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This file contains:
Hurbert Humphrey speech conerning his nomination as a Presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, 14 pgs. [Other Document], 9/30/2016
List of Vice Presidential Staff (Humphrey), 2 pgs. [Other Document], n.d.
Responsibilities of Vice President Hurbert H. Humphrey, 2 pgs. [Other Document], n.d.
From Hudson B. Drake to Haldeman, concerning the Vice President's staff, 2 pgs. [Letter], 12/17/1968
From Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Chapin, Cole, and Higby, re: White House Communications, 1 pg. [Memo], 11/27/1968
From Higby to Haldeman, re: Page Boys Unit, 1 pg. [Memo], 12/2/1968
From Stephen Bull to Nixon Staff, re: Telephone Usage, 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/27/1968
From Flemming to Ehrlichman, concerning telephone communications, G.H. Dillon's business card attached, 1 pg + business card. [Memo], 12/6/1968
From Glenn Olds and Hal Booth to Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May, notes from their meeting on 09/05/1968, 1 pg. [Report], n.d.
From Frank Lindsay to Nixon, 2 pgs. [Letter], 8/15/1968
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WHSF: Returned, 32-31
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WHSF: Returned, 32-31
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This file contains:
Hurbert Humphrey speech conerning his nomination as a Presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, 14 pgs. [Other Document], 9/30/2016
List of Vice Presidential Staff (Humphrey), 2 pgs. [Other Document], n.d.
Responsibilities of Vice President Hurbert H. Humphrey, 2 pgs. [Other Document], n.d.
From Hudson B. Drake to Haldeman, concerning the Vice President's staff, 2 pgs. [Letter], 12/17/1968
From Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Chapin, Cole, and Higby, re: White House Communications, 1 pg. [Memo], 11/27/1968
From Higby to Haldeman, re: Page Boys Unit, 1 pg. [Memo], 12/2/1968
From Stephen Bull to Nixon Staff, re: Telephone Usage, 2 pgs. [Memo], 11/27/1968
From Flemming to Ehrlichman, concerning telephone communications, G.H. Dillon's business card attached, 1 pg + business card. [Memo], 12/6/1968
From Glenn Olds and Hal Booth to Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May, notes from their meeting on 09/05/1968, 1 pg. [Report], n.d.
From Frank Lindsay to Nixon, 2 pgs. [Letter], 8/15/1968
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
31
09/30
Other Document
Hurbert Humphrey speech conerning his
nomination as a Presidential candidate for
the Democratic Party, 14 pgs.
32
31
n.d.
Other Document
List of Vice Presidential Staff (Humphrey), 2
pgs.
32
31
n.d.
Other Document
Responsibilities of Vice President Hurbert H.
Humphrey, 2 pgs.
32
31
12/17/1968
Letter
From Hudson B. Drake to Haldeman,
concerning the Vice President's staff, 2 pgs.
32
31
11/27/1968
Memo
From Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Chapin,
Cole, and Higby, re: White House
Communications, 1 pg.
32
31
12/02/1968
Memo
From Higby to Haldeman, re: Page Boys
Unit, 1 pg.
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
31
11/27/1968
Memo
From Stephen Bull to Nixon Staff, re:
Telephone Usage, 2 pgs.
32
31
12/06/1968
Memo
From Flemming to Ehrlichman, concerning
telephone communications, G.H. Dillon's
business card attached, 1 pg + business card.
32
31
n.d.
Report
From Glenn Olds and Hal Booth to Frank
Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May, notes
from their meeting on 09/05/1968, 1 pg.
32
31
08/15/1968
Letter
From Frank Lindsay to Nixon, 2 pgs.
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Page 2 of 2
Humphey Sept. 30
Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and
as a candidate for President of the United States.
I want to tell you what I think about great issues which I believe
face this nation.
I want to talk with you about Vietnam, and about anothe r great
issue in the search for peace in the world -- the issue of stopping the
threat of nuclear war.
After I have told you what I think, I want you to think.
And if you agree with me, I want you to help me.
