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This file contains:
Organization of the White House Office Staff by C.S. Murphy. 12 pages. [Report], 10/24/1968
To Richard Nixon from Robert C. Hill, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group re: Initial Meeting, October 12, 1968. 4 pages. [Memo], 10/30/1968
Department of State Administration: Misuse of Foreign Service Reserve by Frank G. Siscoe. 2 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
Some Approaches to the Problem of Dealing with the Russians by Frank G. Siscoe. 5 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
Strategic Arms Control Negotiations by Frank G. Siscoe. 3 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
U.S. Policy towards Cuba by Frank G. Siscoe. 3 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
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WHSF: Returned, 39-10
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This file contains:
Organization of the White House Office Staff by C.S. Murphy. 12 pages. [Report], 10/24/1968
To Richard Nixon from Robert C. Hill, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group re: Initial Meeting, October 12, 1968. 4 pages. [Memo], 10/30/1968
Department of State Administration: Misuse of Foreign Service Reserve by Frank G. Siscoe. 2 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
Some Approaches to the Problem of Dealing with the Russians by Frank G. Siscoe. 5 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
Strategic Arms Control Negotiations by Frank G. Siscoe. 3 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
U.S. Policy towards Cuba by Frank G. Siscoe. 3 pages. [Report], 10/30/1968
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
39
10
10/24/1968
Report
Organization of the White House Office Staff
by C.S. Murphy. 12 pages.
39
10
10/30/1968
Memo
To Richard Nixon from Robert C. Hill,
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Advisory
Group re: Initial Meeting, October 12, 1968.
4 pages.
39
10
10/30/1968
Report
Department of State Administration: Misuse
of Foreign Service Reserve by Frank G.
Siscoe. 2 pages.
39
10
10/30/1968
Report
Some Approaches to the Problem of Dealing
with the Russians by Frank G. Siscoe. 5
pages.
39
10
10/30/1968
Report
Strategic Arms Control Negotiations by
Frank G. Siscoe. 3 pages.
39
10
10/30/1968
Report
U.S. Policy towards Cuba by Frank G.
Siscoe. 3 pages.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Page 1 of 1
October 24, 1968
C. S. Murphy
ORGANIZATION OF WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF
General Objective
The President's personal staff is of critical importance
in discharging the duties of the Presidency. The relationship is
an intimate one -- staff members need to be almost a part of, or
an extension of, the President's own person.
The staff should have the following characteristics:
(1) In total, it should be capable of providing assistance
to the President across the whole range of his responsibilities.
It should be relatively small and of very high quality.
(2) Enough different staff members should report to the
President directly and regularly to minimize temptations to empire
building and to make sure that he remains the Boss.
(3) The staff should be flexible enough to meet whatever
problems and demands may arise.
(4) It should be organized enough -- that is staff members
should have continuing areas of responsibility which are clearly
enough defined -- so that they can plan and organize their work
efficiently. Most of the time, each principal staff member ought
to know what he is supposed to be doing and also what other staff
members are doing.
- 2 -
(5) Staff members should not have directive authority
with respect to Cabinet members and agency heads. Cabinet members
and agency heads should have direct access to the President as a
matter of right. Usually, all concerned will prefer to operate
most of the time with and through staff members, but the use of
this channel should be essentially voluntary.
(6) The staff should not be organized along agency lines,
but rather by activities or functions that cut across agency lines
in order to synthesize policies and coordinate operations on a
government-wide basis.
(7) Staff functions should be arranged to provide automatic
checks and balances within the staff as well as automatic cross-
fertilization and stimulation.
Staff Meetings
Above all else, I would recommend that the President have
a regular daily staff meeting with his top White House staff. I am
convinced on the basis of first-hand experience that this can
provide the President a greater return on the time invested than
anything else he can do. A poor staff organization can do a better
job if it has regular meetings with the President than a good organi-
zation can do without such meetings.
Some of the reasons why --
- 3 -
(1) If the staff is to be an extension of the President's
person, they must see him -- hear him -- know him -- know what he
is thinking.
(2) Staff meetings provide an efficient means for the
is
President to make assignments and receive brief reports.
(3) They provide an efficient means for staff members
to keep abreast of what other staff members are doing as well as
the President's own activities.
(4) Such meetings will provide the best possible coordi-
nation of staff activities.
(5) They provide an efficient means of giving most of
the direct access to the President which staff members need.
(6) They can be tremendous builders of morale and esprit
de corps, which is vital to the President's success.
