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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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1
27
4/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Colson RE: campaign
points from a recent meeting with Harris. 1
pg.
1
27
4/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Colson for "The File"
RE: campaign suggestions from Harris. 4 pgs.
Monday, September 13, 2010
Page 1 of 1
[Item N-1]
April 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO: CHARLES COLSON
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Harris made some interesting points when you spoke with
him. The primary one with which I agree fully is that the
President at all costs should avoid "stridency" and crass
partisanship, and any manner of attack upon his opposition
which is seen as inconsistent with his position as leader of
all the people. As for the bland campaign, too early to call
that one. There may be an issue on which the President can
win, by elevating it in the public focus, as he did in November
1969. And should we appear bland and unemotional -- while
the Democratic Party has whipped up an emotional anti-
establishment campaign -- we could be writing our own death.
The stridency point should be kept before us at all times --
but to lock in to a bland campaign now would be unwise -- there
are issues which transcend party, on which we are on the
majority side -- and heating up these issues, could turn to our
advantage.
A final note -- I would not trust Harris so far as one could
throw him. He has long been in Teddy White's phrase, a
"Kennedy fanatic, 11 and I would not be surprised if Kennedy were
not getting cargonas of what he sends to you.
Buchanan
[Item N.2]
.NDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
April 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris
Harris believes that the President needs, between now
and the election, to continually create "straw men". Meany
affords us the best opportunity, but we've got to work at creating
others -- deliberate enemies. The President is against those who
plunged us into Vietnam but now want to sell out America's honor.
The President is against those retailers who over-charge consumers.
The middle man example in the food price issue is a perfect illustra-
tion. If there isn't a natural villain, create one so that the President
can be the defender of the public interest against natural enemies.
Harris believes that the President should be forceful but not
strident; that whenever he is strident, the President brings out the
hostility of a latent anti-Nixon feeling which still exists with a large
body of people, but that when he is deliberate, quiet, rational, forceful,
he does not engender this latent hostility.
2.
Harris believes that we should downplay the campaign through-
if
out the year, make it as boring as possible. Harris believes that a
bland campaign will help us in that we will benefit greatly from a low
turnout. Also, people react better to the President if he does not
polarize on gut issues. This does not mean that we should not address
the issues; we should defuse as many as possible, but not arouse the
passions of the electorate with a very divisive issue that might bring
out our opponents (as with anti-labor legislation, for example).
Harris believes the key to our success is in avoiding having the
American electorate act emotionally or precipitously with respect to the
President's candidacy. He points out that as his pollsters question people,
they get a better response after the questioning than at the outset. More
people favor the President's re-election after they have been walked
through the issues than when they are first confronted with the question
cold, "Do you favor the President as against Candidate X?"
One of the President's strong points is that people think he is
trying hard. He is beginning to develop a characteristic of sincerity,
that he is really working at solving the problems. Harris advises that
we should articulate everything we do rationally, calmly, quietly, and
forcefully. Make people think, make people thoughtful. Do not provoke
instant emotional reactions. The President's style has come through very
3.
well as being deliberate. We should not let him go swinging or
overreacting. If our opponent becomes strident, we should take it
in stride. The more irresponsible the opposition becomes, the
more the President is helped in being looked at as a solid, steady,
strong and deliberate statesman. Be the "solid brick in the middle"
Harris suggests. Ask people to think of the issues seriously.
In this same vein, we should turn the lack of so-called charisma
into an asset, arguing that no one has the right to use the office of
Presidency for the development of a personality cult, that personal
promotion is not the measure of one's success as President. One
cannot run the country through charm, rather through ability. Nixon's
style is to be serious and dedicated, that that is more important than
personal image.
Harris believes that Nixon's image is now being sharpened
as a rational, thoughtful, deliberate leader, all of which can be
destroyed if there is a spontaneous reaction or a sharp galvanizing of
the opposition in the months ahead. Harris believes that if people
are asked calmly and quietly to think through the choice for President,
that the President cannot be beaten by any of the present Democratic
Presidential candidates. If on the other hand, the election turns into
4.
a heated, highly controversial, emotionally charged campaign,
we will simply bring out enough anti votes to defeat us; there are just
more of them than us and if we galvanize them, we (not the Democratic
candidates) can beat ourselves. The key at the moment is to maintain
the tone that we have presently achieved and to hold it throughout the
election year.