For the past several weeks, I have tried to tell you what was
in my heart and on my mind.
But sometimes that message has been drowned out by the voices
of protesters and demonstrators.
I shall not let the violence and disorder of a noisy few deny me
the right to speak or destroy the orderly democratic process.
I have paid for this television time this evening to tell you my story
uninterrupted by noise by protest. or by second-hand interpretation.
When I accepted the Democratic Party's nomination and platform,
I said that the first reality that confronted this nation was the need for peace
in Vietnam. X
I have pledged that my first priority as President shall be to end
the war and obtain an honorable peace.
- 2 -
For the past four years, I have spoken my mind about Vietnam.
Frankly and wi thout reservation, in the Cabinet and in the National
Security Council -- and directly to the President.
When the President has made his decisions, I have supported them.
He has been the Commander-n-Chief. It has been his job to
decide. The choices have not been simple or easy.
President Johnson will continue -- until January 20, 1969, -- to
make the decisions in Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must
be his. I shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and help.
We all pray that his efforts to find peace will succeed
But 112 days from now, there will be a new President -- a new
Administration. and new advisers.
If there is no peace by then, it must be their
responsibility to make a complete reassessment of the situation in Vietnam --
to see where we stand and to judge what we must do.
As I said in my acceptance speech:
The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of
yesterday.
We must look to the future.
For neither vindication nor repudiation of our role in Vietnam
will bring peace or be worthy of our country.
-3-
The American people have a right to know what I would
doo -- if I am President -- after January 20, 1968, to keep
my pledge to honorably end the war in Vietnam.
What are the chances for peace?
The end of thw war is not yet in sight. But our chances
for peace are far better today than they were a year or even
a month ago.
On March 31, the war took on an entirely new dimension.
On that date President Johnson by one courageous
act removed the threat of bombing from 90 per cent of the
people, and 78 per cent of the land area, of North Vietnam.
On that date, President Johnson sacrificed his own
political career in order to bring negotiation that could lead
to peace.
Until that time, the struggle was only on the battlefield.
Now, our negotiat ors are face to face across the table
with negotiators from Vietnam.
A process has been set in course. And, lest that process
be set back, our perseverance at the Conference table must be
as great as our courage has been in the war.
There have been other changesduring these past few months.
The original Vie tnam decision -- made by President
Eisenhower -- was made for one basic reason.
President Eisenhower believed it was in our national
int, erest that Communist subversion and aggression should no
succeed in Vietnam.
It was his judgment -- and the judgment of President
Kennedy and President Johnson since then -- that if aggression
3a
did succeed in Vietnam, there was a danger that we would
become involved on a far more dangerous scale in a wider
area of Southeast Asia.
While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, several
things have happened.
Other nations of Southeast Asia -- given
the time we have bought for them -- have strengthened themselves
against any future subversion or aggression.
In South Vietnam itself, a constitution has been written --
elections have been held -- land reform and anti-corruption
and refugee measures have been stepped up -- and the South
Vietnamese army has increased its size and capacity, and
improved its equipment, training and performance -- just as
the Korean ardy did during the latter stages of the Korean
war.
So -- in sharp contrast to a few months ago -- we see
peace negotiations going on.
We see a stronger Southeast Asia.
We see a stronger Vietnam.
Those are the new circumstances which a new President
will face in January.
In light of those circumstances -- and assuming no marked
change in the present situation -- how would I proceed as
President?
Let me first make clear what I would not do.
To:withdraw would not on
XXX
-3b-
I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal.
To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence
of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations,
It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already
made.
It would be an open invitation to more violence -- more
aggression -- more instability.
And it would, at this time of tension in Europe, cast
doubt on the integrity of our word under treaty and alliance.
Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal.
Nor would I escalate the level of violence in either
North or South Vietnam. We must seek to de-escalate.
The platform of my party says that the President should
take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam. I shall do SO.
- 4 -
North Vietnam, according to its own statement and those of
others, has said it will proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if
we stop the present limited bombing of the north.