Format. The staff meetings should be short -- about 30
minutes. Problems would not be discussed at length or in depth.
The agenda might run like this:
(a) Begin at 9:30 a.m.
(b) The President hands out assignments he has accumulated.
(c) He notices his schedule for the day and asks for
relevant comments. (Does anyone have a particular warning or request
for the President with respect to any appointment on his schedule?
- 4 -
Are staff members to attend any of the President's meetings or to
provide him any additional briefing?)
(a) Anything about the schedule for future days?
(e) The President asks staff members for brief reports
he may want or they may wish to offer.
(f) Appointments can be made for later discussion of
matters that need to be discussed at length.
(g) Anything else?
(h) If any time is left, there is always something on
the President's mind he would like to talk about or ask about.
Place. The staff meetings could be held in the Cabinet
Room.
Attendance. The staff meetings should be attended by the
Special Assistants (or equivalents) discussed below, the Executive
Assistant (Bill Hopkins), and perhaps the Armed Forces Aide. I
would be inclined to permit each of these to bring with him a
deputy or assistant who could sit in the back row and keep quiet --
and could act as an alternate in the absence of his principal.
Special Assistants
Certainly, there are many variations in the way in which
the staff might be organized and functions assigned among them,
depending particularly on the experience and aptitudes of staff
members. However, as a general pattern I suggest an organization
- 5 -
built around a number of Special Assistants to the President, of
roughly equal rank and equal salary (comparable to the present
Special Assistants; salary $30,000).
Each of these Special Assistants would have continuing
primary responsibility for a given aspect of the staff work. He
in turn would have such deputies, associates, and assistants as
were necessary and appropriate. Generally speaking, these assistants
to the Special Assistants should be limited in number and high in
quality. Where appropriate, a Special Assistant might carry a
different title, e.g., Special Counsel, Press Secretary, Legisla-
tive Counsel.
As a point of beginning, I suggest the following:
maynikan
(1) Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs. Responsibilities:
Department and agency operations (excluding international); operations
Domestic Policy Council and supervision of its secretariat;
handling task forces on domestic affairs. Assistants: 6 or 8.
(2) Special Assistant for International Affairs. Respon-
Kissing
sibilities: Operations of Departments of State and Defense, National
Security Council, Office of Special Trade Representative, OEP, handling
task forces on international affairs. Assistants: 5 or 6.
(3) Special Assistant for Legislative Programs. Respon-
sibilities: Content of legislative program, messages to Congress,
coordination of State of the Union, Budget, and Economic Report
Messages. Assistants: 2 or 3.
- 6 -
Keogh
(4) Special Assistant for Speeches. Responsibilities:
Speeches, Presidential statements, Executive Orders, airline cases,
special assignments. It is not necessary that this man have a
talent for writing speeches himself, although that would be very
helpful. It is more important that he be capable of knowing what
the speeches ought to say. He should have the time to think "long
thoughts" across the whole spectrum of Presidential responsibility
and give advice about any and all of it. Assistants: 2 or 3.
Harlow
(5) Special Assistant for Congressional Liaison.
Responsibilities: Facilitating consideration of the legislative
program. The Congressional liaison operation has become increasingly
effective over the past 16 years. It would be worthwhile to get a
detailed exposition of its techniques from those recently engaged
in it. Assistants: 3 or 4.
chapine
(6) Special Assistant for Appointments. Responsibilities:
President's schedule, appointments to see the President, supervise
administration of White House Office, arrangements for ceremonies
and functions (other than those handled by the Social Office).
Assistants: 2 or 3.
Zigla
(7) Special Assistant for Press. Responsibilities:
Press, radio and television. Assistants: 2 or 3.
Flemming
(8) Special Assistant for Personnel. Responsibilities:
Personnel policies, Presidential appointees, talent search.
Assistants: 3 or 4.
- 7 -
(9) Special Assistant for Correspondence. Responsibilities:
Presidential correspondence, historical records, archives, Presidential
libraries, culture. Assistants: 2 or 3.
official historian
Other Officials
The Executive Assistant to the President is a nonpartisan
career official who supervises the administrative and other support-
ing services in the White House Office. His duties and these
supporting services are described at length elsewhere.
The Armed Forces Aide supervises the extensive supporting
services provided by the Department of Defense, especially in the
fields of transportation and communication.
Domestic Policy Council
This memorandum assumes that there will be a Domestic
Policy Council.
