Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
California Congressional Districts Presidential Vote totals by district and winning margin. Prepared by F. Baker Wallace of the National Republican Congressional Committee. 2 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report examining the 1962 California gubernatorial race between Edmund Brown and Richard Nixon. 18 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report titled “State Chairmen’s Press Conferences Compared.” 3 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report reviewing the Nixon for Governor Campaign programs, activities, and volunteer leadership throughout California. 21 pgs. [Report], n.d.
New York Times article by Bill Becker titled "Nixon's campaign Is Called "Dirtiest.'" 2 pgs. Not scanned. [Newspaper], n.d.
To Maurice Stans from Bob Finch Re: "Dissolution of Modern Nailing Services, Inc., through the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee." 3 pgs. [Memo], 1/10/1963
To Richard Nixon from David Hunter re: "Statement of Vote by Congressional Districts." 7 pgs. [Memo], 1/21/1963
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26128171
label
WHSF: Returned, 65-3
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26128171
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Returned, 65-3
description
This file contains:
California Congressional Districts Presidential Vote totals by district and winning margin. Prepared by F. Baker Wallace of the National Republican Congressional Committee. 2 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report examining the 1962 California gubernatorial race between Edmund Brown and Richard Nixon. 18 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report titled “State Chairmen’s Press Conferences Compared.” 3 pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report reviewing the Nixon for Governor Campaign programs, activities, and volunteer leadership throughout California. 21 pgs. [Report], n.d.
New York Times article by Bill Becker titled "Nixon's campaign Is Called "Dirtiest.'" 2 pgs. Not scanned. [Newspaper], n.d.
To Maurice Stans from Bob Finch Re: "Dissolution of Modern Nailing Services, Inc., through the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee." 3 pgs. [Memo], 1/10/1963
To Richard Nixon from David Hunter re: "Statement of Vote by Congressional Districts." 7 pgs. [Memo], 1/21/1963
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26128171
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
ed44c672a7c109ee
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type
Document Description
65
3
n.d.
Report
California Congressional Districts
Presidential Vote totals by district and
winning margin. Prepared by F. Baker
Wallace of the National Republican
Congressional Committee. 2 pgs.
65
3
n.d.
Report
Report examining the 1962 California
gubernatorial race between Edmund Brown
and Richard Nixon. 18 pgs.
65
3
n.d.
Report
Report titled "State Chairmen's Press
Conferences Compared." 3 pgs.
65
3
n.d.
Report
Report reviewing the Nixon for Governor
Campaign programs, activities, and volunteer
leadership throughout California. 21 pgs.
65
3
n.d.
Newspaper
New York Times article by Bill Becker titled
"Nixon's campaign Is Called "Dirtiest." 2
pgs. Not scanned.
65
3
01/10/1963
Memo
To Maurice Stans from Bob Finch Re:
"Dissolution of Modern Nailing Services,
Inc., through the Nixon for Governor
Campaign Wind-Up Committee." 3 pgs.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type Document Description
65
3
01/21/1963
Memo
To Richard Nixon from David Hunter re:
"Statement of Vote by Congressional
Districts." 7 pgs.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Page 2 of 2
CALIFORNIA COMMISSIONAL DISTRICTS
Presidential Vote - General Election - November 8, 1960
NIXON
KENNEDY
District
NIXON
â
KENNEDY
1
Winning Margin
Winning Margin
1
121,961
53.37
106,523
46.63
15,438
2
86,528
48.37
92,357
51.63
5,829
3
113,577
45.32
137,109
54.69
23,532
4
97,282
48.85
101,872
51.15
4,590
5
45,719
32,29
95,862
67.71
50,143
6
101,673
45.75
120,599
54.25
18,926
7
68,908
47.17
77,162
52.83
8,254
8
114,064
44.93
139,815
55.07
25,741
9
104,570
51.83
97,254
48.17
7,416
10
159,649
53.78
137,201
46+22
22,448
11
78,654
51.81
73,157
48.19
5,497
12
75,789
44.16
95,835
55.84
20,046
13
125,169
54.26
105,523
45.74
19,646
14
89,247
50.99
85,766
49.01
3,481
15
83,552
45.35
100,689
54.65
17,138
16
87,061
56.17
67,928
43.83
19,033
17
151,825
49.06
164,077
51.94
12,252
18
101,728
53.57
88,170
46.43
13,558
19
67,698
34.57
128,115
65.43
60,417
20
90,428
67.37
43,806
32.63
46,622
21
171,548
54.64
142,403
45.36
29,145
22
109,834
51.93
101,686
46.07
8,148
23
89,720
42.09
123,463
57.91
33,743
24
77,870
54.20
66,065
45.90
11,805
25
201,489
57.50
148,923
42.50
52,566
NIXON
KENNEDY
District
NIXON
1
KENNEDY
â
Winning Margin
Winning Margin
26
68,084
31.41
148,682
68.59
80,598
27
99,481
52.26
90,888
47.74
8,593
28
244,078
60.31
160,612
39.69
83,466
29
76,461
56.03
59,996
43.97
16,465
30
141,625
54.90
116,349
45.10
25,276
TOTALS
3,259,722
50.27
3,224,099
49.73
35,623
Note: No Republican candidates filed in the 3rd and 12th Districts for Congress.
PREPARED BY:
F. Baker Wallace, Field Representative, Pacific Southwest Region
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL CONMITTEE
Washington 3, D. Co
"In the final analysis, the politician has nothing to offer but his word."
-- James Farley
Mr. Farley's thesis was abundantly evident in California during the
1962 gubernatorial contest between incumbent Governor Edmund G. Brown
and former Vice President Richard Nixon.
The campaign problems of the two candidates were quite different.
Both detractors and partisans agreed that Nixon had an international repu-
tation and then noted he had carried California in his 1960 presidential
campaign. Brown, by contrast, was regarded as totally state-oriented and,
according to his own surveys, he was noted for indecision.
Louis Harris, in a poll sponsored by the Democrats, found in April
1961 that 65 percent of the California voters thought Brown was doing a poor
job as Governor. If he were to be re-elected, he had two jobs and these
formed a campaign strategy: (1) to convince Californians that he had made
great accomplishments and, (2) to discredit the image of his probable
opponent, Richard Nixon.
It is obvious, as will be shown below, that Democratic strategists
had made a detailed study of the areas where Nixon was most vulnerable
and quite understandably set about to capitalise on their findings.
Nixon, on the other hand, had to find the ways to make his inter-
national and national reputation an asset in the gubernatorial campaign.
Apparently, he decided the best means of doing that was to offer a positive
program for building a better California. Thus, in effect, his attacks on
his opponent had to be designed as a way of saying, "Brown doesn't know
how really to take hold of this problem and solve it."
- 2 -
Having some of the same type of public attitude information available
to him as did Brown, Nixon and his campaign workers seem to have decided
that an attack, per se, may misfire when the target is regarded as a friendly
but indecisive man.
In such a campaign, what then is the proper role of the press? If
Nixon advanced a positive statement on a. need in California and in passing
slashed Brown, was he receiving fair coverage if the report of the occasion
stressed the attack and suppressed the positive?
On the other hand, if Brown attacked Nixon's sincerity of interest in
California and knowledge of its problems, would a report be fair if it buried
the attack material in the more passive report of "the need to finish the
water job in California?"
Here we must conclude that had news reports always concentrated on
the attack material they would have been unfair to one candidate, and the
converse would apply if the "positive" side of the campaign was stressed in
all stories of both candidates.
Very likely, this was one of the things behind Nixon's remarks at his
"last press conference." He might have been more exact had he not confined
himself to the 1962 campaign, and no doubt in his own mind he had reference
to his total career in California polities. For the well established facts
are that since 1950 a well-calculated effort was made by California
Democrats to raise doubts in the minds of the voters as to Nixon's "political
morality." That was the theme of Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas' campaign
- 3 -
against him in 1950. It was revived and given new strength in the 1952
campaign in the furor that erupted over the disclosure that Nixon had
supplemental support. In various ways, through cartoons, articles in
liberal journals, etc., the image of Nixon as a tricky, opportunistic Red
baiter was reinforced. That campaign then could be turned (as Mrs.
Douglas had specifically mentioned) into the suggestion that Nixon had
Fascist tendencies.
In March of 1961, the Los Angeles Times ran a series of articles
examining a then little-known organization called the John Birch Society
which they found to be a right wing extremist group with Fascist overtones.
