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This file contains:
From Bull, via Chapin, to Haldeman RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/14/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: turning the 1972 Republican National Convention into a meaningful media event that will grab the attention of American voters. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: the effective organization of big-name celebrities behind RN in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten note added by Chapin. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/8/1971
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26144283
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WHSF: Contested, 1-45
description
This file contains:
From Bull, via Chapin, to Haldeman RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/14/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: turning the 1972 Republican National Convention into a meaningful media event that will grab the attention of American voters. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1971
From Bull to Chapin RE: the effective organization of big-name celebrities behind RN in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten note added by Chapin. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/8/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Document Description
1
45
9/16/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Bull, via Chapin, to Haldeman RE: the
role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and
the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers
program. 7 pgs.
1
45
9/14/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Bull to Chapin RE: the role of speakers
in the 1972 campaign and the establishment
of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs.
1
45
7/20/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Bull to Chapin RE: turning the 1972
Republican National Convention into a
meaningful media event that will grab the
attention of American voters. 3 pgs.
1
45
7/8/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Bull to Chapin RE: the effective
organization of big-name celebrities behind
RN in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten note
added by Chapin. 2 pgs.
Monday, September 20, 2010
Page 1 of 1
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By CONFIDENTIAL NARS, Date 1/14/80
September 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
FROM:
STEPHEN BULL
As
RE:
Scheduling of Senator Goldwater and
Other Surrogate Candidates
A memorandum dated September 2nd from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Chapin
directed the establishment of a procedure for working with Senator
Goldwater's schedule and assigning advance support to him. The imple-
mentation of such a program immediately introduces a much broader
subject with which we will have to deal in the very near future, namely,
the total program for surrogate candidates. In fact, since the September
2nd memorandum, Secretary Connally has been added to the list of those
who should be supported by an advanceman. Therefore, the subject of
this memorandum is intended to be:
1.
General discussion of the manner in which Administration speakers
(i.e., surrogates) are currently handled.
2.
What the various recommendations are from staff members as well
as officers at the Citizens Committee headquarters.
3.
A concensus recommendation for the establishment of a surrogate
program.
Present Speakers' Program
Currently all turndowns of invitations to the President that have any
significance or potential are referred to Pat O'Donnell in Chuck Colson's
office by Dave Parker. Pat O'Donnell subsequently evaluates the
invitation and considers an appropriate Administration spokesman to
fill the speaking engagement. The evaluation is done pretty much solely
by Pat and, according to him, his criteria include many elements such
as whether the event is in a key State, type of event, the media area, etc.
At this point Al Snyder and Van Shumway become involved, Al arranging
for appearances on TV shows in the area where the event is to be held, and
Van arranging for newspaper interviews with the Administration official.
- 2 -
The Administration spokesmen are limited to members of the White House
staff (approx. 8), OMB (approx. 3), members of the Cabinet (approx. 12),
members of the Sub-Cabinet (approx. 20), occasionally Senator Dole, and
occasionally some outsiders, e.g., Pat Moynihan.
Pat O'Donnell is the scheduler and head of the Speakers' Bureau program,
and reports to Dick Howard and Chuck Colson. The Speakers' Bureau
program is now running fairly effectively, but the job of making use of
Administration spokesmen, even now during this "non-political" and
relatively inactive time, can and should be done better. When we get into
the campaign situation which is rapidly approaching, the amount of activity
will be multiplied manyfold.
Currently I discern a lack of overall strategy to the manner in which the
speakers' program is operated, particularly as it relates to campaign
strategy. Specifically, there is no guiding philosophy that seems to dictate
who should go where and why except for where the President is concerned.
There are certain guidelines that have been laid out such as designating
Sec. Volpe as the Administration spokesman to address labor groups, but
there does not yet seem to be an understanding of the overall strategy that
would place Administration spokesmen in regional areas where they could
do the most good for the President politically.
