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This file contains:
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Negotiating a Vietnam Settlement. 2 Pages. Attached to report entitled, “A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-keeping Force.” [Memo], 11/11/1968
"A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-Keeping Force." 16 Pages. [Report], n.d.
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "White House Conference on 'Woman Power.'" 1 Page. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: DC From: Safire Re: "Method of Appointments." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Keogh's "readings" of "key people" for the White House. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Several Foreign Policy Recommendations from Soviet Expert Frank Siscoe - RE: Post election reflection in this area." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Manpower Report." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/14/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity." 1 Page. Not scanned due to previous scanning. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: Haldeman From: Safire Re: Intermediate and long range ideas on an "open presidency." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/14/1968
Re: "All expenses should now be listed on standard expense forms." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/15/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: Presidential return data by state in both raw numerical and present age. 5 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten note To: Bob Haldeman From: “L” Re: follow up. 1 Page. Attached to letter from James H. Stroman to H. R. Haldeman dated 11/18/1968. [Letter], n.d.
To: H. R. Haldeman From: James H. Stroman Re: Contacting Haldeman for an appointment. 2 Pages. [Letter], 11/18/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: "Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the Campaign - Their Causes and Effects." 4 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
Note to Bob Finch from Herbert Klein regarding summary of conversation with Jim Haggerty. 1 Page. Attached to memorandum from Herb Klein to Bob Finch dated 11/19/1968. [Other Document], n.d.
To: Bob Finch From: Herb Klein Re: "notes on a conversation with Jim Haggerty." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/19/1968
To: Haldeman and Ehrlichman From: Safire Re: Inaugural Theme and Ideas." 5 Pages. [Memo], 11/19/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Bill Safire's paper and major points from a Tuesday session. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Safire to Keogh regarding "Nixon Image Abroad" dated Nov 20. [Letter], 11/20/1968
To: Keogh From: Safire Re: "Nixon Image Abroad." 7 pages. [Memo], 11/20/n.d.
To unknown from unknown regarding Mayor Yorty and Henry Salvatori. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/20/1968
"Additional Information on Incomplete Precincts." 1 Page. [Other Document], 11/21/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Larry Higby Re: ASA. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/23/1968
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26127122
label
WHSF: Returned, 41-5
core
doc
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document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
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id
26127122
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Returned, 41-5
description
This file contains:
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Negotiating a Vietnam Settlement. 2 Pages. Attached to report entitled, “A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-keeping Force.” [Memo], 11/11/1968
"A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-Keeping Force." 16 Pages. [Report], n.d.
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "White House Conference on 'Woman Power.'" 1 Page. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: DC From: Safire Re: "Method of Appointments." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Keogh's "readings" of "key people" for the White House. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Several Foreign Policy Recommendations from Soviet Expert Frank Siscoe - RE: Post election reflection in this area." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Manpower Report." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/14/1968
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity." 1 Page. Not scanned due to previous scanning. [Memo], 11/11/1968
To: Haldeman From: Safire Re: Intermediate and long range ideas on an "open presidency." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/14/1968
Re: "All expenses should now be listed on standard expense forms." 1 Page. [Memo], 11/15/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: Presidential return data by state in both raw numerical and present age. 5 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
Handwritten note To: Bob Haldeman From: “L” Re: follow up. 1 Page. Attached to letter from James H. Stroman to H. R. Haldeman dated 11/18/1968. [Letter], n.d.
To: H. R. Haldeman From: James H. Stroman Re: Contacting Haldeman for an appointment. 2 Pages. [Letter], 11/18/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: "Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the Campaign - Their Causes and Effects." 4 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
Note to Bob Finch from Herbert Klein regarding summary of conversation with Jim Haggerty. 1 Page. Attached to memorandum from Herb Klein to Bob Finch dated 11/19/1968. [Other Document], n.d.
To: Bob Finch From: Herb Klein Re: "notes on a conversation with Jim Haggerty." 2 Pages. [Memo], 11/19/1968
To: Haldeman and Ehrlichman From: Safire Re: Inaugural Theme and Ideas." 5 Pages. [Memo], 11/19/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Bill Safire's paper and major points from a Tuesday session. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Safire to Keogh regarding "Nixon Image Abroad" dated Nov 20. [Letter], 11/20/1968
To: Keogh From: Safire Re: "Nixon Image Abroad." 7 pages. [Memo], 11/20/n.d.
To unknown from unknown regarding Mayor Yorty and Henry Salvatori. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/20/1968
"Additional Information on Incomplete Precincts." 1 Page. [Other Document], 11/21/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Larry Higby Re: ASA. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/23/1968
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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This archival description was reviewed and not revised as part of the NARA reparative description initiative on March 4, 2024. The word “Negro” used in the Scope and Content Note was determined to be a creator-generated title. Original archival records have not been altered.
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
41
5
11/11/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Developing
Negro leadership in the Republican Party,
and bringing them into national unity. 1
Page.
41
5
11/11/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Negotiating a
Vietnam Settlement. 2 Pages. Attached to
report entitled, "A Proposal on how to end
the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian
Peace-Kepping Force."
41
5
n.d.
Report
"A Proposal on how to end the War in
Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-
Kepping Force." 16 Pages.
41
5
11/11/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "White House
Conference on 'Woman Power." 1 Page.
41
5
11/11/1968
Memo
To: DC From: Safire Re: "Method of
Appointments." 2 Pages.
41
5
11/13/1968
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re:
Keogh's "readings" of "key people" for the
White House. 1 Page.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 1 of 4
Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type
Document Description
41
5
11/13/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Several
Foreign Policy Recommendations from
Soviet Expert Frank Siscoe - RE: Post
election reflection in this area." 1 Page.
41
5
11/14/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Manpower
Report." 2 Pages.
41
5
11/11/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing
Negro leadership in the Republican Party,
and bringing them into national unity." 1
Page. Not scanned due to previous scanning.
41
5
11/14/1968
Memo
To: Haldeman From: Safire Re: Intermediate
and long range ideas on an "open
presidency." 1 Page.
41
5
11/15/1968
Memo
Re: "All expenses should now be listed on
standard expense forms." 1 Page.
41
5
n.d.
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips
Re: Presidential return data by state in both
raw numerical and presentage. 5 Pages.
41
5
n.d.
Letter
Handwritten note To: Bob Haldeman From: "
L" Re: follow up. 1 Page. Attached to letter
from James H. Stroman to H. R. Haldeman
dated 11/18/1968.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 2 of 4
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
41
5
11/18/1968
Letter
To: H.R. Haldeman From: James H.
Stroman Re: Contacting Haldeman for an
appointment. 2 Pages.
41
5
n.d.
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips
Re: "Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the
Campaign - Their Causes and Effects." 4
Pages.
41
5
n.d.
Other Document
Note to Bob Finch from Herbert Klein
regarding summary of conversation with Jim
Haggerty. 1 Page. Attached to memorandum
from Herb Klein to Bob Finch dated
11/19/1968.
41
5
11/19/1968
Memo
To: Bob Finch From: Herb Klein Re: "notes
on a conversation with Jim Haggerty." 2
Pages.
41
5
11/19/1968
Memo
To: Haldeman and Ehrlichman From: Safire
Re: Inaugural Theme and Ideas." 5 Pages.
41
5
11/20/1968
Letter
To: Bob Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re:
Bill Safire's paper and major points from a
Tuesday session. 1 Page. Attached to memo
from Safire to Keogh regarding "Nixon
Image Abroad" dated Nov 20.
41
5
11/20/n.d.
Memo
To: Keogh From: Safire Re: "Nixon Image
Abroad.' 7 pages.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 3 of 4
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
41
5
11/20/1968
Letter
To unkown from unknown regarding Mayor
Yorty and Henry Salvatori. 1 Page.
41
5
11/21/1968
Other Document
"Additional Information on Incomplete
Precincts." 1 Page.
41
5
11/23/1968
Memo
To: Bob Haldeman From: Larry Higby Re:
ASA. 1 Page.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 4 of 4
N
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400
MEMORANDUM
November 11, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
So
SUBJECT: Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing
them into national unity.
Now that the campaign is over, the urgent task of involving responsible Negro
leadership and participation to heal and help the growing alienation cannot be
exaggerated. The ignorance of your real interest and intentions toward them is
tragic, and their fears have been magnified by the rhetoric of the opposition in
the campaign.
My experience with many of the leaders convince me they are eager to change
this, to know and work with you. In the tribal symbol of "the king" they need to
be able to identify with "you". This cannot be done through white advisors or
staff. What is required is a top Black leader appointed now on your personal
staff, who will go to the White House as Special Assistant. He can, from there,
help build these bridges with a minimum of personal involvement for you, create
those bridges of confidence, and help bring them into the party. The party
cannot bring them in, but you in the White House can.
I strongly recommend you consider Art Fletcher, who was barely beaten by
10, 000 votes for the Lieutenant Governorship of the State of Washington.
This is a powerful man (former pro-football player!), emotionally eloquent,
deeply committed to the Republican philosophy of private initiative, self help, a
splendid "mover of men", who from the White House and close to you, could
greatly reinforce what must be done in HEW, Labor, etc. in this area.
Ralph Cake and Walter Williams both concur in this estimate of Fletcher. An
early appointment would make it much easier to recruit manpower from this
constituency, and also, bring them responsibly into party participation.
CC: Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman, Garment and Keogh
N
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400
MEMORANDUM
November 11, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
So
SUBJECT:
Negotiating a Vietnam Settlement
In the course of seeing key people over the last few months, several pertinent
suggestions have been made which you may now wish to consider as you contem-
plate your strategy as President for ending the war.
1. There is general agreement among the key people, expert on
Vietnam in AID, State and major private organizations, that the President is
badly bungling present negotiations, will be psychologically outmaneuvered
and that you should not get "tarred with his brush", or the chance to bring a new
and fresh strategy will be critically weakened. He might wish to "send you" to
share the blame, much as he used Ambassador Lodge.
