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This file contains:
Buchanan to RN regarding Where RN stands on Vietnam. 1 pg. [Memo], n.d.
Buchanan to Haldeman regarding supporting Texas house of representatives. 2pgs. [Memo], n.d.
Proposed General Eisenhower statement regarding the politics of a halt in Vietnam bombing campaign. 1pg [Letter], n. d.
Memo from Harlow to DC regarding his dictation of Eisenhower statement and DDE's disapproval of bombing politics. 1pg. [Memo], n. d.
Report from Herb Klein regarding candidate RN's position of a bombing halt if assurance is given that no American lives will be lost as a result. 2pgs. [Report], n. d.
Memo from Glenn Olds to RN regarding "An enlarged concept of the 'White House Fellows". 2pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: "The need for 'reorganization' of the maze in Washington, and a useful 'illustration' for speech on the 'DC Rats.'" 1pg. [Memo], 9/16/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: "'Leadership' or 'manpower' gap in Federal programs, as key campaign issue to emphasize. 2pgs [Memo], 9/16/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: Qualification of the Nathan proposal to Kendall re: "Domestic 'National Defense Bond" issue for rebuilding the Ghettos. 1pg [Memo], 9/16/1968
Letter to Dr. Perkins (sender unk.) regarding "breakdown of communication" within staff leading to perceived deterioration of support. 1pg [Letter], 9/19/1968
Memo from DC to Herb Klein (cc: Haldeman) regarding following up with the press. 1pg [Memo], 9/22/1968
Memo from DC to Haldeman, Harlow, and Chotiner regarding NY Times article concerning Humphrey's references to Benson. 3pgs [Memo], 9/23/1968
Memo from DC to Chotiner, Ellsworth, Haldeman regarding (attached) McCormack memo concerning politicization of war in Vietnam. 2pgs (w/ 8 attached pgs) [Memo], 9/23/1968
Chicago Tribune article regarding Agnew's reply to the attack on his use of the word (fat) "Jap." 1pg [Newsletter], 9/24/1968
Memo from RN to Keogh, Price, Buchanan, Safire, Harlow, Gavin, Anderson, Moore expressing general thoughts regarding coming weeks in campaign. 5pgs [Memo], 9/24/1968
Memo from DC to Haldeman regarding Billy Graham's attendance at a meeting in Atlanta. 1pg [Memo], 9/30/1968
Memo from Jim Keogh to DC regarding situation in Atlanta in which a mother received unsolicited pornography through the mail and would use this as a point in a Q and A on law and order. 2 pgs [Memo], 10/2/1968
Draft report for PJB/BH/JK (Poff has okayed) regarding a "Statement for Atalanta." 2pgs [Report], 10/2/1968
Memo from Glenn Olds to R.N. RE: The role of the vice president.. 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
Memo from Glenn Olds to R.N. RE: The role of the vice president.. 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
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26126929
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WHSF: Returned, 35-13
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document
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1
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id
26126929
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contentType
document
title
WHSF: Returned, 35-13
description
This file contains:
Buchanan to RN regarding Where RN stands on Vietnam. 1 pg. [Memo], n.d.
Buchanan to Haldeman regarding supporting Texas house of representatives. 2pgs. [Memo], n.d.
Proposed General Eisenhower statement regarding the politics of a halt in Vietnam bombing campaign. 1pg [Letter], n. d.
Memo from Harlow to DC regarding his dictation of Eisenhower statement and DDE's disapproval of bombing politics. 1pg. [Memo], n. d.
Report from Herb Klein regarding candidate RN's position of a bombing halt if assurance is given that no American lives will be lost as a result. 2pgs. [Report], n. d.
Memo from Glenn Olds to RN regarding "An enlarged concept of the 'White House Fellows". 2pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: "The need for 'reorganization' of the maze in Washington, and a useful 'illustration' for speech on the 'DC Rats.'" 1pg. [Memo], 9/16/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: "'Leadership' or 'manpower' gap in Federal programs, as key campaign issue to emphasize. 2pgs [Memo], 9/16/1968
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: Qualification of the Nathan proposal to Kendall re: "Domestic 'National Defense Bond" issue for rebuilding the Ghettos. 1pg [Memo], 9/16/1968
Letter to Dr. Perkins (sender unk.) regarding "breakdown of communication" within staff leading to perceived deterioration of support. 1pg [Letter], 9/19/1968
Memo from DC to Herb Klein (cc: Haldeman) regarding following up with the press. 1pg [Memo], 9/22/1968
Memo from DC to Haldeman, Harlow, and Chotiner regarding NY Times article concerning Humphrey's references to Benson. 3pgs [Memo], 9/23/1968
Memo from DC to Chotiner, Ellsworth, Haldeman regarding (attached) McCormack memo concerning politicization of war in Vietnam. 2pgs (w/ 8 attached pgs) [Memo], 9/23/1968
Chicago Tribune article regarding Agnew's reply to the attack on his use of the word (fat) "Jap." 1pg [Newsletter], 9/24/1968
Memo from RN to Keogh, Price, Buchanan, Safire, Harlow, Gavin, Anderson, Moore expressing general thoughts regarding coming weeks in campaign. 5pgs [Memo], 9/24/1968
Memo from DC to Haldeman regarding Billy Graham's attendance at a meeting in Atlanta. 1pg [Memo], 9/30/1968
Memo from Jim Keogh to DC regarding situation in Atlanta in which a mother received unsolicited pornography through the mail and would use this as a point in a Q and A on law and order. 2 pgs [Memo], 10/2/1968
Draft report for PJB/BH/JK (Poff has okayed) regarding a "Statement for Atalanta." 2pgs [Report], 10/2/1968
Memo from Glenn Olds to R.N. RE: The role of the vice president.. 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
Memo from Glenn Olds to R.N. RE: The role of the vice president.. 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/18/1968
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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This archival description was reviewed and not revised as part of the NARA reparative description initiative on October 31, 2023. The word “Jap” used in the Scope and Content Note was determined to be part of a publication title. Original archival records have not been altered.
