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This file contains:
From Charles S. Rhyne to Nixon, letter requesting 175 copies of Nixon's memo on "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion." 1pg. [Letter], 9/26/1968
From Lance Tarrance Jr. to Mr. Dick McCormick, letter of thanks for receiving a draft copy of "Dewey's (1948) Plunge to Oblivion,"as well compliments. 1pg. [Letter], 10/9/1968
Copy of "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion", which examines the final six weeks of the Dewey-Truman campaign of 1948. 11 pgs. [Memo], 10/1/1968
From Richard V. Allan to Dick McCormack, complimenting McCormack's memo concerning Vietnam, includes of copy of McCormack's memo. 10 pgs. [Memo], n.d.
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WHSF: Returned, 32-24
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This file contains:
From Charles S. Rhyne to Nixon, letter requesting 175 copies of Nixon's memo on "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion." 1pg. [Letter], 9/26/1968
From Lance Tarrance Jr. to Mr. Dick McCormick, letter of thanks for receiving a draft copy of "Dewey's (1948) Plunge to Oblivion,"as well compliments. 1pg. [Letter], 10/9/1968
Copy of "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion", which examines the final six weeks of the Dewey-Truman campaign of 1948. 11 pgs. [Memo], 10/1/1968
From Richard V. Allan to Dick McCormack, complimenting McCormack's memo concerning Vietnam, includes of copy of McCormack's memo. 10 pgs. [Memo], n.d.
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
24
09/26/1968
Letter
From Charles S. Rhyne to Nixon, letter
requesting 175 copies of Nixon's memo on
"Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion." 1pg.
32
24
10/09/1968
Letter
From Lance Tarrance Jr. to Mr. Dick
McCormick, letter of thanks for receiving a
draft copy of "Dewey's (1948) Plunge to
Oblivion,"as well compliments. 1pg.
32
24
10/01/1968
Memo
Copy of "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion",
which examines the final six weeks of the
Dewey-Truman campaign of 1948. 11 pgs.
32
24
n.d.
Memo
From Richard V. Allan to Dick McCormack,
complimenting McCormack's memo
concerning Vietnam, includes of copy of
McCormack's memo. 10 pgs.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Page 1 of 1
UNITED
CHARLES S. RHYNE
FOR NHER
National Chairman
-AGNEW
HEADQUARTERS
WILLARD HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004
PHONE (202) 783-1560
September 26, 1968
Mr. Dick McCormack
Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Dick:
Your memo on "Dewey's Plunge to Oblivion" is some-
thing I would like to send to all of my people.
Here is a quote from one of our fieldmen:
"Incidentally, both the local and state party organizations
have been sitting on their hands, hoping and waiting for
a Nixon landslide to get their state candidates elected.
You have a mirage in the sky, but no substance here.
This is blunt but the truth. 11
I am worried about such comments so if and when you
get your draft done in quantity, I'd like about 175 copies.
Sincerely,
Churlie
Charles S. Rhyne
National Chairman
CSR/P
cc: John Mitchell
*
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NAtional 8-6800
RESEARCH DIVISION
RAY C. BLISS
CHAIRMAN
October 9, 1968
Mr. Dick McCormick
Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Dick:
Just wanted to thank you again for leaving a copy of your draft on
"Dewey's (1948) Plunge to Oblivion." I read it and thought it quite good,
and in fact, I distributed it to all of our senior staff.
You might say that your memorandum has kept us on our toes.
Jane
Deputy Director of Research
LT:dh
October 1, 1968
MEMORANDUM
Dick McCormack: Foreign Affairs Staff Member
SEPT.-NOV. 1948 DEWEY'S PLUNGE TO OBLIVION
"How did we go wrong? Frankly I do not know." Roper, the day after
the 1948 election.
"Poll taking is still an infant science."
Dr. George Gallup,
same day.
"How could fifty members of the Washington Press Club
be unanimously so wrong?"
New York Times, same
day.
"I can't believe it! I just can't believe it!" A defeated Republican
office seeker who declined
to be identified, same
day.
The purpose of this memorandum is to take a brief look at
the atmosphere of the final six weeks of the Dewey-Truman campaign
of 1948; and see what implications this may have for us now.