I suggest strongly that the President himself chair this
Council. Its membership might well include the Vice President, all
Cabinet members except State, heads of some independent agencies
such as Veterans Administration (which spends a lot of money on a
lot of people), NASA, Small Business, and Atomic Energy Commission.
Agencies in the Executive Office of the President, such as CEA, BOB,
and OST, should be used in a supporting role, but probably should
not be members of the Council.
- 8 -
The Council should have a secretariat to be supervised
by the President's Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs, who
should be generally responsible for the effective functioning of
the Council's operations. It should be quite possible to use the
Council framework as an effective means for the orderly accomplish-
ment of the "domestic affairs" part of the business of the White
House Office. To a considerable extent, this would correspond to
what was done by OWMR in World War II and has been done in varying
degrees by The Assistant to the President, the Operations Coordinat-
ing Council, and other successors of OWMR on and off at the White
House staff since then.
Comments on This Organization
The suggested organization has the following virtues:
(1) It provides a framework for covering everything, at
least once.
(2) It provides meaningful lines of demarcation between
responsibilities of different staff members that should give every-
one a pretty good idea of what he is supposed to do.
(3) At the same time, it provides useful interlocking
in a functional way which will (a) give some leeway for strong
staff members to help others carry the load (e.g., the Assistant
preparing the legislative program will be working with the
Assistant for Domestic Affairs on the same problems, and the
- 9 -
point where one leaves off and the other takes up can be shifted),
(b) provide automatic checks and balances (the legislative program
man, the speech writer, or the Assistant for Correspondence will
have a crack at most of the important matters coming up through
others), and (c) provide ready means for one part of the staff to
stimulate another (e.g., If the speech writer thinks something is
being neglected, he can suggest making a speech on the subject.
This raises the issue; and if the cause is good, action may be
forthcoming to provide a basis for the speech.)
(4) The arrangement tends to encourage cohesion in
Presidential activities rather than fragmentation along depart-
mental and agency lines.
Interchange of Work
Because of the natural interlocking of responsibilities
between certain of the Special Assistants, there would be in many
areas a flow of work that should lead naturally to an interchange
of work between them and their respective assistants. e.g., An
assistant to the Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs might bear
the brunt of the work in developing a Food Program. He could then
move on to write or help on the Message to Congress under the
supervision of the Special Assistant for Legislative Programs --
and simiarly on the speech with the Special Assistant for Speeches.
- 10 -
Speech Writing
Presidential speeches might be divided into two kinds:
(1) Those that are made because there are occasions
that require speeches -- dedications, state dinners, etc. For
these it is nice to have speech writers with a gift for words,
good judgment, imagination and a broad background.
(2) Those that are made because the President wants to
say something about something. For these, it is my view that
substance is even more important than form. Consequently, the
staff system should operate so that people work on these speeches
who are competent to deal effectively with the substance.
Feedback
Arrangements should be made so that staff members who
work on policy development, messages, and speeches will be aware
of the reaction to Presidential statements and actions as evidenced
by the mail, etc.; and their guidance should be made available to
assist in responding effectively to the mail.
Attendance at Meetings
The question of which staff members attend which meetings
of the President with which groups is important. As a general rule,
a few, but not many, staff members should be at most such group
meetings -- Cabinet, Congressional leaders, NSC, etc. The principal
assistant on speeches should be at almost all important meetings --
- 11 -
it can make the speeches much more meaningful if he knows what is
going on. For example, if the President has regular conferences
with the Secretaries of State and Defense and other top Assistants
on international affairs, this man should be there.
Collegiate Atmosphere
I would encourage staff members to engage in extensive
and wide-ranging discussions among themselves concerning the matters
with which they deal -- each a little bit skeptical and recognizing
that for many of these matters there are no certain answers. These
discussions should be tempered with --
Responsibility -- for the final judgments can be of
awful importance. Humor -- it helps keep down the ulcers
and retain sanity. Discretion -- talk rather freely to
each other but carefully outside.
Other Agencies
White House Office staff can improve their effectiveness
and lighten their own burden by the skillful use of assistance from
other agencies in the Executive Office of the President, particularly
the Bureau of the Budget. Operating functions should be kept out
of the White House Office insofar as possible.
The President's Daily Schedule
The Presidency is an impossible job and makes inordinate
demands upon the man who holds it. This is all the more reason why
- 12 -
a schedule should be established to enable him and his staff to
operate as efficiently as possible, and why the schedule should
be adhered to with reasonable fidelity. This may seem a simple
thing, but like the daily staff meeting it is enormously important
to the success of the Presidency.
