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This file contains:
To: RN (via Haldeman) From: Buchanan Re: Views on White House Staff. 4 Pages. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page. [Letter], 11/18/1968
To: H. S.[sic] Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page. [Letter], 11/19/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Herbert W. Kalmbach Re: Crispus A. Wright. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/20/n.d.
To: Larry Higby From: Dave Derge Re: NBC Nationationwide Key Precinct Analysis for Jewish Vote. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/21/1968
To: RN From: Sears Re: "Reorganization of the National Committee and the Relationship Between the White House and National Committee." 22 Pages. [Memo], 11/22/1968
To: RN and Bob Haldeman From: P. M. Flanigan Re: John Loeb. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/25/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Bryce Harlow Re: Conversation with General Goodpaster in Saigon. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Harlow to RN dated 11/27/1968. [Memo], 11/28/1968
To: RN From: Harlow Re: Conversation with Andy Goodpaster. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/27/1968
To: HRH From: RZ Re: Analysis of the national press corps, reporters attitudes, and reporters votes. 8 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
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26127126
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WHSF: Returned, 41-7
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26127126
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WHSF: Returned, 41-7
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This file contains:
To: RN (via Haldeman) From: Buchanan Re: Views on White House Staff. 4 Pages. [Memo], 11/13/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page. [Letter], 11/18/1968
To: H. S.[sic] Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page. [Letter], 11/19/1968
To: H. R. Haldeman From: Herbert W. Kalmbach Re: Crispus A. Wright. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/20/n.d.
To: Larry Higby From: Dave Derge Re: NBC Nationationwide Key Precinct Analysis for Jewish Vote. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/21/1968
To: RN From: Sears Re: "Reorganization of the National Committee and the Relationship Between the White House and National Committee." 22 Pages. [Memo], 11/22/1968
To: RN and Bob Haldeman From: P. M. Flanigan Re: John Loeb. 1 Page. [Letter], 11/25/1968
To: Bob Haldeman From: Bryce Harlow Re: Conversation with General Goodpaster in Saigon. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Harlow to RN dated 11/27/1968. [Memo], 11/28/1968
To: RN From: Harlow Re: Conversation with Andy Goodpaster. 1 Page. [Memo], 11/27/1968
To: HRH From: RZ Re: Analysis of the national press corps, reporters attitudes, and reporters votes. 8 Pages. [Memo], n.d.
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
41
7
11/13/1968
Memo
To: RN (via Haldeman) From: Buchanan Re:
Views on White House Staff. 4 Pages.
41
7
11/18/1968
Letter
To: H. R. Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re:
"Former Presidents, Allowances and Special
Provisions for." 1 Page.
41
7
11/19/1968
Letter
To: H. S.[sic] Haldeman From: S. B. Bull
Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and
Special Provisions for." 1 Page.
41
7
11/20/n.d.
Letter
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Herbert W.
Kalmbach Re: Crispus A. Wright. 1 Page.
41
7
11/21/1968
Letter
To: Larry Higby From: Dave Derge Re:
NBC Nationationwide Key Precinct Analysis
for Jewish Vote. 1 Page.
41
7
11/22/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Sears Re: "Reorganization of
the National Committee and the Relationship
Between the White House and National
Committee." 22 Pages.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
41
7
11/25/1968
Letter
To: RN and Bob Haldeman From: P.M.
Flanigan Re: John Loeb. 1 Page.
41
7
11/28/1968
Memo
To: Bob Haldeman From: Bryce Harlow Re:
Conversation with General Goodpaster in
Saigon. 1 Page. Attached to memo from
Harlow to RN dated 11/27/1968.
41
7
11/27/1968
Memo
To: RN From: Harlow Re: Conversation with
Andy Goodpaster. 1 Page.
41
7
n.d.
Memo
To: HRH From: RZ Re: Analysis of the
national press corps, reporters attitudes, and
reporters votes. 8 Pages.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Page 2 of 2
DETERMINED TO RE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By
RJP
NARS,
Date
4/8/87
MEMORANDUM
TO: RN (via Haldeman)
DATE: Nov. 13, 1968
FROM: Buchanan
Some of these thoughts I have already relayed to Bryce,
but I wanted to get them directly to RN before getting out
of town. These reflect some of my views on the White House
staff; and{RN can discount them given Buchanan's prejudices
and predispositions.
1) If RN is going to build a New Majority, we have to
get cracking on building and expanding the party in the border
states and the South, as well as the Midwest and West. The
party has to be united and working together in all these states
for us to win -- 1968 demonstrated the tremendous resiliency
Iagree-
and strength of the Democrats. My own suggestion would be to
under
put Sears in as a White House Assistant with responsibility
Ehrlich
to the President for reporting on the condition of the party
X
in every state; he should, as well have some measure of au-
thority for settling disputes and scrounging for new Congres-
sional candidates and for liaison with the Hill and the RNC.
Sears is loyal to RN, enormously competent, well liked by press
and politicians and without peer in terms of knowledge of the
various States situations.
2) Press Secretary. Directly and indirectly, several mem-
bers of the press corps friendly to RN have indicated that it
would be a grave error for Ziegler to be named press spokesman.
He won't be.
- 2 -
First, he is an "advertising man" which turns them off at once;
secondly, he is without knowledge on issues and politics and
third, he has no seasoning.
3) RN needs close by him some advisor with "soul" for lack
of a better term. By that I mean someone who understands and
will counsel RN to utilize the vast powers inherent in the
majesty of the office and the respect in which it is held. FDR
and the Kennedys recognized that you do not speak to the poor
in statements and speeches alone, that you speak in symbols and
gestures as well. A dramatic and gracious RN visit to a Negro
community, done with dignity and decorum can help more to win
the blacks back to the national fold than any of Humphrey's
"programs." The same is true of the young. RN, I believe,
should have close to him someone who recognizes and knows how
RN can use the tremendous powers, the third and fourth dimen-
sions of communication offered to him by the office he now holds.
