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This file contains:
From Dick McCormack re: LBJ Peace moves. 1pg. [Memo], 10/6/1968
From McCormack to R.V. Allen, draft copy of "Biafra Statement," concerning Nigeria's civil war. 1pg. [Memo], 09/09/19??
From Agnes Waldron to P.J.M. Buchanan, cc: Greenspan/Allen, re: Administration Actions to Influence the 1966 Election. 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/2/1968
From McCormack to Buchanan, proposed statement by Nixon in respect to Vice President Humphrey's bomb stop proposal. 2 pgs. [Memo], 09/30/19??
From McCormack to Richard Allen, re: Vietnam Status: Inquiries in Washington. 4 pgs. [Memo], 09/08/19??
From McCormack to Ray Price, re: AA's Proposed Task Force. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/02/19??
From McCormack to Price, re: Vietnam Task Force for the Transition Period, 4 pgs. [Memo], 11/02/19??
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WHSF: Returned, 32-25
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WHSF: Returned, 32-25
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This file contains:
From Dick McCormack re: LBJ Peace moves. 1pg. [Memo], 10/6/1968
From McCormack to R.V. Allen, draft copy of "Biafra Statement," concerning Nigeria's civil war. 1pg. [Memo], 09/09/19??
From Agnes Waldron to P.J.M. Buchanan, cc: Greenspan/Allen, re: Administration Actions to Influence the 1966 Election. 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/2/1968
From McCormack to Buchanan, proposed statement by Nixon in respect to Vice President Humphrey's bomb stop proposal. 2 pgs. [Memo], 09/30/19??
From McCormack to Richard Allen, re: Vietnam Status: Inquiries in Washington. 4 pgs. [Memo], 09/08/19??
From McCormack to Ray Price, re: AA's Proposed Task Force. 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/02/19??
From McCormack to Price, re: Vietnam Task Force for the Transition Period, 4 pgs. [Memo], 11/02/19??
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
25
10/06/1968
Memo
From Dick McCormack re: LBJ Peace
moves. 1pg.
32
25
09/09/19??
Memo
From McCormack to R.V. Allen, draft copy
of "Biafra Statement," concerning Nigeria's
civil war. 1pg.
32
25
10/02/1968
Memo
From Agnes Waldron to P.J.M. Buchanan,
cc: Greenspan/Allen, re: Administration
Actions to Influence the 1966 Election. 2 pgs.
32
25
09/30/19??
Memo
From McCormack to Buchanan, proposed
statement by Nixon in respect to Vice
President Humphrey's bomb stop proposal. 2
pgs.
32
25
09/08/19??
Memo
From McCormack to Richard Allen, re:
Vietnam Status: Inquiries in Washington. 4
pgs.
32
25
11/02/19??
Memo
From McCormack to Ray Price, re: AA's
Proposed Task Force. 2 pgs.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
25
11/02/19??
Memo
From McCormack to Price, re: Vietnam Task
Force for the Transition Period, 4 pgs.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Page 2 of 2
October 6, 1968
MEMO FROM DICK McCORMACK
RE:
JOHNSON PEACE MOVES
Reports from Paris indicate that Harriman and Vance
are privately informing the press that they favor a speedy
bombing pause.
Other reports from Washington, including James Reston's
column in today's Sunday Times, suggest that Secretary of Defense
Clifford favors such a pause.
Vance has just returned from Paris, reportedly to recom-
mend this course of action to LBJ.
Leaks from such individuals áre not likely without
Presidential blessing. Quite possibly they pre-lude an announce-
ment from Johnson that he "will go one step farther in the search
for peace. #
I think that this is quite likely and that it will
occur very soon, probably within the context of a comprehensive
progress report on Vietnam to the people.