(I will make more specific and detailed suggestions on
this if desired.)
MEMORANDUM
file
30 October 1968
To:
RN
From:
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
Foreign Affairs Advisory Group
Re:
Initial Meeting, October 23, 1968
Ten members of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group
met in New York City on October 23rd:
Robert C. Hill (Chairman); Gerard C. Smith; Henry
Kearns; John Davis Lodge; Charles Burton Marshall;
Robert Strausz-Hupe; Eleanor Lansing Dulles; Milorad
M. Drachkovitch; G. Warren Nutter; Richard V. Allen
(Staff Director).
Four members were unable to attend: Bradford Morse and Frances
Bolton were campaigning in their districts; Mr. Adolph Schmidt
was out of the country; and William Scranton could not make the
meeting.
1. With respect to campaign issues, the Group dis-
cussed in detail a possible bombing halt and the question of
negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union under
conditions of United States superiority. Suggested language for
statements pertaining to these issues are attached.
2. The Foreign Affairs Advisory Group puts itself
at the service of the President-Elect in the matter of the
transition process. It is felt that, subject to your wishes, the
professional expertise of the members could be put to constructive
- 2 -
purposes by presenting its thought on various problems relating
to the conduct of foreign affairs. Recognizing the sensitivity
of the question of personnel, the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group
has no desire to be involved in this area.
3. As a minor matter of protocol, the Group strongly
recommends that some mechanism be set up, with an appropriately
knowledgeable person in charge, to receive, process and acknowledge
messages sent on and after November 6 by heads of state and other
important foreign dignitaries.
In this connection, the Group strongly recommends for
your consideration the establishment of an appropriately manned
"VIP" lounge, either in New York or Washington, to accommodate
those foreign visitors whom you will not be able to see personally.
Such an office, staffed by persons of your choice, might be of
assistance in disposing of matters not requiring your immediate
attention. Such an office would be coordinated with your own
Chief of Staff.
4. Subject to your approval, the Foreign Affairs
Advisory Group plans to meet again, as suggested in your original
invitation to join the Group, in the period November 8-12.
Attachments:
Suggested statements:
1. Bombing halt
2. Arms control
- 3 -
Attachment 1: Bombing Halt
Any man of good will must pray that this time the
bombing halt announced by President Johnson will prove to be
more than a breather for the adversary, that it will not entail
added sacrifice of American and allied lives, and that it will
prove to be a substantial step beyond the preliminaries of ne-
gotiation and toward the achievement of a peace on honorable
terms that will justify what the war in Vietnam has cost in
blood and treasure.
- 4 -
Attachment 2: Arms Control
The de-escalation of the arms competition will be
an abiding objective of my foreign policy. Not only has the
strategic purpose of the U.S.S.R. been unpredictable and the
Soviet expenditure on arms rising, but our own effort towards
maintaining U.S. strategic power has been eroded by the policies
of the Administration.
The very condition of meaningful arms control nego-
tiations with the Soviets is a dynamic research and development
program in national defense. This is not a matter of piling up
missiles and nuclear bombs. What is needed is the continued
flow of knowledge in the defense realm which will permit us,
if the need arises, to deploy new weapons systems quickly and
effectively. This capability is needed as the essential backstop
for arms control negotiations that will yield agreements con-
sonant with the best interests of world peace and our national
security.
Frank G. Siscoe
October 30, 1968
Subject: Department of State Administration:
Misuse of Foreign Service Reserve
Recommendation: Appointments to Foreign Service Reserve,
including subsequent appointment as Foreign
Service Officers, should be examined to determine
the extent of the misuse of the appointive power
and the evasion of the intent of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946.
During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, through
the assistance of the successive Deputy Undersecretaries
(William Crockett and Idar Rimestad), a series of appoint-
ments have been made to the Foreign Service Reserve (FSR)
Officer category which violated the spirit of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946. Only a strictly limited number of
Schedule C positions (policy-making or political-type jobs)
are open in the Civil Service. The number of FSR's appointed
increased substantially during the period, partly to supply
needed skills on a temporary basis but partly because it
was discovered that the FSR category could provide attrac-
tive jobs without examination--an easily available mechan-
ism for political patronage. It was also discovered, in
further derogation of the career principle, that, with a
short stay in the FSR category, one could qualify for
lateral entry into the career Foreign Service Officer (FSO)
ranks.