I don't know who is the man, but RN needs some people of both
passion and compassion close by. moore + Funch + Garment
4) RN needs to widen his circle of advisors, in my view,
The point is not that any particular individual should be there,
but that points More of view should be represented. The Congressional
Establishment, the Liberal Establishment nationally, the Jewish
intellectuals, the conservatives; labor, the Wall Street Crowd
and the business community, the stock market: RN should know
how all of these various elements are going to react to various
- 3 -
moves. And to do that RN has got to have a base of advisors who
know something about each of these, who march to the different
drums of differing groups of Americans.
There were in my own view, a few mistakes made in the general
election thatmight have been avoided if the ideas had been run
by a few more people.
Nowhere is this need for reliable backboards more urgent than
in the final selection of Cabinet members. I know the require-
ments of secrecy and time, but I think that these selections
should be checked out as exhaustively as possible for both com-
petence and political impact of their appointment. We are going
to have to live with these people; they can make or break us, and
if we err on any side, for God's sake, let it be on the side of
too much checking and too many opinions sought.
5) In selecting the new men around him in the White House,
RN must concentrate not only on people who know how to administer
things, but on some men who have a clear idea of what they want
the Nixon Administration to accomplish. We need some men near RN
with fire in their bellies who want to change things, to accomplish
set goals, not just to hold power.
6) RN in moving as President should not be a "conservative"
in his actions; he should not be induced into any sense of cau-
tion or hesitence by the fact of our tiny plurality. That is a
- 4 -
myth we can disregard, if we will fill the Cabinet with Big Men.
If RN will act with decisiveness and daring, then we will build
the majority as President that we did not win as candidate.
7) The greatest asset we have as President is that trust,
that bond between President and people which LBJ squandered
away by lack of candor and lack of openness. This bond of trust
can survive and even prosper in failure, if we maintain it.
Remember JFK was never held higher in public esteem than when he
took public responsibility for the disaster at the Bay of Pigs.
8) In setting up his White House staff RN ought not let
himself be straight-jacketed by any past model; and I for one
would like to see on the staff there perhaps some maverick in-
tellectual like a Milton Friedman responsible for spinning off
ideas about how RN is going to accomplish this goal of decen-
tralization.
File
RECEIVEd COMMCEN
KEY BiscayNE.
18 NOV 65 6:3 P.M. Locd
RR WTE17
DE WTE16 003
FROM S. B. BULL
TO H. R. HALDEMAN
CITE NY0003
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENTS, ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR.
1. U.S. CODE ANNOTATED - 1967 ("FOR USE IN 1968") PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
TITLE 3, PARAGRAPH 102, SECTION 5,
SUB PARAGRAPH:
A. MONETARY ALLOWANCE OF $25,000 PER ANNUM, FOR LIFE
B. AN OFFICE STAFF, THE TOTAL COST OF WHICH WILL NOT EXCEED
$65,000 PER ANNUM
C. OFFICE SPACE, "APPROPRIATELY FURNISHED AND EQUIPPED, AS
DETERMINED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR (OF GENERAL SERVICES).
E. WIDOW OF A FORMER PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE A PENSION OF $10,000
PER ANNUM.
2. OTHER PRIVILEGES NOT SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THIS ACT BUT
PROVIDED BY CUSTOM AND SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE ACT, IS BEING
INVESTIGATED. INFORMATION TO FOLLOW.
S. B. BULL
DTG 182315Z NOV 1968
RECEIVEd KEY Biscayne
00 WTE17
Comm CISN:
DE WTE16 005
FROM S.B. BULL
19 Nov 68 2:10 P.M. LOCAL
TO H.S. HALDEMAN
CITE NY0005
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENTS, ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL
PROVISIONS FOR
FURTHER TO COMMUNICATION OF 18 NOV 1968, THIS SUBJECT.
1. TITLE 39, SECTION 4165 (POSTAL SECTION) PROVIDES FOR
ALL MAIL OF A FORMER PRESIDENT TO BE CONVEYED ANYWHERE IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL'S FRANK.
2. PRESIDENTS* KENNEDY AND JOHNSON HAVE MADE AVAILABLE
AIRCRAFT TO CONVEY A FORMER PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT BUSINESS
IN THE "PUBLIC SERVICE". IN ADDITION, WHEN IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. ON THIS TYPE OF BUSINESS, A VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE.
THESE PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN USED VERY SPARINGLY BY GEN.
EISENHOWER. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AS A RETIRED
5-STAR GENERAL HE IS ENTITLED TO MANY COURTESIES AND BENEFITS
OF THIS NATURE.
3. CERTAIN BENEFITS SUCH AS SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION, FRANKING,
AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR AN OFFICE STAFF WERE ACCORDED MRS.
KENNEDY BY SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE ACT.
4. ACCORDING TO GENERAL SCHULTZ, AIDE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER,
NO OTHER COURTESIES OR BENEFITS ARE ACCORDED FORMER PRESIDENTS.
DTG: 191830Z NOV 1968
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE
400 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
(212) 758-3444
Done
MAURICE H. STANS
FINANCE CHAIRMAN
HERBERT W. KALMBACH
W. DON BREWER
JEREMIAH MILBANK, JR.
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMEN
DANIEL W. HOFGREN
JACK A. GLEASON
ASSISTANTS TO CHAIRMAN
C. LANGHORNE WASHBURN
FINANCE DIRECTOR
HUGH W. SLOAN, JR.
