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This file contains:
From Jerry Friedheim to Harlow and Haldeman, re: The Transistion: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 3 pgs. [Memo], 10/8/1968
From Anderson to Haldeman, re: Personnel salary scales, 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/16/1968
To Buchanan, re: Post-November Planning, 3 pgs [Memo], 10/1/1968
From Cartha D. De Loach to Bill Harman, follow up to previous conversation concerning White House security procedures, attached copy of the report on White House security procedures in October 1964, 12 pgs. [Letter], 12/6/1968
From Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to Richard M. Nixon, re: FBI Clearance Procedures, 8 pgs. [Memo], 12/4/1968
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26126834
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WHSF: Returned, 32-36
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1
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26126834
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document
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WHSF: Returned, 32-36
description
This file contains:
From Jerry Friedheim to Harlow and Haldeman, re: The Transistion: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 3 pgs. [Memo], 10/8/1968
From Anderson to Haldeman, re: Personnel salary scales, 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/16/1968
To Buchanan, re: Post-November Planning, 3 pgs [Memo], 10/1/1968
From Cartha D. De Loach to Bill Harman, follow up to previous conversation concerning White House security procedures, attached copy of the report on White House security procedures in October 1964, 12 pgs. [Letter], 12/6/1968
From Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to Richard M. Nixon, re: FBI Clearance Procedures, 8 pgs. [Memo], 12/4/1968
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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26126834
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
36
10/08/1968
Memo
From Jerry Friedheim to Harlow and
Haldeman, re: The Transistion: National
Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 3
pgs.
32
36
10/16/1968
Memo
From Anderson to Haldeman, re: Personnel
salary scales, 2 pgs.
32
36
10/01/1968
Memo
To Buchanan, re: Post-November Planning, 3
pgs
32
36
12/06/1968
Letter
From Cartha D. De Loach to Bill Harman,
follow up to previous conversation
concerning White House security
procedures, attached copy of the report on
White House security procedures in October
1964, 12 pgs.
32
36
12/04/1968
Memo
From Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to Richard M.
Nixon, re: FBI Clearance Procedures, 8 pgs.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Page 1 of 1
for
Bob Holdeman
Nixon Agnew
Senator John G. Tower
Chairman
Key Issues Committee
Representative F. Bradford Morse
301 First Street, N.E.
Deputy Chairman
Suite 415
Washington, D. C. 20002
(202) 783-4201
MEMO
October 8, 1968
To: Bryce BAT Harlow/Bob Haldeman
From: Jerry Friedheim, Military Affairs Assistant to Senator John Tower
Staff Director, Nixon/Agnew Key Issues Committee
Subject: THE TRANSITION: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White
House
A major factor influencing U.S. policy in Vietnam during the period
1964-1967 was the White House/national policy making machinery that
formulated the policy. To whit: the process by which national
intelligence and policy making decisions came together in the person of
the President's Special Advisor for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt
Rostow.
The National Security Council played no significant role in the
formulation of Vietnam policy during 1964-1968. The "Tuesday Luncheon
Club" * was the vital decision making mechanism used by the President
and as such this unofficial body constituted a grouping equivalent to,
or superior to, the NSC. But to focus attention only at that mechanism
is to overlook the decisive role played by the President's Special
Assistant (Mr. Rostow) in staffing for those meetings and in the
decisions arising therefrom.
In practice, the Special Assistant for Security Affairs became under
LBJ a sort of "Chief of Staff" who put together for the President the
policy recommendations submitted by the State Department and the
Department of Defense. He also became the President's principal
staff "intelligence officer" passing upon and passing upward the
intelligence products of the entire national intelligence community.
This is a dangerous combination.
*Informal weekly luncheon meeting of the President with those he
regarded as his "key" advisors: Secretary of Defense, McNamara;
Secretary of State, Rusk.
222
2.