According to the Foreign Service Act, FSR's were to be
appointed from government agencies and outside the govern-
ment "on a temporary basis" in order to have outstanding
and specialized skills available, as might from time to
time be required. His term was not to exceed five years.
An FSR may properly be described, according to the intent
of Congress, as a temporary officer.
Cases have been reported of appointments of FSR's up to
ten years and of their assignment to non-specialized work
replacing career FSO's. Any investigation of the FSR
category of officers should reveal a seriesof individuals
whose work is nonessential and non-specialized, and should
be terminated.
Of special importance in this connection is P.L. 90-494,
which was signed into law on August 20, 1968, which pro-
vides for a career category of officers in the U. S.
- 2 -
Information Agency (USIA). A kicker to the USIA career
bill is the Hays Amendment which permits the Department
to bestow unlimited tenure--or career status--on all FSR's.
This dangerous amendment makes the career Foreign Service
even more vulnerable to abuse, making it much easier to
I
appoint persons with political or other influence into
a career system and creating a parallel career category.
The amendment is further suspect because its sponsor,
Rep. Wayne Hays (D.-Ohio), Chairman of the Sub-Committee
on Department of State Operations, has been notorious in
his efforts to destroy the Foreign Service and to bend
it to his will and whim. He is feared and avoided by his
fellow Congessmen because of his caustic tongue and
vicious nature; and, in the past, has not hesitated to
berate unmercifully and unreasonably Department of State
officials in private and in public.
A thorough investigation of the possible effects of this
hastily-passed amendment should be instituted and it
should not be implemented quickly. Consideration should
also be given to its repeal. For what it may be worth,
and after representations from the Foreign Service Asso-
ciation, the current Deputy Undersecretary for Administra-
tion (Rimestad) has promised that "the legislation will
be used solely for the strengthening of the Foreign
Service
there will be no crash program
it is
recognized that such changes in the personnel structure
as may be indicated must, of necessity, be developed
slowly over a period up to five years.
summary
attetude
Frank G. Siscoe
October 30, 1968
Subject: Some Approaches to the Problem of Dealing with
the Russians
1. The fabric of dealings with the Soviet Union should
be approached from the perspectives of the short term
and the long term.
2. Over the short term (several years) it will be
necessary to maintain and increase U. S. economic/political
and military strength with relation to the Soviet Union,
to revitalize the will and encourage the strengthening
of West European resolve to withstand alternately Soviet
military blandishments, and to meet firmly probes of
Soviet or Soviet-supported forces which, if successful,
would endanger clear U. S. interests. Solutions to
basic issues will almost certainly not be attainable in
the short term.
3. Despite a rapid growth in Soviet strategic forces and
a strengthening of its general purposes forces, it is
unlikely over the near term that the Soviet Union would
directly challenge U. S. forces in areas vitally strategic
for both countries. Tactically. however Soviet political
or military moves will be influenced by U. S. policies or
by what the Soviet leaders think are U. S. policies. Risks
of miscalculation would become dangerous if Soviet leaders
have a mistaken expectation of reduced American opposition.
With the lesson of Czechoslovakia fresh in mind, where
American silence in the face of Soviet threats to Czecho-
slovakia was taken as acquiescence and almost certainly
contributed to the Soviet decision to invade, U. S. leaders
must respect a fundamental rule in dealing with the Soviets:
U. S. intentions must be expressed clearly and explicitly
at various levels and, where necessary, at the highest
level. Because of their experiences, training and isola-
tion, Soviet leaders see the world and, in particular,
the U. S., through a distorted prison. Nuances and deli-
cate signals are not enough to correct these misinterpreta-
tions. In order to avoid the dangers of Soviet miscalcula-
tions, it is incumbent upon U. S. leaders and diplomats
in discussions, interviews and negotiations with Soviet
officials to make U. S. positions and polivies clear,
precise and unambiguous.
- 2 -
4. Part of the problem is psychological we impute to
the Soviets a mannerof logic and thinking which is
Western. We see a mirror image of our attitudes and
believe that the Soviets think this way too. We tend
to see both sides of a question and use compromis as
a negotiating tool. We like to be liked and are dis-
turbed by persistent hostility.
5. A good negotiating technique is, "How does it look
from Moscow?" The Soviet mind is suspicious, hostile,
distorted by antiquated Marxist framework, stunted by an
age-old lack of association with the outside world, and
highly sensitive to official and unofficial words and
actions of the United States, which is, after all,
still the most powerful nation in the world and the
only major obstacle to the realization of Soviet aims
and goals. This exericse of looking at the world from
Moscow, should reveal more clearly the variety and
depth of the internal and external problems facing the
Soviet Union.
