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This file contains:
From DC to Haldeman Re: Media plans for Ohio and Pennsylvania telethons. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/19/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: No talking to media about plans for upcoming appearances. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/8/1968
From Robert Ellsworth to Haldeman Re: Meeting to discuss convention aid. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/5/1968
From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Checking on New Jersey and Illinois write-ins. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/22/1968
From Dwight Chapin to DC Re: Delivering Chicago Tribune to delegates and alternates during the Convention. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/25/1968
Handwritten note Re: Mrs. Ethel Kennedy, the news from California. 1 pg. [Other Document], n.d.
From Nixon to Buchanan Re: Huston discussion of simulmatics. Also, memo to Haldeman Re: Simultron Project. 8 pg. [Memo], 5/8/1968
[Memo], 5/6/1968
To Rose Mary Woods Re: June schedule. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/17/1968
From DC to Mitchell, Chapin, Haldeman, Ellsworth, Whitaker, Sears, McWhorter, Kleindienst Re: Scheduling meetings and fundraisers for June and July. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/13/1968
From Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis Re: Nixon's better hold of Democratic and Independent voters than Rockefeller. Also, alternate draft of same letter with handwritten notes. 5 pg. [Letter], 3/17/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Restricted contact between DC and Herb. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Staffing for California situation. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Backing Charlie Rhyne with a good staff. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From Price to Nixon Re: LBJ's Secret Service sent to Paris. Also, LBJ remark on possible invasion of the North. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/31/2016
From DC to Mitchell, Ellsworth, and Haldeman Re: Preparing a paper for Miami delagates emphasizing polls favorable to Nixon. This to counter Rockefeller's use of favorable polls. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
To Haldeman Re: Need for library of Humphrey's vulnerable radio and TV quotes; and family scheduling on state-by-state basis. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Monitoring local and national TV broadcasts. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/15/1968
From DC to Mitchell & Haldeman Re: Greater control over Citzens operation. Possible position for Erlichman and loss of Tom Evans. 2 pg. [Memo], 7/13/1968
To Whitaker, Chapin, and Haldeman from DC Re: Mishandling of Illinois. No photos in similar events in the future. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/12/1968
From DC to Len Garment Re: Need for better TV producers and one-liners. 2 pg. [Memo], 7/9/1968
From DC to Buchanan Re: Appealing to government workers. [Memo], 7/8/1968
From DC to Buchanan Re: Gathering of quotations and parables for Nixon speeches. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/8/1968
To Earl and Herb Re: Nixon preference for the Wicker quote. 1 pg. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten notes Re: Polling, Derge, and California. Also, notes Re: Haldeman, taking a confidential poll on the VP. 2 pg. [Other Document], n.d.
From DC to Haldeman Re: Items to discuss with PR and Speech Research Groups. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/2/1968
From Anderson to Nixon Re: Suggestions for communicating Nixon's position on current issues. Also, memo from From DC to Anderson, Research & PR Groups. 9 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Getting a frank analysis of personnel. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/15/1968
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26126919
label
WHSF: Returned, 35-8
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26126919
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Returned, 35-8
description
This file contains:
From DC to Haldeman Re: Media plans for Ohio and Pennsylvania telethons. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/19/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: No talking to media about plans for upcoming appearances. 1 pg. [Memo], 6/8/1968
From Robert Ellsworth to Haldeman Re: Meeting to discuss convention aid. 1 pg. [Letter], 1/5/1968
From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Checking on New Jersey and Illinois write-ins. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/22/1968
From Dwight Chapin to DC Re: Delivering Chicago Tribune to delegates and alternates during the Convention. 1 pg. [Memo], 1/25/1968
Handwritten note Re: Mrs. Ethel Kennedy, the news from California. 1 pg. [Other Document], n.d.
From Nixon to Buchanan Re: Huston discussion of simulmatics. Also, memo to Haldeman Re: Simultron Project. 8 pg. [Memo], 5/8/1968
[Memo], 5/6/1968
To Rose Mary Woods Re: June schedule. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/17/1968
From DC to Mitchell, Chapin, Haldeman, Ellsworth, Whitaker, Sears, McWhorter, Kleindienst Re: Scheduling meetings and fundraisers for June and July. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/13/1968
From Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis Re: Nixon's better hold of Democratic and Independent voters than Rockefeller. Also, alternate draft of same letter with handwritten notes. 5 pg. [Letter], 3/17/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Restricted contact between DC and Herb. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Staffing for California situation. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Backing Charlie Rhyne with a good staff. 1 pg. [Memo], 4/15/1968
From Price to Nixon Re: LBJ's Secret Service sent to Paris. Also, LBJ remark on possible invasion of the North. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/31/2016
From DC to Mitchell, Ellsworth, and Haldeman Re: Preparing a paper for Miami delagates emphasizing polls favorable to Nixon. This to counter Rockefeller's use of favorable polls. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
To Haldeman Re: Need for library of Humphrey's vulnerable radio and TV quotes; and family scheduling on state-by-state basis. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Monitoring local and national TV broadcasts. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/15/1968
From DC to Mitchell & Haldeman Re: Greater control over Citzens operation. Possible position for Erlichman and loss of Tom Evans. 2 pg. [Memo], 7/13/1968
To Whitaker, Chapin, and Haldeman from DC Re: Mishandling of Illinois. No photos in similar events in the future. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/12/1968
From DC to Len Garment Re: Need for better TV producers and one-liners. 2 pg. [Memo], 7/9/1968
From DC to Buchanan Re: Appealing to government workers. [Memo], 7/8/1968
From DC to Buchanan Re: Gathering of quotations and parables for Nixon speeches. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/8/1968
To Earl and Herb Re: Nixon preference for the Wicker quote. 1 pg. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten notes Re: Polling, Derge, and California. Also, notes Re: Haldeman, taking a confidential poll on the VP. 2 pg. [Other Document], n.d.
From DC to Haldeman Re: Items to discuss with PR and Speech Research Groups. 1 pg. [Memo], 7/2/1968
From Anderson to Nixon Re: Suggestions for communicating Nixon's position on current issues. Also, memo from From DC to Anderson, Research & PR Groups. 9 pg. [Memo], 7/24/1968
From DC to Haldeman Re: Getting a frank analysis of personnel. 1 pg. [Memo], 5/15/1968
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
8
06/19/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Media plans for
Ohio and Pennsylvania telethons. 1 pg.
35
8
06/08/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: No talking to
media about plans for upcoming
appearances. 1 pg.
35
8
01/05/1968
Letter
From Robert Ellsworth to Haldeman Re:
Meeting to discuss convention aid. 1 pg.
35
8
05/22/1968
Memo
From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Checking on
New Jersey and Illinois write-ins. 1 pg.
35
8
01/25/1968
Memo
From Dwight Chapin to DC Re: Delivering
Chicago Tribune to delegates and alternates
during the Convention. 1 pg.
35
8
n.d.
