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This file contains:
From: Ellsworth. Re: Notes on Strategy and Tactics through November 5. 23 pages. [Memo], 6/9/1968
From: Bob Ellsworth. Re: Thanks. [Memo], 7/24/1968
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention and Pre-Election Impact. 3 pages. [Memo], n.d.
To: Buchanan.Re: Further Thoughts On Wallace. 3 pages. [Memo], 6/24/1968
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Breakdown of the Gallup Poll. 11 pages. [Memo], 7/13/1968
Ex-Vice President Lagging 35 to 40%. Unknown author for unknown newspaper. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 7/10/1968
From: Bell. Re: The Gallup Poll.. 9 pages. [Memo], 7/13/1968
Subjects on but not limited to: Campaigning, General Approach, and Agenda. 14 pages. [Other Document], n.d.
To: Mitchell & Haldeman.From: DC. Re: Citizens, Counterattack, Humphrey Attack Strategy, Family Schedule, Speakers, and Background Material. 5 pages. [Memo], 7/8/1968
To: DC. From: Rose Mary Woods. Re: Edwin Emrich Suggestion. [Memo], 7/7/1968
Ohio, Mich. Polls Deal Rocky Blow. Author unknown from The Washington Post. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 7/18/1968
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Billy Graham. 3 pages. Duplicates not scanned. [Memo], n.d.
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Hoover. 2 pages. Duplicates not scanned. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten notes. 2 pages. [Other Document], n.d.
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WHSF: Returned, 33-13
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WHSF: Returned, 33-13
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This file contains:
From: Ellsworth. Re: Notes on Strategy and Tactics through November 5. 23 pages. [Memo], 6/9/1968
From: Bob Ellsworth. Re: Thanks. [Memo], 7/24/1968
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention and Pre-Election Impact. 3 pages. [Memo], n.d.
To: Buchanan.Re: Further Thoughts On Wallace. 3 pages. [Memo], 6/24/1968
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Breakdown of the Gallup Poll. 11 pages. [Memo], 7/13/1968
Ex-Vice President Lagging 35 to 40%. Unknown author for unknown newspaper. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 7/10/1968
From: Bell. Re: The Gallup Poll.. 9 pages. [Memo], 7/13/1968
Subjects on but not limited to: Campaigning, General Approach, and Agenda. 14 pages. [Other Document], n.d.
To: Mitchell & Haldeman.From: DC. Re: Citizens, Counterattack, Humphrey Attack Strategy, Family Schedule, Speakers, and Background Material. 5 pages. [Memo], 7/8/1968
To: DC. From: Rose Mary Woods. Re: Edwin Emrich Suggestion. [Memo], 7/7/1968
Ohio, Mich. Polls Deal Rocky Blow. Author unknown from The Washington Post. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 7/18/1968
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Billy Graham. 3 pages. Duplicates not scanned. [Memo], n.d.
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Hoover. 2 pages. Duplicates not scanned. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten notes. 2 pages. [Other Document], n.d.
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
33
13
06/09/1968
Memo
From: Ellsworth. Re: Notes on Strategy and
Tactics through November 5. 23 pages.
33
13
07/24/1968
Memo
From: Bob Ellsworth. Re: Thanks.
33
13
n.d.
Memo
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re:
Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-
Convention and Pre-Election Impact. 3 pages.
33
13
06/24/1968
Memo
To: Buchanan.Re: Further Thoughts On
Wallace. 3 pages.
33
13
07/13/1968
Memo
To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Breakdown of
the Gallup Poll. 11 pages.
33
13
07/10/1968
Newspaper
Ex-Vice President Lagging 35 to 40%.
Unknown author for unknown newspaper.
Not scanned.
Friday, January 04, 2008
Page 1 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
33
13
07/13/1968
Memo
From: Bell. Re: The Gallup Poll.. 9 pages.
33
13
n.d.
Other Document
Subjects on but not limited to: Campaigning,
General Approach, and Agenda. 14 pages.
33
13
07/08/1968
Memo
To: Mitchell & Haldeman. From: DC. Re:
Citizens, Counterattack, Humphrey Attack
Strategy, Family Schedule, Speakers, and
Background Material. 5 pages.
33
13
07/07/1968
Memo
To: DC. From: Rose Mary Woods. Re:
Edwin Emrich Suggestion.
33
13
07/18/1968
Newspaper
Ohio, Mich. Polls Deal Rocky Blow. Author
unknown from The Washington Post. Not
scanned.
33
13
n.d.
Memo
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re:
Project Billy Graham. 3 pages. Duplicates
not scanned.
33
13
n.d.
Memo
To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re:
Project Hoover. 2 pages. Duplicates not
scanned.
Friday, January 04, 2008
Page 2 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
33
13
n.d.
Other Document
Handwritten notes. 2 pages.
Friday, January 04, 2008
Page 3 of 3
Haldeman
June 9, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
DC
Mitchell
Stans
Haldeman
Flanigan
Kleindienst
Garment
FROM:
Ellsworth
RE:
Notes on Strategy and Tactics through November 5.
Summary: The campaign in 1968 has become a national
campaign in a more complete sense than ever before. The old
politics of regional geographical campaigns, and the old
politics of ideological and class campaigns, have to a sub-
stantial extent given way to the new politics of media
campaigning (as suggested in the Haldeman memorandum of 1967)
with tactics based on demographic analysis.
One of the deep running currents in American politics
today is the demand for a change in 16.8 ership: the opening
theme of the Nixon campaign, the Johnson abdication, the
Kennedy and McCarthy campaigns (netting some 75% of the vote
in recent Democratic primaries), and the Wallace campaign --
all give evidence of this current. One effect of the RFK
killing and TV coverage is to heighten the sense that the
"ins" have failed to govern effectively and to intensify the
pressure for changes in policies and leadership.
-2-
Assuming that Nixon and Humphrey* are the nominees
of the two major parties, Wallace would be the main compe-
titor against Nixon for the votes of those who desire
substantial change. In addition, Wallace will tap a sub-
stantial regional popularity in the South, plus the residual
racism of the South, plus whatever white backlash may have
been generated in recent years in the rest of the country.
Given the nationwide character of the "new politics"
campaign that is indicated this year, it remains that the
President has to be elected (according to the Constitution)
by the electoral college. This means that local and
regional factors must be taken into account, that the
demography of the principal states has to be read and
accounted for, and that the Wallace candidacy has a double
potential for mischief: in that Wallace may win a substan-
tial number (35 or more) of electoral votes, and in that he
might drain off enough "we want a change", anti-Humphrey
and white backlash votes in several states to deprive Nixon
of electoral votes by throwing those states to Humphrey.
In thinking about campaign tactics, it is also
necessary to keep in mind that we will have 25 candidates
for Senate seats (including incumbents running for reelection)
who appear to have a reasonable chance of winning. All of
those votes in the Senate will be important to Nixon as
President.
* A source close to Secretary Fowler says LBJ will
now accept a draft at the Convention.
-3-
The foregoing points: 1.') the national quality
of the election campaign, 2.) the electoral college effect,
and 3.) the Senate candidates effect -- are analyzed in some
detail on the following pages, and at the end the campaign
efforts -- budget, non-candidate efforts, the Vice Presi-
dential candidate's effort and the Presidential candidate's
effort -- are assessed in light of the entire analysis.
-4-
I. The campaign in 1968 has become a national
campaign in a more complete sense than ever before. The
old politics of regional geographical campaigns and the
old politics of ideological and class campaigns, have to
a substantial extent given way to the new politics of
media campaigning with tactics based on demographic analysis.
Politicians tend to think in terms of states or
geographical regions, and while it is necessary to take
account of regions and states later, it is better to start
with a look at the national electorate. It may be a truism
that the American people have become homogenized, but it
is certainly true that television and other national media,
together with the great mobility of large numbers of the
working class (not to mention the sales, business and
professional classes) -- all accelerated and strengthened
by mass college education -- have made Presidential poli-
tics genuinely national.
In fact, Presidential politics today are to a
large extent non-partisan. When George Gallup talks about
the Republican Party being a third party (43% Democrats,
30% Independents, and 27% Republicans) he is talking about
the self-identification of his interviewees -- not about
how people vote. The fact is, both parties are minority
-5-
parties in terms of Presidential politics in the United
States -- and have been since World War II. In the last
5 Presidential elections, the Democrats have received a
majority of the popular vote only once -- in 1964. More-
over, when all the votes cast for President in the last
5 elections are added up, the Democrats come out with
49.6%, the Republicans with 49.1% and others with 1.3%.
These effects are underscored for Presidential
campaign purposes this year because of the general and
pervasive nature of the political issues. For example,
the Gallup Poll Survey of Issues in May 1968 showed 42%
of the American people thought Vietnam was the most impor-
tant problem facing this country today. An ORC poll
conducted for the Nixon organization in February 1968
showed that in California, Illinois, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, Vietnam was
regarded by over 70% of all voters as the one single prob-
lem the President should concentrate on solving. Similarly,
race relations, crime and lawlessness and the high cost of
living/taxes, generally in that order, rated with nearly
equal intensity all across the nation.
Thus: modern mass media permit -- even require --
a truly national Presidential campaign. On historical form
-6-
the two major Presidential candidates can expect to have
an equal chance at winning, regardless of their party
identification, and the politically potent issues appear
to be genuinely nationwide.
That being the case, what are some of the nation-
wide demographic groupings in which the Nixon candidacy
may be expected to have strength, and where may problem
areas expect to be encountered? How large are these
different groups in terms of votes?, Answers to these
questions are important so that the campaign can be de-
signed to emphasize the appeal to and build up the vote
turn-out in the strong groups, largely through organiza-
tional efforts -- and at the same time design appeals to
the problem areas for the purpose of minimizing antagonisms
and emphasizing possible positive appeals. No accurate
study has been made in this area; one is needed.
In a rough and preliminary way, we have developed
a highly speculative analysis, based on conversions of recent
Gallup polls designed to show relative strength and weakness
with basic groups of people as used by Gallup. I want to
emphasize that the following figures are included in this
memorandum only to indicate the utility and importance of
a professional demographic analysis being developed quickly
-7-
for use in this campaign. The figures that follow are so
extrapolated, converted and estimated that they cannot be
taken as anything other than indicative.