6. Over the next few years there should be opportuni-
ties for meaningful negotiations, in limited situations
where U. S. and Soviet interests overlap. But traditional
American optimism should be guarded, since the resolution
of the basic sources of conflict in U. S.-U.S.S.R. rela-
tions will be difficult and prolonged. However, if viewed
pragmatically and without undue expectations, all oppor-
tunities for bilateral and multilateral negotiations in
various forums should be seized. However, if negotia-
tions are bilateral, every care should be taken to con-
sult with, and to seek acceptance from, our allies prior
to and at all stages of the discussions. Our Western
European allies are always jittery over any U. S.-U.S.S.R.
negotiations, especially those dealing with security
matters in which they have an interest. Some possi-
bilities for negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral,
are: (1) Cooperation in joint scientific and technical
projects, such as space travel and nuclear energy; (2)
Joint exploration of the ocean beds; (3) Expansion of
existing U. S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges in educational and
cultural fields; (4) Trade relations, including a trade
agreement and reciprocal opportunities to establish trad-
ing and business offices; (5) Opening of consulates;
(6) Establishment of joint industrial enterprises; and
(7) Additional arms control measures. However, progress
in a period of Soviet hostility unavoidably will be slow,
- 3 -
and the proposals should be made only after realistic
calculation of how they would appeal to Soviet self-interest
7. In Europe, which should be in the forefront of U. S.
foreign policy, the basic problems posed by a divided Germany
and a divided Europe are no nearer to a solution; and the
division of Europe and Germany involves wider issues involv-
ing the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. Our relations with the
Soviet Union should be viewed mainly in the context of
Europe. Soviet leaders would be delighted if the U. S.
abdicated its interest in Central Europe and acquiesced
in a Soviet "sphere of interest".
8. Europe has the potential to be a third major power
center, and its political orientation will continue to
be critical U. S. security. A movement in the direc-
tion of European unity would provide greater stability
although a more unified Europe would be likely to act
with greater independence and, on occasion, contrary to
U. S. interests. In the long run, however, the United
States should not expect to exercise a permanent tutelage
in Western Europe, and should avoid the advocacy of plans
implying the permanent division of Europe.
9. Reasonably, the United States should have in mind and
work for a European settlement which probably can evolve
after an extended period of "normalization". The prospect
of a European settlement being imposed by force is highly
remote. Normalization means growing trade, industrial
and cultural ties between Western and Eastern Europe;
increasing contacts in many fields between West and East
Germany; and efforts to establish a framework of closer
cooperation with all-European problems, especially in the
economic field, in which the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. could
participate.
10. An objective of an ultimate European settlement should
be the withdrawal of Soviet forces beyond the Soviet borders,
which, in all likelihood, could not be obtained without a
similar withdrawal of U. S. forces. A German settlement
is a prerequisite for European unitym but the unification
of Germany is not possible as long as her neighbors feel
a security danger in German reunification. Another objec-
tive should be the removal of artificial and arbitrary
restraints on the nations of Eastern Europe, which would
probably involve limited and specific restraints on the
military and diplomatic freedom of Germany. The U. S.
- 4 -
should recognize, of course, that it may have the power
to help, shape a European settlement, but it certainly
cannot impose one.
11. The process of liberation of Eastern Europe will
11
come about through the normalization of all of Europe.
The U. S. can do little by direct diplomatic and economic
means to force the dissolution of the Soviet empire in
Eastern Europe. But that situation isnot necessarily
going to continue, nor should it, for all time. The
latest "bridge building" efforts in Eastern Europe were
doomed because they underestimated the intensity of
Soviet determination to maintain its hegemony and
military position there, and to crush any local move-
ments which could subvert Soviet power. The Warsaw
Pact (established after the defection of Yugoslavia,
constitutes the most important institution for the main-
tenance of Soviet political and military interests in
Eastern Europe.
12. The ultimate aim of our policy toward the U.S.S.R.
must be based on recumming and continuing efforts toward
the resolution of basic issues. Genuine settlements will
not arise from good will but will come when the Soviet
leaders are convinced by experience that their expansion-
ist aims are not feasible or too costly, and that there
are more attractive alternatives than unprofitable con-
flict. In addition to restraining Soviet ambition, our
policy should hold out opportunities for the satisfac-
tion of legitimate Soviet interests. However, the essence
of our policy should be that the key to the resolution
of basic issues must be a change in Soviet attitudes
which will permit U. S.-U.S.S.R. accommodation.