It became all the more dangerous because the "concensus"
philosophy which pervaded the White House during this period,
and the large degree of personal agreement on policy between
McNamara, Rusk and Helms, contributed to an environment
which effectively closed out argument against the general drift
of the national policy as it also closed out intelligence products
which would contradict or at least undermine the validity of the
direction of this national policy drift.
One of the better specific examples of this restraint upon
the intelligence product was the 1964 decision to close the
military attache offices in Saigon because their reporting was
not consistent with the view then being pursued in Washington.
This effectively deprived the military services of any meaningful
"check and balance" upon intelligence collection within the vital
decision making centers of the Saigon government, and it
rendered military intelligence in Vietnam virtually subservient
to the U. S. Embassy there, though independent reporting channels
continued to exist.
In Washington Mr. Rostow became the focal point of national
intelligence produced by the CIA, which also utilized the products
of the other members of the national intelligence community. He
was also the focal point of policy recommendations and considera-
tions generated by the State Department and DOD.
Experienced senior military commanders understand well the
risks which are inherent in having their G-2 in any way subservient
to --- or in any way related to --- the "planning" process. In such
a situation, intelligence -- which is in the best of conditions not
easily perceptive of the whole "real world" -- tends to become
contaminated.
President Nixon's staff should include a Special Assistant for
National Intelligence who would have direct access to the President
and who would be completely independent of any part of the
planning or decision making process. He should be responsible
for providing the President (and his Staff) with the "facts" in so
far as they are known by U. S. intelligence. When the intelligence
community has different "answers", as frequently occurs, he should
be obliged to advise the President that differences of opinion exist
on the given point of issue.
3.
It is commonly assumed that the Director of Central Intelligence
performs the function described above, but in fact he never has --
mainly because he is a busy administrator in his own right; and
also because it is the nature of Presidential Staffs (all Staffs) to
proceed along with the best information available at the moment in
servicing their boss' requirements. Thus the President's Staff is
apt to move a good distance along in the formulation of policy
without benefit of the best intelligence simply because the DCI
is not a part of the President's personal staff. An intelligence
specialist, who knows the trade and the entire community
capabilities, limitations, vested interests, etc. , would greatly
improve the quality of the intelligence product being utilized by
the White House staff.
Mr. Rostow, able scholar and perceptive strategist that he is,
was not such an "independent agent. II From this lack of indepen-
dence flowed many of the last Administration's Vietnam, mistakes,
vacillations, procrastination and "credibility gap. 11
-30-
10/16/68
Memorandum
To:
Haldeman
From: Anderson
Re:
Personnel salary scales
The following are representative current salary levels.
Major Departments -- State, Defense, Treasury
Secretary
$35,000
Under Secretary
29,500
Assistant Secretary
28,750
Deputy Under Secretary
28,000
Military -- Army, Navy, Air Force
Secretary
30,000
Under Secretary
28,750
Assistant Secretary
28,750
Commissioners -- major agencies
Chairman
29,500
Member
28,750
Atomic Energy Commission
Member
27,055
White House
Special Assistants
30,000
Council of Economic Advisors
Chairman
30,000
Member
28,750
Bureau of the Budget
Director
30,000
Deputy Director
29,500
Assistant Director
28,750
1 October 1968
MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN
RE: Post-November Planning
In view of the likelihood of victory in November, I know
that ultimately some serious attention is going to be given
to identifying those people who will serve in a new administration.
I want to pass along a few thoughts in this regard.
One of the few benefits of my job during the last year and
a half has been the opportunity to observe at rather close
range the activities of the top DOD management. In some areas
I have been appalled by the incompetency, e.g., Systems Analysis;
but in others I've been impressed.
I am not convinced that it would be wise to sweep the
place clean in January. At least two Assistant Secretaries
should be retained if at all possible: Robert C. Moot (Comptroller)
and Dr. John S. Foster (DDR&E). Moot is a career bureaucrat,
but an exceptionally competent one. He hasn't been here long,
but he comes with an excellent reputation and from what I have
seen, a well deserved one. Foster is, in my opinion, first-rate.