Domestically the U.S. had just shaken itself free of the
economic paralysis of the 1930s. Virtually every voter remembered
the soup kitchens, the mountains of unsaleable farm commodities,
the collapse of the banking structure; and the fear, desperation
and individual humiliation which accompanied these conditions. But
by October, 1948 the people were fat and happy.
Major concerns on the homefront were: 1. A 10 percent annual
rate of inflation (Food prices were up 131 percent since 1939); 2. An
enormous harvest which had a depressing effect upon farm produce
prices; 3. Labor resentment at the Taft Hartley Act; and 4. A fear
that the new found prosperity might evaporate.
Except for the Eastern Seaboard, foreign affairs really
didn't concern the voter excessively. After all, the U.S. had just
crushed fascism, had exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, and
an economy which was the envy of the world.
There were trouble spots, to be sure. Czechoslovakia had
just fallen. China's future seemed questionable. Berlin was being
2.
squeezed. Greece was under attack. Incidents of violence were
beginning in Korea. And the Stern Gang had just assassinated the
United Nations representative in Jerusalem. In September, 1948, a
new Draft Law was enacted and Secretary of State George Marshall flew
to Europe trying to develop plans to resurrect the continent's
tattered economic, political and military structure.
Politically the Democratic Party was wracked by dissention.
Not since the slavery issue split the Democratic party in 1860 and
put the first Republican President in the White House had America
witnessed anything like the internecine warfare in the Democratic
Party in 1948. On the left, Henry Wallace's Progressive Party
savagely attacked Truman's hard line against Russia and his relatively
conservative economic policies at home. On the Right, Strom Thurmond's
Dixiecrat movement, embittered by the Civil Rights Plank of the
Democratic platform, hoped to prevent anyone from getting a majority
in the Electoral College and thus to throw the election into the House
of Representatives.
The Republicans, exhilarated by their Congressional Sweep
in 1946, were convinced that the hour for a recapture of the Presi-
dency had struck. It was "time for a change". Pollsters unanimously
agreed. So did almost every major newspaper in the country, including
The New York Times.
It was against this background of events that Thomas Dewey,
the newly nominated Republican candidate for President, began his
campaign in September, 1948, a campaign which he promised would be
"rugged and extensive
"
"As his train rolled through the rich Pacific Northwest,
Tom Dewey was obviously gaining in confidence, and apparently he was
translating into a new maturity. He seemed less like a candidate
bidding for votes and more like a statesman speaking not only for his
party, but for his country." TIME - Oct. 18, 1948.
"Some observers, like columnist Joseph Alsop, found his manner
3.
'a trifle too ostentatiously noble', but they were all agreed on one
thing. He was making and keeping votes." TIME - Oct. 4, 1948.
"By every available piece of evidence, the voters had
already made up their minds to answer: Yes, it's time for a change.
That was why Earl Warren (the Vice Presidential candidate) could afford
to campaign like a big friendly Saint Bernard, tail wagging his way
east across the nation. The Republicans had only to raise no ruckus,
make no thumping blunders, keep their fingers crossed against a
world upheaval - and their election seemed assured." TIME - Sept. 27,
1948.
"Except for a promise to his farm audience that price
supports would be maintained, Dewey attempted no detailed outline of
his program, shrewdly contented himself with general pledges which
friends wanted to hear and enemies would find difficult to attack. He
promised a foreign policy made effective by men and women
who really understand the nature of the threat to peace and who have
the vigor, the knowledge, and the experience required to wage peace
successfully." He promised an administration 'made up of men and
women whose love of their country comes ahead of every other considera-
tion' TIME - Sept. 28, 1948.
"One of the last readings which each of Dewey's prepared
speeches is given before delivery is for the purpose of taking out
or toning down any allusion to Truman which might widely be regarded
as harsh or enhance his underdog role.
