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This file contains:
To Bob Haldeman from Martin Anderson re: transition. 4 pages. [Memo], 10/8/1968
Draft of Present and Future Soviet Policies in Relation to the United States by Frank G. Siscoe. 14 pages. [Report], 10/15/1968
From Sherm Unger to H.R. Haldeman re: November 6th. 2 pages. [Memo], 10/15/1968
To Richard Nixon from Glenn Olds re: staffing the President on ideas and planning for the future. 1 page. [Memo], 10/21/1968
For files from T.W. Evans re: federal salaries. 2 pages. [Memo], 10/22/1968
Exchanges Program with Soviet Union - Its Value and Future Usefulness by Frank G. Siscoe. 2 pages. [Report], 10/22/1968
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WHSF: Returned, 39-9
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This file contains:
To Bob Haldeman from Martin Anderson re: transition. 4 pages. [Memo], 10/8/1968
Draft of Present and Future Soviet Policies in Relation to the United States by Frank G. Siscoe. 14 pages. [Report], 10/15/1968
From Sherm Unger to H.R. Haldeman re: November 6th. 2 pages. [Memo], 10/15/1968
To Richard Nixon from Glenn Olds re: staffing the President on ideas and planning for the future. 1 page. [Memo], 10/21/1968
For files from T.W. Evans re: federal salaries. 2 pages. [Memo], 10/22/1968
Exchanges Program with Soviet Union - Its Value and Future Usefulness by Frank G. Siscoe. 2 pages. [Report], 10/22/1968
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Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
39
9
10/08/1968
Memo
To Bob Haldeman from Martin Anderson re:
transition. 4 pages.
39
9
10/15/1968
Report
Draft of Present and Future Soviet Policies in
Relation to the United States by Frank G.
Siscoe. 14 pages.
39
9
10/15/1968
Memo
From Sherm Unger to H.R. Haldeman re:
November 6th. 2 pages.
39
9
10/21/1968
Memo
To Richard Nixon from Glenn Olds re:
staffing the President on ideas and planning
for the future. 1 page.
39
9
10/22/1968
Memo
For files from T.W. Evans re: federal
salaries. 2 pages.
39
9
10/22/1968
Report
Exchanges Program with Soviet Union - Its
Value and Future Usefulness by Frank G.
Siscoe. 2 pages.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Page 1 of 1
October 8, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Martin Anderson
RE:
Transition
Although the people in the research/writing area have
done no further work on the transition problem since our last
discussion, a volunteer, Professor Wesley McCain -- a colleague
of mine at Columbia -- has completed a fairly complete,
comprehensive survey of the non-civil service federal positions
available for presidential appointment.
This survey breaks down all the positions of the
Executive Office of the President, the Executive Departments
and the Independent Agencies into five employment classifications
ranked according to their policy determining character.
According to the published reports now available,
there are more than 2,500 appointments to be made:
Presidential Appointment (needs Senate Approval)
966
Presidential Appointment
428
Schedule C Appointment
1,118
Total
2,512
It should be noted that this survey does not reflect
all the personnel increases in recent years, and the total number
of appointments may run 10 to 20 percent higher than the
figures shown.
- 2 -
for the positions now identified in the 86 Executive
Departments and Agencies, our current survey includes the
job title, name of the present incumbent and a short
biographical sketch of the key appointments.
The top priority items are:
1. Identification of key positions that must be
filled as soon as possible after the election.
2. Expanding and updating the survey already
completed.
Key Positions
There are two factors which must be considered
simultaneously -- the importance of the appointment, and its
urgency. By these two criteria the following areas of appointment
are critical:
1. The White House office
2. Central Intelligence Agency
3. Department of State
4. Department of Defense (Air force, Army and Navy)
5. Atomic Energy Commission
6. Bureau of the Budget
7. Council of Economic Advisors
8. Office of Emergency Planning
9. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
10. Department of the Treasury
11. Department of Justice
- 3 -
The following positions within each Executive
Department and Independent Agency are critical to their
effective functioning. They should be staffed with people who
are loyal to the President and in fundamental agreement with
his policies. These are:
1. Congressional Liaison
2. Appropriations
3. Legal Counsel
4. Press Relations
5. Personnel
Recommendation
The current survey should be expanded and updated to
include all positions. The following information should be
included:
1. Job title
2. Brief job description
3. Name of incumbent
4. Employment classification (i.e., PAS, PA or C)
5. Grade or salary
6. Tenure classification
7. Tenure expiration
During the fall of 1960, such a survey was made by the
Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and published
as the "Green Book." This was not published in normal channels
and is very difficult to obtain.
- 4 -
If possible we should attempt to get this Committee
to conduct a similar survey; if not, we should assemble a
small staff and do the job ourselves.
The present composition of the Committee is:
Republican
Democrat
Carlson, Kansas
Monroney, Oklahoma
fong, Hawaii
Yarborough, Texas
Boggs, Delaware
Randolph, West Virginia
fannin, Arizona
McGee, Wyoming
Brewster, Maryland
Hartke, Indiana
Burdick, North Dakota
Hollings, South Carolina
Staff Director: John Burzio
Frank G. Siscoe
DRAFT - NOT FOR
PUBLICATION IN THIS
FORM
October 15, 1968
Present and Future Soviet Policies in Relation
to the United States
The international environment in the 1970's is likely
to be more turbulent and competitive, and tensions
between the U. S. and the USSR will persist. The
United States should expect that the Soviet Union is
going to make decisions which will be more uncomfortable
and difficult for the U. S. than heretofore. Parital
accommodations, from time to time, are possible of
realization where overlapping interests exist; but the
Soviet Union's overriding goal over the foreseeable
future will be to reduce U. S. power, prestige and
influence to the extent this may be possible without
seriously jeopardizing the security of the USSR.
