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From Buchanan to RN RE: an analysis of McGovern's campaign image. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the effective use of the Vice President as a campaign tool. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
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From Buchanan to RN RE: an analysis of McGovern's campaign image. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the effective use of the Vice President as a campaign tool. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
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1
37
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: an analysis of
McGovern's campaign image. 6 pgs.
1
37
7/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the effective use
of the Vice President as a campaign tool. 4
pgs.
Monday, September 27, 2010
Page 1 of 1
(Item
THE WHITE HOUSE
file sht
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
Observations from a study of the McGovern primary ads, TV,
radio and press -- and the interesting McGovern biography.
Points worth noting:
1.
Despite the ideological liberalism of Mr. McGovern, there
is a clear conservative thrust to many of his issues ads --
particularly those for "cleaning up the welfare mess, 11 and
relieving the property tax burden on the average citizen. The
McGovern proposals to increase the welfare payments and rolls,
and the manifest inconsistency in proposing $150 billion in new
spending -- while appearing to be for a reduction in and
redistribution of the tax burden is not present in these ads.
Further, late in the parimaries, his new "hard-line" on Israel
was a major topic of his advertising. Could find nothing in the
way of elitist, new left ad themes in McGovern's primary
campaign. Amnesty, abortion, pot, soak-the-rich, slash
defense, $1000 a person were clearly not major themes. There
are, however, several old-liberal approaches which he has
pushed in his advertising. There include:
a)
Social Security benefits beginning at 62 years of age --
a straight shot appeal to old folks, along traditional
liberal Democratic lines.
b)
An interesting emphasis on "occupational health and
safety. 11 For example, a number of TV spots focusing
on how workers were losing life and limb in unsafe
plants, and this was a serious problem. Imagine
this approach to be one with great appeal where McGovern
is weak among production workers.
-2-
c)
Medical care for everyone. This is one of the positive
"liberal" programs, which McGovern emphasized in the
primaries. Again, it is traditional Scammon-Wattenburg
economic liberalism. Again, there is hardly a trace of
what one might call social liberalism, or "radical chic"
politics in the McGovern advertising campaign. And
clearly, our people should never cease making reference
to his "elitist" "radical chic" positions -- and focus on
them, rather than leaving the debate to resolve around
his mor e traditional "liberal" approaches.
OTHER APPROACHES
THE KENNEDYS -- Mr. McGovern is clearly running on
the coattails of two dead men, John and Robert Kennedy; his
documentary is almost a Kennedy Documentary; his TV and radio
spots make extensive use of the Kennedy endorsements of
George McGovern as the "most decent man in the Senate. 11 We
can expect much of this in the fall.
PERSONALITY -- McGovern's campaign consistently contrasts
Mr. McGovern as an honest, open, straight-forward, candid,
consistent candidate -- with Mr. Nixon's Administration, which is
portrayed as deceitful, closed, secretive, distrustful. This is
clearly in the McGovern campaign judgment a winner for them --
and a loser for us. They focus upon the "personality" of the two
candidates and the two campaigns, as much as upon any two issues.
The need for us, again, in my judgment, is to move early to get
out the record of both that McGovern waffles on positions, that
McGovern compromises on principles, McGovern's nasty and
vindictive attacks upon the President, and his political adversaries.
The press, which nails Mr. Agnew to the mast for his rugged
rhetoric has allowed Mr. McGovern to get away with some of
the more incredible statements in American politics. We have
Mr. McGovern's cruel and nasty statements recorded, but these,
along with his waffles and back-downs, have to be moved into
the public record. As with Mr. Muskie, one of our problems is to
diminist this idea that, whether you agree or disagree with
McGovern, you "know where he stands, " and you know he can be
trusted.
-3-
Other attributes the McGovern camp is playing up are such
as "warmth, humanity, sympathy, compassion, 11 and they are
attempting to contrast them with a cold-blooded, super-efficient,
rather heartless White House and President. Such as RN's visit
to the flood-stricken areas of the country is most helpful as an
antidote to this kind of approach. We could do mar e of the last.
Also, an openness, and a new accessibility to the press and public
on the part of the President might, in my view, be most helpful
in working against this "inaccessible" allegation that is part of the
McGovern mode.