ASSISTANT FINANCE DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF, II
Kalmbra form
bench Posels
TREASURER
RAYMOND T. UNDERWOOD. JR.
COMPTROLLER
COURTNEY BURTON
November 20th
GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY
RALPH CORDINER
J. CLIFFORD FOLGER
F. PEAVEY HEFFELFINGER
To:
H. R. Haldeman
you
JAMES S. KEMPER
SPENCER T. OLIN
we
CHARLES S. THOMAS
SINCLAIR WEEKS
From:
Herbert W. Kalmbach
HONORARY CO-CHAIRMEN
Re:
Crispus A. Wright
You may remember Cris Wright. He was
active for us in '62 working with Negro groups
in the Los Angeles area.
Cris just called me from Los Angeles
and indicated that he has great interest in being
considered for some post in the new administration.
I asked him to send you his resume with
a brief covering letter outlining his interests.
9
(RN
file
L
November 21, 1968
TO:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
DAVE DERGE
SOURCE: NBC Key Precinct Analysis--Nationwide
HHH 81%
RMN 17%
Wallace 2%
Jewish vote
Gallup's June findings showed 7% of Jews to be
Republicans.
This is "confidential."
what did goldante PMF get in 6 y ?
what did an get in 60 ?
file
November 22, 1968
MEMO TO:
RN
FROM:
Sears
RE:
Reorganization of the National Committee
and the Relationship Between The White
House and National Committee
I. General Discussion: As a result of the November 5th
election, it is obvious that the future of the Republican
Party, together with its political base, lies in an area
stretching from Florida to the State of Washington. This
area includes all of the 01d South, the Middle West, with
the exception of Michigan and Minnesota, and all of the
Far West. In the Northeast, Maryland, Delaware, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania should be considered border
states under the new configuration and over the next
few years. The election results in these states, as
well as Michigan and Minnesota, will vary from year to
year depending on issues, events and candidates. New
York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and, for
a while, West Virginia must be considered Democratic
strongholds. Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont will
remain Republican.
RN
-2-
November 22, 1968
The political job over the next two years is to
build and establish the Party within the confines of
its Florida-Washington base, making it so strong in
these areas that it can be counted upon to deliver a
Republican majority in statewide elections. Once this
is done, and we are sure of our base, we can tackle the
larger problem of making Pennsylvania, Maryland and
New Jersey more predictably Republican and establishing
stronger organization in Michigan, New York and Connecticut.
If we do our job in the Florida-Washington areas well
enough over the next tow) years, this second phase (the
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Michigan,
Connecticut push) could be commenced after the 1970
elections. The objective of both Phase I, aimed at
establishing a sure base of Republican electoral votes
in any national election and gaining control of the House
and Senate in 1970, and Phase II, the push in the Northern
states mentioned above, will result in making the Republican
Party the majority party in this country four years hence.
RN
-3-
November 22, 1968
II. General Problems: If the above two-phase plan is
to be accomplished in four years, a number of things must
be set in motion immediately: (1) the power and authority
of the Presidency must be brought to bear on the National
Committee to completely remodel it, both in terms of
personnel and function; (2) the Congressional Campaign
Committee, the Senatorial Campaign Committee and the
Republican Governors Association must be abolished, at least
insofar as they now attempt to perform some campaign
function, and their political functions transferred to
a strengthened National Committee; (3) federal patronage,
both in terms of jobs and projects, must be funnelled
through a central source in the White House to be sure
that its distribution is serving the best political
purpose possible. For the next two years, patronage
must be used almost exclusively to build the party in
the Florida-Washington base and not to reward incumbent
Republicans. After we have won control of the Congress,
we can use an appropriate amount of it to keep our
incumbents popular; (4) the patronage which flows from
the many governmental agencies must be funnelled through
the same central source, and this must all be coordinated
with the patronage which our many Republican governors
are distributing; (5) the selection of candidates for
RN
-4-
November 22, 1968
the 1970 elections in Virginia and New Jersey must
commence immediately, and the White House, while not
dabbling in this matter publicly, should use its power
and authority to be sure that the best candidates run
and without going through damaging primaries.
All of this, as well as many other more particular
functions, will have to be undertaken while RN is trying
to deal with a Democratic Congress, confronting the
grave national problems that face us and beating down
the normal amount of sharply aimed criticism from the
Democrats. It is not too unlikely that Teddy Kennedy,
who already has begun rustling around to gain control
of his party, will start running against us next year,
and this will be a separate problem to deal with.
III. The Proposed Function of the Remodeled National Committee:
If we are to change the leadership of the National Com-
mittee, as well as its personnel, and abolish the Congressional
Campaign Committee and the Senatorial Campaign Committe, it
must be expected that this will generate a certain amount
of internal dissension in the party itself. Ray Bliss,
while he certainly can't win any confrontations with RN,
has a few cards to play. Quite wrongly,most of the state
RN
-5-
November 22, 1968
chairmen believe that he has done a good job and see
no reason to replace him. He has cultivated their
loyalty assiduously against the time when someone might
try to replace him. Were he a different kind of fellow,
we could kick him upstairs somewhere, but I cn't think
of any place where he could do a decent job.
Therefore, if we are to replace him we must be
sure that the person or persons who take over his obliga-
tions are acceptable to the National Committee members
and such good appointments that we can keep the bitching
to a minimum. I am in agreement with the concept of
having a two-man Chairmanship, a name Chairman who is a
spokesman for the party and the Administration, and a
second man with a lesser title who is a purely political
mechanic. While RN will have to decide on the top spot
himself since this man will have to speak for him, I
think that Keith Bulen would be an ideal selection for
the second position. Bulen is highly regarded in the
National Committee, a strong and thorough organizer; he
has proven himself tough enough to move a lot of people
around and break some china, yet maintains a strong respect,
even among those whom he has offended. He has been through a
similar exercise to that we are facing in his own state
RN
-6-
November 22, 1968
of Indiana, and is therefore aware of some of the problems
that might not be apparent to others. Most important, he
could be counted upon to be totally loyal.
