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Study of the 1960-1961 Presidential Transition - Memorandum No. 8 - "Personnel Problems of the Incoming President" by Governmental Studies, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 58 pages. [Report], 11/15/1960
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
39
5
11/15/1960
Report
Study of the 1960-1961 Presidential
Transition - Memorandum No. 8 - "Personnel
Problems of the Incoming President" by
Governmental Studies, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C. 58 pages.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Page 1 of 1
Limited Circulation - Not for Publication
STUDY OF THE 1960-61 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION
Memorandum No. 8
"Personnel Problems of the Incoming President"
November 15, 1960
Governmental Studies
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.
PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF THE INCOMING PRESIDENT
Contents
1. Early Actions
2
2. The President and Personnel Administration
3
3. Personnel as a Transition Problem
7
4. Department Heads and Their Subordinates
10
5. The Commissioners
13
6. Appointment Policy and Political Clearance
16
7. The Civil Service and the Problem of "Control"
20
8. The Patronage Push
28
9. The President and His Civil Service Adviser
31
10. The President and the Civil Service Commission
34
Appendix: Presidential Appointments, Listed by
Categories
40
I. Presidential appointments which the
President makes himself, although
with considerable staff assistance
41
II. Presidential appointments which the
President makes, normally relying
largely on White House staff and
department heads for the selection
45
III. Presidential appointments in which
the President's personal involvement
tends to be limited
55
Governmental Studies
Limited Circulation - Not for Publication
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.
PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF THE INCOMING PRESIDENT
This memorandum is intended to be a general introduction to the problems
of personnel management which the President-elect will face as Chief Executive
of the United States government. It is assumed that he will quickly draw upon
the materials, the facilities, and the personnel of the United States Civil
Service Commission to get more thoroughly acquainted with the situation. It
is assumed also that the President-elect will encourage his prospective depart-
ment and agency heads to make contact with the administrative assistant secretaries,
executive officers, and personnel officers in their respective departments and
agencies, in order to acquaint themselves with the peculiar personnel problems
and practices of those agencies.
Three further assumptions concerning the new President's attitude on
personnel matters should be made explicit:
(1) He will be interested in getting into his Administration the
strongest possible group of political executives.
(2) He will be equally concerned with making the civil service as
strong as possible.
(3) He will wish to handle patronage in an orderly way, making the best
appointments possible and minimizing its disruptive tendencies.
2
1. Early Actions
The following actions would be especially helpful to the formation
of the new Administration if taken promptly after election:
i. Selection of a personnel assistant on the President-elect's staff
to take the lead in recruitment of political executives and to be the control
point for political clearance. (A well-organized recruitment program for
executive talent should be set up as soon as possible on a continuing basis.)
ii. Definition of policy to guide the President-elect's staff and the
future department and agency heads in filling political executive positions--a
policy covering objectives, standards, procedures, and political clearances
that is simple and flexible but clear enough to avoid confusion.
iii. Selection of a civil service adviser on the presidential staff
to begin formulating policies and programs with reference to the federal civil
service and the various personnel systems which it contains.
iv. Selection of the person to be designated Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission (its executive) so that the government's central personnel
agency will operate with minimum uncertainty in the transition period, and the
designee can start planning the necessary steps to carry out the new President's
personnel program.
V. Public statement of policy on the professional civil service to
make clear the President-elect's purposes and intent, and to minimize uncertainty
and confusion.
vi. Steps to set in motion a review of the government's personnel systems
and practices, especially their adequacy at higher civil service levels for
present and future needs.
3
2. The President and Personnel Administration
The selection, direction, and control of personnel are at the heart
of the President's power as Chief Executive. He (alone or with the advice and
consent of the Senate) and the department heads whom he chooses appoint all of
the employees of the Executive Branch. The Constitution provides no other
means of appointment. It makes the President the responsible officer for
appointment (and removal) of executive personnel, an authority consistent with
and essential to his duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Control of personnel is also consistent with his constitutional duty to formulate
a coherent legislative program, for much of the work of developing and advancing
the program must be entrusted to his subordinates.
The positions with which the President is concerned fall into six broad
categories involving different levels of responsibility for the President.
Three of these require direct presidential action and three action by the
department head or someone to whom he delegates the authority.
Presidential Appointments
i.
Positions which the President himself fills, making the actual
selections as well as the formal appointments himself, in most instances (but
not all) with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Here he has broad, practically unlimited, removal power. There are
some 90 positions in this category: the principal department and agency heads,
their deputies, and a few of their more important assistants. (Judicial and
diplomatic appointments are not included in this number.)
4
ii.
Positions which the President is responsible for filling but
which in fact are filled largely on the advice of White House staff and the
department heads.
There are approximately 178 positions in this group: 75 deputy under
secretaries, assistant secretaries, and general counsels; chiefs of some 34
bureaus or "services" in the executive departments; 33 members of commissions,
boards, and other multi-headed agencies (only early vacancies are counted);
heads of 7 lesser executive agencies; and 29 appointments to international
agencies. (Again, judicial and diplomatic appointments are not included.)
iii. Positions which are so numerous, so far from the President in
the chain of command, and which have so little impact on policy that the
President does in fact rely almost entirely on others to make the selection.
There are thousands of jobs in this diverse group which includes
various positions of administrative importance: U. S. attorneys; members of
commissions and committees; representatives to lesser international agencies;
and the traditional "patronage" jobs (collectors of customs, U. S. marshals,
officers of mints, and last but not least some 23,000 postmasters who take
civil service examinations and serve without term but are nevertheless subject
to political "clearance" for their initial appointments).
The distribution of positions into these three categories varies
somewhat with the interests, the policies, and the available time and energy
of the President, but the classifications suggested here are nonetheless real
in terms of the President's actual role in the process. Some sort of system
has to be employed to fill the positions and keep them filled.
5
Appointments by Departmental Authority
i.
Positions for which there is an established merit system,
either general or specialized;
ii. Positions for which the competitive procedures of the merit
system are not in force because they are judged to be inappropriate;
iii. Positions deliberately placed outside of any governmental
merit system for political reasons.
In all of these cases, the Chief Executive is responsible for the quality
of the appointments, even though he does not make them and has little if
anything to do with them directly.
The departmental appointments, under a merit system, include the vast
majority of government personnel--roughly 2,300,000 positions. Most of these
positions are in the general civil service supervised by the Civil Service
Commission. The remainder are in the various special merit systems established
by law, such as the Foreign Service, the Public Health Service, or the personnel
systems of the TVA and the AEC.
The President is responsible for the quality of such personnel in a
two-fold way. First, as the constitutional Chief Executive and through
statutory powers vested in him, he has ultimate responsibility for the
maintenance of the personnel system. He has great rule-making power. For
example, he may include or except positions from the competitive service and
he may establish particular policies within the limits set by Congress.
Historically, this has come to include responsibility for leadership in
improving personnel systems. Most major improvements in the government's
6
personnel systems have been the product of strong presidential leadership
and sustained support.
Second, the President is responsible for energizing the system of
personnel management. Systems without people are inert abstractions. People
act, not systems, and the leadership which the President gives to his subordi-
nates in matters of personnel management largely determines what happens within
this "system." Active, alert interest on the part of the Chief Executive makes
for vigorous personnel management all down the line. Apathy or inattention at
the top makes for lackadaisical administration below.
The two groups of excepted positions (ii and iii above) are like the
presidential appointments in that there is no governmental system to find,
screen, and qualify potential appointees. They are unlike the presidential
appointments in that the President is involved not directly, but only as an
administrative superior--as the Chief Executive. He can fulfill his responsi-
bility for the quality of the appointments chiefly through setting an example
in the appointments he makes directly--fixing standards, stating a policy, and
prescribing procedures for review and clearance.
Positions are excepted from the competitive merit system in one of two
ways, either by Act of Congress or by order of the President under authority
given to him by statute. Either the Congress or the President (within his
broad statutory authority) may except from the civil service laws either
single positions or whole blocks of positions. The presidential exceptions
today are contained chiefly in three "schedules" of the Civil Service Commission:
7
i.