NIXON STRENGTH (+)
EXPECTED NUMBER OF
OR WEAKNESS
(-)
CATEGORY
1968 VOTERS
VIS-A-VIS HUMPHREY
I. Sex
Men
36,200,000
even
Women
38,100,000
+1,500,000
II. Education level
Completed college
18,000,000
+1,400,000
Completed high school
38,800,000
even
Completed grade school
17,800,000
-1,800,000
III. Occupation
Professional & business
15,900,000
+1,600,000
White collar
10,700,000
-2,100,000
Farmers
3,700,000
+1,500,000
Manual
41,700,000
-4,200,000
IV. Religion
Protestant
27,200,000
+3,300,000
Catholic
18,600,000
-5,200,000
V. Geography
East
20,500,000
-2,400,000
Midwest
22,700,000
even
South
17,400,000
+ 700,000
West
13,400,000
+1,600,000
VI. Income
over $7,000/year
30,800,000
+1,200,000
$5,000-$7,000
21,700,000
-2,100,000
$3,000-$5,000
13,800,000
- 800,000
below $3,000
10,800,000
even
VII. Size of Community
over 500,000
12,700,000
-1,500,000
50,000-500,000
16,000,000
-1,900,000
2,500-50,000
13,800,000
+1,700,000
under 2,500
,10,800,000
+3,600,000
-8-
The immediate political uses of such figures are
perhaps self-evident. For example, one should emphasize
getting out the vote of high income, highly educated resi-
dents in communities of over 50,000. Nixon has great appeal
to these income and educational groups, and we need to
minimize and cut down anticipated losses in the large com-
munities. For example, it is interesting to note that in
the "Geography" section, the strengths in the South and
West very nearly balance the weakness in the East. This is
not to say that one should ignore the East -- only that one
should not focus one's campaign on the East at the risk of
diminishing the enthusiasm in the Midwest, South and West.
Other examples could be given -- the point is, a demographic/
political analysis, professional and accurately done, is
needed. It will be useful.
On a national basis, the Wallace candidacy holds
dangers. The Gallup and Harris polls in May 1968 show the
following figures:
NIXON
HUMPHREY
WALLACE
UNDECIDED
Gallup
39
36
14
11
Harris
36
38
13
13
Until we can get more precise research, it is
difficult to know what the full effect of the Wallace
-9-
candidacy will be. One presumes his percentages are very
high in the South and quite low in the rest of the country,
and that the 13% or 14% showingin the national polls is an
average. This presumption is borne out to some extent by
a February 1968 poll in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution
showing Wallace with 28% versus a Nebraska poll conducted
in mid-April showing Wallace with 4%. A 4% vote for Wallace
in Nebraska would probably not affect the disposition of
Nebraska's electoral votes; a 4% vote for Wallace in Penn-
sylvania would: it might throw Pennsylvania's electoral
votes to Humphrey. However, a study of Wallace's relative
positions in Harris polls over the spring gives some hint
that, when Humphrey is a candidate, Wallace support tends
to come from Humphrey or from undecideds, rather than from
Nixon. A professional study of the Wallace effect in key
states outside the South needs to be made.
In general: it has been said that, as election day
approaches, Wallace's appeal will fade and his percentage
of the vote will be greatly lower than his percentage in
various polls. This is good campaigning but not an inevitable
development. The hope might be based on the historical
experiences of 1948, when Thurmond and Henry Wallace are
supposed to have run less well in the election than they
did in the polls, and on the experience of 1965 when William
Buckley ran less well in the New York City mayor election
-10-
than he had been running in the polls. However, careful
research shows that while it did happen to Henry Wallace
and Buckley, this did not happen to Thurmond. Instead,
he got a higher percentage of votes than the polls showed
he might. A Crossley poll, taken shortly before the
election of 1948, showed Thurmond with about 1.6% of the
vote. Gallup showed Thurmond getting about 2%. On
election day, Thurmond got over 2% of the total national
vote, performing better than might have been predicted
on the basis of the polls.
Thus it can be seen that, although Henry Wallace
did get only about half the vote that had been expected
for him, Thurmond actually got a little more than what
he had been polling, on a national basis.
Truman ignored Thurmond on the right, correctly
assessing his ppeal as intense but limited to a small
number of voters. Instead, Truman came out hard for federal
medical care and active government generally, berating and
ridiculing the "Republicans" for a do-nothing record. Thus
he occupied Wallace's ground by promising federal action
for the masses and drove Wallace to an untenable Communistic
left position.
-11-
A detailed and thorough analysis of the Wallace
effect, made on a state by state basis, is clearly indicated:
it seems probable that Wallace would win the electoral votes
of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina against
Humphrey and Nixon, with Georgia being a battle ground. No
effort should be made to capture the electoral votes of
these states because of the risk (having in mind the instan-
taneous nationwide quality of mass communications) of losing
votes from the center to Humphrey in other states.
Instead, the Nixon campaign. should continue to
occupy the center as it has done so far, and should undercut
Wallace by stressing that Nixon represents a substantial
change from present leadership policies while Humphrey does
not, both in terms of domestic policies (government and
private capital to draw blacks fully into American life,
bloc grants fcr decentralization of power, judicial balance
and crime comeol for law and order) and foreign policies
(peace, no more Vietnams, use of economic and diplomatic
power with military balance vis-a-vis the USSR to insure
stability in the world) Nixon cannot compete with Wallace
on regional appeal or racism, but he certainly can on the
change of leadership issue.
-12-
Wallace's great weakness, even in the South,
is his lack of experience in Washington and the doubt
that he could manage the federal government. Nixon
could.
II. Given the nationwide character of the "new
politics" campaign that is indicated this year, it remains
that the President has to be elected (according to the
Constitution) by the electoral college.
At the present time, I count 28 states solid for
Nixon with 51 electoral votes -- 6 states (including D. C.)
solid for Humphrey with 81 electoral votes -- 4 states solid
for Wallace with 35 electoral votes -- and 13 statesuncer-
tain with 171 electoral votes.
The breakdown is as follows:
NIXON
HUMPHREY
Illinois
26
Oregon
6
New York
43
Ohio
26
Nebraska
5
Massachusetts
14
Texas
25
Arizona
5
Minnesota
10
Florida
14
Idaho
4_
West Virginia
7
Indiana
13
Maine
4
Rhode Island
4
North Carolina
13
Montana
4
Dist. of Col.
3
Virginia
12
New Hampshire
4
Missouri
12
Utah
4
TOTAL
81
Tennessee
11
Alaska
3
Iowa
9
Delaware
3
Kentucky
9
Nevada
3
Washington
9
Vermont
3
Oklahoma
8
Wyoming'
3
Kansas
7
Colorado
6
TOTAL
51
-13-
WALLACE
UNCERTAIN
Alabama
10
California
40
Louisiana
10
Pennsylvania
29
South Carolina
8
Michigan
21
Mississippi
7
New Jersey
17
Wisconsin
12
TOTAL
35
Georgia
12
Maryland
10
Connecticut
8
Arkansas
6
Hawaii
4
North Dakota
4
New Mexico
4
South Dakota
4
TOTAL
171
A rough, preliminary demographic analysis of the
several states (similar to the rough national demographic
analysis explained above) is attached as Appendix A. This
should be refined and used for political analysis.
Taking the top four states among the undecided --
California, .insylvania, Michigan and New Jersey -- which,
when added to the sure Nixon states, brings Nixon to within
12 electoral votes of winning the Presidency -- the demo-
graphic data are of great political significance.
For example: The business and professional class,
in which Nixon is very strong, runs at about the national
average or a little above. 'Farmers with whom Nixon is
-14-
stronger than with any other occupational group in the
country, runs substantially below the national average.
Manual workers, with whom Nixon is not strong, run at or
slightly above the national average. The implication is
clear for these key states: strong get-out-the-vote
efforts should be organized among the business and pro-
fessional classes; Nixon should campaign to manual workers
on themes (such as law and order) that appeal to them and
stay away from economic themes that alienate them, and he
should avoid talking about farm problems.
In the same states (except for California), rela-
tively small percentages of the population live in rural
areas and as has already been seen by the minuscule percen-
tages of people engaged in farming, most of these are
probably suburbanites or exurbanites. In any case, Nixon
has great strength among people who li e in communities of
under 2500 and substantial strength among people who live
in communities between 2500 and 50,000. The opposition
has great strength among people who live in communities
of over 50,000. What is indicated is a strong get-out-
the-vote drive among the suburbs.
In general, more effort should go into the Uncertain
states than into the Nixon states, and the least effort should
go into the Humphrey and Wallace states.
-15-
III. In thinking about campaign tactics, it is
necessary to keep in mind that we will have 25 candidates
for Senate seats who appear to have a reasonable chance of
winning.
They are as follows:
STATE
SENATE CANDIDATE
STATUS
ELECTORAL VOTES
Oregon
Packwood
Nixon state
6
California
Rafferty
Uncertain
40
Nevada
Fike
N
3
Idaho
Hansen
N
4
Utah
Bennett
N
4
Arizona
Goldwater
N
5
Colorado
Dominick
N
6
No. Dakota
Young
Un
4
So. Dakota
Gubbrud
Un
4
Kansas
Dole
N
7
Oklahoma
Bellmon
N
8
Missouri
Curtis
N
12
Iowa
Ray or Johnson
N
9
Wisconsin
Leonard
Un
12
Indiana
Ruckelshouse
N
13
Kentucky
Cook
N
9
Florida
Gurney
N
14
Ohio
Saxbe
N
26
Maryland
Mathias
Un
10
Penn.
Schweiker
Un
29
New York
Javits
Humphrey state
43
Conn.
May or Sibal
Un
8
New Hamp.
Cotton
N
4
Vermont
Aiken
N
3
Alaska
Rasmussen
Un
3
At least for the first few months of a Nixon
Presidency, it would be beneficial to the White House to
have personally helped in the campaign of every one of
these men -- even the old-timers.
-16-
IV. The various campaign efforts must be
assessed and assigned to priorities so as to produce the
maximum effect, within the limits of the time, money and
personnel that will be available for the campaign.
(1) Budget Priorities.
In the broadest terms, budget priorities should
be assigned as follows, from lowest priority to highest:
(a) Lowest priority: those states regarded
as solid for Humphrey or. Wallace.
(b) Next priority: those states regarded
as solid for Nixon.
(c) Highest priority: those states regarded
as uncertain.
As a general rule, the Candidate's effort, being
the most important, should be expected to consume the most
money.
The Vice Presidential candidate's effort may be
considered in the same category, but of course would not
consume as much money as the Presidential candidate.
The non-candidate efforts would absorb the rest
of the money: the Nixon-oriented get-out-the-vote campaigns
in various metropolitan areas, a high level speakers group
(Surrogate Candidates), and the distribution of campaign
materials.
-17-
(2) Non-candidate Efforts.
These efforts, which would not involve either
the Presidential or the Vice Presidential candidate, should
consist of two principal activities: a high level speakers
group (Surrogate Candidates) and a combination telephone
and door-to-door effort modeled on the highly successful
Oregon operation, for use in metropolitan areas throughout
the country.
Citizens groups, Party organization efforts, and
local campaigns can supplement this phase of the effort,
but -- particularly if the Presidential candidate is going
to severely limit his mass public appearances -- the Surrogate
Candidates and the neighbor-to-neighbor telephone and visi-
tation program will assume great significance in this campaign.
The Surrogate Candidates may be used appropriately
both in speaking to live audiences and in appearing on local
and regional media. These men would be articulate, experi-
enced politicians and public speakers whose thinking parallels
that of the Candidate and who would be amenable to delivering
the Nixon line in some detail. I am thinking of the follow-
ing men: National Committeemen Bud Wilkinson and Bo Calloway,
Senators Baker, Percy and Thurmond, Governors Agnew and Hickel,
and Congressmen Brock, Bush, Morse, Rumsfeld and MacGregor.