In order to hold down the public clamor in this
regard to abolishing the two Campaign Committees, I think
that it is necessary to proceed by first abolishing their
fund-raising capabilities and lodging those with the
National Committee; and then we can proceed to take over
their other functions in regard to candidate selection
and campaign services. Once they no longer have any
fund-raising capability, you will have them on a pretty
short string anyway.
As a temporary mechanism to make it easy on everybody,
I think that a general campaign committee should be formed
at the National Committee comprised of the National Chairman,
his political second, a member of the House, a Senator, and
a Governor. This committee would in actuality have no
campaign function but would serve as a substitute for
the present arrangement. Also, the Governor, the Senator,
and the Congressman could help the National Chairman in
his spokesman duties.
RN
-7-
November 22, 1968
As to the functions which a revamped National Committee
should perform, they should be the following:
A. State Organization -- Political organizations
are built at the state level by a combination of patronage,
discipline and co-ordination with the White House. The
National Committee should have responsibility for riding
herd on the state chairmen to be sure that state patronage
is being distributed as best suits the organizational
growth, that registration programs are properly carried
out, that special interest is maintained in particular
voting groups which are either fundamental to that particular
state or with which we are weak and, on the whole, insure
that the state organizations are run efficiently and with
the required discipline.
B. Campaign Managers -- While the National Committee
in the past has made some ineffective stabs at improving
the work of our state chairmen, no one has ever made any
effort to train any campaign managers. My feeling about
the state chairman situation is that if we find that a
particular state chairman does not know how to carry out
his office, we should replace him with one who does, instead
of trying to train him. In the last election, at least
four Senate seats were lost because of bad campaign managers,
RN
-8-
November 22, 1968
and even in areas where we won, I would be hard-pressed
to point to any good campaign managers. As will be stated
in detail later in this memorandu, we have an excellent
chance in the off-year elections of 1970, especially in
the Senate, but we are likely to fritter away this oppor-
tunity unless we can train some campaign managers in the
meantime. I would charge the National Committee with
this responsibility.
C. Money Raising -- The National Committee
should have full responsibility for raising all money
necessary for the upcoming off-year elections. This
should be commenced immediately, and should occupy a
majority of the Committee's time over the next year. Two
years from now the Committee will be asked to finance 14
target Senate races and about 45 target Congressional
races. This, in addition to the ordinary financing that
has been required in the past.
D. Surburban Program -- The opportunity for
growth in the party over the next ten years does not lie
in the cities. We are woefully out-organized there; most
voters have a bad impression of the Republican party and
probably won't change until conditions change demonstrably
for the better under a Republican Administration, and the
historic ties to the Democratic party, especially among
RN
-9-
November 22, 1968
blacks and other non-white racial groups are so strong
that they can only be broken over a long period of time.
In point of actual fact, even now the largest single
block of voters in each of the fifteen largest states
in this country reside in the suburbs, with the exception
of New York and Texas. Even in New York and Texas, a
combination of the suburban vote and the rural vote far
outweighs that in the cities. The complex of the suburbs
is in a drastic state of change with considerable numbers
of former city dwellers in the provess of moving to the
suburbs. Once there and owning property, they have a
tendency to become. more Republican in their thought than
they were in the cities as matters of taxes and local govern-
ment come more forcefully home to them. The real challenge
for us then is to improve our organization in these areas.
At present, both parties are very poorly organized,
and due to the great change in the population of these
areas, a large share of the voters are not even identified
as to party affiliation or leaning. In the main the
Democrats have tried to perpetuate the "clubhouse" method
of organization, but this does not work at all in areas
that are spread out geographically and have no central
characteristics of race or economic level. Our party
which in most cases was their first, operates as though
RN
-10-
November 22, 1968
it were a small town concern rather than suburban. We
still elect the town clerks in most of the non-Southern
areas but are out of touch with the new voters who moved
over the last eight or nine years. I think the National
Committee should be responsible for developing and imple-
menting a program specifically aimed at the suburbs. This
should be done immediately and should occupy a large
share of the Committee's time when it is not raising money
during the next year.
E. Young Voters Program -- In combination with
the efforts of the Administration in this area, the National
Committee should institute a new program aimed to attract
to the party as workers and voters those between the ages
of 18 and 30. The Young Republicans, while they make a
great deal of noise, have been an ineffective vehicle for
attracting youth to the party. The Young Republicans are
too restrictive philosophically and are mainly concerned
with power struggles within their own body instead of
making any attempt to generate a broad appeal to youth.
They are also too old, the age limit being technically
thirty-five, but many members staying on till well past
forty. Instead of encouraging membership, the present
leadership group often discourages it since they are
fearful that if a lot of new members join the organization
the so-called "syndicate" will be voted out of power.
RN
-11-
November 22, 1968
Beyond the Young Republicans, there are a number of
other conservative youth groups which should be dried up.
If this is to be done, a strong hand will have to be exercised
from the National Committee. While this does not sound
like a high-priority responsibility, it would help to
develop our organization fantastically if we could develop
a better program for young voters so that we don't wind up
trying to convert them from being Democrats when they are
35, as is presently the case.