Schedule A, over 100,000 positions authorized to be filled
without examination because examination is thought to be inappropriate or
ineffective. A large number of these are temporary, seasonal or intermittent
jobs.
ii. Schedule B, 2,000 positions authorized to be filled by non-
competitive examination, because there is little or no competition for these jobs.
iii. Schedule C, 1,200 positions (300 now vacant) authorized to be filled
without examination by departmental authorities because the personnel in these
positions are confidential aides (some with ministerial duties) to political
executives, or because they hold "policy determining" positions in which their
political executive superiors prefer to have men serving at their discretion.
The discretion is complete as to appointment but less so in removal.
3. Personnel as a Transition Problem
Why are the authority and responsibility of the President in personnel
administration a matter of peculiar concern for the President-elect? One
reason is obvious, and there are several others which are less readily apparent.
The obvious reason is the difficulty of selecting persons for a relatively large
number of key political executive positions quickly. There are plenty of people
with proven executive capacity and many with political experience. But to find
talented appointees, dedicated to the public interest, who are both politically
wise and administratively effective is not easy. This sort of talent is scarce
and there are no established sources which surely produce it. Not many of the
names thrust upon the President-elect measure up to standard when checked out.
An active search for talent is necessary.
8
Time is a major problem--+ to get at least the first echelon selected
soon so that they can share the initiative in further recruiting and can make
up their own staffs in time to take over the responsibilities of governing on
January 20.
Civil service morale is a problem for the President-elect. Every
national election creates some disturbance in the ranks of government employees.
Wholesale removal went out of style with McKinley, although there were extensive
exceptions from the competitive service in early New Deal days. But there is
always a demand for jobs by some members of Congress and by the party faithful.
There is also pressure for political clearance of high level appointments
within the merit system. Some Presidents have yielded to this pressure. Until
the new Chief Executive's policy with reference to the civil service is known,
there will be some anxiety, particularly at the higher levels of the civil service.
A special problem within the civil service in 1961 will be Schedule C,
set up in 1953 as a reform, but which had the effect of reducing the number of
high level positions within the merit system. Over half of the incumbents in
these positions (as of March 31, 1960) are persons who had competitive status
before being put into Schedule C jobs, and more than 100 incumbents are in the
anomalous situation of having retained some appeal rights in the event of
removal. This suggests that Schedule C is not the solution to the government's
problem of creating an adequate higher civil service and that it should be
reviewed at an early date, although caution is required lest any change in
this category be interpreted as a patronage move.
9
Although the traditional patronage--political appointments to lower
positions in the administrative hierarchy--will be something of a nuisance
and not much of a benefit to the President in office, he must be prepared to
deal with it soon after election. The patronage system has existed in the
federal government for a long time and one President after another has whittled
it away until it is but an archaic remnant of the 1860's, albeit a burdensome
one. But until it is further trimmed, it has to be borne.
Physical Limitations on the President's Participation
in Presidential Appointments
The President's need for assistance in executive recruitment for high
level positions is clear. Even if a dozen men for each post were available,
the task of checking out the names would be formidable. Data on probable
competence, integrity, possible conflicts of interest, political acceptability,
and personal availability have to be gathered and weighed. Each President
since the mid-thirties has had an assistant on the White House staff assigned
to this task, one whose work will continue throughout the four years, not
only at the outset.
Even with full-time assistance, the President-elect will find it
difficult to give adequate attention to all the selections in Group No. i (see
above, p. 3,and the Appendix). At some point in Group No. ii the essential
decisions will tend to pass into the hands of others--primarily White House
staff members and the department heads. The benefits of concentrating the
President's limited time and energy on filling the more important positions
are apparent. After the top 150-250 selections are made, the quality of the
10
President's appointments is going to depend on the judgment of his subordinates
and the system of standards, policies, and procedures which he has established
for making appointments.
Since lower level presidential appointments are necessarily perfunctory
so far as the President himself is concerned, there is much to be said for
trimming the list and converting the surplus into departmental appointments,
either discretionary or subject to the civil service laws. This requires
legislation, which can be obtained at the beginning of a new Administration
with less difficulty than later.
4. Department Heads and Their Subordinates
There are several half-hidden dilemmas in the choice of men for top
presidential appointments, e.g., department heads, under secretaries, assistant
secretaries. Should the emphasis be upon program capacities? Administrative
abilities? Political strength? Factional and regional balance of the entire
group? At this level it is not difficult to argue that creativity in putting
together a constructive program should have precedence. Administrative skills
and operational know-how are readily available from the ranks of the professional
civil service.
It is easy to overlook the importance of the political-educational role
of political executives at the departmental level. Much of their effectiveness
will depend upon their ability to advocate particular measures, to explain
policies, and to defend programs. This advocacy, explanation, defense, over and
over again, to committees, members of Congress, and the public, will take a large
11
part of their time. Either the Secretary or his under secretary should be
very good at it, and the assistant secretaries should be able to share the
load. If they are ineffective in this role it tends to devolve upon the
bureau chiefs, who then are encouraged to become independent political powers
in their own right.
In choosing his department heads, the President-elect must ask several
fundamental questions: Will the department head and his associates direct and
control the powerful services or bureaus under them, without becoming their
captives? Will the department head follow the President's lead as his agent
committed to the national interest above all lesser interests or will he lapse
into parochialism in his point of view, interests, and values?
One point emerges clearly from a systematic look at past experience.
When a President appoints a Cabinet Secretary or head of an agency, he is not
just making one appointment out of many. He is making a fundamental decision
about the entire area in which the department or agency operates. This
decision will determine whether it will be creditably administered in accordance
with the President's program and intentions, or whether inept or merely
undistinguished leadership will cause the President future grief in any one of
a variety of ways. The reason why this can be so positively asserted is that
the quality and capability of the Secretary will tend always to be reflected
in the second and third echelon appointments, and these in turn are the
positions that make or break the over-all performance of the department.
If it is said that political reasons sometimes dictate low-quality
appointments which a President must occasionally make, the rejoinder is clear:
12
The short-term political gain resulting from an undistinguished appointment
will, almost without exception, be far outweighed by the long-term disadvantage
to a President of being burdened with a person of less than top capacity.
Conversely, a first-rate man or woman named to a top spot, even if the immediate
political advantages of the appointment are minimal, will make this up many times
over in the public credit brought to the President by effective performance, in
the prevention or avoidance of the blunders so often committed by second-raters,
and in the strengthened condition in which the department or agency is left for
the Secretary's successor.
The idea is not to take "politics" out of Cabinet-level appointments.
The point is, rather, that political advantage and top quality are the ideal
combination for Cabinet-level appointments wherever possible, and when this is
not possible, quality without immediate political advantage will be far the
best politics in the long run.
Appointees to positions at the under secretary level require the same
qualities as the heads of agencies. They act for the Secretary in his absence
and they frequently move into his position when he resigns. The early strength
of the under secretaries tends to determine the later strength of the Cabinet.
The President-elect, therefore, is fully justified in giving his personal
attention to appointments at this level.
Although not always done, there is much to be said for selecting the
deputy in conjunction with the department head. The Secretary will tend to
have greater confidence in his deputy and probably use him more effectively.
Also, there will be a better chance that their strengths complement each other.
13
The goal should be an under secretary of a stature equal to the Secretary,
not his inferior. The President's only chance of achieving this is to control
the selection himself.
In the post-war years there has been some tendency to use assistant
secretaries for continuing supervision of particular bureaus or divisions, and
to select men of specialized background for this purpose. The policy has some
consequences which should be noted. Putting a specialist in charge of other
specialists tends to leave the program concerned without broad policy guidance
immediately available. Technical understanding is no substitute for political
wisdom.
There is another difficulty: Most programs nowadays involve so many
techniques that a specialist in one is little more than a layman in others;
and some important programs, in fact, are unique. Thus an apparently relevant
technical background in a high level executive may be so only to a very limited
extent. The quality of the man is fundamentally more important than his
vocational history. Intellectual capacity, judgment, political wisdom, integrity,
and force are the important assets at the highest levels, not technical expertise.
5. The Commissioners
The positions of commissioners in multi-member federal agencies are
a transition problem for the President-elect chiefly in two ways. 1) In most
of those agencies the President designates the chairman, who has the executive
function of directing his agency's staff and operations. These agencies will
tend to become more than ordinarily inactive until the new chairman is named
14
and on the job. 2) The President-elect's selection of the chairmen, and
what he does about his early appointments to the commissions and boards,
should be consistent with his long-range plans for these agencies.
