabinet posts that must be filled.
One danger to avoid is that encountered by
Kennedy, that of filling too many departments from
the bottom up. Generally, the Secretary should be
named first, so that he can be consulted on lower
jobs in his department.
c. Personnel Policy. Various general personnel
21
problems, such as pay raises, leave payments,
and reclassifications inevitably greet the
President-elect. The United States Civil Service
Commission, under John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman,
is best equipped to function on these problems.
These problems should not be handled by individuals
occupied with selecting and screening top appoint-
ments.
2.
Cabinet Appointments
In selecting the heads of the twelve Execu-
tive Departments and the Ambassador to the United
Nations, the new President establishes a public image
of the character of his Administration. Bi-partisan
appointments might be considered. There is a good
public relations impact in making early appointments.
Priority should be given to the following
positions:
a.
Secretary of State and two Under-
Secretaries.
b.
Secretary of Defense and Deputy
Secretary.
C.
Secretary of the Treasury.
d.
Attorney General.
e.
United States Ambassador to the
United Nations.
22
E.
Relations with the Military
1. Replacement of Incumbent Joint Chiefs of Staff
Although the President naturally desires
to have his own men around him, it probably is good
judgment to retain for the time being the present
Joint Chiefs and other senior military men. General
Wheeler, the Chairman, serves at the pleasure of the
President; the term of General Westmoreland, Army
Chief of Staff, expires in 1972; the term of Admiral
Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, expires in 1971;
and the term of General McConnell, Air Force Chief
of Staff, expires in 1971.
Under former Secretary McNamara the status
of the Joint Chiefs was reduced to that of techni-
cians. It would be advisable to restore the earlier
prestige and usefulness of the Joint Chiefs by a
meeting with the President-elect before January. It
would be welcomed by the Chiefs and helpful to the
President-elect.
2.
Presidential Military Adviser
This is a delicate choice as evidenced by
the antagonism aroused in the military establishment
by Kennedy's personal relationship with Maxwell Taylor
and James Gavin. Certainly a personal military ad-
viser to the President can be found who would not
23
arouse such antagonism at the Pentagon.
IV. Relations with Congress
The President-elect will be in a position to
develop a strong continuing relationship with the Con-
gress and he must take the initiative immediately after
election to do SO.
A.
Organization of Congress
The President-elect should give attention to
the organization of both Houses.
B.
Program
The President-elect should plan strategy for
his legislative program with the Congressional leaders.
Many points of his program have, of course, been out-
lined by the President-elect in his public statements.
As soon as Congress meets, steps should be taken to
effectuate these proposals. The State of the Union
message to the Congress will itemize his legislative
objective.
An analysis of the Bills in the 90th Congress
on which full hearings were conducted should be made
and a determination made as to those Bills which the
President-elect might decide to support.
The President-elect has the alternative of urging
their immediate passage or incorporating them into a
24
broad program as presented to the Congress in
his State of the Union message.
C.
Future Relationship with Congress
The President-elect might wish to set forth
immediately his ideas on regular meetings and channels
of communications between him and Congressional leaders.
Personal weekly conferences with the Big Four accom-
panied by ad hoc contacts with committee chairmen and
important Congressmen might be the best approach at
least initially. As already noted it is essential
for the President-elect to establish a position within
his own staff to supervise congressional liaison.
D. Patronage
The Congress, of course, is a constant source
of requests for appointments to government positions.
Lest this create unwanted friction explicit procedures
should be established.
V.
Control of the Republican Party
The President-elect will have control of the
National Committee and the support of the leaders of most
of the organizations within the Republican Party. If not,
this should be acquired shortly after election.
A.
National Chairman and Staff
The President-elect should work with the
National Chairman to encourage communication be-
25
tween the Party leaders and the President-elect,
to assist with patronage with members of Congress
and party leaders, and to coordinate the fund
raising for mid-term elections.
B.
Patronage
Between election and the inauguration, re-
quests for patronage and recommendations of appoint-
ments to Executive Branch positions, particularly
below the level of Assistant Secretaries and policy
heads, will be quite heavy. Perhaps the President-
elect could use the National Committee to divert
pressure from the White House.
Field positions, such as attorneys and post-
masters are politically important but should be made
thoughtfully as a persuader in obtaining passage
of programs through Congress.
Conclusion:
This memorandum is purposely brief. It is primarily
an interim report and check list and seeks to reflect the best
thoughts of a host of others who have worked on the problems
of transition.
Franklin Franklin B. B. Lincoln, Jr.
EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT A
ROOSEVELT WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - March 10, 1945
Secretary to the President
Stephen Early
Secretary to the President
William D. Hassett
Secretary to the President
Jonathan Daniels
Military Aide to the President
Col. Richard Park, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President
Samuel I. Rosenman
Personal Representative of the
President
Donald M. Nelson
Administrative Assistant
William H. McReynolds
Administrative Assistant
Lauchlin Currie
Administrative Assistant
David K. Niles
Administrative Assistant
James M. Barnes
Special Assistant to the
President
Harry L. Hopkins
Special Executive Assistant
Eugene Casey
Personal Secretary
Grace G. Tully
Executive Clerk in charge of White
House Executive Offices
Maurice C. Latta
1
TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE - September 20, 1945
Secretary to the President
Matthew J. Connelly
Secretary to the President
Charles G. Ross
Secretary to the President
William D. Hassett
Special Counsel to the President
Samuel I. Rosenman
Executive Clerk in charge of the
White House Executive Offices
Maurice C. Latta
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Administrative Assistant in the
President's Office
Rose A. Conway
Social Secretary
Reathel M. Odum
Chief Usher
Howell G. Crim
Special Executive Assistant
to the President
George J. Schoeneman
Administrative Assistant to the
President
David K. Niles
Administrative Assistant to
the President
Raymond R. Zimmerman
Military Aide to the President
Brig. Gen. Harry H.
Vaughan
Naval Aide to the President
Commo. James K.
Vardaman, Jr.
ii
TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - July 1, 1952
Secretary to the President
Matthew J. Connelly
Secretary to the President
William D. Hassett
Secretary to the President
Joseph Short
The Assistant to the President
John R. Steelman
Special Counsel to the
President
Charles S. Murphy
Administrative Assistant
to the President
Donald S. Dawson
Administrative Assistant
to the President
David H. Stowe
Administrative Assistant
to the President
David E. Bell
Administrative Assistant
to the President
David D. Lloyd
Administrative Assistant
to the President
Clayton Fritchley
Administrative Assistant
in the President's Office
Rose A. Conway
Social Secretary
Mrs. Edith B. Helm
Secretary to the Wife of
the President
Reathel M. Odum
Military Aide to the President
Maj. Gen. Harry
H. Vaughan, USA
Naval Aide to the President
Rear Adm. Rober L.