This archival description was reviewed and not revised as part of the NARA reparative description initiative on October 31, 2023. The word “Ghetto” used in the Scope and Content Note was determined to be part of a publication title. Original archival records have not been altered.
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
13
n.d.
Memo
Buchanan to RN regarding Where RN stands
on Vietnam. 1 pg.
35
13
n.d.
Memo
Buchanan to Haldeman regarding supporting
Texas house of representatives. 2pgs.
35
13
n.d.
Letter
Proposed General Eisenhower statement
regarding the politics of a halt in Vietnam
bombing campaign. 1pg
35
13
n. d.
Memo
Memo from Harlow to DC regarding his
dictation of Eisenhower statement and DDE's
disapproval of bombing politics. 1pg.
35
13
n. d.
Report
Report from Herb Klein regarding candidate
RN's position of a bombing halt if assurance
is given that no American lives will be lost as
a result. 2pgs.
35
13
09/18/1968
Memo
Memo from Glenn Olds to RN regarding "An
enlarged concept of the 'White House
Fellows". 2pgs.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Page 1 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
13
09/16/1968
Memo
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE: "The
need for 'reorganization' of the maze in
Washington, and a useful "illustration" for
speech on the 'DC Rats." 1pg.
35
13
09/16/1968
Memo
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE:
"Leadership' or 'manpower' gap in Federal
programs, as key campaign issue to
emphasize. 2pgs
35
13
09/16/1968
Memo
Memo from Glen Olds to RN. RE:
Qualification fo the Nathan proposal to
Kendall re: "Domestic 'National Defense
Bond" issue for rebuilding the Ghettos. 1pg
35
13
09/19/1968
Letter
Letter to Dr. Perkins (sender unk.) regarding
"breakdown of communication" within staff
leading to percieved deterioration of
support. 1pg
35
13
09/22/1968
Memo
Memo from DC to Herb Klein (cc:
Haldeman) regarding following up with the
press. 1pg
35
13
09/23/1968
Memo
Memo from DC to Haldeman, Harlow, and
Chotiner regarding NY Times article
concerning Humphrey's references to
Benson. 3pgs
35
13
09/23/1968
Memo
Memo from DC to Chotiner, Ellsworth,
Haldeman regarding (attached) McCormack
memo concerning politicization of war in
Vietnam. 2pgs (w/ 8 attached pgs)
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Page 2 of 3
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
13
09/24/1968
Newsletter
Chicago Tribune article regarding Agnew's
reply to the attack on his use of the word (fat)
"Jap." 1pg
35
13
09/24/1968
Memo
Memo from RN to Keogh, Price, Buchanan,
Safire, Harlow, Gavin, Anderson, Moore
expressing general thoughts regarding
coming weeks in campaign. 5pgs
35
13
09/30/1968
Memo
Memo from DC to Haldeman regarding Billy
Graham's attendance at a meeting in Atlanta.
1pg
35
13
10/02/1968
Memo
Memo from Jim Keogh to DC regarding
situation in Atlanta in which a mother
received unsolicited pornography through the
mail and would use this as a point in a Q and
A on law and order. 2 pgs
35
13
10/02/1968
Report
Draft report for PJB/BH/JK (Poff has
okayed) regarding a "Statement for
Atalanta." 2pgs
35
13
09/18/1968
Memo
Memo from Glenn Olds to R.N. RE: The role
of the vice president.. 2 pgs.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Page 3 of 3
6-10
MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan
not many
for
You might tell these Texans to demand of their Congressmen
before voting for them that they support the popular winner
in the House of Representatives if the thing should go there.
Make them take a stand etc.
I wonder if this si is something we could do nationally.
Get every Republican Congressional Candidate to make that pledge
and then demand thatit be made of Democrats as well.
good ing AAA date lent late I'm a BUCHANAN injust
MEMO TORNX Haldeman
From Buchanan
Two points.
One - RN says it is too late for this but is it
really. According to his scaatched out note he was ready
to try it. We might jast implement it with a series of
telegrams to every Congressional Candidate.
Two - Thimmesch has a bit of a problem. He is theRN
expert. Has written some excellent stuff. Wants to do a piece
on Nixon and Kennedy the last ME two men of the War Generation.
(That is JFK) and Nixon being the last etc. He says he will be
the Nixon Columnist if RN gets into White House. To make along
story short he wants fiveminutes with RN
Buchanan
MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan
To reiterate briefly one point on Vietnam. I don't believe
most people in this country really know precisely where either
RN or HHH stands. They get impressions of the positios of both
but I am sure they could only give the vaguest outlines of those
positions.
But Humphrey has begun to give. theimpression in recent months
and weeks especially, as a man who doesn't know where he stands.
RN ought--without restating his own position I think point up
its consistency--- and indict HHH constantly on waffling on the
central issue of our time.
"If you don't like Mr. Humphrey's position on Vietnam, just wwait
till his next press conference." You might also if you are
asked about HHH saying that your position is escalation etc
answer:
"Listen, Mr. Humphrey hasn't even been able to get his own
position on Vietnam down right-to his satisfaction- you can hardly
expect him to report mine accurately.' Essentially, my position
now is what it has been for the last etc. etc.
"Mr. Humphrey on the other has an advantage in that he has
been able to take both sides of every issue involving the war
etc.etc. etc.
BUCHANAN
PROPOSED GENERAL EISENHOWER STATEMENT
I have consistently refrained from public criticism
of our national leaders in foreign and national security
affairs, even though severely provoked on not a few occasions
since January 1961.
But I cannot withhold an expression of my concern
over recent developments of great importance to our
country's military operations in Vietnam, the Paris
talks and domestic politics.