Over the next decade the Soviet Union will remain the
principal military threat to the U. S. Soviet military
power has reached an unprecedented level and, in Europe,
the Soviet Union continues to strengthen its already
strong military posture. During the past three years
the USSR has substantially increased its strategic
ability to damage severely the U.S.; and present
Soviet programs reflect a determination to achieve
parity, if not superiority, with the U. S. in strategic
missiles. Subject to the important qualifications of
relative resources and priorities, the main thrust of
Soviet strategic doctrine is in the direction of the
achievement of superiority: both qualitative and quan-
titative. Over the foreseeable future, the USSR can be
expected to continue expansion of its strategic forces
and to continue the gradual increasing of the reach of
its general purpose military forces.
As the capacity of the Soviet Union and the U. S. to
do the other devastating damage becomes more nearly
equal, a state of strategic balance and of mutual nuclear
deterrence is developing. In the face of assured
- 2 -
destruction capabilities, both the Soviet Union and the
United States have great difficulty in defining those
national interests, the protection of which would justify
the use of nuclear weapons. However, the rapid growth
in Soviet strategic nuclear forces is unlikely to lead
the Soviet Union to take high risks of nuclear war in
confrontation with the United States.
In situations of mutual deterrence, there can be constant
risks of conflict as the Soviet Union probes for weak-
nesses and seeks to expand Soviet power and influence
in the world. These risks would become dangerous if the
Soviet Union mistakenly sensed a faster U. S. withdrawal
from power positions or a reduced U. S. willingness to
compete actively with Soviet or Soviet-supported forces.
The Soviet leaders may be more inclined to intervene in
Third World areas, if they have an expectation of reduced
chances of American opposition; and they may see greater
prospect of using conventional military force without
risking crisis or confrontation with the U. S. The
increasingly greater reach of Soviet conventional forces,
even though significantly behind the U. S. in all-over
capability, may also persuade Soviet leaders to intervene
in areas non-contiguous to the Soviet Union; but inter-
ventions would be more likely in areas closer to the
Soviet Union, such as the Middle East and North Africa.
Apart from the questions of actual employment of growing
strategic forces or their availability for deterrent
purposes, the Soviet Union will probably flaunt its
strategic power to enhance its political prestige and
to increase its political influence in other countries.
As part of a political strategy, Soviet forces may be
drawn into local conflicts, especially when invited in
by a local government or a revolutionary movement, and
less willing to withdraw. Prior Soviet intervention
would face the U. S. with alternatives of local or
strategic confrontation or non-involvement. In previous
crises (Cuba and Berlin), U. S. nuclear superiority has
exerted an inhibiting influence on Soviet moves.
In Soviet military policy the general purpose forces,
in the past, have been developed and disposed primarily
to cope with a military threat from Europe, and this
European orientation will almost certainly persist for
- 3 -
the foreseeable future. At the same time, the Soviet
Union is becoming increasingly interested in the Soviet
military posture vis-a-vis China and in military capa-
bilities to support Soviet political interests in other
parts of the world.
Soviet airborne and amphibious assault capabilities
will probably expand considerably during the next few
years, assisted by the rapid growth of the Soviet
merchant fleet. In the Mediterranean and in the Indian
Ocean the Soviet Union also has demonstrated its increased
capabilities to conduct anti-submarine warfare and
sustained long-range naval operations. These improved
capabilities would enable Soviet military forces to move
in political support of more distant clients. As a
matter of policy, however, the Soviet Union has preferred
to seek its ends in distant areas through the support of
indigenous forces, a practice which reduces both mili-
tary risks and adverse political reactions. The Soviet
forces lack the sea and air combat capabilities neces-
sary for distant operations against serious opposition,
and there appears to be no evident Soviet program to
achieve these capabilities.
The imminent prospect of a mutual nuclear deterrent may
dispel Soviet caution in Europe and lead to a reassess-
ment of Soviet ability to apply pressure for a solution
of outstanding problems, especially those of Berlin and
Germany. The Soviets may also view the reaction to the
Czechoslovakian situation and a weakened NATO as offer-
ing additional political opportunities. In the past,
however, Soviet policy towards Western Europe has tended
to be prudent and Soviet leaders have learned that
exaggerated Soviet militancy has had the counter-productive
effect of strengthening NATO.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin collective leadership is a fairly
wobbly structure, being a coalition of factions embrac-
ing different interests and views, whose existence is
always in doubt. In the past fifteen years the Soviet
Union has moved from absolute dictatorship, to collective
rule, to one-man leadership and, to the present collective.
While no inevitable pattern emerges, changes in the
Soviet leadership will probably take place within the
next few years which could produce abrupt policy swings,
- 4 -
especially if a single, forceful leader comes out on
top again.
The current leadership, in contrast with the more spec-
tacular Khrushchev, tends towards the basically con-
servative and orthodox, both in external and internal
views. The present collective leadership has survived
for three years, and the main lines of Soviet doctrine
and policy have remained substantially unaltered. How-
ever, an increased influence has been achieved in the
Arab states, in the countries along the USSR's southern
periphery, and especially in the Mediterranean. The
feeling of detente did make some progress in Western
Europe before Czechoslovakia and perhaps could, with
effort, be revived. But Sino-Soviet relations have
continued to deteriorate, the Soviet hold in Eastern
Europe weakened and Soviet progress in the Third World
has been spotted with setbacks. Serious foreign policy
difficulties undoubtedly have arisen among the leader-
ship on such questions as Soviet conduct during the
1967 Middle East crisis and the 1968 Czechoslovak con-
frontation and invasion.