In general, the multi-headed independent agencies suffer from a
combination of executive neglect and excessive legislative attention. The
President appoints the members and the public holds him responsible if the
commission gets into trouble. Yet despite the importance of some of these
agencies it is hard for the President to give them much direction or to
supervise them. There are too many of them for him to do so directly, and
their legislative sponsors, the committees of Congress, have given them multi-
membership and independent status to minimize presidential supervision (except
in certain specific matters), and to maximize their own control. The President's
chief means of control is through his appointments, since Congress, by statute,
has in many instances limited his power of removal. Recent Presidents have
tended to let the commissions alone and have given relatively little attention
to the appointment of commissioners. As a result, the quality of appointments
has declined and the positions have tended to become "patronage" from which the
President frequently has gained little benefit.
Several courses are open to the President-elect:
i.
To drift with the tide and to allow the jobs to be filled by
various patrons in his party. This requires minimum attention on the President's
own part, although careful screening would be necessary to avoid appointments
which might later embarrass him.
15
To follow a much more positive policy with reference to these positions:
while still treating them as patronage, to use them for trading purposes, never
giving one away without getting something in return. Again it would be necessary
to set minimum standards to avoid appointments that would discredit the Adminis-
tration.
ii. To make a positive effort to upgrade the caliber of appointments
and regain the distinction of the commissions' earlier years. This would be
essential if the President-elect plans to strengthen governmental activity in
the fields of economic policy which the commissions represent. His program
aims should then guide his appointments. This course would require a well-
organized recruiting program and sustained attention. It would demand an
effort, and no doubt would provoke some grumbling among disappointed patrons.
But it would make possible reinvigorated economic regulation and probably
avoid the scandals that have embarrassed the last two Administrations.
iii. To postpone action on appointments, except the naming of
commission chairmen. This would be in order if the President-elect's ambitions
for the Administration in the area of economic policy go so far as to include
structural changes to permit better coordination of the activities of the
commissions, tying them in more closely to the national Administration and
the national economic policy. In that case it might be desirable to make as
few new appointments as possible until decisions are made on organizational
changes. This could not be long delayed, however, lest it bring the commissions
to a standstill and cause them to lose key staff members.
16
6. Appointment Policy and Political Clearance
The number of political executives who have to be recruited for high
administrative positions in order to launch a new Administration is large,
compared with other western democracies. It has been a problem for all
administrations since the advent of big government. Two remedies are possible.
Either would reduce the problems of a President-elect, and both may be necessary
to make possible a quick and effective change of administration in the national
government.
One remedial step would be to build up the supply of political
executives, as was proposed, for example, by the Hoover Commission Task Force
on Personnel and Civil Service. Strong presidential leadership would be
essential in such an effort.
A second and complementary course would be to relieve the pressure
on the political executive supply by building up the higher civil service and
creating a cadre of administrators within the service distinguished in their
qualifications and proven in their capacities. This step, too, would require
strong presidential leadership.
Both steps would take time. Measures of this sort doubtless will be
considered by the next President, and conceivably, by taking action he could
simplify transition problems for all of his successors. But they are of no
help to him in launching his Administration in 1961.
The President-elect must improvise a personnel system of his own that
will provide the needed political executive talent. This presents two practical
problems. One is to tap the sources. The other is to deal with the "clearance"
question.
17
Names flood in upon a President-elect; all have to be checked out
against the judgment of people who are familiar with their qualifications,
past performance, and personal integrity. The system of relying on volunteered
names, judging from past experience, does not supply enough candidates of high
caliber to satisfy the standards which the President should set. He must
actively search for talent. His "recruiter," to be effective, must have
contacts with many walks of life in addition to politics.
The department heads and their deputies, when selected, can greatly
broaden the contacts of the Administration and take over much of the responsi-
bility for finding and evaluating potential appointees. But unless the
President-elect, through his own staff, also seeks out suitable candidates,
thereby indicating the standards he expects of his department heads, he will
to some extent lose control of the shape of the new Administration. The
negative act of vetoing misfits is not enough where high posts are concerned.
He must have a qualified person, in whom he has full confidence, to keep watch
over the adequacy of the departmental effort.
One of the considerations which the President-elect will have in mind
more clearly than any of his department heads is the breadth and balance of
his Administration. He needs appointees with diverse experience and backgrounds,
who are representative of his party and of the principal regions of the country.
But above all he must have persons who will put the national interest above all
lesser interests no matter how important, and who will work together under his
leadership, not at cross-purposes. His continued initiative after inauguration
18
in the selection of men and women for positions of high responsibility is
equally important in making sure that these same qualities will be present
throughout the course of his Administration.
Political Clearance
There are several questions to be considered in handling political
clearance. What should be the relation of the President to his party organization,
national and state, and to the members of his party in Congress in matters of
presidential appointments? At the outset, it is clear that from the Chief
Executive's point of view the term "clearance" is a misnomer. So far as high
level positions in the Executive Branch are concerned, he may and frequently
will consult people in his party organizations and in Congress, but he cannot
give: anyone a veto on his choices without jeopardizing his independent position
as Chief Executive and also the strength and integrity of his Administration.
From the moment of his election, he is more the party leader than anyone else
in it. For the next four years the party's character and success will depend
largely on him. There is no one else who can so well decide what is an
appropriate appointment to a political executive post.
The clearance process involves the unity of the Administration and the
President's control of it. The Chief Executive, although he is constitutionally
the head of the Executive Branch, is not in undisputed control of it. Many
interests in American life compete for control of it, piece by piece. For
nearly every government bureau there is an interest group or groups that would
like to dominate it. Some interests appraoch the President directly to make
19
their wishes known, but in many instances they approach him indirectly through
party officials or members of Congress. When the special interest is thus
concealed, it is more difficult to deal with than the direct approach.
Clearance of appointments with party organizations or with Congress, therefore,
must always be advisory or consultative, and at the President's discretion.
Clearance procedures can be useful, and, also, they can be overdone.
They can bring to light useful information in evaluating the probable performance
of the appointee. They also reveal the prospective appointee's degree of
acceptability to the senators and representatives of his own state. They
further serve the courtesy function of prior consultation with committee chairmen
before names are submitted formally for Senate confirmation. These are positive
values.
The danger of overdoing the clearance process arises particularly when
names of prospective appointees to important posts in Washington are cleared
with national, state or local party committees. As an organization concerned
heavily with national conventions and national campaigns, the national committee
has relevant information on those men who have been active recently in the
party's behalf but not much on others. To get more information, the national
committee has to consult state or local committees. But the data which these
groups can provide is frequently of little significance in evaluating a person
for a position of national, not local, scope.
The mechanics of clearance have a bearing on its content. For how
many presidential appointments can the President's staff handle the clearance?
At what point should the function pass to department heads? Should the national
20
committee handle clearance with members of Congress, or only with state
organizations? All varieties and combinations have been used, but there is
much to be said for the President's keeping full control of the process through
his staff and official subordinates, and for consulting directly on the highest
appointments rather than through a middleman. If satisfactory understandings
and defensible rules are not established at the outset, there is likely to be
continuous dissension in the party and considerable uncertainty about exactly
whose Administration it is.
7. The Civil Service and the Problem of "Control"
The question of "control" of the government will probably come up again
extreme
for public discussion although probably not in the/way it did in 1953. In the
1960 campaign the civil service was not under attack, as it was eight years
ago. Nor were the basic economic and social programs of the federal govern-
ment, which the civil service administers, challenged by either party. The
commitment of civil servants to those programs is thus more or less excepted
from partisan criticism. An unemotional assessment of the problem is now
possible.
The question of control has four interrelated aspects: How many new
political executives does an incoming President need to bring in with him in
order to gain control? In what positions should they be placed? What
flexibility should the new managers have in reassigning individuals within
the higher ranks of the civil service? What responsibilities and status are
needed at the higher levels of the civil service in order to make sure that
21
government service will attract and hold the able men it now must have?
On some points there is no disagreement. One is that as the government
is now organized and as Congress now operates, through its numerous and
specialized committees and subcommittees, a large number of political executives
is needed. There is a preponderant opinion also that, with some few exceptions,
the positions of Secretary, under secretary, assistant secretary (and equivalent
posts under other titles, e.g., general counsels in the executive departments)
are appropriate posts for political executives who are identified with each
President as his responsible agents and representatives, whom he brings into
office, retains at his discretion, and who leave when he leaves.