Dennison, USN.
Air Force Aide to the President
Maj. Gen. Robert B.
Land USAF
Physician to the President
Maj. Gen. Wallace H.
Graham, USAF
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Chief Usher
Howell G. Crim
111
EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - July 1, 1953
The Assistant to the President
Sherman Adams
Assistant to The Assistant to
the President
Maxwell M. Rabb
Special Assistant to The Assistant
to the President
Roger Steffan
Special Assistant to The Assistant
to the President
Charles F. Willis, Jr.
Special Assistant in the White
House Office
James M. Lambie, Jr.
Secretary to the President
Thomas E. Stephens
Press Secretary to the President
James C. Hagerty
Assistant Press Secretary
Murray Snyder
Special Counsel to the President
Bernard M. Shanley
Special Assistant to the President
Maj. Gen. Wilton B.
Persons, USA (Ret.).
Special Assistant in the
White House Office
Gerald D. Morgan
Special Assistant in the
White House Office
Bryce N. Harlow
Special Assistant in the
White House Office
Homer H. Gruenther
Special Assistant to the President
C. D. Jackson
Special Assistant to the President
Lewis L. Strauss
Administrative Assistant to the
President
Robert Cutler
Administrative Assistant to the
President
Gabriel Hauge
Administrative Assistant to the
President
Emmet J. Hughes
Economic Adviser to the President
Arthur F. Burns
Physician to the President
Maj. Gen. Howard
Snyder, USA
Acting Staff Secretary
Col. Paul T. Carroll, USA
Assistant Staff Secretary
L. Arthur Minnich, Jr.
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Military Aide to the President
Lt. Col. Robert L.
Schulz, USA.
Naval Aide to the President
Comdr. Edward L.
Beach, USN
Air Force Aide to the President
Maj. William G. Draper
USAF
Personal Secretary to the President
Ann C. Whitman
Secretary to the Wife of the
President
Mary Jane McCaffree, Actin
Chief Usher
Howell G. Crim
iv
EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1960
The Assistant to the President
Wilton B. Persons
The Deputy Assistant to the President
Gerald D. Morgan
Secretary to the President
Thomas E. Stephens
Press Secretary to the President
James C. Hagerty
Associate Press Secretary
Mrs. Anne W. Wheaton
Special Counsel to the President
David W. Kendall
Associate Special Counsel to the President
Henry Roemer McPhee
Assistant Special Counsel to the President
Phillip E. Areeda
Deputy Assistant to the President for Inter-
departmental Affairs
Robert E. Merriam
Deputy Assistant to the President for Congress-
ional Affairs
Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the
President
Homer H. Gruenther
Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the
President
Earle D. Chesney
Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
Kevin McCann
Special Assistant to the President
Maj. Gen. John S. Bragdon,
USA (Ret.).
Special Assistant to the President
Meyer Kestnbaum
Special Assistant to the President
Clarence B. Randall
Special Assistant to the President
Karl G. Harr, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President, and Food-
for-Peace Coordinator
Don Paarlberg
Special Assistant to the President
W. Allen Wallis
Special Assistant to the President
George B. Kistiakowsky
Special Assistant to the President for Personnel
Management
Eugene J. Lyons
Deputy Special Assistant to the President
Amos J. Peaslee
Special Consultant to the President
Clarence Francis
Special Consultant to the President
Arthur Larson
Administrative Assistant to the President
Jack Z. Anderson
Administrative Assistant to the President
Malcolm C. Moos
Administrative Assistant to the President
Edward A. McCabe
Staff Assistant to the President
Clyde A. Wheeler, Jr.
Physician to the President
Maj. Gen. Howard McC.
Snyder, MC, USA.
Staff Secretary to the President
Brig. Gen. A.J. Goodpaster,
USA.
Assistant Staff Secretary
L. Arthur Minnich, Jr.
Assistant Staff Secretary
Lt. Col. John S.D.
Eisenhower
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Administrative Officer (Special Projects)
E. Frederic Morrow
V
EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1960
Assistant to the Staff Secretary
Christopher H. Russell
Secretary to the Cabinet
Robert K. Gray
Assistant to the Secretary to the Cabinet
Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
Military Aide to the President
Col. Robert L. Schulz, USA.
Naval Aide to the President
Capt. E. P. Aurand, USN.
Air Force Aide to the President
Col. William G. Draper, USAF
Special Assistant in the White House Office
James M. Lambie, Jr.
Special Assistant in the White House Office
Frederic E. Fox
Special Assistant in the White House Office
Robert E. Hampton
Special Assistant in the White House Office
Douglas R. Price
Special Assistant in the White House Office
Stephen H. Hess
Personal Secretary to the President
Mrs. Ann C. Whitman
Personal and Social Secretary to Mrs. Eisenhower Mrs. Mary Jane McCaffree
Chief Usher
J. Bernard West
vi
KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1961
Special Counsel to the President
Theodore C. Sorensen
Deputy Special Counsel to the President
Myer Feldman
Assistant Special Counsel to the President
Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the President
Lee C. White
Press Secretary to the President
Pierre E.G. Salinger
Associate Press Secretary to the President
Andrew T. Hatcher
Special Assistant to the President
McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
Lawrence F. O'Brien
Special Assistant to the President
P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
Jerome B. Wiesner
Special Assistant to the President
Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President
Frederick G. Dutton
Special Assistant to the President
James M. Landis
Special Assistant to the President
Frank D. Reeves
Special Assistant to the President
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
Harris L. Wofford, Jr.
Deputy Special Assistant to the President
Walt Whitman Rostow
Administrative Assistant to the President
Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President
Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President
Mike N. Manatos
Special Assistant to the President--Director,
Food for Peace
George McGovern
Physician to the President
Dr. Janet Travell
Military Aide to the President
Brig. Gen. Chester V.
Clifton, USA
Naval Aide to the President
Comdr. Tazewell T.
Shepard, Jr., USN
Air Force Aide to the President
Col. Godfrey T.
