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This file contains:
Frank Lincoln to RN re: Howad Buhse. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/7/1969
Ehrlichman to RN re: Inaugural Address Facilities. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/7/1969
Safire to Haldeman re: Nixon Image Abroad. 9 pgs. [Memo], 1/10/1969
The President to Ehrlichman re: Wisconsin Special Election. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/14/1969
Woods to The President re: Frank Jorgensen. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/3/1969
Ehrlichman to The President re: Nixon Institution of Human Affairs. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/20/1969
To Stets Coleman re: Lin Holton. 1 pg. [Letter], 6/23/1969
Dent to The President re: Polls in the New York City Election. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/8/1969
Dent to The President re: Republican Candidates Announcements. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/20/1969
Dent to The President re: Buzz Lukens. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/5/1969
Gordon Brownell to Harry Dent re: Brownie Reid. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/9/1969
Dent to The President re: Bo Callaway. 1 pg. [Memo], 2/18/1970
Dent to The President re: Morton, Shriver and the Governorship Battle in Maryland. 1 pg. [Memo], 2/25/1970
Dent to Staff Secretary re: Bob Lee. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/3/1970
Chotiner to Higby re: Cliff Jones Letter. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/16/1970
Klein to The President re: Kit Bond Victory in Missouri. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/19/1970
Jack Dreyfus to The President re: Thank You for Book. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/12/1971
James Hughes to The President re: Don Nixon's use of the San Clemente Golf Course. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/6/1971
Leo Cherne to John Mitchell re: Support for the Re-Election of President Nixon. 1 pg. [Letter], 6/27/1969
From Harry Dent re: Recommended Telephone Call to Raymond Gary of Oklahoma. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Henry Cashen re: Recommended Telephone Call to Mickey Mantle. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/10/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to James Roosevelt. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/17/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William France. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/17/1972
Handwritten note from RN to Haldeman. 1 pg. [Other Document], 8/26/1972
Colson to The President re: Al Capp. 4 pgs. [Memo], 9/29/1972
Billy Graham to The President re: Thank you for autographed picture. 1 pg. [Letter], 9/20/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Ithiel De Sola Pool 1 pg. [Memo], 10/5/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William Jack Chow. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/5/1972
From Clark MacGregor re: Recommended Telephone Call to Charles Ross. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/7/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Gene Autry. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/13/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to George Hearst. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/13/1972
From John Ehrlichman re: Recommended Telephone Call to Governor William Cahill. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/26/1972
Dent to The President re: Mills Godwin. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/21/1972
Buzhardt to The President re: Royalties Due Alvin Moscow. 5 pgs. [Memo], 3/4/1974
Ziegler to Butterfield re: President's Meeting with Paul Miller. 2 pgs. [Memo], 3/14/1969
Dent to Haldeman re: 1970 Fund Raising Efforts. 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/26/1969
Chotiner to The President's File re: Meeting with The President. 2 pgs. [Memo], 3/3/1970
Haldeman to The President's File re: Meeting with Attorney General Mitchell and Lee Nunn. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/5/1971
Colson to the President's File re: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor and Charles Colson. 5 pgs. [Memo], 7/11/1972
Colson to The President re: Democrats for Nixon. 3 pgs. [Memo], 7/12/1972
Haldeman to The President's File re: Dinner with John Connally. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/13/1972
Colson to The President re: Connally/Stans. 2 pgs. [Memo], 7/24/1972
Dean to The President's File re: Execution of President and Mrs. Nixon's Estate Plan. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/14/1972
Ziegler to The President's File re: Meeting with Bailey K Howard. 2 pgs. [Memo], 8/14/1972
From George Bush to The President re: Meeting with Governors William Cahill and Linwood Holton. 1 pg. [Memo], 3/20/1973
Dean Burch to The President's File re: Presidential Trip to Michigan. 2 pgs. [Memo], 5/15/1974
Charles Wardell to Dean Burch re: Memorandum for the President's File. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/10/1974
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
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26126700
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WHSF: Returned, 26-9
core
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document
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pageCount
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id
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contentType
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title
WHSF: Returned, 26-9
description
This file contains:
Frank Lincoln to RN re: Howad Buhse. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/7/1969
Ehrlichman to RN re: Inaugural Address Facilities. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/7/1969
Safire to Haldeman re: Nixon Image Abroad. 9 pgs. [Memo], 1/10/1969
The President to Ehrlichman re: Wisconsin Special Election. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/14/1969
Woods to The President re: Frank Jorgensen. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/3/1969
Ehrlichman to The President re: Nixon Institution of Human Affairs. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/20/1969
To Stets Coleman re: Lin Holton. 1 pg. [Letter], 6/23/1969
Dent to The President re: Polls in the New York City Election. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/8/1969
Dent to The President re: Republican Candidates Announcements. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/20/1969
Dent to The President re: Buzz Lukens. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/5/1969
Gordon Brownell to Harry Dent re: Brownie Reid. 1 pg. [Memo], 12/9/1969
Dent to The President re: Bo Callaway. 1 pg. [Memo], 2/18/1970
Dent to The President re: Morton, Shriver and the Governorship Battle in Maryland. 1 pg. [Memo], 2/25/1970
Dent to Staff Secretary re: Bob Lee. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/3/1970
Chotiner to Higby re: Cliff Jones Letter. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/16/1970
Klein to The President re: Kit Bond Victory in Missouri. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/19/1970
Jack Dreyfus to The President re: Thank You for Book. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/12/1971
James Hughes to The President re: Don Nixon's use of the San Clemente Golf Course. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/6/1971
Leo Cherne to John Mitchell re: Support for the Re-Election of President Nixon. 1 pg. [Letter], 6/27/1969
From Harry Dent re: Recommended Telephone Call to Raymond Gary of Oklahoma. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Henry Cashen re: Recommended Telephone Call to Mickey Mantle. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/10/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to James Roosevelt. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/17/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William France. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/17/1972
Handwritten note from RN to Haldeman. 1 pg. [Other Document], 8/26/1972
Colson to The President re: Al Capp. 4 pgs. [Memo], 9/29/1972
Billy Graham to The President re: Thank you for autographed picture. 1 pg. [Letter], 9/20/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Ithiel De Sola Pool 1 pg. [Memo], 10/5/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William Jack Chow. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/5/1972
From Clark MacGregor re: Recommended Telephone Call to Charles Ross. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/7/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Gene Autry. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/13/1972
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to George Hearst. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/13/1972
From John Ehrlichman re: Recommended Telephone Call to Governor William Cahill. 1 pg. [Memo], 10/26/1972
Dent to The President re: Mills Godwin. 1 pg. [Memo], 11/21/1972
Buzhardt to The President re: Royalties Due Alvin Moscow. 5 pgs. [Memo], 3/4/1974
Ziegler to Butterfield re: President's Meeting with Paul Miller. 2 pgs. [Memo], 3/14/1969
Dent to Haldeman re: 1970 Fund Raising Efforts. 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/26/1969
Chotiner to The President's File re: Meeting with The President. 2 pgs. [Memo], 3/3/1970
Haldeman to The President's File re: Meeting with Attorney General Mitchell and Lee Nunn. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/5/1971
Colson to the President's File re: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor and Charles Colson. 5 pgs. [Memo], 7/11/1972
Colson to The President re: Democrats for Nixon. 3 pgs. [Memo], 7/12/1972
Haldeman to The President's File re: Dinner with John Connally. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/13/1972
Colson to The President re: Connally/Stans. 2 pgs. [Memo], 7/24/1972
Dean to The President's File re: Execution of President and Mrs. Nixon's Estate Plan. 1 pg. [Memo], 8/14/1972
Ziegler to The President's File re: Meeting with Bailey K Howard. 2 pgs. [Memo], 8/14/1972
From George Bush to The President re: Meeting with Governors William Cahill and Linwood Holton. 1 pg. [Memo], 3/20/1973
Dean Burch to The President's File re: Presidential Trip to Michigan. 2 pgs. [Memo], 5/15/1974
Charles Wardell to Dean Burch re: Memorandum for the President's File. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/10/1974
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
01/07/1969
Memo
Frank Lincoln to RN re: Howad Buhse. 1 pg.
26
9
01/07/1969
Memo
Ehrlichman to RN re: Inaugural Address
Facilities. 1 pg.
26
9
01/10/1969
Memo
Safire to Haldeman re: Nixon Image
Abroad. 9 pgs.
26
9
04/14/1969
Memo
The President to Ehrlichman re: Wisconsin
Special Election. 1 pg.
26
9
04/03/1969
Memo
Woods to The President re: Frank
Jorgensen. 1 pg.
26
9
06/20/1969
Memo
Ehrlichman to The President re: Nixon
Institution of Human Affairs. 1 pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 1 of 7
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
06/23/1969
Letter
To Stets Coleman re: Lin Holton. 1 pg.
26
9
10/08/1969
Memo
Dent to The President re: Polls in the New
York City Election. 1 pg.
26
9
11/20/1969
Memo
Dent to The President re: Republican
Candidates Announcements. 1 pg.
26
9
12/05/1969
Memo
Dent to The President re: Buzz Lukens. 1 pg.
26
9
12/09/1969
Memo
Gordon Brownell to Harry Dent re: Brownie
Reid. 1 pg.
26
9
02/18/1970
Memo
Dent to The President re: Bo Callaway. 1 pg.
26
9
02/25/1970
Memo
Dent to The President re: Morton, Shriver
and the Governorship Battle in Maryland. 1
pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 2 of 7
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
04/03/1970
Memo
Dent to Staff Secretary re: Bob Lee. 1 pg.
26
9
11/16/1970
Memo
Chotiner to Higby re: Cliff Jones Letter. 2
pgs.
26
9
11/19/1970
Memo
Klein to The President re: Kit Bond Victory
in Missouri. 1 pg.
26
9
01/12/1971
Letter
Jack Dreyfus to The President re: Thank You
for Book. 1 pg.
26
9
05/06/1971
Memo
James Hughes to The President re: Don
Nixon's use of the San Clemente Golf
Course. 1 pg.
26
9
06/27/1969
Letter
Leo Cherne to John Mitchell re: Support for
the Re-Election of President Nixon. 1 pg.
26
9
07/10/1972
Memo
From Harry Dent re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Raymond Gary of
Oklahoma. 1 pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 3 of 7
Box Number Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
08/10/1972
Memo
From Henry Cashen re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Mickey Mantle. 1 pg.