Probably the bombing pause offer will be coupled by
a threat to resume bombing over all of North Vietnem Lf there is
no progress in Paris within a certain time, or 1f the North
Vietnamese take advantage of the bombing halt to launch new attacks
in or around the D.M.Z. The Johnson speech may also announce
another "peace search" trip to South East Asia. Eugene Black
and the Secretary of the Navy's separate but parallel journies
to this area may have been for the purpose of setting things up.
cc. R. Price P Burhama wallen
From R.T. McCormack
DRAFT
Sept. 9
to: R.V. Allen
BIAFRA STATEMENT
During the past few weeks we have witnessed Nigeria's civil
war assume ever more tragic proportions. Biafran fears of atroci-
ties and genocide, and Central Government obsession with total
victory have brought efforts to extend meaningful assistance to the
thousands of Ibo children starving daily to a complete standstill.
The Red Cross and other concerned relief agencies have rushed
mountains of baby food and other protein rich nourishments to the
borders of beleaguered Biafra, where it rots while 6000 Ibo young-
sters perish every day, with thousands more children suffering per-
manent physical and mental impairment.
On Monday, Sept. 9, the Organization of African Unity will meet
in executive session in Algiers to try once again to search for an
African solution to this catastrophy. They will try to succeed at
what Biafran and Central Government negotiations in Addis Ababa have
failed for months to accomplish: a humane and just compromise. Thus
far this senseless delay has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands
of
Ibo children. Humanity can tolerate no further delay
at the expense of these innocents.
The time for token gestures, platitudes, and other meaningless
declarations of concern and regret is long past. Conscience demands
that our Government bring immediate and direct pressure upon both
Biafra and the Central Government to permit the distribution of
relief food to thse now needlessly dying in the agony of starvation.
Our own vast airlift capacity can greatly contribute to this task.
BRINGING in The Necessary 12 pretnic TONS FOOD
Such an act by our Government might well break the present
diplomatic log jam and create the atmosphere for = general compro-
mise settlement.
MEMO TO: P.J.M. Buchanan
October 2, 1968
FROM:
Agnes Waldron
cc: Greenspan/Allen
RE: Administration Actions to Influence the 1966 Election
The following material was prepared by Dick McCormack.
1. August 11. President Johnson assigned Harriman to explore any
and all signs of peaceful intentions by Hanoi, no matter how faint.
2. August 24. Johnson endorsed proposals for an all Asian confer-
ence to settle the Vietnam war, but cautions that "we do not
want to make it appear that we are trying to direct it or force it."
3. Sept. 5.
Johnson said that a U.S. troop withdrawal from South
Vietnam is dependant upon a pull-out of Communist forces.
4. Sept. 11. South Vietnam voters (80.8% of those eligible) elected
a 117 member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and
pave the way for restoration of civilian rule in 1967.
5. Sept. 14. "Encouraged" by what he called a "vote of confidence"
from the people of South Vietnam, President Johnson hailed today
the "real progress and growing momentum" in that nation's eco-
nomic and social rehabilitation. Johnson also made public an
18,000 word report by Robert Komer reviewing the accomplishment
in non-military programs run jointly by the U.S. and S. Vietnamese.
6. Sept. 22. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the U.S. will halt
the bombing of North Vietnam when it received assurances, privately
or otherwise that Hanoi would respond by a reduction of its war
effort. The U.S. would then be prepared to participate in a
mutual withdrawal of military forces under international supervision.
7. Sept. 27. President Johnson announced that he had accepted the
invitation of President Marcos of the Philippines to attend a
heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the Vietnam
conflict.
8. October 4. Official leaks reported that French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville had told President Johnson that North Vietnam
no longer believes it can achieve a military victory, but that
it was not yet in a mood for negotiations. (Probably came from
a State Dept. backgrounder)
9. October 3. Johnson ruled out ending the bombing of North Vietnam
without an indication that Hanoi will, in turn, deescalate its
military activities in South Vietnam.
10. October 6. Johnson left for a 17-day trip to the Far East to
include attending the Manila Conference. Also visited New Zealand,
Australia, Thailand, Korea, Malasia and South Vieunor.