The sudden announcement of still another --
the birth -- bombing halt at a critical point in the
Presidential campaign -- theevident hastiness of decision
revealed by the indignant reaction of President Thieu --
the apparent lack of trustworthy guarantees of reciprocal
restraint by the men of Hanoi -- the resultant impairment
ofjour military effort and the acute embarrassment our
country has suffered for its demonstrated failure to obtain
the cooperation even of its wartime ally -- all together
constitute a misfortune for our country.
I deeply deplore both the timing and the consequences
of this action and I must urge my countrymen to voice
their discontent as I now have.
MEMO FOR
DC
FROM
HARLOW
I have dictated the enclosed proposed Eisenhower statement
to Bob Schulz. He will try to get medical permission to
take this up with DDE at approximately 7 o'clock this
evening.
The General is extremely upset over these recent develop-
ments -- has read a Philadelphia Inquirer editorial which
clobbers LBJ -- and he has been stewing around wishing
he could "do something."
General Heaton is likewise browned off.
Bob is working wholeheartedly with us on this and will try
to maneuver it to make it most likely for the General to
approve.
Schulz will telephone me at Los Angeles to tell me what the
decision is.
Both Dirksen and Ford have approved this idea, and Ford
was very pleased with the proposed statement.
I have asked Ford to check again with Westmoreland.
Westy
is at the Army-Penn. football game, so cannot be reached
until this evening. I have arranged with Ford to call him
at 10:45 his time to get a report.
THIS IS BASIC t BEING
LINE FOR SURROGATES STRENGTHENGH AND OTHERS FROM HERB KLEIN
Stress RN position which has consistently
supported a strong policy which would lead to
peace. RN has been the candidate who has taken
a positive position in support of American efforts.
His position is that he supports a bombing halt
if assurance is given that no American lives will
be lost as a result. Heavily support RN statesman-
ship.
MENT
Question timing, announce Nov. 1st with first
meeting Nov. 6th, day after election. Why was
the President evasive and what cera not possibe carbe?
What quid'pro quo won. Unilateral action with
no concessions which will assure peace, unless there
were North Vietnamese concessions made secretly. What'
were they?
Stress hope that bombing halt will bring peace,
but point out that it does not mean peace.
Cite fact that there have been nine previous
bombing halts.
Point out that minutes before President spoke,
Viet Cong rockets hit Roman Catholic Church and killed
19 persons.
SHOOT ING WILL NOT
HALT,
-2-
Point out that whatever result must be credited
to the President, not HHH who studiously sought to
disassociate himself.
Point out that there is little or no likelihood that
this move will influence presidential election. Nixon
will win. and he is best prepared to go beyond bombing
halt and win peace. Be confident!
-30-
MEMORANDUM
To:
R.N.
Date: September 18, 1968
From:
Glenn Olds
Subj:
The Role of the Vice President
Bob suggested I forward Fred LaRue's memo on the role of the vice
president.
Apart from the term "Executive", which I believe should be reserved
for the president, I believe this suggestion makes very good sense.
Some of the timing is now lost, but it is not too late to implement
important recommendations.
cc: Messrs. Mitchell
Haldeman
Garment
MEMORANDUM: AN EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE UNITED STATES
An innovative role for Spiro T. Agnew in the National
campaign and the new Republican administration
Rationale
The American electorate accepts the fact that the Presidency is too big a
job for any one man. The President is expected to provide the "thrust" of
national purpose, definition of broad goals, and inspirational leadership,
and to make the final decisions on major matters. But Americans, through ex-
perience with military service, corporate and institutional employment, and
virtually all group activities, are accustomed to the delegation of respons-
ibility and authority. And there is precedent for Presidential delegation of
specific responsibilities to the Vice President.
Proposal
Emphasizing (as in other policy statements) the importance of strengthen-
ing the role of state governments in America and (in that frame of reference)
the importance of Mr. Agnew's background as a state governor, announce at
once--pre-empting similar Democratic Party interest before it can be pro-
jected--the following
(1) As President, Mr. Nixon would delegate to his Vice President a clearly-
defined, coherent set of major responsibilities, establishing a new,
higher and better utilization (and training) of the man elected Vice
President, and achieving vastly improved management by the Executive
Branch of the domestic functions of the national government.
(a) State that, as Vice President, Mr. Agnew will chair a subcommittee
of the Cabinet consisting of the Secretaries of Departments whose
major functions are domestic or internal (exclude State, Defense).
(b) State that the Vice President will function as the coordinator of
all Federal domestic programs and activities, personally providing
their "interface" with state governments (plus multi-state regional
groupings and other subdivisions of government).
(c) State that he will establish personal contact with each of the 50
state governors, providing them a direct line of communication and
offering them participation in the process of determining what is
to be the federal-state relationship in any given program, project
or activity under consideration by the national government.
(d) State that, as the now-lacking management system is established
under Mr. Agnew's direction for improved coordination, decision-
making and evaluation at the national level, the refined mechan-
isms and techniques, along with technical assistance in their ap-
plication, and training programs for state employees, will be made
available to the state governments as a federal grant.
(2) With this new role and program as the theme of the Vice Presidential can-
didate's participation in the campaign, schedule Mr. Agnew into every
state Capital City for the announced purpose of discussing with each
present governor (without regard to party) the potential for improving
the federal-state relationship and the management performance of both
levels of government.
(3) Establish publically a special task force headed by candidate Agnew
which will evaluate and expose during the campaign the gross duplica-
tions, conflicts and waste demonstrable in the Executive Branch agencies
now dealing with the states across a broad spectrum of federal programs.
Include as many state governors as are willing to participate in the
task force, plus diverse "intellectuals" from academic and corporate
"think tanks", and representatives of private sector management. At the
outset of the new administration, under the Aegis of the President, this
Agnew task force, already publicized during the campaign, could follow
through to detail and implement a modern management system capable of
achieving vastly improved efficiency in the utilization of federal re-
sources, participation of state government through the inputs and play-
backs from the governors, and leadership of the state governments toward
better management of their own internal affairs--both by example and by
providing unencumbered assistance.