Other Document
Handwritten note Re: Mrs. Ethel Kennedy,
the news from California. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 1 of 5
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
8
05/08/1968
Memo
From Nixon to Buchanan Re: Huston
discussion of simulmatics. Also, memo to
Haldeman Re: Simultron Project. 8 pg.
35
8
05/06/1968
Memo
35
8
05/17/1968
Memo
To Rose Mary Woods Re: June schedule. 1
pg.
35
8
05/13/1968
Memo
From DC to Mitchell, Chapin, Haldeman,
Ellsworth, Whitaker, Sears, McWhorter,
Kleindienst Re: Scheduling meetings and
fundraisers for June and July. 1 pg.
35
8
03/17/1968
Letter
From Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis Re: Nixon's
better hold of Democratic and Independent
voters than Rockefeller. Also, alternate draft
of same letter with handwritten notes. 5 pg.
35
8
04/15/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Restricted
contact between DC and Herb. 1 pg.
35
8
04/15/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Staffing for
California situation. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 2 of 5
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
8
04/15/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Backing Charlie
Rhyne with a good staff. 1 pg.
35
8
07/31
Memo
From Price to Nixon Re: LBJ's Secret
Service sent to Paris. Also, LBJ remark on
possible invasion of the North. 1 pg.
35
8
07/24/1968
Memo
From DC to Mitchell, Ellsworth, and
Haldeman Re: Preparing a paper for Miami
delagates emphasizing polls favorable to
Nixon. This to counter Rockefeller's use of
favorable polls. 1 pg.
35
8
07/24/1968
Memo
To Haldeman Re: Need for library of
Humphrey's vulnerable radio and TV quotes;
and family scheduling on state-by-state basis.
1 pg.
35
8
07/15/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Monitoring local
and national TV broadcasts. 1 pg.
35
8
07/13/1968
Memo
From DC to Mitchell & Haldeman Re:
Greater control over Citzens operation.
Possible position for Erlichman and loss of
Tom Evans. 2 pg.
35
8
07/12/1968
Memo
To Whitaker, Chapin, and Haldeman from
DC Re: Mishandling of Illinois. No photos in
similar events in the future. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 3 of 5
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
8
07/09/1968
Memo
From DC to Len Garment Re: Need for
better TV producers and one-liners. 2 pg.
35
8
07/08/1968
Memo
From DC to Buchanan Re: Appealing to
government workers.
35
8
07/08/1968
Memo
From DC to Buchanan Re: Gathering of
quotations and parables for Nixon speeches.
1 pg.
35
8
n.d.
Memo
To Earl and Herb Re: Nixon preference for
the Wicker quote. 1 pg.
35
8
n.d.
Other Document
Handwritten notes Re: Polling, Derge, and
California. Also, notes Re: Haldeman, taking
a confidential poll on the VP. 2 pg.
35
8
07/02/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Items to discuss
with PR and Speech Research Groups. 1 pg.
35
8
07/24/1968
Memo
From Anderson to Nixon Re: Suggestions for
communicating Nixon's position on current
issues. Also, memo from From DC to
Anderson, Research & PR Groups. 9 pg.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 4 of 5
Box Number Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
8
05/15/1968
Memo
From DC to Haldeman Re: Getting a frank
analysis of personnel. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 5 of 5
Carnet File Copy.
June 19, 1968
Plane let Mr.
MEMORANDUM
Ha (daran know status.
TO:
Bob Haldeman
L.
FROM:
DC
1 would like to know as soon as possible
what the media plans are for running the 1/2 hour telethon in
Pennsylvania and Ohio. I would like to get that decision made
and when it is going to be done. My view being that a check on
that one -- that one properly advertised may give an idea whether
we should run it in other states.
Sean
June 8, 1968
Wcleborter
Klein
MEMORANDUM
a.Woods
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
You must be sure that all of our people -- both
here in New York and Washington -- understand that there are to
be no (absolutely no) backgrounders at this time. I do not want to
hear of any of our people talking off or on the record to any writers
with their ideas of what our strategy, plans, ideas, etc. are for
the period ahead. I want you to make sure that everyone knows this -
including, Ellsworth, Whelan, Herb Klein, Sears, etc. -- all of our
people the press might be asking for some line on what we plan to do
-- what kind of appearances -- etc. NOTHING is to be given out in
this period.
Maybe you and John Mitchell should call all of the
top people together and make this point.
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400
Robert Ellsworth, National Director
January 5, 1968
AIR MAIL
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
c/o J. Walter Thompson Company
6505 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048
Dear Bob:
I have the following instruction:
"Bob Haldeman is to be given charge of the Convention
and all arrangements. Timmons and anyone else who
wants to work on this will be under Haldeman. (John
Ehrlichman of Seattle, Washington, has volunteered to
be of assistance in this matter as well.)"
I have visited with Bill Timmons about this, and we will be
in touch with you in the next few days on what has been done
and how the land lies, etc.
Warmest and best.
JR Robert Ellsworth
National Director
RE:jl
cc: Bill Timmons
May 22, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
RN
Re;
Addition to Check List
While others have the responsibility --
please add to your check list -- New Jersey and Illinois write-ins.
Check on progress.
January 25, 1968
REMINDER TO:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
DC
Pass on to Haldeman my idea that I want some
effort to be made to get the Chicago Tribune delivered
to each delegate's and alternate's room as well as to
each newspaperman at the Convention. The New York Times
and Miami Herald will be there and we need one paper
which will give another point of view.
# # #
mrs Ethel Namely -
The new fune
Cabjum
Bob will Huton you Carl This 3>)
Memorandum to RN
From Buchanan
May 8, 1968
Before the simulmatics idea is finally canned, if it is to
be, would RN take a rapid reading of this thing from TCH. Huston
says the cost of the thing will be less than the cost of the Youth
Budget between now and convention.
ahead (if Buchanan 40g cost or bass
but go $ get ship a new - 416-
figure Cofne Use to
Rn
This is on balance just an
organized effort to get info
that any desent compaign
But sined we went get it- lets buy it.
organisting 2 should have at its fingert
6 May 1968
MEMORANDUM TO BOB HALDEMAN
SUBJ: The Simultron Project
In our initial memorandum explaining the similation process,
we listed six broad areas of information which can be made available:
(1) a state=by=state ranking by degree of "favorableness" to
Nixon, Kennedy, Humphrey, etc.
(2) a weighted ranking of these states by favorableness and
electoral vote, showing the most favorable and most valuable states
for each candidate.
(3) a ranking of the favorableness of the people who have been
mentioned as possible running-mates with Nixon.
(4) "voter-types" (ex., white, urban, Catholic, male, Repbblican,
Easterner, upper socio-economic class) listed in order of preference
for Nixon, Kennedy, etc.
(5) the most important issues in each state.
(6) the most important issues to each "voter-type".
Essentially. the above information represents only a rough product
whose value is derived from its specific application to concrete
campaign objectives, programs. and problems. The options available
are almost limitless once the raw data has been programmed and is
available on the computer. The following examples of application of
this information are intended only to suggest some of the areas where
we believe this program could be of great value. As the campaign pro-
gresses and as we begin to work with the data, new opportunities as
well as now requirements will doubtless arise to be exploited. Since
we intend to limit our hypotheses and allow the data to speak for itself,
we believe that information which we did not anticipate will become
available to guide us further in an effort to provide the utmost assist-
ance in relating public opinion data to the practical aspects of the
campaign. However, there are many applications which we can program
for immediate use. Some of these are listed below.