26
9
08/17/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to James Roosevelt. 1 pg.
26
9
08/17/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to William France. 1 pg.
26
9
08/26/1972
Other Document
Handwritten note from RN to Haldeman. 1
pg.
26
9
09/29/1972
Memo
Colson to The President re: Al Capp. 4 pgs.
26
9
09/20/1972
Letter
Billy Graham to The President re: Thank you
for autographed picture. 1 pg.
26
9
10/05/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Ithiel De Sola Pool 1 pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 4 of 7
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
10/05/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to William Jack Chow. 1 pg.
26
9
10/07/1972
Memo
From Clark MacGregor re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Charles Ross. 1 pg.
26
9
10/13/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Gene Autry. 1 pg.
26
9
10/13/1972
Memo
From Chuck Colson re: Recommended
Telephone Call to George Hearst. 1 pg.
26
9
10/26/1972
Memo
From John Ehrlichman re: Recommended
Telephone Call to Governor William Cahill.
1 pg.
26
9
11/21/1972
Memo
Dent to The President re: Mills Godwin. 1
pg.
26
9
03/04/1974
Memo
Buzhardt to The President re: Royalties Due
Alvin Moscow. 5 pgs.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 5 of 7
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
03/14/1969
Memo
Ziegler to Butterfield re: President's Meeting
with Paul Miller. 2 pgs.
26
9
10/26/1969
Memo
Dent to Haldeman re: 1970 Fund Raising
Efforts. 2 pgs.
26
9
03/03/1970
Memo
Chotiner to The President's File re: Meeting
with The President. 2 pgs.
26
9
05/05/1971
Memo
Haldeman to The President's File re: Meeting
with Attorney General Mitchell and Lee
Nunn. 1 pg.
26
9
07/11/1972
Memo
Colson to the President's File re: Meeting
with John Connally, Clark MacGregor and
Charles Colson. 5 pgs.
26
9
07/12/1972
Memo
Colson to The President re: Democrats for
Nixon. 3 pgs.
26
9
07/13/1972
Memo
Haldeman to The President's File re: Dinner
with John Connally. 1 pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 6 of 7
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
26
9
07/24/1972
Memo
Colson to The President re: Connally/Stans.
2 pgs.
26
9
08/14/1972
Memo
Dean to The President's File re: Execution of
President and Mrs. Nixon's Estate Plan. 1 pg.
26
9
08/14/1972
Memo
Ziegler to The President's File re: Meeting
with Bailey K Howard. 2 pgs.
26
9
03/20/1973
Memo
From George Bush to The President re:
Meeting with Governors William Cahill and
Linwood Holton. 1 pg.
26
9
05/15/1974
Memo
Dean Burch to The President's File re:
Presidential Trip to Michigan. 2 pgs.
26
9
05/10/1974
Memo
Charles Wardell to Dean Burch re:
Memorandum for the President's File. 1 pg.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Page 7 of 7
MEMORANDUM
January 7, 1969
TO:
R. N.
FROM:
Frank Lincoln
BUSINESS COUNCIL - Howard Buhse
Howard Buhse, as you know, is the managing
partner at Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes. I know
he would feel greatly honored to be named to the Business
Council by you in due course.
Frank
FBL,Jr.
CC: John N. Mitchell
provider when
Suane you our
To:
President-elect Nixon
Date: January 7, 1969
From:
John D. Ehrlichman
Subject: Inaugural Address Facilities
Will you want a rostrum to hold notes for your Inaugural yes
Address?
We will arrange for a clock on the platform visible to you
whether you have a rostrum or not.
John & D. Ehrlichman
JDE:sw
Kenc
FYI
Haldeman from Safire
1/10/69
Re: Memo of November 20, 1968 - Nixon Image Abroad
The portion of the memo dealing with the elements of the successful
campaign strategy has been sent to Teddy White as you requested.
The o ther idea, suggesting that a trip abroad be taken by a to P Nixon
aide to exp lain this strategy to lea ding writers in Paris and London,
wa S accomplished by Bob Ellsworth in late November.
G.
Found in Ken Cole's 1969 box of files.
H. Fulton
Special Files Unit
10/15/73
MEMORANDUM
January 8, 1969
TO:
BILL SAFIRE
FROM:
BOB HALDEMAN'S OFFICE
RE:
Your memo of Nov 20, 1968 re Nixon Image Abroad
Please send a copy of your memo of November 20, 1968, to
Teddy White and a note to this office confirming this has been
accomplished.
RN
fyr
KLOGH FROM SAFERE
H
RE: NIKON IMAGE ABROAD
NOV 20
Intellicence Needed: is suudy of post-clection
ips and comments in
London, Paris, Rome, Fr
Surt-Bonn, Amstordam,
Tokyo, New Delhi.
The Reston comm
about European
commentary on the
Lxon may be misinforned.
Our own State Dept
S could get files quickly,
and private clip SC
; would do an analysis also.
Gallup, too, does opinic
bolling overseas, and has
affiliate arrangements We leading pollsters abroad
he could make these availal
to us.
Basic Line Needed
On Campaign Strategy: For use abroad and at home as well, we should
develop a memorandum setting forth the wisdom 01 the
1968 campaign strategy.
This to nip in the bud a historical decision that
we "almost blew it" or "stumbled in."
Should stress point that win was planned in a way
that enables new Administration to govern.
Elements:
1) Choice of primary route to nomination was Canger-
ous but laid to rest "loser" image for campaign;
2) Choice of Agnew was brilliant, as proven by
results; a Tower or Reagan would have blown Ohio,
Illinois, and possibly California while only picking
Texas---and a Lindsay or Rockcfeller would have
blown all border states and Florida while onl picki
up Pennsylvania. Would have fallen short either way.
3) Though all pundits and polls thought Democratic
party was hopelessly split after Chicago, we based
strategy on (a) the likelihood of Ted Kennedy and
Larry O'Brien swinging much disaffected Dem support
in East back to Humphrey;
(b) the likelihood of ultimate if qualifi
McCarthy endorsement in final weeks;
(c) the ability of organized labor to
cut 5% of Wallace 20% stwength, swinging much of Sc.
back to Humphrey (Wallace drop correctly and publicl
predicted by Nixon) ;
In light of these strategic assumptions (which were
the opposite of conventional wisdom at the time)
we positioned ourselved to withstand the most power-
full thrust of all: a bombing halt just before the
election.
4) We know the bombing halt was sure to COME because.
(a) Johnson had done something similar before 1983
election, and know he could override political
timing charge;
(b) Humphrcy campaign, starting at Salt Lake City
speech, was geared wholly to anticipated peace
vote swinging to him, explaining also the arms=
control and nuclear proliferation treaty stress.
Nothing could fully BMV counter this Presidential
move. Blunting it somewhat was (a) Nixon's
emphasis on negociating from strength and the
security gap issue, and (b) total support of Johnson
peace moves to the extent of publicly refusing to
believe political motivation.
With the Democratic strategy long anticipated,
Nixon kept his cool in the final week as Johnson's
move before his Saigon Student "ducks were ina row"
made the political motivation apparent; despite
pressure from Nixon aides, the candidate held to
his long-planned strategy "trusting" that
communist assurances were given and saying that
Johnson did not realize that our allies would UC
refuse to go along. Thus, on final weekend,
Nixon was not impugning Johnson integrity (which
would have bakkfired), only questionging President's
diplomatic judgment and offering to help bring
Saigon into line.
This remarkably cool decision under enoumous pressur.
was the final key to Nixon's victory, allying him
with peace efforts while underscoring his ability
to be a better diplomat and bring peace quicker.
And in the long run, it enabled Nixon to work
closely with Johnson after the election to end the
war; the post-election cooperation shattered
precedent, helping Nixon in his first aim of bringin
the nation together.
5) In this regard, throughout the campaign, Nixon
refraining from the slashing personal attacks on
either his opponent or the President. Strategic
reason: (a) would have reinforced image of Nixon
the Democrats were trying to recall (b) would have
made governing later that much harder.
At the same time, Nixon stayed on the attack
trhoughout, never being drawn into an attidude of
"pretecting his lead".
(6) Nixon introduced the technique of the "talling
position paper" a striking re-use of radio that
had been dormant for thirty years. Enabled him to
deal at length with specific issues without having
to reduce enthusiasm of rally audiences. The pleased
Democratic charge of "not dealing with the issues" :
found itself with noplace to go; at the end, reporters
received two complete books with cirtensive Witch
position. proving his had been a campaign of substance
7) The Nixon television technique, perfected in the
primaries, was so successful it was copied by the
Democrats. The regional panel, showing Nixon at his
strongest answering questions, was maybe imitated
by Humphrey in the final stages. Samewith the
national telethon.
We had to concede an edge to the Democrats on their
use of television spots, since personal attacks
and emotional appeals about "trust" are a more effec-
tive use of the spot format than issue attacks: But
we had to adapt our technique to our overall
staategy.
8. Another part of the overall strategy dealt with
the "battleground states". The decision was made eary
to concentrate both time and money in California,
Ohio, New Jersey Illinois (four we won) and Michigan
New York, Pennsylvania and Texas (which we lost,
the last two narrowly.) Obviously, this strategy paid
off; also, a less publicised but major effort was
made in the border states, where the choice of Agnew
was crucial, and a sweep was made there with the
exceppion of a squeaker in Maryland.
Though the Democrats sought to charge a "Southern
strategy" (which helped them solidify the Negro voca)
the five Wallace states received little Nixon attentic
the law and order issue, a stand against busing and
the active support of Thurmond helped carry Virginia,
the Carolinas and Florida. But a real "southern
Strategy" with no hope of the Deep South would have
been foodish.
On geography, the Nixon grand strategy acheived an
important goal: a national rather than regional
victory. Woodrew Wilson won while carrying only
Ohio and New Hampshire in the East; Humphrey tried
to win without the South and the West; Nixon took at
least one major state in each section. (Jersey in
the East, Florida and the Carolinas in the South,
most of the midwest and most of the west, plus the
border states.)
9) Nixon strategists recognized the Negro vote as a
lost cause from the start, but the candidate never
stopped pressing for "justice" with law and order,
and developed the "black capitalism" concept, again
aiming past the election toward effective government.
10) The strategic mistake should be admitted, since
it was an error on the side of restraint and Signe
decency. Muskie was vulnerable served
Invoiving the FIIA, Billy Sol Bates,
the
THE
affant.