Summary
13. The basic elements of an effective and continuing
U. S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. should include:
(a) Harbor no wishful illusions about Soviet
intentions, and watch closely what Soviet leaders
say and do.
(b) Maintain, with our allies, an adequate margin
of military and economic power.
(c) Repeatedly offer negotiations on outstanding
issues on terms which take into account the
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legitimate. interests of the Soviet Union, but on
no other terms.
(d) Extend guarded cooperation to moerate tensions
while remembering the threats which Soviet power
and commitments pose.
(e) Press efforts to get the Soviets to. open up
their society, thus assisting its evolution in the
direction of accommodation.
Frank G. Siscoe
October 30, 1968
Subject: Strategic Arms Control Negotiations
Recommendation: The United States should agree to meet
with the Soviet Union as early in the Nixon
Administration as possible to negotiate a
possible agreement on strategic missiles
after (1) disassociating the opening of any
talks from other European issues, especially
the political and military implications of
Czechoslovakia, (2) through consultations in
NATO regarding aims and possibilities, and
(3) a candid, in-depth presentation of the
stark problem of nuclear strategic missiles
to the American people and the available
approaches to it.
Vice President Humphrey said in Ohio on October 28 that
the first thing he would do is to try to find some way
to engage the Soviet Union in missile talks. The N. Y.
Times in an editorial of October 25 called for an imme-
diate opening of talks by the Johnson Administration.
Characteristically, the editorial rstated and over-
stated its arguments: "a plateau exists in the arms
race" and "a nuclear balance has been achieved"; and
Washington and Moscow had decided "before Czechoslovakia
to limit offensive and defensive strategic missiles.'
Both Humphrey and the Times ignore or disregard import-
ant facts and circumstances.
1. It would be a profound error to move precipitately
into strategic missiles negotiations, which are only
part of a complex of necessary arms control negotiations,
without further and thorough consultations with our NATO
allies who also have vital interests in arms control
negotiations. It is especially important, because of
likely West European concern, that the negotiations be
thoroughly discussed both before and during these talks.
2. The Soviet Union's clear and relative lack of concern
for the beginning of the missiles talks was demonstrated
by its deliberate choice of invasion of Czechoslovakia
instead of talk; which, in fact, was a direct affront to
the United States and the Johnson Administration. The
historic effects on Europe, both East and West, of the
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Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia should be reassessed.
The U.S.S.R. has previously used disarmament negotiations
for propaganda purposes, and there is a fundamental need
to ascertain how genuine is the alleged Soviet willingness
to negotiate.
3. Humphrey either does not know, or even worse cloaks,
the conditional nature of the Soviet willingness to begin
strategic missiles talks. The Soviet Union expressly
stated, in a diplomatic communication of August 29, 1968
(10 days after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) that the
post-invasion remarks by the U. S. representative in the
UN Security Council were "unfriendly"; and, while the
Soviet Union was willing to conduct negotiations of mutual
interest, the U. S. must understand that Soviet actions
within the Socialist camp could not be questioned. When
eventually agreed upon, the Soviet Union should be informed
that any arms control negotiations would be disassociated
from outstanding European issues and especially from any
implications of "spheres of influence".
4. Of course, decisions have not yet been made "to limit
offensive and defensive strategic weapons" as erroneously
stated by the N. Y. Times. It should be recalled that in
July, eighteen months after the U. S. invitation was
extended, the U.S.S.R. agreed to begin to open strategic
arms talks. The scope of the talks is still undecided,
there is no hint of Soviet accommodation, and Soviet
positions are still obscure and apparently unchanged.
The missiles talks could last many months and probably
years, and in view of the Soviet attitude, there are no
compelling reasons for immediate haste to open the talks.
5. Working-level officials in the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency say that they were prepared to begin
negotiations, but'in a few months will be even "more
prepared".
6. American negotiators will have to determine whether
the Soviet Union is willing or prepared to negotiate at
this stage in U.S.-U.S.S. R. relations. For example the
Soviet leaders have appeared to be more interested in
using the talks for exerting leverage on American defense
policy rather than on getting a formal agreement. The
Soviet leadership almost certainly does not expect an
early agreement in an area which would have far-reaching
implications for the whole range of Soviet policies, and
some elements probably do not believe that one is possible
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at all. Some leaders see an opportunity to reduce the
economic burden of a new and costly round in the strate-
gic arms race others probably fear that an agreement
would perpetuate U. S. military superiority.