"In the words of one of Dewey's chief advisors, 'We don't
want this election to leave any bitterness'. 00
"You get the feeling that Dewey chafes a little under these
self imposed restraints. He can, and likes to punch hard. And a good
many Republican candidates for lesser office would like to have him
hit with full force
"
"The best way to win a presidential election is not always
the best way to lay a foundation for a successful administration. But
in this case, the two objectives go together. Dewey must be credited,
4.
not only with smart campaign tactics, but with sound strategy prepara-
tion for the trials beyond November 2." ERNEST K. LINDLEY, NEWSWEEK -
Oct. 25, 1948.
So confident was the Dewey team that "Presidential Candidate
Thomas E. Dewey rested on his oars last week riding the ground swell
of pro-Republican sentiment. But as the man who expected to command
the ship of state next winter, Dewey continued to take soundings on
the shoal water ahead. Throughout his Western Journey, he had been
in daily communication with his chief advisor on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Delegate John Foster Dulles. Now Dulles was returning from Paris
to make a first hand report on the international conditions."
NEWSWEEK - Oct. 18, 1948.
On the same page of NEWSWEEK which described Dewey resting
on his oars, Truman's campaign was contrasted.
"Like a touring star, President Truman hardly changed his
act from day to day. Sometimes his words were barbed, at other times
the folksy appeal was stronger. The crowds loved it either way,
roaring or chuckling their approval. And like an actor facing an
affectionate audience, Mr. Truman gave it everything he had, to cries
of "Attaboy Harry". After only a four day respite from his Western
Campaign trip, he was still incredibly tireless, this time barnstorming
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and upstate New York. Drawing increasingly
larger and more vociferous crowds, he could point to an SRO sign at
almost every stop." NEWSWEEK - Oct. 18, 1948.
While Truman entertained the crowds and garnered sensational
headlines with blasts at "Fascist Republicans" and epithets such as
"These Republican gluttons of privilege are cold men, they are cunning
men", he systematically created the impression among the newly pros-
perous farmers and workers that "the country could go to the dogs if
the Republicans win." The question was, "Are you going to let another
Republican blight wipe out your prosperity?" TIME - Sept. 27, 1948.
Assailing the Republican controlled "Do Nothing Congress" for
"voting themselves a cut in taxes and you a cut in freedom", Truman
accused the Republicans of being the "tool of special interests".
5.
"If you let the Republican reactionaries get complete
control of Government
I would fear for the wages and the living
standards of the American working man, but even for our democratic
institutions of free labor and free enterprise." TIME - Sept. 27, 1948.
"And everwhere large crowds turned out to cheer the dogged
little man." TIME - Sept. 27, 1948.
"So confident was the Dewey team that the Republican candi-
date, during last week's swing to the Great Plains and back, appealed
more for votes for GOP Senators than for himself. He still pitched
his campaign on National Unity. He still argued only in terms of
broad generalities." NEWSWEEK - Oct. 25, 1948.
"We are entering upon a campaign to unite America. We are
going to move forward to a new unity." LIFE - Nov. 1, 1948
Even Truman's incredible blunder in foreign affairs - his
big weakness - the "Vinson to Moscow" fiasco - failed to provoke a
hard hitting statement from Dewey. While privately deploring the
Truman scheme as a "desperate blunder" with possible "tragic effects
around the world", Dewey publicly confined his attack to the follow-
ing statement.
"The people of America wholeheartedly and vigorously support
the labors of our bipartisan delegation and specifically its insistence
upon a prompt lifting of the blockade of Berlin. The nations of the
world can rest assured that the people of America are in fact united
in their foreign policy and will firmly and unshakeably uphold the
United Nations and our friends of the Free World in every step to
build and preserve the peace." NEWSWEEK - Oct. 18, 1948.
With the candidate they preferred mouthing such platitudes
as "Our future lies before us", friendly newspapers searched for the
meager line here or there that might make a match for those headlines
being garnered by the President. But Dewey believed that his major
error in the 1944 campaign was his all out blast at FDR and thus con-
fined himself to vapid, uncontroversial platitudes.
6.
On the day before the election, the Gallup Poll gave Dewey
49.5% to Truman's 44.5%. Time Magazine gave Dewey 29 states with 350
electoral votes to Truman's 9 and Thurmond's 4 states. Roper, basking
in the prestige of having predicted the previous three elections within
less than 1 percent error, announced that Dewey would have a landslide
comparable only to Roosevelt's massive victory over Landon. These pre-
dictions were consistent with the soundings made throughout the campaign.