ISRAEL -- McGovern's extraordinary sensitivity on this
issue is manifest in the 180-degree turnabout on the issue, and the
astonishing hawkishness in his latest ads. He is vulnerable here;
and the lesson is obvious that we ought to continue to focus upon
his opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, to measures to promote
Israeli security, etc. He is most vulnerable here; and aware of it.
POPULISM -- While "Professor McGovern" is a true
representative of the "radical chic" in American politics of the
"elite" of American liberalism, he has run in past Senate campaigns
and is running as an anti-Establishment candidate, the representative
of the "outs" against the "ins" the fighter agains the "interests"
for the common man who bears too much of the burden, while powerful
corporations and institutions get off without paying their fair share.
The clear need is, as stated in previous memos, to portray McGovern
as a Candidate of the Elite, "Professor McGovern, 11 the lead of
the party of the PhDs. and limousine liberals, whose elitist
shock troops took the party of the people, the "noise-makers"
and the "exotic" the tiny minority who are imposing an asinine
social policy of bussing on a country, eighty-five percent of whose
people do not want bussing.
Thereare few larger imperatives in our campaign than to move
McGovern into the position of the Establishment Candidate -- running
against "Old Meat Loaf and Cottage Cheese," the candidate of
Middle America. Crucial to our success this fall is to put McGovern
in the bag with the "radical chic" and this message it seems to me,
has to be impressed upon our speakers. If we allow him to be
perceived as his ads, and pervious campaigns portray him, we could
have a serious problem.
-4-
Again, our people should not concede the war is immoral, should
not concede that McGovern was right but we are right too, and
we are trying to end it as best we can. We should challenge him
on this issue, on many grounds. We should confront his claim
not co-opt it, by saying something like, "Well, we are against
the war, too, and we are trying to do our best to end it. 11
McGovern should be conceded nothing on Vietnam. He is a back-
stabber who would go "begging" to Hanoi -- and abandon our
prisoners to the enemy, without any guarantee we would ever get
them back. We should view his positions, not with disagreement,
but with contempt. That is my view.
THE STRENGTH & WEAKNESS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN THE MAN
From reading McGovern, most interesting and sympathetic biography,
and observing the man, the following becomes clear. McGovern's
great strength and great weakenss lies in his personality; he is a
minister in his own right and a minister's son; he is a True Believer,
his is the "Passionate State of Mind, " he sees issues in moral
terms, not simply mistaken and wise, but evil versus good. At the
same time he is extraordinarily abmitious -- unlike Goldwater,
Frankly, he bears striking similarities to our present Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Romney. Thus it is that
McGovern can both shift positions and express a righteous faith
in his new position to match his faith and fanaticism in expressing
his old.
VIETNAM -- McGovern's approach is that he is the one
man in the country, who has been "right from the start, 11 about this
miserable, horrible war. This should be confronted, not ignored,
and surely, not conceded by our people. These are three basic
approaches, some of them not complimentary, if not consistent:
a)
McGovern has been a waffler on the war; he voted for the
Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, against its repeal in 1966, for appropriations
for the conflict throughout the early and mid-sixties, and only voted
to get out -- after a Republican had come in to clean up the mess
McGovern's Presidential choices (JFK, LBJ, HHH) had made of
the situation. His bitter attacks on RN thus come not from principle
but from the effort to pick up partisan dividents from under-cutting
an American President trying to get us out of a war into which he
voted us.
-5-
b)
McGovern has repeatedly made predictions as to what the
enemy would do if we made concessions -- and every single
McGovern promise and prediction has been wrong. Nobody had
a worse record on Vietnam in terms of understanding the enemy
than McGovern.
c)
McGovern's attacks on the President who is now honorably
ending American involvement in this war are not something to be
proud of -- they rank among the most shameful episodes in
American history. While President Nixon sought courageously
to extricate America from this conflict -- with his two objectives,
American honor intact, and our commitment not defaulted
McGovern badgered and sabotaged this courageous effort every step
of the way.
Thus, it is that McGovern can compare RN with Hitler and his bombing
policy with extermination of the Jews and still believe in his
own mind that Mr. Agnew is a "demagogue" who says horrible
things. McGovern's self-righteousness can be a great strength -
he has a preacher's appeal; against us his is the appeal of a man
who believes deeply in a "faith" against the man who is the
quintessence of the pragmatist.
His weakness is, again, the weakness of Romney -- he is not
unlikely when pressed to state and re-state his convictions about
RN being like Hitler, when pressed on the question, rather than
backing off. In a pressure situation, he will fall upon the "Gospel"
of the left, rather than frame some non-committal neutral response.