We must always think of the protection of our troops.
As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of the North
as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success
in the negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection
for our troops.
In weighing that risk -- and before taking action -- I would place
key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word --
of communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North
and South Vietnam.
If the government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I would
reserve the right to resume the bombing.
Secondly, I would take the risk that the South Vietnmese would neet
the obligations they say they are now ready to assume in their own self-
defense.
I would move toward de-Americanization of the war.
I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to set a specific
timetable by which American forces could be systematically reduced while
South Vietnamese forces took over more and more of the burden.
The schedule must be a realistic one -- one that would not weaken
the overall allied defense posture. I ama convinced such action would be
as much in South Vietnam interest as in ours.
- 5 -
What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in
Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the
defense of their own country.
That would be an immediate objective of the Humphrey-Muskie
Administration as it sought to end the war.
If the South Vietnamese army maintains its present rate of
improvement, I believe this will be possible next year without endangering
either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.
I do not say this lightly. I have studied this matter carefully.
Third, I would propose once more an immediate cease-fire--
with United Nations or other international supervision and supervised
withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vuetnam.
American troops are fighting in numbers in South Vietnam today
only because North Vietnamese forces were sent to impose Hanoi's will
on the South Vietnamese people by aggression.
We can agree to bring home our forces from South Vietnam, if
the North Vietnamese agree tobring theirs home at the same time. Excend
External forces assisting both sides could and should leave at the same time,
and should not be replaced.
The ultimate key to an honorable solution must be free elections
in South Vietnam with all people, including members of the National
Liberation Front and other dissident groups, able to participate in those
elections if they were willing to abide by peaceful processes.
- 6 -
That, too, would mean some risk.
But I have never feared the risk of one man, one vote. I say
let the people speak. And accept their judgment, whatever it is.
The government of South Vietnam should not be imposed by force
from Hanoi or by pressure from Washington. It hould be freely chosen
by all the South Vietnamese people.
--A stopping of the bombing of the North -- taking account of
Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good faith negotiations and
keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the communists show bad
faith.
-- Careful, systematic reduction of American troops in South
Vietnam -- a de-Americanization of the war -- turning over to the South
Vietnamese Army a greater share of the defense of its own country.
-- An internationally supervised cease-fire -- and supervised
withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.
-- Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing
to follow the peaceful process.
Those are risks I would take for peace.
I do not believe any of these risks would jeopardize our security
or be contrary to our national interest.
There is, of course, no guarantee that all these things could
be successfully done.
Certainly, none of them could be done if North Vietnam were to
show bad faith.
7 -
But I believe there is a good chance these steps could be
carried out.
I believe these steps could be undertaken with safety for our men
in Vietnam.
As President, I would be dedicated to carrying them out --
as I would be dedicated to urging the government of South Vietnam to
expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to broadening
popular participation, including high priority to land reform more attention
to the suffering of refugees
and constant government pressure against
inflation and corruption.
I believe all of these steps could lead to an honorable and lasting
settlement serving both our own national interest and the interests of the
independent nations of Southeast Asia.
We have learned a lesson from Vietnam.
The lesson is not that we should turn our bask backs on Southeast
Asia -- or on other nations or people in less ;familiar parts of the world
neighborhood.
The lesson is, rather, that we should carefully define our goals
and priorities. and within those goals and priorities, that we should
formulate policies which will fit new American guidelines.
Applying the lesson of Vietnam, I would insist as President that
we review other commitments made in other times. that we carefully
decide what is, and is not, in our national interest.
- 8 -
I do not condemn any past commitment.
I do not judge the decisions of past presidents when, in good
conscience, they made those decisions in what they thought were the
interest of the American people.
But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this nation to bring
our men and resources in Vietnam back to America where we need them
so badly and to be sure we put first things first in the future.
Let me be clear: I do not counsel withdraw!l from the world.
I do not swerve from international responsibility.
I only say that, as President, I would undertake a new strategy
for peace in this world, based not on American omnipotence, but on
American leadership -- not only military and economic, but moral.