Surprise
Buchanan
-2-
visit to Cam Ranh Bay. "With 700 correspondents chronicling
the mutual back-scratching with Asian politicians, the finely
honed 'joint communiques', the not so secret 'background brief-
ings', there can be no doubt that Johnson will dominate the
American headlines for two weeks." (Carl Rowan, 10/19/66)
In the background briefings, the "peace search" aspect of the
Johnson journey received heavy emphasis.
"But one official accompanying the President noted that not much
time was available for planning the mission or for identifying
the areas where real movement is likely." (Star 11/19/66)
11. October 18. "Johnson Sees Asia at 'Turning Point' Voices
Confidence at First Stop of 17-Day Tour of the Far East". (NYT)
Johnson speech reasserted the United States pledge of military
aid to the area "as long as danger threatens". But it (his
speech) renounced again all interest in special status, privilege,
territory or perpetual base rights. It looked ahead to the day
when Asians would provide more and more for their own defense."
(10/18/66) NYT Speech offered olive branch to communist China.
12. October 26. Johnson pledges troops at. Cam Ranh Bay. "We shall
never let you down, nor your fighting comrades, nor the
15 million people of South Vietnam nor the hundreds of millions
of Asians who are counting on us to show here - here in South
Vietnam that aggression doesn't pay and that aggression can't
succeed.
11
At the Manila Conference itself the communique mentioned that:
"The Government of Vietnam described the significant military
progress being made against aggression."
Both Ky and Westmoreland made optimistic humanitarian speeches
about progress in Vietnam.
13. November 5. Secretary McNamara flew to the Texas White House
to announce a dramatic reduction in draft calls three days
before the election. This in fact took place. In October,
49,000 men were drafted, in November, 37,600, December, 12,100.
McNamara also announced that the number of troops in Vietnam
would continue to grow at a lower rate than in 1966.
FURTHER AMPLIFICATION ON ANY OF THESE POINTS CAN BE PROVIDED
WITHIN A FEW HOURS.
TO CAT BUCHANAN
FROM DICK MCCORMACK
PROPOSED STATEMENT BY NIXON ON HUMPHREY,S BOMB STOP PROPOSAL
I AM DEEPLY SADDENED TONIGHT TO LEARN OF VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S
WILLINGNESS TO TRADE YOUNG AMERICAN LIVESIN VIETNAM IN RETURN FOR A
FEW CHEAP POLITICAL POINTS.
ON SEPTEMBER X MR. HOMPHREY CALLED ON ME TO LPN JOIN HIM IN A
PLEDGE THAT NEITHER HE NOR I VOUL D OFFER HANOI SOFTER PEACE TERMS AFTERE
ELECTION.
A FEW DAYS LATER HE STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING"THAT
WOULD TEMPT THE MEN INHANOI TO DRAG THIS WAR ON IN THE HOPE THAT THEY'REG
TO GET A BETTER DEAL OUT OF ME JAN.81.
TODAY BY ANNOUNCING THET HE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM IF HE IS ELECTED, MR HUMPEREY IS DOING EXACTLY WHAT HE
PLEDGED HE WOULD NOT DO. HE IS COMPLETELYCUTTING THE GROUND CROM
JUNDERNEATH OUR NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS.
FOR MONTHS NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE OFFERED TO STOP THE BOXBING OF
NORTH VIETNAM , IF HANOI WOULD OFFER SOME RECIPROCAL DEESCALATION, SOME
INDICATION THAT THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETAM WOULD BC
REDUCED. THIS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO DC.
MR HUMPHREY IS AWARE THAT WE HAVE ALREADY USPENED THE BOMBING
OF NORTH VIETNAM EIGHT TIMES, ONCE FOR MORE THAN FIVE WEEKS. BUT NONE
09 THESE BOMBING PAUSES HAS BROUGHT WEACE. INSTEAD EACH HAS BEEN USED BY
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RUSH TRCK TRUCK LOADS OF TROOPS AND AMMUNITION
TO THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.