I. STATE DATA.
1. Determining a winning electoral combination. The most immediate
product of simulation will be a ranking of states based upon their
favorableness and their importance electorally to RN. This will be a
relative ranking (rather than an absolute percentage distribution), but
2.
will tell us with a high degree of accuracy which states represent
the best opportunity for a winning electoral combination. We can
tell which states deserve the most attention based on their relative
electoral importance and which should receive the least attention
because of the likelihood they will inevitably go Democratic. Also,
we will be able to determine which states are marginal and thus require
particular attention.
2. Information for state leaders. As will be pointed out in
further detail below, we will be able to analyze each state in terms
of voter-types and issues. This information will be of great help to
us in many ways, but one peripheral consideration is the possibility
of making some of this state information available to state leaders
to assist them in working not only for RN's election, but for a clean
sweep for the GOP. This helps us guarantee a maximum effort for RN
with the correct groups on the correct issues, but it also helps us
build morale among state leaders by providing them invaluable information
which would not otherwise be available to "except at great expense.
We could also do this for Congressional candidates. If in each state
candidates down the line on the ticket are hitting on the same issues
(issues selected by RN). it is bound to assist the national ticket
and get us more exposure than otherwise might be available.
II. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
1. Scheduling. Simulation data can provide assistance in determ-
ining the amount of attention which the candidate should devote to
each state. In a presidential campaign, the candidate's time is the
most precious commodity. We can determine the relative importance of
states and postulate the attention which should be paid to each state.
We intend to analyze the relative voter appeal of each; the recognized
Republican presidential possibilities, e.s., Rockefeller, Percy, Reagan,
etc., so that we could do the same thing for these people. On the
basis of this information, we will know in which states they are par-
ticularly strong. with which voter-types, and on which issues. From
this information, we can advise on the use of these people in support
of the national ticket. If one of these should be the Vice Presidential
candidate. this information would be particularly useful, but no doubt
RN will want to use all the prominent Republican leaders in his campaign,
and simulation will tell us where to use them to best advantage.
2. Campaign Spending. Simulation can also help determine the
allocation of financial resources. This is an obvious deduction, but
only if it is understood that resources of every type are to be prin-
cipally allocated on the basis of the viable electoral combination
which arises from our determination that certain states and certain
activities are to receive priority because of their importance and
potentiality.
III. VOTER-TYPES.
1. Molding a New Coalition. Presidential elections are not
won on the basis of strict popular appeal. Electoral combinations
are decisive, but the Democrats recognized with FDR that electoral
votes are secured through the careful formulation of a winning coal-
ition of interest groups, 1.0., voter-types. Simulation will enable
us to identify those voter-types within each state which are for RN
or inclined toward him. It will enable us to determine which groups
we have and which groups we need to get. Because we will also be
analyzing the strength of each potential Democratic nominee, we will
also be able to identify those groups which are traditionally Democrat
but which may be dissatisfied with the particular nominee. In view of
the fact that the Democrats may split this year, it is particularly
important that we be able to readily define those groups which are
disenchanted with the ultimate nominee. This we will be able to do
regardless of whom the Democrate nominate in Chicago.
2. Citizens Operation. The Citizens for Nixon operation in
Washington is organizing a series of special interest committees,
e.g.. Senior Citizens for Nixon, Doctors for Nixon, etc. Simulation
will enable us to determine by states where these committees can be
most effective because simulation data will parallel their own interest
orientation. This information will not only make it possible to zero
in on groups in those states which are electorally most important, but
will make it possible to identify specifically which groups are most
important and where and on what issues these special interest groups
should be approached. Our data would also enable the Citizens operation
to operate on a cost effective basis since we would be able to advise
against contemplated projects which our analysis of each group by state
indicated would not be productive.
3. Voter Registration. Certainly a major effort will be under-
taken to register new voters in those states which we regard as
crucial. Simulation, augmented by demographic information to determine
population shifts and trends in voting, will enable us to pin-point
those areas where intensive registration efforts would be most pro->
ductive. We can determine specific voter-types within geographical
areas which represent the most lucrative targets for a registration
effort as well as point out specific communities which should receive
priority attention.
IV. ISSUES.
1. Determining key issues. Simulation will enable us to determine
key issues by state and by voter-type. This will enable us to tailor
our appeals to specific groups which will make up the new coalition
necessary for victory. More specifically. we can:
Be Advise RN and others campaigning on his behalf which
issues are of paramount concern in each state and relate these issues
to specific voter-types. As a corollary, we can advise which issues
to avoid in particular areas so as to eliminate the possibility of
unnecessarily generating disagreement in an area where it could easily
be avoided.
b. Advise various campaign consittees both at the national
and state level on the type of appeal to include in printed campaign
literature. This would be particularly helpful to the Citizens
operation since we could provide specific information on issues of
greatest concern to those groups which they are attempting to service.
This assistance could also be rendered to state committees who would
thus be able to concentrate on those issues of greatest concern within
their own states.
0. Advise the advertising people on the type of copy to
be used in particular states and in the media directed at particular
voting groups. By working closely with media representatives, we
could provide information on voter attitudes and issue-orientation for
voters within recognized media-markets. This assumes, of course, that
some advertising will be localized. However, even on national advertis-
ins. the type of issue information we could make available would doubt=
less be of asistance.
2. Public Opinion Data Book. We could prepare for use by key
staff personnel a notebook containing public opinion data developed
not only from our simulation operation, but also from demographic
and voter trend studies as well as other public opinion research.
This notebook would be broken down into various categories, 0.5..
a) demographic information, b) issue information (by states and voter
types), c) states (voting trends, demographic information, voter-types,
issue orientation), d) voter trends (by states and voterptypes on
various issues), and e) group attitudes (on issues by states). As you
can see, much of this information would be cross-indexed to make it
easier to use. When preparing a speech, planning an itinerayy, pre-
paring advertising copy, or drafting a piece of campaign literature,
this information would be readily available. We could put this infor-
mation into such a format as to make it readily available to the working
staff. of course, this would not be a substitute for the more detailed
analysis which would be made available to RN for planning purposes,
but would simply be an additional effort in order to gain the maximum
use of the information which we produced.
V. PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.
1. Analysis of polls taken outside the organization. Our in-
house personnel could study polls taken by people unrelated to the
Nixon organization and evaluate it for the benefit of top staff planners.
5.
This would include various public opinion polls appearing in the media.
We could relate this data to our own to determine both the reliability
of our own work and the political significance of the polls being
published.
2. Analysis of local polls. Many polls of varying reliability
will be appearing in the local press, e.g., the Gary Tribune's poll
of Indiana's 1st Congressional District. We could collect this infor-
mation and evaluabe 1t, thus enabling us to compare it with our sim-
ulation data to further refine our analysis of state voter-type attitudes
within states. Much of this type of information might not otherwise
come to the attention of the campaign staff, but might nevertheless
be of some value.