He is terribly concerned about our failure not to spend more
for strategic R&D and has fought as hard as possible within the
inner-councils as well as on the Hill for more funds. He is
sharp, diligent, and practical. He is hawkish as hell on the
question of U.S. -Soviet strategic strength, particularly in areas
of nuclear weaponry. He opposed the Test Ban Treaty and still
believes privately that the Soviets would not hesitate to resume
testing in the atmosphere if it were to their advantage to do SO.
The basic decision, I suppose, must be whether we should
retain some of the "old team". My belief is that we should where
we can do so consistent with the Boss's long-range plans, i.e.,
where those whom we wish to keep can work confortably with a
new Administration. There is also the question of continuity,
which I think ought to carry some weight.
There is yet another consideration. When Kennedy appointed
McNamara it was with the understanding that he could appoint
his own team. I understand this was McNamara's price, but it
was too high a one. I think the President should retain the
rught cs)
2.
prerogative to appoint directly key sub-Cabinet officials where
the nature of the job is such as to be of particular importance.
This does not mean that you surround a Cabinet Secretary with
a group of people with whom he can't work, but some jobs are
too important to be filled by a Secretary S crony.
Such a job in DOD is Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs (ISA). This job will be of particular import-
ance during the next few years since ISA is responsible at the
DOD working level for operations, in Vietnam and for the forth-
coming strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets. This is
one place where I would clean house completely, since what I
have secn (particularly with regard to the proposed negotiations)
scares me to death. Your friend Halperin should be one of the
first to go.
I have noticed tremendous speculation in the press about
Rocky for Secretary of Defense. For many reasons I hope it
never gets beyond the speculation stage. My first choice would
be Senator Henry Jackson. First, because I think politically
it is imperative to have a Democrat in that slot, and second
because it should be a Democrat who has good relations on the
Hill. If we are to do what must be done, it will be vital to
maintain close, warm relations with the key members of the House
and Senate, and while we can hope for the best, it is likely
that the Democrats will control at least the Senate.
My second choice for SecDef is Clark Clifford. All of us
here have been impressed by him since he took over, and I think
it would not be at all unacceptable if he were asked to remain.
In such an event, you would want to appoint a Deputy Secretary
who was youngish and administratively oriented: someone who
could handle the day-to-day administrative responsibilities as
Nitze now does. Nitze should go.
I have had several calls regarding the Newsweek story that
McGeorge Bundy might get the Secretary of State job. The reactions
were unusually bad. I pleaded ignorance (easy to do), but was
surprised at the overt hostility. Scranton doesn't seem to excite
people much one way or another.
I have been getting together the names of some younger types
who are program-oriented who might be good in some staff slots
but I suspect there will be an abundance of these types coming
out of the campaign. I am afraid we might have trouble recruiting
some of the more competent, idealistic yet practical people who
3.
have been in the vanguard of the independent sector programming
since there seems to be increasing disillusionment over the
Boss's failure to be specific with regard to contemplated pro-
grams and a gut fear that a new Administration will be staffed
by left-overs from the Eisenhower years. Again, this might not
pose any problem if you already have an abundance of good people
in the campaign organization who you can use.
Although this may sound like a broken record, I do think
one area which must be given consideration when contemplating
a new administration is locating people of broad organizational
and administrative experience who can help tie the package to-
gether. This will be particularly important if the Boss is to
retain a maximum degree of relief from becoming tied down in
routine administrative matters. It is almost impossible to imagine
the organizational nightmare of the federal bureaucracy unless
you are in it, and the key to the President controlling it is
delegation of broad administrative authority to trusted subordinates
across Departmental lines. It really boils down to a matter of
developing the eyes and ears the President needs if he is to
prevail over the bureaucracy.
I am going out to Indianapolis the 13th to talk to my bosses
in the law firm and to see about buying a house, but I should
be back the 23rd and would be happy to discuss these matters
and others with you or Greenspan should you desire.