The principal exceptions are the administrative assistant secretaries.
These positions were established pursuant to recommendations of the first
Hoover Commission as jobs for experienced professional civil servants
(appointed by the department head with the President's approval, but not
presidential appointments confirmed by the Senate) and they have been so
treated by both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. There are also a
few assistant secretaryships with specialized functions which by tradition have
been accepted as nonpolitical career posts, e.g., Fiscal Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury.
There is a minority view, strongly held by some who have occupied the
positions, that most of the assistant secretaries in the Department of Defense
and the armed services departments should be "nonpolitical." No one suggests
that they should not serve at the President's pleasure as his politically
responsible subordinates. But this view favors nonpartisanship, or at least
22
bipartisanship, in filling these positions, without challenging their functions
of policy, leadership, and responsibility. The view assumes the probability of
change but not automatic or complete change with each new Administration.
There is agreement that top political executives need the privilege of
bringing with them some aides and assistants as discretionary appointees serving
at their pleasure. Some of these are ministerial helpers, now placed in Schedule
C because their duties are "confidential." How many such assistants there should
be may be disputed, but the principle is generally accepted.
There is very general support also of the principle that most of the
government, including posts of high responsibility, must be staffed by capable,
trained, and experienced civil servants for whom government employment is a
career or profession. Although the President must bring his principal sub-
ordinates into office with him, not every executive in the hierarchy can do SO.
This would mean a complete turnover in the executive chain of command, right
down to the end, an impossible policy today.
The question on which there is disagreement and uncertainty is where
to stop the line of dominoes from falling. It is generally accepted that top
political executives operating at the departmental level need some experienced
civil servants as assistants (along with political aides) and to man secretariats,
budget and personnel offices, and to perform other staff functions at the depart-
mental level. The unsettled question is where in the line of command the
experienced civil servant should take over from the political executive.
The argument over this point usually centers on the bureau level of
management (the major operating units within the departments which contain more
23
or less coherent programs). The long-term trend over the decades until 1953
has been to include more and more bureau chiefs in the competitive civil
service. Only thirty-four out of nearly 300 are now presidential appointees
and experienced career employees have frequently been appointed bureau chiefs
even when the positions were excepted from the competitive service. The
Eisenhower Administration stopped and partially reversed this trend by putting
most bureau chiefs into Schedule C and also some positions at still lower levels.
Although thought to be necessary at the time, the wisdom of the action was
challenged (by a not unfriendly critic, the Hoover Commission) and the subsequent
history of Schedule C has cast doubts on the original logic behind its creation.
Four-fifths of the Schedule C positions now occupied, according to the last
published report of the Civil Service Commission, March 31, 1960, had been filled
from the government service. (They were not brought into the government fresh
from private life.) More than two-fifths of the incumbents, in fact, came from
the competitive service. Roughly half of the incumbents today have competitive
status.
A new department head needs flexibility within the civil service, as
well as among his political executive subordinates, in putting the right men
in key jobs. This principle is generally accepted. A position which is best
staffed by someone who knows the program and is an "old hand" in the government
is not necessarily best staffed by the incumbent after an Administration changes.
Another individual, also a career man, might do better. The possibility of
making such reassignments to give the department head a man of his choice
without the government's losing the services of the man replaced seems not to have
24
been fully understood by many political executives who came into the government
without previous federal experience in 1953. This doubtless contributed to the
creation and to the expansion of Schedule C.
The Eisenhower Administration has continued the policy begun by the
Truman Administration of fixing authority and responsibility for statutory
functions in the department heads rather than the bureau chiefs, an observable
long-term trend which is increasingly realistic in the big government of today.
It has also moved appreciably to clarify and confirm the department head's role
of providing leadership and accepting full responsibility for the conduct of
all departmental affairs. The logic of this trend implies a more subordinate
and less political role for the bureau manager.
The political status of bureau chiefs (and lower administrators) in
Schedule C is also challenged by many who are concerned about the strength
of the civil service--the adequacy of the system to produce men capable of
dealing with today's tasks and tomorrow's problems. They do not see how it
will be possible to attract and hold the caliber of men needed for the federal
service if most of the positions of bureau chief are not within the range to
which successful civil servants may normally advance, without undue risk of
terminating their careers at the next change of Administration.
The problem of control is aggravated or reduced by two characteristics
of the department heads and other key men in the new Administration. One is
policy and the other is experience. To the extent that department heads have
in mind clear objectives and reasonably precise program specifications, the
control problem is minimized, for then it is easier to give direction to
25
subordinates, and it is easier for the latter to catch on and to contribute
effectively to formulation of the Administration's program. There is less
likelihood of misunderstanding or of working at cross-purposes.
To the extent that new department heads and their key associates have
had experience in or understand the national Administration they will be aware
of the capacities of the federal civil service, of the existence within it of
many outstanding administrators, and of their responsiveness to positive leader-
ship. The experienced political executive moves quickly to identify the talented
men in his organization, to explain his plans and objectives to them, and to
utilize their know-how in the development of his program. He does not find it
difficult to spot the misfits or the laggards, nor does he find them more
numerous than in other large organizations.
The great majority of political executives who have served the government
in departmental high commands have come to appreciate the competence, the respon-
siveness, and the dedication of career administrators. Incoming doubts cyclically
give way to outgoing testimonials. The transition problem is to bridge the gap
quickly, to learn by using the civil service, exploiting its experience and
resources to the full. If the political executive who is new to the government
is not himself confused or insecure in spirit, he should not find the break-in
period abnormally difficult or trying. This is the gist of the testimony of
those who have been through the mill.
If this review may be accepted as a reasonable approximation of the
situation, what points does it suggest for consideration by the President-elect?
Five may be noted:
27
people in whom he can have confidence into the key positions around him. The
possibilities for selection through promotion, transfer, reassignment, and various
forms of entry into the service are extensive. Adjustments of this sort are normal
and less involved in red tape than the newcomer to the government may have been
led to expect. On the other hand, the executive who tries to disregard regulations
and cut corners may have trouble. Knowing the system is the key to using it.
V. A thorough review and re-evaluation of the civil service systems
of the government as they apply to higher civil servants is in order. Do they
attract the government's fair share of the best talent? Do they fully develop
these men and hold a sufficient proportion of them through their years of greatest
productivity? Do the terms and conditions of employment encourage optimum
performance and maximum utilization? These questions need to be answered
authoritatively as a prelude to whatever measures the new President may wish to
take to strengthen the effectiveness of the government for its exacting task over
the years ahead. If there is to be such an assessment, it is desirable to plan
for it so that it can be started promptly in the new Administration. It would
include the problem of Schedule C and go much beyond it.
Thorough briefing on the government's personnel practices is probably
desirable for all new political executives of high rank. The first stage could
be arranged by the President-elect's civil service adviser, working closely with
the Civil Service Commission. If, after this general introduction to the system,
department heads sat down with their administrative assistant secretaries or
executive officers and discussed specific matters of personnel administration in
their particular agencies, they would shorten the awkward period of adjusting to
a new system, and would minimize the possibility of mistakes.
28
8. The Patronage Push
Each new Administration must deal with a demand for patronage, even
though these politically dictated appointments to more or less routine jobs
many echelons below the President cannot measurably help him in his own task.
Nevertheless, the considerable administrative burden must be borne and handled
carefully lest these appointments do damage to the Administration by turning
out badly.
In addition to the burden of screening and processing the political
appointments, there is a subtle and probably more serious aspect of the
patronage push to be considered. It is the effort to penetrate the merit
system sub rosa by insisting on political clearance of appointments which
occur through promotion or through presumably competitive entry to higher
positions in the civil service. The effects of such subversion of the merit
system go far beyond the positions concerned by arousing anxiety among govern-
ment employees and creating public misgivings about the integrity of the
Administration's personnel policies. Since the President has clear authority
to except positions from the competitive civil service if he chooses, political
clearance of appointments to merit system positions has about as much to offer
him in the long run as cheating at solitaire.
A President-elect has several courses open in dealing with traditional
patronage. One possibility is to curtail it, transferring the positions in
question to the competitive service. This would have the benefit of lightening
the administrative load of filling the positions politically. The civil service
system has grouwn chiefly through presidential actions of this sort, beginning
29
1
with Grover Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt.