Mach more substantive than anything
leveled against DUE Nixon said no, which
permitted the Democrate to build up Muskie into a magor
asset and helped their attack on Agnew by contrast.
11) 12 Tosologically, Nizon occupied the middle from the
start, gambling that he could 1d: keep the middle in a
three way race large enough to win. Amazingly, the
solid Nixon strength held at 42% throughout, assuming
Gallup to be correct. He successfully fended off
erosion from both sides, holding his bloc of independents
and Republicans, finally picking up some extra support
from Wallace protesters.
An Eastern Republican nominee, or a Mixon vino adopted a
all-out liberal stance, wouldh have lost the East anyway
as traditional Democratic strength came together, and
worse for the nation---would have permitted Wallace
to get one fourth to one third of the popular vote.
Thus, the Nixon victory was a victory for the center,
enough of a change to satisfy the non-racist rightist
protesters, and indeed the only type of candidacy that
could effectively govern the nation. (Walter Lippman
and Stewart Alsop forsaw this.)
When you lose, the "if only" begins. But consider the
"ifs" in the way the Nixon strategy turned out:
He could never have won, if (a) he had neglected the
primary's, (b) he had chosen a vice presidential nominee
from either left or right (c) he had depended on the
dissaffection of vocally unhappy Democrats (d) he had
launched a slashing attack on Johnson or Humphrey
(e) he had neglected the thoughtful speeches and opened
himself to the 'no substance' charge (f) he had spent
more time in states eigher surely won or lost (g) he had
adopted a regional or southern strategy, and most
important at the end, if (f) he had panicked and blasted
the President on a phony bombing halt.
One mismisp misstep, and he could easily have lost; one
strategic or tactical error, and the traditional
Democratic majority plus the far right's breakaway would
have meant a Humphrey victory. But Nixon moved
straight ahead without stumbling once; that was the
secret of the greatest comeback in modern political
history.
6
Follow-Un to
Selected Foreign Proce: IN Should now CO open up channels to
the foreign proce Stationed here. Some, like
Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, are
beliweChere (and Brandon is charming to the
Nixon Staff but files unfriendly material.)
these men wante personal interviews with Kinon,
of course, but they can be satisfied with close
attention by top Nizon staffers and a feeling that
they have been chosen to got a look "inside".
We should select a half-dozen from key capitals
and assign staffors to get across our message
just before publication in the US of the first
story on these lines.
Trip Abroad by
Nixon Intimates:
A task force of three men known to be close to
the President-elect should be sent to Europe.
Announced purpose: fact-finding on respect for
America and its present policies among non-
governmental sources.
Composed of: an editor (a Klein or a Keogh or an
editor or publisher who knows Nixon well who was
not inthe campaign) ; a financial man or economist;
and somebody who was connected with USIA in the
Eisenhower administration.
In the course of their fact-finding, they would
hold press conferences and private meetings with
journalists abroad, revealing what they know
about Nixon the man and the way the American
campaign was conducted- in the only way that
enables the winner to govern.
This should be a non-diplomatic mission, and the
task force should steer sharply away from question
to them about foreign policy. Of course, to avoid
offense, they should set up their meetings with
private individuals in consultation with our
State Department and probably through the govern
ments of the countries they visit.
7
Television Abroad:
Informs
us
that
the
USIA
in
preparing a halk-hour documentary the
Probic cive. say, this bhould to C.
viewed and appropriate comments given with 811
due attention to propriety.
I understand that out own campaign documentary
is being throughly distributed abroad.
If we decide to cooperate to the extent of an
interview with the President-elect with any or all
of the US networks, provision should be made to
make the intorview simultaneously available to
oversease networks.
Ninon philosophy
We should set someone to work immediately on
abroad
translating relevant portions of "Ni>on on the
Issues" and "Nixon Speaks Out" into French,
Italian, German and Japanese.
These excerpts should then be mailed to a wide list
of foreign editors with a letter from Zeigler
introducing himself and opening a channel of
answers to queries.
We should make a deal with a US publisher to
publish a book of Nixon campaign speeches, with a
new introduction and an epilogue to make it
copyright-able. Proviso: quick translation and
publication abread in paperback form.
And while we're at it, we should write a new
conslusion to "Six Crises" and haverh that
translated and published around the world.
By the time the translation is finished and type
set, the Inaugural address will be delivered and
can be included.
A Final Thought:
Betweenn Christmas and Inauguration Day, Julie and
David will be going on their honeymoon. Perhaps,
after a week of idyllic privacy on some hideaway,
they would be willing to make a tour of Europe.
Impact: fantastic. And they would have the best
and most natural reason to be travelling abroad.
APR 14 1969
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 14, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
John Ehrlichman
FROM
The President
Rn
I am not satisfied by the report Sears made
with regard to the Wisconsin special election. When I think
that Ody Fish is probably the best State Chairman in the
country, and when I think of all the other things we had going
for us, it seems to me that despite the excuses that Laird
did not make a speech, etc., etc., the White House staff
was not really on the ball in watching this situation. Conse-
quently, I want a shake up to take place where this is
discussed with Rogers Morton, the House Campaign Committee
and particularly some action is taken to see to it that the
White House is better represented than it was in this instance
by Sears on the "nuts and bolts. 11
I would like to have a memorandum prepared
for me within a week indicating what action will be taken to
handle such problems in the future. This election, plus the
almost unbelievable waste of funds in Tennessee, is a very
good lesson for us, but only if we do not sit back and read
long memoranda indicating what went wrong without taking
specific action to deal with the problem.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 3, 1969
TO:
The President
CC: Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
Frank Jorgensen called re the discussion you
had had with him about getting busy in the Western States.
He is concerned that in the Congressional races coming up
we should be picking candidates soon and get going and he
says he is willing, able and feels it is time to get going.
Also he said some day if there is some spot that
the President really feels he could do a job - short term -
he would even be glad to come back this way.
# getty 1 day
How about 4 light as
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
JUNE 20, 1969
FOR THE PRESIDENT
RE:
NIXON INSTITUTION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS
(WHITTIER COLLEGE)
Ed Morgan reports that Dr. Paul Smith officially retires
from the Pr esidency of Whittier College September 1, 1969
and will assume the duties of Director of the Nixon Institution
of Human Affairs and also Chancellor of Whittier College on
that date.
The Whittier people have written to you asking for a
private conference to discuss two possible candidates to
be the new President of Whittier College. Morgan has
replied indicating that they should advise him of their
candidates in advance.
$250, 000 has been raised for the Nixon Institution and an
additional $1 million for a new building is assured.
They are incorporated in much the same way as the
Stanford Hoover Library.
JOHN D. EHR LICHMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1969
Dear Stets:
I am very pleased to know that you are going
to be helping Lin Holton in Virginia this
year. You're the man to do the job, just
as you did for us last year.
This will be an important contest and can
have much to do with advancing the cause of
two-party competition in the South.
In addition to this, Lin should have a great
opportunity, and I consider him to be an
outstanding candidate and a very goodfriend.
I told Harry Dent to keep in contact with you.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
the
supposed to here written me. whether you like it a not your Xumin
I thought you might like to Nod the letter grare
presture are be n the line in this compaign you cm don lot
it wishout being too apeply in I there me thomes
Mr. The Plains Stets Coleman discuss it Stels was you set back.
Virginia 22171
July8,1969
anso the wood some money from
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 8, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The political polls in the New York City election present
a confused picture. Most show Procaccino with a small
lead, but one claims Lindsay is ahead slightly. My concern
is that Marchi is rising and in doing so is taking votes
away from Procaccino who stands the better chance of
defeating Lindsay. The more Procaccino exposes himself
publicly the more he drops. The more Marchi exposes
himself, the more votes he picks up from Procaccino. The
polls seem to show that Marchi has the least chance of
winning.
Jim Allison, Deputy Chairman of the RNC, is very friendly
with Lindsay's pollster. This man told Allison that Lindsay
is slightly behind Procaccino and that his advice to
Lindsay was to help Marchi take votes away from Procaccino.
I am convinced this is why Evans-Novak, the New York Times,
the New York Post, and Newsday are giving Marchi such good
)mith
buildups.
Morton is going to New York later this month to attend a
fund-raising dinner for Marchi in order to appease Jerry
Milbank. I have warned him of my concern and have asked
him to please look into this. I am also suggesting the
same to Charlie McWhorter and Jerry Milbank.
This
Dot
is march years
Harry S. Dent
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 20, 1969
Tompland
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Bob Taft will announce for the U. S. Senate Friday.
Governor Rhodes has already announced, and Buzz
Lukens has told me he will announce in January.
Governor Rhodes called the President the other day
but the call was taken by the Vice President. He
wanted the President to stop Taft from announcing.
Of course, this would not have been wise. There is
nothing we can do to stop the three-way race, and if
we attempted to do anything we would become involved
in a hot Ohio intra-Party battle.
A recent survey showed Taft scoring 43%, Rhodes 40%,
and Lukens 20% against leading Democrats. Taft and
Rhodes were running ahead of the Democrats with Lukens
running behind. Lukens feels that in a three-way race
he will win because there is no runoff.
Lee Nunn of the Senatorial Campaign Committee has been
concerned about having Rhodes as our candidate all along,
and is convinced that Taft will win the nomination and
the general election. There is some question whether
Life will hit the Governor again next year.
The Party will be a little short on the Governor's race.
The Democrats are pushing Gilligan, the man Saxbe beat
last year, to run for Governor but he may decide to go
for the Senate in view of his interest in one-worldism.
The State Chairman thinks Representative Chuck Whalen of
Dayton might be the best candidate for Governor under these
circumstances.
Hands.
Harry S. Dent
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 5, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Buzz Lukens came by to see me Thursday evening.
In the course of the conversation he said he would
not enter the U. S. Senate race and would help Bob
Taft if the President asked him to do this - but,
only if the President should ask him. He hates
Rhodes and thinks Taft is dull. He wants to run and
is seemingly convinced he can win if he gets the
nomination.
Question: Do we give him the word to get out and
help Taft, or leave him along altogether?
Get out
Leave Lukens alone
we cen't
S.
fight abodes
Harry S. Dent
(Lubens would so we told
him To report Toft
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
DECEMBER 9, 1969
TO: HARRY S. DENT
FROM: GORDON S. BROWNELL
You asked me to discreetly check with Conservative Party
people in New York into the chances of their getting rid
of Rep. Brownie Reid next fall.