- 9 -
That new strategy for peace would emphasize working
through the United Nations.
strengthening and maintaining our
key alliances for mutual security particularly including NATO
supporting international peacekeeping machinery. and working
with other nations to build new institutions and instruments
for cooperation.
In a troubled and dangerous world, we should seek not
to march alone, but to lead in such a way that others will wish
to join us.
Even as we seek peace in Vietnam, we must for our security
and well-being seek to halt and turn back the costly and ever more
dangerous arms race.
Five nations now have nuclear bombs.
The United States and the Soviet Union already possess
enough weapons to burn and destroy every human being on this
earth.
Unless we stop the arms race. unless we stop 15 to 20 more
nations from getting nuclear bombs and nuclear bomb technology
within the next few years, this generation may be the last.
For 20 years, we have lived under the constant threat that
some irresponsible action or even more great miscalculation
could blow us all up in the wink of an eye.
There is danger that we have become so used to the idea
that we no longer think it abnormal - forgetting that our whole
world structure depends for its stability on the precarious
architecture of what Winston Churchill called the balance of terror.
- 10 -
This is no longer an adequate safeguard for peace.
There is a treaty now before the Senate which would stop the
spread of nuclear weapons. Thattreaty must be ratified now.
If this nation cannot muster the courage to ratify this treaty --
a treaty which in no way endangers our national security, but adds to it
by keeping these weapins out of the hands of a Nasser a Castro,
o
and
many others -- there can be little hope for our future in this world.
We must ratify this treaty.
I also believe that we must have the courage -- while keeping our
guard up and fulfilling our commitments to NATO -- to talk with the Soviet
Union as soon as possible about a freeze and reduction of offensive and
defensive nuclear missiles systexxx systems.
To escalate the nuclear missile arms race is to raise the level of
danger and total destruction. It is costly, menacing, fearsome and offers
no genuine defense.
Beyond that, if I am President, I shall take the initiative to find
the way -- under carefully safe-guarded, mutually-acceptable international
to
inspection -/ reduce arms budgets and military expenditures systematically
amon g all countries of the world.
Our country's military budget this year is 8Q billion dollars.
It is an investment we have to make under existing circumstances.
It protects our freedom.
But if we can work with other nations so that we calx can all reduce
our military expenditures together, with proper safe-guards and inspection,
then, it will be a great day for humanity.
- 11 -
All of us will have moved further away from self-destruction.
And all of us will have billions of dollars with which to help people live
better lives.
The American people must choose the one man they believe
can best face these great issues.
I would hope that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Wallace and I could express
our views on Vietnam not only individually, but on the same public platform.
I call for this because - - on the basis of our past records and past
carerrs -- there are great differences between our policies and programs.
Those view of Governor Wallace which I have seen reported indicate
that he would sharply escalate the war.
Mr. Nixon's past record reveals his probably future policies.
In 1954 - at the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu -- he
advocated American armed intervention in Vietnam in aid of French
colonialism. It was necessary for President Eisenhower to repudiate his
proposal.
Since then , he has taken a line on Vietnam policy which I believe
could lead to greater escalation of the war.
In January of this year, Mr. Nixon described as "bunk" the idea
that free elections in South Vietnam were of importance.
In February of this year, when questioned about the use of nuclear
weapons in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said that a general "has to take the position
that he cannot rule out the use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations
that might develop."
- 12 -
Since then, he has indicated he has a plan to end the war in
Vietnam, but will not disclose it until he becomes President.
If he has such a plan, he has an obligation to SO inform President
Johnson and the American people.
Few days ago, the Republican Vice Presidental Nominee said there
is not now and never has been a Nixon-Agnew plan for peace in Vietnam.
It was, he said, a ploy to "maintain suspense." And then he said: "Isn't
that the way campaigns are run?" I think we need some answers about
this from Mr. Nixon
Mr. Nixon's public record shows, also, consistent opposition to
measures for nuclear arms control.