Such action would tend to
emphasize the Administration's interest in the government's effectiveness
and would bring it some prestige. But such action usually causes anguish
among some members of Congress and among the state and county party organi-
zations which are the beneficiaries of the patronage. Possibly to avoid this
distress, and preoccupied with other more urgent matters, most Presidents have
tended to defer these reforms until the latter part of their terms of office.
This delay has given them a chance to "restore the balance" in political
appointments. But unfortunately the timing of the action tends to impeach
their purposes, and the benefits accrue chiefly to their successors.
A second course of action is to set the standards high in terms of
minimum qualifications for appointment, insisting that patrons put forward
candidates clearly capable of handling their jobs successfully. If the
President is firm in rejecting substandard nomineers for presidential appoint-
ments, he will carry his point and will also set the example for handling
departmental patronage, although explicit instructions as to standards probably
will be necessary in addition. The disadvantage of this course is that it
1. If the President-elect should decide to reduce the patronage, an obvious
group to begin with are the postmasters in first, second, and third class offices.
These positions are anomalous among presidential appointments. They are filled
either by promotion from the competitive service (about one-fourth of the appoint-
ments), or by persons from outside chosen through competitive examinations but
subjected to political clearance before being selected from the list of eligibles.
This clearance system, with its pressure and finagling, tends to undermine the
integrity of the examining process. It is within the President's power to end
this anomaly very quickly, simply by instructing the Postmaster General to forward
to him the names of the best-qualified candidates without subjecting them to
political clearance. There would be a squawk, but probably not much real pain,
and it would not be prolonged if the President is firm.
Other similar possibilities for the pruning knife are the U. S. marshals,
and political appointments in the Bureau of Customs and the U. S. mint--venerable
hang-overs from 150 years ago. The customs appointments in particular have
30
requires considerable energy to overcome the inertia of political patrons and
get them to produce acceptable candidates. In some instances the President and
his agency heads might have to dig up suitable appointees themselves (a labo-
rious task) or leave the jobs unfilled. The President would carry his point in
a relatively short time but he would have to be firm and it would be a brisk
battle while it lasted.
A third course is to spend the least possible time and energy on patronage,
merely screening to keep out the more obvious bad risks and misfits, accepting the
inevitability of mistakes, and getting rid of them as quickly as possible when
they come to light.
Still a fourth possibility should be considered--active use of patronage
to buy legislative support for the Administration and its program. There have
been times when Presidents have found it useful to have something of value to
offer when votes were hanging in the balance. But the possibilities of carrying
this policy very far are doubtful and diminishing. In seeking support on a
particular issue, an important post such as a judgeship may be significant, but
appointments to routine jobs are not likely to mean very much when compared with
other methods at the disposal of the President and his Administration for
building up general support for their program.
embarrassed a number of Presidents, but no one yet has modernized the system.
There is no reason today except political inertia for the President's making such
appointments, but it would take legislation to shift the appointing function to
the department heads.
Among the appointments by departmental authority in which political
favoritism is involved are the rural mail carriers. Like the first, second, and
third class postmasters, the list of eligibles is determined by competitive exami-
nation, but the Post Office Department subjects them to political clearance before
making the appointments--largely vitiating the effects of the competitive examina-
tions. This could be ended by presidential action. No legislation is required.
31
Only one point is clear among these alternatives. It is that there is
no advantage at all to the President in being anything but firm in any course
he follows. Patronage is the Chief Executive's prerogative. No one else has
any "rights" to it, traditional or otherwise. If he knowingly appoints any but
the best possible man to any job, or if he allows a department head to do so,
there ought to be a very good reason for it. There are scarcely any situations
now in which a low-quality patronage appointment can be advantageous to the
President on balance. It is the total performance of his Administration that
determines a President's chances for a second term; nothing else matters very much.
The President has everything to gain and nothing to lose by being tough and
unequivocal in his policy with reference to patronage.
9. The President and His Civil Service Adviser
Since 1939 the President has had in the Executive Office or on the White
House staff an adviser (most recently called the Special Assistant to the
President for Personnel Management) to assist him in handling matters affecting
the civil service. Before 1939 the President frequently used a member of the
Civil Service Commission as a personnel adviser, and for the 1953-57 period
President Eisenhower used the Chairman of the Commission for this purpose.
Whatever arrangement the President-elect may prefer, it will be
advantageous to make the decision reasonably soon after election and to get his
civil service adviser on the job at once. To be fully effective, the person
chosen should know problems of large-scale personnel management in general and
something about the civil service system in particular. He should be familiar
32
with the interested House and Senate committees and with the most significant
employee organizations. He should also have the President's full confidence.
This is most important of all, for the adviser can draw on experts in civil
service problems, but unless he himself has the President's confidence, he
will not be effective.
There are a number of ways in which the adviser can be useful to the
President-elect:
i.
First of all he can brief the Chief Executive-to-be on his powers
and duties with reference to the various personnel systems of the government.
To exercise them wisely he needs to have some idea of the characteristic features
of these systems, and of their peculiar problems and difficulties. This he can
get most easily from his own adviser.
ii. On such specific questions as whether to undertake any early changes
in the civil service rules, the addition to or subtraction from the competitive
service, the shifting of presidential appointments to the department heads, the
adviser can be most helpful. He can make clear the pros and cons; and when an
action is decided upon, his advice as to the best means will be of value.
iii. He can help to plan for the orientation of new political executives
in personnel matters. Some general introduction to the system probably is desirable
before department and agency heads begin to work with their administrative
assistant secretaries, executive officers, and personnel officers, who can carry
further their orientation into the administrative policies and procedures of the
government.
33
iv. In looking ahead to longer range improvements in civil service
systems which the President may wish to undertake, the adviser can be quite
useful. Improvements are needed, especially in the provisions for higher civil
servants. The President and his department heads will note some of them in due
course, but the performance of the government employees is good enough that some
of the real possibilities for improvement will go unnoticed, except by an alert
and sophisticated student of personnel administration. Planning ahead for
constructive changes is necessary if they are to be made in time to help the
Administration. A fast start will make a difference.
V.
The adviser can help the President to play an important role in
day-to-day personnel management throughout the government. Unless the Chief
Executive takes some interest in effective personnel management, and encourages
his department heads to do so also, the systems tend to bog down. The Chief
Executive sets the tone. In the government there are great opportunities for
the development of all varieties of talent, for example through successive
placement of career officers in different assignments at increasing levels of
responsibility, as well as through formal training programs. These possibilities
have hardly begun to be exploited. The federal government could be for its
employees the most intellectually stimulating and professionally rewarding
place to work in the world. But to become this kind of employer, there has
to be not only leadership and vision but also attention to each individual's
capacity for performance and growth.
vi. The President-elect will also find his adviser helpful in the
perennial battle over pay legislation and related matters. It takes sophisticated
34
guidance to deal with the special pleading of employee unions without losing
their support on other measures which are more clearly in the public interest.
There is a question for the President-elect to consider as to where his
civil service adviser should be located. Should he be on the White House staff,
in which case he will not be expected or, probably, permitted to appear before
committees of Congress? Or should he and his small staff be in the Executive
Office of the President (but not the White House staff) where the President can
use him as a spokesman on matters of personnel policy? It is convenient to have
an expert witness who can speak for the Administration on personnel questions;
some who have followed the handling of such matters over the years feel strongly
that for this reason the Executive Office attachment is better. After an
ambiguous beginning in 1939, however ( the adviser was listed publicly in the
on
Executive Office, but was/the White House payroll), the practice has been to
attach him to the White House staff, where he is today.
10. The President and the Civil Service Commission
The Civil Service Commission is the Chief Executive's principal agent
in administering the general civil service laws. At times the Commission has
been relatively close to the President, and they have worked together in making
important changes in the civil service system. Most major improvements have
come about in this way. This is natural since large administrative discretion
is needed to administer the civil service laws, and important changes in basic
civil service rules require the President's approval.
The Commission was drawn closer to the Chief Executive in 1949 when
the Chairman was made the "chief executive and administrative officer" of the
35
Commission, and the President was authorized to designate the Chairman who, as
such, serves at the President's pleasure. Until 1956 Commission members served
without term and customarily offered their resignations after a presidential
election. Since statutory changes made in that year, the three Commissioners
have been appointed for overlapping six-year terms. The terms of two of the
current Commissioners will expire during the next four years.