3. Periodic Report on Polling Implications. We could prepare
a periodic analysis of published polls to be circulated among the
campaign staff and others directly interested in the campaign. This
activity would principally be of psychological value since we could
point out encouraging signs and discredit obviously political efforts
designed to make RN look bad in the polls, 0.8., Harris. An example
of this is the recent student poll conducted by Time magazine. We would
point out that the margin of error in such a major effort is such that
it is likely that RN has more campus support than Bobby, particularly
in view of the fact that only the most politically-motivated students
would take the time to go to the polling places and vote. The margin
of difference in the two totals 18 so slight that we should realistically
consider RN to have at least tied with Bobby for second rather than
having placed third as Time would have us believe. We would support
this contention by pointing out that other student surveys have shown
greater Republican affiliation on the campus than does the Time study,
and that many students who are "hung up" on the Vietnam question will
swing around as the issue clears now that Johnson is out of the race.
This sort of analysis (rough as it is here) might be valuable to our
campaign workers who will be called upon to exphain the meaning of
polls occuring in the daily press.
4. In-House Polling. It is obvious that the most efficient
arrangement would be for us to handle whatever in-house polling is
necessary. From our simulation data, we can determine which states
require polls in order to provide us with sufficient data. We can also
determine the types of information we need based upon whatever defic-
iencies turn up in our simulation of a particular state or based upon
issues which suddenly show up which we believe need to be examined
further. However, if it should be decided to have ourrent polling
done by someone else, we should at least be provided with the faw
data once the poll is completed and we should be consulted prior to the
preparation of the interview questions. One of our first tasks should
this project be authorized should be to evaluate the raw date from
polls already conducted on behalf of RN.
6.
MI.
CONCLUSIONS.
We believe that the above represent some of the major areas where
simulation can be of particular assistance. As mentioned at the beginn-
ing. we intend to let the data speak for itself, so we fully expect
to find information which will suggest new avenues for both exploration
and application. One of the main advantages of the simulationpprocess
is that it will enable us to identify problem areas which will require
further investigation in special polls and further analysis of demo-
graphic information, voter trend studies, and issue surveys. To attempt
to postulate these problem areas at the outset would be to defent our
purpose and ignore the process, but one of our major tasks will be to
be on the lookout for them so that we can anticipate their impact
before we are confronted with them on a political level.
We believe that the proper utilization of the data which simulation
can give could easily result in the savings of more money that the
simulation operation will cost. This is particularly true if financial
resources are allocated among stages and voter-types on the basis of
our determination of where they will do the most good. Thus, simulation
can help campaign planners and financers reduce the likelihood of money
being spent in areas and for projects which, in the final analysis,
will not materially assist RN in November.
We recognize that in many instances listed above wherein we
suggest the use of data derived from simulation, it would be possible
to arrive at approximately the same information by other means. For
example, an electoral combination of states could be put together
merely by sound judgment. It might or might not be as accurate as
what we could dtermine through simulation. Also, it would be possible
strictly from demographic information and voter trend studies to determ-
ine in which states you should concentrate your voter registration
efforts. You could also determine the issue orientation of voter-types
by states by non-simulation techniquess but only through the extensive
use of state polls -- at a cost of approximately $300,000 if you were
to do the job thoroughly.
We believe the advantage of simulation, particularly at this time,
is the opportunity it provides for coordinated effort. There 1s not
a single example listed above of information which we believe would
of itself justify the expense of a simulation program. However, we
believe the total program is certainly worth the expense. An important
question which you might wish to ask yourself is this: Are you likely
without the simulation program to get the same degree of information
with the same degree of accuracy as rapidly and at less cost with the
same degree of coordination and close attention? If the answer is yes,
then doubtless simulation offers you little. If & candid appraisal is
likely to force you to conclude that you would not, we believe simulation
7.
is definitely necessary.
Two examples immediately come to mind to point out the type of
service an in-house simulation effort could provide. First, there
are at least 20 states which have state-wide polls available. Some,
of course, are more reliable than others. We could analyze these
state polls and determine how reliable they are. Those which we found
to be valid for our use would enable us to avoid the expense of con-
ducting our own polls in those states. Query: Without such an in-house
capability would the Nixon operation take advantage of this opportunity?
Second. the Republican House and Senate Campaign Committees are planning
to survey 50 Congressional districts and 8 states during the campaign.
If RN is the nominee, we could most likely gain access to this information
and again eliminate the necessity for some original polling at our
expense. Query: If there were not within the campaign organization
a specific team working with this type of information, would this
opportunity be seized?
It also should be pointed out that these types of information
would be of value only if they augmented a simulation project, sine
otherwise it would be virtually impossible to relate them to data
which not only verified their accurancy, but which provided the addition-
al detailed information necessary to provide you with meaningful con-
clusions.
We believe that it is possible to provide valuable information
for planning puposes in sufficient time to be of use and to do so at
a reasonable cost. We believe that simulation is the most efficient
means to provide this information and to guarantee the coordinated
effort most likely to assure that raw data is translated into practical
campaign assistance.
It is not our desire to over-sell the advantages of simulation.
In fact, we believe we have tended to attribute less value to the
process than we actually believe it has. We tend to think that more
information will be available and more uses for it will present themselves
than we have suggested to you. Simulation is not magic, nor is it pure
science. It is, however, one important step along the road that leads
from an educated guess to a calculated probability. It is valuable as
a planning tool and as an aid in the formulation of decisions and the
allocation of resources. This we feal is enough to justify its use,
and should you decide to go ahead with the project, we will provide
you with the most precise data possible upon which to make the curcial
decisions necessary in the months ahead.
PETER M. FLANIGAN
5/17/68
TO: Rose Mary Woods
RE: Schedule
The June schedule proposes a
June 5 drop-by at the Links. For us to
prepare this effectively we would like
approval by Monday, May 20.
yes
PMF
no
butmo more more of
the
unless
B75
MEMORANDUM
5/13/68
TO: Messrs. Mitchell, Whitaker, Kleindienst, Ellsworth
McWhorter, Sears, Haldeman and Chapin
FROM: D.C.
I have seen a number of requests in recent days for
consideration ofspeaking engagements after the Oregon primary
and also for meetings with delegates in key states. Unless we
begin to analyze these carefully now, we will be making decisions on
a hit and miss basis and my schedule will probably get so crowded
that I will arrive in Miami on August 5 like a rag.
Just as soon as we return from this week's trip I think
a meeting should be held at which all the possible meetings in June
and through the 21st of July are put on the table and considered.
In this connection, Stans is pushing for four or five fund-raising
receptions in various parts of the country. If possible, these should
be given low priority because they, of course, do not serve our
purposes in terms of getting delegates, however, they may prove to
be necessary if the finance committee does not come through with what
we need.