Fifty members of the Washington Press Club, most of them bureau chiefs,
unanimously predicted a Dewey victory.
ON NOVEMBER 2 THE ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTION WERE:
States
Electoral
Candidate
Carried
Vote
Popular Vote
Truman
28
304
23,600,000
Dewey
16
189
21,500,000
Thurmond
4
38
1,000,000
Wallace
0
0
1,100,000
The Democrats also gained majorities in both Houses of Congress.
What Happened?
One Dewey partisan in the candidate's hometown of Owosso,
Michigan, theorized that "There are just more damned fools in this
country than there are intelligent people." It seems likely that this
theory applied to Dewey's mobile campaign headquarters, the "Victory
Special" if not to the country as a whole.
More specifically:
1. The farm vote went to Truman because he convinced them
that the Republican Congress had slashed programs designed to benefit
the farmers, that the Republicans would cut back on price supports,
and that the Democrats deserved the farmer's gratitude. Dewey refused
to counter these and other specific accusations beyond a vague
statement indicating that he would not abolish all price supports.
2. Labor mechanically and efficiently got out the vote to
oppose Dewey because of outrage at the Taft Hartley Act.
7.
3. Truman as president systematically cultivated special
groups of voters, such as the 1,500,000 Federal Employees whose
pensions were increased during September 1948.
4. Dewey's speeches were so bland that even though the vast
majority of newspapers were in favor of him, they couldn't scroungeup
enough sex to compete against Truman's sensational headlines.
Example. "Truman Compares Dewey to Hitler".
Dewey's campaign was devoid of emotion. To quote one post election
analysis: "What explains it is the distrust of the warm sentient
average man for the man or the party of calculation. "
6. Lulled to slumber by the predictions of pollsters and
columnists, the Republicans failed to make maximum effort. In fact
the Republican National Committee cut the party's radio money as well
as its time - down $200,000 from a 1944 high of $700,000, in the
mistaken belief that the election of Dewey was in the bag and conse-
quently there was little need to waste money answering the Democrats'
charges. Instead of refuting the "Gluttons of Privilege" epithets,
the Republican radio campaign concentrated on a bland spot announcement:
"DEWEY GETS THINGS DONE. REMEMBER, DEWEY GETS THINGS DONE."
7. The precinct workers of the Republican party, already
fewer in number than the Democrats, lulled by the same siren song of
complacency, failed to actively proselytize during October and to
urge indifferent Republicans to go to the polls on November 2. Since
the voters weren't terribly excited about either candidate, the party
commanding the most active and efficient machinery to get the voters
to the polling booths carried the day.
8. Truman was greatly helped in key states by a large number
of popular Democrat candidates for Senate, Governor and House races.
Douglas in Illinois, Humphrey in Minnesota, Lausche in Ohio, etc., etc.
IMPLICATIONS FOR 1968
Many of the implications of the 1948 campaign are so self
evident as to require no further amplification. And, of course, there
are important differences between 1948 and 1968. For one, the average
voter no longer has the specter of the Depression foremost in his
8.
consciousness. And after 8 years of Eisenhower, public fears that the
Republican party would reverse all the social legislation of the New
and Fair Deals have evaporated.
Another important difference is that Humphrey, unlike Truman,
does not command the office and prestige of the presidency. Nor
apparently has he a string of extremely popular candidates for local
offices to help him through key areas. And, of course, Truman had no
seemingly endless war on his hands, nor was he plagued by race riots
terrorizing American cities.
In a nut shell, in 1948 after a ten year depression, things
were finally going along just fine and people were concerned about
rocking the boat with new and unproven leadership. In 1968 two
monstrous problems dismay and frighten voters and people are looking
for leadership with solutions.
SPLINTER PARTIES 1948 and 1968
The threat of the splinter parties in 1948, while serious,
was smaller than today. Russia's post war belligerence had taken much
of the credibility out of Henry Wallace's attacks on Truman's hard
line. The widespread prosperity reduced the effectiveness of Wallace's
attacks on Truman economic policies. Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat
movement against the comparatively mild civil rights plank of the
Democratic platform seemed rather irrelevant to many Southerners
living in an iron clad segregated society. As a consequence each of
these splinter groups received only about 1,000,000 votes.