As an executive agency, the Civil Service Commission has a peculiar
status. It is regarded by many members of Congress as a "watch dog of the
merit system," checking any tendencies of departmental administrators to "play
politics" with the merit system, and, on appeal, reviewing personnel actions
affecting individuals, particularly those arising under the Veterans Preference
Act of 1944. To some extent, the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and
Civil Service have regarded the Commission as their agent for defending the
interest of rank and file employees against policies or decisions of "management"
which might be unfavorable to the mass of employees. These two committees have
kept the Commission under rather close surveillance. Perhaps because of their
double responsibility for postal and civil service matters, the committees'
point of view on personnel policy has tended to be somewhat similar to that of
the employee union officials, especially the postal unions.
The substance of this situation is that the Civil Service Commission
tends to be "in the middle." The President is responsible for administering
the civil service laws largely through the Commission; but the legislative
committees control changes in law, particularly pay legislation. The staggered
six-year terms instituted in 1956 moved the Commission toward a position of
36
formal independence of the President but without explicitly limiting his
removal power. The present position of the agency is thus somewhat ambiguous.
This situation poses two questions of policy for the President-elect:
How closely does he wish to work with the Commission? And what should be the
Commission's relationship to him? He does not have a completely free choice,
for he is constrained by his need to give continued leadership to the Commission
as the chief instrument for carrying out his constitutional responsibilities in
the personnel field, and by the critical importance of an effective civil service
in government today. There are several courses which could be followed:
i.
The simplest course is to leave the Commission in its present
anomalous position "in the middle," between the Chief Executive and the House
and Senate Committees on Post Office and Civil Service. The President could
give direction to the Commission immediately by deciding on his Chairman, and
by reappointing or replacing members as their terms expire. He would in fact
find the Commission responsive to his leadership in all measures which he might
wish to undertake to strengthen the civil service and to improve federal
personnel administration.
By working closely with the Chairman and by using the Commission as a
central personnel agency, the President would at the same time establish his
leadership and the Commission's executive role. This could be done with little
or no change in personnel, and with no structural change. In essence, this
course simply requires the President to pick a Chairman in whom he will have
full confidence, to keep in touch with him regularly, and to maintain an
interest in what the Commission is doing.
37
ii. A course of action in sharp contrast to this acceptance of the
status quo (and of the 1956 legislation) would be to move along the lines
proposed by the Brownlow Committee of 1937, and more recently restated in the
Clark bill. This proposal, in substance, is to move the Civil Service Commission
into the Executive Office of the President where the Chief Executive will be
clearly responsible for it; to substitute a single personnel director (roughly
parallel in status to the Budget Director) for the present three-man Commission;
and to limit the function of a civil service board or commission to appellate
and investigatory matters. Such a change is based on the assumption that
personnel administration is a prime management tool in directing the government's
affairs, a tool which the Chief Executive needs and for which he should be
directly responsible. Sentiment for this change has been growing over the
years among those who feel that as presently organized the government's central
personnel activities are too negative, too largely regulatory in emphasis, and
too much under the domination of legislative committees, which, it is asserted,
are limited in their point of view.
If this proposal should be carried out successfully, the President would
not need any other adviser on civil service matters on his staff. His director
of personnel would be that adviser.
iii. A middle course is possible between accepting the status quo and
establishing the central personnel function of the government in the Executive
Office. One possibility is to seek legislation eliminating the present fixed
terms for Civil Service Commissioners, thus returning the Commission to its
historic status as a presidential commission. This move would meet resistance
38
in the Committees on Post Ofice and Civil Service, but not insuperable
resistance. It would be a fight for principle--the re-establishment of
formal presidential control--but it would not add substantially to the
President's power inasmuch as he has retained the right of removal even
though commissioners are appointed for specific terms.
An alternative procedure would be deliberately to change the Commission
by changing its members. The President's discretion is complete. He might
appoint another "TR" who would give aggressive political leadership in civil
service improvement, or he might use one or more of the positions simply as
patronage. Both policies have been followed at times by past Presidents. In
modern times there has normally been at least one commissioner (sometimes the
minority member) who has been an ardent believer in the merit system and who
has taken the lead in advancing measures to improve the civil service. 1 Since
1949 the Chairman has tended to be the controlling figure in the Commission's
program, although he has to have the support of at least one of his colleagues
to make important changes. If the President has hopes of a strengthened civil
service, he cannot afford to toss more than one position to a patron of his
party. If he has ambitions for significant constructive innovation in federal
personnel administration, he will need maximum strength and quality in all
three positions.
1. The present Commission, generally regarded as a "good commission," is
unusual in its composition. Two members have spent almost their entire careers
in the federal government, the Chairman 27 years, and the minority member 39,
most of this in the competitive civil service. Although both later held high
political executive positions in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, they
are essentially career types. Only the third member comes from a background of
participation in electoral politics.
39
Whatever course is adopted, an early decision on the chairmanship of
the Commission would have the advantage of keeping the central personnel agency
of the government running smoothly in the transition period and of providing
the President-elect with a highly useful counselor.
40
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
I.
Presidential appointments which the President makes himself,
although with considerable staff assistance
41
II.
Presidential appointments which the President makes, normally
relying largely on White House staff and department heads for
the selection
45
A.
The deputy under secretary-assistant secretary group.
45
B.
The bureau level within departments and agencies
47
C.
Commissions, boards and other multi-headed agencies- -
vacancies during 1961
49
D.
Various single-headed agencies
53
E.
International agencies
53
III.
Presidential appointments in which the President's personal
involvement tends to be limited
55
A.
Appointments of considerable administrative importance.
55
B.
Appointments to various boards, commissions, and
committees not included in I or II.
56
1
41
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
I.
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAKES HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH WITH
CONSIDERABLE STAFF ASSISTANCE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
White House Office 2
1-6
Administrative Assistant (6) [The President may allocate 2 at
$22,500
7-14
the salaries to the posi-
3 at
21,000
tions as he deems proper. ]
7 at
20,000
3 at
17,500
(Includes Exec. Secretary,
National Security Council)
15
Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management
Fixed by President
Bureau of the Budget
16
Director
$22,500
17
Deputy Director
20,500
18-20 Assistant Directors (3)
20,000
Council of Economic Advisers (3 members)
21
Chairman (s)
$20,500
22-24 Members (2) (s)
20,000
National Security Council
25
Executive Secretary
See information on
salary under White
House Office above
Operations Coordinating Board
26-27 Members (2)
Central Intelligence Agency
28
Director (s)
$21,000
29
Deputy Director (s)
20,500
1
Not including ambassadorial or judicial positions, or positions normally filled
by ex officio appointments.
Data for these lists are taken from several sources, which in some cases conflict.
Conflicts have been reconciled insofar as possible, but some inaccuracies may
still exist.
2
Positions listed in this section are in accordance with a July 1960 government
publication. However, it appears likely that there may be nine special assistants
and other authorized positions in the White House Office filled by presidential
appointment.