McHugh, USAF
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Personal Secretary to the President
Mrs. Evelyn N. Lincoln
Social Secretary
Letitia Baldrige
Chief Usher
J. Bernard West
vii
KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1963
Special Counsel to the President
Theodore C. Sorensen
Deputy Special Counsel to the President
Myer Feldman
Assistant Special Counsel to the President
Lee C. White
Press Secretary to the President
Pierre E. G. Salinger
Associate Press Secretary to the President
Andrew T. Hatcher
Special Assistant to the President
McGeorge Bundy
Deputy Special Assistant to the President
Carl Kaysen
Special Assistant to the President
Lawrence F. O'Brien
Administrative Assistant to the President
Mike N. Manatos
Administrative Assistant to the President
Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
Jerome B. Wiesner
Special Assistant to the President-Director,
Food for Peace
Richard W. Reuter
Special Assistant to the President
Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
Brooks Hays
Special Assistant to the President
Stafford L. Warren, M.D.
Special Assistant to the President
David L. Lawrence
Advisor for National Capital Affairs
Charles A. Horsky
Physician to the President
Rear Adm. George G. Burkley
(MC), USN.
Military Aide to the President
Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifto:
USA.
Naval Aide to the President
Capt. Tazewell T. Shepard,
Jr., USN.
Air Force Aide to the President
Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHug?
USAF.
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Personal Secretary to the President
Mrs. Evelyn N. Lincoln
Social Secretary
Nancy L. Tuckerman
Chief Usher
J. Bernard West
viii
JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1964
Counsel to the President
Myer Feldman
Associate Counsel to the President
Lee C. White
Associate Counsel to the President
Hobart Taylor, Jr.
Press Secretary to the President
George E. Reedy
Assistant Press Secretary
Malcolm M. Kilduff
Special Assistant to the President
McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
Lawrence F. O'Brien
Administrative Assistant to the President
Mike N. Manatos
Administrative Assistant to the President
Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President-Director,
Food for Peace
Richard W. Reuter
Special Assistant to the President
Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President
Stafford L. Warren, M.D.
Special Assistant to the President
David L. Lawrence
Special Assistant to the President
Walter Jenkins
Special Assistant to the President
Bill D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
Horace Busby, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
S. Douglass Cater, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President on the Arts
Roger L. Stevens
Special Consultant to the President
Jack J. Valenti
Advisor for National Capital Affairs
Charles A. Horsky
Physician to the President
Rear Adm. George G. Burkley
(MC), USN.
Military Aide to the President
Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifton
USA.
Executive Clerk
William J. Hopkins
Personal Secretary to the President
Mrs. Juanita Duggan Roberts
Press Secretary and Staff Director for the
First Lady
Mrs. Elizabeth S. Carpenter
Social Secretary
Mrs. Bess Abell
Chief Usher
J. Bernard West
ix
JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - OCTOBER 14, 1968
Special Assistant to the President
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
George E. Christian
Special Assistant to the President
E. Ernest Goldstein
Special Assistant to the President
Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
James R. Jones
Special Assistant to the President
Walt Whitman Rostow
Special Assistant to the President for
Consumer Affairs
Miss Betty Furness
Special Consultant to the President
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA,
Ret.
Special Consultant to the President
George E. Reedy
Special Consultant for Physical Fitness
James A. Lovell, Lt. Cmdr.
Special Counsel to the President
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President
Larry Eugene Temple
Legislative Counsel to the President
Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr.
Counselor to the President
Charles S. Murphy
Deputy Special Counsel to the President
Lawrence E. Levinson
Associate Special Counsel to the President
W. DeVier Pierson
Assistant Press Secretary to the President
Wyatt Thomas Johnson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President
Mike N. Manatos
Physician to the President
Vice Adm. George G. Burkley
(MC), USN
Armed Forces Aide to the President
Brig. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh
USAF
Personal Secretary to the President
Mrs. Juanita Duncan Roberts
Press Secretary and Staff Director for
the First Lady
Mrs. Elizabeth S. Carpenter
Social Secretary
Mrs. Bess Abell
Executive Assistant
William J. Hopkins
Chief Usher
J. Bernard West
EXHIBIT B
JOHNSON EXECUTIVE OFFICE- October 14, 1968
Bureau of Budget Director
Zwick, Charles J.
Deputy Director of Bureau of Budget
Hughes, Phillip S.
Council of Economic Advisers, Chairman
Okun, Arthur
Council of Economic Advisers
Smith, Warren L.
Council of Economic Advisers
Peck, Merton J.
Executive Secretary of National Security
Council
Smith, Bromley K.
Director of Central Intelligence Agency
Helms, Richard
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Taylor, Rufus L., Vice Adm.
Executive Secretary of National Aeronautic
and Space Council
Welch, Edward C.
Special Assistant to President
Rostow, Walt W.
Director of Office of Economic Opportunity
Harding, Bertrand
Deputy Director of Office of Economic
Opportunity
Perrin, Charles R.
Office of Emergency Planning Director
Daniel, Price
Deputy Director of Office of Emergency
Planning
Merker, Mordecai M.
Civil Defense Advisory Board Chairman
Goebel, Margaret
Office of Science and Technology Director
Hornig, Dr. Donald F.
Deputy Director of Science and Technology
Bennett, Dr. Ivan L.
Office of Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations
Roth, William M.
Deputy Special Representative
Rehm, John B.
National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Chairman
Humphrey, H. H.
Executive Secretary of National Council
on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development Executive Secretary
Wenk, Edward Jr.
Consumer Advisory Council Executive
Secretary
Furness, Betty
Consumer Advisory Council Chairman
LaFollette, Bronson
xi
EXHIBIT C
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS - October 14, 1968
Secretary of State
Rusk, Dean
Under Secretary of State
Katzenbach, Nicholas
Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs
Rostow, Eugene V.
United States Representative to
United Nations
Wiggins, James R.
Administrator for AID
Gaud, William S.
Director of Peace Corps
Vaughn, Jack Hood
Secretary of Treasury
Fowler, Henry H.
Under Secretary of Treasury for
Monetary Affairs
Deming, Frederick L.
Under Secretary of Treasury
Barr, Joseph W.
Secretary of Defense
Clifford, Clark M.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Nitze, Paul H.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Wheeler, Earle G.
Secretary of the Army
Resor, Stanley
Under Secretary of the Army
McGiffert, David E.
Secretary of the Navy
Ignatius, Paul R.
Under Secretary of the Navy
Baird, Charles F.