-18-
The telephone-personal visit operation used so
successfully in Oregon involves the limited but active
involvement of thousands of men and women, for the most
part within metropolitan areas. Briefly: paid professionals
telephone and recruit volunteers to hand-carry packets of
campaign material to 5 neighbors. The original successful
calls of course are followed up with direct mail and with
a further follow-up telephone call. This has worked well
not only in Oregon but in a number of other cities in the
West. It can be modified in various. ways. The principal
advantage of such an operation is that it actively involves
tens of thousands of individuals directly in the campaign
and thus is very much in line with the new so-called "parti-
cipatory politics".
(3) The Vice Presidential Effort.
The Vice Presidential candidate, acting as an
alternate Presidential candidate, should design his campaign,
his media presentations and his personal appearances so as
to appeal, on a national basis, to those elements of the
electorate with which the Presidential candidate may not
have the greatest strength. For example, if there are age
groups or occupation groups or even ethnic groups -- in the
national electorate and more particularly the undecided
-19-
states -- where the demographic analyses show the Vice
Presidential candidate to have substantially more potential,
his campaign should focus upon those elements in those areas.
The Vice Presidential candidate cannot substitute
for the Presidential candidate, however, in the Senatorial
candidate area.
(4) The Presidential Candidate's Effort.
(a) Time. Fifty-eight calendar days lie
between Labor Day, the traditional start of Presidential
campaigns, and election day. Assuming that the Candidate
can sustain a high intensity effort 5 days out of every 7,
that means 41 days are available for high intensity campaigning.
Assuming the Candidate can do with 6 hours' sleep
each day, that provides 738 hours. Assuming that no more
than one-third of those hours (i.e., 6 hours a day) can
be given to public appearances (including backgrounders,
conferences with political leaders, time actually spent
with staff) -- that leaves 246 hours for public appearances
by the Candidate during the general election campaign.
In attempting to arrive at a theoretical basis
for utilization of the Candidate's time (total 246 hours),
it is my feeling that at least 10% should be set aside for
personal visits with the leading figures of the national
-20-
press, radio and TV. I do not know that this exact per-
centage has been used, but undoubtedly the time that has
been devoted to this purpose during the last several months
has been time well spent. That leaves approximately 225 hours.
Although I assume most of the television advertising
production will be out of the way by Labor Day, it is quite
possible that some issue may come up requiring the production
of new advertising material by the Candidate during the cam-
paign itself. Ten percent of the Candidate's time should be
reserved for this eventuality. That Teaves approximately
200 hours. These hours should be apportioned so as to put
the greatest effort in those places where the greatest effort
is needed and where it has the best chance of paying off.
Analysing the political situation in the several
states, eliminating those states solid for Humphrey or Wallace,
assigning to ch Nixon state its own electoral vote, assign-
ing to each Uncertain state double its own electoral vote,
then adding to each Senate Candidate state that state's
electoral vote -- and then dividing the 200 public appearance
hours among the states on the basis of the relative weights
thus assigned to them, the Candidate's public appearance
time should be spent in various states approximately as
follows:
-21-
STATE
CANDIDATE'S TIME (hours)
Alabama
0
Alaska
1½
Arizona
2½
Arkansas
3
California
30
Colorado
3
Connecticut
6
Delaware
3/4
District of Columbia
0
Florida
7
Georgia
6
Hawaii
2
Idaho
2
Illinois
13
Indiana
61/2
Iowa
4½¹/2
Kansas
3th
Kentucky
4½
Louisiana
0
Maine
1
Maryland
7½
Massachusetts
0
Michigan
101/2
Minnesota
0
Mississippi
0
Missouri
6
Montana
1
Nebraska
1
Nevada
1½
New Hampshire
2
New Jersey
81/2
New Mexico
2
New York
0
North Carolina
3
North Dakota
3
Ohio
13
Oklahoma
4
Oregon
3
Pennsylvania
22
Rhode Island
0
South Carolina
0
South Dakota
3
Tennessee
3
Texas
8
Utah
2
Vermont
1½
Virginia
3
Washington
2
West Virginia
0
Wisconsin
9
Wyoming
1
-22-
NB: It should be recognized that New York,
because of its preeminence in the communications world and
because of the nationwide implications of anything that is
done or not done in New York, represents a special case.
NB: South Carolina also represents a special
case. If Senator Thurmond campaigns for the Republican
ticket in the manner and to the extent he has indicated,
and if he or Harry Dent desires the Candidat in South
Carolina, the Candidate must give serious consideration to
going.
NB: It is essential that the "unity" theme which
has been stressed so successfully and so effectively so far
in 1968 -- effectively in terms of primary results, effectively
in terms of favorable standings in national polls and effectively
in terms of reactions of commentators such as Wicker and Broder --
be given tangible, concrete form in the conduct of the general
election campaign. In detail, this means campaigning, and
thus appearing to be concerned with, all of the major geo-
graphical sections of the country. This will be relatively
easy as there are in fact either undecided states or states
with Senate candidates in every section of the country.
It also means campaigning to the two groups that
are most alienated from the rest of the country and that are
-23-
i
causing the most trouble: the blacks and the young people.
I do not suggest that the Candidate modify his positions
on the issues or his views on either domestic matters or
foreign policies -- only that he campaign to these groups,
thus reassuring the rest of the country that, as President,
he would pursue a policy of national unification rather
than continued drift or further division.
"Probably every generation sees itself as charged
with remaking the world. Mine, however, knows
that it will not remake the world. But its task
is perhaps even greater, for it consists in keeping
the world from destroying itself:"
Albert Camus, on receiving
the Nobel Prize for Literature,
1957.
For your information
From Bob Ellsworth
July 24, 1968
Bob -
Thanks for the loan of your copy.
MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan
This is a memo prepared by an amazing politiczl creature
in Fino-s office who wants to work for RN--and who has enormous
depth and breadth of knowledge of the American electodate and
voting patterns. He has told me he would be willing to be quizzed
by our four top people on his aski ability. Attached isa copy
ofa memo prepared by him at Len's request in ten minutes.
Buchanan
I
C an agrees
Lets
hire this guy
RN
Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention
and Pre-Election Impact of the High Poll Showing and
Predicted November Strength of George C. Wallace
As the November campaign shapes up as one focusing the
issues of law and order, George C. Wallace, the candidate whose public
pronouncements cater to the hearts - if not the minds - of a large segment
of the population, is rising in the polls.
There are reasons - see below - why Wallace's vote is liable
to emerge as far less significant in November than now predicted, and this
should be born in mind as far as pre-convention strategizing.
Point One: Wallace's poll strength is being falsely measured.
The question posed in the polls asks voters whom they would like to see
elected president - not whom they intend to vote for. Historically, voters
have shrunk from third-party candidates in the. general election, even though
they prefer them, because such votes are wasted votes. Even if the question
were modified to 'whom do you now intend to vote for", it would still
overstate Wallace's election day strength, but to ask who would you like
to see elected is to court a high Wallace vote by eliciting responses from
conservatives who prefer Wallace's position (especially while Mr. Nixon is
as yet somewhat inchoate) but who will not waste a vote on him. THE POLLS
GROSSLY OVERSTATE WALLACE STEENGTH AND UNDERSTATE NIXON STRENGTH (TO BE
PICKED UP FROM WALLACE).
Point Two: Much of the vote Wallace reeeives in the end is
liable to come from disgruntled Democrats, while GOP voters hold ranks.
One can analogize here to Wm F. Buckley's race in New York City, for while
he took votes from both Beame and Lindsay, the last minute dropoff in
Buckley support (confirmed by comparing Assembly District polls with actual
votes) came in Republican districts and represented conservative Republicans
edging back to Lindsay because of party ties. In the end, Wallace's vote is
liable to be more Democratic than observers predict, and this trend (see
following commentary) does not militate for Rockefeller but for Nixon
because 1) a more conservative Republican will bring GOP voters back to
the fold and 2) the Wallace split-off should be useful in marginal states
like Michigan and Illinois (coming as it will from Democrats in bulk).
Thus, from the preconvention viewpomnt, Nixon should not
overreact to Wallace in either of two ways: 1) he should not move left and
re-orient himself to a left-trending city appeal; and 2) he should not
write off the South because Wallace will, in the end, not win much of
it. These two refusals must be congruent - they are inter-dependent.
What Mr. Nixon should do is this: refrain from courting Wallace
or affirming any Southern strategy because Rockefeller can make delegates
edgy be raising the Goldwater spectre and simultaneously suggesting that
Mr. Nixon is Goldwater's heir. But at the same time, the Nixon strategy
should not embrace the Rockefeller style assertion that the campaign will
be won or lost by a liberal pitch or the lack of it in the big cities.
The Nixon strategy should take a middle of the road straddling position
as follows to retain strength now and flexibility for the campaign.
Suggested Nixon strategy: 1) Accept thesis that big city
states and urban voting is crucial to victory but do not accept thesis
that liberal social programming is necessary; 2) Accept thesis that
George Wallace's bloc should not be courted but minimize Wallace strength
by citing historical analysis of third-party Southern behavior and
explaining poll proclivity to overstate his strength; 3) Counterattack
by showing how Nixon will overcome Wallace - use trend data again - in
the modern Outer South (while Rockefeller would lose all South) and by
showing gross weakness of Nelson Rockefeller in big cities, see enclosure,
and showing real Nixon urban strength (see enclosure).
By this approach, no liberal positions will be taken which
will offend Wallace poll backers who must be held - and will be - on
election day, but at the same time, it will undercut Rockefeller's
theme that urban votes are necessary and that 1) a liberal approach
is necessary to get them, and that 2) Rockefeller must be nominated.
The encoosed short statements detail the following arguments
1) Nixon will be in good shape down South in November because the Wallace
third-party phenomenon will not hold up; 2) Nixon can do well in the cities
because of conservative and Catholic trend, explaining that much of his
1960 weakness was not linked to "Urban" behavior, but to Catholic voting
(for JFK) which will not be a problem in 1968; and lastly 3) how Nelson
Rockefeller, contrary to his propaganda, is not a good vote-getter in
the cities (citing his great decay in urban New York).
See ebclosed
Then, after Mr. Nixon is nominated, he should pursue a moderate
conservative course sufficient to clearly differentiate himself from Hubert
Hpm@rhey on 1) social policies and 2) the war in Vietnam (ideal position is
quasi-isolationist) This will strike the right balance between moderation
and appeal to independents, and the needed "realm of plausibility" differen-
tiation by which the Waldace vote will fall back in line for Mr. Nixon.
Such an approach ought to reduce the Wallace vote to 3-5% nationally, with
the electoral vote impact confined to 27 (Alabama, Mississippi and Luisiana
and much of the minimal Northern vote won from urban Demcrats (Lake Count
letroit, Milwaukee, Nov
al).
B
8 of the
24 June 1968
On.
n
do
MENORANDUM TO BUCHANAN
very
whaten-
SUBJ: Further Thoughts on Wallace
I think it is important in assessing the Wallace threat to
keep our perspective. I yould estimate that between 5 and of
his support is hard-line racists. There isn't a damn thing we
could do to get these people, and of course we couldn't afford to
try if we wished. However, Hocky is full of shit when he says
or Republican candidate wouldn't want their support. Hell, you
take every vote you can get from whomever will give it. The point
is we canit get these people and we should forget then.