WR
Charles W. Colson
Document source description
This file contains:
From Buchanan to Colson RE: campaign points from a recent meeting with Harris. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/17/1972
Copy of a memo from Colson for "The File" RE: campaign suggestions from Harris. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/3/1972
Page data
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Document data
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- 26144247
- Core
- doc
- Type
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DTO data
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"ocrText": "Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nContested Materials Collection\nFolder List\nBox Number\nFolder Number\nDocument Date\nNo Date\nSubject\nDocument Type\nDocument Description\n1\n27\n4/17/1972\nCampaign\nMemo\nFrom Buchanan to Colson RE: campaign\npoints from a recent meeting with Harris. 1\npg.\n1\n27\n4/3/1972\nCampaign\nMemo\nCopy of a memo from Colson for \"The File\"\nRE: campaign suggestions from Harris. 4 pgs.\nMonday, September 13, 2010\nPage 1 of 1\n[Item N-1]\nApril 17, 1972\nMEMORANDUM TO: CHARLES COLSON\nFROM:\nPAT BUCHANAN\nHarris made some interesting points when you spoke with\nhim. The primary one with which I agree fully is that the\nPresident at all costs should avoid \"stridency\" and crass\npartisanship, and any manner of attack upon his opposition\nwhich is seen as inconsistent with his position as leader of\nall the people. As for the bland campaign, too early to call\nthat one. There may be an issue on which the President can\nwin, by elevating it in the public focus, as he did in November\n1969. And should we appear bland and unemotional -- while\nthe Democratic Party has whipped up an emotional anti-\nestablishment campaign -- we could be writing our own death.\nThe stridency point should be kept before us at all times --\nbut to lock in to a bland campaign now would be unwise -- there\nare issues which transcend party, on which we are on the\nmajority side -- and heating up these issues, could turn to our\nadvantage.\nA final note -- I would not trust Harris so far as one could\nthrow him. He has long been in Teddy White's phrase, a\n\"Kennedy fanatic, 11 and I would not be surprised if Kennedy were\nnot getting cargonas of what he sends to you.\nBuchanan\n[Item N.2]\n.NDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nEYES ONLY\nApril 3, 1972\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE\nSUBJECT: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris\nHarris believes that the President needs, between now\nand the election, to continually create \"straw men\". Meany\naffords us the best opportunity, but we've got to work at creating\nothers -- deliberate enemies. The President is against those who\nplunged us into Vietnam but now want to sell out America's honor.\nThe President is against those retailers who over-charge consumers.\nThe middle man example in the food price issue is a perfect illustra-\ntion. If there isn't a natural villain, create one so that the President\ncan be the defender of the public interest against natural enemies.\nHarris believes that the President should be forceful but not\nstrident; that whenever he is strident, the President brings out the\nhostility of a latent anti-Nixon feeling which still exists with a large\nbody of people, but that when he is deliberate, quiet, rational, forceful,\nhe does not engender this latent hostility.\n2.\nHarris believes that we should downplay the campaign through-\nif\nout the year, make it as boring as possible. Harris believes that a\nbland campaign will help us in that we will benefit greatly from a low\nturnout. Also, people react better to the President if he does not\npolarize on gut issues. This does not mean that we should not address\nthe issues; we should defuse as many as possible, but not arouse the\npassions of the electorate with a very divisive issue that might bring\nout our opponents (as with anti-labor legislation, for example).\nHarris believes the key to our success is in avoiding having the\nAmerican electorate act emotionally or precipitously with respect to the\nPresident's candidacy. He points out that as his pollsters question people,\nthey get a better response after the questioning than at the outset. More\npeople favor the President's re-election after they have been walked\nthrough the issues than when they are first confronted with the question\ncold, \"Do you favor the President as against Candidate X?\"\nOne of the President's strong points is that people think he is\ntrying hard. He is beginning to develop a characteristic of sincerity,\nthat he is really working at solving the problems. Harris advises that\nwe should articulate everything we do rationally, calmly, quietly, and\nforcefully. Make people think, make people thoughtful. Do not provoke\ninstant emotional reactions. The President's style has come through very\n3.\nwell as being deliberate. We should not let him go swinging or\noverreacting. If our opponent becomes strident, we should take it\nin stride. The more irresponsible the opposition becomes, the\nmore the President is helped in being looked at as a solid, steady,\nstrong and deliberate statesman. Be the \"solid brick in the middle\"\nHarris suggests. Ask people to think of the issues seriously.\nIn this same vein, we should turn the lack of so-called charisma\ninto an asset, arguing that no one has the right to use the office of\nPresidency for the development of a personality cult, that personal\npromotion is not the measure of one's success as President. One\ncannot run the country through charm, rather through ability. Nixon's\nstyle is to be serious and dedicated, that that is more important than\npersonal image.\nHarris believes that Nixon's image is now being sharpened\nas a rational, thoughtful, deliberate leader, all of which can be\ndestroyed if there is a spontaneous reaction or a sharp galvanizing of\nthe opposition in the months ahead. Harris believes that if people\nare asked calmly and quietly to think through the choice for President,\nthat the President cannot be beaten by any of the present Democratic\nPresidential candidates. If on the other hand, the election turns into\n4.\na heated, highly controversial, emotionally charged campaign,\nwe will simply bring out enough anti votes to defeat us; there are just\nmore of them than us and if we galvanize them, we (not the Democratic\ncandidates) can beat ourselves. The key at the moment is to maintain\nthe tone that we have presently achieved and to hold it throughout the\nelection year.\nWR\nCharles W. Colson"
}