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This file contains:
Copy of a memo from Bill Gavin to Mr. Shakespeare RE: the "reason, passion and imagination" of RN and his administration, as well as strategies for the 1972 presidential race. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Buchanan to RN RE: a column entitled "Muskie Watch" for use in "Monday." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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WHSF: Contested, 1-24
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This file contains:
Copy of a memo from Bill Gavin to Mr. Shakespeare RE: the "reason, passion and imagination" of RN and his administration, as well as strategies for the 1972 presidential race. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Buchanan to RN RE: a column entitled "Muskie Watch" for use in "Monday." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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1
24
6/14/1971
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Bill Gavin to Mr.
Shakespeare RE: the "reason, passion and
imagination" of RN and his administration,
as well as strategies for the 1972 presidential
race. Handwritten notes added by unknown.
5 pgs.
1
24
>
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: a column entitled
"Muskie Watch" for use in "Monday." 1 pg.
Monday, September 13, 2010
Page 1 of 1
[ItemN-2)
EYES ONLY
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Shakespeare
Some Thoughts on 1972
What, ultimately, does any politician have to work with?
Three things: reason, passion and imagination. Even if he
successfully mixes these three it won't assure him political
success because events might go against him. But without
these qualities, even events can't save him.
Looking coldbloodedly at 1972, how will the President
appear to the voters insofar as these three qualities are
concerned? And how will his opponent shape up?
1. Reason. It seems to me that this is our strong point.
Nixon is in the public mind an eminently reasonable and reasoning
man (two different attributes). There is not a Democrat who
can match Nixon's reputation for thinking things through, sorting
things out, balancing all things. Muskie comes close but there
is nothing in his record that shows he can appeal to the voters
as the candidate of pure reason.
Now this is all to the good. Contrary to what the pundits
say, there is great comfort to be taken by the electorate from
knowing that they can count on a certain kind of familiar. if dull--
rational process in decision making. Nixon is perhaps the best
example of the "reason-candidate. " LBJ had everyone on the
point of a nervous breakdown because no one knew what he was
going to do next, i. e., everyone began to doubt his capacity for
thinking things through.
EYES ONLY
-2-
EYES ONLY
But reason, politically speaking, is dull. It is good, but good
only in that way that medicine is good. Reason is appreciated only
when things are going wrong (JFKs much publicized discussions with
wise men during the missile crisis proved to be as much help to him
ass the ultimate decision did; people knew things were "being thought
through" and had confidence in Kennedy.)
The Nixon Administration has been marked by this: we are
reasonable (we set reasonable goals reorganization- and go about
them in reasonable ways) but dull Yet no one quite knows whether
this is good or bad, as far as sizing up our chances for 1972. For
the moment lets content ourselves with the facts: we are the first
Administration in ten years to be almost universally thought of as
one in which "thinking things through" is taken for granted. This
quality of course works against us also: we are accused of balancing
too many things, of trying to be too rational, of attempting to avoid
needed risks, etc. But in any event, we are associated in the public
mind with reason.
2. Passion. Passion, in this Administration means Agnew and
Agnew means passion. The documentation of his arguments, the
precise nature of his claims, the moderate speaking style with which
he made them all of these are as dust compared to the one single
fact about the Vice President: he represents passion in this
Administration.
Like all passion, the passion represented by Agnew is pure
energy, i. c., in the public mind the content of his passion has become
almost unimportant (even to his friends); what counts is that he is
what he is, breaking the rules of political decorum, saying things,
making waves, in short, making a passionate appeal to the passions
of the public. Not to put too fine an edge on this thing, it can be said
in a very real sense that Agnew's appeal is the appeal of the lover: it
11
is direct, forceful, open, full of energy and rather unfocused.
Does anyone "out-passion" us? I think not. No one running for
President can aford to take the chances Agnew has. He is the single
most passionately discussed, admired, hated politician alive today,
including Old George Corley Wallace.
-3-
But passion is too much for most people. Most of us can take it
only in bits and pieces and Agnew has in three years made a mini-
career out of it. He has, as they say, enflamed the hearts of the
faithful.
Many questions arise: does the public distinguish the passionate
politics of Agnew from the rational politics of Nixon? Does Agnew's
style hurt or help or really have no affect on Nixon's image? It is
difficult to say but my guess is that something entirely unexpected has
happened: the public has become confused by the Agnew style in
contrast with Nixon's style. The public simply doesn't know what to
think. I'm not saying the public disagrees with his content; I'm saying
it has completely forgotten his content. All they' 11 remember in 1972
about Agnew is a big cliche in which sound and fury make up the
greatest part.
Thus, I think we are going into 1972 (no matter who is on the ticket
as Vice President for us) with a paradoxical, but very real problem:
the very quality lacked by Nixon in the eyes of most people is precisely
that which Agnew has, but in such a way that people are not certain
what to make of it all. Is Agnew, Nixon? Is Nixon, Agnew? This
uncertainity about the image of the ticket is, in my mind, a danger. In
1968 everyone knew what the Republican ticket was: a bit dull, but solid.