Very probably, he will be more sensitive, more likely to move to
outrage, with the suggestion that he is a waffler, a hypocrite, than
that he is a radical. Indeed, his campaigns have shown that he is
extremely effective in combating the charge that he is a "radical";
he has been at his most effective agains the straight-on smear
attack and his worst defeat to Karl Mundt came when hi S
zealotry and hatred of Karl Mundt got the better of him so that he
was making incredible charges.
This analysis of McGovern's character reinforces my belief that
our best attack against him is not the heavy-handed direct charge
that he is a radical and extremist, not a shouting denunciatory
approach but repeatedly elevating his wild positions, his
slanderous statements about the President, and suggesting and
pointing to his radicalism and extremism without raging against it.
-6-
Keep this positions and statements in front of the public, but a
posture of humor, of incredulity about the wildness of his
positions, of indignation and outrage at the character of his
slanders of the President and other decent good men will, in my
view, be fare more effective than for us to think up another new
way to call McGovern a wild jackass every morning. What
McGovern the radical has going for him is something also which
Jim Buckley had going for him -- when you look at the guy on the
tube and listen to him, it is hard to accept him as a radical. We
have the media which will be helping him clean up his past for
this election; and our job is to consistently, and insistently get
that past on the public record -- and make McGovern defend or
talk about that record and hopefully, hysterically denounce us as
SOBs, which his sense of moral worth and righteousness is fully
capable of leading him to do.
WAR HERO -- Look for Guggenheim, his documentary man,
and his ad campaign, and his statements to appeal to his lost
constituency by focusing heavily upon his war record as a bomber
pilot; and one will find, I would think, that the national media, will
help out with regular reminders that George McGovern was a
medal-winning bomber pilot in the war against Nazi German, and
thus can hardly be considered a wooly-headed peacenik. McGovern
has expressed consternation that the press was constantly referring
to "War Hero McCloskey" and not to "War Hero McGovern. 11 Their
documentary also focuses heavily on his war record.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (As Requested)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: The Vice President and the Campaign
Because the Vice President remains, outside RN, the biggest gun
we have, the Veep should be staffed up -- at least on the level of
the 1970 campaign. Full plane, and gear and constant contact and
communication with the White House and Re-Election Committee.
1. He will have to visit those states the President cannot visit,
as of course the first responsibility.
2. However, as often as possible, the Vice President should be
scheduled into those areas and among those groups that are the
battleground in 1972. And that is not Republicans. We, by and
large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic,
urban, Jewish, middle-income, working class Democrats who are the
swing votes, the ones who will decide by how large a margin we will
win this one, if we do win it.
Therefore, schedulers should look to Pulaski Day Parades, Columbus
Day Parades (What about a WH function, along the lines of the
St. Pat's Party), union halls, Knights of Columbus, Queens, PBA,
and ethnic community meetings.
This is vital, in my judgment -- and we should schedule Dole and
MacGregor into the GOP functions, using the Veep for those areas
where he can do us the most good -- among the Wallace Democrats
in the North, in places like Michigan and elsewhere.
3. The Vice President should have a set-piece speech, as the
President had, and instead of an entire new text every day -- as in
1970 we should have a new "Ten Graphs" in each speech. This
is one hell of a lot easier on speech writers, and gives us greater
control of the material that the press runs.
-2-
4.
The Vice President should carry the fight to the opposition
ticket, by and large ignoring Eagleton -- and zeroing in on McGovern.
The Veep has the Assault Book. What is needed now more than
anything is co-ordination of the attack strategy so that we don't pee
away everything in the first weeks, and so that our strategies can
be co-ordinated.
5.
Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice
President and the national and local press; this might well require
a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Veep's staff toward
the traveling press. (We had good relations we thought, by and
large, in the 1970 election.) Certainly, the Vice President should
do something for the locals at each stop. And we ought, of course,
to shelve for the campaign the broad anti-media attacks; unless
a) it proves politically necessary in light of their shafting. We have
the political dividends out of this -- our target is McGovern.
6.
Contact on a regular basis between the President and the Vice
President would be especially helpful -- not simply for morale purposes,
but to review the success of failure of a given strategy and to maintain
campaign flexibility.
7.