2. Dr. Guy Pauker, Vietnam expert from Rand Corporation, who
leaves for Saigon today as part of General Abrams' study group on strategic
alternatives in ending the war, has prepared a proposal on how to end the war
which he left with me last night. It deserves reading, but his thesis, summarized
on page 12 - 14 makes an important case for an Asian Peacekeeping force pivoted
on Pakistan and Indonesia, two moslem countries with special experience with
communist subversion and interest in regionalizing security in the area. Pauker
will collect any intelligence you may wish while in Vietnam these next three weeks.
3. Dr. Herman Kahn, President of the Hudson Institute, suggests
developing (a) a reconstruction of the moral and political rationale for the war,
(b) announcing a simple theory of victory, (c) radically improving the tactics
(he has a wide range of suggestions) and (4) define and consummate the range
of military victory contemplated. He is in Vietnam now pursuing this model
and will report on return.
RN
-2-
November 11, 1968
4. Donald Coster, former AID head in Vietnam and currently advisor
to our special arms forces training school at Fort Bragg, strongly urges early
contact with Trudeau and activation of a Canadian neutralizing role. He leaves
next week for Vietnam, has close personal associations with Vietnamese leaders
from the President down, and would be pleased to collect any intelligence
desired. He strongly recommends pursuing approaches through neutral agencies
such as the World Bank (Livingston Merchant, our Canadian Ambassador is a
key here), where the Mekong Delta development, etc. can be more than the
political gimmick the Southeast Asian people feel President Johnson made of it.
5. Colonel Kelly, friend of Reuben Nathan, former head of the
Special Forces in Vietnam, has volunteered to work on or help staff a task force
on a Vietnam settlement. He has a grasp not only of military, but political and
economic realities, and would be ready and willing if desired to recommend
civilian and military composition for such a group. Please see attached proposal.
CC: Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh
A PROPOSAL ON HOW TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
The Case for an Asian Peace-Keeping Force
The mainstream of the debate on Vietnam in recent
months has centered on two issues: (1) under what circum-
stances should the bombing of North Vietnam be stopped and
(2) should a coalition government be imposed on South Vietnam
through negotiations among third parties or should the
people of South Vietnam be given a chance to elect their
future government from among all political forces existing
in the country.
Significantly, these two issues concern respectively
the beginning and the end of the process of negotiation
required for terminating the war. Much less attention
seems to have been devoted, at least in public discussions,
to the long process that should lead eventually from re-
duction of hostilities as a first step to the creation of
a new political regime in Saigon as the last step toward
peace.
Concern with the initial and terminal moves in the
negotiatory process is understandable. The circumstances
under which the bombing of North Vietnam would be stopped
could be so complex as to defy interpretation. But they
might also lend themselves to partisan claims that either
Washington or Hanoi are giving in. Positions on whether
a peace conference should discuss the composition of a
coalition government or arrangements for general elections
can be reduced in essence to the question of whether one
accepts or rejects a delayed Communist, take-over.
-2-
Advocates of a coalition government prior to elections
are implicitly accepting defeat in Vietnam, writing off
seven years of war. The specific provisions of an agree-
ment concerning a coalition government can, of course,
provide a larger or smaller measure of face-saving to
cover this American defeat, but another outcome than an
eventual Communist take-over is most unlikely, due to the
obvious weakness of countervailing political and military
forces in Vietnam today.
If a coalition government is established in the near
future, eventual Communist dominance can be achieved with-
out the support of a majority of the population. Once
legalized through inclusion of the NLF in the Saigon
government, an activist and ruthless Communist minority
can proceed to liquidate its active opponents by all the
means which have proved effective in the past in Eastern
Europe and in China, and of course in Vietnam itself in
1945-46. The passive, though not necessarily indifferent,
majority of the population will be left without alternative
leadership and will choose to survive rather than fight.
The destruction of the anti-Communist opposition will
be relatively easier than in Eastern Europe or in China
because of the characteristic weakness and brittleness of
all Vietnamese political forces other than the Communists.
On the basis of personal contacts going back fifteen
years, I surveyed the political situation in South Vietnam
Note
last March and returned with the firm conviction that no
South Vietnamese political forces existed then which could
hold their own in free political competition with the
Communists. Nothing that I have seen or heard since would
induce me to change this estimate.
-3-
Arguments on a possible accommodation between Communists
and other political forces in South Vietnam today are based
on wishful thinking. Even the allegedly well organized
religious groups -- such as the Catholics, Hoa Hao and
Cao Dai -- are splintered, factionalized and vary in their
degree of anti-Communist commitment. Traditional political
parties such as the VNQDD and the Dai-Viet are merely small
cliques, while new political formations have no popular
substance behind their new, ephemeral, shingles.
But not only a coalition government imposed from
outside, even free elections if held too soon would be
nothing but a disguised way of accepting a Communist take-
over. This does not mean that all we have to do is to
play for time. Those who discount the future assuming
that the extent of face-saving for the United States
depends on the time span which would lapse before South
Vietnam becomes an overtly Communist state underestimate
the capacity of the rest of the world to anticipate the
likely course of events and to read our true intentions.
We may have to bow to the inevitable but we should not
maximize the enemy's chances of winning.
This is why, in my judgment, we must strive for a
political solution which would make it clear that the
United States really wants to keep the future open and to
secure for the people of South Vietnam a last chance to
save themselves -- if they really have the will and the
spiritual resources to do so -- by gaining for the dis-
organized and fragmented political forces of South Vietnam
time to rally in extremis, despite their past failure to
do SO.
-4-
This would require convincing the South Vietnamese
political elites not only that they will not be able to
carry on with factional strife indefinitely under the protec-
tion of the American military umbrella, but also that they
still have a real opportunity to redress the balance of
political forces by organizing themselves for the forth-
coming political competition with the Communists.
While nobody can predict whether genuine political
reconstruction will in fact take place in South Vietnam,
it would be worth trying to create an environment favorable
for such an attempt, both for the sake of the people of
South Vietnam and in order to maintain the reputation of
the United States as a country which is a genuine and
valuable protector. Even if the South Vietnamese fail to
take advantage of our efforts on their behalf, the lesson
will not be lost on the rest of the world.
Political reconstruction would involve the establish-
ment of vigorous political organizations and a free
exchange of ideas concerning the future of South Vietnam.
I am fully aware of the problems posed by the initial
advantage this could give to the Communists, who would thus
gain a chance to participate overtly in the political
life of the country, starting with a stronger organization
and with more militant and purposeful propagandists than
the other groups.
But we have little choice: authoritarian suppression
of the Communists in the past has also stifled the political
development of other political forces with a potential
mass base, until they became unable to hold their own against
an activist Communist minority, while armed suppression of
the Communist insurgency has led us to the present impasse.
-5-
The alternatives to a period of political reconstruction
which might, hopefully, still create a viable non-Communist
political system are either a protracted war or rapid
American disengagement, to be followed almost certainly
by a Communist take-over.
The third way proposed here avoids these two undesir-
able alternatives and offers a solution which has at least
a reasonable chance to succeed. Naturally, the creation
of conditions which would permit a period of political
reconstruction in South Vietnam is not possible without
willingness on the part of all parties concerned to refrain
from the use of violence. Neither side is likely to be
cooperative in the search for a political solution as long
as it still believes that it can win militarily without
paying an exorbitant price for victory. It is obvious
that if either side gives in, it has actually been forced
to do so by the superiority of its adversary. If the
United States withdraws unconditionally, this means that
Communist conduct of the war made an alternative course of
action intolerably costly to us, militarily or politically.
If the Communists give up their efforts to secure control
of South Vietnam, we have coerced them to renounce their
objectives.
To induce the Communists to accept a cease-fire and
a period of peaceful political competition they will have
to be convinced that the alternative is much less desirable
from their point of view, namely that the American forces
which they cannot displace will remain for an indefinite
duration in South Vietnam. A protracted war and an extended
American presence may be a more gloomy prospect for Hanoi
than even a few months ago. Their forces and supplies are
-6-
suffering significant attrition. Furthermore there are
signs of a Sino-Vietnamese rift and the Soviet Union may
be entering a period of considerable difficulties in
Eastern Europe. All this raises for Hanoi the specter
of serious logistic shortages in the future and may
increase their interest in a settlement.
It can of course also be argued that precisely because
it faces serious problems in its Eastern European sphere
of influence the Soviet Union may be interested in keeping
the United States engaged in Vietnam. The Soviet leaders
may also conclude that the highly unpopular course of
action on which they have embarked in Czechoslovakia is
a lesser political burden if simultaneously the United
States continues its present policy in Vietnam.
It may not be possible to convince Hanoi that the
United States can win the war at a cost politically and
morally acceptable to the American people, but it should
be less difficult for the next administration to convince
the Vietnamese Communist leaders that if they remain
unwilling to cooperate in the search for a peace with
honor, the American forces can deny them victory and remain
11
stationed indefinitely in South Vietnam. This would
require a change of Allied strategy to reduce American
casualties and expenditures to a fraction of the annual
costs since 1965. Such alternative strategies are con-
ceivable, but their adoption would require leadership of
exceptional firmness.
A political solution that would remove the American
presence from South Vietnam and give the Communists a
chance to participate legitimately in the political life
-7-
of the country might be an attractive alternative if they
perceive the present situation as a military stalemate
that cannot be easily overcome.
Assuming that by January 20, 1969, the test of wills
between President Johnson and President Ho has ended in a
draw, a new negotiating team should then try to obtain
quickly agreement in principle on a new approach to the
resolution of the conflict, which would allow to halt the
bombing below the 19th parallel, in a different context
from that. of 1968.
In my judgment, the crucial issue is not whether
halting the bombing above the DMZ would increase the mili-
tary risks for our troops. There are alternative means to
reduce those risks, including a change in troop deployment.