I talked at length with Harry Middendorf, Bill's brother
and Manhattan County Chairman for the Conservative Party.
He will do some further checking, but I feel his initial
report is accurate and complete as is.
Someone in the Conservative Party will definitely oppose
Reid, but the party is weak in Westchester County where
New York Times liberal Republicans predominate. Kevin
Phillips brings this out in his book.
Middendorf feels, and I reluctantly agree, that Reid's
strength is too broad and his past majorities too huge
to hope for his premature demise.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
MH
NARS, Date 5/12/80
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
After talking with Bo Callaway Tuesday, I have
become convinced that Bo can be talked into running
for governor of Georgia. Phil Campbell thinks Bo
would be the best bet with Congressman Fletcher
ticket would be Callaway for governor and Thompson
for lieutenant governor, but this might entail the
1
brown
Thompson being a close second. His idea of the best
loss of Thompson's seat in Congress.
This is in response to the President's request for
information on this race.
Harry S. Dent
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 25, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Morton, Shriver and the Governorship
battle in Maryland.
Chairman Morton decided not to make the U. S. Senate race in
Maryland for a number of reasons, but primarily because he
did not feel he could win. We are now getting reports that
he is not ruling out the possibility of running for Governor
if Shriver, Mahoney and Mandel make the race in the Democrat
primary. This would split up the Democrats, as per the Agnew
race in 1966, giving the Republican candidate a better chance
to win than usual. Mahoney, the perennial candidate, should
take votes away from Mandel, rather than Shriver, and with no
primary runoff, Shriver could emerge as the winner. Since he
is a potential Presidential candidate for 1972, we might need
to give some special attention to this Gubernatorial race.
The Vice President and Dent separately talked to Chairman Morton
this morning, and found that he did not rule out the
possibility. A survey Morton had conducted showed that the
Governorship would be easier to take than Tydings seat. He
plans to run a new survey as soon as Shriver gets in.
If the President has any suggestions on this subject we need to
know. We cannot afford to let Morton consider this one publicly
and then back out at the last minute, making our candidate a
second choice. The man most likely to run if Morton does not is
Stan Blair. However, he will step aside for Morton.
motor Harry S. Dent it our
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 3, 1970
TO:
The Staff Secretary
FROM:
Harry Dent ASD
With regard to the President's request that I have Bob Lee
work on the GOP split in Florida, I have Bob Lee coming in
to see me next Wednesday for this purpose and also to assign
him some additional political chores. The prime problem we
might have with Bob working on this is that he is aligned
with the Kirk/Osborne side and very decidedly so. Neverthe-
less, he and I will try to figure out what all can be done
to alleviate the situation as much as possible. Kirk is a
sure winner over Eckerd for the Governor nomination, but the
race between Congressman Cramer and Lt. Governor Osborne is
very close. It might be best eventually to persuade Cramer
to stay in the House and retain his leadership position.
VINA Harry I beliem we should
do the - tige
Try some without exploring
Causing if you can too much commition
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 16, 1970
FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
MURRAY CHOTINER
I am returning Cliff Jones' letter dated November 11,
addressed to the President, and am not answering in
my name since he refers to me in a complimentary
fashion.
with me
Cliff discussed plans for 1972 and I have followed through
by talking with Bob Kunzig and intend to discuss Pennsylvania
organization with Senator Scott, George Bloom, Jack Jordan,
and Dave Maxwell.
Perhaps the President would like to know that Pennsylvania
appreciated the support given by the President, Julie and
Tricia.
Enclosure
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date
To: Chotiner
From:
Larry Higby
laugh handle this
united it p
fyi
Republican State Committee
of Pennsylvania
P. O. BOX 1624, HARRISBURG 17105 TELEPHONE (717) 234-4901
CLIFFORD L. JONES
Chairman
November 11, 1970
MRS. PETER K. HONAMAN
Vice Chairman
The President of the United States
M. HARVEY TAYLOR
Chairman Emeritus
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PHILIP L. CORSON
Treasurer
Dear President Nixon:
THOMAS B. McCABE
National Committeeman
I am sorry that the Republican Party did not win
the gubernatorial election in Pennsylvania. If anything,
MISS SARAH ANN STAUFFER
we are even more disappointed than you are.
National Committeewoman
Without your all-out support we could not even have
MRS. LOUISE RUSSELL
Secretary
made a battle. While our loss was large, the county in which
you appeared, Lancaster County, did respond to our expectations
MRS. CAROLINE SHAW TATOM
even to the extent of upsetting a Democrat incumbent legis-
Assistant Secretary
lator. This is a tribute to your efforts in that county.
1
We most appreciated the support of your family. Julie
and Tricia were just wonderful, and even better than their
reputations.
The support you provided through the Vice-President
helped immeasurably in fund-raising.
Murray Chotiner was a real bulwark. Without the
type of support you provided there, we could not even have
continued the campaign. We did indeed depend on you.
I have some thoughts about the election in 1972
which I would like to share with you, and I will do so
first by talking to Murray Chotiner.
Sincerely,
murray followed has seen
&
through
Clifford L. Jones
Ronee
Chairman
CLJ:jj
Cc: Murray Chotiner
Jack Gleason
one
a
good
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN H.W.
One of our little noticed, but most important victories,
was the election of Kit Bond in Missouri. It offers
great promise in many ways. I thought you would be
interested in seeing the attached clipping.
Attachment
put him on
birld our list of people &
I
OA should be cabited
as party ocan Missouri
sport
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 4/28/71
TO:
Jon Huntsman
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
X for requests
For your files.
heen of B
Brue Have ber both Joyce
JACK J. DREYFUS, JR.
2 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004
January 12, 1971
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for the beautiful copy of the
book containing your speeches.
I hope you get a chance to visit Minot's
Island this year. We have scraped a piece of land
level so that a helicopter can land there
In many ways the island might be ideal for
you. It has a chip and putting green and also a
tennis court. Ten minutes away, by boat, there is
a nice little nine-hole golf course; on a busy day
it has three players on it. Weather permitting, all
meals can be outdoors. Steaks cooked on rocks
are delicious; and clambakes are okay too.
I hope the coming year will be a wonderful
one for you and your family
Warmest
regards,
Jack equal these
The President
The Whitehouse
Washington, D. C.
good.)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Arrangements have been made for Mr. and Mrs. Don Nixon and 14
of their guests to use your San Clemente golf course on Friday, the
7th of May. Following the golf game, they plan a dinner party at the
San Clemente Inn.
BRIGADIER GENERAL JURH JAMES D. HUGHES
good
LEO CHERNE
589 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
June 27, 1972
I
The Honorable John Mitchell
Committee to Re-elect The President
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
The
Dear Mr. Mitchell:
Several days ago I had occasion to tell my good friend
Leonard Hall that I've made the personal decision to identify myself
with the efforts to re-elect President Nixon. Since I have been
life-long Democrat, I will undoubtedly associate myself with what-
ever committee is formed to express the views of other Democrats
supporting the re-election of the President.
Solely for purposes of identification, let me say that I am
Executive Director of The Research Institute of America, Inc.
,
Chairman of the Board of The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing
Company, Chairman of the Board of The International Rescue Com-
mittee, and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Freedom House.
I am enclosing "A Statement of Concern" about the record
of Senator George McGovern in which I have already joined. If it
has not been brought to your attention, I feel certain that you will
find it a significant document.
to
With my deep regards,
LC:is
Dear Sincerely, July for mitholl (down) lither
Enclosure
CC: The Hon. Leonard Garment
Miss Rose Mary Woods
has
li
dept. coming r as party type
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H THE BRESIDENT HAS SEEN
July 10, 1972
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
Former Democrat Governor
Raymond Gary of Oklahoma
O: 405/795-3327
R: 405/795-3280
RECOMMENDED BY: Harry S. Dent
(Colson concurs)
PURPOSE:
To thank him for the message he has sent
through Dewey Bartlett indicating support
for the President's re-election and to get
his assessment of the political situation.
BACKGROUND:
Dewey Bartlett, former Republican Governor
now running for Senate, is convinced Gary can
play major role in carrying Oklahoma for the
President and Bartlett. Gary was Muskie
man, but tells Bartlett privately he will
support President. Gary is from a con-
servative part of the State (Madill) and is
influential among Oklahoma's conservatives.
The telephone call would do much to get
Gary's support for the President and Bartlett
out in the open.
TALKING POINTS:
1.
Dewey Bartlett has told us of Gary's
interest in the President's re-election.
2.
What is Gary's assessment of the
situation in the Democrat Party
nationally?
3.
What is Gary's assessment of the
Oklahoma situation?
H-no- for weren or have descussion
- a passibly letter is just ok- refer to Coundly
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
p/m
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 10, 1972
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
MICKEY MANTLE
RECOMMENDED BY:
HENRY C. CASHEN II
PURPOSE:
Yesterday, Mickey Mantle agreed to
serve as a Chairman for Democrats
For Nixon. As you know, Mantle is
the former baseball great of the New
York Yankees. He is currently a
successful businessman in Dallas, Texas.
TALKING POINTS:
1.
That you express your thanks for
his support and indicate your optimism
that he will be a tremendous asset in
working with John Connally on the
campaign.
Ltr being
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
James Roosevelt
Beverly Hills, California
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE:
To thank him for his public and active
support of your re-election.
BACKGROUND:
James Roosevelt, one of the co-chairmen
that
of the Democrats for Nixon Committee,
is going on big talk shows on the West Coast
to blast McGovern. This was his idea and
call
he has come to us for ammunition. The
son of FDR in your camp is certainly
impressive.
Ovel
TALKING POINTS:
1. Thank him for his active support and
help in your re-election.
2. Mention your being pleased of his
important efforts in your behalf on
several of the West Coast talk shows.
August 17, 1972
THE
Ph
AS
SEEN
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
William H. G. France
President, International Speedway Corporation
Daytona Beach, Florida
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE:
To thank him for his public and active
support of your re-election.
BACKGROUND male
William H. G. France was the 1972
Chairman of the Florida State Democratic
Delegation. He is now one of the co-
chairmen of the Democrats for Nixon
Committee. Although he was Wallace's
key financial supporter, he can be very
helpful to us now.
is
TALKING POINTS:
1. Thank him for his active support
of your re-election.