Secretary of the Air Force
Brown, Harold
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Hoopes, Townsend
Attorney General
Clark, Ramsey
Attorney General Deputy
Christopher, Warren
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Director
Hoover, J. Edgar
Solicitor General of United States
Griswold, Edwin N.
Postmaster General
Watson, W. Marvin
Deputy Postmaster General
Belen, Fred C.
Secretary of Interior
Udall, Stewart Lee
Under Secretary of Interior
Black, David S.
Secretary of Agriculture
Freeman, Orville L.
Under Secretary of Agriculture
Schnittker, John A.
Secretary of Commerce
Smith, C. R.
Under Secretary of Commerce
Bartlett, Joseph W.
Secretary of Labor
Wirtz, Willard W.
Under Secretary of Labor
Reynolds, James, Jr.
Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
Cohen, Wilbur J.
Under Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare
McCrocklin, James
Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development
Weaver, Robert
Under Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development
Wood, Robert
Secretary of Transportation
Boyd, Alan
Under Secretary of Transportation
Robson, John E.
Administrator of Federal Aviation
Vacant - McKee
x11
EXHIBIT D
CHAIRMEN OF PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT AGENCIES - October 14, 1968
Administrative Conference of the United
States, Chairman
Williams, Jerre S.
American Battle Monuments Commission,
Chairman
Devers, Jacob L.
Appalachian Regional Commission, Federal
Cochairman
Fleming, Joe W., II
Atomic Energy Commission, Chairman
Seaborg, Glenn T.
General Advisory Committee on Atomic
Energy
Hafstad, Lawrence R.
Canal Zone Government, Governor
Leber, Walter, Maj. Gen.
Civil Aeronautics Board, Chairman
Crooker, John H., Jr.
Commission of Fine Arts, Chairman
Walton, William
Delaware River Basin Commission, Federal
Member
Udall, Stewart L.
Delaware River Basin, U. S. Commissioner
Northrop, Vernon D.
District of Columbia Commissioner
Washington, E. Walter
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Chairman
Alexander, Clifford L., Jr.
Export-Import Bank of the United States,
President and Chairman
Vacant (Linder, Harold F.)
Federal Farm Credit Board, Governor
Tootell, Robert B.
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review,
Chairman
McElroy, Dennis L.
Federal Communications Commission,
Chairman
Hyde, H. Rosel
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Chairman
Randall, Kenneth A.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Chairman
Horne, John E.
Federal Maritime Commission, Chairman
Harllee, John
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
Director
Simkin, William E.
Federal Power Commission, Chairman
White, Lee C.
Federal Reserve System, Chairman, Board
of Governors
Martin, William McC., Jr.
Federal Trade Commission, Chairman
Dixon, Paul Rand
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States, Chairman
Sutton, Leonard V. B.
General Services Administration,
Administrator
Knott, Lawson B., Jr.
Indian Claims Commission, Chairman
Vance, John T.
Interstate Commerce Commission, Chairman
Tierney, Paul J.
National Aeronautic and Space Administra-
tion, Administrator
Webb, James E. (Vacant)
National Aeronautic and Space Administra-
tor, Deputy Administrator
Paine, Thomas O.
National Foundation of the Arts and the
Humanities, Chairman
Stevens, Roger L.
National Labor Relations Board, Chairman
McCulloch, Frank W.
National Mediation Board, Chairman
Gamser, Howard G.
National Science Foundation, Director
Haworth, Leland J.
New England Regional Commission, EDA
Federal Cochairman
Linnchan, John J.
xiii
CHAIRMEN OF PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT AGENCIES - October 14, 1968 (cont'd)
Ozarks Regional Commission, Federal Co-
chairman
McCandless, William M.
Panama Canal Company, President
Leber, W. P., Maj. Gen.
Railroad Retirement Board, Chairman
Habermeyer, Howard W.
Renegotiation Board, Chairman
Hartwig, Lawrence E.
Securities and Exchange Commission,
Chairman
Cohen, Manuel F.
Selective Service System Director
Hershey, Lewis B., Lt. Gen.
Small Business Administration,
Administrator
Samuels, Howard J.
Subversive Activities Control Board,
Chairman
Manhan, John W.
Tax Court of the United States, Chief
Judge
Drennen, William M.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Chairman
Wagner, Aubrey J.
United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Director
Foster, William C.
United States Civil Service Commission,
Chairman
Macy, John W., Jr.
United States Information Agency,
Director
Marks, Leonard H.
United States Tariff Commission,
Chairman
Metzger, Stanley D.
Veterans Administration, Administrator
Driver, William J.
xiv
6
November 24, 1953
SUMMARY SHEET
Fice
FEDERAL PERSONNEL PROBLEM
Purpose
The attached material is based on information received by various
Republican senatorial offices. Its purpose is to bring to the atten-
tion of the Administration a pattern of operation within the personnel
branches of the executive agencies and departments which we believe is
highly detrimental to the programs of the Administration. Due to
limitations of time and personnel the scope of this material has been
confined to the presentation of selected examples which we believe
are sufficient to indicate the pattern of operation.
In brief, the evidence would indicate that the following objec-
tionable practices exist:
Personnel and organization and management directors who are
closely allied with the previous Administration are ignoring qualified
people who are recommended for positions with the federal government.
Available positions in the federal government are being filled
by personnel who are not in sympathy with the present Administration and
its policies and it is believed that personnel directors as well as
organization and management directors in the departments and agencies
are instrumental in obtaining such appointments.
Certain recently reorganized agencies and departments wuld
appear to have failed to take advantage of reorganization powers
granted them by Congress with respect to the hiring of personnel.
The Civil Service Commission has recently revoked its previous
order which would have permitted the reorganization of bureaus within
agencies and departments without the transfer of personnel.
There is a well defined pattern of transfers between agencies
involving personnel directors and organization and management directors
which indicates an interlocking scheme of protection and organization
designed in part to protect incumbents in government positions and to
thwart the appointment of qualified individuals who are sympathetic to
the new administration.
Recommendations
The following changes are suggested:
A broader interpretation of the executive order which establishes
Schedule C positions to include all policy making positions in the
executive branch of the government.
2.
Personnel and organization and management directors should be
made Schedule C positions (see attached list of personnel directors
with dates of appointment; personal histories of personnel directors
may be found in agency files.)
To relieve the immediate situation the position of special assist-
ant for personnel should be created in each agency and department.