MEMORANDUM
September 18, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glean Olds
SUBJECT: An enlarged concept of the "White House Fellows"
Bob has communicated your interest in an enlarged role for bright competent young
interns or fellows of the White House. Because of its importance to the campaign,
relating as it does to quickening the interest of youth, the academic and corporate
community, and interest in competence in government generally, I offer one major
enlargement of the concept you could play up substantially in the campaign.
Announce that you intend to enlarge and rotate White House Interns or Fellows with
Junior Ambassaders of the President to each of the 50 states; six months in Washington
and then six months in the State Capital and then into service in either.
It would have the immediate following effects.
(1) Reinforce your emphasis on returning the power and influence of government
to State and local sources;
(2) Underscore the importance you give to young leaders;
(3) Accent the two way communication between the White House and State Houses;
(4) Provide a vehicle, related to, but outside the direct power structure for
communication of the general feeling of the people, fresh suggestions, almost a
Junior ombundemanship;
(5) Neutralise the fears of State Governers, Congressmes, and Senators, that
all White House appointments, interns and leadership training "stays in Washington",
by reversing the flow in a total cycle - federal - state - either!
(6) Provide a vehicle of youth and enthusiasm for continuing the positive values
of the "listen in - speak out" activities that have proved valuable in the campaign,
through your "Junior Ambassadors."
RN
-2-
September 18, 1968
(7) Symbolise the importance of a "generalist" approach to government service,
to develop the reserveir of younger top talent for subsequent major positions.
(8) Utilize local and state mechanisms for recruiting, screening, and
recommending, after the fashion of service academy appointments to avoid the
"intellectual elite" approach of so many fellowship programs.
MEMORANDUM
September 16, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
RE:
The need for "reorganisation" of the maze in Washington, and a
useful "illustration" for your speech purposes on the'DC Rats
"The New Washington Government- Health Needs and Goals"
was the subject of Thomas W. Fletcher, Deputy Mayor-
Commissioner. Fletcher said all of the District's problems
are related. "You can't separate one from the other." He
suggested better coordination between departmentssand
agencies within the District Government. He added that
"fragmentation and proliferation of government responsibility
made problem solving very difficult." He described the
District's approach to RAT EXTERMINATION.
"FOUR AGENCIES DEAL WITH THE RAT PROBLEM,
FLETCHER EXPLAINED. THE DOWNTOWN RATS IN
BUSINESS AREAS ARE HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC HEALTH. THE RESIDENTIAL RATS ARE
HANDLED BY THE CODE ENFORCEMENT PEOPLE.
THE PARK RATS ARE HANDLED BY THE PARKS DEPART-
MENT, AND THE ORDINARY RATS ARE HANDLED BY PRIDE,
INC. AND YOU KNOW THE RATS ARE HAVING A BALL THEY
JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND THE JURISDICTION.
"
MEMORANDUM
September 16, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:q Glenn Olds
RE:
"Leadership" or "Manpower" gap in Federal programs, as key
campaign issue to emphasize
Your political philosophy and major radio and campaign addresses all emphasize
the primacy of persons in government. They indicate that money, bureaucracy,
and programs cannot generate the right human resources and motivation to solve
the problems for which they are designed. The "bankruphy" of current Federal
programs in NEW, HUD, OEO and other domestic areas to say nothing of foreign
affairs turns, in no small measure, on failure to give adequate attention to
personnel competent to give leadership which money, structure and formal
programs cannot provide.
You could greatly strengthen your appeal to the youth, teachers, intellectual, and
executive groups by focusing on this missing link in federal programming. Without
basic attention to this problem, the best conceived programs will fail. You can
emphasize that you intend:
1. To recruit competent young "leaders" for every level of govern-
mental responsibility;
2. To refuse to authorize money or program for which there is not
evident and adequate leadership competent to spend it wisely and well; (many of
the poverty programs failed becuase of this 1)
3. To develop new opportunities for developing leadership in both the
private and public side of national life through
(a) Designing a new and expanded form of the White House Fellow or
Intern Program;
(b) Rethinking a comprehensive form of National Elective Service
in a wide variety of fields;
(c) (c) Reorganizing the research and training provisions of the various
Federal programs to provide more and better opportunity for leadership
development;
RN
-2-
September 16, 1968
(d) Developing a Junior Ambassador program to and from the
States as well as overseas;
4. To strengthen local and private initiative in leadership development
and programming refusing to introduce massive, expensives, and duplicative
Federal programs without proper coordination and assessment of available
competent leadership.
MEMORANDUM
September 16, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olde
RE:
Qualification of the Nathan proposal to Kendall re: Domestic
"National Defense Bond" issue for rebuilding the Ghettes.
In conversation with Don Kendall this week I discover that he did not intend I
should convey recommending action now on this proposal.
He thinks it is a sound idea, should be explored responsibly, and if the idea
standseup before the critics, move toward implementation after the election.
I had mistakenly urged in my memorandum of September third action now!
September 19, 1968
Dear Dr. Perkins:
I regret the unhappy breakdown of communication with-
in our staff that has complicated the assignment and
responsibility Glenn laid out with you and which en-
joyed my enthusiastic support. The willingness of
you, and your chairman and Board to encourage your
personal leadership of this effort, was most gratify-
ing to me.
You will understand, I trust, that in every national
political campaign the pace and complexity makes poss-
ible separate initiatives that are not always in close
communication. I regret the duplication of effort that
has accrued but understand your desire under the cir-
cumstances not to assume the full responsibility we had
counted on you to carry.
Please know, however, how much I hope for your con-
tinued interest in the campaign and help in whatever
appropriate ways you may still feel inclined. Glenn
has told me of the personal sacrifice you were willing
to make to help.
Sincerely yours,
Dr. John Perkins
President
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.