He attacked Adlai Stevenson and myself for advocating a nuclear
test ban treaty -- a treaty to stop radioactive fallout from poisoning and
crippling people the world over. He called our plan "a cruel hoax. "
We can be thankful that President Kennedy and the Congress did not follow his
advice.
Today, he is asking for delay of ratification of a treaty carefully
neotiated over several years and signed by 80 nations -- the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear ;weapons.
I speak plainly: I do not believe the American Presidency can afford
a return to leadership which would inc rease tension in the world. which
would, on the basis of past statements, escalate the Vietnam war and
which would turn the clock back on progress that has been made at great
sacrifice to bring the great powers of the world into a saner relationship in
this nuclear age.
- 13 -
On the great issues of Vietnam of the arms race. and of
human rights in America -- I have clear differences with Mr. Nixon and
Mr. Wallace.
I call on both of these men to join me in open debate before the
American people.
Let us put our ideas before the people. Let us offer ourselves
for their judgment -- as men and as lead ers.
Let us appear together -- in front of the same audiences or on
the same television screens, and at the same time, to give the people
a choice.
We must not let a President be elected by the size of his
advertising budget.
We cannot let a President be elected without having met the
issues before the people.
I am willing to put myself -= myself.
my programs.
my
capacity
for leadership before the American people for their judgment.
I ask the Republican nominee and the third party candidate to do
the same.
I ask, before Election Day that we be heard together as you have
heard me alone tonight.
I appeal to the people -- as citizens of a nation whose compassion
and sense of decency and fair play have made it what Lincoln called "the
last best hope on earth. "
- 14-
I appeal to you as a person who wants his children to grow up in
that kind of country.
I appeal to you to express and vote your hopes and not your hates.
I intend, in these five weeks, to wage a vigorous.
tireless.
and
forthright campaign for the Presidency.
I shall not spare myself, or those who will stand with me. I have
prepared myself. I know the problems facing this nation.
I do not shrink from those problems.
I challenge them.
They were made by men. I believe they can be solved by men.
If you will give me your confidence and support, together we shall build
a better America.
END TEXT
Enclosure (1)
VICE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF
Executive Office Building
* Has regular personal contact with VP
1. Vi Williams
VP personal secretary
2. Marsha Shephard
VP traveling secretary
3. Virginia
Reception and mail handling
4. Ashton
VP personal matters
5. Col. Dick Hunt
Handles Vietnam mail
--Military Ass't to VP
6. Julia
Hunt's secretary
7. John Reilly
Foreign Affairs advisor
8. Donna Cunningham
Secretary to Reilly
9. Doug Bennet
Domestic matters, speeches idea man, generalist
10. Mary x
Bennet's secretary (left)
11. *Bill Welsh
Legislation, programs, personnel & general
--Administrative Ass't
operations. key advisor
12. Mary X
Typist (left)
13. Suzanne
Welsh's peronal secretary & answers mail
14. Monica
Welsh's Girl Friday & receptionist
15. Edith Moore
Mail, typing & filing
16. Jim Sasser
Facilities, cars & office supplies
17. Karen
Sasser's secretary
18. Barbara Ramsey
VP appointments secretary
19. *Bill Connell
Political relations & strategist; key advisor
-- Exec. Ass't.
20. Eiler Raunholt
Connel's Ass't.
21. Gloria
Connel secretary
22. Caroline
Receptionist/clerk
23. Neal Peterson
Indian Affairs; misc. light jobs
24. *Ted Van Dyk
Basically public relations, final speech
authority and idea man; key advisor
25. Terry Edwards
Van Dyk Secretary
26.
John Stewart
Overall councils; coordinator & speech writer
27. Mary x
Secretary
Capitol
28. Edna Raunholt
Chief clerk type & mail distribution center
29.
Julius Cahn
30. Carroll
31.
Dave Gartner
VP's personal valet & agriculture advisor
32.
Dukes Ofield
33.