The really important question is whether stopping the
bombing is a meaningful first step toward a resolution of
the conflict rather than a demonstration of Hanoi's superior
Key
willpower, which forced the United States to accept their
terms.
The key elements in the approach to a resolution of
the conflict suggested here are (1) a period of about two
years for political reconstruction in South Vietnam, (2)
substantial Asian peace-keeping forces as custodians of
the agreement. If Hanoi is willing to accept these two
elements of a new approach to the termination of the war,
then it would make sense to stop the bombing south of the
19th parallel as a first step toward the negotiation of a
comprehensive settlement.
It should be noted that this approach does not demand
from Hanoi a military quid pro quo, which would in any case
not be too meaningful in view of the difficulties we would
-8-
encounter in proving violations of agreements on a reduced
rate of infiltration or for the restoration of the DMZ,
which are both so much less visible than aerial bombardments.
The Asian peace-keeping forces, which form an essential
element of this plan, would have to be a substantial,
combat ready, presence in South Vietnam, not an expanded
version of the ICC established under the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments. Whether these forces should be under U.N. auspices
or made directly available to the parties agreeing on a
settlement of the conflict can be left open at this time.
Details of the command structure of those forces would
also have to be worked out later.
The peace-keeping forces would require substantial
amounts of modern equipment, which they could perhaps
NOTE
receive by direct transfer from the departing American
forces. The cost of this operation is likely to be high
and may have to be carried indirectly by the United States
in the form of expanded aid to the participating countries.
The communists may have legitimate reservations about the
impartiality of any country which receives massive American
aid. It would therefore be desirable to reach an under-
standing with the respective Asian governments that indirect
NOTE
compensation for their peace-keeping expenditures should be
deferred.
Such arrangements are not compatible with American
governmental processes and the established practice of aid
administration. Therefore the financing of peace-keeping
forces through the intermediary of the U.N. appears impera-
tive, despite the well-known past difficulties of such
endeavors. In practice, I am compelled to admit, this
reduces greatly the probability that the present proposal
can be implemented.
-9-
There are very few countries that have the military
manpower that would permit them to make a substantial con-
tribution, and are also politically eligible for this
mission. India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan could make
substantial contributions, but it is unrealistic to expect
Indian and Pakistani forces to be willing to operate
jointly. Japan could make substantial contributions, but
would probably refuse to get involved and might also create
a political issue because of its occupation of Vietnam
between 1942 and 1945. This leaves Indonesia, together with
either India or Pakistan as potential contributors among
the larger Asian powers.
Prospects for cooperation between Indonesian and
Pakistani forces appear at first glance excellent, whereas
between Indonesia and India there has never been much love
lost. Indonesia and Pakistan are the two largest Moslem
countries in the world, almost equal in population (cca.
110-130 million each), with armed forces of the same size
(340,000 for Indonesia and 324,000 for Pakistan). They
have maintained throughout their independent existence
excellent relations. Both are on good terms with the West
and with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan has also good
relations with China.
Among the smaller countries in Asia, Iran and Malaysia,
11
which are also Moslem countries, could make token contribu-
tions. There is some advantage to have a Moslem peace-
keeping force in a Buddhist country with a strong Catholic
minority as this would at least simplify its task with
the non-Communist elements. While the above-named four
countries are all anti-Communist in their domestic policies,
they have nottaken sides against Hanoi and could therefore
-10-
be acceptable, unlike Thailand, the Philippines, South
Korea, Australia and New Zealand, who are all combatants,
and the Republic of China which could not get involved
without the risk of a sharp reaction on the part of
Communist China.
Contingents from other continents need not necessarily
be excluded, but at least three arguments can be invoked
against their participation: (1) it would be preferable
to develop the concept of a regional Asian responsibility
in this matter, even if the operation is placed under
global, U.N. auspices; (2) if forces from outside Asia
are introduced it will be difficult to reject contingents
from Eastern European Communist countries; (3) the size
of the forces required makes it unlikely that sufficient
numbers from outside Asia would be deployed and the advan-
tages to be expected from token contributions are out-
weighted by the disadvantages just mentioned. My prefer-
ence would be for merely Indonesian and Pakistani forces,
with the supreme command alternating between the two but
with troops from both countries deployed in all parts of
South Vietnam.
I explored this idea in March in Djakarta with some
Nore
very high Indonesian officials and found them sufficiently
responsive to make further discussion worthwhile. The
manpower resources exist. Indonesia has about 150 Army
battalions. Of them about one-third could be made avail-
able for the envisaged mission, which would permit to
place one combat-ready battalion in each of South Vietnam's
44 provinces and have a few battalions available as a stra-
tegic reserve or for special duty in the major cities.
-11-
My estimate that one-third of Indonesia's land forces
11
could be made available is based on Indonesian positions
expressed in October 1962, when the leaders of the Army
anticipated a period of peace following the satisfactory
solution of the conflict over Western New Guinea and before
Sukarno engaged their country in the armed confrontation
with Malaysia.
At that time Indonesia's military leaders estimated
that their Army, which was of about the same size that it
is now, would use one-third of its forces for garrison
duty and keep one-third in training. They were soliciting
American help to employ the remaining third usefully in
civic action programs.
Facing currently no international crisis, with an
internal security situation considerably better than in
1962, and only modest involvement in civic action programs,
the Indonesian Army should be capable of making 50 battal-
II
ions available for a two-year peace-keeping mission in
South Vietnam. If Pakistan could deploy forces of about
the same size, each province would be secured by a sizeable
force, capable of dealing effectively with violations of
the cease-fire and of protecting the population.
The Indonesian Army has considerable operational
experience with civil affairs and has constantly rotated
units from Java to the Outer Islands for garrison duty or
for counter-insurgency. No other Asian army has comparable
logistic experience with inter-island deployment. It is
not much more difficult to send Army units from Djakarta
to Saigon than it is to send them to Medan or Makassar.
A Pakistani presence would of course require a somewhat
greater logistic effort and the Pakistani Army lacks the
Indonesian's experience with counter-insurgency.
-12-
Despite the anti-Communist record of the Indonesian
Army, there are also several political factors which would
operate in their favor: Indonesia has not only diplomatic
relations with North Vietnam, but also a NLF representative
and a South Vietnamese Consulate in Djakarta. The Indonesian
government has maintained a neutral posture in recent years
toward the conflict, having previously vocally supported
the Communist side. Although Indonesia's strained rela-
tions with China appeared as a serious obstacle to this
plan last March, Hanoi's assertion of independence from
Peking, manifested in accepting the Paris talks and other-
wise, may now allow the Vietnamese Communists to accept
an Indonesian involvement in the termination of the conflict,
especially if Pakistan, which has good relations with China,
would also participate.
If a period of political reconstruction under the
custody of Asian peace-keeping forces is accepted in prin-
ciple by both sides, the solution envisaged here would
involve the following sequence of events:
1. A cease-fire in position of all combat
forces involved, perhaps with some minor local
regroupment in order to reduce the likelihood
of armed clashes. The alternative of regrouping
the opponents into large designated areas is not
realistic because nobody will want to abandon
terrain and thus risk a new division of the
country following lines of political-military
control.
2. ARVN and VC forces remain in the areas
in which they operated previously. Neither side
is expected to give up their weapons immediately.
-13-
The alternative is unrealistic because neither
side would trust the other and put itself at
its enemy's mercy. But both sides are expected
to respect the cease-fire and will be demobilized
eventually.
3. Asian peace-keeping forces take over
temporary control of the territory, according
to a detailed but flexible schedule, dependent
on the demonstrated willingness of all combatants
to enforce the agreement. NVN and Allied forces
leave the areas which have been transferred to the
custody of the Asian peace-keeping forces. At
the end of a period to be established by negotia-
tions, all NVN and Allied forces are expected
to depart from the territory of South Vietnam.
Temporarily the Asian peace-keeping forces become
custodians of the military installations and of
the equipment left behind by the departing forces.
4. The Asian peace-keeping forces, suitably
provided with fire-power and mobility, are
expected to act as riot squads in case of renewed
armed clashes between ARVN and VC elements, to
protect the population from "armed propaganda"
and other forms of violence, and to exert residual
police power in situations beyond the capabilities
of local Vietnamese authorities.
5. A Political Reconstruction Commission is
created including representatives of all political
forces in South Vietnam. Its role is limited to
guaranteeing freedom of political organization
and expression and the preparation of national
-14-
elections. The Political Reconstruction Commission
enforces its decisions directly through the Asian
peace-keeping forces, without interference by
regular South Vietnamese authorities.
6. The government resulting from the September 3,
1967 elections or its successor, as determined
by South Vietnamese political processes, remains
in power for its full term of four years in accor-
dance with the Constitution promulgated on April 1,
1967 In exchange for Communist agreement to
accept the present regime in South Vietnam till
September 1971, the South Vietnamese government
undertakes to amend Article 4 of the Constitution
which bans "Communism in any form" and is therefore
incompatible with the process of political recon-
struction underlying the peace settlement. As
some major political functions will have been
transferred from the government of South Vietnam
to the Political Reconstruction Commission, the
Saigon authorities would be concerned primarily
with public administration and economic rehabili-
tation which might make them somewhat less objec-
tionable to the Communist side.
7. If peace negotiations would be com-
pleted by September 1969, leading to a cease
fire, this would initiate a period of political
reconstruction of about two years coinciding with
the complete, simultaneous, withdrawal of all
foreign troops from South Vietnam, other than
the Asian peace-keeping forces. At the end of
that period, in September 1971, free elections
-15-
would be held, monitored by the Asian peace-
keeping forces, which would then also withdraw,
following the creation of a new government in
Saigon.