Among those congratulating the Times for its enterprise and joining in the
general condemnation of the Society's methods was Richard Nixon.
Governor Brown, on the other hand, in a press conference on March 21,
1961, professed no particular concern about the John Birch Society though
he did ask Attorney General Mosk to look into it. Mosk subsequently made
a report to the Governor in which he dismissed the organization as a
collection of "old ladies in tennis shoes."
However, within seven months, President Kennedy had decided that
the Birchers were a dangerous force in the nation. In a speech to the
California Demoeratic Party in Los Angeles on November 18, 1961, Kennedy
referred to the Society as follows:
10
The discordant voices of extremism are once again heard
in the land. Men who are unwilling to face up to the danger from
without are convinced that the real danger is from within.
"They look suspiciously at their neighbors and their leaders.
They call for 'a man on horseback' because they do not trust
the people. They find treason in our churches, in our highest
court, in our treatment of water. They equate the Democratic
- 4 -
Party with the welfare state, the welfare state with socialism,
socialism with communism.
--Public Papers of the President, P. 735
Brown followed up this attack in a speech on January 8, 1962, to the
National Press Club in Washington, D. C., but he went further. Through
inmendo, he tied Richard Nixon directly to the organization:
"You may well note that Mr. Nixon is not a John Bircher, and
the evidence is that he is not.
"The real problem, however, is that he is not joining the fight
against the ultra-right wing - although these extremists are a
streng force in our state and in his party. Richard Nixon (is)
in a position where he must choose between principle and oppor-
tunism. He has chosen the latter. He has stepped away from
these who are fighting the political primitives, and he appar-
ently wants their money and support.
"If I run, I want no support from either extreme (Birchers or
Communists).
On February 20, 1962, Governor Brown said in his press conference
that "the John Birch Society is a minor issue in this campaign." Nevertheless,
he pursued the matter as though it were a major issue, and for good reason.
Marianne Means, White House Correspondent, reported that Lou Harris had
found in a survey of California voters that "85 percent of Californians not
only disagree with far right ideas, but actively dislike such groups because
they think them dangerous and crackpotty. Consequently, Brown is emboldened
to step up his attacks on the far right." (San Francisco Examiner, 2/18/82)
Brown kept up a steady drum fire of attack during the primary and the
fall campaign. He always mentioned the Birch Society effort to impeach Earl
Warren and tied the Republican Party firmly to the extremist group by men-
tioning two Republican incumbent Congressmen (John Rousselot and Edgar
Hiestand) who had admitted membership in the group. He called on Nixon
- 5 -
repeatedly to disavow these candidates. Nixon for his part had declared
that "there is no place for a candidate on the Republican ticket who seeks
or accepts the support" of the John Birch Society. In March, 1962, at a
meeting of the Republican Assembly, a volunteer organisation that has
official status within the Republican Party, Nixon introduced a resolution
categorically condemning the Birch Society and calling on all Republicans
to disassociate themselves from it forthwith.
Nixon's action was politically courageous. His primary opponent,
Jeseph Shell, had the support of right wing Republicans and was making
headway in his campaign. Nixon's action did not however gain him any
advantage. Brown continued to fiail away at the Birch Society always being
careful to associate the group with the Republican Party and Nixon in par-
ticular. Press coverage of the Governor's remarks on the subject seldom
mentioned Nixon's prior repudiation of the Society.
Thus, the questions were raised:
(1) Was the press inadvertently perpetuating a false issue?
(2) When political reporters feel that a campaign question
has been asked by one candidate and answered by the
other, does the reporter have any obligation to mention
this in his coverage if the issue is raised a second and
third time?
Recently a questionnaire was sent to California newspaper publishers
asking these questions:
- 6 -
(1)
Do you expect a reporter to exercise his own judgment
about which portion of a candidate's address is "newsworthy?"
(2)
Do you expect a reporter to reflect his own judgment on the
legitimacy of an issue or charge raised by a candidate in
the story the reporter writes?
With one exception, publishers answered the first question affirma-
tively. The only reservations made in answering this way were to suggest
that the reporter should sometimes consult with the city editor on the question
of newsworthiness.
Almost all publishers replied in the negative to the second question.
However, the qualifying comments were of particular interest.
From the publisher of a paper which editorially supported Governor
Brown:
"But I would expect the reporter to draw attention to any
contrary fact, as for example -- if Mr. Nixon charges that
Governor Brown has been soft on narcotics enforcement,
and the reporter is aware these charges have been answered
previously, I would expect him to insert a sentence to the
effect, 'Gov ernor Brown, in a speech last week in Podunk,
denied Nixon's charges and pointed to
number of
convictions. 1"
From a paper which made no editorial endorsement:
"We do not expect a reporter to reflect his own judgment.
We would expect him to select the important facts of a speech
and present them as accurately as he can. Sometimes it is
necessary for a reporter to explain certain assertions if
ambiguities exist. If the explanations are irrelevant, the
desk will excise them from the copy."
- 7 -
Although the Birch Society had no official status within the
Republican Party, the California Democratic Clubs (CDC) have official
status within that party and are a counterpart to the Republican Assembly.
CDC clubs are chartered by the various Democratic County Committees
and claim to be the volunteer arm of the Democratic Party. The CDC, in
its annual state convention regularly enacts a long series of resolutions -
many of which are embarrassing to the regular Democratic Party organi-
sation. In 1960, the CDC had passed resolutions calling for, among other
things:
- Abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
- Abolition of Red China to the U.N.
- Reduction of Military Expenditures.
- Repeal of Loyalty Oaths.
- Establishment of Police Review Boards.
The Democratic high command both in Sacramento and in Washington
was so concerned about the "far out" tendencies of the CDC that they made
certain that no such resolutions as those listed above were enacted in 1962.
At that, a resolution condemning the Kennedy Administration's fallout
shelter program was narrowly averted. The Young Democrats in their
annual convention, however, did condemn the program.
Nixon attacked Brown for accepting support from the CDC. The
Los Angeles Times explained to readers that the questionable CDC reso-
lutions were enacted by "a handful of delegates. :. at two o'clock on a
Sunday morning at the tag end of an exhausting convention day." The small
number of delegates and their political points of view were not further
identified except to say that they "knew their stuff - and what they wanted
to put over. "
- 8 -
Brown felt it necessary to disavow the above mentioned resolutions
but in doing so once more tied the John Birch Society to Nixon. Again,
press coverage made no mention that Nixon had condemned the Birch
Seciety nor did it mention that unlike the CDC the Birch Society had no
status official or unefficial in the Republican Party.
To some, this raised the question of what is proper to explain to
readers.
Following the primary election, Brown made a significant change
in his campaign slogan. During the primary, his billboards proelaimed
"Keep California First." When September rolled around, the slogan had
been changed to read "The Man Californians Can Trust." The change in
alogans was indicative of his campaign strategy.
In the fall of 1961, at the time Nixon announced his candidacy,
Brown lagged 16 percentage points behind Nixon in the polls. (After his
re-election, Brown admitted that at the time he was so discouraged that
he had decided not to seek the nomination.) Other polls measuring opinion
of his job performance underscored his pessimism.
Louis Harris reported Brown's job rating by the voters as follows:
April 1981
December 1961
Positive
35%
40%
Negative
65%
60%
By August, 1962, Brown's rating showed 43% of those polled rated
as positive while 57% had rated it negative. Impressive as this improvement
was, it was a long way from assuring Brown's re-election. At the same
time, Harris reported that Brown had managed to convince an increasing
. 9 -
number of voters that he had done a good job on water, highways and
education. At the same time, be had managed to erode the widely held
opinion that he was weak and indecisive.
As a result of his survey, Harris suggested that Brown should
concentrate his fire on Nixon's sincerity, his presidential ambitions,
lack of warmth, and, most important, the development of the suggestion
of scandal. The one specifically suggested by Harris was a loan made by
the Hughes Tool Company to Nixon's brother six years age.
The Democrate lost little time in following through with the Harris
observations at the Democratic State Convention held August 25 and 26,
1982. Reger Kent, the party chairman, and Eugene Wyman, the chairman-
elect, held a press conference to charge that the John Birch Society was
helping Richard Nixon to wage a "dirty campaign." Kent and Wyman dis-
played to newsmen an automobile bumper strip with the legend, "Is Brown
Pink?" Wyman claimed that the bumper strips were "on sale at book
stores which also peddle John Birch Seciety literature." Although he made
no claim that Richard Nixon was connected directly or indirectly with this
campaign ma terial, Wyman commented that, "smear attacks such as this
always seem to happen to people who run against Richard Nixon in
California."