F. Early Warning System -- One material way
that the Democrats have always been much better than we
are has been that up and down the ranks of their organization
they have usually been better prepared to defend the actions
of the Democratic Administrations to the voting public. In
the Democratic party, precinct chairmen are usually well
enough aware of the "party-line" that they can answer the
routine questions of voters within their block about most
actions that are taken by the President or the party. We
have never had this kind of discipline in our party, and,
therefore, when a concerned voter asks his precinct chairman
why we did "X" he usually stands and looks at the sky and
shakes his head. I think it would be extremely helpful
for the National Committee in co-ordination with
RN
-12-
November 22, 1968
the White House and Congress to be charged with the
responsibility of mailing to a large mailing list of
party workers a "party-line" on any significant develop-
ment. A very wise politician once told me that "the
most effective way to influence the voters is to have
your own clowns charged up and able to give the impression
they are on the inside.' " This is absolutely true, and
this program would be aimed at keeping the "clowns" charged
up.
G. Direct Mail -- In place of the extraordinary
amounts of trash that the National Committee now circulates
to a vast mailing list, the National Committee should make
available to the state committees specified mailings aimed
at selling the party and the Administration. The cost
factor on this could be worked out jointly by the National
Commiteee and state committees, and the state committees
ould do the actual mailings. This would help and encourage
the state committees to develop their own mailing lists
as well. Even in the days of television, no one has ever
found a substitute for direct mail in politics.
H. Liaison with the White House -- The political
mechanic at the National Committee should be in close contact
with the political man at the White House on matters of
patronage, party re-organization, and general strategy.
RN
-13-
November 22, 1968
As stated above, the National Committee will be raising
the money, training campaign managers and implementing
specific programs in the suburbs and among youth, but since
all of the re-organization described above will take time,
much of the burden of distributing patronage, working out
the knotty problems of candidate selection and choosing
the target races for 1970 will have to come from the White
House. The mechanic at the National Committee should be
made fully aware of these White House functions, and they
should be co-ordinated with the activities of the National
Committee through his person.
IV. The White House Role: As stated in I, we are
examining a two-phase program: (1) establishing and building
a base for the party that stretches from Florida to the
state of Washington with the goal of carrying the Senate
and House in 1970, and (2) thereafter concentrating on
specific states outside that base to build the party into
a majority party by 1972. Since a great deal of time will
be taken up at the National Committee in accomplishing
the re-organization set forth in III, and pressing the
programs suggested there, it will be necessary, as well
as advisable, for the White House to carry out the following
political functions:
RN
-14-
November 22, 1968
A. The Co-ordination and Distribution of Patronage -- There
should be one man at the White House through whom all patronage
is funnelled. He would work in conjunction with the political
man at the National Committee and to some extent with our
Congressional liaison. He should have flowing through him all
direct federal patronage, all patronage of the agencies of
the federal government and a knowledge of what patronage
the Republican governors have and how they are using it. The
above should be true for both job appointments and work
projects. For the next two years, the vast majority of
patronage should be used to build the party within the Florida-
Washington base with the added hope that certain individuals
whom we are trying to build up to run for officein 1970
can be benefitted by the use of patronage also. Very little
patronage should be used during this period to reward
incumbent officeholders. Once we gain a majority in the
House and Senate, we can use our patronage to insure the
incumbents' popularity, but using it for that purpose now
would defeat our goal of carrying Congress. There will be
some bitching about this, but that's the way it will have
to be for the next couple of years. The person handling
the patronage must be very aware politically, so that when
we decide to build a dam in Arkansas he can call up the
local county chairman and alert him. The local county
RN
-15-
November 22, 1968
chairman in turn should then be able to call up his old
buddy, "Joe" and tell him he has got a job, thus obligating
"Joe," his family, and friends. This over-simplification
is basically how it should work. I might add that under
this scheme, the National Committee would be responsible
for riding on the local county chairman to be sure that
he knows some "Joe's" to call.
B. Candidate Selection -- There are some 32 Senate
seats up for election in 1970, only seven of which are
Republican (Fannin, Murphy, Scott, Williams, Hruska, Fong,
and Goodell). The seven Republican seats look to be quite
safe. The 25 Democrats make up the class of '58, which was
swept into office in a year when we lost heavily and re-
elected in 1964 when it was almost impossible to lose if
you were a Democrat. Outside of a few safe Senate seats
in the South, a large number of these 25 seats can be won
if we start early enough and put up decent candidates.
Many of these target Senate seats are in the Florida-
Washington area that we will be concentrating on in the
next two years (MaGee, Burdick, Cannon, Hartke, Gore, Moss,
Holland, Montoya, Proxmire, Young and Yaroborugh). In
Michigan, New Jersey and possibly Connecticut (Hart,
Williams, and Dodd, respectively), seats are also up for
election which we could win with the right candidates.
RN
-16-
November 22, 1968
Far too often in the past we have lost for one of
two reasons: bad candidates or bad campaign management.
The White House power and authority should be brought to
bear on the first of these problems and the National
Committee should try to solve the second as indicated
above. While the President cannot get directly involved
in selecting Senatorial candidates, it is a fairly easy
matter to freeze out individuals who should not be running
by letting the word get around in party circles that the
White House thinks "X" should make the race. Some of our
Governors should be encouraged immediately to seek Senatorial
nominations and if they work early and swiftly, they can
avoid going through any harmful primaries. This does
not mean they need to publicly announce their candidacies;
just that we privately understand that they will be willing
to make the race and can count on that fact. In some areas
(North Dakota, for example) a Congressman (Mark Andrews
perhaps, or if not, Tom Kleppe) should be tested out early
as to whether it is possible for them to run for the Senate.
The tender problem of maneuvering the right man into running
for the Senate in these particular states without offending
the local party should be the responsibility of the White
House man since he can speak with the authority of the
President and will be able to devote more of his time to
working out any problems with getting the right candidate
RN
-17-
November 22, 1968
to run through the use of patronage. He should, of course,
consult various sources before deciding on any particular
candidate in any particular state.