Persistent disagreements almost surely exist within
the leadership on internal matters, especially the
thorny problem of resource allocation. The leadership
has delayed or compromised on fundamental internal
demands, the strength of which is uncertain. These
include: greater freedom for the creative intelligentsia
and scientific community; reform of the centralized
economic management and planning; curb on arbitrary
use of power and a new constitution; and greater, agri-
cultural and rural social investment. The attitude of
the Soviet military toward political and economic
matters, despite its traditional stance of noninterven-
tion, may become critical if the political leadership
remains indecisive.
The instinctive reaction of the current Soviet leader-
ship at home and abroad has been towards the use of
dogmatic methods, which resist the realities of the
contemporary world. Additional control measures are
likely over the next immediate period. If the economy
should falter or serious reverses be encountered abroad
- 5 -
or in the Communist world, the intensification of
controversy within the Politburo could bring important
leadership changes, with the emergence of a more force-
ful leadership being a probability. Whether this new
forceful leadership would be a danger or a benefit for
the West is difficult to predict, although it seems
likely over the short run the changes would be accom-
panied by a rise of tensions and uncertainty.
Any Soviet leadership recognizes that the Soviet Union
is inevitably involved in a worldwide rivalry with the
United States and, where pragmatically possible, is
determined to change the international relationship of
forces to the Soviet advantage. Soviet leaders bring a
basic attitude of suspicion and distrust to any considera-
tion of U. S policies and see the U. S. as the principal
obstacle to the growth of Soviet influence in world
affairs and the only significant military threat to
Soviet security. Any substantial change in this basic
hostility is not foreseeable over the next ten years.
Recent Soviet foreign policy has been characterized by
a persistent disengagement of its national goals from
communist ideology, a disposition to demand recognition
as a global power and a conscious pursuit of alternate
policies of confrontation and collaboration with the
United States. The USSR, in its search to insure its
long-term security, must compete for influence in the
world with Communist China as well as with the U. S.
and its European allies.
Soviet foreign policy is historically a compound of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, pragmatically applied, and
Great Russian national interests. While Soviet leaders
still express belief in the ultimate worldwide victory
of the Communist system, they have not regarded that
victory as a concrete or immediate task of Soviet foreign
policy or of Soviet military forces. The decline of the
world-revolutionary commitment and the concentration on
11
the national interests of a great power have been accom-
panied by the growth of Soviet capabilities creating
greater opportunities for pushing its great-power goals.
Ideology continues to serve the Soviet leaders as a.
framework for political, economic and social analysis
and as a vehicle for rationalization and explanation of
- 6 -
Soviet behavior. In this role, Soviet ideology seeks
to explain Moscow's status as a global power as being
consistent with its self-appointed role as spokesman
for the Third World against "international imperialism".
Soviet policy in Europe is designed to preserve and
improve its military and diplomatic position in the
heart of Europe. Soviet policy is directed toward the
reduction or elimination of U. S. influence, the isola-
tion and containment of West Germany and the weakening
and destruction of the Atlantic Alliance. Germany is the
main issue in contention with the West, and the principal
elements of the Soviet position are the maintenance of
the division of Germany, the continuance of the present
frontiers and the nonaccess by West Germany to nuclear
weapons. Soviet policy seeks to prevent the develop-
ment of the latent threat of Germany to the Soviet posi-
tion in Central Europe and encourages the ultimate dis-
engagement of the U. S. from Europe, which would remove
the protection of the U. S. over West Germany and the
threat of West Germany's developing into a military
power in its own right.
In Eastern Europe the hegemony of the USSR will be
increasingly confronted with countervailing nationalistic
and economic influences. The Warsaw Pact remains the
most important institutional framework for the exertion
of the USSR's influence in Eastern Europe and for the
maintenance of Communist solidarity against Western
Germany. The Czechoslovak invasion demonstrated Moseow'
deep concern with the highly strategic position of the
northern states (Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany)
and disquiet over any possible set of circumstances
which would weaken the Soviet position in Central Europe.
The southern states (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) are
almost surely considered less strategically important.
This seems especially evident in the Soviet handling of
Romania, where the Soviet Union has demonstrated its
reluctant willingness to accommodate itself to Romanian
recalcitrance within the Warsaw Pact and Romanian desire
for changes in structure and arrangements.
The military and political interests of the Soviet Union
in Eastern Europe are so paramount that the efforts of
the countries there to loosen their bonds with the USSR
will be a delicate procedure carrying varying degrees
- 7 -
of risk. Eastern Europe has been a relatively stable
area since World War II, primarily because of Soviet
political and military pressures. In contrast, as
these controls are increasingly resisted over the next
decade, more instability is likely. Setting aside the
supply lines to Soviet forces in East Germany, ^Poland
is potentially the most explosive country in Eastern
Europe. But the outlook for Poland is bleak over the
next ten years, and, confronted with an impossible
geographical position, a weak economic situation and a
lack of flexible, capable leadership, Poland is likely
to remain tightly and unwillingly tied to the Soviet
Union.
The present hostility and rivalry between the Soviet
Union and China will probably continue through the next
decade, regardless of leadership changes in either
country. On key issues the Soviet and Chinese leader-
ships diverge: the theory of "wars of national libera-
tion", arms control measures, attitude toward the United
States and the leadership within the Communist bloc.
Added to these are fundamental national incompatibilities
of historic animosity, geographical claims, economic
divisions and conflicting security objectives.