Norm Sherman
Press secretary
34. Sandy
Secretary
Add some 3 or 4 John & Mary Does
Enclosure (2)
RESPONSIBILITIES OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
A. Constitutional Responsibilities
1. In the case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties
of said office, the Vice President succeeds to the office of President.
2. The Vice President presides over the Senate as its President, and in
the case of a tie vote, may cast the deciding ballot. The Vice
President receives an annual appropriation for clerks ($245,528),
with which he may hire any number and type of staff assistants that
he desires. As the Presiding officer of the Senate, the Vice President
signs bills for transmittal to the President, and designates the Senate
membership on conference committees.
B. Responsibilities Assigned By Statute or Executive Order
1. Legislative Branch
a. Appoints members to various joint commissions (they currently
number approximately 30) as provided by law.
b. Member, Joint Commission for Extension of the United States Capitol.
2. Executive Branch
a. Member, National Security Council
b. Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council (Four Council
members. The Executive Secretary is Edward C. Welsh.)
C. Honorary Chairman, National Advisory Council of the Office of
Economic Opportunity. (Fifteen Council members, including the
regular chairman.)
d. Chairman, The Peace Corps National Advisory Council. (Twenty-two
Council members.)
e. Member, Board of Regents, Smithsonian Institution.
f. Chairman, President's Council on Physical Fitness. (Eleven
Council members. Administrator is John P. Wilbern.)
g. Chairman, Presidents' Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty.
(Ten regular Council members and one ex-officio member. The
Executive Director is Edward C. Crafts.)
h. Chairman of Presidents' Council on Youth Opportunity. (Twelve
Council members. The Executive Director is Gerald M. Christenson.)
i. Chairman, National Council on Indian Opportunity. (Seven Council
members. The Executive Director is William Carmack.)
j. Chairman, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development. (Eight Council members and six observers. Executive
Secretary is Edward Wenk.) This Council expires in June 1969.
C. Responsibilities Assigned Informally By The President
1. A regular member and participant in all Cabinet meetings (by custom
and tradition).
2. The President's liaison to local government officials.
3. The President's liaison to the Plans for Progress organization
(P for P is a private group composed of industry representatives
that undertake to employ the hard-core unemployed.
4. Chairman, President's Cabinet Task Force on Travel USA. (Twelve Task
Force Members. This Task Force has been inactive for the last two
years.)
1
In entries under Paragraph B-2 where reference is made to the number of
Council or Task Force members, the Vice President as Council Chairman is not
included in the total.
file V.P.
December 17, 1968
Dear Bob:
Enclosed are the write-ups you requested on an expedited basis.
As I mentioned to Larry today, I don't have all the dope on all the people.
The reason, simply enough, is that when I came aboard on 9/5, they were
already in a "campaign mode.' What I have tried to do is determine what
their usual (or pre-campaign) spot was on the Vice President's staff.
For those people on Enclosure (1) with no function noted, I will dig it up
and phone it to Larry as soon as possible.
I would like to make a few general observations based on my real experience
on the job and my industry experience vis-a-vis HHH's overall organizational
setup:
1) He has no chief of staff type to head up a very heterogenous mix
of activities and people widely dispersed physically, unconcerned
with what's going on next door and often inclined to put their own
twist on something in derogation of other programs, policies or
activities. This can be traced many times to lousy communications,
organization or reliance on a personal rapport with HHH.
2) There is absolutely nothing in writing resembling either a functional
or personnel organization scheme, information flow, policy coordination
or action follow-up. This is not to say that everything should or
must be proceduralized, but it is a little weird when no one can give
you an answer or when you get diametrically opposed answers from
responsible staff members.
3) Too many people and most of them drones.
4) Nobody admits to working for anyone else -- they all work directly
for HHH.
5) Job roles, missions and relationships are undefined and not understood;
duplicative and cumbersome office filing and procedure and a strong
penchant for stacking papers, books, mail and various other items on
desks such that no wood is showing Reminds one of a Goodwill store.
Enclosure (2) is fairly straight forward.