8. The international peace conference
would also have to negotiate whether the two
11
Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia should be neutral-
ized under international guarantees, or whether
this issue should be left open, to be negotiated
after September 1971 by the new government in
Saigon with its neighbors. I would incline
toward the latter formula which would give more
freedom of action to a South Vietnamese govern-
ment friendly to the West, if such a government
happens to be elected. The converse risk that
a Communist or pro-Communist government would
then have the freedom to align itself with
China or Russia does not strike me as excessive.
Any Vietnamese government will need aid for
reconstruction and will probably try to maximize
its independence by relying on aid from a
variety of sources, including, if available,
from the West.
One final observation: once they have left the country,
NVN and American forces would not face a symmetrical situa-
tion with regard to possible re-entry into South Vietnam.
NVN forces could be easily infiltrated again, initially at
least with as little visibility as they choose to seek.
American forces could not return without being very con-
spicuous. This is not necessarily a disadvantage. The
problem we have to solve now is how to secure Communist
-16-
cooperation in providing the non-Communist and anti-
Communist forces a last chance to organize. In this
endeavor our trump card is the offer to withdraw the
American forces from Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists
are unusually suspicious and have good reason for it after
their 1946 and 1954 experiences. If the asymmetry with
regard to the return of NVN and American forces works in
their favor, this might allay some of their suspicions
and facilitate an agreement.
N
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
Ale
PHONE (212) 661-6400
MEMORANDUM
November 11, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
Go
RE:
White House Conference on "Woman Power"
One of the largest untapped sources of leadership essential to "uniting" the
country are women. Increasing numbers of well-educated responsible women are
emmerging with competence and convictions regarding education, health,
welfare, job-training, urban affairs, and foreign policy.
Mary Harvey, a close friend, and senior editor of McCall's (who did the
Eisenhower interview on reconstructing the UN sent on recently) has
developed a remarkable network of leaders of these various women's groups.
She would be willing to help mobilize these women through a White House
Conference, early in your administration to take a hard look at how they could
help "unite the country" and contribute to the leadership needed to solve our
hard problems. I would be glad to pursue this to provide a substantial proposal
if you wish to encourage it.
CC:
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh
DC from Safire
file
November 11, 1968.
Re: Method of Appointments
1. Order: The "first appointment" was Rose Woods, which was good; had a
symbolic appeal to women and to millions of secretaries.
a. The first appointment outside your close official family might be a
Mexican-American, perhaps announced in your speech at Cardinal
McIntyre's dinner in Los Angeles on December 5 for the hospital
that services Mexican-Americans. At whatever level this appointment
is, it will achieve greater significance if it comes very early, uphold-
ing your pledge to do better for the Spanish-speaking Americans. Also,
not as blatant a grandstand play as an early Negro appointment.
b.
The natural tendency is to appoint the Cabinet from top down -- State,
Defense, Treasury and down the line. This has a dribbling-off effect.
From public opinion point of view, greatest impact would be to make
those the climactic appointments.
2. Setting:
The most skillful technique used by Kennedy in 1960 was to make all
appointments out of doors, at Hyannisport or Palm Beach. On television,
gave the appearance of freshness, briskness, letting in the fresh air.
Some of your own introductions of new Cabinet members could be at key
Biscayne or in California, outside on the lawn; the meeting with Agnew(and
with Humphrey) for example, was aided by the outdoor press conference.
3. Cumulative Effect:
There will be a clear effort by liberal columnists to seize on the first two
appointments of liberals, Democrats or moderates as evidence of a "move
left" in your party.
Their attitude is "We couldn't lick him, so now we'll capture him. " An
early "move left" would be met with only a little public approval by these
writers, and with a deep-seated contempt by most of the Eastern establishment.
At the same time, it would start the "sellout" charge by conservatives, and
"I told you so" by Wallace. You would then be in a narrow strip of no-man's
land in the midst of severe crossfire.
-2-
No matter what the ultimate composition of your Cabinet, I believe the first
few made public should be centrist or slightly right of center. You should
reassure those who voted for you before reaching out to those who voted
against you. With that base laid, then is the time for the "coalition" concept.
4. Common Denominator of Appointments:
Big point should be made that each appointee is a "problem solver, " despite
his political coloration.
The four great problems should be constantly referred to -- ending the war,
halting the rise in crime, preventing violence, stopping inflation, Problem-
solving teams, perhaps headed by Cabinet officers, should be publicly focused
on each problem.
In this way, the emphasis will be on action to meet the problems, and less on
which direction the new administration will "move" philosophically.
5. Good Quote on Appointments:
Thomas Jefferson: "No duty the President had to perform was so trying as
to put the right man in the right place. "
MEMORANDUM
few
November 13, 1968
TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JIM KEOGH
Here are the readings I got from some of our key people:
Alan Greenspan: He is basically not interested in a
government position except, as he put it, one or
two that would be presumptuous for him to mention.
By this, I take it he means Secretary of the Treasury
or Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Alan really
wants to go back to his own business. He says he
will be happy to help out in any way he can during
the transition, and if there is some way that such
a connection would be possible, he would like to
be thought of as avilable for consulting work after
January 20th.
Dick Allen: He is extremely interested in being a
member of the White House staff, and would particu-
larly like the post of Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs. If that specific assignment is not
possible, he would be pleased to have a President's
Assistant position having to do with foreign ploicy
and/or defense.
Bill Safire: Bill would be interested in a speech
writing role in the President's staff. He is quite
willing and ready to sell his business to take such
a position.
Bill Gavin: He is interested in a writing role,
preferably in the White House.
Henry Loomis: He is interested in a government
organization position and would be particularly
pleased to be associated with any new Hoover Com-
mission. He feels that he is better suited to a
line job, rather than a staff assignment.
Martin Anderson: Highly pleased with the prospect
of a role in research at the White House.
Darrell Trent: Interested in a line position rather than
a staff assignment, and would like something having
to do with business or aviation, which would seem to
send him toward commerce, and particularly FAA.
Note-I did not talk with Price or Buchanan since I assumed that
their roles were pretty well established.
JK:bls
N
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400
MEMORANDUM
November 13, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
so
SUBJECT:
Several Foreign Policy Recommendations from Soviet Expert
Frank Siscoe - RE: Post election reflection in this area
In brief they concern:
1. The misuse of Foreign Service Reserve - which has multiplied
"foggy bottom" with ill-prepared personnel who can hang on
indefinitely. A clue to major reform of State Department.
2. The policy toward Cuba - suggested agenda page 2.
3. Strategic Arms Control Negotiations - suggestions from Russian
expert.
4. Exchanges with USSR - critical notes with reference to trade.
5. Some approaches to dealing with USSR.
Agenda for negotiations - page 2
Elements of policy - page 4
6. Background paper re: Soviet policies toward United States
(Useful general analysis as file background for negotiation -
very little new - page 3-5 useful analysis current leadership. )
attachments
CC:
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh
MEMORANDUM
November 14, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
SUBJECT:
Manpower Report
On October 21 I prepared an initial report on the formal organizational structure
I have been using on the manpower effort, with nine specific recommendations
for systematic organization of the total problem of staffing. John Mitchell
suggested I hold this report and the working model (Black Book - Manpower
Structure) as enclosed, until after the election.
My own report of recommendations I had hoped to deliver and discuss with you
personally. Our last conference was on July 19, and so much has transpired
since, I had wished to make some interpretive remarks personally on the
material. Efforts to see you or John in this busy period have proven so difficult
it has occurred to me you might be better served to have the material delivered
to you for such review as you might care to give it now.
In order that you might profit most by the material of the second book (Manpower-
Content - Models), I offer these interpretive notes.
Section I - General
Simply indicates how we have organized and developed the files with
profiles and backup material on well over 1000 key people, programmed, where
possible, into specific positions within the executive branch.
Section II - Specific Models
We have analyzed all the policy statements you have made as guidelines
for the selection of manpower, and illustrated how our files can be used to produce
comprehensive recommendations. I have chosen HEW and State which I know best,
and made recommendations to include (1) the comprehensive generalist, (2) the
political generalist, (3) the specialist and (4) the special for each position.
RN
-2-
November 14, 1968
For State Department, I have illustrated how the analysis and recommendations
of one of Washington's brightest younger men describes one of the strengths of
our file, i.e., specific recommendations of one type of source.
Finally, in this section, I have selected what I consider important positions
requiring early attention, with comprehensive recommendations covering a wide
range of types in terms of ideology, age, region, and experience background.
Section III
Is merely the brief summary in terms of the six broad categories I
have used from the beginning, of the people whom I have seen in depth, soliciting
their ideas, manpower recommendations and support.
Section IV
Represents a simple model for processing, evaluating and recruiting
in the manpower field, with a simple flow chart indicating how the various
inputs and controls coould give you the best comprehensive management of the
manpower problem in the limited time available.
attachment
cc:
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Keogh
Mr. Garment
MEMORANDUM
November 11, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
Glenn Olds
SUBJECT: Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing
them into national unity.
Now that the campaign is over, the urgent task of involving responsible Negro
leadership and participation to heal and help the growing alienation cannot be
exaggerated. The ignorance of your real interest and intentions toward them is
tragic, and their fears have been maghified by the rhetoric of the opposition in
the campaign.
My experience with many of the leaders convince me they are eager to change
this, to know and work with you. In the tribal symbol of "the king" they need to
be able to identify with "you". This cannot be done through white advisors or
staff. What is required is a top Black leader appointed now on your personal
staff, who will go to the White House as Special Assistant. He can, from there,
help build these bridges with a minimum of personal involvement for you, create
those bridges of confidence, and help bring them into the party. The party
cannot bring them in, but you in the White House can.
I strongly recommend you consider Art Fletcher, who was barely beaten by
10, 000 votes for the Lieutenant Governorship of the State of Wahhington.
This is a powerful man (former pro-football player!), emotionally eloquent,
deeply committed to the Republican philosophy of private initiative, self help, a
splendid "mover of men", who from the White House and close to you, could
greatly reinforce what must be done in HEW, Labor, etc. in this area.