Wyman said that the Democrate were considering legal action to
identify the maker of the bumper strip but he never did so. There was no
further mention of the strips during the campaign. No effort was made by
an enterprising reporter to check the veracity of Wyman's statements.
- 10 -
In passing, we might raise the question as to why the publishers
who said the legitimacy of issues was in the province of editors never
saw to it that editorials appeared questioning the relative degree of
improperness between "Leftish" insimuations against Brown and the
"Reactionary" insimuations against Nixon.
During the course of the Democratic State Convention, Assemblyman
Jerome Waldie, Democratic Caucus Chairman and floor leader, made a
highly inflammatory speech in which he demanded that Nixon explain all of
the circumstances surrounding a loan made to his brother by the Hughes
Tool Company. It was typical of the oratory common to political conventions
and not unlike those made by the Republican officials at their conventions
during this period in which they attacked Brown.
At the same convention, Assembly Speaker Unruh acknowledged
generalissimo of the Democratic organisation, offered a resolution which
would have barred Birchers and Communists from membership in the
Democratic Party.
The Long Beach Independent headlined the story, "State Demos Split
Over Birch, Reds."
The San Francisco Examiner headed the story, "Demos Battle Over
Ban on Reds, Birchers."
The L. A. Times headline ran, "Nixon Asked to Explain Hughes Loan."
The sub-head: "Democrat Demands Details of $205, 000 Aid to Brother."
The Times story led off with 13 inches of coverage for Waldie's remarks.
- 11 -
Then, in the continuation on page 10, there was a 7-1/2 inch report on
the introduction, debate and defeat of the Unruh resolution.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the L. A. Times coverage
of the convention was the fact that the paper saw fit to print 23-1/2 inches
of full text of Waldie's speech. This appeared on page 11. No other event
at the convention received such full coverage from the Times. Indeed, it
is not the custom of the paper even to print the full text of the U.S.
President's speeches.
Governor Brown on August 30 denounced yet another automobile
bumper strip reading, "Earl Warren Should Be Impeached." Like the
aforementioned "Is Brown Pink?" sticker, this too was said to be appearing
in Southern California. Brown, just as Wyman did, died Ninon into the
latest bumper strip by calling on him, "ence and for all to take a definite
stand on this type of political campaign."
Again, no effort was made by the press to determine whether such
auto bumper strips were being distributed and, If so, by whom. The
Governor's charge and innuendo was taken at face value.
The effect of the charge, of course, was to identify the Governor with
former Governor and Chief Justice Earl Warren. Harris had observed in
his August survey that "Chief Justice Warren is both a familiar and well-liked
figure in California. .We certainly can conclude that the Warren name is
one that can help the Brown cause, and, in fact, in every move that Nixon
makes to appease his smarting right wing, the invidious comparison can be
drawn between the Nixon and Warren Types of Republicanism." (The son-
- 12 -
of the Chief Justice, Earl Warren, Jr., was campaigning very actively
for Brown and the Chief Justice on his frequent visits to the state always
managed to have his picture taken with the Governor.)
With the aforementioned accusations concerning automobile bumper
strips, the way was cleared for later accusations that Nixon could not be
trusted, that he was currying the support of extreme right wingers, while
Mr. Brown and his colleagues were representing to the California voters
the only worthwhile values. Moreover, Nixon and his supporters never
entered a denial that the statements of Wyman and Brown were insccurate,
distorted, or even questioned these innuendoes implicit in the Brown and
Wyman remarks.
By mid-October, Brown and various Democratic spokesmen had
been able to raise enough questions about Nixon's sincerity and integrity
to make their final play successful.
On October 8, Nixon addressed a Republican State Central Committee
meeting for approximately ten minutes. In all, Nixon spent about twenty
minutes at the gathering. Among the observers at the meeting was Eugene
Wyman, the Democratic State Chairman. During the course of the meeting,
a pamphlet entitled California Dynasty of Communism by Karl Prussion was
handed out to the various delegates by unidentified persons. The next day
on the television program "Meet the Press" Nixon was questioned directly
about the pamphlet which he repudiated without any qualifications.
The next day, Wyman in a press conference declared that Nixon had
"indirect" responsibility for the Prussion pamphlet.
- 13 -
Two things in the pamphlet were singled out for attack by Eugene
Wyman, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee:
(1) The pamphlet contained a cropped photo of Brown.
(2) It purportedly misquoted Brown in his "welcome" to
Khrushchev when the Premier visited California.
It was not the first time Brown's "welcome" had come under attack.
However, it was never attacked by Nixon. On April 3, 1961, Thomas J.
Anderson, a member of the John Birch Society's national council, said in
Los Angeles (as reported by the L. A. Examiner):
"We should be trying Khrushchev - or the Governor of
California, who told Khrushchev, 'We honor you; we salute
you; we welcome you.
On April 12, 1961, the Sacramento Bee reported:
"He (Brown) scoffed at attacks made on him by officials
of the Society because he welcomed Seviet Premier Nikita
Khrushehev to California.'
When the Prussion pamphlet appeared, the purported welcome was
remarkably similar to the one quoted by the Birch official:
"Premier Khrushchev, we who admire you, we who respect you,
welcome you to California.
Thus, the type of quotation or misquotation was not new to Brown or
his campaigners. What was needed seemed to be a link to Nixon, despite
his repudiation of the pamphlet and the Birch Society. Wyman claimed that
the pamphlet was being distributed in Republican headquarters. Prussion,
the author, in a press conference of his own stated that he had received no
orders from Republican organisations but that he had received an order for
- 14 -
1000 copies from the CDC. Prussion reiterated his offer to be sued on
the contents which also appeared on the title page.
Wyman's real opportunity came when the Nixon organisation at the
late date of October 15 published and distributed a four-page leaflet entitled
"Pat Brown and the CDC." Like the Prussion pamphlet, this too contained a
eropped picture, one of which originally showed the Governor applauding a
crippled child, Wyman thus undertook to convey the idea that both pieces of
propaganda were sponsored by Nixon and represented the worst kind of
smears. Additional attention was drawn to the whole matter by the denials
issued by Nixon's campaign manager and subsequent legal steps that were
taken to obtain court injunctions against further distribution of either piece
of literature. Paralleling the charges and counter charges on the various
pieces of campaign literature, the Hughes loan came in for increasing
comment. Brown, while he had shied away from any discussion of this issue,
became increasingly bold following his comfrontation with Nixon at their only
joint appearance. In addition, he-directly accused Nixon of wanting to be a
"dictator" and directly associated him with the Birch Society. Press coverage
faithfully reported the Governor's accusations and editorially failed to question
his exaggerated assertions of "wrong doing" on Nixon's part. The Governor
was assisted by various Democratic spokesmen who either backed up his
assertions or made new claims. While the press reported these faithfully,
seldom were denials and counter accusations made by Republican spokesmen
noted (see attached memo on state chairmen's press conferences).
In the course of the campaign Nixon had several obstacles aside from
those already mentioned.
- 15 -
One was his familiarity with state problems. Here the press often
made use of the innuendo.
"He rapped President Kennedy for failing to issue an executive
order banning racial discrimination in federally assisted housing.
..
But Nixon did not spell out his own position on the racial issue.
(L.A. Times, 10/8/62)
The suggestion is obviously that Nixon himself lacked a firm position.
"With one exception, Nixon did not detail any specific programs
he will propose to meet California's governmental problems.
Instead, he said, he will continue his 'Blueprint for Progress'
in a series of seven radio broadcasts on succeeding Sundays
beginning September 23. " (L.A. Times, 9/13/62)
The same innuendo was here used OR a broader scale - he lacked any
state programs.
"The GOP candidate, referring to unspecified state buildings,
criticised what he termed 'state-built eyesores' and said there
ought to be competitive bidding on architectural contracts."
(L. A. Times, 10/15/62)
It would not be hard to stretch the remark "unspecified state buildings"
to the point that you would doubt if Nixon had ever seen a state building.
"At each stop, Nixon relied on his "bask" campaign speech, which
deals with such issues as narcotics and law enforcement, taxes and
the cost of government and jobs and pensions. " (L. A. Times, 10/19/62)
Here there is the strong implication that Nixon had mastered only a few
state matters and that he dwelled on them incessently.
Five days later, the same inmuendo again appeared in the L. A. Times:
"Nevertheless, the Republican candidate ran through his basic
campaign speech, dealing with such subjects as government
spending, taxes, jobs, and law enforcement."