Further, we don't need Wallace. that is, Calloway made a
mistake when he said Wallace should join with the depublicans
against the Administration. Wallace doesn't sive a darm about
anything except satisfying his urge to run for President. Tis
populism is best reflected in his frequrent assaults upon the
private foundations of this country -- Rockefeller, Ford, and
Wellon. The inclusion of the latter amares me; it suggests he
doesn't really much about the private sector, nor does he care.
In this respect, the guy is dangerous SS hell. Knocking him out
of the ball game as 2. serious political figure would be a major
service to the nation.
What we need to do is go after those people who indicate at
this time that they're for Wallace but who are not really racists.
These people -- particularly Southerners are simply fed up with
being run over by the Planners. They're fed up with crime and
civil disorder. with being told that all the problems in this
country
are
their fault because they're white and prosperous.
RA
Southerners particularly feel that they been abused lons enough
they are all racists, they starve children, they bomb churches, etc.
It is a visceral reaction on their part to support Wallace since
he speaks for "Southern Power" -- that is, he is willing to tell
the Establishment to get off the South's back. This is emotionally
satisfying to many Southerners -- moderates as well as conservatives.
know because my North Carolina wife is one of them. She's
lepublican and wouldn't vote for Wallace, but she can't help finding
some pleasure from watching Vallace "tell 'en off".
That does this mean for RN in the Course of the campaign?
think it is this: we have to 30 Cyter the Independent and
Democrat who is sick of the permissiveness which permeates our
society, but who wants to do something about it, i.e., wants his
vote to count, to really make a difference, to effectuate a change.
Vallace does extraordinarily well among those people in the current
polls, but I doubt if he can hold these people if they have E.
reasonable and electable alternative. Im doesn't t have to appeal
to a covert racism to get them, but he does have to stake out a
distinct position on the sut issues and pound it home. And he has
to convince these people that a vote for him is a solid vote for
2.
the type of change which they want to see take place in this
country. I don't think this requires any marked change in what
the Boss is presently saying. What I do think it requires is
a little more passion on the Boos's Grart, a determination to
keep hitting on these gut issues in phrases which stick in the
mind of the average voter ( Wallace's Frot a dire's worth of
lifference" is one hell of an effective phrase), and a decision to
year our media advertising to this type of appeal to the dis-
enchanted Independent and Democrat.
One thing which I found of interest when I was studying the
voter trends in North Carolina over the last 8 years is the marked
similarity in the percentage of votes cast in 1960 and 1964 for
the Republican subernatorial candidate and the presidential candidate.
It suggested too ne that there wasn't much switch voting. This say
mean that it would be to our advantage to tie our national
in these states to the state-wide races, particularly where in
North Carolina, for example, we have 8. dann attractive cubernatorial
condidate. I don't know if any consideration has been given to
this sort of state by state analysis of campaign strategy, but
think someone ought to look into it.
We don't have much choice but to write off Alabama and
0 Mssissippi to Vallace, but I think it would be a mistake to
grant him any of the other "Deep South" states. We can't afford
to do so, for I don't want to take my chances with 8. brokered
election. Knowing Wallace, I would bet 100 to 1 he would make.. 0.
deal with Humphrey before he wouldnith us. And humphrey could get
away with it -- not as word of protest from the New York Tines.
I an rather concerned about the use of media in the campaign,
since I don't see much in the way of coordination between what
they are planning and what we are discussing in terns of issue
exploitation. I think this is a matter that might deserve further
consideration.
One incediate requirement in terms of fighting Wallace is for
US to attempt to come up with some catch phrases which are respon-
sible but which appeal to those concerned about the Gut issues.
The loss needs to hanmer away day in and day out on n couple of
issues. Water pollution may be One hell of & national problem,
but I doubt if it will tin us many votes.
As a matter of necessity, tre have got to keep the Callotays
Martins and Thurnonds from stirring up a lot of con-
t@Oversy, but on the other Hand, we need them stumping the South
a
S.S will on Rri's behalf We need the bouth to win, and - think
we can develop a so-called Southern strategy which is effective
and yet consistent with the Boss's oft-stated posytion on matters
of civil rights. In other words, I am not advocating nor do = think
we need engage in any cmapaign to out- fallce Wallace on racial
datters.
One final word about the Negro vote. I have watched the
polls carefully and the best I have seen ocky do amone the
liegroes is 26,6, which is a neximum of 2.6 million votes. The
Boss is credited by Harris) with gettins 19,0 of the Kegro vote
against Humphrey unless Teddy is on the ticket when it goes down
to 7.00 The greatest myth( of contemporary politics is the idea
that the Negroes are a "swing" vote. They're Democratic votes,
or at least the vast majority of them are. From all indications
of No TO voter patterns thus far this year, Negro voting may -
less then
be
50,0 as great among registered voters in November
as white voting. What we need to do 18 avoid giving the Regro
any reason to vote. That means we don't want to antagonize him
by & Soldwater-type campaign, but our greatest asset potentially
is the possible feeling on the Negross part that Humphrey doesn't
represent such a hot item that it is necessary to troop to the
polls. I think this will be particularly true if he selects
Comally as a running mate.
Disjointed as these thoughts are, I think they suggest some
matters for further consideration. With Mallace getting as much
as 14,0 of the vote in some Northern states and matching EN's vote
in the South, we can't afford to ignore his challenge.. However,
tre must attempt to put it perspective. He could be our major
threat in some areas of the country, and we need to figure out
how to cope with him without alienating other voters whose support
we also need.
July 13, 1968
MEMORANDUM
Comint
TO:
RN
FROM:
BUCHANAN
This sense we
for
Lying unnoticed before our eyes in the breakdown
will
of the Gallup Poll is the answer to our riddle; RN's
landslide victory is sitting right there in front of us.
I have already documented the quintessential importance
of RN winning the Wallace Protestants -- the other wing
of RN's victory lies in the Humphrey Catholics.
Everyone is squealing about RN's 7 per cent of the
black vote and RN's 4 per cent of the Jewish vote. The
crisis and the opportunity both lie in RN's 27 per cent
of the Catholic vote against HHH.
(Against McCarthy, a Catholic, RN gets 30 per cent
of the Catholics) RN -- note the following statistics.
UNITED STATES POPULATION
Jews
Negroes
Catholics
5,800,000
22,000,000
46,000,000
(Eligible to vote)
3,500,000
11,000,000
26,000,000
(In allocating the "eligible to vote" I gave the
Jews the highest percentage of eligible because they tend
to smaller families and so an older average population
- 2 -
the Catholic came second and the Negro third, as the
latter has the youngest population. Statistically, it
is said that half the American Negroes are under 21.)
(Probable Voters)
Jews
Negroes
Catholics
2,400,000
5, 500,000
17,000,000
(Again, the allocation was made that about 70 per
cnet of the eligible Jews will go to the polls in November,
that about 65 per cent of the Catholics (national average)
and about 50 per cent of the Negroes (historically true.)
Against HHH, RN is currently getting about 4 per cent
of the Jewish vote which amounts to a paltry 100,000 votes
nationally. He is getting seven per cent of the Negro
vote nationally which is not quite 400,000 votes.
RN nationally today is getting fewer than 500,000
Negroes and Jews in these United States.
These statiscs are telling us something that we can
ignore only at the cost of victory this coming November.
First, let's take the Jewish vote. If we multiplied
our present Jewish vote by five, we would be adding fewer
than 400,000 new voters. In other words to go from 4 per
cent of the Jewish vote to 20 per cent of the Jewish vote
- 3 -
would add to RN's total about 386,000 new supporters.
On the other hand, if RN increased his support among
Catholics from 27 per cent which he has against HHH to
30 per cent (which RN already has against McC,) RN would
be adding 510,000 new supporters to his cause.
That 3 percentage point increase that RN can easily
pick up among Catholics also amounts to more than all the
Jews and Negroes combined that RN has right now -- which
as I pointed out from the current Gallup Poll is under
500,000.
Now let's look at the Catholic vote.
RN is currently running at 27 per cent of those
17,000,000 votes, which means RN is reaping about 4,600,000
Catholic votes, or just a shade under that figure: In other
words, RN has 46 Catholics backing him for every Jew support-
ing him, and 10 Catholics for every Negro supporting.
RN's Catholic support is nine times RN's Jewish and Negro
support combined in terms of total votes.
These statistics are in themselves astounding. But
more important is where we get the votes to win this
election.
If we look at it cold-bloodedly, in terms of votes --
we should be putting seven times as much time and money
- 4 -
and media and writing in special interest appeals to
Catholics as to Jews -- because they have seven times
as many votes.
But even seven times the effort would not be
sufficient if we argue from reason and logic -- because
the Catholic is one hell of a lot easier voter to win
over from Hubert than is the Jew or the Negro. The latter
two are the most committed of Democrats. (JFK did better
with Jews than he did with Catholics; and since 1964
the Negroes are lost to the Republicans for a generation.)
There is no reason on God's earth why in this day
and age HHH, the liberal Protestant Druggist, should be
getting twice as many Catholic votes as RN.
Let's put it this way.
Suppose RN has in mind making a speech like Black
Capitalism, which is directed to our black friends, or
perhaps writing a piece for the Zionist magazine which is
directed to our Jewish friends. If RN's purpose is to raise
his percentage among these groups he will find that:
An increase of 1 per cent among Jewish voters adds
24,000 new supporters to RN's ranks.
An increase of 1 per cent among Negro voters adds
- 5 -
55,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.
An increase of 1 per cent among Catholic voters
adds 170,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.
My contention is further that it is easier for
RN to pick up that 1 per cent among Catholics, than it
is among the traditionally hostile Negro and Jewish
communities. The logic seems to me to be undeniable;
if we are going to make special group interest, minority
interest appeals -- let's make them to the Catholics.
It is easier for RN to gain ground here; it is
less risky in terms of backlash to make specific appeals
to RCs as opposed to Jews and Negroes; and it is a
thousand times more promising.
Let's rmember too that Cardinal Cushing and Jack
Kennedy won't be in this ball game; and Catholics in
1968 are one hell of a lot more conservative and receptive
to an RN positions approach, than are the Negroes and
the Jews.
In terms of votes, 50 per cent of the Catholic vote
would mean more to a candidate than to get every Negro
and Jewish vote in the United States.
If RN can raise his percentage of the Catholic vote
13 points -- from 27 per cent against HHH to 40 per cent
- 6 -
against HHH -- the votes he would add would be equivalent
to raising himself from 7 per cent of the Negro vote
to 37 per cent and from 4 per cent of the Jewish vote
to 28 per cent.
It is utterly impossible for RN to get 37 per cent
of the Negro vote; it is next to impossible for RN to
get 28 per cent of the Jews -- but to jump from 27 per
cent of the Catholics to 40 per cent is not impossible;
and if we did it, we would have broken up the historic
Democratic coalition and won a national landslide.