ON MARCH 3L THE PRESIDENT ANNONCED A BOMRINGSUSPENSION OVER
MORE THAN 75 5 OF NORTH VIETNAM'S TERRIROTIY HANOIS ONLY REACTION
TO THIS HASBEEN TO DOUBLE THE RATE OF SUPPLIES AND WAR MATERIAL COMING
IN THROUGH THE PARTOF HAIPHONG AND TO STEP PP THEIR ATACKS AND
TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH.
FOR SOME TIME NOW, NORTH VIETNAM HAS ATEMPTED TO MASS ENOUGH
TROOPS AND AMMUNITON ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO LAUNCH A MASSIVE
ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAMS NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES. THUS FAR WE HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO FORESTALL THIS BY AGRESSIVELY BOMBING ALL SUCH TROOOP BUILDE
UPS. MRHUMPHREY NOW PROPOSES TO GIVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE f PRIVILEDGED
SANTUATRY FFOM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST OUR ME FIGHTING MEN
IN THE SOUTH.
BY ANNOUNCING NOW THAT HE WILL STOP THE BOMBING OF :CRTH VISTAMM
FOUR MO NTHS FROM NOWIF ELECTED, HUMPPREY IS GIVING THE NORTH VICTNAMENTE
CLEAR NOTICE THAT ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS WAIT AND THEYWILL GET UHAT THEY
HAE BEEN DEMANDING FOR MANYMONTHS IN PARIS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE CAN HARDLY EXPECT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO NEGOTIATE SEFIOUSLY
NOW.
THIS IS A GROSSSLY IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDEON THE PART Co A MAN
WHO WANTS TG BE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. IC :. ON HIM TO
WEIGH CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ANNOUNCEMNTNG RETHINK HIS
POSITION ON VIETNAMONCE AGAIN, AND RETRACT HIS STATEMENT.
END OF PROPOSED STATEMENT.
I SUGGEST THAT WE TREAT THIS ASPECT OF THE HUMPHREY SPEECH
SUA SEPARATELY, AND HAVE SOME OTHER NIXON SPOKESMAN DEAL WITH
THE REST OF HIS COMMENTS AND DISTORTIONS.
END.
RMN-DT
M C A NY
URGENT MEMO FOR PAT BUCH
SEPT
Memorandum to Mr. Richard Allen
From Richard McCormack
Topic: Vietnam Status: Inquiries in Washington
My initial conversations reinforced several un-
surprising conclusions:
(1) There has been absolutely no progress
of substance in Paras.
(2) The North Vietnamese strategists
base their hopes on an ultimate collapse of the
Thies-Ky-Huong Government.
(3) A major do-or-die attack on Saigon
coinciding with a surfacing and participation of the
substantial number of V. C. agents already in Saigon
can be expected before the U.S. election - possibly
very soon.
(4) General Abrams is held generally in
Smrhhigher esteem by professionals and colleagues
than was his predecessor.
Bundy's assistant in charge of coordinating the Paris
negotiations in Washington, Hayward Isham, confirmed that
Humpphegy4s comments about "straws in the wind" were
nonsense and that they actually had the effect of harden-
ing the North Vietnamese negotiators' position.
Isham also stated that the North Vietnamose negotiators
domonstrated a great deal of bitterness about the defeat
of the Mc Carthy forces and by the similar hard line
of both major parties' platTorms. on Vietnam.
Isham felt that progress in the Paris talks would
be sparked less by a new U. S. administration than by
concrete potitical or militury events in South Victnam.
He. stated that the V.C. agents were trying to encourage
disgruntled South Vietnamese politicians to undermine the
Thieu Government. They have, however, met with very little
success thus far.