CARTHAD.DELOACH
December 6, 1968
Mr. William R. Harman
Federal Office Building #7
726 Jackson Place, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Bill:
It certainly was a pleasure to personally
meet you and have an opportunity to talk with you
this morning. In accordance with our conversation,
there is attached a copy of the results of the survey
made of White House security procedures in October,
1964, for President Lyndon B. Johnson.
If I can be of further assistance in regard
to this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely,
Refer
Enclosure
COPY
October 27, 1964
WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL
SECURITY PROCEDURES
Following the completion of our survey of per-
sonnel security matters at the White House, the FBI
instituted a procedure of checking Security Investigation
Data for Sensitive Position sheets, Form 86, through FBI
Headquarters divisions.
This processing is designed to provide the
White House Personnel Security Officer with basic infor-
mation which is a prerequisite to establishing a logical
priority system for requesting full-field investigations.
This preliminary check system includes processing the
security forms through the FBI Identification Division to
locate any arrest record and through the FBI Employees
Security Section indices to determine the date of the last
White House full-field investigation. In addition, a
search of the general indices of the FBI is being made to
determine the nature and date of any applicant-type inves-
tigation conducted on White House personnel in the past.
This preliminary system of checks is currently
under way and will be completed within the next several
days.
COPY
White House Full-field Investigations Currently in Process
During the past two weeks, full-field investigations
have been instituted on a number of key White House advisors
and employees. These include investigations of Messrs. Reedy,
Nelson, Carter, Watson, Clifford, Fortas, Mrs. Stegall, and
Mrs. Roberts.
We will also immediately update the investigations of
the Honorable Lee Calvin White, newly designated White House
Personnel Security Officer, and the Honorable Bill D. Moyers,
Special Assistant to the President. Mr. White was the subject
of a full-field White House investigation, completed on
January 9, 1961. A full-field investigation of Mr. Moyers was
completed on June 20, 1961.
Investigative Priority Assigned by the White House
Mrs. Stegall at the White House has conducted an
initial audit of the security data sheets which were furnished
her for submission to the FBI based upon her knowledge of
"sensitive-type" job assignments within the White House. This
categorization will be of material assistance to the FBI, and
the forms for key personnel are being given priority processing
by the FBI.
CA7 2 -
INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
WHITE HOUSE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES,
WHITE HOUSE MILITARY EMPLOYEES,
SECRET SERVICE AND WHITE HOUSE POLICE
1. White House Civilian Personnel
The full-field background investigations of White
House civilian personnel, on whom specific requests for such
investigations have been received, are being conducted by the
FBI. These are being given the highest priority.
2. Military Personnel
Our survey of White House Security personnel reveals
that there are approximately 600 military personnel assigned
to the White House Staff in various capacities. These include
drivers, communications personnel, a special group of warrant
officer guards, and individuals assigned to the various
Military Aide offices.
It is important that each military service conduct
the background investigations of its own men. There is an
agreement between the FBI and the Department of Defense regarding
handling of investigative responsibilities, and the military
branches are in the best position to conduct investigations of
their own people. Military personnel who have not been
investigated within the past year should receive such investi-
gations.
- 3 -
Results of these military background investigations
should be channeled to the White House Personnel Security Officer
who has the ultimate responsibility for evaluating White House
personnel.
A suggested letter to the Secretary of Defense has
been delivered to the Honorable Bill D. Moyers. This
communication requests that the Department of Defense undertake
full-field background inquiries on all military personnel
assigned to the White House. These investigations should
include a check of the fingerprint identification records of
the FBI.
3. Secret Service Personnel and White House Police
Normally, Secret Service has the responsibility for
investigating its own personnel and that of the White House
Police. This responsibility should continue.
It is recommended that the White House Personnel
Security Officer confer in the immediate future with the
Chief of Secret Service to insure that all necessary steps
are taken to review the investigations concerning personnel
within Secret Service's area of responsibility. Where necessary,
current fingerprint cards should be forwarded to the FBI's
Identification Division for an up-to-date check of criminal records.
and 4 -
Establishment and Control of White House Security Files
Attached to this memorandum is a sample of a proposed
file for use by the White House Personnel Security Officer. It
has been recommended that a simple alphabetical filing system
be established with an index card control. The individual items
in each file should be numbered consecutively, which will provide
additional security for the material contained in the file.