Today's Wallace movement focuses on the fears and resent-
ments of a large percentage of lower and middle class whites. The
Negros, flag burners, pot smokers, hippies, yippies, etc., appear to
threaten their whole system of values. A vote for Wallace seems to
be a way of vicariously lashing out physically at the long-haired pro-
testers and militant Negros. It is interesting that one of Wallace's
best crowd pleasing lines is his threat to run over any hippy or
protester who might lay in front of his car after Wallace's being
9.
elected President.
The latest poll soundings indicate that 21% of the voters
would vote for him today. Yet to be determined is how many more
voters really plan to cast their ballot for Wallace but are ashamed
to admit it to pollsters.
A blatant appeal by us to the hard core of the Wallace
element probably would cost us the election. Perhaps the most
sensible way to approach the bulk of potential Wallace supporters
is to issue a stream of balanced statements and speeches decrying
violence and proposing concrete improvements in ghetto conditions.
Ghetto schools (invariably the worst in facilities and faculty in
the City) should be upgraded. Black Capitalism emphasized (Federal
loan guarantees to low income entrepreneurs through local banks).
"Pride of ownership" theme should be stressed (Home improvement loan
and mortgage guarantees). Tax credits should be offered to industry
to hire and train hard core unemployed (Bell Telephone of Michigan
and Ford Motor Company's experiments in Detroit ) Each of these
constructive statements gives us an opportunity and a platform for
saying "WE CAN NOT HAVE RIOTS IN OUR STREETS."
The average Wallace sympathizer is probably not merely anti-
Negro. He is afraid. He is afraid that the value of his house - the
major investment of his life - will plunge in value amidst an invasion
of "low class" Negros. He is afraid that his union job security will
vanish if large numbers of Negros are admitted into his trade union.
He is afraid that his wife and daughter will be attacked by Negro
hoodlums. He is afraid that the education and safety of his children
will be jeopardized by bussing them to inferior schools in Negro ghetto
areas.
It is by addressing ourselves frequently to these specific
fears in a constructive manner that we can best combat the Wallace
threat.
Since the lower middle class reads the papers and watches
10.
the media with far less attention and care than more educated elements
of the population, and since Nixon gets far more prominent coverage
in the media than Agnew, I suggest that it would be a mistake to give
Governor Agnew the major burden of carrying the message of the Republi-
can ticket to the potential Wallace voter. (Is the Wallace voter
watching "Face the Nation"? Is he reading the Times and Post
political and editorial sections?) What kind of coverage do the news-
papers in Cicero and Levittown give Nixon and Agnew's respective
comments?
COMPLACENCY
All available journalistic and poll evidence suggested that
Dewey would win in 1948. As a consequence, the grass roots level of
the Republican political machine (the Precinct workers) failed to
make a vigorous effort to propagandize the voters during October, 1948.
On election day, the same thing occurred. This is probably the biggest
danger to our campaign right now. To combat this, I suggest that State
and Local Chairmen be sent large numbers of reproduced editorials analyz-
ing the Dewey defeat in 1948 to distribute to their ward and precinct
leaders.
The second danger of complacency is that one's statements
become so bland and uncontroversial as to be boring. The underdog in
desperation has a tendency to lash out with increasing vehemence
as the campaign progresses. In competition for headlines, this
situation can be deadly. This is particularly dangerous because
political scientists (v.o. Key, etc., etc.) have documented that
a large number of voter switchovers occurs in the last two weeks of a
campaign. We must make damn sure that we keep generating exciting,
headline provoking, proposals and attacks. We must also anticipate
that Lyndon Johnson will pull out all the stops during the next three
or four weeks to make his administration look as good as possible to
the voters. We will, therefore, be competing for favorable headlines
not only with Humphrey, but also Johnson.
11.
One of the legitimate areas for garnering headlines is
Humphrey's verbal blunders. Let's not find ourselves again in the
situation where "TRUMAN COMPARES DEWEY TO HITLER" spreads across the
front pages of the land, while Harold Stassen's "authorized" rebuttal
gets short shrift on page 7.