Several things could change this, however. Prices
have soared wildly within the last few weeks. For
example, the black market price of the dollar has gone
from 170 piastres to an unprodedented 210. Rice and
other standes have similarly risen. A deflating piastre
could plunge out of sight in the event of another
prolonged V.C. attack on Saigon. This eventuality could
cause a Government crisis of the first magnitude. No one
seems to know for certain why this inflation is now
resuming on this scale. Chinese black marketeers, who
regulate the black market price of the dollar in Saigon,
clearly contributed. Oddly, there secms to be a striking
parallel between the black market rates in Hong Kong
and Saigon. Yet the V.C. undoubtodly have increased the
pressure on Saigon, driving up the price of
about Mc Carthy's presidential prospects has 0 contributed
to the scramble for liquidity by Saigon's merchant class
In any case, the stability of the piastre is directly
related to Vietnamose confidence in their Government's
ability to cope with the V.C.. This recent inflationary
trend, therefore, must be closely watched.
Mr. Nguyen Hoan, charge d'affaires attthe Victnamese
Embassy in Washington, discussed the general situation
in Vietnam with me for an hour. On questions such as
what areas of policy and practice one should change to
improve the war effort, Hoan requested a week's respict
so that he and his colleagues could prepare a full and
considered answer.
Hoan did, however, stress how important he felt
two actions were: one, acceleration of the arming of
local self-defense councils and, two, organizing these
groups throughout the country. I expect Hoan will
provide us with some politically useful information in
the weeks to come.
Colonel Robert Outlaw, Congressional Liaison, DOD,
offered to set up regular status briefings on Vietnam
following receipt of a letter of introduction from the Nixon
Headquarters.
Proposed follow-up activities:
(a) Before my next visit to Washington I shall
attempt to arrange a meeting which furmer Secretary of Defense
Mc Namara to explore IlDs rumored dovish attitudes.
(b) I will also meet with the Penterm briefors
in a series of detailed briefings on the status of a
number of promising new classified programs aimed at the
V.C. infra-structure.
(c) I shall also revisit my initial contracts.
List of Contacts:
Nguyen Hoan
Charge d'Affaires
Embassy of Vietnam
John Burke
Head of:
Vietnam Working Group
Department of State
Hayward Ishem
Bundy's Assistant in charge of Paris negotiationsccordination
Leonard Sullivan
Director of ODDRE, Southeast Asia
DOD
Colonel Robert Outlaw
Congressional Liaison
DOD
Nov. 2
To Ray Price
from Dick McCormack
re: AA's Proposed Task Force
I spent this morning at AA's home discussing his ideas on
a task force.
Based on his Nixon interview, AA has apparently contacted a
large number of people in the academic and diplomatic community.
Originally Nick proposed a large task force to be sent to
Vietnam for ten days to function as a Royal Commission.
As composition for the force he mentioned such diverse people
as Admiral Burke, Mark Hatfield, Don Luce, Harriman, Senator
Brook, General Walt, plus a large number of other academic and
diplomatic luminaries.
He added that since 11 we are anyway on the make to disengage"
the group wouldn't exactly function as a fact finding body.
Quite frankly I found Nick's ideas extremely vague. His OWN
familiarity with Vietnam is dated by more than a decade. ( He was
a Lansdale aide fduring 1954-55.)
When he inquired as to my feelings on his ideas, I told him
that I strongly felt that we needed to apply some first class
talent to the problem of Vietnam, but I was uncertain how useful
a brief trip to Saigon would be; and I felt some concern that the
whole operation might degenerate into a mobile press conference,
with Hatfield saying one thing, and Burke contradicting him.
As Nixon's first post election involvement in Vietnam, I felt
this might well be a most inauspicious begining.
At this point Nick montioned that perhaps the group
could best functionas an advisory board in Washington, chaired
by RN, to review policy options for Victnam.
I told him that this proposal might well have some
promise and that he would be contacger after the election by
the Staff.
He has subsequently called me to say that in view of the
general uncertainty regarding Vietnam, he now feels that the
functions of his group should be decided a week CT so after
the election.