Ralph Cake and Walter Williams both concur in this estimate of Fletcher. An
early appointment would make it much easier to receint manpower from this
constituency, and also, bring them responsibly into party participation.
ed: Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman, Garment and Keogh
Haldeman from Safire
November 14, 1968.
Here are some intermediate and long-range ideas on an "open presidency."
Not all to be used, of course, but elements of a mix.
Jim Keogh told me of your query about availabilities. I am available to
the point of panting to be a Special Assistant.
For that, I would sell my business, sever all ties, turn stock into
government bonds, and enter Washington totally unencumbered.
Three books in the past five years labels me an author, qualified for
speechwriting and the myriad other chores in the White House.
As for public relations ideas, my anonymity in the campaign and over
the past couple of years testifies to a certain discretion and loyalty. I
believe the PR thinking is needed, but its source need never surface.
Other selling points: A New Yorker who once worked for Javits and
Rockefeller without losing his Nixon identity; 38; a regular synagogue-goer;
a sympathetic historian with some credentials to interpret Nixon later;
no interest in elective office; ready to take the financial beating; passion
for anonymity; affinity for the telling phrase; open mind and trap shut.
Hope you can use me.
Enclosure
LH
file
November 15, 1968
&
MEMORANDUM
All expenses should now be listed on standard
expense forms, and forwarded to Pat Dugan at
400 Park Avenue.
Reimbursement checks will
follow.
LH:bs
J-
Lold
To: H.R. Haldeman
From: Kevin Phillips
As per your request communicated by Larry Higby, I have collected
the enclosed data giving presidential returns by states in both raw
numerical and percentage terms.
Most of the enclosed figures were taken from AP (Nov. 9) and UPI
(as printed in the Washington Post of Nov. 17). The wire services do
not have more recent figures available for the collectivity of states
-- or so I was advised.
The most recent material available from our research department
was the Nov 9 AP tabulation; the most recent data available from the
Republican National Committee and given me by Gil Rudolf was the
Nov 17 UPI compilation.
For a number of states, the wire service returns were inadequate
or conflicting, so that I telephoned the offices of the several
secretaries of state to inquire after the certified returns. In
California, Michigan and Illinois, the returns have not yet been
certified, although the semi-official California canvass agrees
closely with the press figures.
The most recent total figures (UPI Nov 17) are:
RN
31,284,747
HHH
30,948,643
GW
9,820,896
The RN majority - 336,000 above - is likely to increase just
a bit more.
If any precise estimate or claim is to be made, the enclosed
data cannot be taken as gospel; official state canvasses are likely
to show a number of minor changes. Most of the canvasses will be
completed next week.
alabama 50g-?
Penna absentees
Florida obsertees —
Maryland
absenteen
)
L
The 1968 Presidential Returns by States
State
HHH
(%)
RN
(%) GW
(%)
Comments on Completeness
Alabama
196,579
(19%)
146,923
(14%)
691,425
(67%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post ) *
Alaska
34,501
(43%)
36,428
(45%)
9,887
(12%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Arizona
166,742
(35%)
255,970
(55%)
45,066
(10%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Arkansas
183,317
(30%)
186,547
(31%)
236,504
(39%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash Post ;
however AP figures for
Nov. 9 give slightly higher
totals for each man with
only 99% tabulated
California 3,187,364
(45%) 3,409,554 (48%)
482,162
(7%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) ;
semi-official canvass figures
are about the same. This
includes most absentee votes
Colorado
336,272
(42%)
409,262
(51%)
60,691
(8%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Connecticut
624,661
(50%)
557,830 (44%)
76,707
(6%)
New York Times Nov 8; this
set of figures is slightly
different than AP Nov 9
The UPI state totals carried on November 17 do not indicate what percentage of the state's
vote has been tabulated; in most cases, the vote is complete. Where there is evidence of
incomplete totals, mention has been made
State
HHH
(%)
RN
(%)
GW
(%)
Comments on Completeness
Delaware
88,730
(42%)
96,162
(45%)
27,658
(13%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
DC
136,452
(82%)
29,617
(18%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Florida
676,794
(31%)
886,804
(41%)
624,207
(28%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) with presumably
full tabulation; AP on Nov 9 gave
lower figures with an alleged 100%
of ED's reporting
Georgia
333,062
(27%)
365,722
(29%)
535,389
(44%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) nearly
complete
Hawaii
141,300
(60%)
91,440
(39%)
3,465
(1%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) presumably
complete
Idaho
88,835
(31%)
164,029
(57%)
36,058
(12%)
AP Nov 9 and UPI Nov 17; complete
Illinois
2,008,319
(44%)2,137,239
(47%)
385,065
(8%)
AP Nov 9 with 98% of EDs tabulated; no
certified total available as yet from
Illinois Secy of State
Indiana
806,259
(38%)1,057,784
(50%)
243,030
(12%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) presumably
complete
Iowa
477,445
(41%)
616,776
(53%)
66,258
(6%)
AP Nov 9 and UPI Nov 17; complete
Kansas
299,890
(35%)
468,172
(55%)
87,453
(10%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Kentucky
395,097
(38%)
458,905
(44%)
190,493
(18%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post) complete
Maine
212,484
(55%)
164,477
(43%)
6,307
(2%)
AP Nov 9 with 94% tabulated; Maine
Secy of State data not final
Maryland
533,045
(43%)
515,674
(42%)
179,859
(15%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation (but
does not include absentees)
State
HHH
(%) RN
(%) GW
(%)
Comments on Completeness
Massachusetts
1,458,058
(64%)
762,477
(33%)
85,556
(3%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Michigan
1,585,447 (48%) 364, (42%) 327,361 (10%)
AP Nov 9 for 99% of EDs; the
Michigan Secy of State does not
yet have official returns
Minnesota
857,738
(54%)
658,643(43%)
68,931
(4%)
Official Minnesota State
Canvas
Mississippi
149,419
(22%)
88,214 (12%) 414,402 (66%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
presumably complete
Missouri
785,908 (44%) 807,635 (45%) 205,129 (11%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Montana
109,218
(42%)
130,119
(51%)
18,548
(7%)
AP Nov 9 with 96% tabulated
Nebraska
163,531
(32%)
303,968
(60%)
42,604
(8%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
of EDs.
Nevada
59,853
(39%)
73,523
(48%)
20,491
(13%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
of EDs
New Hampshire
130,589
(44%) 154,903 (52%) 11,173
(4%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
of EDs
New Jersey
1,264,206
(44%)1,325,465(47%) 262,164 (9%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
New York
3,444,812
(50%)2,966,987(44%) 347,786 (5%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
N. Carolina
462,601
(29%)
626,690
(39%)
497,482
(31%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
N. Dakota
94,319
(38%)
138,667(56%)
14,244
(6%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Ohio
1,692,213 (43%)1,785,318(45%) 468,591 (12%) AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Oklahoma
301,658 (32%) 449,697 (48%) 191,731 (20%) AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Oregon
355,875 (44%) 403,491(50%) 49,151 (6%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
State
HHH
(%) RN
(%) GW
(%)
Comments on Completeness
Pennsylvania 2,203,946
(48%)
1,991,784
(43%)
368,275
(8%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Rhode Island
239,497
(65%)
115,929
(31%)
14,967
(4%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
S. Carolina
196,889
(29%)
260,558
(39%)
211,754
(32%)
AP Nov 9 with 99% tabulation
S. Dakota
117,505
(41%)
147,438
(51%)
23,209
(8%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash.Post)
Tennessee
350,041
(28%)
467,232
(38%)
421,044
(34%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash.Post)
Texas
1,267,317
(41%)
1,227,199
(40%)
581,717
(19%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash.Post)
Utah
157,072
(37%)
238,637
(57%)
27,052
(6%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Vermont
70,449
(44%)
85,128
(53%)
4,953
(3%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
Virginia
447,675
(33%)
590,515
(43%)
325,427
(24%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Washington
561,675
(48%)
520,491
(45%)
85,713 (7%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
W. Virginia
373,382
(50%)
306,601
(41%)
72,022 (9%)
AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Wisconsin
748,895
(44%)
810,092
(48%)
126,762 (8%)
UPI Nov 17 (Wash. Post)
JWT
with Bob-follows to do you fule
up on their b
Ng
Bob Haldeman
JAMES H. STROMAN
6815 Lake Shore Drive
Dallas, Texas 75214
November 18, 1968
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Hotel Pierre
New York, New York
Dear Mr. Haldeman:
Mr. Larry Higby, your able assistant, called me last
Wednesday and asked me if I could be in Key Biscayne
on Saturday to meet with you. He indicated he would
discuss the matter further with you and arrive at a
time for the appointment. We then talked again on
Friday and decided that it would probably be better
if you and I had a telephone conversation first due
to your rigid schedule with the President-Elect. Mr.
Higby asked me to call you at 10:30 Sunday morning.
I attempted to reach you at that time and also at
various other times throughout the day, but you were
unable to accept the calls.
I just wanted you to know that I did follow Mr. Higby's
instructions.
I would also like to give you a few more personal
references; all of these individuals have known me
for years.
Thank you again for any consideration you might be
giving me.
Respectfully,
Damon't Thoman
CC: Key Biscayne Office
Honorable Fred Harris
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Dr. M. Norvel Young
President
Pepperdine College
Los Angeles, California
Honorable Ben Barnes
Lieutenant-Governor-Elect of Texas
Austin, Texas
Hon. J. Howard Edmondson
Former United States Senator and
Former Governor of Oklahoma
2700 First National Bank Building
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Mr. John H. Banister
Minister
Skillman Avenue Church of Christ
Dallas, Texas
Mr. A. Pollard Simons
4800 Preston Road
Dallas, Texas
Mr. Will Hayden Griffin
Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dallas, Texas
Mr. James L. Fisk
Former Executive Assistant to Governor of Oklahoma
4961 Quebec Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
fele
To: H.R. Haldeman
From: Kevin Phillips
As per your request communicated to me by Larry Higby on my
return to New York on November 18, I have prepared an analysis of
the changing political trends during the final three weeks of the
campaign which suggests what happened -- and why -- to substantially
narrow the gap and endanger RN's victory.
Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the Campaign
- Their Causes and Effects
A. As of October 15, the generality of polls put RN ahead in most
states except that:
HHH led in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Hawaii, D.C.,
West Virginia and Minnesota (and even the last two
were uncertain)
Wallace led in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia,
Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, North Carolina and
Florida; and
Texas, Michigan and Maine were rated toss-ups
B. Between October 15 and Election Day, RN slipped substantially in
the Northeast, markedly along the Pacific Coast, moderately in the
Great Lakes, very little if at all in the Farm states and Mountain
states. At the same time, he gained slightly in the Border and
substantially in the perimeter South. As a result of these trends,
the following changes occurred in the above list:
HHH captured Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania,
Washington and Maryland; and
RN took some Southern states - South Carolina, North
Carolina, Tennessee and Florida - away from Wallace
C. Because of these changes, RN's ultimate if narrow victory rested
on a combination of West, Midwest, Border and Southern perimeter
- the basic alignment corresponding to the changing ideological
patterns of national politics and projected in RN's original
strategy. This would not have been true of the RN coalition which
seemed possible in early October - an RN alliance of the North and
West against a Wallaceite South.
In the last three weeks of the campaign, a number of ideological and
organizational factors emerged to drive blue-collar Democrats and
liberals of both parties to HHH, and this same tightening of the
two-party context raised the prospect of HHH victory, inducing many
Southern conservatives to switch from Wallace to Nixon.
D. The major trends and their causes are as follows:
1. Wallace losses and HHH gains among normally Democratic
union members - In October, labor union leaders mounted
a strong campaign to induce their members to abandon
racially-motivated Wallace support and return to the HHH
column. At the same time, the Democrats attacked RN
with blatant but effective misrepresentation on the issues
of employment, Social Security and medicare. The GOP
went on the defensive rather than attacking and showing
blue-collar unionists the link between Great Society
failures and attitudes and growing crime and racial
turmoil. In the end, almost all of the Democratic blue-
collar vote went back to HHH; in states like Ohio and
Pennsylvania, most of the Wallace vote came from Repub-
licans (very much contrary to hopes and early expec-
tations).
2. HHH's strong resurgence among long-suspicious liberal
Democrats - Beginning with his October 1 bombing halt
speech - the Viet bombing halt was a liberal symbol
not just a political/military tactic - HHH began to
recoup ground with McCarthyites, youth, blacks and
liberals in general. This trend accelerated sharply
in mid-October as signs grew of potential for a bombing
halt and fruitful Vietnamese negotiations. Other major
causes of HHH's recovery among liberals, all beginning
to mesh together by late October, were:
a) intense liberal distaste for VP nominee Agnew,
inflamed by the rising hubbub of bloopers (and
Democratic advertising relating thereto) and the
anti-intellectual tone of Agnew's campaign and
the anti-establishment thrust of the Agnew-related
attack on the New York Times; Agnew personified
what liberals had feared viz RN in the past and
this Gundermined the ticket's appeal and was a
godsend (among liberals) to an HHH troubled by
lingering memories of Chicago and Mayor Daley;
b) RN's security gap speech and the media misrepre-
sentations and Democratic distortions relating
thereto; liberals (and many moderates) shrank
from the idea of spending billions on a bomb and
missile race - and this is what RN's position
was presented as being - with the result that
they turned to Humphrey.
Of course, the last-minute bombing halt gave the Demo-
cratic campaign a major impetus. Pollster Louis Harris
has privately said that his last-minute poll results were
fashioned by women trending to HHH in support of the
bombing halt. Ultimately, HHH ran very strongly in those
very liberal areas where he had been extremely unpopular
in September (in Wisconsin, his best gains over 1960 levels
came in McCarthyite and Vietnik Madison; in New York, his
best gains over 1960 levels came in rich and liberal Scars-
dale and Manhattan's East Side).
3. RN's late-hour pick-up from Wallace in the South and Border -
As HHH recovered in the North, making Wallace a hopeless contender
and putting himself back in the race, many conservatives in the
South and Border left Wallace for RN. This trend was augmented
by the same conservative imagery - Agnew, the security gap and
so forth - which hurt RN (and helped HHH) among Northern
liberals
E. The chronology of the HHH trend is conjectural, although the polls
offer some guide. A large number of undecided voters were breaking
to HHH throughout October, however private polling done for RN by
Joe Bachelder indicated a late-mid October stabilization at a non-
fatal level. Lou Harris suggests that the bombing halt prompted a
last minute rush to HHH, and although polls taken for RN indicated
no such movement, there is some voting pattern evidence that it
did occur. HHH did very well in exactly the McCarthyite areas that
would have been receptive to a bombing halt.
F. George Wallace's impact is not conjectural; he hurt RN far more
than he hurt HHH. Most of the persons who voted for Wallace this
year voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964. The Labor Union/Democratic
campaign to drive blue-collar unionists back to the Democratic
presidential ticket was highly successful. In Pennsylvania, for
example, Wallace did poorly in labor strongholds around Pittsburgh
or in Wilkes-Barre, Scranton or Altoona. And most of the Wallace
blue-collar vote came from Republicans (or conservatives who would
have voted for RN) while the small-town and white-collar vote was
very Republican in its derivation. For example, Wallace carried
two townships in the greater Pittsburgh area - Indiana and Kilbuck.
Neither are blue-collar strongholds like Braddock or McKeesport
(where Wallace did much less well); they are units which backed RN
in 1960 and Pennsylvania Republicans Shafer in 1966 and Schweiker
in 1968. In the South and Border, Wallace took votes which had gone
to Goldwater in 1964 or which were breaking towards the GOP in
1966. Wallace clearly cost RN Texas and Maryland. The size of the
Wallace vote: of Republican and Goldwater origins, as well as the
lack of Wallace success among blue-collar Democrats, partially
reflects the GOP failure to articulate the social and urban failure
of Great Society liberalism in a way which would have both drawn
GOP Wallaceites back to RN and encouraged blue collar Democratic
unionists to persist in their (Wallaceite) opposition to Democratic
policies.
G. The impact of the Non-indictment of LBJ domestic and foreign
policy - RN lost an opportunity for considerable political benefit
when he declined to attack the chief personage and policies of
the most unpopular administration since the Nineteen-Twenties.
By not taking issue with the Vietnamese and domestic social policies
generally unpopular with the American people for their profound
failure, RN lost
a) a chance to impede HHH's recovery among liberals by saddling
him with the Johnson policy failure (instead RN sometimes
verged on seeming the Johnson policy perpetuator)
b) a chance to attract Wallaceites and cement blue-collar
Democratic adherence to Wallace by spotlighting the
failure of Great Society liberalism; and
c) a chance to spark the campaign and rebut allegations
of blandness and evasion of the key issues
On the other hand, such a campaign would have left a large residue
of bad feeling which would have handicapped the success of the
upcoming administration in dealing with a Democratic congress. Still,
in terms of winning votes, a strong indictment of the LBJ/HHH
Administration would probably have been more successful than the
policy actually pursued.
H. The meaning of the election, despite RN's narrow majority, is
quite clear. 57% of the electorate chose RN or Wallace in repudiation
of the policies of the last four years. Most of the Wallace vote
would have gone Republican in a two-party contest --- and it should
go for RN in 1972 (assuming that Wallace is no longer viable in
light of his relative confinement to the Deep South). By retaining
an ideological option throughout the campaign, RN did not carve
out a clearcut constituency and won what turned out to be a narrow
victory in the face of concerted liberal opposition and conservative
fragmentation between Wallace and the GOP. The opportunity of 1972
probably focuses on winning the bulk of the 1968 Wallace vote.
Herbert G. Klein
Nixon Agnew
Manager for Communications
Campaign Committee
Staff of Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400
The following is a summary File
BOB:
a conversation initiated with me
by Jim Haggerty.
HERB
Herbert G. Klein
Nixon Agnew
Manager for Communications
Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400
November 19, 1968
MEMORANDUM:
TO: BOB FINCH
FR: HERB KLEIN
The following are notes on a conversation with Jim
Haggerty:
1. VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: He has had calls from
three senators all of whom are worried about having
the Vice President in the White House. They say if
he spends too much time there, he limits communi-
cation between Senate and President. They recall
that they felt RN was someone on whose shoulder they
could cry. They say that with the Vice President
away, it lessens advance notice on blow up points
or danger problems which can be handled in advance
if known. They say RN did this often by learning
of a problem and communicating with Ike, Persons
or even Jack Martin.
2. NO PRESS SECRETARY: He says that circumstances
gave him power no others will have or should want to
assume. He says, however, that calls he has received
indicate that present plan gives them the short end
of the stick and thus antagonizes press even before
inauguration. They say a second echelon press
officer is not enough, regardless of the idea, they
want top attention. Haggerty says this is part
pride, part self interest. He says the challenge
will now be to trap other aides and get answers and
the difficulty may be that in their answers they
may differ when exchanging black sheets. He says
Johnson tried something like this with Georbe Reedy
and it was a failure. He says present setup could
blow up in three months. He says RN has to be a
-2-
great President and his comments are because he
believes he will be but that he is handicapping
himself unnecessarily before he begins.
3. ALL PURPOSE AIDES: He believes operation of
federal government day by day is different from a
campaign. White House aides should deal with
compatible departments of government. Top aides
are important.
HIS CONCLUSION: A campaign or what happens now
is child's play next to what happens in critical
time of government. Every president has the right
and a desire for a separate structure, but this
plan as now drawn forth will create disaster to
the reputation of a man who should avoid it and
can avoid it to become a great president.