Future changes in Soviet and Chinese leadership could
affect the recurrent degrees of hostility. In the
Soviet Union, the collective leadership is basically
unstable, and, in China, Mao is mortal. Yet, in spite
of their deep-seated differences, both the Soviet Union
and China have something to gain from avoiding a further
deterioration in their relations. Both still regard
communism as a single movement, suffering from a tempo-
rary schism, and each feels entitled to lead it. Des-
pite the bitterness of polemics, each blames current
problems on the opposite leadership. Thus, the door
is left ajar for a future reconciliation, should new
leaderships emerge. Although remote, a pragmatic recon-
ciliation between the Soviet Union and China and a sub-
merging of their differences in order to adopt a common
front against the United States, cannot be excluded. A
military Chinese leadership, especially if faced with
threatened economic failure, could desire greater
cooperation and economic and military aid from the Soviet
Union. However, under any set of foreseeable circumstances,
- 8 -
it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would be
tempted to give China military assistance of a nuclear
nature.
The maintenance of fanatical ideological and revolu-
tionary zeal in China after Mao, simultaneous with an
increasingly "revisionist" Soviet policy, would lead to
greater friction. Chinese attitudes would be crucially
influenced by U.S.-Soviet relations. A genuine Soviet
detente with the United States, coupled with treaties
on arms control matters; a more relaxed Soviet policy
toward Eastern Europe; and closer relationships between
Eastern and Western Europe, including the two Germanies
would confirm Chinese conviction of U. S.-Soviet collu-
sion and the Soviet betrayal of the Communist cause.
Any Soviet moves to reduce Chinese influence, especially
in Asia, would exacerbate Sino-Soviet tensions and
increased Chinese provocations against Soviet citizens
would further ruffle feelings. Since early 1963, Soviet
military strength and air defenses, including strategic
weapons, have been strengthened along the Sino-Soviet
border, but these developments appear to be more precau-
tionary in nature and in answer to a border security
problem than a major military threat in the near term.
While the Soviet leadership probably discounts the like-
lihood of an early, large-scale conflict with China, it
is clearly apprehensive about the long-term prospects
for growth in China's military power.
The Soviet Union, since 1955, has conducted an active,
but generally cautious, campaign for influence in the
Third World of less developed countries. About that
time, several radical states were considered by Soviet
ideologists as having embarked on the "non-capitalist"
path, and Soviet leaders appeared to conclude that Commu-
nist goals could be more effectively pursued through
cooperating with nationalist governments than through
their overthrow by Communist parties. The overturn of
"non-capitalist" regimes in Indonesia and Ghana and
instability in other radical states seem to have made
the Soviet Union less sanguine regarding the speed of
favorable developments in the Third World. There is
some evidence of discontent among the Soviet leadership
over the commitment of Soviet resources and prestige to
- 9 -
clients whose interests may be different from those of
the Soviet Union and whose actions can be unpredictable
and uncontrollable.
Soviet attention has been devoted to the strategic
Middle East and North Africa, where Moscow has success-
fully exploited anti-Western attitudes in Arab countries.
The Soviet Union has repaired much of the damage done
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the USSR will doubt-
less continue to try to build presence and influence in
the Arab world, to the West's detriment. However, the
Soviet leaders will probably continue to balance support
of the Arabs, pressure on the Israelis to withdraw,
military assistance to Arab countries, and discouraging
the Arabs from reopening hostilities. In Asia and
Africa, military aid programs have served Soviet policy
objectives well. These programs have enabled the Soviet
Union to play a role in regional disputes, to establish
contact with military elites and to harass Western rela-
tions with Third World countries. The Soviet Union has
consistently tended to assume certain risks in extending
military aid, and will probably continue to use this
instrument of foreign policy in the same fashion over
the foreseeable future.
The Middle East is the area most likely to be marked by
turmoil and local war over the next decade. Despite any
Soviet wishes to prevent another Arab-Israeli conflict,
Arab frustration and Israeli truculence are likely to
lead again to hostilities, with resultant pressures and
increased tensions for the U. S. and the USSR.
The Soviet Union is now seeking acceptance in Iran and
Turkey as a "good neighbor" and hopes to capitalize on
the growth of neutralist sentiment, but the Soviet
leaders probably anticipate any expansion of Soviet
influence in Iran and especially in Turkey will be
gradual.
In Latin America, the Soviet Union has emphasized
gradualist policies based on diplomatic, cultural and
commercial activities. Clearly, Latin America has a low
priority for Soviet politcymakers who will probably
continue to stress probing tactics rather than to seek
revolutionary situations.
- 10 -
It seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will adopt any
dramatic changes of policy in the Third World, unless
the world power balance is abruptly distorted, or will
accept additional military or political risks. Except
where gains appear clear, the Soviet Union will probably
continue to be circumspect in supporting "national
liberation" forces. However, risks and material support
of current dimensions will probably continue to be
assumed, because of what the Soviet leaders conceive as
the USSR's need to assert its legitimate interests in
practically all areas of the world.
Soviet foreign policies over the next decade could range
between two extremes.
и
One possibility is the Saviet acceptance of the path of.
genuine coexistence with the West, which would include
a political solution for Europe, the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Central Europe and the abandonment
of the expansionist ideology of communism. This choice,
based on conciliation and cooperation with the U. S.,
would lessen worldwide tensions markedly, avoid another
strategic arms race, and permit the concentration of
Soviet resources on internal development. This choice
would lead to a sure detente. It should be immediately
stated that present or likely Soviet leaders will not
give serious consideration to this alternative.
On the opposite end of the spectrum of choices is the
>
high risk of war policy, based upon demonstrative and
unrelenting hostility to the United States and aggres-
sive acts against U. S. interests in areas of contention.