99 Broad Street
New York, New York
Ke
bill
yes
is
September 22, 1968
ane
MEMORANDUM
TO:
HERB KLEIN cc: Haldeman
FROM: DC
I assume that letters are going out on a regular basis
to the newspapers that may endorse us and to columnists and
I
commentators who write or say good things about us.
I will not have the time to look these over myself, but it should
be standard operating procedure for us to follow up in this way,
particularly if a good editorial or column is written to a state,
a follow-up letter could be very helpful in getting some extra mileage
out of the visit.
#######
file
/ you
September 23, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Haldeman, Harlow, Chotiner
FROM: DC
This story by Apple on Humphrey's references to
Benson should really be nailed with our Farm group. Let's
don't get in bed with Benson but they can point out that
Humphrey's talking about Benson compared with
Truman
is that the farmer jumped from the frying pan into the
fire with parity going down lower than at any time in
years, etc.
# # #
The New York Times -- Saturday, September 21, 1968
HOMEWREY EXTOLS THE VIRTUES OF RUSTIC LIFE
By R. W. Apple, Jr.
Buffalo, Illinois -- September 200 -- Hubert Humphrey
the country man has been at large in the Middle West for the
last 24 hours.
"I grew up out here and I am proud of it. I have
had a few people say that possibly this dulls your vision, but
I don't think SO. I think the clean fresh air of thePlains
gives us a better vision that the smog of otherplaces."
Then he had words of scorn for his city-bred Republican
opponent, Richard M. Nixon, taunting the former Vice President
for talking about "plowing a straight furrow with a corn picker. "
"Now that's a trick, that one, " Mr. Humphrey shouted.
"I tell you, we can put it in the state fair and get rich."
And finally the Vice President went after Ezra Taft
Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture under President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, sounding more and more like the man he described as
"that grand fellow from Independence, Mo., that great President,
grand American, Harry S. Truman. "
"Mark my words, dear friends," Mr. Humphrey cried,
clapping his hands together like a revivalist preacher, "if we
lose this election Ezra Taft Benson will look like a social
worker compared to what you'll get. "
cerral Franciscon About ??
Promo
W. Apppe's story -- page -2-
The Vice Presidentrecalled seeing Mr. Nixon walking
into joint sessions of Congress "arm-in-arm with that stalwart
defender of backward movements and rural poverty, Ezra Taft
Benson."
"If you think you're going to get any comfort out
of Nixon, Agnew and Benson, then you've been drinking something
that I haven't."
September 23, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
CHOTINER, ELLSWORTH, HALDEMAN et. al.
FROM:
DC
I suggest all of you read the memorandum from
McCormack. (attached) It seems to be right on target, par-
ticularly the section on Page 7 which I have turned the memor-
andum to. This should be brought home emphatically. This
fellow Komer in Vietnam is no good and is completely poli-
tically motivated. Predictions should be made immediately
that they are going to announce bringing home troops in the six
weeks before the election. Also, the people should be reminded
of the rosey predictions that were made by McNamara in 1966.
This has got to be carefully handled so that we put the monkey
on Humphrey's back and not on Johnson's back. I would handle
it in a way that it appeared that Humphrey was trying to get
the Administration to do this and that Johnson was resisting
it since he did not want to play politics with the war.
I think too, that we have been very ineffective in
failing to nail Humphrey for his vacillation on Vietnam. He
has supported Johnson's position and then said that he could
support the Dove position and then urged Nixon to join him in
no new
saying that txxx Administration would offer softer terms and then
- 2 -
made his statement with regard to the difference between the
Vice Presidential and Presidential seal. He has played politics
with the war and thereby has hurt the negotiations by his
repeated public statements that progress is being made in the
Paris talks -- statements that were later discredited by
Harriman as well as by the Hanoi negotiators. I think that it
should be charged that Humphrey's statements have had a definite
negative effect on the negotiations.
On the other side of this whole question is the report
that we received from Arthur Burns which is a ttached and in
which Maxwell Taylor says that there are signs that North Vietnam
may be willing to engage in substantive talks now that the
presidential candidates are chosen. I have not yet talked to
John McCone who should be on the phone list for today.
Along this line, I would like a message to get to
Agnew -- possibly through Sears -- urging that when he sees
Rusk, as RN asked him to do, that he press Rusk hard on the
rumors to the effect that North Vietnam may be willing to engage
in substantive talks. Agnew should directly tell Rusk that
Maxwell Taylor is spreading the word in private conversations
that talks will begin sometime before the election and that this
is all assigned for its political effect. Make Rusk either
deny or support this.
# # #
7
should similarly have their tours increased. Positive incentives
should accompany the mandatory tour extensions.
VIETNAM AND U.S. POLITICS
For all those who remember the McNamara press conference
at the LBJ ranch three days before the 1966 congressional elections,
at which a massive reduction in draft quotas was announced and
a rosy Vietnam picture presented to the then more gullible
American electorate, there can be no doubt that Humphrey will
attempt some similar coup.
Ambassador Komer's Deputy in 4th Corps, John Vann,
has publically reported that 100,000 troops could be now withdrawn
with no harm to the military effort. Presumably these would be
engineers, clerks, office club staffs, etc:, etc. Imagine the
impact of of pre-election LBJ fireside chat pointing out statistically
progress in various areas, and concluding by announcing that
because of the successful training of Vietnamese units, 100,000
of our boys will be home by Christmas, and more will follow. We
should prepare for this contingency.
Humphrey's own position on Vietnam has bounced during
the last week from one extreme to the other. He has supported
President Johnson's position, declared that he could have supported
the Dove Platform, retracted that statement, urged Nixon to join
him in saying that no new administration will offer "softer terms"
to Hanoi after January 20, etc., etc. Surely a statement blasting
this vacillation is in order.