# # #
November 19, 1968
TO:
MESSRS: HALDEMAN
EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
SAFIRE
file
RE:
INAUGURAL THEME AND IDEAS
I. THEME:
"Bring Us Together" was perfect for the victory statement;
it is not quite adequate for an inaugural theme.
"National Unity" was not the primary Nixon campaign message;
"New Leadership" was. A straight unity appeal now smacks of
'concensus'; it makes it appear that we feel our mandate
is weak.
Dynamic movement, a fresh approach, should be our primary
inauguration theme, with national reconciliation the first
order of business. Therefore, I suggest "Forward Together."
II. THE SYMBOLIC OPPORTUNITY:
The inaugural activities provide a one-in-an-administration
chance to keynote and characterize leadership.
Although "Unity" is an abstract word, "reconciliation" --
between the races and between the generations -- is an urgent
concern.
Symbolism costs nothing; we should build into the address,
the parade and the ball the new president's understanding of
the need for reconciliation. Inaugural honors are used to pay
political debts; we should do this, but also use these honors to
demonstrate how we are reaching out.
- 2 -
Here's how:
1. What the President says: Progressive reconciliation,
not stagnant unity; diversity, not divisiveness; dissent,
not disruption. Tone should neither plead nor lecture;
should evoke and inspire. Needed: one good surprise.
2. Who the President Invites: The feeling of the inaugur-
ation will be carried in pictures of the faces of the
people attending the functions.
(a). I have already suggested inviting the twenty-three
Viet Nam Medal of Honor winners and the Presidential
Medal of Freedom winners;
(b). We should see plenty of black faces; not just the
Ed Brookses and Whitney Youngs, but the Abernathy's
and Roy Inneses (though stopping short of the
preachers of violence), This will not only be a
positive move toward reconciliation, but it will
avert picketing and demonstrations that would mar
the Inauguration. In this way, the "demonstration"
will be ours.
(c). We should invite and help finance the transportation
for delegations of Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans,
Cubans and Indians. Not postcard Indians Indians
dressed in suits, looking dignified and proud.
(d). We should focus attention on the delegation from the
"New South" -- Tower, Thurmond, many of the
- 3 -
Republican candidates in the states Wallace carried
as well as the border states. This would provide
the counterbalance to the minority groups and
underscore the reconciliation theme.
3. The President's Hatlessness: Even so trivial an item as
this has symbolic possibilities. Handled wrong, it will
be played as (1) disrespect for tradition and evidence
of gaucheness; (2) a slap at the hat industry and all it's
employees. Explained properly, it will be interpreted as
(1) an effort to introduce informality to a ceremony that
belongs to what is not an essentially informal people;
(2) anti-stuffiness (3) a desire to be recognized as the
same man who was elected, and not transformed into a
top-hatted "dignitary".
4. What we make available to the media in text and especially
pictures: Everything to do with Inauguration will be
picked out and laboriously chewed over. We can direct the
thrust of the coverage by:
(a). Commissioning five eminent painters (including one
Negro and one Spanish-speaking American) to do a
painting on the theme of "Foward Together", also
five great photographers. Has to be a spread in
Life and all over television, hammering home our
theme; also shows an interest in the non-chi-chi
arts. Tom Hoving at the Metropolitan could move
guidely on this.
(b) Similiarly, five poets on the reconciliation
- 4 -
theme, to be published in the inaugural program and
widely disseminated. Marianne Moore, the best in
the business, is a Nixon fan and nobody knows it.
(c)
An unprecedented attention to detail at the ball,
which is customarily handled by a half dozen harried
banquet managers. Food should be regional, indigenous
American dishes (George Lang of the Four Seasons did
this successfully at the World's Fair). Will show
the necessity of cross-fertilizing American Society
with the best of each region, and the special cultural
contribution of minority groups. Sounds small, but
will be covered big.
(d)
Entertainment at the ball. The few entertainers who
helphed us should get recognition here. But most of
show business was on the other side. We can turn this
minus into a plus in this way; by importing, for the
first time at an American Inaugural, one great
entertainer from Europe and one great one from Asia.
will help with overseas press as well. A wild
thought: the prima ballerina from the MOSCOW Bolshoi.
In the old days, we were only inaugurating an American
president; now we inaugurate a leader of the world.
III. STAFFING:
We should move quickly to involve people like Hoving, Lang, Hobe
Lewis (for the best printed program ever) to work in the planning
stages with Marriot and Ehrlichman. I've spoken to some already
- 5 -
they are dying to be volunteers. Frank Leonard should put out
several issues of "The Nixon Inauguration to call attention to
these details.
IV. STYLE:
This inauguration should not be;
(a) Austere because of the war --- we will recognize the fact
of the fact of the war with the Medal of Honor winners;
(b) An imitation of Camelot ----- that was all style and
elegance and had no real theme, and the whole thing would
be wrong for Nixon;
(c) Another one of the staid, average-type Eisenhower inaugurals
(though one of Eisenhower's Inaugural speeches was damn good)
The Nixon Inauguration should be:
(1) the focusing of attention on an urgent concern of
reconciliation, with an affirmation of the ability to
do something about it;
(2) in step with the informal, moral tone of the heartland
of America;
(3) the rediscovery of the richness of our national
diversity, which is our strength and not our weakness.
11/20/68
To: Bob Haldeman
From: Jim Keogh
Image
Bill Safire put down on paper the major points we discussed
at our Tuesday session--plus some added thoughts. Some copies are
attached.
The search for better intelligence (first point) is in
progress. Herb Klein was to ask the U.S.I.A. to gather a summary
and analysis of overseas press reaction and comment on the election.
This should be available in a few days. Also, Martin Anderson and
Klein are getting a summary and analysis of positive comment in the
U.S. for use in drafting our own memorandum on the campaign and
election.
Safire has put down a pretty good outline for such a
memorandum. Pat Buchanan is thinking about how the memorandum
should be written.
In connection with the idea for a trip abroad by Nixon
intimates, we considered at a second session today the problems
related to a believable cover story and the danger that such a
trip might seem too defensive. An acceptable alternative could
be a series of personal and private visits by individuals--with
proper alerting of the press and perhaps some arranging of lunches
or dinners with editors by the embassies. For example, Jack Whitney
might make a personal trip to London and have a lunch with editors.
Perhaps Garment could go to Paris on business and his presence could
be tipped to the press. And maybe Ehrlichman could go to Bonn.
Surely a tip that John was in Bonn would bring the press running.
Incidentally, Frank McCulloch is doing a two-part piece
for LIFE to run in January. I think we can do some good spadework
there.
KEOGH FROM SAFIRE
RE: NIXON IMAGE ABROAD
Nov 20
Intelligence Needed: a study of post-election clips and comments in
London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt-Bonn, Amsterdam,
Tokyo, New Delhi.
The Reston column from Moscow about European
commentary on the "old" Nixon may be misinformed.
Our own State Dept sources could get files quickly,
and private clip services would do an analysis also.
Gallup, too, does opinion polling overseas, and has
affiliate arrangements with leading pollsters abroad;
he could make these available to us.
Basic Line Needed
On Campaign Strategy: For use abroad and at home as well, we should
develop a memorandum setting forth the wisdom of the
1968 campaign strategy.
This to nip in the bud a historical decision that
we "almost blew it" or "stumbled in."
Should stress point that win was planned in a way
that enables new Administration to govern.
Elements:
1) Choice of primary route to nomination was danger-
ous but laid to rest "loser" image for campaign;
2) Choice of Agnew was brilliant, as proven by
results; a Tower or Reagan would have blown Ohio,
Illinois, and possibly California while only picking
Texas---and a Lindsay or Rockefeller would have
blown all border states and Florida while only picking
up Pennsylvania. Would have fallen short either way.
3) Though all pundits and polls thought Democratic
party was hopelessly split after Chicago, we based
strategy on (a) the likelihood of Ted Kennedy and
Larry O'Brien swinging much disaffected Dem support
in East back to Humphrey;
(b) the likelihood of ultimate if qualified
McCarthy endorsement in final weeks;
(c) the ability of organized labor to
cut 5% of Wallace 20% steength, swinging much of East
back to Humphrey (Wallace drop correctly and publicly
predicted by Nixon) ;
In light of these strategic assumptions (which were
the opposite of conventional wisdom at the time),
we positioned ourselved to withstand the most power-
fule thrust of all: a bombing halt just before the
election.
2
4) We knew the bombing halt was sure to come because:
(a) Johnson had done something similar before 1966
election, and knew he could override political
timing charge;
(b) Humphrey campaign, starting at Salt Lake City
speech, was geared wholly to anticipated peace
vote swinging to him, explaining also the arms=
control and nuclear proliferation treaty stress.
Nothing could fully XXX counter this Presidential
move. Blunting it somewhat was (a) Nixon's
emphasis on negociating from strength and the
security gap issue, and (b) total support of Johnson
peace moves to the extent of publicly refusing to
believe political motivation.
With the Democratic strategy long anticipated,
Nixon kept his cool in the final week as Johnson's
move before his Saigon 2xix "ducks were ina row"
made the political motivation apparent; despite
pressure from Nixon aides, the candidate held to
his long-planned strategy "trusting" that
communist assurances were given and saying that
Johnson did not realize that our allies would
refuse to go along. Thus, on final weekend,
Nixon was not impugning Johnson integrity (which
would have bakkfired), only questionging President's
diplomatic judgment and offering to help bring
Saigon into line.
This remarkably cool decision under enonmous pressure
was the final key to Nixon's victory, allying him
with peace efforts while underscoring his ability
to be a better diplomat and bring peace quicker.
And in the long run, it enabled Nixon to work
closely with Johnson after the election to end the
war; the post-election cooperation shattered
precedent, helping Nixon in his first aim of bringing
the nation together.
5) In this regard, throughout the campaign, Nixon
refraining from the slashing personal attacks on
either his opponent or the President. Strategic
reason: (a) would have reinforced image of Nixon
the Democrats were trying to recall (b) would have
made governing later that much harder.