Humphrey is now consciously following the successful method
of Truman in 1948.
A. Offering gifts to special voter groups
(Proposed 50% increase in Social Security, etc., etc.).
B. Strongly attacking RN.
C. Increasingly making sensational gestures and
dramatic proposals in the hope that one or the
other will capture the imagination of the voters.
In many other national, state and local elections, this
technique has enabled an underdog to overwhelm the front runner in the
last minute. The increasing Wallace poll strength is another great
incalculable factor.
1968 has been the year for political surprises. I think we
can do without another one.
***
Menard V.Allen
Nixon for Procident Committee
to Fain Avenue
NOW York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 001-0400
Fordign Policy
Resourch Coordinator
Memo:
Dick Mc--
Telenday 1000 May
Excellent memo on VN. = have
made a few changes, which you will
see.
Please be sure that cipies of the
memo do not go outside the organization
When these changes are made, : -
WILL
forward the memo to the tour.
September 13, 1968
MEMORANDUM from Dick McCormack; staff member
who recently returned from Victnam
SUBJECT: Recent promising developments in Vietnam
I. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Ironically, if the War in Vietnam is won, it will be part-
ly because of the attack by the Viet Cong at TET; for amid the
smoke and ruins, and fear of a new thrust, desperately needed
reforms both in policy and personnel were and are being
implemented.
The most important of these reforms was in the Vietnamese
Government itself. Discrediting corruption of vast proportions
extended up to and including Vice President Ky himself. Tens
of thousands of dollars were offered for province chief
positions, so vast was the opportunity for personal aggrandizement
This extended down to virtually every level of Government.
Worse, because every president to succeed Diem was
essentially a. compromise figure, large numbers of officials
from previous administrations remained on the job. Their
loyalty and responsiveness was directed, not at the new
president, but at the respective power faction which had
sponsored them. The power block was considered permanent - the
president temporary. Thus a presidential directive could and
frequently was ignored when it conflicted with the power
faction's idea of its own best interests. Under this system
of mutual backscratching, even when an official's corruption
-2-
became so notorious as to attract the attention of the American
press, the official was quietly transferred to a new location.
until the heat was off.
Under this system of fragmented patronage and
administrative power, essential and long range planning was
ignored: & "let the Americans GO it" attitude prevailed,
corruption openly flourished. Even war widows frquently had to
kick back a percentage of their meager pension if they received
it at all. Robbed in every conceivable way in virtually every
governmental contact, it is little wonder that the Vietnamese
people felt no respect for its Government.
Since TET, President Thieu and his equally honest and
respected Premier Tran Van Huong have rapidly and effectively
consolidated the fragmented administrative structure under them.
For the first time since 1963 large numbers of corrupt
officials have been removed from high position. Three of the
four powerful corps commanders, 21 of 44 province chiefs, and
over 100 district chiefs were unceremoniously dumped. To
replace still more corrupt, unresponsive or imcompetent
officials, Premier Huong recently opened a ten week school for
top administrators. A sign of the times is that
he had difficulty getting candidates for jobs which formerly
were bought for tens of thousands of dollars. The word is cut:
greater honesty, hard work, and results will be demanded of
officials. For the first time since Diem's early days, the
South Vietnamese Government enjoys the respect of the people.
Without this respect, U.S. forces could have fought almost
endlessly without achieving victory. There 00111 remains
much to be accomplished in improving the Administration of
South Vietnam, but the trends are all in the right direction.
-3-
II. VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE
Unlike the unwieldy administrative structure formerly
representing Saigon, the Vidt Cong had developed a superbly
disciplined and organized political infrastructure
comprising between 80,000 and 100,000 men. It is these
political and administrative forces, rather than the roving
North Vietnamese divisions, which must be eliminated if
victory is to be achieved. This belated post-TET realization
has resulted in a major shake up of our fragmented pacification
program. For the first time we have begun to coordinate our
intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts. In this process,
we made some astonishing discoveries. We found, for example,
that we had in one district eleven separate and uncoordinated
intelligence networks operating. Frequently agents belonged
to and were paid by several intelligence agencies unknowingly.