Hubert's Catholics have half of our victory and the
Protestants of George Wallace have the other half. If
we get one of these halves back, we win; if we get them
both, we can win a landslide -- and the two objectives
are not mutually exclusive:
It is time to ask ourself -- what is the best we
can do among Jews and Negroes. I would say 20 per cent
of the Negroes and 20 per cent of the Jewish vote, given
our current situation and only four months to go. If
we made a Herculean, Jewish-Negro pitch and reached that
percentage among both (it would cost us votes to Wallace)
we would be adding some 1, 100,000 Negro and Jewish votes.
We can get the same number of new votes -- 1,100,000 -- by
- I -
raising our Catholic total from 27 to 34 -- at little or
no loss to Wallace. This seems incredible but the statis-
tics are there.
What do we conclude from this memo?
1) Hubert Humphrey will be looking for a Catholic,
if he is thinking, to put on that ticket with him -- and
the case for Teddy Kennedy becomes even more convincing.
2) If RN intends any future special interest appeals --
for God's sake, let us give the Catholics some consideration.
3) RN's research staff should find out what is the
gut 'Catholice' issue which unites them -- and I would
think it is the questionof parochial schools and some of
tax relief for what they feel is an excessive burden of
supporting both their own and their neighbors school. If
we go with the tax credit idea -- let's make sure we put
the Catholic's and Lutheran Schools up high in the copy.
4) Let's stop looking around so hard for what the
Negroes want to hear, and what the Jews want RN to say on
the Middle East -- and let's start taking some polls of
Catholic voters' interests and concerns.
5) As for the Middle East and Israel -- it now
becomes clear that there is no mileage whatsoever in a hard-
line pro-Israel posture by RN. As noted, if RN's Jewish
vote goes from 4 per cent to 20 per cent, he picks up
fewer than 400,000 votes. It's a waste of time and effort.
- 8 -
6) RN should reconsider, if he has already decided,
whether we ought not definitely to take the Conservative
Party endorsement, and let Javits and his friends squeal
their heads off.
7) It would be seven times as valuable for RN to
show up at a visibly Catholic event as it would be a
Jewish event.
8) It might be in RN's interest to begin to say
what intelligent men are already saying -- that when it
comes to the Middle East or anywhere else -- that an
American statesman's first duty is to place America first,
and not any other country, no matter how strong our times
or our commitments.
(I am not arguing for RN to come off anti-Jew and
score points that way at all. I just say that quite
frankly, slobbering over the Israeli lobby is not going
to get us anything, and so we ought to stand tall on the
issue. It would appear the same is true of the Negroes.)
9) This offers new thoughts on the Vice Presidential
thing -- which Buchanan did not mention in his memo on
Reagan.
10) Ethnic groups which tend to be Catholic should
be given first priority consideration in media, and time
and RN statements and considerations. Among minority
groups religion becomes now a factor in our considerations.
- 9 -
11) Positive efforts should be made to have RN
and family and kids in specifically Catholic settings --
such settings should take priority over Negro and Jewish
settings.
FINAL NOTE: To RN/ From Buchanan
We have come up here in the last two weeks with the
Wallace in-depth analysis which no one has to date refuted;
and here is a Catholic analysis which would seem to me to
be self-evident to any of our people who are supposed to
be analyzing the polls. But our poll people, to my knowledge,
have never even mentioned either -- and our media people
have not yet acted on the first -- the Wallace threat.
If this kind of analysis -- of both Wallace and the
Catholic thing -- as opposed to the Negro- Jewish approach
has not been brought to RN's attention by his poll analysts --
then perhaps they are reading our polls through rose-colored
liberal glasses -- and they ought to be replaced.
My suggestion is that some of us in research be
given access to the polls that we are taking so that we
can do some of our own analysis; that Alan Greenspan be
instructed to analyze the results of our polls as well as
the "media" people; that further, strategy people be asked
either to refute the analysis we have come up with -- or
- 10 -
start guiding the campaign and the advertising by them.
What I am contending in these recent memos and
what I have yet to see refuted is that all this endless
talk we have been getting about RN losing unless he gets
the Negro and Jewish vote is a pile of crap. We have
let ourselves be sold a bill of goods. The Eastern liberal
Establishment which goes down the line for the Democrats
has made the Republican Party dance to its own tune;
it has told us that we cannot win without Negroes and
Jews -- and it continues to feed us this nonsense every day.
The power off the Negro and the Jew to damage RN in
this election lies in this: The Negro loud-mouths are
given access to the public communidations media by a guilt-
ridden establishment -- and the Jews control that com-
munications media.
We don"t want to antagonize or alienate these people --
they can damage us. But they're not our voters; and
if we go after them, we'll go down to defeat chasing a
receding rainbow. The Irish, Italian, Polish Catholics
of the big cities -- these are our electoral majority --
they, and the white Protestants of the South and Midwest
and rural America. That way lies victory.
RN -- By dropping to 4 per cent of the Jewish vote and
7 per cent of the black vote -- we have been given a
tremendous flexibility; man, we can't get any lower --
and so RN is now free of trying to placate these people,
of trying to acquiesce their views -- and he can tell
it like it is to the whole damn country. Let's face it.
We are right now at 35 per cent of the vote nationally --
six points under Barry Goldwater. The way I see it we
are just about at bedrock -- the guys we have will be
hard to lose in any event; they are damn near all
Republicans; it is time for RN to start swinging and
telling it precisely like it is.
Buchanan
Price
garment
all should read this
Ellewnet
July 13, 1968
Backer
MEMO FROM BELL
free
In 1948, Thomas E. Dewey proved that an Out
party can't
win an election by playing it safe.
Even when the Out party has most of the issues including
a massive split in the In party--going its way.
The last three Gallups have been remarkably stable in the
spread between Humphrey and RN . between 40 and 42 for Humphrey,
between 35 and 37 for RN. An RN deficit of 5 or 6 every time.
The chief variable nas been significant gains by George Wallace--
to the point where RN is now running third in the 13-state
area of the South.
Clearly, nothing catastrophic has occurred. No significant
errors have been made by RN or his campaign--as everyone, includ-
ing the press, has acknowledged.
Equally, though, it is clear that a campaign which doesn't
make mistakes is not enough. The RN campaign has been run on
& strategy of not taking chances- and it has failed to catch
fire.
On those occasions when a controversial issue has been
seized, the initial flurry of protests from the liberal press
has often caused it to be modified- if not dropped. Examples:
Columbia, the Supreme Court, crime itself.
It is my feeling that we will win this election, if we do,
by a strong appeal to the heart of the middle class: Americans
who make $6000 to $15,000 a year. The "group" that Richard
Scammon has called the "unblack, the unyoung, and unpoor. 11
This is what Democrats call the Gut vote; it is a group which
Hubert Humphrey has so far held remarkably well.
Unfortunately, Gallup has not been breaking his polls down
according to income. But there are ways of guessing.
Among clerical and sales people, Humphrey leads, 43 to 37.
Among people between the ages of 30 and 49, Humphrey leads,
45 to 35.
Among Catholics, he leads, 53 to 27.
Among those who have finished high school but not college,
he leads 43 to 35.
All of these represent bigger Humphrey leads than he enjoys
nationwide.
Wallace is averaging about 12 per cent among these groups.
The Gut vote, then, is leaning toward Humphrey. But this
group is not happy. It is concerned, in particular, about the
following things:
1. Crime. They are worried about the safety of their
families. They are sick of permissiveness in the courts, the
city halls, and the Administration.
2. Riots. They do not subscribe to the theory that stealing
and killing become more tolerable when carried out by large num-
bers of people. They also reject the idea that their own racism,
real or not, is the primary reason for crimes committed by groups
with which they are seldom in contact.
3. The decline of U.S. prestige abroad. They are upset
that third-rate military powers can keep the most powerful
nation in history in a stalemate. They react particularly strongly
anything else, the War on Poverty and the constant and visible
scandals that have accompanied it from its inception have turned
these voters against Johnson's reform coalition. It just doesn't
take much sophistication to see that subsidizing gangs is not
going to help the ghettos.
It is intolerable to the RN campaign that Hubert Humphrey-
the chief enthusiast and publicist of every one of the most
extreme Great Society programs, and a man who, it develops,
falls considerably short of Johnson's resoluteness in foreign
affairs - should be in possession of this gut vote. It is
intolerable that he should now be running first not only in
the South but in the Midwest the two areas which voted most
strongly against the Great Society in 1966.
I think a number of shifts in emphasis are required.
1. Less emphasis on lofty, general "think" speeches.
I don't think that the staunchest admirers of the "New
Coalition" and "New Democracy" speeches would argue that
these did us the slightest good with the Gut vote. I do not
think this would have changed significantly had these two
speeches been broadcast in full on TV network prime time.
The main argument for them is that they keep Establishment
commentators off our back. That is true. But I would argue
that the solons lay off primarily because they realize we
are not hitting the chords of the electorate "If Nixon
keeps up with this kind of thing, we don't have to worry. "
2. More specificity. The obverse of the above is that
Bella 10015 he in
the more specific we get, the more the solons hit us. When
Clayton Fritchey takes us to task for our "flying Pueblo"
statement, we may be sure we have drawn blood. The only
criterion of a Clayton Fritchey is what will hurt Richard
Nixon in November. If we are delivering speeches that do us
little or no good, the Clayton Fritcheys will lay off in the
hope that we stick to bland generalities. The moment that
we throw out something on a real issue which the Gut Voters
can understand and respond to--such as the "flying Pueblo"
or Columbia statements- that is when they pounce on us in
the hope that we will drop it. Because to the Gut vote, what
is important and understandable is that which is specific:
this American ship held by North Korea, that poverty grant
that subsidized a gang, this college being disrupted by the
sons and daughters of their bosses, that trade agreement which
helped Poland to make the ball bearings which kill our men
in Vietnam, that American embassy that was burned. A
candidate can be very specific about events and issues
without getting into personalities. A speech or a statement
is demagogic not because it is appealing, but because it is
with
wrong or distorted. Liberal commentators will accuse us of
demagogy whenever we do something that is appealing. I
think we must steel ourselves to that fact.
In addition, specificity demands that we nail down
Humphrey on his own rhetoric. When he calls for new ties with
the Chinese Government, we must ask him what Chinese government
he is talking about- the Maoists or the rebels. When
Ent get our attach group G follow cip
he says that the United States should no longer contain communism,
we must first remind him of Rusk's statement late last year
that the United States is legally committed to come to the defense
of more than 40 nations, and then ask him which of those nations
he is still willing to help, and which he proposes to abandon.
When he endorses a Marshall Plan for the cities and the Urban
Coalition's multi-billion-dollar job plan--programs that even
Johnson opposes--we must ask him where he is going to get the
money, and how much larger than $25 billion the Humphrey budget
deficit is going to be.