August 17, 1972
8-26-72
H -
as you Hnow we are to
send watchs to n. R. and
those who second the
nomination (The watch is probably
for men- but it is small
enough for women too)
In addition I want a
Certifient of apprication to yo
to all who participtil in the convents
Be generous in this - lover all
speaking presiders - musical
argungstion + there who appeard
events at th youth Rolly of other
T his may nun to a hundred
or so - but it is by for the
easiest way for us to show
appreciated after all if we
do it for the appearm wesh
do it for the emailtin -
In addition - will you
give me the names of 5 or 6
who worled in arrangements
+ who deserve 3 call - even though
they were not B poblicyal at
the converting
11 To Certified of application
with matified oppoint for
Shis
for
Control the to the susm of the 1972
Rembin nature lumbe" In PM
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
A1 Capp
I thought you might like to see A1 Capp's quick note to me
about Ed Cox. A1 is a harsh critic, as you know.
Attachment Site very
Send to
AL CAPP
September 22, 1972
Charles Colson
Special Counsel to the President
Executive Office Bldg., Rm. #182
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C.
Dear Chuck,
LI'L ABNER
A short note before I take off
for London. A few nights ago, young
Cox, the President's son-in-law,
appeared on Boston TV. He gave an analysis
of the reasons for the youth support of
the President.
It was immensely effective. He
has a sound, charming delivery, a fine
mind, and every word carried conviction.
I urge that you use him as much as possible
during the campaign, he may be the best
man you have on the road.
Best,
@ Al Capp
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 2, 1972
Dear Mr. Cox:
The President asked that the attached
letter from A1 Capp be forwarded to
you for your information.
Sincerely,
Brueca Kehili
Bruce A. Kehrli
Staff Secretary
Mr. Edward F. Cox
The White House
Washington, D. C.
AL CAPP
September 22, 1972
Charles Colson
Special Counsel to the President
Executive Office Bldg., Rm. #182
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C.
Dear Chuck,
LI'L ABNER
A short note before I take off
for London. A few nights ago, young
Cox, the President's son-in-law,
appeared on Boston TV. He gave an analysis
of the reasons for the youth support of
the President.
It was immensely effective. He
has a sound, charming delivery, a fine
mind, and every word carried conviction.
I urge that you use him as much as possible
during the campaign, he may be the best
man you have on the road.
Best,
@ Al Capp
THE HAS SEEN
BILLY GRAHAM
Montreat, N.C. 28757
September 20, 1972
Dear Mr. President:
This is just a note to thank you
for the autographed picture of us taken in
California. I was delighted and honored to re-
ceive it. It is interesting that we have been
friends for so many years and I only have two
or three autographed pictures of you in that
whole time. It is most thoughtful of you to
send it.
Grady and I had a marvelous time
at San Clemente. We met SO many interesting
people that we would have never otherwise met
in a lifetime. Even Zsa Zsa Gabor said that
she was one of my fans.
Things seem to be going well in the
campaign. I personally think your strategy at
the present time is correct. It is unfortunate
that you have to battle your opponent and also
at least two of the major networks. It is my
judgment that McGovern is beginning to gain a
little ground.
With warmest personal greetings, I am
Cordially yours,
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
THE PRESIDENT PAS SEEN
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
Ithiel De Sola Pool
Chairman, Dept. of Political Science
MIT
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE:
To thank him for his public and
active support of your re-election.
BACKGROUND:
On October 4, 1972 Ithiel De Sola Pool
was announced as another of the Vice
Chairmen of Democrats for Nixon. He
is a leading educator and comes from
Call ade. in Ltr the
a prominent Jewish family. He was
not invited to the September 22 dinner
at the Connally ranch.
TALKING POINTS:
1. Thank him for his support.
October 5, 1972
THE PRESIDENT BAD GEEN
ty
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
William Jack Chow
President
San Francisco Civil Service Commission
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE: usthp
To thank him for his public and
active support of your re-election.
BACKGROUND
made
On October 4, 1972, William Jack
Chow was named a Vice Chairman
of Democrats for Nixon. He is
President of the San Francisco Civil
Service Commission and was named to
this position by Mayor Joseph Alioto.
Chow is a prominent Chinese-American.
He was at the Connally dinner on September
22 but it was not known at the time that he
would become ( with Alioto's approval) a
Vice Chairman for Democrats for Nixon.
TALKING POINTS:
1. Thank him for his support.
October 5, 1972
THE PRESIDENT
RECOMMENDED PRESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE CALL
TO: /
Charles D. Ross (Chuck)
Campaign Director
Ohio Committee for the Re-Election
of the President
RECOMMENDED BY:
Clark MacGregor 7m form
(Colsoncoucurs)
PURPOSE:
To personally thank Mr. Ross for his efforts
as Campaign Manager
BACKGROUND:
Ohio is a key state, and Mr. Ross has worked
very hard and has made great inroads with
typically democratic voting blocs.
TALKING POINTS:
1. I appreciate the tremendous effort you have
put forth on behalf of my re-election.
2. I realize this is time-consuming and that it
takes you away from your personal and business
responsibilities.
3. Ohio is certainly a key state, and with your
considerable efforts, I am confident we will win.
4. I would be interested in your analysis of the
campaign in Ohio.
Date of Submission: October 7, 1972
Mr. Ross may be reached at 614-224-7411 (office)
513-298-8072 (home)
CALL wede. 4
THE patsident HAS SEEN
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
Gene Autry
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE:
To thank him for his strong support
BACKGROUND: cill wies nothe
Gene Autry was one of your large
contributors in 1968 and has continued
his strong support and hard work for
your re-election. He was not invited
to the San Clemente celebrities reception.
There has been no recorded Presidential
contact with him within the last two months.
TALKING POINTS:
1. Express your appreciation for his
continued support.
2.
Ask him how he thinks the campaign
is going.
October 13, 1972
THE PRESIDENT nAS SEEN
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
George Hearst,
Publisher
Jr. geolle
Los Angeles Herald-Examiner
not
RECOMMENDED BY:
Charles W. Colson
PURPOSE:
To thank him for his strong support
made.
BACKGROUND:
The Hearst newspapers have
did cell
endorsed your candidacy for
re-election. There has been
no Presidential contact with
George Hearst within the last
two months.
+>
TALKING POINTS:
1. Express your appreciation for
his continued support.
2. Ask him how he thinks the campaign
is going.
October 13, 1972
ftr-
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO
Governor William Cahill
-
New Jersey
RECOMMENDED BY
John Ehrlichman
(Colson
concurs
BACKGROUND
Through inadvertance Governor Cahill was not
mentioned or recognized at the Northeast
Regional meeting at Governor Rockefeller's
estate on Monday, October 23.
Since then the Governor has let it be known to a
number of people of his personal distress
because he was not given mention as the other
call made: will
Governor (Rockefeller) was.
Governor Cahill has been working diligently in
behalf of the Committee to Re-elect in New Jersey.
New Jersey was a state carried last time and he
is predicting that the President will carry it again
handily, principally as a result of his work.
The Governor's daughter has been active in the
President's campaign also
TALKING POINTS
1.
Call to thank Governor Cahill for taking the
trouble to come to the meeting at Tarrytown
last Monday night.
2.
Ask the Governor about standings in
New Jersey at the present time.
3.
Mention to him that it is improbable that your
campaign would bring you to New Jersey
before the election but mention how well
saturated the New Jersey situation has been
with the Vice President, your family and the
surrogates and express gratitude for the
strong support of the Cahill organization
October 26, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
Aso
Republican friends of Senator Harry Byrd in Virginia
have been working to get former Governor Mills Godwin
to announce as a Republican candidate for Governor
for the general election set November 1973. Our
friends working on this matter informed me Senator
Byrd has encouraged Godwin to run as a Republican
and to announce within 45 days. Godwin reportedly
wants to wait 2 or 3 months and see a poll and have
a physical examination first.
I talked with Godwin the other day and let him
know that we were very hopeful he would do this
as a Republican, particularly since the Virginia
Republican Party through its recent election of a
new State Chairman has sent him an engraved invitation
to do SO. I also pointed out that with the election
of Senator-elect Scott the Party is more likely now
to soon consider nominating one of their own for the
governorship that Lt. GOV. Henry Howell, the liberal,
would win if Godwin runs as an Independent and the
Republicans also nominate their candidate.
If Godwin makes this move, we can expect to have a
Republican governor elected and a majority of the
Virginia General Assembly come next November.
THE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 4, 1974
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
J. FRED BUZHARDT
your
SUBJECT:
Royalties due Alvin Moscow
Mr. Moscow, through his agent, has asked for an accounting
of royalties and payment of any additional sums due him.
As you may recall, your agreement with Mr. Moscow provided
that he would receive $20,000 plus 25% of additional income
received by you from the rights granted to Doubleday & Co. in
excess of the $60,000 advance until that 25% equaled $15, 000.
The agreement also provided that Mr. Moscow would be
furnished copies of Doubleday's statement to you within ten
days of receipt, until all sums due him had been paid. The
$20, 000 obligation was fulfilled on December 20, 1962, and
subsequently Mr. Moscow received royalty payments in the
amount of $2,439.87 on August 15, 1962 and $467.29 on
March 13, 1964.
At my request, Doubleday & Co. has provided a statement
(Tab A) showing royalties earned through October 31, 1973.
Based upon those figures, it would appear that an additional
$2, 971. 15 is due Mr. Moscow (See Tab B).
It is my recommendation that Frank DeMarco be instructed
to issue a check in the above amount to Mr. Moscow and to
furnish him with a copy of the latest statement from Doubleday
& Co.
Approve
Rx I must get this
Disapprove
al personal out of the legal hand office
and in to alexanda's
DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.
SUMMARY
ROYALTY STATEMENT
FOR THE 6 MONTHS ENDING 10/31/73
DATE
SIX CRISES
From pub.
thru
4/30/73
Royalty earned
90,679
06
10/31/73
Royalty per statements
850
85
91,529
91
The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
6/ 5/61
Advance
20,000.00
The White House
12/ 5/61
"
40,000.00
Washington, D. C. 20500
3/31/62
Indexing charge
140.00
3/16/62
thru
8/16/62
Promotion expense
7,309.39
Purchases
531.40
8/ 7/62-
thru
8/17/73
Royalty payments
22,698.27
90,679
06
Due
850
85
G 5077 2M 4.72
COMPUTATION OF ROYALTIES DUE ALVIN MOSCOW
Royalties Earned to Date
$91,529.91
Less:
Advance on Royalty
$60,000
Indexing
140
Promotion Expense
7,309.39
Purchases,
531.40
$67,980.79
-67,980.79
Total Payments
$23,549.12
Amount Due Mr. Moscow
Twenty-five percent of Royalty Payments
(25% X 23,549.12).