This possibility would ignore economic costs, produce a
spiral in the strategic arms race, and bring a drive for
weapons' superiority in every field. Implicit in this
choice would be the assumption of political and military
courses of action leading to direct confrontations with
U. S. forces. The selection of this policy would entail
serious risks endangering the survival of the USSR and
a disregard of the consequences of general war. There
are no evident considerations compelling such a drastic
and extraordinary change in Soviet policy.
The range of Soviet foreign policy decisions is likely
to be considerably narrower than the above-indicated
- 11 -
extremes. Pressures within the Soviet Union, rivalry
and independent forces among the communist countries,
growing power centers in Western Europe, Japan and
China, uncertainties in the developing countries and
policies adopted by the United States will tend to
inhibit sharp or sudden changes in Soviet policies and
to influence some degree of accommodation between
impalatable and irreconcilable choices. This is not
to say that there will not be times of serious tensions
or threats of war among the major powers; and there will
almost surely be armed clashes among smaller powers,
armed intervention by major powers and internal revolu-
tions which would attract the introduction of other
outside forces. In an international political atmos-
phere dominated by uncertainties, the USSR will compete
for influence and position; but the Soviet knowledge
of misjudgment in the past and of the increasing complex-
ity of international forces in the future should avoid
drastic decisions involving clear U. S. interests.
Mutual nuclear deterrence is likely to persist between
the U. S. and the USSR through the next decade. Present
Soviet strategic force increases give the USSR a capa-
bility it has never had before, but an assessment of
relative military capabilities is becoming increasingly
complex. While the considerable growth in Soviet
strategic forces is probably not sufficient in itself
for the Soviet Union to run a high risk of nuclear
confrontation with the U. S., potential options for
moves in Third World areas will be created by the
greater reach of Soviet conventional forces.
The relative tenseness of U. S.-Soviet relations is
likely to depend more on the Soviet Union's assessment
of its national interests, rather than on its strict
adherence to Communist goals of world domination. Con-
servative and dogmatic tendencies are evident within
the Soviet leadership, regarding both internal and
external policies. Soviet leaders, both present and
potential, seem likely to be antagonistic toward the
United States, and are almost certain to follow an
active and assertive foreign policy in their efforts
to expand Soviet influence. U. S. and Soviet interests
will continue to conflict in many parts of the world,
and the U. S.-Soviet relationship is likely to continue
- 12 -
to oscillate between contention short of military con-
frontation and limited cooperation. All risks of
military conflict cannot be precluded even if the
Soviet Union tries to avoid direct conflict with the
U. S. Miscalculations are possible and the Soviet
Union could get involved by inadvertence or by judging
mistakenly that the U. S. would not resist or intervene.
A major variable in U. S.-Soviet relationships for the
coming decade is the uncertain interaction between
possible U. S. withdrawals and likely Soviet efforts
to expand.
The Soviet Union seeks to become a modern and efficient
industrial society, and greater attention is now being
given to consumer demands. But the Soviet leaders,
saddled with an antiquated Marxist economic system,
remain faced with fundamental economic problems, such
as the need for agricultural investment, the reform of the
collective farm system and modernization of economic
management and planning. Varying degrees of economic
reform have been proposed, but prospects are for a con-
tinuation of the cautious approach and the primacy of
central planning, with stubborn opposition to greater
autonomy and freer play for market forces.
Resource allocation is a perennial problem requiring
perplexing choices, and one cause for dispute within
the leadership almost certainly has been ever-increasing
military and space expenditures, which compete with
insistently higher demands for agriculture, consumer
services, roads and housing. Military and space expen-
ditures are forced higher by global competition with
the United States, but the Soviet economy is forced to
absorb these costs. There is little or no likelihood
that the Soviet leaders will be able to reduce arms
spending without distinct, and as yet undetected, moves
toward accommodation with the United States.
One important indicator of Soviet intentions toward
Ky
accommodation with the West would be any change in the
Soviet attitude toward the decentralization of the state
monopoly of foreign trade. In international economic
affairs, the Soviet leaders from Lenin onward, have
stressed the key role of the monopoly of foreign trade
on the Socialist economy. Up to now, the Soviet
- 13 -
economists have spiritedly rejected the cautious experi-
mentation in Eastern Europe with the principle of state
monopoly and the view that socialist industry needed to
adjust to foreign market conditions and practices.
A few comments could be ventured about the future
evolution of Soviet society, the prospect for basic
changes and their effect on foreign policy. From the
perspective of the past 10-15 years one can see definite
changes. With the denigration of Stalinism has come a
substantial modification of the system of terror as an
instrument of power. The party, rather than the police,
has emerged as the dominating instrument of control,
which permits a greater discussion of problems and the
introduction of various pressures on the decision-making
process. Within strictly defined limits, an increased
measure of personal and cultural freedom has accompanied
a perceptibly higher standard of living.
In the foreign field, the modification of the theories
of violent revolution and inevitable war set the stage
to make the design of "peaceful coexistence" more plaus-
ible to the outside world. Yet the Soviet purpose in
"peaceful coexistence", while fostering less tension,
has not been to achieve harmonious relations, but to
continue an active political struggle. Soviet leaders
have been at pains to deny any prospect for the long-
term coalescence of capitalism and socialism in the
evolution of a "hybrid society".