In the House we have suffered from the same problem
of poor candidates and poor campaign managers. Even
though we've had a Congressional Campaign Committee which
has spent an inordinate amount of time and money trying
to select candidates, we still run into the problem of
men running for the House from particular areas in which
they just cannot appeal to the voters. As an example,
in this past election, our candidate in the 24th District
of Pennsylvania (Erie) was a Protestant Minister, this
in a district which is heavily Catholic and heavily
ethnic. Add this to the fact that his Democratic opponent
was an Italian, and it is not hard to see why we lost
this district which had been Republican for a substantial
period of time up until 1964. In the 2nd District of Iowa
(Cedar Rapids) we ran a lawyer who had never been out on
a farm and should any manure have attached to his shoe,
he probably would have thrown his shoes away. This in
a district which can be carried for the Republicans if
we can get a strong farm vote in the counties outside
of Cedar Rapids. It is presently held by a Congressman
who no more fits the District than Adolph Hitler could
RN
-18-
November 22, 1968
represent the Lower East Side. Yet we lost it for the
third straight time.
It is suggested that in approximately 45 target
Congressional districts that the White House take a
very active interest in the candidates selected to run
and that the National Committee see to it that they are
well-financed and well-managed. Advice as to these
candidates can be obtained from reliable sources in
the states, and the candidates can be screened by the
political man at the National Committee, as well as by
the man at the White House.
C. Political Advice to the President, Vice President,
and Cabinet -- In making various decision the President
may need the benefit of political advice from someone
inthe White House who is aware enough of what is going
on in the country to be able to form judgment as to how
various Presidential decisions will be received. In
regard to the Vice President, since much of what he does
will involve dealing with the Governors, it might be
helpful to him to have the advice of a politician so that
programs such as block-grants to the states can be implemented
in areas where they will both serve the public good and
the good of the Republican party. The same is true for
the members of the Cabinet dealing with domestic policy.
RN
-19-
November 22, 1968
In addition, at least some of the time of the Vice President
and the Cabinet members should be spent in helping to build
the party through well-placed speaking engagements and, in
regard to the Vice President, a fairly strenuous program
of fund raising speeches. These should be coordinated
through the White House man.
D. Congressional Operations -- From time to time,
while trying to get legislation through a Democratic
Congress, it may be necessary to put some extra pressure
on some of the Democratic members in order to obtain their
votes (for example, generating a lot of mail from their
district encouraging them to vote for the bill or being
in close enough contact with some of their contributors
to generate a few telephone calls to them). This is not
a function that the Congressional liaison can adequately
take care of, nor is it one that the National Committee
should involve itself in. Again, it is a matter of
delicacy which must be handled apart from any involvement
of the President, but the White House, the only institution
with the power and authority to generate such pressures.
I think it should, therefore, be the responsibility of
the political man in the White House to see that this
is done if necessary.
RN
-20-
November 22, 1968
E. Candidate Building -- Sometimes we have been in
the situation where we have had good candidates but they
were totally unknown to the populace of the area where
they were running. The White House should co-operate
with the National Committee in seeing to it that we
don't run any races in 1970 in the target areas at least
where the candidate is not "known" to the voting public.
This involves working the prospective candidates into
various short-term governmental committees and operations,
so that they can obtain a little publicity back home.
Basically it should be handled by the White House political
man, but there will be areas where co-ordination with the
National Committee man will be helpful.
F. Liaison with the National Committee -- Certainly
the White House man should keep in close contact with the
man at the National Committee and work with him to accomplish
the programs described in III. A close working arrangement
between these two individuals is imperative if the plan is
to work. The two should work well enough together that they
can freely exchange thoughts about both their responsibilities.
RN
-21-
November 22, 1968
G. Defining the White House Function -- Since it
would be costly for the world at large to know that the
White House was going to take such an active interest
in the building of the party and selecting candidates,
and the political use of patronage, it would be best to
describe the political operative at the White House merely
as the President's chief political advisor and combine
his above-stated duties with a few others which won't take
up much of his time, but will give the impression that
he is not spending a majority of his time on politics.
In line with this it would be appropriate for him to
take over the duties of the Cabinet Secretary and also
some responsibilities for working with Vice President
Agnew. Both of these functions can be helpful in the
political vein, since I would hope that the Cabinet could
be used for political purpose and certainly Vice President
Agnew should devote a healthy portion of his time to the
political effort. The Cabinet Secretary function would
be helpful to the political man in that he would have
some way to keep apprised of what substantive matters
were being decided in the Departments which might be of
RN
-22-
November 22, 1968
political benefit, and it would allow him to keep a
better rein on the patronage flowing from the Cabinet
positions. The political man should not be given the
title of Cabinet Secretary; however, he should assume
the function. To carry out his job he'll need a title
of appropriate weight in the White House staff.
Peter M. Flanigan
Deputy Campaign Manager
File
Nixon Agnew
Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400
November 25, 1968
TO: RN
Bob Haldeman
RE: John Loeb
I met with Loeb for the suggested discussion.
Loeb told me that it is true that in one week he and
Wayne Andreas, with minor help from George Ball, raised
$5,000,000 in the form of loans (Sidney Weinberg was not
involved in this activity). The candidate met with the
loan endorsers and gave them a strong personal commitment
to work to pay off these loans.
Loeb says that he himself is not particularly
interested in whether or not his loan is paid off. How-
ever he does have some responsibility to the other members
of the group. He is lunching today with the candidate and
Andreas and will discuss the matter then.
Loeb wonders if the proposed position would be
helpful assuming the candidate wants to continue active in
politics. I tried to sell the benefits of him taking this
job. I also pointed out that in small private dinners he
could be active in redeeming his pledge.