We should, on the campaign trail, avoid I think, the epithet
and make our charges based strictly on the record. So that
McGovern is forced to respond to what he himself said -- not to what
we called him. However, the extremism of the McGovern positions
and statements, and the "elitism" of the New Left controllers of the
Democratic Party remains an effective theme appealing to Democrats.
8.
We should remember that the swing voters in this election are
Democrats -- and strictly Republican appeals this fall are only useful
for rallying the troops, nothing more. The "McGovernites" is right
on the mark.
9.
The situation of 1970 where the President's people were on
board the Veep's plane- at the Veep's invitation -- was a good one.
Since the President is not going to be stumping, his top writing talent,
or much of it, should be withthe Vice President.
10.
I recognize the need to defend the President and his Administration,
but what the press considers "news" is usually negative news, i. e.,
an "attack" rather than a defense. And we must not allow McGovern
to swing over onto the offensive i. e., I would argue that the Vice
President should be carrying the struggle to their ticket, rather than
waiting for them to attack, and defending the President.
-3-
In my view, whereas in 1968 it was relatively easy to scare the
voters, with attacks on RN's economics and position on medicare,
etc. that tactic on the part of the other side won't work today.
Whether they agree with RN or not, very few Americans are
"frightened" by the prospect of another RN term. The same cannot
be said of McGovern; and this is the factor which opens up the
possibility of a landslide. Thus, a campaign which continually raises
specters about McGovern's extremism, and the crazyness of his
ideas, is the only kind of campaign I think that can win us a major
landslide. A defensive strategy, thus, does not commend itself to
me -- especially for our biggest gun outside of the President. We
ought to have other views on this.
11.
We have to be wary of making George a Martyr. Mean-spiritedness
has no place in this campaing; thus, it is important that the campaign
staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up. The humor
used should be light and needling not mean in character.
Again, on this score, though unfair, it is true that we have a smaller
margin for error than the Democrats. The Veep can call McGovern a
"fraud" and be excoriated for it McGovern can compare RN to Hitler
and his policy in Vietnam to the "extermination of the Jews" and get
away with it, without comment. Without tearing into our friends in the
media, we have got to keep pointing this up.
12.
Vitally important that we not allow a situation to develop, as
in 1960 with RN or 1968 with the Veep, when the candiate and his
traveling press were at sword's point. Even if the press is shafting
us, it is not to our advantage to conduct a Cold War with them when
they are reporting what we say and do. In the fall, on the Vice
President's plane, there should be some who will bring that "can of oil"
when necessary, and will, in a good cause, eat a little crow and
humble pie.
13.
Essential that the Vice President, this fall, feel that he has
the full confidence and support of the President, and regular backing.
My view is that in 1968, when the Vice President was under attack,
we would have done better by bringing him on to answer the charges
against him. In 1972, we can be sure that the Vice President will be
an issue the answer to this is to put him on the air, on national
television, and to let him in his own calm way, with his own accents,
answer the allegations that will be made against him. To show he does
not have horns. We might even consider a visit to some campus -- or
a youth confrontation on the tube for the campaign. As in 1952, a
-4-
harsh and strident and unfair attack on a Vice President can be made
to back-fire against its perpetrators.
Considering that one of the advantages of McGovern is that he may
be perceived as the underdog, the anti-Establishment candidate, it
might be good to get the Vice President into this role, and come
fighting back fairly, against all these elements and institutions that
are out to get him.
14.
Lastly, the major appearance the Vice President -- the major
national impression -- will come from his acceptance speech. This
speech can do a tremendous job for him, and for us, in laying out the
record of the Democratic ticket, in appealing to those Democrats who
have bolted, and in leaving an impression of the Vice President before
the country.
PJB would like to help put some of this together for the Vice President,
and if the President suggested that, would be most helpful.
15.
Recognizing that there are many within the White House and
the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word
should go forth that this is a "team" effort, there should be no
"background" knocking the Number Two man, who will be shouldering
as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign.
Nothing is more embittering than to pull off the wire some holier-than-
thou statement from a fellow Republican, when- in the interests of the
Administration -- we are throwing Goodell to the sharks. Even a
word from RN to all involved that this is a team effort; that no good
is served us or the Party by background back-stabbing, and that this
is an all-for-one, one-for-all operation, would be beneficial in the
campaign, I would think -- from the 1970 experience.
Buchanan