Otherwise, I strongly counsel
speci
detailed recommendations on the war. A statement calling for
a reduction of troops and a de-Americanization of the war could
blow up in our faces if a TET #2 occurs. Let us continue with
our position that any specific comment on Vietnam's future could
jeopardize the negotiations in Paris; and that we won't trade
American lives for a few political points. If constrained to
speak at length on the subject later in the campaign, I urge
that we have Governor Agnew do it largely confining ourselves
to blasting the many, many errors the Administration has made
during the buildup, the surrepticious way the Administration
duped the public while the buildup was underway; the tactical
errore in Vietnam. We might also denounce Humphrey for hurting
negotiations by his repeated public statements that progress had
been made in the Paris talks (there are straws in the wind, etc.),
statements which were later discredited by Marrimon so-well C.G by
the Hanoi negotiatiors; and whiched WED informed by a high State
Department official had a definitely negative effect upon the
negotiations by leading the North Vietnamese to Believe that any
small concession or hint of concession by them would be immediately
used as political ammunition by the Administration.
#####
September 13; 1968
note
MEMORANDUM from Dick McCormack, staff member
recently returned from Vietnam
SUBJECT: Recent promising developments in Vietnam
I
THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Ironically, if the War in Vietnam is won, it will
be partly because of the attack by the Viet Cong at TET:
for amid the smoke and ruins, and fear of a new thrust,
desperately needed reforms both in policy and personnel were
and are being implemented.
The most important of these reforms was in the Vietnamese
Government itself.
Because every president to succeed Diem was essentially
of compromise figure, large numbers of officials from previous
administrations remained on the job. Their loyalty and respon-
siveness was directed, not at the new president, but at the
respective power faction which had sponsored. Thus a presidential
directive could be and frequently was ignored when it conflicted
with the power faction's idea of its own best interests.
Since TET, President Thieu and his equally honest and
respected Premier Tran Van Huong have rapidly and effectively
consolidated the fragmented administrative structure under them.
Three of the four powerful corps commanders, 21 of 44 province
chiefs, and over 100 district chiefs were unceremoniously dumped.
To replace still more corrupt, unresponsive or incompetent
officials, Premier Huong recently opened a ten week school for
top administrators. A sign of the times is that he had difficulty
getting candidates for jobs which formerly were bought for tens
of thousands of dollars. For the first time since Diem's early
days, the South Vietnamese Government is beginning to enjoy the
respect of the people. Without this respect, U.S. forces could
have fought almost endlessly without achieving victory. There
still remains much to be accomplished in improving the Admin-
istration of South Vietnam, but the trends are all in the right
direction.
II. VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE
Unlike the unwiedly administrative structure formerly
representing Saigon, the Viet Cong had developed a superbly
disciplined and organized political infrastructure comprising
between 80,000 and 100,000 men. It is these political
and administrative forces; rather than the roving North
Vietnamese divisions, which must be eliminated if victory is
to be achieved. This belated post-TET realization has resulted
in a major shake-up of our fragmented pacification program.
For the first time we have begun to coordinate our intelligence
and counter-intelligence efforts. In this process, we made some
astonishing discoveries. We found, for example, that we had
in one district eleven separate and uncoordinated intelligence
networks operating. Frequently agents belonged to and were
-aid by several intelligence agencies unknowingly. Thus one
a intelligence which
could give us some piece of
would show up on several separate reports, giving it undue
weight. The sheer mass of information generated by this process
left much of it unused. In a country where timely reaction is
of the utmost importance, this situation proved to be disastrous.
The TET fiasco was only the most obvious aspect of this. But
it brought matters to a head.
In the aftermath of the TET offensive, Ambassador
Komer was able to coordinate the information gathering networks.
Using this information, he was able to expedite project Phoenix,
& massive undertaking to identify the elaborate V.C. infrastructure
and to eliminate it by the most direct means.
Combined American/Vietnamese teams began suddenly
visiting Vietnamese villages In response to intelligence reports.
Concentrating on key personnel, this rapidly expanding program
has eliminated more than 6,000 V.C. administrators within a
few months.
III. MILITARY IMPROVEMENTS
Militarily, a number of improvements have recently
mainfested themselves. More than 100,000 soldiers, many elite
troops of the North Vietnamese Army, were killed during and
since the TET offensive. As a consequence, the careful. planning
and high discipline which characterized North Vietnamese actions
has deteriorated. However, most military observers agree that
massive infusion of replacements have brought the North Vietnam
strength numerically back to its pre-TET condition. In this
period, however, our own strength has grown far beyond that of
January, 1968.
The replacement of General Westmoreland with General
Abrams has met with virtually universal appreciation. The
character difference between the two men is best reflected by
their respective valedictory and inaugeration addresses.
Westmoreland declared that it was impossible to stop the rocket
attacks on Saigon and other cities. A few days later Abrams
said he could and would; and did. He established a double
ring defense system around Saigon and installed computerized
radar to spot and silence rocket and mortar attacks. Beyond
that, Abram's no nonsense character has made a singular impression
on the Vietnamese Government. Abrams has demanded action and
has gotten it,
Abrams has a reputation for being far more aggressive than
was his predecessor. He has emphasized saturation small unit
patrolling and ambushing. I am also told that staff changes
which he has made have produced a marked qualitative improvement
at MAC V headquarters and elsewhere.
Under Abrams, the training and arming of the South
Vietnamese Army with the latest weaponry has been dramatically
accelerated. He has recognized that South Vietnamese units
armed with World War II vintage ML rifles will not move
aggressively against a foe better armed with the automatic AK 47.
It is difficult for me to emphasize what an enormous difference
in morale I noticed among ARNV units armed with the M16. Already
100,000 have been distributed to them with 100,000 more on the
way.
Abrams is also increasing the number of joint Vietnamese/
American operations in marked contrast to his predecessors
preference to operate exclusively with American troops whenever
possible. In the I Corps, the Marines are "marrying" 14-man
squads of leathernecks with Vietnamese Popular force
units. Abrams has also approved the formation and arming of
civilian "Self-Defense Councils". Already more than 400,000
Vietnamese voluntarily enrolled and 40,000 have been armed.