RECOMMENDATION FOR PERSONNEL DIRECTORS JOBS BEING
PLACED IN SCHEDULE "C"
Patronage bottlenecks are caused by existing agency resistance
through government operations control. Democrats in policy making key
positions have this year and will continue, unless constructive steps
are taken to adopt a new pattern, to embarrass the Republican senators,
congressmen and the Republican National Committee. Everyone tells the
same story - Republican people are sent to the agencies and they rarely
ever get hired - why? Is it really because of the Republican budget cuts?
During the last twenty years the Democrats built up a new organiza-
tion and they covered up in their reorganization two very important and
crucially key positions. Seventy-two laws were passed during this
time which directly or indirectly consolidated these positions through
Civil Service Commission authority until today there is in control of
government an operating group small in number but protected by these
laws authorizing the Civil Service Commission to give these jobs and
men the protection anticipated by Democrats and now needed by them.
In every agency the Administrator or Secretary knows what he wants
to do policywise but must have the willing cooperation of two men: the
Personnel Director and the Organization and Procedures Director. Pre-
sently, these jobs and men are placed under the protection of the
Civil Service Commission and can't be touched because they are declared
to be non-policy making positions.
In government there is what is known as a job description covering
the duties of the individual. This job description is approved by CSC
and a man having the qualifications to fit the job must be selected to
fill the job and he must be approved by the CSC. Where private
2.
industry would keep changing the job descriptions to truly reflect the
true duties of the personnel director - government does not. The result
is a piece of paper legally correct but out of date when the true and
factual duties of the incumbent are known. At present, personnel direc-
tors are today not performing in accordance with the job description
listed with CSC but are determining which people are hired and which
are not by using the gimmicks of the CSC and controlling subordinates
to the advantage of the Democrats and keeping the qualified Republicans
out.
Our present CSC is not rendering a favorable climate for Republican
appointments and unless the jobs of Personnel Directors and Directors
of Organization and Management are placed in Schedule C and the CSC
gives a clear cut two to one majority for the Republicans, the unfavor-
able situation will continue.
The Personnel Director is a key man in that he is recommending
changes and keeping his administrators advised. Especially since many
top level Republican appointees are new to government and they tend to
feel helpless and rely upon the advice of the incumbents as they would
in business. This makes the Personnel Director and the Organization
and Management Director even more of a policy maker.
In government the employees are very party conscious and tend to be
loyal to those who appointed them, not those who keep them in the jobs.
There are many who feel they belong to the club and as long as they do
they are in and when their club is out of power they expect anything to
happen but they drag their feet meanwhile. This applies to the grade 9
jobs and above, quite across the board and in some cases certain lower
positions.
3.
The difference between the function of personnel directors in
private industry and government is that personnel directors along with
the other officials of a private firm are all members of the same team,
whereas in the government they are appointed by one or the other poli-
tical party. Regardless of the fact that they claim to be career
people their sympathies remain with the political party responsible for
their appointment.
It is our belief the key to the whole thing, the situation of
appointments in government, are with the directors of personnel and
the directors of organization and management. (See attached list of
personnel directors with dates of appointment.)
On May 29, 1953, the Civil Service Commission issued an order "Which
would enable an agency to abolish a bureau, lay off all its employees,
transfer their functions to another bureau and staff the new bureau
with completely new employees." This would have given personnel directors
an opportunity to ride the agency of old new deal Democrats who were
not cooperating with the Administration and to replace them with capable
Republicans in accordance with Civil Service Commission authorization.
If there had been personnel directors appointed by Republicans they
would no doubt have taken advantage of this opportunity. This order
was laterrescinded, just prior to the reorganization at Department of
Agriculture. It is alleged that personnel people at Agriculture compli-
mented the Commission on this action. They stated that by rescinding
this order the Secretary of Agriculture was prevented from doing some
things he wanted to. This is disloyalty.
To our knowledge, only one department has replaced the Director of
Personnel with a Republican appointee. The argument has been offered
4.
that the position of Director of Personnel is not on a policy making
level. It is pointed out that a reference to the Civil Service job des-
cription of this position and of actual duties and influence will indi-
cate it to be of a high policy level. As the situation is today, the
personnel directors are able to work together to the point of giving
reductions in force in one agency and arranging with directors of person-
nel in another agency to rehire good Democrats released from the first
agency. For example, in a position at Foreign Onerations Administration,
a position as Chief of Recruitment was authorized by Organization and
Management and while the record indicates there was a Republican quali-
fied under Civil Service standards for the position within the agency,
it is alleged a man was brought over from the State Department -
"Walter Curtis" and placed in this job at a GS-14. We are told Curtis
worked for an insurance company prior to 1947 when he went into the State
Department as an employee. In 1947, he was earning $4200 per year. He
has been brought along as fast, if not faster, than Civil Service
promotional regulations would permit and through the cooperation of his
"friends" qualified for $9600. Curtis was endorsed by George Elison,
Arch K. Jean and Judson H. Lightsey from the State Department. Lightsey
was originally connected, or worked under, Henry A. Wallace in the Board
of Economic Warfare and has been a long term new dealer, as are Elison
and Jean. Lightsoy has since been transferred to U.S.I.A. and on at
least one occasion a Senator's office was told that he was the man that
must be contacted on personnel matters. This is another case of trans-
fers in order to control the personnel situation.
PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE
In connection with reduction in force notices at Foreign Operations
5.
Administration, the following are some of the individuals who received
their notices: Jay Wescott, Everett Bellows, Robert Whitett, Harry
Clement. Interviews were arranged for them under cloudy circumstances
with recruiting representatives of UNKRA here in Washington. These men
were interviewed according to a pre-arranged plan and offered positions
with UNKRA in Korea. All of the above named it is alleged are well
known extreme new dealers with political philosophies of the extreme
left. It might be pointed out that as far as can be determined, none
of the Republicans receiving reduction in force notices at that time
were allowed the benefit of such interviews. This would indicate that
the Director of Personnel at Foreign Operations Administration, or at
least some of his assistants, are most certainly working in close con-
tact with the personnel people at UNKRA. We might remind the reader
at this point that Tyler C. Wood, a Democrat of long years of
government service, is heading the Foreign Operations Administration
mission in Korea and has as his assistant Bill Coleman, another alleged
new dealer.