Lower tensions from time to time have not modified the
Soviet refusal to confront the basic sources of conflict
with the U. S. The resolution of the central issues in
Soviet-American relations will be difficult and prolonged
and, as matters now stand, cannot be settled by imme-
diate negotiation or compromise. In each case, a pre-
requisite is a radical shift in Soviet outlook and
priorities which will only result from cumulative effects
of many factors, some of which are:
(1) Further erosion of the militant and aggressive
aspects of Communist ideology;
(2) Lack of success in expansionism and interven-
tionism;
- 14 -
(3) Greater concern with the Chinese threat to
Soviet security;
(4) Increased demands for internal consumption
and welfare; and
(5) Decline in general fear of the West, espe-
cially Germany.
Soviet views are persistently held, and past experience
suggests that the required shifts in Soviet attitudes
will take an extended period of time, well beyond the
end of the next decade. The Soviet state and leader-
ship have made commitments which challenge U. S.
political survival, and deserve to be treated with
the greatest prudence for many years to come. Yet,
various pressures for change are almost certain to
continue. In the long run, the impact of the Soviet
system on the outside world will depend in large part
on economic power, whether by way of example, or in
capacity to aid, or to threaten. Powerful world econo-
mic forces, managed realistically in an atmosphere of
mutual advantage, could well influence Soviet economic
developments. Competing claims for resources will con-
tinue to be a persistent problem. But there is no
immediate or direct relationship between economic
factors and changes in foreign policy. Trends in the
West, in the less developed areas and within the Commu-
nist world may diverge from Soviet expectations and
encourage gradual and de facto changes in policy or
emphasis. Expansionist goals may take on more and more
a neutralistic flavor. Soviet society will probably
continue to evolve, with living conditions improving
and an increased preoccupation with internal problems.
But obstacles to internal political change are formid-
able and the structure of autocratic power will stub-
bornly resist modifications.
The process of change, which will probably be neither
orderly nor steady, should produce, in time, a Soviet
regime willing to curb its expansionism and to accept
accommodation, but the requisite shifts will involve a
prolonged historic process. The evolution over the next
decade, however, will be important to show guide-lines
and bench-marks which will give a better idea of how long
the road may be.
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Haldeman
Transition
FROM:
Sherm Unger
DATE:
October 15th
Ehalichna
RE:
November 6th
Pursuant to your request here are my thoughts on November 6th.
On that date, RN will be hit by an overwhelming barrage of politicoes,
contributors and power brokers all of whom feel they hold an IOU and all
seeking Federal appointments, jobs and influence. The best way to handle
the problem is to have in being an organization charged with the responsibility
of talking to these people, receiving their input, and making preliminary re-
commendations for appointments. This would allow RN to concentrate on more
important things while placating the "friends" with whom we need to continue
good relations.
This operation should be divided into several groups, one, and the
most important, should be primarily concerned with the complex problem of
Cabinet appointments (let me add parentheticly that I feel with these key
appointments the qualities of loyality and responsiveness to RN should out-
weigh national stature or political import -- for historical examples of
the problems that can develop when the first qualities fail to outweigh the
latter read the appropriate chapters in Neustadt's Presidential Power).
Another group which should be subdivided, should bear the responsibility of
locating and recruiting people of specialized talent for specific re-
sponsibilities.
With reference to the second group subcommittees could, for ex-
ample, concentrate on: (A) HUD with its crucial positions supervising
demonstration cities and metropolitan planning schemes (these can be levers
against Democrat urban machines) as well as urban renewal and open space
program; (B) Buruea of Budget with its obvious need for topflight personnel
with the political experience to evaluate and budget key programs with an
eye toward their political impact; (c) IRS with politically oriented
personnel in key positions early for obvious reasons; (D) an examination of
Government Commissions with an eye toward expanding the staffs and turning
over the personnel; (E) the immediate selection of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals.
There are 93 U.S. Attorneys with 797 Assistants authorized and 93 U.S.
Marshals with 684 Deputies authorized. Most of the appointees are subject
to at least veto from state political organizations, but should not under
any circumstances be hacks. This is an immediate opportunity to put into
position a nationwide political organization of our own, if the recruiting is
done with care (but quickly, while there are plenty of slots around to
give the second raters). Having just spent 3 months talking all day to our
political types (down to county and city chairmen) around the nation, having
practiced law for more than 15 years, and being interested in the development
-2-
of political organizations this is an area in which I might be of specific
assistance, as we discussed, and an area in which I would be interested.
If this outline meets with your approval, I would like to start
on a more detailed plan to handle the problems involved, since there are
only 76 days from election to inaugeration and there is much to be done
in that period. We can discuss this further when you have time.
AGNEW
Transition
Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 661-6400
MEMORANDUM
October 21, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
He
SUBJECT:
Staffing the President on ideas and planning for the future
A recurring theme from top leaders of industry, government, the professions and
academia I have interviewed over these past six months, is how little impact the
frontiers of knowledge have on the content and conduct of government. They
complain that the President, who presides at the center of government, is rarely
and poorly staffed to utilize the latest insight of the various institutes, centers,
research and development, for both planning and management. They point out
there is not even a central computer system for the White House to compile and
coordinate contemporary information for decision making, much less, long
range planning. They remark that entrenched habit, bureaucracy, and repetition
of mistakes thrive in a climate where there is little consistent attention given to
the input of "break through", and future-looking ideas.
Though not peculiar to government, this problem generally is giving rise to
specialized institutes (the most recent, Institute for the Future, Middletown,
Connecticut) whose principal function is to focus new ideas on the planning and
management of the future. The pace of change and the magnitude of present
problems and their interrelation, make this one of the most urgent requirements
of the Presidency. Because Presidential responsibility covers the entire range
of national problems, it must be informed by the most contemporary, comprehensive,
and integrative information and ideas available - not only from within but beyond
the resources of government. The issues are too grave to be left to the slow
bureaucratic process of "bubbling to the top" or the ad hoc chance of random ideas
filtering in from outside. What is required is systematic provision for this staffing
function within the White House, properly linked and programmed to the major
centers inside and outside government at work in these frontier areas.