4. More chance-taking. I realize that should, for instance,
the Pueblo be made a major campaign issue, there is always the
danger that Pyongyang will release it in order to embarrass RN
(some have argued that this kind of thing has already been done
by the Russians to RN, in two instances that come fairly readily
to mind). Despite the seeming intransigence of the Kim Il-Sung
regime, I believe this is a real possibility. However, I would
be inclined to accept that risk. An issue which so fulfills the
Gut-vote criterion of specificity, and which, as I have said,
so typifies the lack of will of this Administration, more than
makes up for the negative possibilities. I would even argue that
an emphasis on this issue might help us on balance, even assuming
the ship is released. (This, of course, would depend on the
circumstances in which the ship is released. If the Administration
is forced into a humiliating apology or indemnity, as seems
likely, the issue would be more alive than ever). The Pueblo
issue could be made even more graphic by reciting the exact
circumstances in which the ship was captured-- why no resistance
was authorized, why no air support was nearby, etc.
In any event, to draw blood we must take chances. If we
take chances, we are going to make more "mistakes", and the hostile
press will show us no mercy when we do. But in my view the
biggest mistake of all would be to run a campaign whose central
goal is to avoid all mistakes.
5. More personal appearances. The primaries showed that
RN is probably the most effective campaigner on the American
political scene at this moment. Aside from the remarkable
returns, the most striking proof of this is that RN is generally
regarded as leading Humphrey in every state in which he has
campaigned extensively. Even Humphrey's strategists ("As
Humphrey Backers Size Up Election Now, II U.S. News give us
all five of the RN primary states New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
Indiana, Nebraska, Oregon--among a grudging total of eleven
states that they give us altogether. If these visits are
accompanied by the kind of newspaper and media advertising
characteristic of a primary, we can move ahead in selected
states with a two- or three-day semi-saturation effort.
6. The New Candor. This, I think, is the central
criterion. At the Hudson Institute briefing Thursday, Kahn
said that what the majority of voters are looking for is
someone who tells them the truth, even if the truth is
unpleasant. He said that the candidate who begins to do
this is going to win the election in a landslide because
the people have had four years of lying, they know it,
and want a change. If large handouts to the Negroes are
not only not possible, but may worsen the problem if they
were possible, they want to know about it. That is what RN
told them in the Black Capitalism speech- - the one moment so
far in which the RN campaign caught fire. The New Candor of
that speech should be the model for the rest of the campaign.
That, above all else, is what the Gut voters crave.
In Vietnam, this involves saying, in a time of national
pessimism, that the United States has a commitment to the
South Vietnamese government that cannot be renounced, except
at the cost of a worldwide decline in American credibility
and prestige. We support an honorable settlement, if that
is possible. But we must ask Humphrey what he plans to do
if Hanoi rejects the "political settlement" that he describes
as the "only way" to end the war. It 16 not enough for a
great nation to keep its easy commitments. If we default when-
ever the going gets rough, all our commitments will be called
into question.
If Hanoi does not accept reasonable settlement, then there
is no alternative to the continuation of the war. But RN
cannot just promise the Gut vote what Kahn calls "more of
the same" that would be fatal. This time, should the talks
collapse, we must do what the Democrats have never done:
proclaim a comprehensive war plan that promises victory
over aggression without escalation, whether or not the enemy's
morale is broken. The surest way to keep an enemy's morale
alive is to proclaim, as your only objective, the breaking
of that morale. This time, we must institute a police program
that will bring security to every hamlet. The only sure way
to end violence in South Vietnam is to separate the VC from
their victims, and this may be a painstaking process. We
must admit it. But for the first time, there would be a
war plan that is realistic, checkable, and credible--not only
to the enemy but to the electorate that will have to support
it.
Rockefeller claims to be the only candidate with a viable
peace plan. RN must become the only candidate with a viable
war plan. In addition, he must assert still another hard
truth: that a viable peace plan depends on a viable war
plan. That Hanoi is not the sort of adversary that agrees to
reasonable terms unless it faces, as its only alternative,
a grinding process of attrition that will lead to defeat.
This is a hard course for RN to take. On the other hand-
given his own position and his future credibility- it is also
the only position he can take. I believe it is the kind of
honest, hard talk that will be greeted with visible relief on
the part of the Gut voter a voter who doesn't want this
country to lose its national honor any more than he wants to
be lied to.
To summarize: the Gut -Americans in families making
between $6000 and $15,000 a year--make up a majority of the
voters. Humphrey is doing better with this group than with
the electorate as a whole, and far better than he has a right
to be doing. New approaches are needed to win interest and
commitment among these voters. These include: more specificity,
more visibility, more controversy, more chance-taking, and
above all a New Candor that in the words of Robert Kennedy
"tells it like it is," the hard answers as well as the easy
ones, the bad with the good. To do this, to use Buchanan's
phrase, we may have to "cut the umbilical cord" between us
and an establishment which wishes us ill in any event, and
subject ourselves to a significantly higher level of printed
and broadcast abuse. I think it is worth it. I think that
by going after the Gut voter with honesty and realism, we
can not only break out of the Gallup Poll rut but win this
election going away.
I. INTRODUCTION
CAMPAIGNING
The time has come for political campaigning - its techniques
and strategies - to move out of the dark ages and into the brave
new world of the omnipresent "eye."
A candidate for any city-wide, state-wide or national
office can't afford the old "tried and true" methods of campaigning:
six speeches a day, plus several handshaking receptions, a few
hours at factory gates and a soul-crushing travel schedule. Just
because it has always been this way doesn't mean it always has to
be.
Let's look at the whole thing from the viewpoint of just
basic logic. If a national candidate actually does six speeches
a day, six days a week, for the full eight-week campaign period,
he'll make 288 speeches. If he has a spectacular crowd-gathering
ability (or staff), he might average 5,000 per speech (but no one
ever has). So he will have spoken in the flesh to a total of
1,440,000 people. A reasonable estimate is that at least 75% of
those people are his loyal adherents. So he's had the opportunity
to convert only 380,000. True, most elections, except national,
are won by less than that. But then, will he really convert this
25% - and is it really 25%? Probably more likely 10%.
What happens to the candidate in this process? He becomes
punchy, mauled by his admirers, jeered and deflated by his
-2-
opponent's supporters (and paid troublemakers), misled by the
super-stimulation of one frenzied rally after another. He has no
time to think, to study his opponent's strategy and statements, to
develop his own strategy and statements. No wonder the almost
inevitable campaign dialogue borders so near the idiot level.
Yes, but think of the great value it has in "firing up the
troops." Baloney! Analyze carefully the actual number of troops
that count in a campaign, and you'll find they are very few, can
be fired up much more effectively and efficiently by small
"private" sessions on an informal basis with the candidate, and
are themselves being worn to a frazzle and constantly diverted
from important activity (precinct work and telephoning) to crank
up a crowd for the next rally or airport arrival.
True, maybe, but the real importance is the effect on
news media and thus indirectly on their vast audiences. That's
the worst argument of all. How many stories per day will any
newspaper or radio or television station carry about a single
candidate? Answer: one - if he's really lucky, important or
controversial. So what's the use of roaring around making six,
eight or ten stories every day?
Obviously it's to get localized coverage in each area of
the constituency. But isn't the wire story, the commentator or
the syndicated columnist what really counts? It sure is!
So what do you do - quit campaign travels and sit on the
front porch? Not at all. You plan a campaign that is designed
-3-
to cover the important localities, provide excitement and stimula-
tion for your supporters, generate major news every day, generate
intensive coverage in depth by commentators and columnists, develop
a meaningful dialogue (even if one-sided), and still offer a
reasonable chance of the candidate's survival.
II. GENERAL APPROACH
How, then, does a candidate plan his campaign schedule (and
build his campaign organization) to accomplish these objectives?
First - the whole approach and the basis for all planning
and structuring must be directed to the same concept: that the
candidate's time, energy and thinking will be programmed for
maximum possible benefit. And maximum benefit is defined as
reaching the most people most effectively. And this does not
necessarily mean in the flesh.
He has to take maximum advantage of the media of mass
communications, with emphasis on that or those which reach the
most people and present him most favorably and believably.
Television will undoubtedly be pre-eminent - but radio, newspapers
and magazines should not be overlooked.
One news lead per day
The first consideration is development of one major news
lead per day. (Herb Klein argues strongly for two leads per day -
one timed for AM newspapers and another for PM's and TV/radio news.
This should be carefully analyzed, because he's probably right.
On the other hand, one per day is obviously more desirable from
our point of view, and in a presidential campaign the AM's and
PM's both have to cover a candidate's news, so there may be a
way to work satisfactorily with just one lead per day - I hope
so.) This can result from a speech made at a rally, a statement
at a formal news conference, a remark made apparently of fhandedly
-5-
at an airport or on the sidewalk, a television or radio address,
a "confidential" interview with a columnist, a reaction to a
planted position or question by a prominent supporter, an answer
to the opponent's attack or position, release of a white paper,
a statement by a prominent supporter expert in some field,
reaction to a major external news break, or just a formal news
release.
Over the period of the campaign, all of these and other
devices should be used on a carefully planned but apparently
random basis. No regular pattern should be established, and the
element of surprise should be skilfully utilized.
Not a single day should pass without such a news lead,
planned in advance as to content and method of release and
coordinated with the total campaign effort. The whole approach
should be one of initiation and attack, rather than reaction and
counterattack. The timing and approach should not be dictated by
the opposition.
Obviously, it will be necessary at times to react and to
counterattack - and to revise strategy to fit the developing
situation and the opponent's strategy. But this in no way
precludes the necessity for a complete, preconceived plan, even
though it be revised daily.
Overall schedule
After an overall skeleton is developed on the basis of the
daily news lead, the candidate's schedule can be filled in, using
-6-
his time for a balanced program of corollary supporting activities.
Major needs will include at least one major public appearance
almost every working day, one or two offbeat "color" activities,
many short and a few long personal or small group meetings, ample
staff time, frequent studio time (TV and radio) and, by a wide
margin most important, lots of free time for thinking, rest,
recreation, reading and unplanned activity. Also maximum use of
programmed phone calls.
Major public appearances
The daily public appearance may or may not be the base for
the news lead as mentioned above. When it is, it should be
carefully staged - and when it's not, the speech should be standard
so we retain control of what the lead will be. These appearances
should not all be rallies. Some should be motorcades, staged
visits to plants, hospitals, etc., large worker meetings, head-
quarters drop-bys. Some should be at night, some in the daytime.
All should be designed for maximum coverage - and should not be
restricted to the stereotyped kinds of political appearances. They
should be dictated by the overall strategy, not by the pressures
of local organizations or leaders.
Offbeat activity
The offbeat "color" activity should be planned for
particular effects, generally in the "image-building" area. In
many cases these would appear to be unscheduled and spontaneous.
They would always be an integral part of the overall plan. These
-7-
would include frequent use of "drop-bys" at group meetings, human
interest individual contacts at all levels (the shoeshine boy,
Billy Graham, a kid who has collected campaign funds, spectator
or participant sports, etc.). Some leeway for completely oppor-
tunistic activity, with staff always on the alert for possibilities.
Meetings
The personal or small group meetings would not be publicized
and are used to make points primarily with people who will in turn
reach large numbers of other people. Concentration is on TV and
radio commentators, columnists, syndicate feature writers,
publishers, station owners, major civic leaders, party leaders,
specific issue spokesmen.
It will be argued that this approach simply does not cover
enough cities - there is inadequate geographic spread. The answer
is that the important thing is not the one city where the candidate
is, but the coverage of his activities that goes into all cities.