I would like to see a suggested schedule on this when I
return from this week's swing. John Whitaker will have most of the
invitations and Kleindienst etal will have the recommended conventions
or delegate meetings that I would have to attend. In addition, time should
be left open for telephone calls and personal visits with some VIP types.
I cannot emphasize the necessity of keeping a lot of loose time in this
period because a personal meeting whose name comes up on the spur of the
moment may prove to be far more valuable than one that we might have
scheduled a month or two earlier involving a full delegation.
fyi
Staff
note
March 17, 1968
Letter from Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis:
note
put page this 2 priority many
Dear Hobe:
The popular "line" that Nixon is a cipher at winning
independent and Democratic votes, while Rockefeller is
a giant needs examination in terms of reality. That propa-
ganda will become a din as the Rockefeller operation
intensifies.
Since the ultimate proof is in actual election vote
counts, let's take the very latest -- New Hampshire:
Bothe Nixon and Rockefeller had to be written in on
the Democratic ballot. Therefore, the "ballot listing"
excuse was better forgotten, and the result was not even
mentioned
The reason: Nixon's write-in by Democrats
was 4.6 percent; Rockefeller's was .004 (four-tenths of
one percent.)
The offical count: 2,529 of NH's registered Democrats
wrote-in Nixon: 248 wrote in Rockefeller And incidently,
only about 600 Democrats wrote in Bobby Kennedy.
The NY Times, in an election-eve editorial antici-
pating a massive Rockefeller vote (for which the Rockefeller
apparatus had worked) declared: "Any sizeable Rockefeller
vote
can be regarded as in the nature of an anti-Nixon
protest vote."
Well, that one dies aborning. The Times next day
neglected to note the "anti-Nixon protest" turned out
to be a Nixon triumph and Rockefeller dud.
That was ballot-box reality, not needled propaganda
and wishful fantasy.
And on that score, another fact-of-voting that ought
tobe remembered is Nixon's sizeable non-Republican (Democrats,
Independents) vote in 1960. As I recall, Nixon got well
over 5-million votes more than the Republican party turnout.
And his pulling-power resulted in a nation-wide net
Republican gain of 21 Congressmen, two Senators, two governors,
300 state legislators and swarms of state, county and local
officers. (Thus with Nixon at the top of the ticket,
the GOP reversed a down-hill trend of two years before
when the Democrets won an incredible net total of 16 Senate
seats and swept to victory at all levels, coast-to-coast... )
---
One other thing:
I surely hope the Nixon people are carefully collect-
ing tapes and film of all the post-NH Bobby, McCarthy and
Johnson-Humphrey observations about each other. Like much
of what we have seen and heard these past days (and might
soon forget), the Kennedy statement that Johnson must go
because America positively must have "new leadership" should
be precious stuff to replay repeatedly in September and
October, ( A major flaw in the 1960 campaign was the failure
to have leading Democrats make the case against Kennedy
- 3 -
via replayed tapes, No Republicans could state it so effect-
ively as Fello-Demos Johnson, Rayburn, Truman, Morse and
others had done.
Well. I suppose that's that for now.
All the best
Earl
Dear
This
a go se Type MP
Personal
March 17,1968
Dear Hobe:
The popular "line" that Nixon is a cipher at winning
independent and Democratic votes, while Rockefeller is a giant
needs examination in Itstit terms of reality especially that Since the
propoganda will become a din as the Rockefeller operation
intensifies.
Proof
Since the ultimate is in actual election vote counts, let's
take khask the very latest -- New Hampshire:
Both Nixon and Rockefeller had to be written in on the
Democratic ballot Therefore so the sank-abost ballot 1431 listing
release
was better Forfath ANd The Result was
not not even mentioned The reason: Nixon's write-in by
Democrats was 4.6 percent; Rockefeller's was .004 (four-tenths
of one percent)! The official count: 2,529 of NH's
registered Democrats wrote-in Nixon; 248 wrote in
Democrats
Rockefeller
And incidently only about 600, wrote in Bobby
Kennedy
The NYTimes, in an election-eve editorial anticipating a
massive Rockefeller vote for which the Rockefeller apparatus
had worked declared: "Any sizable Rockefeller vote can be
regarded as in the nature of an anti-Nixon protest vote."
Well, that one Line died aborning the Times Nextday
neglected to note the "anti-Nixon protest" reality turned out to
be a Nk Sombination Nixon triumph and @ Rockefeller dud.
Rose
-2-
That was ballot-box reality, not needled propaganda and
wishful fantasy.
And on that score, another fact-of-voting that ought to be
recalled is Nixon's sizable non-Republican (Democrats, independents)
vote in 1960. As I recall, Nixon got well over 5-million votes
more than the Republican party turnout.
nation-wide
And his pulling-power resulted in amet Republican gain of
21 Congressmen, two Senators, z two governors, 300 state
legislators and swarms of kohakk state, county and local
officers. (Thus with Nixon at the top of the ticket, the GOP
reversed a down-hill trend of you two years before
won
net
when the Democrats scined an incredibl total of 16 Senate
seats and swept to victory at all levels, coast-to-coast...)
---
One other thing:
I surely hope the Nixon people are carefully
collecting tapes and film of all the post-NH Bobby, McCarthy and
Johnson-Humphrey observations about each other. Like much of what
we have seen and heard these past days (and might soon forget),
the Kennedy statement that Johnson must go because America
MR positively must have "new leadership" should be precious
stuff for Nison backers to replay repeatedly in September and
October. (A major flaw in the 1960 campaign was the failure to
have leading Democrats make the case against Kennedy
drametically remind the electorate via replayed tapes) blank No
efablidews could State tso effectively as Fello -Denos
of Johnson, Rayburn, Truman, Morse and others had Done
Well. I suppose that's that for now.
All the best
5
April 15, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
You have to have an understanding with Herb that
the contact cannot be with me except in extreme instances. (1) He can't
call me with results of polls, etc. and (2) he must not have any responsibility
for setting up appointments with newsmen. These requests are to go to
Dwight Chapin.
April 15, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
Check Finch on the California situation. I think it
is imperative to go forward fast on the double-pronged thing you mentioned
to me. Put someone in charge -- Parky perhaps publicly and then a tough,
able organizer who will keep his confidence on the group that is supposed
to work on the delegates.
April 15, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
I think it is vitally important to back Charlie Rhyne
up with excellent staff people. He is full of ideas -- he needs a top
executive assistant. Tom Evans is a good guy but we need to have
someone with great drive -- some ambition. We need another go-er
someone who is brief on the phone and gets things done.
He wants to get toing on doctors wives, doctors, lawyers
-- whole bunch -- he wants to open up an office with some fanfare, etc.
Be sure we appoint an assistant who will be in charge of
the volunteer women (get Pat Hitt to appoint an assistant).
Get Pat and Charlie together and maybe they will really
get something going.
File
wed 7/31
From: Price
To:
RN
Subj: LBJ - Paris
1. Alan Greenspan has learned that several Secret Servicemen have
taken off for Paris; the supposition is that LBJ is keeping his op-
tions open for a personal appearance. Also, LBJ apparently made a
press conference remark today which at least carried the threat that
an invasion of the North isn't ruled out, if they bring off their
bhreatened new offensive in the South.