- 16 -
Another area of campaign strategy involved proposed televised
debates. Several things probably entered into the Nixon thinking on this
matter. One certainly was the question of putting aside the argument
of unfamiliarity with state problems.
Another was doubtless the knowledge that in at least one state
election - New Jersey the year before - the refusal of one candidate to
participate in debates weighed heavily against him on election day and
perhaps lost the election for him.
Nixon had refused to join in any public debate during the primary
because of his determination to wage his campaign against Brown rather
than a fellow Republican.
Joe Shell, Nixon's opponent in the primary, had scored heavily
on this decision of Nixon's and the press was filled with Shell's repeated
challenges.
On top of it all was the near certainty that Brown was trying to
duck the debates.
In the early days of the general election campaign, both Nixon and
the Republican leaders bore down hard on the debates. Challenges and
accusations were leveled at Brown by State Chairman Weinberger, Herb
Klein, Nixon's press secretary, and others. Nixon, himself, raised the
issue in press conferences.
The result was scant. At times it was buried in other stories.
Once the L. A. Times ran a 6-inch story headlined "Candidates Exchange
Debate Charges."
- 17 -
If anything, Brown fared better on the debate. On September 5,
a 3-1/4 inch story was headlined, "Brown Gives Debate Terms."
The Republicans had released statements concerning the debates
on September 3 (GOP National Committeeman and Woman), on September 7
and September 9.
Finally, there was the campaign issue of Communism and internal
subversion. As has been noted, from the time of the Helen Gahagan Douglas
campaign of 1950, there had been a conscientious effort made by Nixon's
opponents to suggest that he was opportunistic in his use of this issue in any
election. Understandably, this issue is of such magnitude in a campaign
that it can only be seen in perspective if the dimensions of the issue are
mentioned early and the discussion of the issue stays within those boundaries.
In the case of the 1962 campaign, Nixon repeatedly spelled out his
attitude toward Communism during the primary campaign. On June 1,
Nixon again summarised a four-point program for combating "the Communist
menace in California." At every opportunity, Nixon tied his anti-Communist
program directly to Governor Brown's failure to treat the matter as serious.
Nixon's program was duly reported in May and June 1962.
When in the final election, however, Nixon re-introduced the subject
of Communist control, Brown attacked it as though it was brand new and a
case of characteristic Red-baiting on the part of Mr. Nixon.
In spite of Nixon's frequent mentioning of the fact that he had outlined
his program to combat Communism during the primary, the San Francisco
or Los Angeles metropolitan dailies never reported the fact.
- 18 -
Curiously, Nixon would have been aided by the observat ion that
this was not "new news." By not reporting the fact that he had outlined
his program four months before, the press allowed Brown's innuendo
to stand as fact: Nixon was opportunely grabbing a phony issue.
"A politician has nothing to offer but his word." In 1962, there
was a culmination of a twelve-year campaign to cast doubt upon the word
of one man. The campaign could not be viewed as an isolated happening
nor could reporters treat it fairly without reference to what had gone
before. Perhaps it is asking too much to ask reporters to reflect their
full knowledge of personalities and issues in their reporting of a campaign,
but there may be times when failure to report constitutes the gravest of
challenges to the responsibilities of the press.
STATE CHAIRMEN'S PRESS CONFERENCES COMPARED
In the course of the campaign. the two state leaders of their respective
parties held press conferences to denounce activities of the opposite
party and campaign. Two of these conferences were remarkable/parallel
in intent and content.
On October 18, Eugene Wyman called a press conference in Los Angeles
at the Biltmore Hotel. At that time he denounced two publications that had
appeared in the campaign: a booklet written by Karl Prussian called
California Dynasty of Communism and a leaflet prepared by the "Democrate
for Nixon" called Pat Brown and the CDC. During the conference. Wyman
charged that both publications contained "cropped" photographs of Brown
which were damaging to his campaign and which contributed to an overall
smear against the Governor.
Nixon had repudiated the Prussian booklet as had Chairman Weinberger. Both
ordered removal of copies from any GOP headquarters.
On November 1, Weinberger called a press conference of similar dimensions
as Wyman's at the same hotel to file an extensive brief and complaint of
violations of the Code of Fair Campaign Practices which Governor Brown had
signed prior to the campaign. Twelve major violations were cited of the
Brown campaign. Immediately following the press conference, the Brown
campaign manager, Harry Lerner. stood outside the press conference passing
- 2 -
out & prepared statement by Brown in which he did not deny or challenge
any of the charges of violations made against him. It was, therefore.
regarded by the Brown people as the important occurrence in the campaign.
That
Now, a comparison of the press space et each press conference received la
interesting. In the Los Angeles Times. Wyman's press confesence was
given a 27-inch 2-column stody with A headline "Brown Picture Fakes
Blamed on Nixon Aidem" subhead. "Democrat Leader Wyman Charges
Second Pamphlet Now Misrepresenting Governor." The L.A. Times
on November 2 carried a 1-column, 8-inch report of the Weinberger press
conference headlined, "Smear Claims Exchanged by Two Parties.'
The New York Times on October 19 carried a 12-1/2 inch report of the
Wyman press conference headlined, "Nixon's Campaign Is Called 'Dirtient', 11
Story appeared on page one of the NYTimes.
On November 2 in the New York Times, the report of Weinberger's press
conference was carried In an 8-inch story on page 8 headlined. "GOP Charges
Brown Violates Fair Campaign Practices."
Further in this comparison of the New York Times handling of the press
conferences. substantial detail was given to Wyman's specific charges con-
corning cropped photographs. The names of the pamphlets were mentioned
and discribed. Concerning Mr. Weinberger's charges, the last papagraph
- 3 -
was the only one which dealt specifically with the violations. and is quoted
as follows:
"Mr. Weinberger called attention to ten handbills
or publications that he said were Democrat-inspired
'smears' of Mr. Nixon."
The L.B. Independent Press-Telogram, a newspaper supporting Governor
Brown for re-election. treated the stories in one of the most flagrant
V lolations of journalistic ethics that could have been recorded during
the campaign. The paper carried a full report of Wyman's original press
conference, and then on October 26 ran a 1/2 page reprint of the entire
charge including photographs, treating it as though It was news of the day.
Their news "peg" for running it the second time was, according to them,
1 he fact that the Committee to Re-elect Brown had jast released the
cropped and un-cropped photographs. This was simply not true - they
were circulated at the Wyman press conference and several newspapers
ran them on October 19 including the L.A. Herald-Examiner.
In the Long Beach Independent Press Telegram: there was no report made
of the Weinberger press conference.
Introduction:
The first responsibility of the Nixon for Governor campaign
organization was to develop and make effective sound programs and
activities for the promotion and election of the candidate. Except
for the registration and get-out-the-vote effort, the campaign
organisation had primary responsibility for the success of its many
programs.
The Republican State Central Committee and the individual
Republican county central committees had primary responsibility
for organising and administering the Republican registration program
and for getting-out-the Republican vote on election day. In these two
areas, the Nixon campaign organisation's responsibility was supple-
mental in nature.
The purpose of this report is to provide for the record a
brief review of the Nixon campaign programs and activities and a
listing of the volunteer leadership throughout the state who were in-
strumental in furthering these programs. In addition, and in order
to make this file as complete as possible, the Report of Registration
and Statement of Vote compiled by the Secretary of State and other
printed material is included under appropriate tab headings.
Organisation:
At the very outset, it was decided to run the campaign on a
North-South basis with a steering committee composed of men from
the two divisions to be responsible for coordinating the campaign
effort statewide.
- 1 -
Prior to the appointment of the steering committee mem-
bership, a campaign chairman and finance chairman was appointed
by the candidate for each division: In the North, it was Andrew
Downey Orrick, Paul L. Davies, and Arthur J. Dolan (Davies and
Dolan acted as Northern California Finance Co-Chairmen); and in
the South, H. C. "Chad" McClellan and Maurice H. Stans.
The Statewide Steering Committee membership included
Orrick, Davies, and Dolan from the North and McClellan, Stans,
Valentine, and Minckler from the South. Bob Finch, as counsel for
the campaign, was asked to sit in on all meetings of the committee.