Many more will be shortly.
I do not wish by this report to infer that all is well
in Vietnam--or that victory is around the corner. It took the
British ten years to wipe out 15,000 hard core guerrillas in
Malaya'. I do, however, believe that the trends finally are in
our favor, that the Army of Vietnam can assume an increasing
degree of the responsibility, that we can pull out substantial
numbers of our non-combat forces in 1969, and that with certain
other changes we have now a winning recipe.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS
We must, however, steel ourselves against certain
dangers. Saigon and all other cities and towns of South Vietnam
have been infiltrated by thousands of Viet Cong agents. Countless
other Vietnamese are subject to coercion by threatening exposed
relatives with reprisals. These agents could, if coordinated,
plant enough bombs, set enough fires, and throw enough grenades
to thoroughly disrupt much of metropolitan Vietnam. If this
were coordinated with an attack from the outside against Saigon,
it could produce an impact of untold proportions on World Presses
and U.S. public opinion. Worse, if the attack were prolonged,
a siege on Saigon could drive prices to the point where the
plaster would be virtually worthless. (Already beef prices
are 300% higher in Saigon than in Kientuong province, some
fifty miles distance.) A scarcity of food, a wildly inflating
phaster, and a long series of block-destroying fire fights could
eventually produce the kind of homeless, hungry masses which
could topple the Government. It is this goal, after the cold
shower effect of the McCarthy defeat in Chicago, that Viet Cong
are counting on to bring them to victory.
Other reforms would greatly contribute to a quicker
victory. THERE IS NO REASON WHCY CAREER OFFICERS SHOULD BE
PERMITTED TO DO A YEAR'S TOUR IN VIETNAM AND THEN RETURN TO THE
UNITED STATES WITH ALL THE PAINFULLY ACQUIRED AREA AND COMBAT
EXPERIENCE. Civilians in the higher AID, CORDS, and Embassy staffs
Chicago Trubne, Tuesday, September 24, 1968
AGNEW REPLIES TO ATTACK ON USE OF 'JAP'
Honolulu, Sept. 23 -- AP -- Spiro T. Agnew, the
Republican Vice Presidential nominee, said today the
Democrats "really must be desperate" to accuse him of using
a contemptuous word for Japanese.
Agnew was commenting on a statement by Rep. Spark
M. Matsunaga (D., Hawaii) who charged Agnew with using the
term Jap, which Matsunaga said is a contemptuous word
for Japanese.
A story in the Washington Post today said Agnew
visited the news reporters' section of the plane on which
he was traveling and noticed a sleeping reporter of Japanese
ancestry. The article quoted Agnew as asking, "What's the
matter with the fat Jap?" Agnew said, "the reporter and I
happen to be good friends, and kid each other a lot about
note
that. "
Sear
Buchur
he warsed
agnew must
a Candidate
has no friends in
the all Press - enemer - they if they are small
a a stary - -
Holdeman
Bob
September 24, 1968.
REMORANDUM
TO:
Keogh/Price/Buchanan/Safire/Harlow/Gavin/Anderson/Moore
FROM:
RN
Here are some general thoughts with regard
to excerpts and statements for the next six weeks. I don't
think we are yet quite hitting the mark as these comments
will indicate.
As a general rule, an excerpt should be no
more than 1 to 1-1/2 pages long. It should be meaty and
quotable and should be material that I can easily work into
a stump speech even if I am speaking outdoors without a podium.
A case in point is the statement for Sioux Falls.
Something like this should never be put out as an excerpt for
two reasons: (1) It is too long. (2) It is too localized.
From now on anything on agriculture should generally just be
dropped off as a statement for the local press and let our
press give it whatever ride they want. The national press
couldn't care less about what we say on Karl Mundt's pet REA
project nor on our repeating our agriculture program. In fact,
I think the less we speak nationally on agriculture in the
next few weeks - the better. Just drop statements off where
needed - Harlow knows what we can say -- they can just be
cleared with Bryce -- I won't need to see them.
- 2 -
More often than not a statement dealing with
a local subject and zeroing in on a local problem should be
dropped off at most stops. This will % enormous local
coverage and since it will not require me to include the
material in my speech it imposes no burden on me. Just read
the advance information sheets and if you see that some place
cares about Indians - put out a little statement indicating
that we care about Indians, etc. A case in point was the
statement Pat Buchanan prepared reacting to the Yippees that
broke up the Catholic mass in Milwaukee. As a matter of fact,
that statement deserved even a national play. I hope it got
out in time to get not only the local press but also to be
circulated among our national press.
With regard to our excerpts - they should
zero in primarily on the four major themes. If we scatter-
gun too much we are not going to have an impact. That is why
I repeat we must have at least two excerpts a week which hit
some aspect of the law and order theme and one or two a week
which hit some aspect of the spending theme and two or three
which hit the foreign policy-respect for America theme.
Let me take the spending theme as a case in
point. I think a follow up on what we said in Milwaukee would
be to find the memorandum that I dictated a couple of weeks ago
and if you can't find it - I think you will recall it. In it
I said that a survey would show that we could safely make the
statement that no member of the Senate had introduced bills calling
for more money than Hubert Humphrey. I think we should nail him
- 3 -
as the most expensive member of the Senate while he was in
the Senate and that he would be the most expensive President
in history if he wereto be elected. He will have a very
difficult time denying this because he would have to say
that one of his supporters had introduced more bills - or
called for spending more money - than he did.
I think we should start hammering him hard and
regularly on the spending theme, particularly in view of the
fact that he has introduced so many bills and talks about
introducing so many new programs. on this score, it is now
time to cost-out Humphrey's programs for spending and then make
the charge that already in this campaign - with six weeks left -
he has advocated programs which would add
millions of dollars
annually to the budget. This does not have to be done in too
technical a fashion -- I don't want a Dunn and Bradstreet report
on it.