It is recommended that these security files be
checked periodically against payroll rosters and the master
White House personnel records. This will insure that all
individuals are incorporated into the security file system,
and that each individual has received a current full-field
investigation.
It is also recommended that these security files be
maintained in a safe-type fireproof file cabinet.
It is further recommended that access to those
security files be carefully limited and precisely defined,
and that the President personally approve individuals who
will have access to them. Basically, it will be necessary
for the Security Officer, his Assistant, Mrs. Stegall, and
a filing clerk to have access to them.
upt 5 -
All security files should be returned to the filing
cabinet each night, and a charge-out card system should be used
to show the date and identity of the individual who checks out
any of these files.
These charge-outs should be examined on a weekly
basis. Any security files unaccounted for should be immediately
located and refiled.
In addition, it is further recommended that strict
controls be maintained on material added to or deleted from
these files.
The attached sample file folder will clarify and
explain this recommended filing procedure. It can be used as a
guide in setting up the filing system.
These recommendations have been discussed with both the
Honorable Lee Calvin White, Security Officer, and his Assistant,
Mrs. Stegall, and they have approved these suggestions.
Washington Metropolitan Police Procedures for Handling Morals
Arrests.
The FBI has been informed that the Washington
Metropolitan Police Department is now considering a revision of
its procedures concerning individuals arrested on morals charges.
It is contemplated that in the future, all Federal agencies,
including the White House and Congress, will be notified directly
whenever one of their employees is arrested. Further, arrest
records kept by the Morals Division of the Police Department will
include information concerning the arrested person's
- 6 -
occupation. In addition, a full set of fingerprints will be
taken from each suspected sex offender and forwarded to the FBI,
whether or not the individual has been arrested previously.
Derogatory Information Concerning White House Personnel Developed
by Other Government Agencies.
Consideration should be given by the President to the
issuance of an Executive Order to all Federal departments and
agencies instructing them to furnish the White House Personnel
Security Officer with any derogatory data developed by them con-
cerning any personnel associated with the White House. This
procedure would correspond to the FBI's practice of notifying
Government agencies at a cabinet level of any information
received on an employee reflecting deviate sexual behavior or
commission of a serious crime.
FBI Fingerprint Checks
Based on the background information available on the
Form 86 being submitted by White House employees, the FBI
Identification Division will make appropriate checks for finger-
prints of each individual. In some instances, due to such factors
as a common name, it will be necessary for the White House
Personnel Security Officer to make arrangements with Secret
Service to secure a complete set of fingerprints from the
individual concerned. Every effort will be made by the FBI to
keep requests for new fingerprint cards to a minimum.
** 7 -
Updating Investigations
The White House Personnel Security Officer should
establish a follow-up system to insure that investigations of
White House personnel are brought up-to-date periodically.
This system should be established in a manner which will result
in an even and regular flow of these requests to the FBI.
Corollary Investigations
The White House Personnel Security Officer should
have the responsibility for making separate requests for
full-field investigations of employees of the Alderson Reporting
Service, and of any other individuals who may come in close
contact with the President.
Maintenance of White House Fingerprint Records in the "Criminal
Section" of the FBI Identification Division
In order that the White House Personnel Security
Officer may be promptly advised in the event any White House
employee is arrested, it will be necessary for the FBI to
transfer all White House employees' fingerprint cards from the
civil section of the Identification Division to the criminal
section files. This will be done at once in the Identification
Division of the FBI.
- 8 -
White House Resignations
The White House Personnel Security Officer should submit
to the FBI, on a monthly basis, a list of all employees who have
left White House service so that their fingerprint cards can be
transferred from the criminal file section to the civil section
in the Identification Division of the FBI.