Thus one man could give us some piece of unreliable intelligence
which would show up on several separate reports, giving it undue
weight. The sheer mass of information generated by this process
left much of it unused. In a country where timely reaction
is of the utmost importance, this situation proved to be
disastrous. The TET fiasco was only the most obvious aspect
of this. But it brought matters to a head.
In the aftermath of the TET offensive, Ambassador Komer
was able to coordinate the information gathering networks.
Using this information, he was able to expedite project
Phoenix, a massive undertaking to identify the elaborate V.C.
infrastructure and to eliminate it by the most direct means.
Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoons, Popular
Reconnaissance Units, and a number of other similarly oriented,
combined American/Vietnomese teams began suddenly vioiting
Vietnamese villages in response to intelligence reports.
Concentrating on key personnel, thib rapidly expanding
program has eliminated more than 6,000 V.C. administrators with-
in a few months. This program is doubtless one of the most
important and promising activities now under way in Vietnam.
If through the Paris talks or an Hanoi decision the level of
hostilities is decreased, this project will be of critical
importance. This doubtless explains dramatically increased
interest in Phoenix by the GNV.
III. MILITARY IMPROVEMENTS
Militarily, a number of improvements have recently
manifested themselves. More than 100, 000 soldiers, many
elite troops of the North Vietnamese Army, were killed during
and since the TET offensive. As a consequence, the careful
planning and high dicipline which characterized North Vietnamese
actions has deteriorated. Front assaults on heavily fortified
positions, badly coordinated attacks, green troops and inferior
leadership have caused them horrendous, casualties for meager
results. However, most military observers agree that massive
infusion of replacements have brought the North Vietnam strength
numerically back to its pre-TET condition. In this period,
however, our own strength has grown far beyond that of
January 1968.
The replacement of General Westmoreland with General
Abrams has met with virtually universal appreciation. The
character difference between the two men is best reflected by
their respective valedictory and inaugeration addresses.
Wostmoreland declared that it W/.C impossible to stop the
rocket attacks on Saigon and other cities. A few days later
Abrams said he could and would: and did. He established is
double ring defense system around Saigon and installed
computerized radar to spot and silence rocket and mortar attacks.
Beyond that, Abram's no nonsense character has made a singular
impression on the Vietnamese Government. Abrams has demanded
action and has gotten it. When recently he asked for the results
of a Vietnamese ambush system in Gia Dinh and learned that of
600 monthly "night ambushes" only one contact with the Viet
Cong had been made, he exploded. Changes were made.
Abrams has a reputation for being. far more aggressive than
was his predecessor. He has emphasized saturation small unit
patrolling and ambushing. I am also told that staff changes
which he has made have produced a marked qualitative improvement
at MAC V headquarters and elsewhere.
Under Abrams, the training and arming of the South Vietnamese
Army with the latest weaponry has been dramatically accelerated.
He has recognized that South Vietnamese unites armed with
World War II vintage Ml rifles will not move aggressively
against a foe better armed with the automatic AK 47. It
is difficult for me to emphasize what an enormous difference in
morale I noticed among ARNV units armed with the M16. Already
100, CCO have been distributed to them with 100, OCO more on the
way.
Abrams is also increasing the number of joint Vietnamese/
American operations in marked contrast to his predecessors
preference to operate exclusively with American troops
whenever possible. In the I Corpo, the Marines are "marrying"
14-man equads of leathernecks with Vietnamese Popular force under.
I feel strongly that this experiment can and will be rapidly
expanded. Abrams has approved the formation and arming of
civilian "Self-Defence Counsils". Already more than 400, COO
Vietnamese voluntarily enrolled and 40, CCC have been armed.
Many more will be shortly.
I so not wish by this report Tor infor that all is well
in Vietnam--or that victory is around the corner. It took the
British ten years to wipe out 15,000 hard core guerrillas in
Malaya. I do, however, believe that the trends finally are in
our favor, that the Army of Vietnam can assume an increasing
degree of the responsibility, that we can pull out substantial
numbers of our non-combat forces in 1969, and that with certain
other changes we have now a winning recipe.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS
We must, however, steel ourselves against certain dangers.