7. Basic, then, to strategic arms control negotiations
is the U. S. approach which should emphasize a willing-
ness to negotiate at proper times and with proper prepara-
tion, an evident determination to maintain our military
preparedness and position and a demonstration to the
U.S.S.R. that the absence of an agreement would force us
to introduce innovations in our nuclear defense and
offense.
Frank G. Siscoe
October 30, 1968
Subject: U. S. Policy towards Cuba
Recommendation: It is most likely that Castro will not
seek accommodation with the U. S. and, despite
depressed economic conditions, he should con-
tinue in power over the next year or two;
however, the U. S. should be prepared to engage
in definitive talks with any successor Cuban
government.
When Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959, he
dyeada
looked upon Latin America as a vast, fertile field for
Cuban-style revolutions. Persistent failure has decreased
the attractiveness of Castro-Guevara theories of guerrilla
warfare and peasant-based revolution, and Castro's insist-
ence on revolutionary tactics has alienated the orthodox,
pro-Soviet elements which dominate the Latin American
Communist movement. In the face of an increased resist-
ance by other Latin American countries to guerrilla move-
ments and a Soviet damper on "premature" revolutionary
activity, there seems little chance of any significant
Castroist successes over the next several years. The U. S.
should insure this continued lack of success, by extend-
ing assistance in training and equipment to Latin American
countries which lack the resources to handle serious sub-
versive and insurgency problems.
Castro currently lacks offensive weapons and transport
capabilities, and Cuba does not pose a military invasion
threat to the countries of Latin America, except possibly
against Hispaniola. Castro also presumably realizes that
open attack would invite unmanageable U. S. and Latin
American retaliatory measures. Recently, Castro--perhaps
because of adverse economic developments in Cuba and the
Bolivian fiasco--has shown little interest in the "export
of revolution" to the rest of Latin America. However,
Castro has committed himself to the path of violence and
has given notice of an intention to continue providing
propaganda, training, leadership and financial support
to selected revolutionary groups in Latin America. Never-
theless, chances are that his revolutionary objectives
will continue to be frustrated.
The Castro regime probably will continue to provide us
little room for flexibility in our Cuban strategy. We
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should continue in our efforts to isolate and ostracize
Castro and to increase pressure on Cuba's economic rela-
tions with the non-communist world. Castro is unlikely
to agree to our basic terms for a U. S.-Cuban accommodation--
cessation of his exportation of subversion and revolution
and discontinuance of his military dependence on the
U.S.S.R. Also, he is unlikely to provoke us to intervene
militarily in Cuba. We cannot expect the mere passage
of time to solve our problems with Cuba.
The Soviet Union probably sees no alternative to him,
even if he is expensive and recalcitrant; and there are
distinct advantages in the situation. It is unlikely
that Castro's economic difficulties or his contentious
relationship with the U.S.S.R. will cause him to turn
toward the U. S. for assistance or trade. It seems
equally unlikely that he would be responsive to direct
overtures by the U. S. on any issue.
Castro gives every evidence of being in firm, domestic
control and of remaining that way, barring accidents,
over the next couple of years. Even if economic condi-
tions were to deteriorate, he would still have the advan-
tages of a powerful political machine and a formidable
military-security apparatus.
If Castro should leave the scene, the successor regime
might well resemble the current one and pose similar
problems for the United States, but it is deubtful that
such a regime would be as totally intransigent as Castro
and our possibilities for maneuver likely would be greater.
With Castro no longer in power, we would have an opportu-
nity for a more flexible policy toward Cuba. We, accord-
ingly, should be prepared to engage in talks with a new
Cuban government and with our OAS colleagues in search
of an acceptable arrangement with Cuba.
In any discussions with the successor Cuban government,
the United States should insist on the regime's renuncia-
tion of the exportation of revolution and of its primary
dependence on the U.S.S.R. We should be prepared for
frank discussions concerning (a) the status of confiscated
AGENDA
U. S. economic assets in Cuba, (b) the future of the
Guantanamo Naval Base, (c) the restitution of some sort
of Cuban sugar quota in the U. S. market, and (d) the
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future of the Cuban exile community in the U. S. In such
discussions the United States should be sufficiently
flexible to maximize its opportunities to regain influ-
ence in Cuba and to facilitate, if feasible, Cuba's reentry
into various inter-American organizations as a responsible
member.