Temporary White House Employees
It is understood that a number of White House employees
are on temporary assignment and are expected to depart after the
November election. It is suggested that no request for full-field
investigations be submitted on any individual in this category.
Future Requests for White House Full-field Investigations
It is recommended that all future requests for full-field
White House investigations, including updating investigations, be
handled as follows:
A written request should be forwarded by the White House
Personnel Security. Officer to the attention of FBI Assistant Director
C. D. DeLoach when requesting full-field investigations of
White House Staff members and Presidential appointees. It is
further suggested that the security data sheet, Form 86, be
attached to this request in duplicate. It is also requested that
a current fingerprint card, Form 87, be attached. This procedure
will save considerable time and greatly facilitate the FBI's handling
of the full-field inquiry.
are 9 -
White House Name Checks
All requests for name checks should emanate from the
White House Personnel Security Officer, or his Assistant,
Mrs. Stegall.
Liaison
Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach of the FBI will
maintain daily liaison with the White House Personnel Security
Officer to resolve any questions which may arise in connection
with the procedures set forth above.
Enclosure
- 10 -
TO
:
Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach, FBI
FROM
:
SUBJECT
:
FBI Investigation
Subject's Name
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Present Address
has requested:
( ) Copy of Previous Report
( ) Name Check
( ) Full Field Investigation
The person named above is being considered for:
( ) White House staff position
( ) Presidential appointment
( ) Position with another agency
ATTACHMENTS:
( ) SF 86 (in duplicate)
( ) SF 87, Fingerprint Card
( ) Biography
REMARKS:
REPORT SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY FBI TO:
MEMORANDUM
TO:
President-elect Richard M. Nixon
FROM:
Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
December 1, IS
FBI CLEARANCE PROCEDURES
On the basis of conferences between President
Johnson's transition representative, Charles S.
Murphy, Counselor to the President; the Attorney
General; Director Hoover and myself, a procedure
has been established for the conducting of personnel
full-field background investigations by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation on prospective Presidential
appointees.
The Attorney General outlined a procedure in
his letter to Director Hoover, dated November 14,
1968. A copy of that letter is attached hereto.
Paragraph 6 of this letter was later modified to
eliminate reference to the furnishing of the
results of any such investigations to the appropriate
member of the present administration.
Additionally, we have conferred at length
with Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach, in order
to establish the necessary procedures for facilitating
the requesting and reporting of full-field FBI
background investigations.
For your information, full-field FBI background
investigations have been completed on me and my
Page 2
assistant, William R. Harman. These reports were
sent to the Security Division of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. On the basis of such
investigations, both of us have been granted top
secret security clearance.
The procedure for requesting full-field FBI
background investigations is outlined in a
memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, dated December 4,
1968, a copy of which is attached hereto. Outlined
below are those types of clearances available and
the appointees who should be subject to those
clearances.
TYPES OF CLEARANCES
1. FULL-FIELD FBI INVESTIGATION
The cost of each such investigation is
$1305.00. The total cost of such investigations
is figured into the FBI budget. We have been
assured that the FBI will endeavor to complete
an investigation within 2 weeks after the
request is made.
WHITE HOUSE
All members of the White House staff,
including clerical personnel. Assuming
no clerical personnel utilized by the
Page 3
present administration were retained,
this would involve approximately 200
individuals.
A full-field FBI investigation should
also be conducted with respect to any
individuals who come in direct personal
contact with you and the White House,
such as various personnel on detail to
the Executive Office from various agencies,
and additionally such persons as the White
House chef, file clerks, painters and
maintenance men. The FBI conducts
investigations as to 700 such persons,
including the White House staff and clerical
personnel. The background of some of these
persons will be investigated by the various
agencies to which they are attached. It
should be noted that the approximately 600
military personnel attached to the White
House are investigated and cleared by
their own military services. The Secret
Service investigates and clears its own
personnel and the White House police force.