$ 5,887.28
Less:
Payment 8/15/62
$ 2,439.84
Payment 3/13/64
476.29
$ 2,916.13
- 2,916.13
Total Due Moscow
$ 2,971.15
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 19, 1974
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
FROM:
DAVID C. HOOPES S.
SUBJECT:
Royalties due Alvin Moscow
Attached is Fred Buzhardt's recommendation of March 4 which
the President approved that DeMarco be instructed to issue a
check in the amount of $2, 971. 15 to Mr. Moscow and that he be
furnished with Doubleday's latest statement.
Please note that it was also requested that this personal matter
be moved from the Counsel to the President's office in the White
House to the Law Offices of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander.
I have advised Buzhardt of this request and he will follow up with
the appropriate action.
Thank you.
3/19
2
50 Agnes Wildror notified 5 info first para.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 19, 1974
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
FROM:
DAVID C. HOOPES S.
SUBJECT:
Royalties due Alvin Moscow
Attached is Fred Buzhardt's recommendation of March 4 which
the President approved that DeMarco be instructed to issue a
check in the amount of $2,971.15 to Mr. Moscow and that he be
furnished with Doubleday's latest statement.
Please note that it was also requested that this personal matter
be moved from the Counsel to the President's office in the White
House to the Law Offices of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander.
I have advised Buzhardt of this request and he will follow up with
the appropriate action.
Thank you.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
March 14, 1969
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By MH HARR, Date 9/5/80
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD
FROM: Ron Ziegler
Report on President's meeting with Paul Miller, MAR 14. (5:10pm)
Paul Miller, President of the Associated Press and President of
Gannett Newspapers, is in town for the Gridiron dinner, and requested
this meeting with the President.
There were no substantive matters discussed in the meeting, and the
tone of the meeting could be characterized as one of two old friends
meeting briefly for a chat.
Following the important announcement of the ABM decision earlier
in the day, the President was very relaxed. Mr. Miller and the Presi-
dent discussed:
Golf (The President indicated there was no
time to play any more because it takes too
much time out of the day)
Exercise (The President indicated he should
exercise more but doesn't, again because of the
time. The President said he really doesn't use
the pool as much as people seem to indicate.
He said he uses it only about three times a week,
but he should exercise more.)
The President reminisced with Miller for awhile about a sailboat ride
which he took with Miller some years ago. The President indicated that
was one of the best times he has ever had.
- 2 -
Paul Miller invited the President to attend his annual pre-Gridiron
luncheon and the President indicated he could not do so because of his
meeting with the NAB today. The President in turn invited Paul Miller
and his family to attend the Sunday church services.
Mr. Miller indicated that his father was a Minister and that he had
attended the first church service in the White House and would enjoy
attending this one very much.
The President said, when he learned that Mr. Miller's father is a Minister,
"I didn't realize we came from such similar backgrounds. Although my father
was not a Minister, my family is very religious. I remember I used to go
to church four times on Sunday: to Sunday School, to church, and afternoon
and evening. Then on Wednesday there was prayer meeting and always choir
practice. So our backgrounds from that standpoint are similar.
During the meeting the President sat on the couch in a relaxed manner
with his feet propped up on the circular coffee table.
Following the meeting Mr. Miller said to me how well he thought the
President looked -- that he looked a little tired but not worn or strained.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1969
FOR:
Bob Haldeman - THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
Harry Dent
We need to give Jerry Milbank and Rogers Morton a decision
as soon as possible on what participation may be expected
of the President in the 1970 fund-raising efforts. In a
meeting this morning the President committed to nothing.
Before they entered he told me he had agreed to do the
March 11 fund-raiser in Washington, but indicated this
might be all he could do.
At the close of the meeting Milbank pulled out the attached
schedule of ten fund-raisers done by Kennedy in 1961-1963.
The President looked over the list carefully and remarked
that Kennedy had a Democrat Congress and did not therefore
have the problem that this President has.
Morton and Milbank have both indicated they might as well
quit if they cannot get more than one appearance. This is
how strongly they feel about the matter.
Attached is a copy of the briefing paper for the President
if you want to look this over further.
The President expressed a strong interest in Elly Peterson's
"Action Now" program, a partisan version of our Voluntary
Action Program. He volunteered to write many letters for
her, turning this over to me to execute. These would be
form letters expressing his interest in getting Republicans
to show an interest in people by doing volunteer work in
the public interest. I will handle this.
Morton proposed to rearrange things at the Congressional
Campaign Committee so that the National Committee would
handle all new, or non-incumbent races, and the Campaign
Committee would handle all incumbent races. The President
liked the idea very much.
Mr. Haldeman
- 2 -
October 24, 1969
Milbank presented the President with his book of letters.
If this is sent over to me I will take care of this.
Also, the question of whether Morton should run for the
U. S. Senate was discussed. Morton suggested that
Congressman Glenn Beall, Jr. run for the Senate and
Stan Blair run for Governor. The President seemed to
go along with the suggestion because he did not want to
lose Morton as National Chairman.
Morton reported on the good job being done to lay the
necessary plans for winning key state legislative seats
in accord with earlier instructions from the President.
CC: Dwight Chapin
Alex Butterfield
/
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MAR 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM OF FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 3, 1970
I.
PARTICIPANTS
The President, Congressman Thomas Kleppe of North
Dakota, Harry Dent and Murray Chotiner.
II.
PURPOSE
To discuss the possibility of Congressman Kleppe becoming
a candidate for the United States Senate from North Dakota
this year.
III.
DISCUSSION
Senator Quentin Burdick (D) is up for re-election this year. The
filing deadline is July 23, 1970 and the Primary will be September
first, 1970.
The State's two Congressional seats are held by Mark Andrews (R),
First District and Tom Kleppe (R), Second District. Reapportion-
ment will probably result in eliminating one Congressional District.
It is expected that Gov. William Guy (D) is expected to run for the
one remaining Congressional seat in 1972.
Cong. Andrews (R) was reelected in 1968 by 71. 9% of the vote and
Cong. Kleppe was reelected that year by 51. 9% of the vote.
North Dakota should be considered a Rep. State. Both legislative
houses are overwhelmingly Republican; the Statewide 1968 results
were Republican except for the governorship; Senator Milton Young (R)
is exceedingly popular.
The Congressman stated he wanted to do everything possible to
help the President but stated it would be an uphill fight, whereas
he could win his Congressional seat without much trouble. His
friends were urging him not to run for the Senate but to stay in
the House.
The President pointed out that one's friends usually do that. He had
experienced the same thing in California in 1950 when he was con-
sidering running for the Senate.
The President told Congressman Kleppe that he might just as well
run for the big one since the probabilities were that one of the
Congressional seats would be eliminated as a result of reapportion-
ment.
At the conclusion of the conference, Harry Dent and Murray Chotiner
met with the Congressman and further discussed the practical aspects
of the Congressman entering the race for the U. S. Senate.
Subsequently, Congressman Kleppe announced his candidacy for the
Senate.
Murray M. Chotiner
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MA y 5,
May 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.'
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Attorney General
Mitchell and Mr. Lee Nunn on
Wednesday, May 5, 1971
The purpose of this meeting was just for the President to chat
with Lee Nunn informally and to thank him for taking on the
important role he's agreed to assume in Mitchell's outside
campaign organization.
The President opened the meeting by telling Mr. Nunn how much
he appreciates the sacrifice he's making and the help that he will
be providing.
Then there was some general discussion of the approach to
political fund raising and to specific questions in individual
states regarding political organization, personnel and problems.
After the meeting with the President, the Attorney General and
I met at some length with Mr. Nunn to go into detail on the specific
points that had been touched upon in the Presidential meeting and
Nunn is set to follow-up on all of them.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
July 1972
A
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting with John Connally, Clark McGregor and
Charles Colson, July 11, 1972
Conclusions:
1.
Connally honestly wants and needs a rest.
2.
Despite whatever else he may say, he is keenly interested in
his own future and I do not believe he is ruling out any options.
He is very anxious to know what the President wants from him
in the way of future assignments, and in my opinion would jump
at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.
3.
Understands fully the dilemma of Democrats for Nixon, is
happy that we have not set up an organization, he does not
want to be handed a "fait accompli" but at the same time
realizes we need to get the organization set up and running
immediately and agrees completely with the strategy of
getting the Democratic endorsements now. In short, he
totally understands the difficult situation we are in, but he
is not ready to make his own decision.
4.
If he assumes the chairmanship of Democrats for Nixon, he
wants it to be a real campaign, well financed; he wants to play
a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control
in the areas for which he is responsible.
A more detailed summary of the meeting is attached.
LmDa
Charles W. Colson
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES
ONLY
WASHINGTON
July 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor
and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972
MacGregor opened the session by explaining how he wants to take over
the campaign, the things the President had discussed with him, the steps
that he, MacGregor, was taking to reorganize the Committee to -Elect
the President, the general situation politically around the country. He
then discussed the importance of the Democ rats for Nixon effort. Mac
Gregor said he was very hopeful that John Connally would agree to be
the head of our national effort in this area. I then explained all of the
Democratic support we expected to get -- Teamsters, other major
labor leaders (Connally expressed some surprise over some of the
names), leading Jews, businessmen and politicians. Several times
during the conversation, Connally came back to this point wanting to
be sure we really had the people lined up that we said we did.
I explained the dilemma we were in, that we had good people ready to
go, in fact eager to, but we were reluctant to create any organizational
framework until we found out what interests Connally had in this area
and obviously if Connally was interested in this area, we would not
set up anything that didn't have his complete approval. He seemed
very appreciative of this point and also said he understood the dilemma
completely. He further said he felt it was important to move fast and
to get Democrats defecting while their passions were aroused as they
are now. In short, he felt we shouldn't wait, that we should move out
immediately but also expressed appreciation for our not moving until
he could be involved. I used the Paulucci example saying that we were
holding him at bay, not accepting his $1 million because we didn't know
if Connally would want Paulucci involved.