JOB CREATION
In the case of an individual at Foreign Operations Administration
reduced in force, an administrative position was "created" in the
International Branch of the U. S. Office of Education to take care
of this individual. Yet we are told there are no vacancies if we call
there. This individual had been a personnel director in a private
concern and was brought into the government by a Republican in a high
office. The people making the offer to create the job in the Office
of Education did not know of this man's affiliation with the Republican
party at that time. This again would indicate a close working
6.
relationship between personnel people in Foreign Operations Administra-
tion and those in the Office of Education, which is indicative of the
same kind of thing going on in other agencies. We are informed that
where pressure is too great to keep a Democrat in a position, the plan
is to get a so-called Republican with government service, and one with
whom the old crowd is acquainted and attempt to have him fill the
position.
TECHNIQUE
In connection with the filling of vacancies in agencies, these
vacancies are held in suspended action and are not officially listed for
recruitment until it is convenient to do so by the personnel director
and/or the operating official or officials. This gives them an oppor-
tunity to determine the "qualifications" of the candidate wanted for
each job and many times enables the selection of an individual on a
hand picked basis from within the agency or another agency or from recom-
mendations given by those friendly to these people. At the time candi-
dates are referred by letter from the offices of congressmen, senators
and the Republican National Committee, these applicants are called in
and given interviews and passed from the Personnel Department to operat-
ing officials, or vice versa, who are appraised in advance of where these
individuals come from and as a result a cursory interview takes place.
The applicants leave with the knowledge that the position has not been
officially cleared by the budget or the job description has not come
out of Classification or the complete program in connection with that
project has not been worked out. After the hand picked candidates
have been selected, this whole project is dropped officially into place
and any other candidates referred by congressmen, senators or the
7.
Republican National Committee, or any candidate previously referred by
these groups will be told that the job has already been filled and that
no further openings exist. Thus, it is almost impossible to gain
acceptance of Republicans under the present personnel set up. Where
extreme pressure forces placement of a Republican for the record, an
occasional one is taken in and given a job but remains "sealed off"
where he can do no harm in terms of policy or otherwise.
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES
In Washington, there are today three professional societies to
which many government personnel people, as well as Organization and
Management people and some other categories, belong for the purpose of
research and extending their influence as well as exchange of informa-
tion, (1) The Society of Personnel Administrators in which many people
below GS-12 belong. This Society is influenced a good deal by top
Democrats in government agencies through their people who belong. (2)
The Society for the Advancement of Management, Washington Chapter, is
composed largely of the technical people usually at GS-13 and above,
whose people belong to Navy, Air Force, Army, and technical agencies.
(3) The Civil Service Assembly which has chapters throughout the United
States. People who belong to this Society are usually old line civil
servants, and many of the top career people belong to and support this
organization. These people know one another and often hcld memberships
in all three organizations. Information is exchanged and people are
recommended by and recruited through these societies. It is alleged
there is a close working relationship between the personnel directors
and these organizations.
To again indicate the policy making level and influence of the
8.
personnel directors' positions, consider for example, the recruitment of
personnel for overseas service. Prior to January 20, 1953, candidates
were recruited and various processes were carried on concurrently, viz:
interviews, reference checks, physical examination, security check,
passport application, shots, which enabled the accepted applicant to
be in the field in a relatively short time. An example exists where a
candidate was picked up on the West Coast and was in Taipei within six
or seven weeks (T. O. Ryhesbarger, a Geographer-FOA). This involved
the cooperation of Personnel as well as Operations. Since January 20,
1953, applicants are required in the program at FOA to be recruited on
the basis of consecutive rather than concurrent steps in the processing,
such as first the interview, then references must be carefully checked
and evaluated, following that security must be completed, followed by
a physical examination and the answer received either favorable or un-
favorable. The applicant's biography then must be cabled to the mission
in which vacancies exist, a cabled reply received before passport appli-
cation is made, shots cannot be given until the passport application
has been made. All of this taking from three to six months. Upon
inquiry one would be told that there is a clause in that order which
indicates that any applicant considered priority can be recruited on a
as
priority basis. However, in a program such/FOA, operating on a
temporary basis all overseas jobs are gonerally required as on priority
basis. It is pointed out that personnel directors in all government
agencies could, in this same way, slow down the program of the Adminis-
tration.
STATE DEPARTMENT
In the case of six or eight jobs that were up for consideration
9.
on a Schedule C basis after a Republican appointee had taken over as
personnel director, within a week members of the Personnel Management
Staff had influenced the newly appointed personnel director against
authorizing the placement of these six or eight jobs in Schedule C.
The individual that related this incident laughed about it indicating
that it was rather unusual. Under the Democrats, this would not have
happened. This was a Democrat in personnel of another agency indicating
that the story had gotten around other agencies that the Democrats in
the State Department could wield some immediate influence.
EXAMPLES OF INFLUENCE IN PLACEMENT
In order to give a few specific examples to demonstrate how person-
nel directors are cooperating with one another to prevent placement of
Republicans we submit below some cases brought to our attention.
Post Office Department. Charles Hook, Jr., reports to Mr.
Summerfield, Postmaster General. The Post Office Department is consider-
ing a project whereby the United States will be divided into sixteen
areas, or regions. An administrative officer for each region, a
special assistant, personnel officer, an employment officer, a classifi-
cation officer and whatever clerks and other personnel are needed will
be appointed to administer the regional affairs. The first personnel
officer to be appointed was a long time Democrat by the name of Arthur
McLean, who was formerly at Federal Security Agency as Personnel
Director. He was brought over to FOA by Everett Bellows, noted left
winger. His inefficiency was soon apparent and he was told that if he
didn't resign charges would be preferred. He chose to resign and he
has recently been appointed Personnel Officer in the Cincinnati, Ohio,
region and is scheduled to be out there within the next few days. (See
10.
attached Jerry Kluttz story from Washington Post. This column printed
a long time after this report came to us.)
"Q. Who is responsible for the appointment?
A. A Gus Hertz. He is a young consultant, probably about 32, but
the point is age doesn't make much difference, job experience in the
consultant field is what is important. He has been authorized by Mr.
Hook to do the organization and management work in setting up these
regions as well as the interviewing of all applicants for the job.
"Q. What is his background?
A. A long time Democrat. I haven't any idea where he is from. I know
Hertz got out of the job he had by reduction in force. He came over to
our office and the fellow he was formerly working with - Leonard Johnson,
who is an officer of the Civil Service Assembly to which Hertz belongs,
talked immediately to Mel Spector, Acting Personnel Director, about him.