To act as a campaign policy committee for the Southern
California campaign, a so-called Southern California Policy Board
was appointed consisting of McClellan, Stans, Edward R. Valentine,
Robert L. Minckler, and Robert H. Finch. The function of the
committee was to formulate and coordinate campaign and financial
policy and review campaign operations. Sitting as ex-efficio members
of this committee at its weekly meetings were H. R. Haldeman,
California Campaign Manager, and Herbert W. Kalmbach, Executive
Director. The eandidate was kept advised of the committee's decisions
and met with the individual members thereof from time-to-time.
In the North, similar committees were established and consisted
of a Campaign Coordinating Committee, a Steering Committee, and a
Policy Committee. Cap Weinberger, Joe Martin, and Ruth Watson were
active in late 1961 in setting up the outlines of the campaign organization
structure. William M. Speneer, Jr., was appointed Northern California
- 2 -
Campaign Director in February of 1962. Edward Slevin, Executive
Director of the Republican State Central Committee, acted as the
Northern California administrative director in the latter months of
the general election campaign.
In order to alert and enlist the support of those Californians
who had evidenced partisanship on the candidate's behalf in prior
elections, a statewide mailing was made to these Nixon supporters
on November 6, 1961. Enclosed with a letter from the candidate was
a pledge-of-support card and enlistment sheet to be filled out and
returned to state headquarters. These who signed up and made token
donations of $1.00 were mailed pins and membership cards as charter
members of the Nixon for Governor Statewide Committee. State head-
quarters then mailed these names and addresses to the Nixon campaign
chairmen in the county and community where each committee member
resided. The local chairman was asked to follow through and place
each volunteer in some position of responsibility and effectiveness in
his organisation.
Also, a Southern California Advisory Committee was organized
during the primary campaign for the purpose of providing the candidate
with the views of a score or more of his friends who had long been
supporters and close associates throughout his political career. Ray
Arbuthnot acted as Chairman and Harrison McCall as Statewide
Coordinator of this committee. The membership roster is set forth
in this report under an appropriate tab heading.
- 3 -
Following the organization and appointment of the top campaign
leadership in both divisions, first priority was then given to structuring
the campaign in the fifty-eight counties of the state and to developing
sound programs and activities to be implemented by the candidate and
the campaign organisation.
It was decided to include the following eleven counties in the
Southern Division: Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Imperial,
Riverside, San Bernardino, Inyo, Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa
Barbara, and Ventura. The other forty-seven counties in the state
made up the Northern Division.
The appointment of each one of the county chairmen was the
responsibility of the division campaign chairmen. The county chair-
man then had the responsibility to appoint his county campaign com-
mittee, the county finance chairman (by and with the consent of the
division finance chairman), and the individual Nixon community
chairmen throughout the county. There was no policy prohibiting
co-chairmen at the county, division, or community level.
At the same time that the campaign volunteer leadership was
being appointed, staff personnel was being recruited to administer
the campaign programs and activities throughout the primary and
general election campaigns. A very brief description of these pro-
grams and activities is set forth below for the sake of making the
record complete:
(a) Candidate
The purpose of a campaign organisation is to assist the
- 4 -
candidate in merchandising his programs and personality to the
electorate. And in accomplishing this objective, nothing is more
important than the proper scheduling of the candidate's time and
appearances. Therefore, as a matter of first priority, a scheduling
committee was set up at the very outset of the campaign. This
committee had the final responsibility for planning the candidate's
time and for scheduling his appearances.
As an integral part of the scheduling of the candidate, an
"advance" group was assembled which had the responsibility to plan
in minute detail the routing and time-table that the candidate would
follow at each one of his appearances anywhere in the state. It should
be noted that scheduling and advance work was done not only for out-
of-town trips but for local appearances as well. In point of fact, a
major part of the office meetings and conferences held by the candi-
date were initiated and arranged for by the scheduling committee.
The candidate's staff included hier personal secretary, Rose
Mary Woods, two or three additional secretaries, and those assigned
to his traveling group. Included within this latter group were the
candidate's press secretary and tour manager. Those who made up
the tour group were charged with the handling of the press, radio and
television, and such other matters as might be expected to come up
on the particular trip. A writer and technical personnel in the communi-
cations area were often part of the candidate's traveling group.
- 5 -
(b) Advertising
Very early in the campaign, the decision was made to retain
a single advertising agency to handle the preparation and placement
of all advertising including literature and materials. After careful
analysis of all factors involved, Hixson & Jorgensen, a Los Angeles
agency, was so retained. Production itself was administratively
handled through the campaign staff with the agency doing all design
and layout.
To consult with the campaign manager in the development and
programing of all advertising and public relations programs and to
assist in the mapping of strategy and plans in the advertising area,
a Public Relations Advisory Board was established with membership
consisting of Ted Braun, Dick Moore, Bob Forward, Herb Klein,
Bob Finch, Kai Jorgensen, Charles Farrington, and Bob Haldeman.
Farrington, as staff public relations director, had the general
assignment throughout the campaign of acting as liaison between the
agency and the campaign organisation itself.
Advertising programs included such diverse activities as
planning campaign literature, billboard layout and showings, telethons,
television and radio spots, literature, etc. It would not be possible
to outline these programs in detail within the context of this report.
Suffice it to say that a great many separate activities were carried
on in this area under forced draft and with many talented and effective
people assisting in the effort.
- 6 -
A few brief examples of what is meant by the foregeing need
to be stated for one to appreciate the magnitude of effort and talent
expended: For instance, the several regional telethons which were
conducted around the state in the closing weeks of the general election
campaign and the seven weeks of radiocasts required a great deal of
coordinated work on the part of the research department, advertising,
etc.
(c) Press Bureau
The campaign press bureau was under the overall direction of
the press secretary, Herb Klein, who operated at the side of the
candidate. Sandy Quinn acted as the staff press bureau director from
the state campaign headquarters. In addition, staff personnel were
employed to handle such everyday matters as press background and
contact, special feature writing, attack and counter-attack writing, etc.
The overall purpose of the headquarters press bureau organi-
sation was to provide information and releases on the activities of the
candidate and on all other phases of the campaign. General campaign
activities and programs included all volunteer programs. Also, the
bureau established such innovations as the radio-beeper service which
furnished press copy to newspapers by telephone and a pre-recorded
film release service furnished to television in advance of scheduled
showings.
(d) Research Program
Immediately following the primary election, a Republican
Research Center was established with offices on the eighth floor of
- 7 -
the Coast Federal Building in downtown Los Angeles. The purpose was
to effect substantial economies in the campaigns of the several
Republican state candidates and assure effective team work in the
research area.
The implementation of this program resulted in making the
State Central Committee responsible for research for all state candi-
dates. The center itself was directed by Don Frey, Executive Director
of Republican Associates. And all members of the Nixon research staff
who had been operating as a separate campaign staff group in the pri-
mary were brought in as part of the Research Center personnel
grouping.
The functions of the Center included serving all candidates with
weekly fact sheets, a weekly wrap-up of major ulterances, a speech
fact book for pending conferences, and miscellaneous assignments.
In addition, Frey and the Center staff received direct assignments
from the major candidates, performed analyses and conducted voter
surveys, rendered a press service, did investigative work, and helped
to develop campaign literature which required substantial research
involvement.
(e) Mail Office
An extensive campaign mail office operation was operative
throughout the primary and general election campaigns. Under the
direction of Loie G. Gaunt, all mail addressed to the candidate was
initially handled by the mail office which was based on the seventh
- 8 -
floor of the Coast Federal Building.
Requests for RN appearances were routed to the seheduling
committee for handling. All other types of correspondence wase
handled by the mail office including extensive correspondence dealing
with campaign issues and the candidate's position with respect thereto.
Several staff members including typists assisted in the handling of
campaign correspondence.
In order for correspondence to be handled expeditiously, it was
mandatory that close coordination and cooperation should exist between
the mail office and such related activities as the scheduling committee,
candidate's personal staff group, research, etc. As a result of these
efforts, all candidate's mail, whether in or out of state was handled
throughout both campaigns in an orderly and businesslike manner.
(f) Miscellaneous
In addition to the foregoing, there were several additional
programs which were treated in the overall as statewide in nature but
which were administered separately by the two divisions. Included in
this category were the minorities, veterans, and Democrate for Nixon
programs.
Two minority groups were included in the minorities program,
negroes and Mexican-Americans. Special programs were not set up
for the Jewish group, the Japanese, etc. These latter groups were
- 9 -
handled as part of the other programs and not as special and separate
programs. There were Japanese-Amerieans for Nixon, Chinese-
Americans for Nixen, etc., set up as part of the Contact program or
as part of the special Nationalities program.