EYES ONLY
2.
We also discussed the difficulty of getting defections without having
a place for the defectors to go. In the case of labor there is no
problem. Unions can announce their own endorsements and their
leadership can announce their personal endorsements. The same
is true for politicians, like Rizzo. But someone not in a public office
has an entirely different problem. I used the illustration of John
Kenney, who was formerly Jackson's campaign treasurer, former
Democratic National Committeeman from Washington, D. C. and former
Under Secretary of the Navy. He wants to support Nixon but feels that
it would be highly presumptuous to call a press conference to do so,
that he, in effect, is just an ordinary citizen. If, however, he could
announce as a member of the Board of Directors of Democrats for
Nixon, there would be a plausible reason for a public statement. I
also pointed out that in a few weeks Kenney might be taken in by
McGovern, whereas today we have him. Hence the need to have an
organized plan, people in place and an operation functioning.
Clark talked about his conversation with Dwayne Andreas, the fact that
the Democrats operation was as important as anything we would have in
the campaign and that in his judgment, a view he was sure the President
shared, that Connally was the only man who could do this. At a number
of points in the conversation, Connally kept saying, "Are we sure there
isn't anyone else who could do this?". He several times expressed
concern over his need to begin making money again, his plans to go
back to the law firm, but to retain sufficient personal freedom to be
able to campaign, the need to maintain an apartment in Washington and,
as he put it a myriad of other mundane details. He also said that if he
were to take the operation over, he would want to run it himself; he
had not gotten where he is in life by allowing other people to make
mistakes for him. If mistakes are made, it would be becau se Connally
made it on his own behalf. He indicated that he would want to assume
full responsibility for the South and the Southwest, would want to handle
money, advertising and organization. He felt the effort would demand
at least $2 to $3 million and MacGregor assured him those funds would
be available.
At several points in the conversation, Connally asked what kind of campaign
the President wanted. MacGregor spent a considerable amount of
time explaining this, the gist of which was the President, in MacGregor's
view, would not start campaigning until Halloween, that he would concentrate
on being President, using the advantages of the office and letting
surrogates handle the heavy load of campaigning. Connally kept asking
EYES
ONLY
3.
who would attack McGovern. I didn't make the point that Connally
would be the best man for fear of turning Connally off. I did make
the point that we would be hitting very hard on the issues, that we
would not be attacking McGovern personally, but cutting his positions
hard and all of our speakers would have to assume responsibility for
this.
At 3 or 4 times during the meeting, Connally said, "When I do this
11
or "The way I am going to run this is
"
At several points I thought
he was on the verge of saying yes. Needless to say, neither Clark
nor I put it to him that hard to force an answer. At the end of the
meeting, he said he never made decisions when he was tired and
that therefore he didn't feel he could make a decision until he had
had a little rest. He agreed, however, with the point that MacGregor
and I made that the best time for a press conference would be Friday
or Saturday, immediately following his meeting with the President.
I made the point at least twice that it was my idea to raise the issue
with Connally simply because I felt we were under enormous time
pressures, but I realized full well that the discussion should have
taken place exclusively between the President and Connally. Each
time I raised it, Connally demured and said he did not stand on
protocol and in some ways preferred it this way because he could
talk frankly and kick around the pros and cons. He also said he
was glad to have time to think it through. I told him that we were
frankly jumping the gun simply because we were getting so many
urgent appeals from Democrats and we didn't want to accept support
until after it had been discussed with Connally, but at the same time
not lose it by delaying. He agreed with both points.
After MacGregor left, I deliberately stayed behind for a few minutes
and said to Connally that I personally had very warm feelings for
him, that I had no idea what his interests were in the future, but I
didn't think anything that Clark or I were suggesting would in any
way hurt Connally in the future; that in my opinion, a very historic political
re-alignment was taking place, that Nixon was building a new coalition.
The point I made was that whatever his interests are in the future, I felt
it would not be detrimental to be part of the effort to build a new political
EYES ONLY
4.
alliance, which I felt we had the opportunity to do this year. Connally
said he had no personal ambitions of any kind but that he agreed with
my analysis that we are on the verge of a massive change in political
allegiences around the country and that the President could very well
be the architect of a new majority in this country. He then asked me what
the President meant in his last press conference when he said that he
had another assignment for Connally in mind. I told him that I had
never discussed that question with the President and that I didn't know,
but that I knew for a fact that the President thought that Connally was
one of the very few people who would have the courage to do the things
that had to be done in the Government and I thought his remark that
Connally was able to do anything in Government was very significant
and reflected how highly the President regarded Connally. Connally
said he thought the remark was very important; he had read the
President's press conference very carefully, particularly the remarks
about the Vice Presidency. He then said that, "Of course the President
has no choice with respect to Agnew. I assume the reason he went
through the answers he did was to get back at Agnew because he was
still mad at the comment that Agnew made about a Democrat not running
on a Republican ticket. 11 I told Connally I had no idea, that this was one
subject I had never discussed with the President, that a President always
has all of his options open, especially this President, but that since the
subject had never come up when I was present, I really couldn't cast any
light on it. I simply said again how highly the President regards Connally
and that whatever the President said, I am sure he said with great
deliberatness. Several times Connally commented about the specific
language the President used in his last press conference with regard
to the Vice Presidency. Connally said he might like to talk to me again
today, but in any event he would be in touch before leaving the city and
that he would want to do anything that the President wanted him to do
to be of help in getting the President re-elected which he felt was the
most important thing he could do. I haven't the slightest doubt but that
Connally was fishing with respect to what I could tell him on his future
and in my opinion he is greatly interested personally in his own future,
specifically this year.
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES ONLY
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Democrats for Nixon
During your meeting with John Connally, you might wish to get into
the question of Democrats for Nixon and Connally's role. Needless
to say, he is a virtually unanimous choice to head the organization if
he will do SO. Clark McGregor and I opened this question yesterday.
We didn't conclude anything but we discussed the question thoroughly
(separate detailed memo is attached).
We have been moving ahead, as you know, with efforts to recruit a
number of prominent Democ rats. We have done so because in the
immediate aftermath of the Convention the anti-McGovern feelings
will be the strongest and we can build momentum during this period,
creating the public impression of a wholesale defection from McGovern.
We have proceeded in the knowledge, however, that John Connally likes
to do things his way and that he might resent some of the efforts we
have made since he in effect was not running the show. We have, there-
fore, been walking a tightrope.
What we would like to come out of your meeting with Connally is his
ratification of what we have done to date and his willingness to in effect
take over what we have gotten started. Alternatively, we need a green
light to go ahead with our next best choices to head at least for now the
Democrats' effort.
All of the endorsements that we have sought thus far have been of indiv-
iduals. Jeno Paulucci went a little further than we had asked and formed
a Committee of Concerned Democrats and Independents with 7 other mem-
bers. We want to fold it into Democrats for Nixon on the assumption that
Connally approves; if Connally does object, we can, of course, keep it
independent but this will give us some problems with Paulucci, who is
sensitive to being in a subordinate position.
EYES ONLY
-2-
Paulucci, like Dwayne Andreas, expects Connally to run a national
operation; if, in fact, we ask Paulucci, Andreas and their friends to
be part of something other than the National Democrats for Nixon effort.
I fear they may feel we are downgrading their importance. Andreas
has a list of prominent former Humphrey supporters that he wants to
recruit immediately but once again he feels the need to find the mechan-
ism to bring them in. Max Fisher has at least a dozen prominent Jewish
Democrats that want to be folded into our organization. Once again, we
need a place for them to come.
We have also picked up the endorsement and/or commitment to endorse
of several labor leaders. In addition to the Teamsters, we have Calhoon,
Gleason, Ken Lyons, Mike May, Brennan, quite likely Rademacher and
a series of lesser lights, principally state level leaders.
Rizzo will be announcing soon as will Lausche. Smathers and Jack March
are working through the lists of former Members of Congress. We have
a bloc of former Jackson supporters headed by John Kenney who will
announce, but who would like to talk to Connally first. Balzano has a
group of reasonably prominent ethnics who can either be folded into
Democrats for Nixon or become part of the ethnic apparatus.
We have done nothing in terms of organization structure because once
again, knowing Connally's personality, we have not wanted to jump the
gun on him. We would like to get the organization established, set up
a national office, have Connally announce its existence and, of course,
his chairmanship as soon as possible. This will be the invitation to
disaffected Democrats whom we have not sought but who are looking
for a place to come.
It is the recommendation of McGregor, Mitchell and I that Connally move
as soon as possible so that he can become the catalyst we need. A series
of individual endorsements over the next two weeks is fine but none of
them will have the national impact of an announcement of a national
organization opening followed by a daily announcement of new recruits.
On the organization side, we have hired two young men, temporarily
running the effort out of an improvised office. One is a young Vashington
?
PR man, former aide to Sargent Shriver by the name of Mickey Gardner.
I am very impressed with what I have seen of him so far and would hope
he would meet with Connally's approval. He has given up his PR job and is
available to us through the campaign. We also have John O'Neill, a first
year law student from Texas, for the next two months. (He made something
of a national name debating John Kerry.) To run the operation here, it is
-3-
EYES ONLY
my strong recommendation that we bring in Mike Monroney, Jr. as
the principal chief, day to day operative. Gardner and O'Neill would
work for him. I have known Monroney for many years. Connally knows
his father. Monroney is 45, ran for Congress in Maryland and lost,
is a life-long Democrat, but conservative and a Jackson supporter.
He is prepared to fold up his own business to spend full time, but
needless to say, is unwilling to make that move without knowing he
has Connally's blessing. Mike also would like for personal reasons
to have Connally talk to his father, Former Senator Monroney. Mon-
roney's feeling is that a call from Connally would make his father more
understanding of Mike's desire to join the campaign and, more import-
antly, it will also result in his father joining Democrats for Nixon as
well. Monroney, Sr. was very highly regarded by his colleagues and
this would be a very significant defection.
I have not attempted in the foregoing to enumerate all of the potential
Democratic defections that we believe we have. We believe prominent
sitting Democrats in Congress will work for us even if quietly or perhaps
will permit their associates to be involved in our effort (as is the case
with Rooney and Delaney). We also believe parts of the Daley operation
will support us publicly. We have enormous possibilities on Wall Street.