Fl
July 24, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mitchell, Ellsworth, Haldeman et al
FROM:
DC
It is obvious that we will have to contend with Rockefeller's
use of his Crosley and other polls that he will select. I think it is important
that on an urgent basis we have our most skillful PR types develop a paper on
polls which we can use to counteract this.
I have seen the materials that have been prepared by the news
bureau and which I assume were distributed at the Governors' Conference and
other places. They are, frankly, pretty sad because they emphasize quantity
and lose impact completely. What is needed is to analyze those polls which
really show RN doing well For example, the fact that we do better than Rockefeller
does in Illinois and Ohio. The fact that we carry New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
etc. The fact that we do better than Rockefeller does in Florida and South
Carolina. The fact that we do better than Rockefeller does in lowa.
All of this must be prepared in a relatively brief summary and
then attach the polls to back it up. This is an area where I think we have
done a very poor job up to this point due to the fact that we are simply relying
on collecting a great mass of polls without analyzing them and making an argument
which is effective.
This material should be collected and analyzed now and then written
up in a way that it can be delivered to each delegate when he arrives in Miami.
It must not be simply put in the NOMINATOR. This should be prepared as a
counter action to the whole Rockefeller deal.
TO HALDEMAN - A reminder
who 7/24/68
In view of Hubert's attack on RN as a racist I again emphasize
that somewhere in this operation of ours we need a complete library of Hubert's
most vulnerable quotes which have been recorded on radio or on TV. As I pointed
out before, I doubt if the National Committee has anything worthwhile in this
respect and it is urgent that we go beyond the mis miniscule operation that Agnes
has initiated in this field. She simply hasn't the staff or background to do
this job alone.
Another reminder to Haldeman
W
I think it is important that the family schedule be carefully examined in terms
of what we can do to zero them in in the marginal states rather than to have
them *sis disipated in states that do not have the same importance. I realize
that some of the pressure can be taken off of me by sending them to states I will
not be able to visit but let us also remember that they can be extremely effective
in the major states as well and that that should be the first priority.
Further reminder to Haldeman
It is vitally important that the whole speakers operation be
upgraded. Again I suggest that this be put in charge of a sophisticated Congressman
ke
or Senator. Perhaps Herb Klein should work with them - possibly Brock would be
a good man to do this. Charlie McWhorter has some good paix ideas on this point
and, of course, the whole operation has to be blended with the Surrogate Candidate
deal.
Caty
Whole
July 15, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
file
FROM:
DC
I have been discussing - and I think we need a
new in=put -- situation with regard to monitoring TV broadcasts both
nationally and locally. I feel that that should not be under Frank
Shakespeare. It is not really fair to Frank to put him into the situation
see
where he has to be policing his own industry. For instance yesterday
whalen
Whalen and others brought up the way Kiker and a few others have been
kicking us - Cleveland coverage was very bad. I guess they criticized
how we got the crowd and everything else and no one has done anything
about it.
I want Herb to develop a plan and I want you to have
it for me later this afternoon. This should be part of the Klein operation.
Just set up the whole procedure whereby this is done. We should do it for
national broadcasts and set up something in each area for the local ones.
Herb should draw up a plan and have it ready today. No one likes to take
these people on. I want you to check it out and give me a battle plan and
get someone on this whole area of the counter-attack.
Also ask Herb what he has found out about the Surf
Club press party which the Rockefeller people are giving on Saturday --
Walter Annenberg had his invitation. I think we should get one of the
invitations and see what the score is. We know this is a club where they
practice discrimination.
file
July 13, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO:
John Mitchell/ Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
I have been giving a great deal of thought in the
last few days, as I know you have, to the Citizens operation. I have
reached the reluctant conclusion that we have to move now on it or be
saddled with an organization that might make the difference between
winning or losing in a few key states.
It probably is necessary to have Evans returned
to the firm - although I would like to avoid such drastic action. We
may have to ask Charlie Rhyne to gracefully step aside. Now - in
suggesting that I am ready to consider such drastic action, I am only
emphasizing how urgent I think it is.
What concerns me is that after your talk to Huston,
Rhyne reacted in a completely negative way which means that Evans is
in complete control of the organization and that means we could be
saddled with an organization from now until November over which we
have no control.
Looking at what has happened to date -- every
positive move that has been made has been made inspite of instead
of because of what the Citizens have suggested. Cubans for Nixon
is now off and running but with no assistance of significance from the
Citizens group. Had we waited for the Citizens to act we would not
have ;had a group. The doctors group is on its way but Dr. Annis and
Dr. DeLuccia are terribly distressed by the type of people they have
had to work with in Washington -- their complete incompetence - the
usual political hacks. That is why I gave them the go-ahead to run
it their own way. The sports committee which Cy Laughter is working
on is now on its way but through no credit at all to the Citizens group.
Cy, in his very well-intentioned but bumbling way, has made some
yardage but every bit of it has been ground out without any assistance
- and many times over the objections - of the same little pipsqueaks
who are trying to run the Citizens.
I use those areas only as examples because I know
this can be duplicated in many fields, including particularly the women's
organization.
2 -
The problem basically is that Charlie Rhyne is a
superb front man but not a good organizer. Tom Evans is neither a
good front man nor a good organizer but he is in charge of organization
and he is obsessed by the usual phobia which infiltrates so many people
who get into politics for the first time -- building a staff. We are simply
submerged with deputies, executive directors, executive secretaries,
administrative assistants, field men, etc, - with very little being accomplished.
I am writing this memo of course in confidence and
quite directly because it is based on a number of reports that I have had
and I am convinced that drastic action is necessary if we are going to
salvage the situation. With regard to Charlie Rhyne, despite the fact
that he is an old law school friend and was active in 1960, if you conclude
he should go - just work it out with fine sse. With regard to Evans we have
to face the fact that he loves politics but he loves position more. He is not
in this because he wants to do something but because he wants to be somebody.
I have suggested - without success - that Chotiner
could come back and analyze the whole operation and give some recommenda-
tions. Short of that kind of action, I urged the meeting with Huston. Now
that that has fallen on its face, what I fear is that we will simply drag
along with the same organization building a little empire with plenty of
"kings" and no "subjects."
I can't really express in words how strongly I feel on
this matter. I do think it is of the highest priority to put somebody in charge
of Citizens to set it straight. The only name that occurs to me at the moment
that might fill this gap is Ehrlichman. Perhaps this is the best niche for
him in view of his highly intelligent abilities for toughness and his no-nonsense
approach.
I think your main problem is going to be Evans but
the time to face up to that is now rather than after the convention. By
facing up to him we can shift him aside. I think the approach here is that
Garment is away from the firm and that Tom is needed there. That might
not be the way but some move is called for far beyond anything we have
thought of up to date.
######
Bile
7/12/68
Haldeman/ Whitaker/ Chapin
from DC
One lesson that came out of the Illinois thing -- it was handled
rather badly they had so many PR people around. These people had flown
in from all over and they shoved them through - there was quite a bit of
resentment.