I might also add that much the same comments in this letter apply to the
White House operation, and not just because of LBJ's lameduck situation
It's always been that way according to a number of key staffers.
Give me a buzz if you need anything else.
Regards,
Hudson
Hudson B. Drake
Home: 202/244-6349
Office: 202/225-5595
MEMORANDUM
November 27, 1968
Has This copy copopy been
TO:
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
DWIGHT CHAPIN
KEN COLE
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
BOB HALDEMAN
RE:
WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS
As a back-up to the present White House communications
network, RN has requested that one of our staff be available
as duty officer at all times. He would assist the White House
board and RN in communications and other matters as needed.
To facilitate this request I am asking you to become one of
the people available for duty officer. Ninety percent of the
time I will assume this role and be in a position to be in
communication with the White House board. If for some
reason, however, I am unavailable, the board will contact
one of you and request that you assume the role.
During that time you should be able to be reached on a con-
tinuing basis by the board should RN or the White House board
require assistance.
Thank you for your cooperation.
+
MEMORANDUM
December 2, 1968
TO:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LARRY HIGBY
RE:
PAGE BOY UNITS
The White House Signal Corps is now investigating small
page boy units that will simply signal, causing you to phone
into a switchboard.
These will be smaller than the present page boys, but will
not be as small as you had requested. They are now re-
questing Motorola to attempt to design a truly miniaturized
receiver to fit your purposes.
More deatila when available.
HRW
Bullfile
TO:
Nixon Staff
FROM: Stephen Bull
RE:
TELEPHONE USAGE
November 27, 1968
In order to best utilize the communications facilities
provided us, the following points are offered regarding the
use of the WHCA (White House Communications Agency) lines.
BACKGROUND
WHCA is a joint military agency under the Defense
Communications Agency. Operators are military personnel
assigned to this detail as a tour of duty. The telephone
installers, however, are employees of the N.Y. Telephone Co.
Requests for installation of phones should come to me, and I
will direct the requests to the WHCA Trip Officer, who will
then place specific installation orders with N.Y. Telephone.
RECEIVING CALLS
1. In order for you to receive calls you must keep the
switchboard appraised of your location at all times. The WHCA
operators maintain listings of each Staff member so that incoming
calls can reach you. However, if you leave your desk for any
significant period of time without advising the operator where
you can be reached the operator will either waste a great deal
of time tracking you down or the call may miss you completely.
Most likely both will occur. In view of this, for your benefit
please follow these guidelines:
a) Insure that the telephone operator knows the
primary lines on which you can be reached.
b) When leaving your phone unattended for more than
a few minutes, advise the operator of your temporary location.
If you will be unable to receive calls at your temporary location,
so inform the operator, who can subsequently advise the party
calling you when to try again.
c) Insure that the telephone operator knows your
residence location and telephone number.
-2-
d) Should your position be such that you might need
to be reached at any time or place, you should constantly keep
the operator appraised of your location, e.g. the location of
the restaurant where you are dining and the approximate time of
arrival and departure at the restaurant.
2. The incoming N.Y. telephone (Signal) number is 421-3100.
PLACING CALLS
1. Local Calls - In nearly every case, the telephone
instrument in your office contains WHCA lines and straight
business lines. These business lines are entirely separate from
the WHCA operation. For local calls, where you know the telephone
number, you can just dial directly on the business line. If you
do not have time, do not know the number, etc., ask the WHCA
operator for the party you want and he will connect you. Please
provide as much information as possible, e.g. "This is Mr. Smith.
I would like Mr. Jones at ABC Corporation in N.Y.C. I think
they 're located on Park Avenue."
2. Long Distance Calls - You should try to place all toll
calls through the WHCA operator for one very good reason: we
do not pay for toll calls through WHCA, whereas we do on the
business lines. As with local calls, provide the operator
with as much information as possible.
3. Inter-Office Calls - Lift WHCA line and ask the
operator for the party to whom you wish to speak. No extension
numbers are necessary.