We have some Democratic political leaders like Esposito. We have
former Democratic office holders like Governor Gary of Oklahoma
and Governor McNair of South Carolina.
The problem in a nutshell is that we cannot move out and really do the
aggressive job we need to until we staff an operation and give people a
committee to join. We cannot set up the committee and staff the oper-
ation until we know where we stand with Connally; hence, we are really
very much in limbo at the very time when we should be actively and
publicly bringing Democrats into the fold.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM :
H.R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT :
Dinner With John Connally
July 13, 1972 at
La Casa Pacifica
This dinner was to review with Connally the plans for putting together
a Democrats for Nixon organization, and primarily to enlist Connally
as the key man in doing this.
Connally has some reluctance because of time and personal problems,
but indicated that he would do everything in his power to be of help to
the President and that if this was the best role for him, he would work
out a way to do it.
There was a detailed discussion of various personal matters relating
to Connally's position in the campaign and in the future. It was a very
pleasant and productive meeting.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Connally/Stans
I am sorry to report to you on an unfortunate incident involving
Connally as to which you should be advised and perhaps call
Connally if you feel it is warranted.
Last week MacGregor asked to meet with Connally and myself to
be sure we were thoroughly coordinated -- a necessary thing to
do obviously. We decided to include Stans because under the
new statute, Connally cannot spend funds without Stans' permis-
sion. Obviously fund raising and expenditures have to be closely
coordinated because of the inevitable competition for the same
sources, the need for initial funding by Stans as well as the strict
statutory ceilings.
In the meeting we had this afternoon (after your visit with Connally),
Stans became very difficult; he seemed very unhappy over the whole
Democrats for Nixon effort. He said that he was already getting
money from Democrats and obviously any funds Connally raised
would be "in competition" with his efforts. He further said that he
had an obligation to raise $40 million and that anything Connally
needed would be in excess of that and he didn't think he could raise
it. MacGregor said that he would gladly reduce his budget to make
room for Connally's needs. I made the point that Connally would
have to be assured of a budget of at least $3 million (since Connally
had told me over the weekend he didn't want to launch an effort unless
he was assured of funding of at least that amount).
Connally became visibly angry during the lunch especially when Stans
said that if Connally raised more money than his "budgeted" figure,
he would have to turn it over to Stans. During the lunch Connally said
EYES ONLY
2.
he wasn't sure he wanted to embark on the Democrats for Nixon
effort at all and Stans allowed as to how he wished the President
could find another fund raiser. Despite frequent attempts by
MacGregor and me to keep it under control, the atmosphere was
distinctly hostile.
After the lunch, I assured Connally that the candidate's views on
this would prevail and that I knew exactly how you felt about it and
that he shouldn't worry about Stans. I urged him to leave it in my
hands. He said that he didn't ask for this job and that while he had
no trouble at all dealing with MacGregor or myself, that it was best
to find out right from the beginning where he stood. He said
attitudes were very important to him, that he thought Stans had a
very negative attitude and really acted as if Connally was an
"intruder and competitor". I said again that I knew where the
President stood and Connally said that isn't good enough. He
said, "The President has to let his people know where he stands.
Obviously Stans doesn't have the word. 11
I assured Connally that I would see that Stans did understand the
President's views and Connally said, "Well, I will have to see for
myself". He said he was unable now to agree to announce Democrats
for Nixon on August 1. (Yesterday he had decided that would be the
date.)
I think Connally was putting on a little show for everyone involved.
He is a very sensitive fellow and Stans can indeed be rather dour
when it comes to discussing campaign funds. Also, Maury is very
tired and under a lot of pressure.
Connally, unfortunately, will have to work with Stans; under the new
statute, complete autonomy is impossible. I assured Connally that
he would be spared anything like this in the future and that Jacobson,
Connally's counsel, could handle it. He said he didn't want Jacobson
"subjected" to this either.
Under the circumstances, MacGregor and I think it may be important
for you to tell Connally that we have reported to you on the lunch and
that he can be assured that there will be no problem, that the budget
matters have been determined by you, that autonomy is to be maintained
and that if he can't deal with Stans, he can work through MacGregor and
me exclusively. Clark and I will simply have to handle Maury.
(Clark, Chuck & I all agree you should
not contact Stans. Will handle him
H.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
JOHN W. DEAN, III
X
SUBJECT:
Execution of President and Mrs. Nixon's
Estate Plan
Monday, August 14, 1972
2:49 PM
PARTICIPANTS:
The First Lady
John H. Alexander, Firm of Mudge Rose
Guthrie and Alexander
Richard S. Ritzel, Firm of Mudge Rose
Guthrie and Alexander
H. R. Haldeman
John D. Ehrlichman
Alexander P. Butterfield
John Ratchford
John W. Dean, III
The President and Mrs. Nixon met with John H. Alexander
and Richard S. Ritzel, both of the law firm of Mudge Rose
Guthrie and Alexander, to review and sign their wills and the
three trust instruments comprising their estate plan. H. R.
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman also signed certain of the
documents. Alexander Butterfield witnessed the signings and
John Ratchford notarized them. Throughout the meeting, the
mood was light and informal.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
RONALD L. ZIEGLER RZ
SUBJECT:
President's meeting with Bailey K. Howard
Monday, August 14, 1972
12:00 noon
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Bailey K. Howard
Ronald L. Ziegler
Bailey K. Howard opened the conversation by saying that in 1968 he and
his publications supported President Nixon, and that he wanted to do so
again in 1972. Noting the fact that he has retired from full-time partici-
pation in his job and has moved to a new home on Mulholland Drive in
Southern California, Bailey Howard said he had time to volunteer to the
1972 re-election effort.
He proposed that he take the month of September and a part of October to
solicit endorsements from weekly and other smaller daily newspapers in key
states. Specifically Howard suggested that he send a series of three letters
prepared on the robotype machine to editors and publishers of smaller
publications in the key states. He also indicated his interest to visit various
papers to tillicit their editorial support.
What he has in mind is a personal effort centered around direct mail and
individual contact, and he is looking to Herb Klein and the MacGregor organ-
ization for assistance in preparing materials.
In the course of the conversation Howard asked the President on which key
states did the President want him to concentrate. The President said New
York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, Missouri and Ohio. Also to overlap
into Indiana, Wisconsin, and New Jersey.
Howard also pointed out that he would like to place a $100 ad in many of the
weekly papers in the key states, and also he is prepared to contribute
$20, 000 of his money in this effort, splitting the cost with the MacGregor
Committee.
-2-
The President requested that we provide materials to Bailey Howard
and said, "None of those thick books -- give him the thick book; that
is all right. But boil the material down for Bailey Howard to edit into
his own words. Give him only a few pages on the main issues. " Klein
can discuss this with Bailey Howard, the President said.
Howard made the point that he wanted to devote his full time to this and
would do so at his own expense. But he wanted assistance in preparing
three letters that could be sent to daily newspapers throughout the country.
Republican
March 20, 1973
National
Committee.
George Bush, Chairman
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
GEORGE BUSH
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GOVERNORS WILLIAM T. CAHILL AND
LINWOOD HOLTON - TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 1973
Ken Cole, George Bush sat in on this meeting. Cahill had been
pressing for a meeting to get the President as fully committed
as possible in his re-election campaign. The President told
Cahill that he could not get involved in a primary, stating that
Sandman was a good supporter of the President's and that he, the
President, had other commitments around the country that were
difficult, such as California and Illinois. Thus it would be
more difficult if he endorsed. Governor Cahill readily under-
stood this, as did Holton. The mood was generally friendly.
Cahill was most understanding about the non-endorsement and
was pleased with the President's suggested formula as to an-
nouncement. Cahill was going to announce his candidacy the
next day, and the President said it would be fine to say that
he had seen the President, that the President was not going to
involve himself in a primary, that the President appreciated
the work Cahill had done for him as Chairman of his campaign,
and that there was good cooperation between Cahill and the White
House. The atmosphere was favorable. Later Holton reported that
he was very pleased with the way the meeting had gone. Cahill
did not press, as I had feared, for a Presidential endorsement
in the primary.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 484-6500.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 15, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
DEAN BURCH
DB
SUBJECT:
Presidential Trip to the Michigan 8th C. D.
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
George Bush
Bryce Harlow (see note)
Dean Burch
Immediately following the Republican Leadership Meeting on Tuesday,
April 2, 1974, the President asked those listed above to step into the
Oval Office for a discussion of his proposed campaign trip to Michigan's
8th Congressional District in behalf of James Sparling, Republican
candidate in a special election to fill the vacancy created by Rep.
James Harvey's accession to the Federal bench. The election was
scheduled for April 16, and the trip was tentatively set for April 10,
1974.
By way of background, an invitation from Sparling had issued on
March 20 or 21; Bush proposed a campaign visit in conversation
during the Republican Gala in D. C. on March 27; and Bush and
Burch had reviewed recent poll data in Chicago on March 29 at a
Midwest Regional GOP meeting. The poll showed Sparling trailing
Traxler, the Democratic candidate, by about 9 points.
On April 1, 1974, Sparling began hedging his invitation and said he
didn't want the President to campaign for him, simply to "meet the
- 2 -
people" and "address the issues". During this brief meeting, the
President observed that he was going to get blamed for a Sparling
defeat in any case, that the candidate was "ten points back" and
that, if he made the trip, he might be able to cut that gap by
several points. On balance, the President thought it would be
worth the risk. The other participants agreed and the April 10
date was tentatively set.
NOTE: I do not recall that Harlow took part in this meeting and
believe that he did not. He was, in any case, opposed to the trip.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 10, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DEAN BURCH
FROM:
CHARLES W.B. WARDELL, III
CW
SUBJECT:
Memorandum for the President's File
Please prepare a Memorandum for the President's File on his
meeting with George Bush, Mr. Haig, Mr. Harlow and you on
Tuesday, April 2, 1974 at 10:40 a.m.
DATE DUE: Forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of this memorandum.
Thank you.
November 15, 1967
Dear Stets:
You must surely be as pleased as I am by our
November 4 victories in Virginia and also in
New Jersey and elsewhere. 4 couple of days
age 1 tried to reach yo 1 by telephone to tell you
how much I appreciated the very generous help
you gave to Lin Holson's campaign. Without
you, Holton would not have had the financial
assistance be needed.
With warm personal regards.
Sincerely,
Mr. J. D. Station Coleman
The F Flains, Virginia 22171
RN: Melencamp:emu