At the same time, Nixon stayed on the attack
trhoughout, never being drawn into an attidude of
"pretecting his lead".
(6) Nixon introduced the technique of the "talking
position paper" a striking re-use of radio that
had been dormant for thirty years. Enabled him to
deal at length with specific issues without having
to reduce enthusiasm of rally audiences. The planned
3
Democratic charge of "not dealing with the issues" x
found itself with noplace to go; at the end, reporters
received two complete books with extensive Nixon
positions proving his had been a campaign of substance.
7) The Nixon television technique, perfected in the
primaries, was so successful it was copied by the
Democrats. The regional panel, showing Nixon at his
strongest answering questions, was xxpix imitated
by Humphrey in the final stages. Samewith the
national telethon.
We had to concede an edge to the Democrats on their
use of television spots, since personal attacks
and emotional appeals about "trust" are a more effec-
tive use of the spot format than issue attacks. But
we had to adapt our technique to our overall
staategy.
8.) Another part of the overall strategy dealt with
the "battleground states". The decision was made eary
to concentrate both time and money in California,
Ohio, New Jersey, Illinois (four we won) and Michigan
New York, Pennsylvania and Texas (which we lost,
the last two narrowly.) Obviously, this strategy paid
off; also, a less publicised but major effort was
made in the border ssates, where the choice of Agnew
was crucial, and a sweep was made there with the
exceppion of a squeaker in Maryland.
Though the Democrats sought to charge a "Southern
strategy" (which helped them solidify the Negro vote)
the five Wallace states received little Nixon attention;
the law and order issue, a stand against busing and
the active support of Thurmond helped carry Virginia,
the Carolinas and Florida. But a real "southern
Strategy" with no hope of the Deep South would have
been foodish.
On geography, the Nixon grand strategy acheived an
important goal: a national rather than regional
victory. Woodrow Wilson won while carrying only
Ohio and New Hampshire in the East; Humphrey tried
to win without the South and the West; Nixon took at
least one major state in each section. (Jersey in
the East, Florida and the Carolinas in the South,
most of the midwest and most of the west, plus the
border states.)
9) Nixon strategists recognized the Negro vote as a
lost cause from the start, but the candidaté never
stopped pressing for "justice" with law and order,
and developed the "black capitalism" concept, again
aiming past the election toward effective government.
10) The strategic mistake should be admitted, since
it was an error on the side of restraint and dagan
decency. Muskie was vulnerable on several juicy
counts---matters involving the FHA, Billy Sol Estes,
the TFX affair. Much more substantive than anything
leveled against Agnew. But Nixon said no, which
permitted the Democrats to build up Muskie into a major
asset and helped their attack on Agnew by contrast.
11) X Ideologically, Nixon occupied the middle from the
start, gambling that he could kk keep the middle in a
three way race large enough to win. Amazingly, the
solid Nixon strength held at 42% throughout, assuming
Gallup to be correct. He successfully fended off
erosion from both sides, holding his bloc of independents
and Republicans, finally picking up some extra support
from Wallace protesters.
An Eastern Republican nominee, or a Nixon who adopted a
all-out liberal stance, wouldx have lost the East anyway
as traditional Democratic strength came together, and
worse for the nation---would have permitted Wallace
to get one fourth to one third of the popular vote.
Thus, the Nixon victory was a victory for the center,
enough of a change to satisfy the non-racist rightist
protesters, and indeed the only type of candidacy that
could effectively govern the nation. (Walter Lippman
and Stewart Alsop forsaw this.)
When you lose, the "if only" begins. But consider the
"ifs" in the way the Nixon strategy turned out:
He could never have won, if (a) he had neglected the
primaryes, (b) he had chosen a vice presidential nominee
from either left or right (c) he had depended on the
dissaffection of vocally unhappy Democrats (d) he had
launched a slashing attack on Johnson or Humphrey
(e) he had neglected the thoughtful speeches and opened
himself to the 'no substance' charge (f) he had spent
more time in states eigher surely won or lost (g) he had
adopted a regional or southern strategy, and most
important at the end, if (f) he had panicked and blasted
the President on a phony bombing halt.
One missemp misstep, and he could easily have lost; one
strategic or tactical error, and the traditional
Democratic majority plus the far right's breakaway would
have meant a Humphrey victory. But Nixon moved
straight ahead without stumbling once; that was the
secret of the greatest comeback in modern political
history.
5
Interpretation Abroad
Follows Pundits Here:
The trend of opinion formation about the US
abroad is started by the writers stationed in the
US from foreign papers; they all take their
lead from US columnists.
Therefore, an understanding of the preceding
strategy of the campaign must originate with a
respected US writer.
Since this interpretation is different from the
standard line (of"Nixon lucked out"), it will
start a fresh spate of stories which the foreign
press will pick up. Andx ifit isx accompanied
by some "inside" revelations, it will get a good
play. These second thoughts make the history.
Needed: Our Own
Donovan or Schlesinger: The Eisenhower administration opened its files
to a respected reporter, Robert Donovan; the Kennedy
administration had Schlesinger Jr. live in.
On a much more limited scale, we should confide in
a respected writer to do the inside story of the
campaign. In the course thereof, he will reflect
Nixon to be the cool, careful, thoughtful,
strong leader he proved himself to be in the
campaign.
One suggestion: Nick Timmesch of Newsday, author
of a good book on the Republican party. He is
nobody's patsy, but 90% of our message would come
through.
Another suggestion: Peter Maas of New York magazine,
a Bobby Kennedy intimate. Would add immense
credibility, and I know him well enough to judge
that 80% of the message would come through.
In opinion-formation, 80% of the message from a
credible source is far more effective than 100%
from a source inside that clearly is gringing the
new administration's ax.
A reporter such as one of these would write XXXX
for a publication of limited circulation, even the
Satevepost; however, we might interest the
Readers Digest in reprinting it, which would make
it mass circulation here and abroad.
6
Follow-Up to
Selected Foreign Press:
We should begin now to open up channels to
the foreign press stationed here. Some, like
Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, are
bellwethers (and Brandon is charming to the
Nixon staff but files unfriendly material.)
These men want personal interviews with Nixon,
of course, but they can be satisfied with close
attention by top Nixon staffers and a feeling that
they have been chosen to get a look "inside".
We should select a half-dozen from key capitals
and assign staffers to get across our message
just before publication in the US of the first
story on these lines.
Trip Abroad by
Nixon Intimates:
A task force of three men known to be close to
the President-elect should be sent to Europe.
Announced purpose: fact-finding on respect for
America and its present policies among non-
governmental sources.
Composed of: an editor (a Klein or a Keogh or an
editor or publisher who knows Nixon well who was
not inthe campaign) ; a financial man or economist;
and somebody who was connected with USIA in the
Eisenhower administration.
In the course of their fact-finding, they would
hold press conferences and private meetings with
journalists abroad, revealing what they know
about Nixon the man and the way the American
campaign was condusted---in the only way that
enables the winner to govern.
This should be a non-diplomatic mission, and the
task force should steer sharply away from questions
to them about foreign policy. Of course, to avoid
offense, they should set up their meetings with
private individuals in consultation with our
State Department and probably through the govern
ments of the countries they visit.
7
Television Abroad:
Frank Shakespeare informs us that the USIA is
preparing a half-hour documentary on the new
President. Needlessto say, this should be carefully
viewed add appropriate comments given with all
due attention to propriety.
I understand that out own campaign documentary
is being throughly distributed abroad.
If we decide to cooperate to the extent of an
interview with the President-elect with any or all
of the US networks, provision should be made to
make the interview simultaneously availabèe to
oversease networks.
Nixon philosophy
We should set someone to work immediately on
abroad
translating relevant portions of "Nixon on the
Issues" and "Nixon Speaks Out" into French,
Italian, German and Japanese.
These excerpts should then be mailed to a wide list
of foreign editors with a letter from Zeigler
introducing himself and opening a channel of
answers to queries.
We should make a deal with a US publisher to
publish a book of Nixon campaign speeches, with a
new introduction and an epilogue to make it
copyright-able. Proviso: quick translation and
publication abread in paperback form.
And while we're at it, we should write a new
conslusion to "Six Crises" and have that
translated and published around the world.
By the time the translation is finished and type
set, the Inaugural address will be delivered and
can be included.
A Final Thought:
Between Christmas and Inauguration Day, Julie and
David will be going on their honeymoon. Perhaps,
after a week of idyllic privacy on some hideaway,
they would be willing to make a tour of Europe.
Impact: fantastic. And they would have the best
and most natural reason to be travelling abroad.
Calf
File
Schaton
(Find
November 20, 1968
HENRY SALVATORI called rmw and said:
"Mayor Yorty called me. He told me to call
RMN. He said that during the campaign RMN asked him to become
a member of his Cabinet and he sayd yes. Since he has to make his
plans he would like to know whether he is being considered, etc. "
Henry Salvatori said we should either call him back or call Yorty
direct and let him know what the score is -- he is apparently quite
anxious. (You will recall the Salvatori's were the ones who got after
us to call Yorty when we were in California just prior to the election!!!!)
Tell Salvatori yorty is under consideration -
but can't be specific until all other
November 21, 1968
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INCOMPLETE PRECINCTS
Illinois: Cook and DuPage Counties have not yet certified.
This can be expected Friday or Monday.
Maine: We will have complete story on Friday.
Michigan: There is a scattering of precincts. We are
not missing any blocks of precincts.
Montana:
No information but we are trying to track this
down.
(RN
MEMORANDUM
November 23, 1968
Q
TO:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LARRY HIGBY
RE:
ASA
With regard to your query on ASA, we found no agency
containing those initials.
However, there is an agency entitled ESSA, which stands
for Environmental Sciences Service Administration. in Commerce
It is involved with coastal and geodetic services, and also
the Weather Bureau.
NASA is ind. agoncy
admin?
5 in space