As for the negroes, Crispus A. Wright, a young Los Angeles
attorney, was appointed a Vice Chairman of the Southern California
campaign and was made responsible for developing and making
effective a negro program throughout the Southern Division. Alice
Leopeld had like responsibility in the North.
Wright organised a committee of twenty-five leading negro
citizens in the Metropolitan Los Angeles area and attempted to
accentuate youth and to recruit additional members for his committee
from the more aggressive and generally recognized leadership of the
negro community, and thereby tried to avoid coming up with the same
old perennials which the party's candidates had all too often chosen
to carry their banners in this area in past campaigns. Alice Leopold
attempted to do the same in the bay area.
Throughout the Southern and Northern division areas leading
negroes were recruited to move out front in support of Dick Nixon's
candidacy. Wright and Mrs. Leopold were in touch with this leadership
group and coordinated their activities with the other general campaign
programs. Largely as a result of Wright's leadership, more negro
Nixon headquarters were opened in Los Angeles County in the 1962
election than were opened in the 1960 presidential campaign.
- 10 -
The Mexican-American program was organized in the South
under the general direction of Art Sutton, who had represented
Newsweek magazine in Mexico for several years and who had been
very active in Mexican-American affairs in Los Angeles for some
time immediately prior to the election. Sutton brought in Bob
Carvajal as his staff man to travel throughout the Southern California
area on behalf of this program. Throughout his period of employment,
Carvajal remained a registered Democrat and a member of the
Democratic State and Los Angeles County Central Committees.
Sutton, Carvajal, and the others who were especially active in
the M-A program were helpful to the scheduling committee in arranging
for several Nixon appearances in the general election campaign period.
Of particular note was the candidate's appearances at the Mexican
Independence Day parade in mid-September and at the East Side rally
in mid-October.
As for the veterans, a top-level committee of acknowledged
leaders was established early in the campaign and included represen-
tatives from each of the three largest veteran organizations. Repre-
sentatives of the committee were present at all state conventions during
the election year (including the national American Legion Convention in
Las Vegas in early October) and had as their ongoing responsibility the
continual contacting of all of the veteran groups throughout the state and
selling them on the candidate and his views. The budget allotted this
committee enabled the group to place a certain amount of campaign ads
in the leading veteran publications.
- 11 -
A Democrats for Nixon program was set up in the general
campaign with headquarters at Wilshire and Flower Streets in downtown
Los Angeles. Co-Chairmen were appointed and programs adopted. And
the advertising firm of Bosell & Jacobs was retained to provide adver-
tising and administrative requirements.
Several thousand registered Democrats became members of the
committee and by their contributions underwrote extensive campaign
advertising supporting Diek Nixon's candidacy. Many celebrities who
were registered Democrate appeared on the several telethons.
Modest budgets were assigned to the minerities, veterans, and
Demecrats for Nixen programs and scheduling arranged for the candi-
date to meet with the leadership of each of these groups from time-te-
time and to make appearances before large groups as seemed to be
necessary and justified.
Southern California Campaign:
As stated earlier, the Southern California area was comprised
of eleven counties. One of the eleven, Les Angeles County, was so
extensive in terms of the percentage of the total vote of the state's
electorate that it was arbitrarily divided into seven divisions -- each
one of which was roughly equal to the others in number of population.
If is of interest to note that each one of the Los Angeles County divisions
was by itself larger in population than all but one or two of the other
fifty-seven counties in the state.
Chad McClellan, as Southern California Campaign Chairman,
proceeded to appoint county and division campaign chairmen at an early
- 12 -
date and furnished each with a written outline of his responsibilities.
Subject to the approval of Maury Stans, Southern California Finance
Chairman, each county and division chairman was asked to appoint a
finance chairman for his county or division. In addition, the county
and division chairmen were urged to appoint Nixon campaign chairmen
in each of the communities in their respective areas.
A community handbook was prepared (see tab) for the guidance
of each community chairmen in setting up his local Nixon committee
and thereafter moving to implement specifically stated programs.
In the finance area, specific goal figures were hammered out
by and between Chad McClellan and Maury Stans representing top
campaign leadership and each one of the county and division chairmen.
Once agreement had been reached, each chairman was expected to see
to it that at least a minimum geal amount was contributed to the state-
wide budget over and above the meney required to meet local needs.
To our knowledge this is the first time that such an approach in political
fund raising had been so successfully accomplished in California peliti-
cal history. The total gross goal amount for the ten out-counties was
$170, 000; and the final post-election report showed total gross receipts
from these counties of $182, 690. 25. The goal amount was thus exceeded
by $12, 690. 25. And, in addition, a total gross amount of $89, 141. 35
was received from the seven divisions within Los Angeles County exclu-
sive of menies received by the campaign from United Republican Finance,
fund raising dinners, telethons, and direct contributions. Maury Stans'
finance report states these results in detail.
Included in the various programs which were pushed by the
Southern California campaign organisation were what was known as the
- 13 -
Field, Action, and Contact programs. In addition, considerable
attention and effort was devoted to the Democrats for Nixen program,
a veterans program, and two minorities programs.
The field program consisted mainly of the effort and drive
necessary to insure the establishment of effective Nixon campaign
committees in counties, divisions, and separate communities through-
out the Southern California area. To assist the county and division
chairmen, a field staff organization was established,
Such field activities as the establishment of campaign head-
quarters in every community and programs and activities to be
carried on out of such headquarter locations were pushed throughout
the campaign. Bumper sticker squads, literature drops and distri-
bution, assistance in getting out crowds for railies, etc., all were
designated as functions of each Nixon community committee.
Also the field organisation worked with the state and local
central committee organizations to supplement the party's programs
in the registration and get-out-the-vote programs. A great number
of volunteers were recruited from the Nixon organisation for work in
the County's victory squad program on election day.
A Nixon volunteer, Bill Haight, was recruited and took on the
responsibility for developing a poll-watchers program for November
6th. The Nixon organisation supplied the names of many who worked
in this program on election day.
A campaign speakers bureau was set up under the direction of
- 14 -
Chairman Pat Hillings. Carol Arth prepared a speakers bureau
manual which was later distributed to all Nixon speakers and county
division and community chairmen. A copy of the manual is included
as part of this report.
The Action Program comprised several separate programs
including Operation Telephone, Jewelry Sales, Friendly Democrat
calls, Volunteers, etc., and were all conducted under the general
direction of Mrs. Valley Knudsen, a Southern California Campaign
Vice Chairman. A separate Action Program report has been received
and is included in this report under an appropriate tab heading.
An indication of the degree of organization and follow through
that was accomplished in the Operation Telephone program may be
seen from the fact that the total number of telephone calls made to
Republicans and friendly Democrate during the four day period ending
on Saturday, November 3, 1962, exceeded by a substantial margin the
number of calls made in the 1960 presidential election.
In addition to supplying the staff leadership for the five main
sub-divisions in the Action Program, Carol Arth, the staff director
for women's activities, was responsible for what was known as the
"Key" program and for organising and administering a moniter program.
The Key Program had as its objective the writing of letters to
publishers, breadcasters, commentaters, etc., to express appreciation
for good Nixon coverage or to express diseatisfaction with unfair or
- 15 -
biased coverage. And the objective of the monitor program was to
systematically and continuously view all key radie and television
commentators and newseasters and then to maintain an accurate
file of their attitudes, approach, and presentation of all news and
comments relative to the campaign.
As in the Action Program, the key and menitor programs
were active throughout Southern California and were implemented
by volunteer chairmen especially recruited and enlisted for this
special work.
Also, 8 "friendly ear" program was established whereby
volunteers on a regularly scheduled basis were made available to
meet and discuss issues of the campaign with voters who visited the
headquarters.
Another project was the so-called special letter program.
This involved sending personalized letters from the candidate to
people throughout the state who had distinguished themselves by
reason of some worthy act or accomplishment.
A "Contact" program was developed and pushed under the
direction of John Vaughn, a Southern California Vice Chairman. In
essence, the objective of this program was the establishment of Nixon
committees with each committee to be tied to a particular interest
whether by occupation, affiliation, or some other logical classification.
Lawyers for Nixon, Dectors for Ninon, Barbers for Nixon, etc.,
all were recruited into this program and were asked to recruit additional
- 16 -
membership principally by means of letter correspondence. A graphie
idea of the magnitude of these mailings may be gained when it is known
that a total of 518, 600 letters were mailed by the Contact division. And
this total number was mailed within a budgetary limit based on a pro-
posed total mailing of 125, 000 letters.