Page 4
LEGISLATIVE
A full-field FBI investigation should be
conducted on the individuals to fill the
4 legislative positions that will be
available for appointment:
Architect of the Capitol
Assistant Comptroller General
Librarian of Congress
Public Printer
DEPARTMENTAL
There are a total of 533 Presidentially
appointed full time executive positions
to be filled and they are summarily
listed below. A full-field FBI investigation
should be conducted on appointees to all of
these positions.
Cabinet--12
Deputies and Under Secretaries--16
Assistant Secretaries--70
Military Departments--15
General Counsels--12
Miscellaneous Bureau Chiefs and others--102
Ambassadors--121
The Department of State has its own
security division which conducts
investigations for Ambassadors.
This investigation should not be
Page 5
done by the State Department in
advance of January 20, 1969, but
should be handled by the FBI.
United States Attorneys-93
United States Marshals--92
These are term positions, the majority
of which will expire between June
and December of 1969. The Department
of Justice conducts investigations as
to these personnel.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
In addition, there are a total of 220 full
time Presidentially appointed positions in
the independent agencies. Of this number,
approximately 95 will be available for
appointment by you immediately. An additional
25 to 30 appointees in this category will be
available in the calendar year 1969. A full-
field FBI investigation should be conducted
on each appointee to these positions.
An Internal Revenue Service check is part of
every full-field FBI investigation. Normally
the FBI sends its form requesting an IRS check
to its contact in the Internal Revenue Service
Page 6
requesting information on tax returns and
litigation for the past 7 years. In turn, the
IRS in Washington checks with the regional
offices. The IRS attempts to ascertain whether
there is any delinquency in filing of tax returns
or payment of taxes and the existence of suits
pending against the individual by the Government
for taxes. This check takes approximately 1½
to 2 weeks and is done concurrently with the
full-field FBI investigation. If the FBI has
the social security number of the individual,
this check may be completed in a matter of hours
by computer. A data bank indexed by social
security numbers and containing IRS information
of this variety is used for this purpose.
2. FULL-FIELD INVESTIGATIONS BY OTHER AGENCIES
There are a number of positions, approximately
1600 which are not appointed by the President,
but which would require nevertheless some type
of background investigation. These are persons
in policy and supporting positions categorized
as the top of the Civil Service (GS-16, 17, and
18) and Schedule Cs. Under the present
administration these persons are chosen by the
heads of the respective departments and agencies.
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The responsibility rests with the Department or
Agency head to ascertain which positions in his
Department or Agency are sensitive enough to
require an investigation of the prospective
occupant of that position. The investigations
are ordered and reviewed by the Department or
Agency heads. The Departments of State, Defense
and Justice have their own investigative agencies
within the Departments that complete this function.
Where no investigative agency exists within the
Department, a full-field investigation is
conducted by the Civil Service Commission.
Such an investigation is conducted by the Civil
Service Commission and costs approximately
$450.00. It should not be considered to be the
equivalent of a full-field FBI investigation.
It is inadvisable to have the Department
investigative agencies or the Civil Service
Commission conduct background investigations
on prospective non-presidential appointees
before inauguration. These investigations
should be handled by the FBI. After January
20, 1969, the new administration can shift this
investigative function back to the Agency or
the Civil Service Commission.
Page 8.
3. NAME CHECKS
On request, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
will perform name checks on individuals chosen
to fill part time positions on various Boards and
Commissions. There are about 2200 of these
part time positions and a full-field FBI investigation
for each appointee has not been done in the past
with the exception ofthe appointee to the United
States Advisory Commission on International
Education and Cultural Affairs, as requested by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
name check can be completed in a few days and
involves submitting to the FBI information on
the prospective appointee, such as his name,
date and place of birth, and present address.
This information is checked against the central
files of the FBI which would contain records of
all criminal convictions and additional information
furnished to them by the intelligence agencies,
including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State (S.Y.),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (civil and
criminal), the Department of Defense (service
records) and the House Un-American Activities
Committee.
7.B.X.J.