We agreed that the key was whether or not the
candidate wanted to take the offered position. If he
does, it would seem that arrangements could be made so that
the loans need not stand in the way. Loeb said he would be
in touch with me after the meeting.
P.M.Flanigan
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
By
E.O. RJP 12356, Section 1.1
Confidential.
Han
NARS, Date
4/8/87
MEMORANDUM
November 28, Fite 1968
TO:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
All
On November 27 I talked with General Goodpaster in Saigon.
He was responding to my request for a recommendation of a high-
quality officer competent to do for RN what Goodpaster did for
President Eisenhower on the White House staff.
Goodpaster recommends Col. Robert G. Gard (0-62355). Gard is
now in Vietnam and has been there six or seven months. He is
Commander of Division Artillery of one of the American divisions
in Vietnam.
Goodpaster says he is "absolutely first-rate and top-flight."
He taught at West Point. He has had excellent advance schooling
including the War College. He was the top man in his class at
the War College.
One wonderment about Gard: after the War College, he was assigned
to the Pentagon in an executive capacity with Secretary McNamara
and stayed on for a time with Secretary Clifford. But, Goodpaster
says, Gard is "straight professionally" and would be totally loyal
to President Nixon.
Of great importance: note attached copy of my memorandum about
General Goodpaster himself. Could be that we will want to use
Goodpaster and forget Gard!
MEMORANDUM
November 27, 1968
TO:
RN
FROM:
HARLOW
Late this evening I had a discussion with Andy Goodpaster,
exploring frankly whether or not his involvement in the White
House would help or injure his career. I assured him of your
high personal esteem and of your strong feeling that you would
not wish to take any action which could be injurious to him in
any way.
I am to call him back on Friday, November 29.
His reaction was, predictably, "honor, duty, country." I gather
he is totally prepared as a career soldier to do without regret
whatever the Commander-In-Chief might suggest or request. I am
sure he both means and feels that.
Perhaps you would wish to give me guidelines on my follow-up
conversation with him Friday, to make certain that I do not
misrepresent your feelings about this and to insure that I do
not carry this beyond your personal desire.
CC: Robert Haldeman
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By
RJP
NARS,
Date
4/8/87
file
STRICTLY- CONF IDENTIA
MEMORANDUM
TO:
HRH
FROM:
RZ
The following is an analysis of the national press
corps that covered RN on a regular basis during the campaign.
The judgment of each individual is based upon conversation,
attitudes and copy filed. An attempt at accuracy has, of
course, been made. However, in an analysis such as this it is
difficult to be absolutely accurate.
As you read through the analysis, it will be noted
that there are many "undetermined" votes. This is due to
the fact that, even though the press corps is of course
generally liberal, during the 1968 campaign they were not
emotionally committed to Humphrey. Therefore, some of the
undetermined may have been swayed to vote for RN -- some who
may not have been expected to. However, I would weight the
undetermined category to Humphrey.
I think the important thing is -- and I have mentioned
this on a number of occasions -- that a concensus did not
develop in the press corps during the 1968 campaign. Possibly
because of Humphrey and the lack of personal appeal he had to
many of the press corps, and the tremendous negative attitude
toward the Johnson administration. (Johnson has probably had
the worst press relations of any president in modern history.)
One final point: The 1968 press corps was basically
full of new faces who were not committed to a previous point
of view and were highly impressed by RN's campaign.
Result of analysis: 86 total votes
RN
29
HHH
30
*Undetermined 27
(weighted toward HHH)
ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Vote)
Bell, Jack
Generally fair; old pro.
Hard to determine
Boyarsky, Bill
Liberal Californian. However,
impressed with RN. Coverage has
HHH
been straight.
Cormier, Frank
Liberal, essentially a water boy
like most AP journalists. Reports
facts without embellishments.
HHH
White House correspondent.
Morin, Pat
Courtly gentleman type. RN knows
well. RN all the way.
Bet on RN vote
Mears, Walter
Good AP reporter. Generally fair.
RN vote
BALTIMORE SUN
Furguson, Pat
One of the originals.
Probable RN vote but not sure.
Undetermined
Nordlinger, Steve
Friendly and fair. Traditional Dem. RN vote
Had battle with himself but finally
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS
arrived at RN conclusion.
Hoving, Bob
Tremendously friendly in the
primaries but liberal type.
HHH I would say
CHICAGO DAILY NEWS
Lisagor, Peter
Old pro. Generally friendly.
Undetermined
CHICAGO SUN TIMES
Bartlett, Charles
Has written some favorable stuff
but an old Kennedy hand.
HHH
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
Dombrowski, Lou
Basically friendly, good man,
programmed well on release of RN
financial position.
RN vote
Edwards, Willard
100% pro RN
RN vote
Kling, Bill
Quite friendly, pro RN
RN vote
Freeberg, Russell
Friendly.
RN vote
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
Havel, Bob
Voted Humphrey
HHH
*(BALTIMORE SUN addition)
Potter, Phil
Strongly anti RN
HHH
COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Vote)
Embry, George
Very friendly, good reporter.
Fed into to Ziegler from
RN vote
Humphrey camp.
DETROIT NEWS
Joyce, Tom
Neutral.
Chance of RN vote
GANNET
Germond, Jack
Around long time. Generally
HHH
positive attitude.
HEARST
Barnett, David
No reading
Undetermined
Considine, Bob
Told Ziegler flatly thinks RN
a winner and that country needs
an RN victory. Based on this,
RN vote
voted for RN.
KANSAS CITY STAR
Cauley, John
Pro RN
RN vote
KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS
Boyd, Bob
Liberal, essentially negative to
HHH vote
RN. However, as at Editors meeting,
will credit RN when performance good.