Also, & "Win" program was initiated as part of this program --
the ebject of which was to enlist Nixon supporters within particular
companies. A Nixon chairman was appointed for the company who then
appointed sub-chairmen in various departments and occupational groups
of the company. These chairmen then enlisted Nixon support from their
fellow employees.
In addition to the Contact and Wis programs, several special
committees were organized during the sampaign to enlist additional
support for the candidate. Three such special committees were the
Nixon-Airs, Sportsmen for Nixon, and Nationalities for Nixon.
Nixon-Airs. Approximately 150 airline stewardesses from all
major airlines serving the West Coast were recruited and enlisted into
a special committee called Airline Nixen-Airs. The announcement of the
formation of this committee resulted in a great amount of publicity
throughout the Nation and such was reported in all media. Each Nixon-
Air were a special "Pat Red" uniform (manufactured for the campaign
at cost by Miss Pat of California). They did such work as appearing at
all telethons, passing out literature at rallies, and making plant and
factory tours where they passed out free ceffee and literature including
bumper stickers to union members.
- 17 *
Sportsmen for Nixon. Over 100 nationally and internationally
known athletes were recruited and enlisted as members of the Sports
Advisory Committee. This group then provided speakers for rallies,
made telethen appearances, and worked as members of the Victory
Squad on election day. They also produced a fine Sports brochure
and letter which was mailed to a carefully selected list of 36, 000
sports fans.
Nationalities for Nixon. Leaders of 32 ethnic groups formed
this committee which had as its function that of disseminating infor-
mation among the foreign born and first generation nationality groups
supporting the candidacy of Richard Nixon. The committee raised its
own funds and purchased ads in their own foreign language newspapers
and on foreign language radie stations.
Northern California Campaign:
There were forty-seven counties assigned to the Northern
California Campaign Division. In total registration, this division
represented approximately forty percent (40%) of the total electorate
in the state. As was stated earlier, Cap Weinberger, Jee Martin, and
Ruth Watson were the ones who did most of the pre-campaign planning
for this division.
Following his appointment as Northern California Campaign
Chairman, Downey Orrick proceeded to appoint area and county
chairmen for his division. The appointment of area chairmen (an
"area" usually comprised three or more counties) was decided upon
as a matter of necessity owing to the great distances and number of
counties as compared to the Southern California Division. Each county
. 18 -
chairman was then asked to appoint a county finance chairman and
community Nixon chairmen.
The community handbook previously referred to was distri-
buted to each community chairman as an aid in the setting up of
local campaign committees and as a guide to thereafter working to
accomplish the goals and programs set forth therein.
In the finance area, as is shown in the Stans report, there
was relatively little attempt made to assess and recover from the
counties outside of the bay area any amount of campaign contributions
to support statewide budgetary programs. Fund raising was handled
primarily through United Republican Finance in San Francisco. As
against a goal figure of $440, 000. 00 for the state finance budget,
Northern California contributed a total of $244, 439. 64.
Organisationally, the Northern California campaign was
divided into two bread divisions: campaign and contact. The cam-
paign division under the direction of Jim Halley concerned itself
primarily with seeing to it that effective Nixon chairmen were
appointed in all areas, counties, and communities. The contact
division was involved primarily with a "Contact" and "Win" program.
In addition, a speakers bureau, press bureau, labor and minorities
committee (Alice Leopold), and a scheduling committee were estab-
lished, This latter committee was set up to facilitate close coordination
with the scheduling committee in Los Angeles.
Bill Spencer as Northern California Campaign Director had
overall responsibility for managing the Northern California Division
- 19 -
under the Chairman, Downey Orrick. Later, Ed Slevin was made
responsible for the administrative direction of the division under
the Chairman's direction. Ruth Watson worked closely with Jim
Halley in the Campaign division.
Generally, the programs pushed in Northern California
were the same as were pushed in Southern California. The em-
phasis, however, varied from program to program. For example,
the "Win" program was developed to a greater extent in the North
than in the South while the reverse was true for the "Contact"
program.
Conclusion:
The 1962 Nixon for Governor campaign is now part of
California political history. As stated earlier, the purpose of
this report is to briefly review for the record the organization and
programs of the campaign; the analysis of reasons why the result
obtained must be done by others. Even so, certain observations
are pertinent. Under a separate tab heading is a copy of a report
dealing with the matter of press coverage during the campaign.
Se long as the Democrats in California maintain their pre-
sent 3-2 registration edge, it is mandatory that general party unity
and solidarity be present in general election campaigns if the
Republican candidates are to have any chance for success at all.
An expression of views from all factions should be encouraged in
the primary period; however, once the candidates have been nomi-
nated, all should then join in their support. Disunity in a general
- 20 -
election eampaign is a luxury the party can't afford.
Also, of necessity, the campaign organisations must be able
to have confidence in the excellence and effectiveness of the formal
party organizations -- the state and county central committees and
their basic responsibility for improving the party's registration
percentage, for getting out the party vote on election day, and for
wholeheartedly supporting the Republican candidates. Effective
political organization is a year-around job, and to leave the task of
registration and getting-out-the-vote to the various campaign organi-
sations is to place an Intolerable burden on machinery designed pri-
marily to consern itself with the election of a candidate.
By virtue of the 1962 election result, the Democrats now have
the opportunity to further consolidate their position in this state and
thus increase the likelihood of iron-elad machine and boss rule.
Unruh and the others are effective political operators; to deny this
is to deny success. The Republican task is to do a better job of selling
a superior product. This calls for top-grade leadership and organi-
sation -- and a willingness on the part of the various factions to indulge
in some give and take in the course of combining behind their candidates
in one unified force for victory.
- 21 -
January 10, 1963
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Maurice Stans
FROM:
Bob Finch
RE:
Dissolution of Modern Mailing Services, Inc., through the
Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee
A. Background of the Corporation
In the course of the 1960 Presidential campaign (pre and post
convention) the Nixon office established a sizable mail facility in downtown
Washington, D. C.
At the outset this was financed by the Folger Research Committee;
later by the Nixon Volunteers and finally by the Republican National
Committee itself.
Apart from payroll and the expense of mailings themselves, title
to, or equity in certain equipment was established over the period involved.
This included 8 Friden Flexowriters, machine stands, tape and selectadator
readers, etc.
As of the time Nixon left Washington there were still over 25, 000
pieces of mail yet to be handled and it was obvious that the level of corres-
pondence would remain at a high level no matter what personal course Nixon
decided to pursue.
Accordingly, it was determined to set up a mail office in Los
Angeles (to be financed by Folger) and as well our equipment, and two
trained persons. On the 8 flexowriters alone, a savings of about $16, 000
was achieved in this way. Other equipment, such as the Autopen, had been
purchased in Washington, D. C. and could not have been resold except at a
considerable loss.
As to the mailing lists which had been developed over the years in
Mr. Nixon's office and during the 1960 campaign it was felt advisable to
also send this to the west coast. During the campaign it had been put on a
Scriptomatic card system, and had grown to include about 430, 000 names
nationally. Politically it was not appropriate to let this list get out of con-
trol. Commercially, it was not feasible to let it lie idle since it rapidly
becomes out of date. And from Mr. Nixon's standpoint, it seemed desirable
to have it available for use in whatever party leadership role he decided
to undertake.
Because a large volume of overhead is inherent in such a mechanical
operation, an effort was made to establish Modern Mailing Service as a
commercial enterprise so that income from commercial sales could help
defray the overhead. It could not be said, however, that the operation has
-2-
ever functioned strictly as a commercial business - first, because
political work always had priority and commercial work would be shunted
aside for it; and second, because in order to meet rush political orders,
it was necessary to maintain on the payroll personnel sufficient to handle
rush work which would have been scheduled differently in a purely business
operation.
One hundred shares of stock were issued. Ninety of these were
hald in trust by William Stover for those of us who, for political reasons,
had advanced capital to the corporation. In addition, a $38, 000 loan was
obtained from Union Bank, cosigned by Volk, Taylor, Stover and Finch
which was to be repaid after the election. The other ten shares were sold,
as an incentive, to the man who was hired as a salesman to promote
commercial business.
From February to June of 1961 the organization's total activity
and payroll was connected with Richard Nixon's activities and corres-
pondence. The corporation began business formally on June 1, 1961 and
ceased operations on December 31, 1962. During this time it had total
sales of $136, 303. 83, of which $90, 182. 76, or two-thirds, was billing for
political work, most of this being for Mr. Nixon. Some quasi-political
work, such as a national mailing on the lists promoting Mr. Nixon's "Six
Crisis" was accomplished at a loss.