Recommendation:
That following the election you appoint a special assistant and small, select staff
whose principal purpose is to provide a comprehensive contemporary, and
continuous editing and input of ideas for the future, to inform your thinking,
planning, and management of government.
cc: Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman, Garment and Keogh
File
TO SDE
RN
MEMORANDUR
FOR: Files
FROM: T. W. Evans
1w2
October 22, 1968
I talked today with Fredrick Kappel who, among other
things, is Chairman of the President's Commission on
Federal Salaries. Previously Mr. Kappel had sent me
the attached materials. Perhaps the most informative
is the newspaper article speculating on salary increases
in key positions. Mr. Kappel noted that his initial
report had been turned in in June, 1967 and has not
been made public. The next meeting of his committee,
and probably the last meeting, will be held before
December 1, when the final report is due.
It would probably be appropriate to get back in touch
with Mr. Kappel after November 5, if our interest in
this matter continues. In the meantime, I am sending
to the Government Printing Office for the Randall and
Folsom Reports, which were the reports of predecessor
commissions in this area and which Mr. Kappel admits
had great influence on present thinking.
CC: John Mitchell
The Federal Diary
Pay Raises for Civilian, Military Personnel
Will Cost More Than $2 Billion Annually
By Jerry Kluttz
and July won't be ready for includes AFL-CIO President
employes and the next admin-
raises for military personnel
about six weeks.
George Meany and John Cor.
istration, no matter who is
under a "total compensation"
More than 5.5 million Fed-
But BLS was persuaded to
son, a management specialist.
elected President, isn't likely
concept. But military people
eral civilian and military per-
make rough estimates of the
Two members each were ap-
to junk it.
who now get "free" retirement
sonnel are in line next year
probable 1969 raises by the
for pay raises that will cost in
Kappel Committee, which
pointed by the Vice President,
This means the new Presi-
benefits would have to con-
excess of $2 billion annually.
must recommend adjustments
dent must earmark over $2,bil-
tribute 6.5 per cent of their
Speaker of the House and
salaries to a retirement fund
The first of the planned se-
in he salaries of Federal exec-
President of the Senate.
lion in his 1970 budget to fi-
ries of salary increases could
nance Federal pay raises, and
like their counterparts in the
utives to the President by Dec.
Kappel, Meany and Corson
Civil Service.
be effective as early as next
in the salaries of Federal exec-
were all members of a panel
an amount of that magnitude
Allowances and differen-
Feb. 15, for the Vice Presi-
needed by the Committee to
that advised the President, at
won't be easy to find.
dent, Cabinet members, Fed-
guide It in its recommenda-
his behest, on pay raises for
The new President also will
tials, now separate from basic
military salaries, would be a
eral judges, members of Con-
tions.
Federal executives. Mr. John-
soon learn that postal em-
gress and other Federal execu-
If all goes as planned, Mr.
son shelved their recommen-
ployes won't be satisfied with
part of basic pay.
tives who haven't had salary
Johnson will earmark funds in
dations and wouldn't make
their July 1 raise, comparabil-
adjustments since 1964.
his 1970 budget, to be sent to
them public.
ity or not. In fact, the Na.
More than 2 million classi-
Congress in early January, to
Whatever the President's
tional Postal Union wants the
fied, postal and related em-
finance higher salaries for
reasons for sitting on the first
comparability principle
ployes have been promised, by
Federal executives. In fact, the
report, he's likely to get some-
junked, and it will demand a
law, another raise next July 1
law requires this to be done.
what similar proposals from
15 per cent increase next year.
that will make their salaries
the Kappel committee, which
Military pay rates are an-
Also as provided by law, Mr.
fully comparable with private
other salary problem the next
Johnson will send the report
was set up by law. And the
pay rates. They have had six
President is required to act on
President and Congress must
of the Kappel group to Con-
increases over the past six
it.
face. The Pentagon wants
gress, perhaps by Jan. 15-
THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, September 15, 1968
only five days before he re-
The first Kappel report is
them overhauled and tied
years.
The 1969 increases are ex-
tires. Congress would then
known to have recommended
closely with pay rates and ben-
pected to average "a minimum
have just 30 days to act on the
these salary increases:
efits for white-collar classi-
of 8 per cent" for the 1.3 mil-
Vice President, $43,000 to
fieds.
report. Otherwise it would go
lion classifieds and related
$60,000; Chief Justice of the
On paper, the Pentagon
into effect automatically.
employes, and "about 5 per
United States, $40,000 to
plan proposes major pay
cent" for the 736,000 postal
Congress could only block
$60,000; Associate Justices of
workers. Last July's 5 per cent
the recommendations by cast-
the Supreme Court, $39,500 to
raise on top of a 6 per cent in-
ing a majority vote to disagree
$58,000; Cabinet members,
crease 9 months earlier was
with all or a part of its recom-
$35,000 to $55,000; members of
supposed to have brought
mendations, or by approving
Congress, $30,000 to $45,000.
most postal salaries to parity
legislation of its own to adjust
Heads of independent agen-
levels with private industry.
executive salaries.
cies such as VA, Space and
Another law guarantees the
The law that set up the pro-
General Services, $30,000 to
3.5 million military personnel
cedure for the review of exec-
$45,000; Undersceretaries,
the same percentage increase
utive salaries every four years
$30,000 to $41,000; Assistant
given classifieds. If classifieds
by a high-level citizen group
Secretaries, $30,000 to $40,000,
get 8 per cent next July 1, SO
was approved last December.
and members of boards and
will the military under that
It was written by Rep. Morris
commissions, $28,000 to
statute.