On the law and order theme, I think we should
start hammering on the fact that he defends the record of the
Administration over the past four years. Demand that he mame
one instance in which he disagrees with the record of the
Administration. Does he disagree with Clark in not using wire
tapping -- in not going after organized crime --- in not
enforcing the Narcotics Act. Demand replies. We must keep him
on the defensive just as he is trying to put us on the defensive.
Another theme that can be developed is Hubert VS.
Hubert. Pick out four or five major issues and use direct quotes
where he has contradicted himself. These all don't have to be
- 4 -
big issues -- of course, Viet Nam offers the mose inviting
one. Get to work on this one immediately and sive me a
good excerpt on that one.
Some general guidelines:
Don't be cute or gimmicky -- just hit hard with
crisp one-liners whenever they are appropriate.
I think we can make some mileage too out of
everybody reading the press excerpts that Pat Buchanan sends
in to me and then having our excerpt directly relate to one of
those provided we are not simply answering Hubert.
It seems to me that most of our excerpts suffer
from not being current and livelier. This could be corrected
by simply spending a little more time reading the daily news
summaries and zeroing in on some of those problems.
Another point that we want to develop is to demand
Hubert disassociate himself from any of the Administration's
policies with which he disagrees. Ask again and again for him
to name in the field of foreign policy, in the field of domestic
policy, in the field of law and order where - if at all - he
disagrees with the Administration.
I think.a good excerpt could be gotten out too
on Hubert's not waging a national campaign. Why is he avoiding
the South? Challenge him to go South.
Apart from these day to day excerpts, of course,
we should drop in regular statements - about two a week from
now on -- that are meaty, substantive - they will not have any
impact on voters but they will impress the press -- the piece
on the Presidency; merchant marine, etc., are ones in this
- 5 -
category.
It seems to me that we should have more of
these statements in the bank than currently seems to be the
case.
There is no reason why we should not get
some rather safe statements on some of these issues, calling
in effect for change so that we thereby counter the charge
that we are not talking to the issues.
Sometime toward the middle of the week we
should all get together and discuss this further but I would
like for all of you to have / discussion a on this tonight in
Seattle and see how we can improve on our program in this
respect.
########
was
September 30, 1968
fule
Done
MEMORANDUM
TO:
HALDEMAN
FROM:
DC
Billy Graham and his wife will attend the meeting
in Atlanta and . will sit with Mrs. N at the Southern Regional
TV. Have arrangements for them to,, get transportation from
L
North Carolina to Atlanta for that meeting. Billy is also
going to the lunch for Byrnes the following day. I think
he is joining us, however, on his own.
# # #
work out with tow office
Call Graham of get him straightened
out on sched.
r # think into in Atlata? wrong.
Sharlayer - - of metal Pwr tide
October 2, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
DC
FROM:
Jim Keogh
We do not have an excerpt situation in Atlanta,
but we (Gavin) offer you this for use in Q and A on law
and order:
Recently I received a letter from the daughter of a
minister, herself the mother of two young boys. Enclosed
with the letter was an advertisement for books and pamphlets
which could be described only as pornographic.
This woman began her letter by reminding me that we
had been guests in her church a week before.
And then she wrote:
"Ill start first by apologizing for sending filthy
literature to you
but where else can I go?
We have two good boys, one 14 and the other 10
so this is a personal concern. This is the third time we
have received such literature by mail. We burned the first
and returned the second
now this.
Mr. Nixon, if there is anything you can do, please,
for the sake of the children and our nation
help."
This woman's cry is not alone. This mother's plea
is but one out of many from those whose privacy and sense
of decency are invaded and ignored by scoundrels who use
the mails to send unsolicited pornography to unsuspecting
children.
- 2 -
I say that a new administration will set as an
important goal the protection of this woman and her children
and decent people like them all over America.
We will demonstrate that the traditional American
belief in privacy and the right to raise children in a
moral atmosphere are 98 in full accord with the Constitutional
provisions guaranteeing free speech. These provisions must
not and will not be abused by those who send unsolicited
pornography through the mail.
DRAFT -- 10/2/68
PJB/BH/JK (Poff has okayed)
Statement for Atlanta
:
Last Sunday, in a nation-wide radio broadcast, I
outlined a new program for establishing law and order with
justice in this country. My statement was, in effect, a
supplement to programs I had proposed earlier in the year
during the primary campaigns. And one of the points I made
is that the present Attorney General of the United States --
incredibly -- balks at using the tools Congress has placed
at his disposal to fight crime.
He has publicly declined to use the authority granted
him by Congress to penetrate the secrets of organized crime
by means of electronic surveillance. He takes this position --
and Mr. Humphrey joins him in it -- despite the fact that
responsible law enforcement officers all over the country feel
that the use of wiretapping, under clear-cut safeguards, is
the most effective weapon available to combat such crime.
Now, in the few days since I discussed this issue in
that national broadcast, I have learned that the Attorney
General is refusing to use still another tool at his command.
On August 30 his office issued a memorandum calling
on all U.S. attorneys around the country to ignore Title II
of the Omnibus Crime Bill that became law three months ago.
- 2 =
That title seeks to reduce the adverse impact on
law enforcement of recent Supreme Court decisions. It aims
particularly to facilitate the use of confessions and
eyewitness identification in the prosecution of people
arrested for crimes. Basically, it seeks to restore a
better balance between the rights of the criminally-accused
and the rights of the law-abiding public.
The A+torney General fought to block passage of
that anti-crime legislation -- and it can be said that
this was his right.
But, once the law was passed, the public had a right
to expect it to be enforced. What the Attorney General is
indulging in is a high level version of civil disobedience:
he questions the law so he won't use it.
This is just one more reason why we need new
leadership in the battle against crime in this country:
leadership that will use all the tools it has to restore law
and order with justice. And that's the kind of leadership I
promise America.
######