I think Johnson is Treasurer of that Society. When he found we didn't
have a job he was told about creating a job in FOA. At that time they
had Helen Elliot, who was there and they couldn't give this job to
this fellow, so they got her to leave and they would have let that man
get into this job, However, about that time Hertz received an appoint-
ment at the Post Office Department."
COMMISSION CONTACTS
"One individual who is tied into this and he is with Civil Service
Commission - Clyde Hall. If any members of the Societies want to know
where these jobs are and who to see, you call Clyde Hall.
"Q. What is his job?
A. I don't know what title he has, but his office is supposed to be
the office to help people get jobs.
"Q. Is he in charge of recruiting of pormanent Civil Service?
A. No, Ed Holland is in charge of placement of displaced career per-
sonnel. Mr. Holland is a former O.P.S. Inspector - GS-13, and is
alleged to be a well known good Democrat."
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Another specific example of how personnel people in one agency are
working with those in another, is the situation at the Veterans Admin-
istration. A man by the name of Longfellow, who is supposed to be a
Republican, was appointed the Assistant Administrator under the
Republican Administrator - Haegley. A vacancy occurred in the position
of personnel director. Fred Zapollo was appointed. Fred Zapollo was
originally in charge of the WPA program for a while in Harrisburg for
11.
the State of Pennsylvania and was brought into Federal government by
Oscar Ewing as personnel director at the Veterans Administration. He
left that job - being recruited for the position of Chief of Employment
shortly after ECA was formed on the bi-partisan basis under Paul
Hoffman. Recently, he was moved from there upon the recommendation of
the CSC and some others to the position of Personnel Consultant to
General Kerr at the Veterans Administration, who had been appointed
Assistant Administrator for Personnel Purchasing, etc. General Kerr,
when he retired, was succeeded by Mr. Longfellow and Mr. Zapollo was
made Acting Personnel Director. Here was an instance of a vacancy on a
high level position being filled by a Democrat in spite of the fact that
the Administrator was a Republican appointee. Several apparently quali-
fied candidates were endorsed by senators, the Republican National Com-
mittee and by the personnel people at the White House. Here is another
instance of where personnel people now classified under Civil Service
are transferred from one agency to another in order to assure the
Democrats of keeping a firm hand on the personnel situation.
"Q. You mentioned that Donald Dawson was still very active. How was
this possible? What is he doing?
A. He has an office here in town as a consultant.
"Q. What kind of a consultant?
A. He doesn't say what kind of a consultant he is. Dawson was direc-
ting this Foderal Personnel Council and had his thumb right on top of
it. For a long time they didn't know what to do or how he could be
most effective working from his house. After the new Administration took
over, he decided the Republicans weren't going to clean out personnel
people SO he opened an office and is listed as just consultant. The
word is to see Donald because he still has people under his thumb.
"Q. In view of his prior activities, do you have any knowledge or in-
formation whether he is hired as a consultant to obtain jobs with the
Government?
A. No, just from what I hear from the boys.
"Q. You mentioned before that right after January the personnel people
12.
all expected to be moved?
A. Yes. Not only the personnel top people but the management group.
Any people that the Democrats felt that were policy making people and
they were making temporary plans to leave Washington. As far as they
were concerned the group behind Dawson is A.D.A. and Bob Nathan - he is
working with them.
PUBLIC HEALTH
"In Public Health, there is another example, Carl Nasi. I don't know
what his background is. He is a public health civil engineer. He
came from Public Health to the number two spot in MSA/PHS. Now he is
acting due to Dr. Hedley's death. Carl just moved up. Not appointment.
They have a fellow in mind - I don't know what his name is - a long
time Democrat, however."
In this agency we have another instance of a vacancy in the pesi-
tion of personnel director. A Democrat was appointed.
INTERNAL REVENUE
In the Internal Revenue Department many examples are evident.
Harold Vance, head of Management at OPS, after election moved over to
the Internal Revenue Department in a high management position and took
his secretary with him.
Philip Charles applied to FOA for a grade 15 Deputy Personnel Director.
FOA was told by CSC that unless Charles was hired they would not approve
anyone else. Since Mel Spector, acting Personnel Director, wanted
Edward MacMinaman, who was with him in Paris in this job, arrangements
were made on the inside with Edward Montague, Director of Personnel at
Internal Revenue, for Charles to be employed over there; thus, opening
the job at FOA for Mac Minamen.
Edward Montague, former Director of Personnel for the State Department,
was transferred to the Internal Revenue Department as Personnel Director.
Winston McNamara, Assistant Chief of Recruitment at FOA was transferred
to the Internal Revenue Department six weeks ago.
It appears that the Democratic personnel people are concentrating on
13.
"loading" the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Evelyn Robison in the position of assistant to Jane Ganeshan, brought
into FOA by Spector, Acting Personnel Director. She was formerly
Administrative Officer at OPS. She was moved into this position at OPS
never having had a day of experience in personnel work, but is a well
known Democrat. Miss Robison was first hired at FOA on the basis of
90 days but since has been moved into this position, apparently to stay.
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
The following are selected cases which illustrate the fact that
overseas employment affords a convenient foxhole for politically active
Democrats. Other cases could be cited but unfortunately, there is no
central depository of the personnel records of persons employed by the
United States Government in its overseas establishments. It is ex-
tremely difficult to get personnel information in regard to overseas
employment because such information is scattered throughout the Executive
establishment and by that method, is well hidden.
(1) Eugene H. Merrill, Chief, INFRA Construction Section NATO,
Paris, France.
Merrill's present position pays $14,300 per annum (Grade FSR-1),
exclusive of allowances, etc. This appointment was made subsequent to
January 20, 1953.
Merrill is the close personal friend and political protege of former
Congressman Walter K. Granger, Democrat of the State of Utah.
In May 1952, Granger put Merrill's name forward for appointment to
the Board of Directors of TVA. This recommendation culminated a long
series of New Deal-Fair Deal positions held by Merrill dating from
November 1941 - oTM, WPB, State, Military Govt.-Germany, NPA and DPA.
14.
In the heat of the 1952 Presidential campaign, President Truman
appointed Merrill a member of the FCC. This appointment was announced
by President Truman in the course of a campaign speech at Provo, Utah,
Merrill's home state. Following the November election, President
Eisenhower withdrew the Merrill appointment. Thereafter, Merrill was
appointed to the $14,000 job which he now holds.
The report of contributions filed by the Democratic National Com-
mittee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives shows that in
October 1952 Merrill contributed $100 to the Democratic Campaign Fund.