Only a minute fraction of the people in a city where the candidate
appears actually see him in the flesh. The vast majority just
watch on TV or read about it in the newspapers. To these people,
what difference does it make if he's in their city, the neighboring
one, or one clear across the country?
The geographic pattern should be developed to provide
balanced regional coverage, with proper representation of large
and small cities, urban and rural, etc. But an appearance in a
small farm town in Iowa can be just as effective in its impact on
-8-
an Oregon small farm town resident as it is on the Iowans. In
other words, people identify with other similar people - so get
coverage of whatever group you're with and you'll affect all the
similar groups who see the coverage.
Programmed phone calls
Use phone calls to keep troops fired up. During allotted
time, two staff men work on placing calls. Get one lined up
ahead so candidate sits at one phone - pushes buttons to utilize
two lines alternatively - talks for 2 minutes on each call. Can
do about 25 calls in an hour. On some can go even faster. Staff
have calls programmed ahead with background card*on each for
candidate's quick briefing.
Use phone calls to maintain ties with key commentators and
columnists. Call them two or three times a week for their
reactions to campaign. Don't tell them anything - ask for their
analysis and ideas. Pick some favorites and work them hard. Build
the list as fast as possible and keep adding to it.
Use a phone car for all long drives, and use time for phone
calls as per above - or else program car and other travel time for
one of specific purposes - i.e., staff, personal meetings, work,
rest, etc.
Radio network
Use network radio to keep troops fired up - by buying
5 minutes on national network every day through entire campaign -
at 6:30 pm local time. Have a daily report from the candidate
-9-
and marching orders from campaign manager. A supply of fill-ins
could be pretaped for emergency use, but normally candidate would
tape current message each day. This could be delivered to local
outlet for network feed - or fed by phone. One staff man would be
producer and program would be tied to overall plan.
Mail
Use mail to fire up troops. Draft and start typing a
standard but personalized letter to each local chairman. Mail
them all two weeks before election day. Just thanks and encourage-
ment. Signed by candidate.
III. ADDENDA
AVERAGE DAY'S CONTENTS
Start at 9:00 AM - finished by 10:00 PM
Work 6 days a week. Use the Sunday for complete break - rest and
reading and planning.
Spend 2 hours on public events
2 hours on private meetings
2 hours for rest and writing and staff
2 hours for meals
2 hours for travel plus some of above time
1 hour for phone calls
1/2 hour briefing for traveling press - every day
1 1/2 hour TV taping.
SOME BASIC RULES
Don't go to cities that don't have adequate facilities
- good hotel with right room arrangements
- airport proximity and reasonable weather conditions
- good local organization for rally work, meeting, etc.
- major communications facilities - TV, radio, phone
Don't plan schedule on any basis except what we want.
Don't do any public fund raising during campaign -
use phone calls, private meetings and letters for this.
Use airport arrivals for offbeat color - suburban rallies, etc.,
but don't cut in to main public event.
-11-
Use a few motorcades where they 11 really work - and go all out.
For all other travel, use unpublicized routes, but look
for offbeat possibilities.
-12-
SAMPLE DAY 1
9:00 leave hotel for
9:15 Publisher meeting - 1/2 hour - at the paper
9:45 leave for TV studio
10:00 makeup and preparation for TV taping
10:30-11:00 tape major statement for today
11:15 leave studio for luncheon at hotel
11:30 pre-reception with small group of civic leaders
12:00 group into luncheon - candidate to room to eat - 1 hour
1:00 candidate to luncheon - standard speech - 1/2 hour
15 minutes handshaking, etc.
Drop by convention luncheon on way out or in
2:00 return to room for phone calls - 1 hour
staff work - 1 hour
4:00 private meetings in suite - individuals - 15 minutes each -
3 per hour - 6 meetings
5:00 leave for airport - fly to next city - dinner and staff work
on plane
10:00 arrive at hotel
-13-
SAMPLE DAY 2
9:00 leave hotel for airport
9:45 take off for next city
2 hours travel - staff work on plane
11:45 arrive new airport -
SUBURBAN WELCOME RALLY
standard speech
12:30 drive into town
1:00 arrive at convention luncheon in progress for drop-by
1:30 to suite -
1/2 hour lunch - staff
1 hour phone calls
3:00 to TV studio for panel program
3:15 at studio - makeup and preparation
3:45-4:15 tape show
4:30 leave for veterans' hospital visit - offbeat
4:45-5:30 at hospital
6:00 arrive at hotel - to suite - rest
6:30-7:00 cocktails - 6 key civic leaders
7:00 prepare for evening meeting - eat dinner
8:15 leave for major coliseum rally
8:30 speak at rally
9:30 return to hotel - overnight
-14-
PHONE CALL PROCEDURE
1. Maintain roto card file - 4 X 6 cards alpha by name.
Front side - name, phone numbers, basic data - political,
personal, etc.
Reverse - complete record of contacts - phone, mail, personal
2. Staff pulls cards for today's calls - figure ratio of number
to time - stack in order of priority.
3. Note with each card suggested points for candidate to make.
4. Staff places calls - while candidate is on preceding one.
Chat if time available - get reading and make notes.
5. Hand card and notes to candidate before he takes call - for
quick pre-briefing.
6. Staff listen in on call - record any needed follow-up. Post
info on card - refile - toss out notes except follow-up.
7. Two staff. men needed to do this - one on current call, one on
next one.
NOTE: Use conference calls - i.e., all local chairmen set up by
regional man.
/ Strat Mog
Laguna
July 8, 1968
MEMOR NDUM
TO:
John Mitchell/ Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
This is a general memorandum covering several
points Intive already mentioned and a few others that I may not have
touched I am including all of these thoughts in this memorandum
because this is perhaps the last time I shall have a chance to appraise
our campaign activities and to make suggestions that may prove useful.
Citizens
know that by the time you read this you will have met with
RN
Husica and I hope to the extent his ideas are relevant you will try
to 541 them adopted. I feel that Tom Evans' effort in this field
needs to be substantially strengthened and that somone with a hard
nosed attitude of a Huston must be seeded into the group at the
earliest possible time.
Physicall
With regard to our general approach. It should be altogether
different than in 1960. Then, our primary effort was to set up
parallel volunteer organizations at the national and state level with
state chairmen and a whole hierarchy down the line. This year -
except where it may be useful to have a state chairman in order to
implement our other objectives in a particular state - we should
not go forward on that line. Our concentration should be primarily
on developing special interest groups in the swing states. Of course,
Citizans
in other states as well for insurance purposes we should let these
groups operate bur what is vitally necessary is to put 90% of our
effort into the major swing states.
One purpose, of course, is to obtain news stories out of such
committees but an even more important effort must be to get law
enforcement officials, etc. operating in our behalf cutting across
party lines, etc. Humphrey knows how to do this because he has
campaigned at a state level in exactly the same way that I have.
One area that particularly needs emphasis is the nationality group.
The National Committee's operation here is pretty sad. The
emphasis here should not be on the traditional line of "captive
nations" which will be what the National Committee's group will
- 2
suggest."
This is the doctrinaire approach of the past. The
emphasis should be appealing to these groups on law and order
and ower issues on which they may be very sensitive. Of course,
the captive nations theme can be a sub-line where it seems to be
appropriate.
again suggest that Hiram Fong could provide some useful
in-put on this kind of organization. It didn't work out too well in
California but on a national basis I am inclined to think that the
0
way he moved on into the less elite groups -- like beauticians,
barbers, etc., was most effective. It is a great compliment to
such people to be asked to participate in the campaign. It is of
vital importance, incidentally, for us to recognize that we are
not going to make much headway with the Negroes and we must
make a much greater effort, for that reason, with the other
nationality groups.
In this connection, a massive effort among Mexican-Americans
must be undertaken at once in Texas and California.
2. Counter Attack
There must be ready to go into action immediately after our
convention a counter-attack group with a procedure set up to defend
RN when he is attacked by someone RN may not want to answer.
Here, the Surrogate Candidates can play a role and in our own
organization Klein and Ellsworth can be used to hang statements
on if we want them to be that close to us.
I cannot emphasize more the importance of getting this set
up on a proper basis. You will find that there was an "Answer Desk"
set up in 1960 which was run from Washington and it was a fairly
effective operation in defending the Administration, It was not too
effective in defending RN.
Typical of a case in which such an operation would be used was
on the Calloway matter. I know that a majority of our staff felt that
I should respond to Rockefeller on the Calloway attack. It would
have been better to have a strong statement made by someone else
SO that RN could have referred to that as being the answer and not
touched on it himself.
- 3 -
3. Humphrey Attack Strategy
understand that Earl Mazo is going to do some work in this
tillings
field, As I pointed out in an earlier memorandum, the report that
Agnee made up was a fair start but only scratched the surface as
far as possibilities are concerned. We need chapter and verse -
going back through his entire Senate career - on the statements
and positions that Humphrey would like to forget today. It is
going to be essential for us to nail him as a way-out liberal.
On the subject of spending, for example, Agnes has come up
with the figure of 100 billion dollars which would have been the
cost of Humphrey proposals had they been enacted into law. I
notice that Jack Knight in his column Sunday pointed out that
Humphrey's major liability was that he was a big spender. I
would like this study to be pursued in more detail so that our
speakers would be able to say, in effect, "Had Hubert Humphrey
had his way, the annual: budget would be
billion dollars more.
Had Humphrey had his way, the following programs, costing SO
much each, would have been enacted into law."
I this connection, we also need a good library of Humphrey
on zipa - both radio and TV as far as statements he would like to
forget.
We may not decide to use this material but we should
have ready for counter-attack in the event that our opponents
start taking us on. This is a vitally important assignment and
should be supervised at the highest level. This is one area, of
course, where the National Committee should have the work already
done for us but I doubt if you will find much in their files.
1 also imagine that Goldwater could have done something on
this score in 1964. In any event, it needs a follow up.
4. Hand-Holding
With Ruwe and Hillings on deck, a good start will have been
made on this project. Not only do I visualize an operation in which
we respond to calls that are made to us but also one where calls
are initiated to political, financial, editorial and personal types
who either might expect a call or who would react very positively
if they received one. Not only should such calls be made by Ruwe
and Hillings but I would hope that others would undertake this kind
of assignment to the extent their schedules will permit.
RmW could make calls of this type - Eddie Nixon and, of course,
the top political men, including Mitchell, Kleindienst et al.
I think one way we can avoid having people say that the candidate
is "fenced off" is to beat them to the punch and constantly to have
a dialogue with them.
5.
Family Schedule
think the family scheduling should be upgraded and possibly
Ruwe would be a good answer here. We have an excellent added
stroke which should be used quite precisely not only in states where
I may not be able to campaign but particularly in major states in
cities which I would not be able to visit. For example, I think the
family should be very heavily scheduled in California, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Chio, et al.
Here we ought to get in touch with our State Chairmen and tell
them what the potential is and see what kind of events they can
arrange.