Saigon and all other cities and towns of South Vietnam have
been infiltrated by thousands of Viet Cong agents.
Countless other Vietnamese are subject to coercion by
threatening exposed relatives with reprisals. These agents
and sympathizers have largely remained submerged. They could,
however, if coordinated, plant enough bombs, set enough fires,
and throw enough grenades to thoroughly disrupt much of
metropolitan Vietnam. If this were coordinated with an attack
from the outside against Saigon, it could produce an impact of
untold proportions on World Pressos and U.S. public opinion.
Worse, 1f the attack were prolonged, a siege on Saigon could drive
prices to the point where the placter would be virtually
worthless. (Already beef prices are 300% higher in: Catigon
than in Kientuong province, some fifty miles distance.)
A scarcity of food, a wildly inflating piaster, and a Long
series of block-destroying fire fights could eventually
produce the kind of homeless, hungry masses which could topple
the Government. It is this goal, after the cold shower effect
of the McCarthy defeat in Chicago, that Viet Cong are counting
on to bring them to victory.
Other reforms would greatly contribute to a quicker victory.
The fact that officials, both civilian and military, rotate back
to the states after only one year in Vietnam means that the
"institutional memory" is very short. Ghastly mistakes of both
omission and commission are directly attributable to this cause.
Battle casualties being what they are, however, those involved
in actual combat (less than 90,000 out of total commitment of
550,000!), should have an option to return after the one year's
tour of duty. This should apply to captain's level and below.
BUT THERE IS NO REASON WHY OFFICERS OF HIGHER RANK SHOULD BE
PERMITTED TO DO A TOKEN TOUR OF USUALLY SIX MONTHS WITH A COMBAT
UNIT, FLY A DESK IN SAIGON FOR AN ADDITIONAL SIX MONTHS, AND THEN
RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH ALL THE PAINFULLY ACQUIRED AREA
AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE. Civilians in the higher AID, CORDS, and
Embassy staffs should similarly have their tours increased.
Positive incentives should accompany the mandatory tour extensions.
Vietnam and U.S. politics
For all those who remember the MoNamara press conference at
the LBJ ranch three days before the 1966 congressional elcotions,
at which a massive reduction in draft quotas was announced and is
rosy Vietnam picture presented to the then more gullible American
electorate, there can be no doubt that Humphrey will attempt some
similar coup.
Stories are leaking out of Saigon that officials are reporting
that 100, 000 troops could be now withdrawn with no harm =0 the
military effort. Presumably these would be engineers, clerks,
officer club staffs, etc. etc. Imagine. the impact of 2 pre-election
LBJ fireside chat pointing out statistically progress in various
areas, and concluding by announcing that because of the successful
training of Vietnamese units, 100,000 of our boys will be home
by Christmas, and more will follow We should prepare for this
contingency.
Humphrey's own position on Vietnam has bounced during the last
week from one extreme to the other. He has supported President
Johnson's position, declared that he could have supported the Dove
Platform, retracted that statement, urged Nixon to join him in
saying that no new administration will offer "softer terms" =0
Hanoi after January 20, etc., etc. Surely a statement blasting
this vacillation is in order.
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Otherwise I strongly counsel avoiding specific detailed
recommendations on the war. A statement calling for a reduction
of troops and a deamericanization of the war could blow up in our
faces if a TET #2 occurs. Let us continue with our position that
any specific comment on Victnam's future could jeopardize the negotia-
tions in Paris; and that we won't = trade American lives for a few
political points. If constrained to speak at length on the subject
later in the campaign; I urge that we have Agnew do it, largely
confining ourselves to blasting the many, many errors the Admini-
stration has made during the buildup, the surrepticious way the
Administration duped the public while the buildup was underway;
the tactical errors in Vietnam. We might also denounce Humphrey
for hurting negotiations by his repeated public statements that
progress had been made in the Paris talks (there are straws in
the wind, etc., etc.), statements which were later discredited by
Harriman as well as by the Hanoi negotiators; and which I was
informed by a high state department official had a definitely
negative effect upon the negotiations by leading the North
Vietnamese to believe that any. small concession 02 hint of con-
cession by them would be immediately used as political ammunition
by the Administration.