GENERAL
1. The bells and lights on the phones are powered by the
110 volt current in each room. In some of the newer rooms in
the Hotel Pierre all the current in the room is controlled by
a single wall switch. It is possible that on bright days you
might not be using electric lights and possibly might have the
electricity turned off. If this happens your phone will not
ring.
2. To report a line out of order, advise the WHCA operator.
He will request repair service for either the WHCA or business
lines.
file - office
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
To HRH
RICHARD M. NIXON
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 6, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO: John Ehrlichman
FROM: Harry Flemming
I've been contacted by George Dillon,
who is the telephone communications manager at
the White House. He would like to talk to who-
ever has been assigned the responsibility of tel-
ephone communications for the incoming White House
Staff. His business card is attached.
BELL
WILSAS
G. H. DILLON
kenny
ACCOUNTS MANAGER THE WHITE HOUSE
THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
TELEPHONE COMPANY
392-2074
To:
Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May
From:
Glenn Olds and Hal Booth
Subject: Notes from our meeting of September 5, 1968
We discussed the fourfold analysis of the paper to RN of
August 15; i.e. (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive Program, (3)
Government Organization (4) Transitional Arrangements, with
action referral under each as follows:
(1) Personnel:
(a) Move forward immediately in identification of
outstanding people from the several sources
discussed.
(b) Booth to confer with Lindsay's aid to avoid
duplication and aim at coordination
(c) Cambridge group to work at "qualitative"
criteria, and attention to the vehicle and
process of screening;
(d) Detail optional profiles with consequences
in pivotal areas, (Ex: a "policy making" or
administrative" Sec. of State
)
(e) Identify the 50 "toughest", not necessarily
the most prestigious, positions.
(f) Identify the "structure of consent", as well
as the structure of authority or power" in
the executive branch
(g) Identify the top civil servants in all depart-
ments;
(2) Substantive programs:
(a) Suggestions of substance or procedure re: trans-
lating policy into legislative program
(b) Assess policy options re: existing or proposed
programs.
(3) Governmental Organization:
(a) Consider small staff for program design independ-
ent of bureau or department
(b) Identify omni-competent people for major inter-
grating of ideas and policy to give coherence and
focus to the initial phases of a new administration.
(c) Identify organization "hang ups", pitfalls, and
conversely, resources and structures available for
use in implementation.
(4) Transitional arrangements:
(a) Suggest special qualities required for the key
liason person;
(b) Identify the person enjoying R.N.'s absolute
confidence & public trust to monitor the process
of transition as Clark Clifford did for Kennedy;
(c) Develop detailed information on nature, scale and
calendar of this process.
ITEK CORPORA
MASSACHUSETTS 02173
617,276-2000
FRANKLIN LINDSAY
1968
The Honorable Richard M.
450 Park Avenue
New York, Now York 10022
Dear Dick:
You will probably I's
York
in January, I told you 84
the
problems of transition #:
to a new
administration which Phil
17 and I
Lave had under vay since
this study
we have had weetings with
through
past transitions, includi
essay, Andy
Goodpnster and Mac Bundy,
y of the
files and studios relatic
adminio-
tration to another.
The attached memorar
Hone
from this study. It is :
which
might be done before the
to
insivion
and to make it more effec
to
memo-
zanda during the next the
interest
and assist you, and would
ugjestions
as to specific transition
about.
During our conversat
hat you
would welcone some early
My of
younger man) which the L.E
in
filling its roster of 212
vist you
think ve uight be holpful
eve, we
are beginning a modest of
hope
that you will also ask of
to this
end used.
Specific 13y, VO Les
thations
in:
identifying key :-
(1)
The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
-3-
August 15, 1968
could rejoin us later. I think you know my own background, which
included work for Paruch at the U.N., the Herter Committee and
ECA, the CIA, and the management consulting firm of McKinsey and
Company before becoming head of Itck.
If you would like to discuss any part of the transition
problem at any time during the next few weeks, ve will be glad
to try to meet with you at any time and place you suggest.
Sincerely,
Jack
FAL:dac
Attachment