But now? Solidity of image (I'm not talking about programs) is gone.
A bad sign.
3. Imagination. Here we have an Administration that has called
for a revolution, that has called for revolutionary new systems of
welfare, revenue sharing, etc. But in the public's mind it is an
Administration wholly without imagination. I don't know why this should
be so but I'm positive it is so, And here is where the danger lies. In
order to win in 1972 a candidate is going to have to be reasonable, have
mini-passion but also appeal to the imagination of the voters. We
simply don't do that and we never have. Voters voted for us in 1968
not because they imagined what we were going to do but because they
knew what we are going to do. After five years of LBJ, intellectual
certainity became almost politically sexy. But now after four years
of dull reason with eruptions of (Agnevian) passion and few if any
appeals to the imagination (the Peace Corps was such an appeal, so
in it's way was the Great Society) have been made. Even the six
great goals have been sold as well-thought-out goals that can be
reached through reason and prudence.
-4-
We are going into 1972 with absolutely no appeal to the imagination
and there is, as far as I can see, no way out of it. No gimmick will
suffice. Either you have it or you don't and we don't as far as
imaginative appeal goes.
Now what does all this add up to? It means that we are in very
big trouble as far as image is concerned. We will be the party of
peace- but people expect peace.
The great strength we have, however, is that there is only one
possible candidate who could appeal to the imagination of the voters,
sweep through the words, add the logic and the record and hit them
in the gut: Teddy. And he ain't running. If he does run, we are in
a fight for our political future. No other Democrat has even the
slightest chance of appealing to the fancies and fantasies of the public
as does Teddy. We will win if he doesn't run. * Not because we are
going to overwhelm the voters with our record or our charm (they are
not really interested in either) but because we can out-reason all of
them and none of them has that much more going for him as far as
imagination is concerned. Passion could well be our undoing. But if
this is so, it is already a political fact simply waiting to be recorded
in November 1972. Thus, any attempt to remove Agnew in order to
"clean-up" the ticket is fruitless. His pluses and minuses have already
been engraved on the public's mind and have been associated with the
entire "Administration-image. " Replacing Agnew would, I think, solve
nothing and probably harm our chances on the right.
What does this all add up to?
1.
We should not attempt to build some kind of image that appeals to
the imagination for the simple reason that no one will believe it. Any
energy used during the campaign to make us look "exciting" is, to me,
a waste. Thus television and other media should be used in a different
way from 1968. Instead of the fast-moving, exciting "cinema-verite"
technique in spots, we should make stark, statistical appeals based on
documented facts. At first glance this seems to be disastrous, but I
think our hope lies in sticking to what we do best (reason) and what we
are identified with in the public mind. We can't turn our back on four
years of reasoned, prudent progress and try to excite people with dreams
of grandeur or majestic sweeping visions. An explanation of what I
mean: the numbers of Americans that were in Vietnam when we came
* We can, of course, win if he does run, providing two things occur:
(1) Chappaquiddick is engraved in the hearts of the voters and (2) the
voters don't want fantasies. Both seem unlikely to occur.
-5-
in and numbers of how many there are when the campaign takes place:
stark, unadorned, repeated over and over and over-this kind of thing
will do more than a thousand arty camera angles.
2. Quite literally everything depends on the public mood. If the public
is looking for excitement after four years of reasoned progress, than it
is my feeling we are in big trouble and that there is little if anything
we can do about it as far as a media campaign is concerned. They
voted for us because they thought we were solid; we have been solid;
we must run once more as the solid party.
3. Gimmicky media appeals to the youth vote simply are a waste of
time. Our appeal to youth must be an appeal to their concerns as
Americans, not as young Americans and I think the President should
say this. The Democrats are starting out with a wide spread in youth
registration and we can't get them by appealing to the "youth issues"
that the Democrats already have tied up. Let the Democrats cozy up
to "youth"; we will treat the new voters as Americans first, i.e., we
will take them as seriously as they take themselves.
A final--and to me, frightening--point. History has been known
to deal in ironies before. Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration
was defted because the Democrats were able to state that while they
were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should belin second
place as far as missile defense is concerned? And wouldn't it be ironic
if the Democrats said that they could do better than we could in our
own programs vis-a-vis China?
Ghastly thoughts.
Bill
Bill Gavin
[Item N-3] 3]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE
FROM
STILN
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
From Buchanan
Attached is a toned-down version of the
First Installment of the MUSKIE WATCH, written for
the next edition of MONDAY if approved which
you always might find amusing.
The author would be one Martin Scriblerus,
Free-lancer for the RNC, and the piece would be re-
run, without endorsement and without comment.
PJBuchanan