1. Skip the pictures -- don't bother with them. They want to say hello
and be treated like human beings.
(To herd them in and take a pictures and not have time to
say anything to them is TERRIBLE)
From now on - NO PICTURES -- or if there are pictures do not have them
pushed around.
CONFIDENTIAL
July 9, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Len Garment
FROM:
DC
With regard to Ailes, I believe we should try
to get him as a producer if that is possible. If it is not possible,
I think it is vitally important for us to get some other top producer
immediately. As you know, I have felt for a long time that this
was the weakest role in our television production. We have gotten
by with catch-as-catch-can in this area for some time but a full
time first-rate producer is urgently needed and 1 want you to go on
this immediately.
I would like for you to make copies of Ailes' memo
and to submit it to Price, Buchanan, Whalen, Shakespeare and Trelevan.
Apart from his recommendation with regard to mixing up the length
of answers, which is a good suggestion, he puts his finger on what I
have felt for a long time is a general weakness in both our television
a nd speeches. It is what I was trying to get at when I have compared
the telethon "hard sell" with the more relaxed pace of Hillsboro and
our documentary efforts.
What we need are some "one-liners" some "kickers"
some "memorable lines." Perhaps the man who is most adept at this
is Safire or - no, he tends to come up with lines that sound "tinny
and gimmicky" but the difficulty is that the rest of our crew do not seem
to have a particular ability in thi field. We are long on responsibility
we are sometimes eloquent but we seldom come in with the good hard
quote which audiences are going to remember.
I recognize that one of our problems here is that
we cannot take the simple approach which a one-liner almost assumes.
That is why a Reagan or a Wallace can come up with better lines than
we do. On the other hand, I think that our speech writers, our excerpt
writers, and everyone concerned, should put their minds to this
problem and see what we can do to sharpen up our whole effort.
I still get back to my fundamental proposition that
a hard sell on the issues in which people are most interested is more
effective than the responsible analysis which I usually give in my
responses to questions and which is always the earmark of our speeches.
- 2 -
What it comes down to is that intelligent people
appreciate our style. For the great mass of voters it goes right
over their heads. And, unlike Adlai Stevenson, we too seldom
come up with a line which will hit them in the eye even when most
of what we say is going right over their heads. This is a matter
that I would like to discuss on Sunday with those who are included
in this memorandum and with Frank Shakespeare if you can all come
to Montauk Point. Speak to Chapin about making the arrangements.
On another subject, I think we should go forward
on another hour to an hour and a half of the personal documentary --
try to schedule it on Friday afternoon. Chapin will set up the time.
July 8, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Pat Buchanan
FROM:
DC
The next time the research group meets,
let's try to develop some line with regard to the government
workers which will be appealing to them.
They are a decisive block in Maryland and
Virginia and, of course, there are more government workers in
California than there are in Washington, D. C.
Our anti-big-government line may scare these
people and I think we need a good program for them to counter-
balance this, Here is a place where the Critical Issues Group
might give us some assistance.
file
July 8, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Pat Buchanan
FROM:
DC
Would you give an assignment to Huston and
Gavin to prepare for RN the fifty best quotes from Woodrow Wilson
and from Churchill - having in mind the fact that I am interested
only in quotes that might be relevant today. Let each of them
work independently on this project.
Also on that same subject, Jim Howard makes
the point that we need to use more parables in our speeches. I have
often raised this same question myself. Would you ask Gavin, Huston
and Hume to come up with any further suggestions. Also, if there
are any others on the staff who have any flair in this direction - get
them to work on it too.
It is not helpful for me to receive a mass of material
in this respect (I can buy books of quotations). I want each individual
to put himself in my place and try to come up with parables and/or
quotes that can be used in some of my speeches today.
File.
July 2, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
HALDEMAN
FROM:
DC
fold Evons complete says her a ball.
RE:
SENATOR MUNDT
BBdoen't Dar
1) His first item was with regard to a Bill Wolfson,
who claims to be a friend of Bebe Rebozo's but is primarily
a leading New York Jewish figure. Wolfson believes that I
katall
should spend an evening with him at his apartment with a
half dozen of his very prominent Jewish friends and that
call Pre
this will help us greatly in the Jewish community. My
reaction is basically negative.
I would suggest you give Rebozo a call I have
some recollection that this character Wolfson is no good.
also IDE
2) He asked also about Anna Chennault's suggestion
More
that either I or a member of my staff talk to General Khiem
allow
about Vietnam etc. This might be worth following up and
I would suggest that Allen be the man to do the talking.
Be sure that Anna Chennault is informed that we did follow
w/
Hu
up.
3) Item three was with regard to Ken Stofflmen of
the National Farmers Organization. This is the rather
radical group which up to this time has looked with favor
on Kennedy, which Mundt says could possibly be oriented
toward RN if we indicate some concern about Farm imports.
With further relation to this subject, Mundt
pushed again for us to get Steve Nelson, who is Tom Kleppe's
aide, as our permanent Farm man on our staff. As I recall
Nelson, I don't remember that he was too bright but he was
loyal and knew the people in the farm community.
For your guidance, you don't want to spend an
inordinate amount of time on the Farm subject because we
can make more hay with that time in other directions. What
we need, however, is perhaps somebody on our staff like
a Steve Nelson who can hold the hands of people like Stofflmen,
and also for that matter, talk with Mundt and others in the
Senate who simply want to bend my year. Kleppe is our
friend; you can check with him to see whether this Nelson
thing should be pursued. And Bryce Harlow particularly
should be checked because he may have a veto on it; he
should have the final word.
McCinness
Eddie McGuiness apparently has a long song and
dance about how Wilkie blitzed the 1940 Convention. He
complained to Mundt that he had talked with Tom Evans and
Evans was "too young" to remember the 1940 Convention and
at
he didn't understand what happened. I learned knak the
MSinnis
party for Finch and Don Hughes that Eddie McGuaness had
also talked with Charlie McWhorter for an hour and Charlie
said that his information is irrelevant to our situation
- 3 -
today. I believe Charlie is right. On the other hand,
Hillings
I would suggest that when Hillings comes aboard, that he
McGinnis
also massage Eddie McGuinness a bit, since he is a long
time friend from the past, and does have some stroke with
certain Veterans Organizations.
With further reference to Veterans, this I
emphasize again is an area where we should really go gun-ho,
Citizen
in view of Hubert's weakness in this field. I should like
to do so without having to address the two Veterans con-
a
ventions, although I realize this is probably very difficult
one to avoid.
# # #
File.
EARL/HERB
RN thinks we should use the Wicker quote -- Ptold him Earl had mentioned
this at dinner the other evening.
R.
File.