Regular copy is not bad. Tends to
play it straighter than before.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Donovan, Bob
Good newspaperman
RN vote
Foley, Tom
Good reporter. Would put in
Undetermined
RN column.
Irwin, Don
Liberal, plays it straight, has
been friendly and helpful within
RN vote
the corps.
LIFE
Byers, Marge
One of our best friends in the
RN vote
corps.
MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Vote)
Cunningham, Morris Pro RN
RN vote
METROMEDIA
Blackburn, Dan
Lightweight, liberal-ish, straw
HHH
in the wind.
Chamberlayne, Pye
Seems friendly
RN vote probably
Christian, Alan
Reports good.
Undetermined
Cole, Jack
Cocky, arrogant, infectious
HHH
among press corps. Goldwater
staff man in 1964.
MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE
Bailey, Charles
Unable to estimate. Liberal,
Undetermined
difficult to judge vote.
NATIONAL OBSERVER
Dickinson, Jim
No solid reading. Observer,
however, basically friendly.
Expect voted HHH
Perry, Jim
From outward appearance not pro
RN nor anti RN.
Guess HHH vote
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Greene, Jerry
Friendly, a good ear in the press
RN vote
corps.
Healy, Paul
No reading: seems neutral.
Undetermined
NEW YORK POST
Hoffman, Paul
Agitator
HHH
Hoge, Warren
Has written some good stuff for
HHH
an essentially hostile paper.
NEW YORK TIMES
Apple, John
Liberal, does not lean to RN at all
but young and impressionable. Can
HHH
be used to our advantage.
Bigart, Homer
Ultra-liberal, anti RN
HHH
Kenworthy, E. W.
Liberal, negative
HHH
NEW YORK TIMES (cont.)
(Vote)
Semple, Bob
Liberal reporter. Likes RN and
RN vote
staff.
NEWARK NEWS
Carter, Peter
No reading
Undetermined
NEWSDAY
Bookbinder, Bernie Appears friendly. No reading on vote. Undetermined
NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSO.
Biossat, Bruce
Essentially political columnist,
Undetermined
has done good stuff for RN. Can
be used to RN advantage and has been.
NEWSWEEK
Alsop, Stewart
Endorsed RN.
Undetermined
Brumley, Jane
Emotionally committed to RN 100%.
Missionary work with others in
press corps.
RN vote
Cannon, Jim
Essentially negative.
HHH
Fleming, Karl
Liberal, unfriendly when came on
HHH
tour but has come around.
PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
Levy, Paul
Straw in the wind; liberal.
Undetermined
Daughen, Joe
No reading
Undetermined
Day, Tony
Very fair, comes from newspaper
RN vote
family.
PUBLISHERS HALL SYNDICATE
Kraft, Joe
Liberal intellectual but thinks
RN Vote
RN man for the times. His columns
on RN enormously helpful with the
liberal community.
PULLIAM NEWSPAPERS
Hiner, Lou
Republican; boozes too much, of
RN vote probable
little account or use,
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
(Vote)
Childs, Marquis
HHH
Dudman, Dick
Ultra left-winger while seems
HHH
personally friendly, strongly
anti RN.
SCRIPPS HOWARD
Bassett, Gene
No reading.
Undetermined
Knapp, Ted
Shrewish, anti RN, probably
HHH
among the 30%.
TIME
Austin, John
Liberal; however, impressed with
Undetermined
RN skill, May, like Fentress,
think RN best for national unity
at this time. Therefore, perhaps
pro RN or neutral.
Lamont, Lansing
In the same league with Kiker.
HHH
Fentress, Sim
Guess HHH vote
WASHINGTON POST
Alsop, Joseph
Hostile, but less so than other
HHH
years.
Broder, David
Liberal, best political reporter
Undetermined
on tour perhaps. Writes it
straight most of the time and
credits RN when performance good.
(Stevens Point)
Obordorfer, Don
Liberal type. Prides himself on
HHH
being investigative reporter. Has
WASHINGTON STAR
written some good & some bad stuff.
Bullen, Dana
Lawyer, covered Supreme Court.
Undetermined
Good reporter, checks facts before
writing. Basically pro RN in
sympathy.
Hope, Paul
Mixed bag; sometimes negative,
HHH
other times very favorable.
Difficult to categorize.
Johnson, Haynes
No clear reading.
Undetermined
ite House.
Undetermine
1 helpful to
ell of RN.
0 staff and pro RN. Undetermined
ng time, old pro. Wrote
able story after covering
N days.
Undetermi
-y not political reporter.
air reports.
Undete
JWS well. Good reporter
Undet
a lot of influence in press
S. I suspect RN vote.
PORT
Loyal, good supporter.
Generally weak type. Does not
fulfill much of a reporting t
but on our side and therefor
easily used.
CBS
(Vote)
Dean, Morton
Filed generally good reports.
Undetermined
Hard to determine how voted --
Seemed fair.
Hart, John
Young, aggressive, overly ambitious,
impolite, but feel we can work this
guy our way.
Undetermined
Plante, Bill
Mixed reports. Probably voted RN.
RN vote.
ABC
Koppel, Ted
Aggressive, trying to get up the
ladder, normally fair but definitely
not pro RN personally.
HHH
Snell, Dave
Generally not pro RN but leaning
our way when he left tour.
Undetermined
MUTUAL
Clarke, Phil
Solid RN
RN vote
Scott, Marvin
Clarke protege.
RN vote
NBC
Kaplow, Herb
This year no question. Position
firmed after return from Wallace
campaign.
RN vote
Kiker, Douglas
Ranks alongside the worst.
HHH
Valeriani, Dick
Liberal reporter. Sometime
HHH
agitator.