42
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
National Aeronautics and Space Council
30-33
Members (4; one to be from Federal Government) (s)
$100 p.d. and expenses
[for members appointed
from private life]
34
Executive Secretary (s)
$20,000
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
35
Director (s)
$25,000
36
Deputy Director (s)
22,500
37-39
Assistant Directors (3) (S)
20,000
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization
40-42
Members (3*)
without compensation
[* Presently three members; however, no statutory limit on membership. ]
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
State
43
Secretary of State (s)
$25,000
44
Under Secretary of State (s)
22,500
45
Under Secretary of State for Political [or Economic] Affairs (s)
22,000
International Cooperation Administration
46
Director (s)
$21,000
United Nations
47
Representative of the U. S. (s)
det'd by President
48
Deputy Representative of the U.S. (s)
det'd by President
Security Council
49
Deputy Representative of the U. S. (s)
det'd by President
United States Information Agency
50
Director (s)
$21,000
51
Deputy Director (s)
20,500
Treasury
52
Secretary of the Treasury (s)
$25,000
53
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
54
Under Secretary [for Monetary Affairs] (s)
21,000
43
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Defense
55
Secretary of Defense (s)
$25,000
56
Deputy Secretary (s)
22,500
Army
57
Secretary of the Army (s)
$22,000
58
Under Secretary (s)
20,000
Navy
59
Secretary of the Navy (s)
$22,000
60
Under Secretary (s)
20,000
Air Force
61
Secretary of the Air Force (S)
$22,000
62
Under Secretary (s)
20,000
Justice
63
Attorney General (s)
$25,000
64
Deputy Attorney General (s)
21,000
Post Office
65
Postmaster General (s)
$25,000
66
Deputy Postmaster General (S)
21,000
Interior
67
Secretary of the Interior (s)
$25,000
68
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
Agriculture
69
Secretary of Agriculture (s)
$25,000
70
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
Commerce
71
Secretary of Commerce (s)
$25,000
72
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
73
Under Secretary [for Transportation] (s)
21,000
Labor
74
Secretary of Labor (s)
$25,000
75
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
44
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Health, Education, and Welfare
76
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (s)
$25,000
77
Under Secretary (s)
21,000
Atomic Energy Commission
[5 members, 5 year terms]
78
Member (s) (one vacancy)
$22,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $22,500
79
Chairman, Military Liaison Committee
20,000
Civil Service Commission
[3 members; 6 year terms; not more than 2 of the 3
members to be of same political party]
80
Member (s) (first vacancy, February 28, 1961)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Federal Aviation Agency
81
Administrator (s)
$22,500
82
Deputy Administrator (s)
20,500
General Services Administration
83
Administrator (s)
$21,000
Housing and Home Finance Agency
84
Administrator (s)
$21,000
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
85
Administrator (s)
$22,500
86
Deputy Administrator (s)
21,500
87
Chairman, Civilian Military Liaison Committee
20,000
National Science Foundation
88
Director (s) [6 year term ending in 1963]
$20,000
Small Business Administration
39
Administrator (s)
$20,000
Veterans' Administration
90
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs (s)
$21,000
45
I.
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAKES, NORMALLY RELYING
LARGELY ON WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND DEPARTMENT HEADS FOR THE SELECTION.
A.
THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY-ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
State
91
Deputy Under Secretary [for Administration (s)
$20,500
92
Deputy Under Secretary [for Political Affairs] (S)
20,500
93
Counselor (S)
20,000
94
Legal Adviser (s)
20,000
95
Asst. Secretary [for Public Affairs ] (s)
20,000
96
Asst. Secretary [for Congressional Relations] (S)
20,000
97
Asst. Secretary
[for Policy Planning ] (s)
20,000
98
Asst. Secretary
[for Inter-American Affairs] (S)
20,000
99
Asst. Secretary
[for European Affairs] (S)
20,000
100
Asst. Secretary
[for Far Eastern Affairs (s)
20,000
101
Asst. Secretary
[for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs (s)
20,000
102
Asst. Secretary
[for African Affairs ] (S)
20,000
103
Asst.
Secretary [for International Organization Affairs ] (s)
20,000
104
Asst. Secretary [for Economic Affairs (S)
20,000
105
Asst. Secretary [for Administration] (S)
20,000
Treasury
106
Asst. Secretary (s)
$20,000
107
Asst. Secretary (S)
20,000
108
Asst. Secretary (s)
20,000
109
General Counsel (s)
19,000
Defense
110
Asst. Secretary [Comptroller (s)
$20,000
111
Asst. Secretary
Health & Medical ] (s)
20,000
112
Asst. Secretary
International Security Affairs] (S)
20,000
113
Asst. Secretary
Manpower, Personnel & Reserve (S)
20,000
114
Asst. Secretary
Properties & Installations (s)
20,000
115
Asst. Secretary
Public Affairs (S)
20,000
116
Asst. Secretary [Supply & Logistics] (S)
20,000
117
Director of Defense Research & Engineering (s)
22,000
118
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (s)
pay as prescribed by law for
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
119
General Counsel (S)
20,000
Army
120
Asst. Secretary [Financial Management] (s)
$20,000
121
Asst. Secretary [Logistics ] (S)
20,000
122
Asst. Secretary [Manpower, Personnel & Reserve Forces (s)
20,000
46
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Defense (Continued)
Navy
123
Asst. Secretary Personnel and Reserve Forces] (S)
$20,000
124
Asst. Secretary [Material] (s)
20,000
125
Asst. Secretary [Research and Development] (S)
20,000
Air Force
126
Asst. Secretary Financial Management] (S)
$20,000
127
Asst. Secretary Research and Development] (S)
20,000
128
Asst. Secretary [Materiel] (s)
20,000
Justice
129
Solicitor General (s)
$20,500
130
Asst. Attorney General Antitrust Division] (S)
20,000
131
Asst. Attorney General
Civil Division] (s)
20,000
132
Asst. Attorney General
Criminal Division[ (s)
20,000
133
Asst. Attorney General
Internal Security Division] (S)
20,000
134
Asst. Attorney General [Lands Division] (S)
20,000
135
Asst. Attorney General
Tax Division] (S)
20,000
136
Asst. Attorney General
Civil Rights Division] (s)
20,000
137
Asst. Attorney General
Director, Office of Alien Property] (S)
20,000
138
Asst. Attorney General
[Office of Legal Counsel] (s)
20,000
Post Office
139
Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Operations] (S)
$20,000
140
Asst. Postmaster General
Bureau of Transportation] (s)
20,000
141
Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Finance] (s)
20,000
142
Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Facilities] (s)
20,000
143
Asst. Postmaster General Bureau of Personnel] (S)
20,000
144
General Counsel (s)
19,000
Interior
145
Asst. Secretary
Fish and Wildlife] (S)
$20,000
146
Asst. Secretary
Mineral Resources] (s)
20,000
147
Asst. Secretary
Public Land Management] (S)
20,000
148
Asst. Secretary Water and Power Development] (s)
20,000
149
Solicitor (S)
19,000
47
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Agriculture
150
Asst. Secretary (s)
$20,000
151
Asst. Secretary (s)
20,000
152
Asst. Secretary (S)
20,000
153
General Counsel (s)
20,000
Commerce
154
Asst. Secretary [for Administration] (s)
$20,000
155
Asst. Secretary [for International Affairs] (s)
20,000
156
Asst. Secretary [for Domestic Affairs] (s)
20,000
157
General Counsel (s)
19,000
Labor
158
Asst. Secretary for Labor-Management Relations] (s)
$20,000
159
Asst. Secretary [for Employment and Manpower] (s)
20,000
160
Asst. Secretary [for International Labor Affairs] (s)
20,000
161
Solicitor (s)
20,000
Health, Education, and Welfare
162
Asst. Secretary [for Legislation] (s)
$20,000
163
Asst. Secretary (S)
20,000
164
Special Asst. to the Secretary [for Health & Medical Affairs] (s)-
20,000
165
General Counsel (s)
20,000
B. THE BUREAU LEVEL WITHIN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
Treasury
166
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (s)
$21,000
167
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue (s)
19,000
[Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury]
168
Commissioner of Narcotics (S)
17,500
169
Treasurer (s)
17,000
170
Director of the Mint (s) [5-year term ending in 1963]
16,095
171
Comptroller of the Currency (S) [5-year term ending in 1964]
20,500
Justice
172
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (s)
$20,000
48
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Interior
173
Commissioner of Reclamation
$19,000
174
Director of Geological Survey (s)
18,500
175
Commissioner of Indian Affairs (s)
18,500
176
Director, Bureau of Mines (S)
18,500
177
Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife (s)
18,500
Agriculture
178
Administrator, Rural Electrification Administration (s)
$20,000
[10-year term ending in 1966]
179
Administrator, Farmers' Home Administration (S)
18,000
Commerce
180
Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads (s)
$20,000
181
Chief, Weather Bureau (S)
18,500
182
Director, Census Bureau (S)
18,500
183
Director, Coast and Geodetic Survey (s)
Armed forces pay schedule
184
Assistant Director, Coast and Geodetic Survey (s) Armed forces pay schedule
[4-year term ending in 1962]
185
Director, Bureau of Standards (S)
$18,500
186
Commissioner of Patents, Patent Office (S)
20,000
187
First Assistant Commissioner of Patents (S)
Classification Act
188-9
Assistant Commissioners of Patents (2) (s)
Classification Act
Federal Maritime Board
[3 members; 4-year terms; not more than 2 members to be of
the same political party]
190
Member (s) [first vacancy June 30, 1961]
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Labor
191
Commissioner of Labor Statistics (s) [4-year term ending in 1963]-
$18,500
192
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division (s)
20,000
193
Director, Women's Bureau (S)
17,310
49
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Health, Education, and Welfare
194
Surgeon General, Public Health Service (s)
$19,000+
[4 year term; present term ending January 1961]
allowance
195
Commissioner of Social Security (s)
20,000
196
Chief, Children's Bureau (s)
18,500
197
Commissioner of Education (s)
20,000
Housing and Home Finance Agency
198
Commissioner, Federal Housing Administration (s)
$20,000
[vacancy existing; 4 year term]
199
Commissioner, Public Housing Administration (s)
20,000
C.