Confirpole- add 8 is
impress noteven Derge get results
very carefully kept
if Weige has to -OK
in each state
straight race N-H
N-N-W
also R-HW
Derge- in Beckely -
40 Eugan Health - 415-654-3985
at Clarement 843.3000
hi here mon. AM. -flying late Seen.
worf. call Sat AM to set eys 8.
mon AM finalg.
be sure Derge knows this is comfidential
Rich RN:rmw 7/4/68
Call Dage
Haldeman -- "We are taking a very confidential poll on the VP. Derge -- Now
the purpose of this note is (1) To add a question that I want asked in this poll
and (2) to impress upon him thexx because of the time fantowemx factor we are
not doing these through Bachelder -- the results of this poll --
I do not want Derge, Haldeman or Mitchell to see them -- I want them to
come directly to me. If Derge sees them he is to be told they are to come to
me ONLY -- I will tell Haldeman and Mitchell -- I do not want anyone else
to tell them or anyone.
In each of these states run just a straight race -- Nixon VS Humphrey (no VP)
- each state a race Nixon/ Humphrey/Wallace and I also want them to run.
Rockefeller/ Humphrey/ Wallace in each state.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356 Section 1.1
By RJP NARS, Date 4/6/87
July 2, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
HALDEMAN
FROM:
DC
In this memorandum I will list several items
to be discussed with the PR Group and with the Research
Speech Group.
The Gallup Poll dates, as to when they are
in the field, coincide pretty well with our schedule as
far as the first two polls are concerned, since we will
either have television in the major states in that period
or will have had it immediately before. The blank spot
in our program, of course, if from July 28 to August 4.
Perhaps we need to have now some discussion of what kind
of re-runs or saturation TV and Newspaper advertising we
could have in the field during this period in the major
states. Would you have this considered and give me a
recommendation?
# # #
But Haldeman
file
July 24, 1968
Newport Beach, California
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Anderson, All Research Group, P.R. Group
FROM:
DC
RE:
Attached Suggestions from Anderson
1. This analysis is on target.
2. Research - follow up in areas RN indicates.
3. P.R. -- particularly note RN agrees with page 1 completely -
This is point he has been trying to make. It is time to
move away from fighting the old battle of image to the new
battle of where RN stands - only this way do we cut the
Wallace vote.
6/6/68
To:
RN
Fr:
Anderson
Here are some suggestions for future speeches or
statements.
To andersement all Personal group
os wellas P.R.
is This analysis is
on larget
X
Researds-
I
follow areas R.n. up in in dietes.
3
P.R. 1 particulary not
Rn with
This pagel is the joint
It is time to fighting more the
trying he timolie-
has been
away old the battle bottle image of
to where winstands R.N. do we out
only this without vote.
MCA
6/6/68
COMMUNICATION OF ISSUE
POSITIONS
RN has now developed a well-structured position on
issues that is clear, consistent and directly attuned to
the convictions of the great majority of the American
people -- including independents and democrats.
So far our major communications effort seems to have
been aimed at dispelling myths about RN's personality and
character The thrust of this action has been successful,
and the effect should be cumulative from now on.
However, relatively little has been done to communi-
cate positions on issues. Audience response -- at rallys,
dinners, shopping centers, etc. -- has been excellent in
regard to the points RN has been making to them directly
on issues such as the economy, crime, the role of govern-
ment, poverty programs, Vietnam, riots and SO on.
It seems that we should now turn our efforts toward
communicating these ideas through the mass media to the
great mass of people who do not yet have a comprehensive
view of where RN stands. It takes months to effectively
communicate an idea to the electorate, and if we don't
start now, it is unlikely that we will be able to transmit
a clear, coherent picture by November.
I suggest that we now take stock of all the points
made SO far, and condense and edit them into a brief, well-
structured package that will spell out:
(1) The basic theme of the campaign.
(2) The elements of that theme and how they relate
to and reinforce one another.
Then we should work with the communications people to
develop a program for communicating this package of ideas
to every person who is a potential Nixon voter.
# # # #
MCA
6/6/68
good
OCEANS: THE UNDERWATER FRONTIER
Draw analogy between the oceans and space. These are
the last two great unexplored areas of the world, and com-
pared with space, relatively little has been accomplished
in our vast oceans.
(1) The potential of the sea -- the untapped re-
sources of minerals, oils and food.
(2) The sophistication of the new ocean technology
available for use.
(3) The importance of the oceans for national se-
curity.
With regard to the exploration of the sea, we are now
at the same point we were at in the early 1950's (at the
start of the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration) with the ex-
ploration of space. What we need now is a national agency --
a National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) -- that can pro-
vide the kind of direction and coordination that was so vital
to the brilliant successes of our space effort in the 1950's.
Advantages
(1) Shows awareness of new technology, a forward-
looking position by a modern candidate. Brings
in the excitement of exploration.
(2) Adds diversity and depth to policy position.
Disadvantages
(1) It is relatively unimportant compared with the
major crises of today.
(2) In terms of priorities, we cannot afford to spend
very much money on any effort like this.
MCA
6/6/68
to
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER
ARMY it
name
RN's position on the all-volunteer army is a sound one.
However, at this time it is vulnerable because the reasons
for such a step and its advantages have not been fully ex-
plained. To those who do not understand how a volunteer
army would work, it may appear that such a move would under-
mine our national security.
We can forestall this reaction with a comprehensive
statement setting forth the main advantages of an all-
volunteer army -- increased national security, elimination
of the draft -- and answering the main objections before
they come up -- can't get enough men, lack of flexibility
in crises, threat of a military takeover, etc.
####
MCA
6/6/68
COMPUTERS AND MAN
The idea is to show that RN is:
(1) Thoroughly familiar with technological develop-
ments in this area, and is the up-to-date candidate that
can cope with the on-rushing technology of the last third
of the 20th Century.
(2) Allay peoples' fear of computers. Used by an
Administration that understands and appreciates their
capabilities, they can benefit man, that they can make life
easier for him instead of more difficult, that they can ex-
pand his freedom, not limit it.
# # # #
till of
required
MCA 6/6/68
THE EXTREMIST LEFT
Demonstrate the dangers of the "new left" by tracing
out their history, their views and their actions. While
still very small this "incipient 'totalitarianism" must
not be allowed to spread. Use examples of what has happened
with similar movements around the world, and draw analogies
between developments abroad and at home.
Call on democratic candidates to repudiate the "extremists
of the far left" such as the SDS.
teled
####
(80
MCA 6/6/68
THE NEW ROAD
A short statement of principle, discussing the philo-
sophy and principles of RN's approach to government. Not
people, or parties, but the ideas that the "New Alignment"
is based on. Discuss the nature of individual freedom and
responsibility.
Develop the theme that the new road is that approach
to government that recognizes that the purpose of government
is to protect the rights of individual people -- their lives,
their property, their chance for the opportunity to make some-
thing of themselves. This road is the only road in history
that has made it possible for people to have -- at the same
time -- security, freedom and prosperity.
Emphasize the morality of this new road, particularly
in regard to the initiation of violence. Show that the
approach is characterized by an idealistic morality that
transcends party, race and creed.
####
May 15, 1968
Portland, Oregon
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
DC
Let's get a completely frank analysis of
our organization and shake it up.
I think there is some outright disloyalty -
some just passive acceptance - and others who are just
incompetent. I feel we need to shake it up -- firing a few
people might do just that !