One item which was not handled adequately in Chicago by the
Advance Man is with regard to interviews that Tricia, Julie and
David have with the press. It must be clearly understood that such
interviews are not to cover their views on political subjects. If
reporters - either television or news - do not want to interview them
under those circumstances -- SO be it. I think it is too much to ask
them to be prepared on all the subjects which a political reporter
would ask. They ran into some pretty tough antagonistic questioning
from a reporter from the Sun Times and one from the Mutual Broad-
Casting System, when they were in Chicago. I don't want them submitted
to this - but beyond that this can be risky when they get beyond their
depth.
This, again, takes a fairly sophisticated advance man or at least
one who is instructed as to how to handle the situation. Perhaps it will
be necessary when they do go out on these trips to have a press man
go with them since it appears that such interviews are the rule rather
than the exception. They, of course, can be extremely helpful from a
local publicity standpoint but the cost would be too great if we get
them involved in freewheeling political press conferences. Haldeman
should check this out immediately so that the future schedules are
handled as indicated.
6.
Speakers
Just as soon as possible the Speakers Bureau must be upgraded
and put under a Congressman or Senator or perhaps a joint operation
with two in charge. Brock would be excellent at the Congressional
- 3 -
level and perhaps Baker at the Senatorial level. Charlie McWhorter
would be a good man to help out on this at the staff level. He submitted
an analy is to me a few weeks ago pointing up the number of Governors
and Senators who are not up for re-election and who should be available
to complign nationwide. Also there are several Congressmen who
have safe districts who are in this category. Using this group effectively
could 02 a major assist to us in the campaign but the decisions on it
should be made at a strategy level and not simply on the basis of rushing
around to find a speaker when we have an engagement to fill.
7. Backsmound Material
Che area I would like for you to shore up is with regard to this
background material. In two respects: (I) the color material where
we now have in mind using Gavin and a couple of others. (2) The
necessity of taking these long memoranda that Charlie McWhorter
prepares and boiling them down. Ellsworth prepared the background
on a number of occasions - he has the knack of it. I will not always
have time to read a couple of pages of ma terial but will need just the
bare essenti als.
*************************
Blab.
July 7, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
DC
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
fyi
qng.
Another suggestion Edwin Emrich made was that
somehow or other you try to telephone each delegate.
He said he had had Nelson Gross do that in their
county and that is how he won.
One thought -- since you will have covered a lot of
them how about trying to call the ones you are not going to be meeting
personally?
wall
be Program paty 1 to dr Consult you to How n.n. Rx
Bob- This Calt.
up-
&
we
no
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
PROJECT BILLY GRAHAM
TO:
Richard Nixon
FROM:
State Senator John Conlan
The Goal:
To utilize and develop in the most positive manner an
indorsement of Richard Nixon by Billy Graham, the Christian statesman.
A Recommended Solution -- in Four Stages (short summary)
Stage One - Have Billy Graham give the invocation at the Republican
National Convention.
Stage Two - Phase A - Nixon appears at the Pittsburg Crusade
(Aug 30-Sep. 8th)
Phase B - Nixon stops by Graham home in Montreat, N.C.
in course of a campaign swing thru Carolinas.
Stage Three - DECISION Magazine (circ. over 6 Million) carries
cover or lead story "Personal Interview with Richard
Nixon"
this must be September issue)
Stage Four - Phase A - Billy Graham publicly endorses Nixon on
nation-wide 30-minute T-V program.
Phase B - Billy writes personal letter to each on
his mailing list telling them reasons for his
endorsement and asking them to work in Nixon's behalf
if God so leads them to join Billy in this matter.
Stage One - By Billy appearing at Republican Convention, this
opens the door to preparing his followers and the public
for his later indorsement action. However, this question
arises: Will the DEmocrats then ask Billy to appear
at THEIR convention and give the invocation? Does he
decline? Is he so tied up with the Pittsburg crusade
starting three days later that he can't make it to
Chicago? Does he fly into Chicago for the Demo convention
for the real purpose of appearing bi-partisan still, but
yet braodening his image and his PUNCH when he later
comes out for Nixon two-three weeks thereafter? This
writer is presently inclined to think his appearance
at both conventions, if invited, would add strength
to his "well-thought out" endorsement of Nixon. having
"attended" both conventions in a truly "bi-partisan"
sense
Con the other hand, why give a blessing to the Demos:
Stage Two-
Phase A - Billy's Pittsburg Crusade will be filmed
for T-V showing later. A Nixon appearance there will
have great wire-service value in preparing Graham"s
CHristian supporters for Billy's later indorsement.
Nixon, in scheduling which evening he appears in
Pitsburg, should keep in mind that both the mammoth
(50-60,000 attendance) Sunday, September 8th rally
as well as a mid-week Youth Night rally will be
taped by Grahams crew. Decision to make then: Does
Nixon prefer the "Youth" night appearance, image-wise,
or does he prefer the Sunday or other appearance
(Billy's T-V telecast should be given between Sept. 15-
October 1st, for maximum effect in activating his following).
Phase B - A Montreat, N.C. (Asheville area) appearance
by Nixon would be good would help the REpublican
gubernatorial, senatorial and congressional cause
in N. Carolina, etc. HOwever, wouldn"t this have
to be done before the Pittsburg meeting?? i.e., before
the DEMO convention, to which Billy may or may not
be invited?
Stage Three - Nixon needs to be written up in a personal "exclusive"
interview in Billy Graham's DECISION Magazine (over
6,000,000
circulation
perhaps 20 Million readership)
for the September issue: This requires a directive
immediately from Billy to SHerwood Wirt, editor of
DECISION and a splendid writer ( politically on
conservative side), to fly to Nixon and interview him
(and his family, if possible, photograph the family)
in time to write the lead article before the September
issue goes to press in early August!
Similar stories could be planted in other Christian
publications like Christian Life, Collegiate Challenge,
Young Life, etc. if staff assistance is given Nixon
on this.
Stage Four -
Phase A - Billy Graham"s public indorsement of Nixon
should not be at a press conference or other press
release situation. It definitely should be a 30 minute
nation-wide T-V telecast prime time: Billy should
announce at a press conference the day before he is
scheduled to go on T-V (on time previously bought under
Nixon's name to keep private the timing of the annuuncment
and thus heighten the suspense) that he WILL go on
nation-wide T-V "tmmorrow night" to "discuss American
affairs".
Just buying T-V page ads is not enough.
The listening audience must be "built" by a 24 hour
prior press release. (longer advance notice will only
give critics time to carp).
The telecast should be well-prpared, using documentary
film, photos, etc. of Dr. Graham's travels around the
world, of his meetings with kings and queens, premiers,
parliaments and presidents, abroad and at home. Narrated
by Billy, this can establish during the first 15 minutes
of the telecast his "credentials" as a World Statesman
himself in addition to being an evangelist. A skillfully
put together, well-documentedvisually attractive background
of action will "establish" Billy in the eyes of the non-
evangelical listening audience of millions; thus when
he uses the remaining 10-12 minutes to tell why he's
for Nixon, why the country is in crisis, etc. THEY,
the audience, will find him most credible. A presentation
of the type I have in mind will so convey the real depth
and knowledge of Billy Graham to millions of Americans 9
that if the Liberal clergy or the other polticians try to
cut Billy up, they will fail because the public would have
seen and heard his depth with their very owneyes.
- 2 -
Phase B
A one or two page, single sheet letter should be sent to
every one on Billy Graham's mailing list. A personal letter
using his Montreat or Minneapolis address will protect him
from losing his own supporters who will tend to think
of his political indorsement as a radical departure. A
personal letter should set forth his reasons for indorsing
Nixon and possibly urging them to do everything they can
possibly do to elect a God-fearing man to the Presidency.
This letter, to the 6,000,000-plus, timed to arrive at their
home shortly after the telecast, will serve the dual function
of activating most of his supporters in Nixon's behalf and
simultaneously assuaging some possible dissenters because
they received a personal letter from Billy setting forth his
sound Christian reasons for taking a stand in this Hour of
Decision.
- 3 -
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
PROJECT HOOVER
TO:
Richard Nixon
FROM:
State Senator John Conlan
THE GOAL:
To secure the indorsement of Richard Nixon by
J. Edgar Hoover - one of America's truly great
living heros -- about whom generally everyone, except
the criminal and the leftist, have the highest
admiration.
THE FACTS:
There is little doubt in most minds that the next
President of the U.S. will select the successor to
Hoover. Either Mr. Hoover's health or age will cause
his removal from the scene during the next presidency,
or the new ultra-liberal Democrat president will, upon
assuming office in Janaury, "thank" Hoover publicly
for his almost 50 years of public service -- and thus
send him into retirement by replacing him with a new
"younger" man. In other words, the handwriting on the
wall indicates that Hoover will be "graciously" (or
ungraciously, if necessary) be booted out by an ultra
liberal Democrat administration.
Mr. Hoover's options, it would appear are
(a) to stay quiet thru the inauguration and "hope" he
has a Republican president; or,
(b) fight a probable losing battle with a new DEmocrat
administration load/with leftists; or,
(c) use all the personal prestige he has to elect
Richard Nixon to the presidency and thus have a man
with whom he can cordially work out the succession
at the F.B.I.
POSSIBLE STRATEGY
Since Billy Graham is willing to lay his "all" on the line
for America, why not have Richard Nixon ask Billy Graham
to go to Hoover, privately, on a man-to-man basis. Hoover
is a pretty keen Christian and reputed admirer of Billy.
Billy should ask Hoover to join Billy in going "all out"
for Nixon
(With this combination a voter would have to be an "Atheist
or a communist" to vote against their endorsement this
is humorously written).
Option One - Hoover could resign one day, announce
he was going on a 30-minute nation-wide
telecast (ala Graham) two days later,
then give a tremendous, well-documented
rational for why he was indorsing Nixon
after all these almost 50 years of being
a non-partisan civil servant. "I resigned
in order to speek out for America" etc.
a very moving presentation could be
written.
%
Option Two - Hoover would not resign, if he preferred,
but would speak out anyway
pointing out
that he was concerned about his successor
as F.B.I. head that he did not want to
see it prostituted to a position for political
patronage or special interest Therefore,
he urges his fellow Americans to elect Nixon
because Hoover is confident Richard NIxon
will allow Hoover to select his own successon
etc. when Hoover retires in the very near
future.
CONCLUSION :
With Hoover and Graham both for Nixon, it would be
an overwhelming one-two punch to the Democrats and,
moreover, it would cut millions of votes out from
under George Wallace (and turn them to NIxon in spite
of Wallace):
- 2 -
1:00
1 time amount for reasons- -
use 1/2 hr TV- like a documentary -
1
buildip ahead - what's hegoing to do.
clips of G in other places w/world Colu
ned National Front Coalition
have McCantly on left - Wallace on regit
2
G couldget JEdgan
Hoover - do TV- annc. hill resign i/pas.
1/2 how - Sat nite -
use G for contact
3
proten in Repub. ranks - defertion to Wallan
John Connally as V.P.
RN sping have as surprise - for coalition
like Churchill - civis of one times
provides way to bridge gap after election
in Congress
article for Decision magozine -hept. rive
personal ltr mailing to 6 mill.
4
- ne TV - use opvisual aids
film clips in bkgd-
maps - stills er -charts
animation