Hudson
An apparently very competent former Deputy to Lansdale, DAVE
who returned from Vietnam only a couple of months ago, has
been working with another group to study the problems facing
the President Elect regarding Vietnam. From my conversations
with him, I believe that his group will have some extremely
and reports
useful suggestions within ton days after the election.
He can be reached at RAND in Washington, B.C.
Tel. 202 2965000.
CC PRICE
Memorandum from Dick McCormack
re: A Vietnam Task Force for the Transition Particd
The purposes of such a task force would be:
1. Evaluate the current situation both in Vietram and Far
2. Develope and explore policy options for RN
3. Keep RN informed on what certainly will be a highly
situation.
4. Establish lines of communication between the New Admini:
and American and Vietnamese working level personnel.
5. Make recommendations on staffing appropriate agencies
both in Saigon and Washington.
The problems such a task force may involve:
l. The possibility that the South Vietnamese will
to play the task force off against the Old Administration
thus preventing effective action in Paris or elsewhere.
2. Premature leaks from the task force which would undersin.
morale still more in Saigon.
3. The lack of security clearances could prevent the task
force from being kept fully informed. ( Security blearances
take up to three months. If Lyndon Johnson wants to has
full control of the situation, he can quietly delay or
security clearance process, thus denyung
staff support.
4. Individual members of the task force should not
:-
with the attitude that we're her. =
you've created. :: Rather, the
be stressed.
5. To prevent misunderstandings, the group should coordinate regularaly
with the Embassy and MACV. I think a member of the Embassy staff
should be included on all official visits . with South Vietnamese
leaders.
6. Any group which lacks a rather thorough familiarity with the
situation in Vietnam will unavoidably become a victim of the
slick briefings which all American agencies in Vietnam have
developed to cope with the hoard of VIP visitors which
come to Vietnam for varying periods.
7. Any group which comes to Vietnam with very strong views, either
hawkish or dovish, and only remains for a ten day or two week
period can not be expected to return to the United States
with anything more profound or useful than a strengthening
of previous prejudices. The task force, in any case, should
remain at least a month in Vietnam and keep control of their
schedule, lest they be taken on a circuit of the best refugee
camps, the most successfully pacified hamlets, and elite
ARVN units.
8. Most of the professionals associated with Vietnam have
been with the present Administration in one capacity or another.
In our search 6or 11 fresh, objective, thinking", we should beware
of the pitfalls of Amateurism.
9. Within a large diverse group, there may be a temptation for
those members who feel that their opinions are not being given
sufficient weight
to
attempt to win their case
through the press.
My own feelings are that we should convene a small group
of knowledgable people, including at least one person who
knows RN very well and in whom RN has complete confidence, to
begin an immediate study of the situation in Vietnam and Paris.
Within a very few weeks I think that this group should
be sent to Vietnam. Without compromising our ability to influence
the Government of South Vietnam by a premature unqualified
promise of support, the head of this task force should do
what he can to restore self confidence to the Government of
President Thieu. Thieu lost an immense amount of face
as a result of the Johnson declaration and the ppreceding
confrontations between Bunker and Thieu. It is extremely
important that all the careful work of consolidating power under
President Thieu not be in vain. The American people will not
give us the time to repeat this process in event of another coup.
Until this can be done to restore self confidence,
to resume negotiations in Paris would be very unwise. Thieu
has been made to look like an American puppet, which is of course,
how Hanoi has been attempting to portray him for years.
So much face has. been lost that it might well be wise
to encourage the Jouhnson Adminisfration to petmit the South
Vietnamese to stall for a number of weeks.
The President Elect, by speaking out or withholding comment,
has a significant weapon to influence the Johnson administration.
I think at very least he should at the outset demand a basic
veto on major policy questions which come up between election
and Jan 20. Johnson's apparent obsession with his place in
historymight well lead him to follow unwise policies in an attempt
to solve the Vietnamese problem. Such hasty or ill considered
action by LBJ during these next vital three months could
not only immensely complicate the task of the New President,
but also so compromise our negotiating position as to permit ultimately
a communist takeover.