This is but one item in a long record of financial contributions and
support for the Democratic Party and individual Democratic candidates.
In 1950, Merrill contributed $100 to Democratic Congresswoman Reva Beck
Bosone and $150 to Democratic Congressman Walter K. Granger. Inasmuch
as Merrill was then on the Federal payroll, the propriety of these con-
tributions was questioned and made the subject of national publicity.
The contributions seem to transgress the provisions of the Act of June 25,
1948 to make it a criminal offense for government employees to donate
monies to members of Congress.
(2) Guy J. Swope, Special Assistant to the High Commissioner (Germany)
Swope's position pays $14,000 per annum (Grade FSR-1), exclusive
of allowances, etc. This appointment was made prior to January 20, 1953.
Swope is an ardent and active Democrat. He served one term in the
Congress of the United States (1937-39) as a. Democratic member of Con-
gress from the State of Pennsylvania. Thereafter he was appointed
Auditor and then later Governor of Puerto Rico; then Director of the
Division of Torritories in the Department of the Interior--these were
outright patronage appointments requiring the clearance of the Democratic
15.
National Committee.
During the war, Swope was a commissioned officer in the United
States Navy. Thereafter, he held several important jobs in the U. S.
Military Government, first in Japan, and now in Germany.
The official Democratic National Committee report of contributions
for 1952 shows that in October 1952 Swope contributed $300 to the
Democratic Campaign Fund. No effort has been made to search out his
contributions in prior years but it can be reasonably assumed that such
contributions were made.
(3) William E. Warne, Director of Operations, U. S. Mission to
Iran.
Warne holds a position paying $13,200 per annum (Grade TCA-1),
exclusive of allowances, etc.
Warne's appointment to his present position was effected prior to
January 2C, 1953, He has a long record of New Deal-Fair Deal employment
and enjoyed very special trust and confidence of New Deal-Fair Deal
officials in the U. S. Department of the Interior. Warne has an open
and well-known record of active Democratic partisanship. He is a former
publicity man who rose to become Assistant Secretary of the Interior
under former Secretary Oscar Chapmen. He stepped down from his position
as Assistant Secretary to become Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau
of Reclamation and it was from this position that he was appointed to
his present position in Iran. This personnel action was taken in
November 1951.
No attempt has been made to search out Werne's record of contribu-
tions to Democratic campaign funds.
7
25c
This reprint is one of many scholarly articles
PS-399
designed for convenient use by students and
professionals. Published by the College Division.
THE BOBBS-MERRILL
REPRINT SERIES IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
York
THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL POLITICAL EXECUTIVES*
DEAN E. MANN
The Brookings Institution
Central to the problem of obtaining intelli-
tively brief period at the beginning of the Eisen-
gent and effective management and policy di-
hower administration, alleging that they were
rection in the federal government are the
the product of big businessmen fathers, Ivy
sources and procedures used in the selection of
League colleges, large corporations or big law
federal political executives. These executives,
firms, and country clubs, all of which made
occupying positions usually subject to presi-
them "representative of the corporate rich." In
dential appointment and senatorial confirma-
their landmark study of Federal Administra-
tion, constitute the "key group in making
tors,4 now 25 years old, Macmahon and Millett
representative government work within the
said that "appointments to assistant secre-
executive branch." Through them the Presi-
taryships have been political in most connota-
dent directs and controls his administration,
tions of that word, with little regard for
creates political support, and establishes lines
qualifications or the needs of the posts. Few of
of defense for his political program. Increasing
the occupants of these positions have been
attention has been paid to the selection process
conspicuous individuals." One imaginative
in recent years because of frequent reports of
commentator asserted that the difference be-
extreme difficulty in recruiting able people, in-
tween a Roosevelt New Dealer and a Truman
ability to retain their services, and allegations
Fair Dealer was about 30 pounds; the differ-
that those who have served have proven less
ence between an Eisenhower and a Kennedy
than adequate. The problem as broadly stated
executive was about 30 years and a shift from
by the (Jackson) subcommittee on National
"gentlemen 'C' boys" to Phi Beta Kappas.
Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on
For the present study, several approaches
Government Operations is: "how to make the
were taken in obtaining information on the
quality of appointments of private citizens to
process of selecting political executives. First,
national services keep pace with the spiraling
we secured biographical information on all
complexity and difficulty of foreign policy and
political executives who had served in the
defense problems."2
federal government between 1933 and 1961.
The information available on the back-
Using standard biographical sources and in-
grounds of men who have served as political
formation supplied by the federal agencies, we
executives, the duration of their terms, the
assembled profiles of these executives, including
procedures used in their selection and their
information on place of birth, education, occu-
reactions to the prospect of government
pation, residence, party affiliation, age at the
service-in short, the information to substanti-
time of appointment, and length and kind of
ate these charges-has hitherto been highly im-
previous public service. Second, using a modi-
pressionistic, based on inadequate data, out of
fied random sampling procedure we chose 108
date, or tinged with ideological preferences. To
cases of appointments during the Truman,
cite but a few examples, C. Wright Mills char-
Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations for
acterized the second team of the political direc-
an intensive investigation to learn the pro-
torate in his Power Elite³ on the basis of a rela-
cedures followed in the recruitment and selec-
tion of political executives. Interviews were
This paper is taken from a book to be pub-
lished in 1964 by the Brookings Institution,
4 New York, Columbia University Press, 1939,
Washington, D. C., by Dean E. Mann with the
p. 302.
collaboration of Jameson W. Doig. An earlier ver-
8 William V. Shannon, "The Kennedy Ad-
sion was presented at the Midwest Conferer
ministration: The Early Months," The American
Political Scientists, Chicago, May 1963.
Scholar, fall 1961, pp. 484-85.
1 Commission on Organization of the Exe
6
As defined in this study political excutives
tive Branch of the Government, Task Force R
are limited to under secretaries and assistant
port on Personnel and Civil Service, February
secretaries in major departments and deputies in
1955, p. 39.
several other agencies: Bureau of the Budget,
2 "The Private Citizen and the National Serv-
Veterans Administration, General Services Ad-
ice," Organizing for National Security, Hearings,
ministration, Housing and Home Finance Agency,
vol. 3, 1961, p. 63.
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, United
3 New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p.
States Information Agency, International Cooper-
233.
ation Administration and predecessors.
81
Reprinted from THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 58, No. 1,
March, 1964
Copyright, 1964, The American Political Science Association
All rights reserved
Notes
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