K. Udall (D-Ariz.). In essence,
$35,000.
The 8 and 5 per cent aver-
it gives Congress veto power
In their platforms, both
age figures are "rough projec-
over pay rates recommended
major political parties have
tions" made by the Bureau of
by citizen study committees.
embraced the principle of sal-
Labor Statistics which has not
Mr. Johnson appointed
ary comparability for Federal
competed its annual task of
Frederick Kappel, former
comparing Federal pay rates
president of American Tele-
with salaries for similar jobs phone & Telegraph Co., chair-
in industry. BLS' final report man of the nine-member
of its study made last June panel, and his appointees also
FRANK G. S ISCOE
October 22, 1968
SUBJECT: Exchanges Program with Soviet Union -- Its Value and Future
Usefulness
RECOMMENDATION: The exchanges program with the Soviet Union, now ten
years old, has had qualified success; and it is in the
United States' interest that the program be continued
and, where possible, expanded.
The first U.S. - U.S.S.R. Exchanges Agreement was signed on January 27,
1958, and on May 25, 1960, despite a change in the political climate,
President Eisenhower said: "We must continue businesslike dealings with
Soviet leaders on outstanding issues and improve contacts between our own and
the Soviet peoples." A new two year agreement was signed in June, although
the volume of exchanges provided is reduced. The 1968 agreement like its
predecessors covers exchanges of delegations and visits in scientific,
technical, educational, cultural and other fields. The Soviet negotiators
insisted on obtaining a reduction in the number of exhibits and in the
numbers of graduate students to be exchanged.
From the beginning the United States has carried on exchanges with the
Soviet Union in the full knowledge of their limitations: they are not a
strong enough vehicle to reform the Soviet Union nor to solve outstanding
problems which divide the two countries. Put they are useful to the
United States because the information obtained helps to evaluate develop-
ment of the Soviet Union and in the long run they may help to influence
the Soviet Union in more constructive directions.
The United States and the Soviet Union have had radically different goals
in the exchanges program. The Soviet primary goals appear to be twofold:
to obtain scientific and technical information, and to portray a favorable
picture of the Soviet Union and Soviet policies. To the Soviet emphasis
on technical information and abundance of exchanges in broad cultural
fields, the United States has responded with an insistence on a balanced
program, with reciprocal opportunity and mutual advantage for both sides.
The going has not been easy. The Soviet authorities have been determined
to keep alien influences within controlled bounds, have recurrently
demonstrated concern over the political impact of exchange visits and
have consistently resisted any attempts to enlarge the U.S. - U.S.S.R.
exchanges program.
The State Department develops and coordinates policies for the U.S. -
U.S.S.R. exchanges program and several departments and agencies significantly
assist in its development. Since governmental funds for the program are
limited for most exchanges the U.S. Government is dependent upon private
organizations for financing and programming. It is estimated that private
financial support has been at least as large as the official funds expended.
The U.S. - U.S.S.R. exchanges program is a splendid example of the
cooperation between the private and governmental sections.
A major expansion of the exchanges program would reflect a fundamental
turn in U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations and drastic changes in Soviet attitudes
toward the United states and controls over Soviet society. There is little
chance in the foreseeable future of obtaining any significant increase
in U.S. - U.S.S.R. exchanges.
However, the program should be reviewed carefully in light of prevailing
conditions to determine steps to strengthen it. The most effective field
of exchanges has been education and a special effort should be made to
increase the number of scholars studying for an academic year. The
recruitment effort in the United States should be directed toward
interesting higher caliber graduate students in fields besides Russian
history and literature to apply for the program. Some thought should be
given to a trainee exchange program in business and professi fields
such as law. accounting, social work, engineering trade and the arts.
Additional financial support is essential and consideration should be
given to a separate line funding of the Soviet (and Eastern European)
programs. Up to now no governmental funds have been appropriated directly
for the program, but expenses are defrayed by the several interested
governmental departments and agencies and private organizations. Past
experience shows that these exchanges could have beenincreased if
additional funds had been available.
Despite the lack of prospects for expansion, United States negotiators
should seek every possibility of enlarging the program, consistent with
national security and the principle of reciprocal advantage. However,
it should be recognized at all times that the beneficial effects of the
program which is deliberately kept small by the Soviet Union, are of an
indirect nature and can be felt only over a period of years.
The program is peripheral to the main issues confronting the United
States and the U.S.S.R. and undue emphasis should not be placed upon its
successes if any. Such claims only make the Soviet leaders more
suspicious. Nevertheless, the U.S. - U.S.S.R. exchanges program has had
qualified value in the past and if handled well could help to produce
a better climate for more fundamental U.S. - U.S.S.R. activities in the
future.
One of the most important of these mutual activities is the development
of U.S. - U.S.S.R. foreign trade. This field, however, must be approached
in a realistic manner, and different from the argument described by Theodore
C. Sorensen in "Why We Should Trade with the Soviets" in Foreign Affairs
for April, 1968. In this article Sorensen tends to blame the Export
Controls Act for the low level of trade, but fails to note that
both Soviet exports and i mports are fully controlled by the Soviet foreign
trade plan and that the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade places
drastic restrictions on trade possibilities. The U.S. should, however,
take the initiative in a combined governmental - private industry
approach, to discuss thoroughly all obstacles to trade and, most
importantly, should press for Soviet approval for American firms to have
places of business in the Soviet Union and to negotiate with wholesalers,
suppliers of raw materials and others in addition to the foreign trading
companies.
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