COMMISSIONS, BOARDS AND 1 OTHER MULTI-HEADED AGENCIES-
VACANCIES DURING 1961
Civil Aeronautics Board
[5 members; 6 year terms expiring December 31; not
more than 3 members to be of same political party]
200
Member (s) (one vacancy, December 31, 1960)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Federal Communications Commission
[7 members; 7 year terms; not more than 4 members
to be of same political party]
201
Member (s) position now held by recess appointee)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Federal Power Commission
[5 members; 5 year terms expiring June 22; not more
than 3 members to be of the same political party]
202-3
Members (s) (two positions now held by recess appointees)
$20,000
204
Member (s) (first vacancy, June 22, 1961)
20,000
President does not designate Chairman
1 Includes present vacancies, positions now held on recess appointment, and
positions now held by appointees whose terms expire before the end of 1961.
50
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Federal Trade Commission
[5 members; 7 year terms expiring September 25; not
more than 3 members to be of same political party]
205-6
Members (s) (two positions now held by recess appointees)
$20,000
207
Member (s) (first vacancy, September 25, 1961)
20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Interstate Commerce Commission
[11 members; 7 year terms expiring December 31; not
more than 6 members to be of same political party]
208
Member (s) (position now held by recess appointee)
$20,000
209
Member (s) (first vacancy, December 31, 1960)
20,000
President does not designate Chairman
National Labor Relations Board
[5 members; 5 year terms; 3 expiring August 2; 2 expiring
December 16; members shall not engage in any other business,
vocation, or employment]
210
Member (s) (position now held by recess appointee)
$20,000
211
Member (s) (first vacancy August 27, 1961)
20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
212
General Counsel (s) [4 year term, shall not engage in any other
business, vocation, or employment]
20,000
Securities and Exchange Commission
[5 members; 5 year terms expiring June 15; not more
than 3 members to be of the same political party]
213
Member (s) (position now held by recess appointee)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
[7 members; 14 year terms; not more than 1 member to be
selected from each Fed. Res. district, with due regard
to a fair representation of financial, agricultural,
industrial, and commercial interests]
214
Member (s) (present vacancy)
$20,000
President designates Chairman for 4 year term at salary of $20,500
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Tariff Commission
[6 members; 6 year terms; not more than 3 members to be
of same political party, and in making appointments
members of different political parties shall be appointed
alternately as nearly as may be practicable]
215
Member (s) (first vacancy June 16, 1961)
$20,000
President designates Chairman annually at salary of $20,500
Export-Import Bank of Washington
[Board of Directors: 5 members; not more than 3
members to be of same political party]
216
President (s)
$21,000
217
First Vice President (s)
20,500
District of Columbia: Board of Commissioners
[3 members; 3 year terms; third member appinted from Army
Corps of Engineers as Engineer Commissioner with rank of
Captain or higher]
218
Member (s)
(first vacancy July 1, 1961)
$19,000
219
Member (s) (one position held by recess appointee)
19,000
Public Utilities Commission
[3 members; 3 year terms; Engineer Commissioner of the
District to constitute third member of the Commission]
220
Member (s) (first vacancy June 1, 1961)
$16,295
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
[3 members; no statutory limitation on terms]
221-3
Member (s)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
[3 members; 4 year terms; not more than 2
members to be of same political party]
224
Member (s)
(
first vacancy July 1, 1961)
$20,000
225
Member
(s) position now held by recess appointee)
20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
52
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
National Mediation Board
[3 members; 3 year terms; not more than 2 members to be of
same political party and no person interested in any
organization of employees or in any carrier shall be a
member of the Board]
226
Member (s) (first vacancy February 1, 1961)
$20,000
Chairmanship rotates annually at salary of $20,500
Subversive Activities Control Board
[5 members; 5 year terms; not more than 3
members to be of same political party]
227
Member (s) (first vacancy August 9, 1961)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
Renegotiation Board
[5 members; no statutory limitation on terms; the secretaries
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General
Services shall recommend one person from civilian life to serve
as member of the Board.]
228-232 Members (5) (s)
$20,000
President designates Chairman at salary of $20,500
No appointments within the first year to Tennessee Valley Authority, Commission on
Civil Rights, Indian Claims Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
53
D.
VARIOUS SINGLE-HEADED AGENCIES
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
233
Director (s)
$20,500
Selective Service
234
Director (s)
$20,000
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
235
Administrator (s)
$20,000
236
Deputy Administrator (s)
17,500
National Capital Transportation Agency
237
Administrator (s)
$19,000
238
Deputy Administrator (s)
18,500
Commission on Civil Rights
239
Staff Director (s)
$22,500
1
E.
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
United Nations
240
U. S. Representative, Economic & Social Council (s)
det'd by President
241
U. S. Representative, Trusteeship Council (S)
det'd by President
242-51
5 Special Representatives: 5 alternates, General Assembly(S)
det'd by President
252-61
5 Representatives; 5 alternates, UNESCO (S)
$15,000
1 The President appoints the Governors and their alternates, and the
Executive Directors and their alternates to the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund
and the Inter-American Development Bank. All serve without compen-
sation. Presently, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Under
Secretary of State serve as the Governor and alternate, respectively,
of the three organizations. Officials from the Treasury and State
Departments now serve as Executive Directors and alternates.
54
NO.
TITLE
SALARY
World Health Organization
262
U. S. Delegate (S)
$12,000
263
U. S. Alternate (S)
10,000
International Atomic Energy Agency
264-5
Representative and Deputy Representative (s)
det'd by President
International Refugee Organization
266
Representative of the United States
$12,000
267-8
Two alternates
10,000
55
III. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT TENDS
TO BE LIMITED
A. APPOINTMENTS OF CONSIDERABLE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPORTANCE
TITLE
SALARY
Librarian of Congress (S)
$20,000
Public Printer (s)
20,000
Architect of the Capitol
19,000
Heads of nine bureaus and offices, Department of the Navy -- Rank, pay and allowances
of rear admiral, upper
half, unless appointed
to a higher grade
Chiefs and deputy chiefs, Mutual Security Program Special
Missions, International Cooperation Administration
det'd by President
Examiners-in-Chief, Patent Office, Department of Commerce -- Fixed by Secretary of
Commerce (not in excess
of maximum rates for
Grade 17)
Governor of Guam, Department of the Interior [4-year term] (s)
$19,000
Governor of the Virgin Islands, Department of the Interior (s)
19,000
Governor of the Canal Zone (s)
19,000
U. S. Attorneys (one for each judicial district) (s) [4-year terms]
12,000-
20,000
Commissioned officers of Regular Corps (s) and Reserve Corps, Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Commissioned officers, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce (S)
Foreign Service Officers
$ 6,345-
17,250
Miscellaneous positions, including U. S. Marshals, Collectors of Customs,
Postmasters, Officers of Mints, Assayers, and others. Twelve different
types of positions are included in this category; in most cases, no
fixed terms are provided for.
56
B. APPOINTMENTS TO VARIOUS BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES NOT
INCLUDED IN GROUPS I OR II
To 14 advisory boards, commissions, etc.
In seven of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided
for; more than 30 offices in these agencies are filled
by presidential appointment.
In the remaining seven agencies, terms of from two to
six years are provided for; more than 70 offices in
these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.
To 7 memorial and monument commissions and other agencies.
In four of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided
for; 22 offices in these agencies are filled by presi-
dential appointment.
In the remaining three agencies, terms of from four to
eight years are provided for; 12 offices in these
agencies are filled by presidential appointment.
To 5 international boards and commissions.
No fixed terms are provided for; 29 offices in these
agencies are filled by presidential appointment.
To 34 miscellaneous other boards and commissions.
In eighteen of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided
for; more than 115 offices in these agencies are filled by
presidential appointment.
In the remaining sixteen agencies, terms of from three to
ten years are provided for; 139 offices in these agencies
are filled by presidential appointment.