In the final months of the general election of 1962, the lists of 1960
national contributors were mailed seeking financial aid for the Nixon
Gubernatorial campaign. These mailings were successful and resulted
in approximately $80, 000 in out of state contributions at cost only.
It goes without saying that no dividends were ever paid at any
time to any shareholder, nor any interest paid on any monies advanced
to the corporation from time to time by any party.
At the present time the corporation is insolvent, its business
having been continued because of the political campaigns far beyond the
point where a purely commercial enterprise would have ceased. The cor-
poration's suppliers and principal creditors have extended their credit
because of sympathy with the primary function of the corporation, and
consequently bankruptcy or some form of arrangement with the creditors
would appear highly undesirable.
The purpose of this memo is to discuss the propriety of an arrange-
ment whereby the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee would
underwrite the dissolution of Modern Mailing Services, Inc., and the
payment of its obligations. The effect of such action on three groups should
be considered: (1) The Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee
and its principals; (2) Modern Mailing Services shareholders, and (3)
Modern Mailing Services creditors.
-3-
B. Legality from standpoint of the Nixon for Governor Campaign
Wind-Up Committee:
This committee is essentially a trust and the question which
should be considered is whether the committee's payment of Modern
Mailing Services' obligations would conform with the purposes for which
the committee was established.
Three factors would appear to justify this action by the committee:
1. The benefit which the Nixon campaign has derived from
the corporation and the fact, as indicated by the sales
figures above, that the corporation was for all intents
and purposes an arm of the campaign. This benefit was
both one of convenience in having a facility available for
crash work and financial in that an ordinary business would
have charged considerable more for much of the work which
had to be done at night and on a rush basis.
2. The fact that credit has been extended to the corporation
by sympathetic businesses because of the campaign
involvement, so that the reputation of the campaign is
involved.
3. The fact that the purposes and objectives of the company,
particularly with respect to the mailing list, have been
coincidental with those of the Nixon organization. The
retention of the mailing list with the cost involved in doing
so, was predicated primarily upon the hope of winning, just
as was the entire campaign effort. In the event of victory,
the list and rest of the mailing facility would have been in-
valuable to Mr. Nixon in exercising his responsibilities as
a leading political figure.
The above factors would appear sufficient to justify the proposed
action by the Wind-Up Committee.
C. Modern Mailing Services, Inc. 's Shareholders
The action is legally competent 50 long as a majority of the
corporate shareholders have consented to the transfer of the corporate
assets to the committee. This is obviously no problem.
D. Effect on the Corporation's Creditors
This is primarily a practical matter. While creditors might
ordinarily be reluctant to stand by as an insolvent debtor corporation
transferred its assets, the same factors which motivated them to extend
their credit in the first place now prevent them from intervening. They
know that they will be better off as a result of the contemplated action, and
as long as they are paid off fairly promptly will certainly raise no objections.
MEMORANDUM
January 21, 1963
To:
RN
From:
David Hunter
Subject: Statement of Vote by Congressional Districts
1st Congressional District:
Miller (Dem. )
100,962
Clausen (Rep. )
97,949
Brown
100,969
Nixon
100,755
2nd C.D. :
Johnson (Dem. )
106,239
Nagel (Rep. )
58,150
Brown
93,261
Nixon
72,040
3rd C.D.:
Moss (Dem. )
138,257
Geo. Smith (Rep.)
46,510
Brown
115,462
Nixon
71,788
4th C.D.:
Leggett (Dem. )
55,563
Honsinger (Rep.)
42,762
Brown
58,099
Nixon
42,567
5th C. D. :
Shelley (Dem. )
64,493
Charles (Rep. )
15,670
Brown
64,458
Nixon
29,022
- 2 -
6th C. D.:
O'Connell (Dem.)
74,429
Mailliard (Rep.)
105,762
Brown
115,840
Nixon
78,143
7th C. D.:
Cohelan (Dem.)
86,215
Cantando (Rep.)
47,409
Brown
82,361
Nixon
59,642
8th C. D.:
Miller (Dem.)
97,014
Petersen (Rep.)
36,810
Brown
83,032
Nixon
57,437
9th C.D.:
Edwards (Dem.)
79,616
Donovan (Rep.)
41,104
Brown
76,132
Nixon
50,734
10th C.D.:
Thurber (Dem.)
68,885
Gubser (Rep.)
106,419
Brown
86,485
Nixon
90,738
11th C.D.:
Keller (Dem.)
61,623
Younger (Rep.)
101,963
Brown
90,464
Nixon
82,115
- 3 -
12th C.D.:
Stewart (Dem.)
47,576
Talcott (Rep.)
75,424
Brown
60,792
Nixon
65,045
13th C.D.:
Holgate (Dem.)
45,746
Teague (Rep.)
84,743
Brown
68,201
Nixon
64 720
14th C.D.:
Weidner (Dem.)
58,369
Baldwin (Rep. )
99,040
Brown
91,150
Nixon
71,192
15th C.D.:
McFall (Dem. )
97,322
Young (Rep.)
41,726
Brown
73,707
Nixon
68,564
16th C.D.:
Sisk (Dem.)
108,339
Selland (Rep.)
42,401
Brown
90,020
Nixon
63,185
17th C.D.:
King (Dem. )
74,964
Bruinsma (Rep.)
36,663
Brown
70,529
Nixon
44,945
- 4 -
18th C. D.:
Hagen (Dem.)
91,684
Arnett (Rep.)
64,037
Brown
82,021
Nixon
74,369
19th C.D.:
Holifield (Dem.) )
78,436
Ramsay (Rep.)
48,976
Brown
70,133
Nixon
61,303
20th C.D.:
Mayer (Dem.)
49,850
Smith, H. Allen (Rep.)
119,938
Brown
64,501
Nixon
114,343
21st C. D.:
Hawkins (Dem.)
73,465
Smith, Herman (Rep.)
13,371
Brown
86,905
Nixon
15,190
22nd C. D.:
Corman (Dem.)
75,294
Foote (Rep.)
65,087
Brown
71,116
Nixon
73,056
23rd C. D.:
Doyle (Dem.)
83,269
Clawson (Rep.)
46,488
Brown
74,099
Nixon
61,416
- 5 -
24th C. D.:
Mellon (Dem. )
50,970
Lipscomb (Rep.)
120,884
Brown
62,526
Nixon
117,897
25th C.D.:
Cameron (Dem.)
62,371
Rousselot (Rep.)
53,961
Brown
64,738
Nixon
55,540
26th C.D.:
Roosevelt (Dem. )
112,162
Belts (Rep. )
52,063
Brown
110,429
Nixon
60,542
27th C.D.:
Burkhalter (Dem. )
66,979
Hiestand (Rep. )
61,538
Brown
70,583
Nixon
61,760
28th C.D.:
Felixson (Dem.) )
91,305
Bell (Rep.)
162,233
Brown
112,675
Nixon
151,135
29th C. D.:
Brown, Geo. (Dem.)
73,740
Richardson (Rep. )
58,760
Brown
80,267
Nixon
61,170
- 6 -
30th C.D.:
Roybal
69,008
McDonough
53,104
Brown
78,859
Nixon
51,041
31st C.D.:
Wilson, Chas. (Dem.)
76,631
Hahn (Rep. )
70,154
Brown
90,096
Nixon
66,135
32nd C.D.:
Johovich (Dem. )
47,917
Hosmer
115,915
Brown
84,268
Nixon
84,630
33rd C. D.:
Sheppard (Dem.)
96,192
Thomas (Rep.)
66,764
Brown
88,437
Nixon
80,054
34th C. D.:
Hanna (Dem.)
90,758
Geier (Rep.)
71,478
Brown
76,521
Nixon
88,034
35th C.D.:
Shamsky (Dem.)
61,395
Utt (Rep.)
133,737
Brown
62,494
Nixon
132,831
- 7 -
36th C.D.:
Godfrey (Dem.)
56,637
Wilson, Bob (Rep.)
91,626
Brown
59,908
Nixon
83,596
37th C.D.:
Deerlin (Dem.)
63,821
Wilson, Dick (Rep.)
60,460
Brown
62,764
Nixon
59,954
38th C. D.:
Saund (Dem.)
54,022
Martin (Rep. )
68,583
Brown
58,498
Nixon
66,197