Possible Approaches to a Surrogate Program
In 1968 John Whitaker, who scheduled Candidate Nixon, also scheduled
the surrogates. An individual was assigned the task of actually running
the surrogate candidates, and second and third string advancemen were
used to serve these surrogates. In 1970 Nick Ruwe operated the surrogate
program which was less complex than that of 1968 and depended more on
Administration spokesmen.
In a discussion of a surrogates program, John Whitaker laid forth the basic
philosophy that the principal objective should be to find an event for the
appropriate spokesman for an appropriate area, and let that event be the
vehicle to get him into the area. Once in the area, however, the event
becomes secondary to a more important operation which would be to give
the surrogate the widest exposure which can usually be obtained by getting
him on TV talk shows, special interviews with the newspapers, and all of
the things that we are supposedly doing now with our current speakers'
program.
- 3 -
John Dean has expressed to Colson and others that the campaign be kept
out of the White House and that only the President and Vice President be
scheduled politically from here. He has even suggested the possibility
that the First Family be scheduled out of 1701. This plan would go into
effect after the official kickoff of the campaign, presumably after the
first of the year, or maybe as late as August.
Chuck Colson recommends that for a period of time, possibly up to the
Convention, we continue to handle through the Speakers' Bureau all
Administration representatives they currently handle for all official,
non-political events. In order to avoid placing campaign or political
activities in the White House, a parallel operation should be established
at 1701 to handle all political activities, including fund-raisers. A rep-
resentative, to be determined, from 1701, would work directly with Pat
O'Donnell to coordinate political and non-political events. This would
provide the capability for including a political event in conjunction with
the Administration spokesman's attendance at the official non-political
event. 1701 would be directly responsible for the scheduling and handling
of all Administration spokesmen for political events, as well as all non-
Administration spokesmen specifically designated as surrogates, including
Senator Goldwater and other Congressional spokesmen, Governors, and
selected outside speakers such as Mrs. Mitchell. Jeb Magruder has put
forth this recommendation, and concurs with the above.
On July 28 Jeb Magruder submitted a memorandum from Don Rumsfeld
and a task force which studied surrogates, to the Attorney General, a copy
of which was submitted to Mr. Haldeman, setting forth a preliminary
recommendation for "SPOKESMEN RESOURCES", which is, in effect,
the 1972 surrogate program. The recommendations in that memorandum
are summarized as follows:
1.
Cabinet, selected agency heads and White House staff members
be scheduled in the Colson/O'Donnell operation for the remainder
of 1971.
2.
The President and Vice President continue to be handled separately.
3.
Magruder will designate a staff man to operate Spokesmen Resources
from 1701. He will coordinate his activities with the Speakers'
Bureau.
- 4 -
4.
RNC handle Congressmen until the end of 1971.
Note:
Subsequent verbal modification from Jeb would give
the RNC the routine Congressmen. The designated
surrogates would be handled through 1701.
Recommendation for a Surrogate Program
This is where I may be overstepping my bounds and getting myself into
trouble, but it appears to me that the overall campaign strategy is still
obscure to the operatives, i.e., the Howards, the Porters and the O'Donnells
who have been charged with the responsibility for implementing some of the
specific tactics for campaign '72. A surrogate program should be one of
the major tactics directly related to the overall strategy. By the end of 1971
the President will probably have visited all 50 States and, from what little
I have learned about what will be the President's posture during the campaign,
there will be emphasis on major TV appearances, much less personal cam-
paigning than in 1968, and much of the campaign period will be spent being
the President as opposed to being the candidate. This means that the personal
appearances will be through the surrogates in the key States.
Considerations for Surrogate Program
1.
"Key States" is a fluid entity that will probably be readjusted as
the campaign develops. For planning purposes in the formulation
of the surrogate program, those States, and perhaps specific areas
within the somewhat larger States, need to be specified to those who
will operate the program. The Magruder memo to the Attorney
General lists 21 States as "key States". This figure includes
primary States. I have also heard other figures. One of the
questions is --where should be the area of emphasis.
2.
The aforementioned memorandum provides a listing of potential
surrogates, utilizing four categories: "Cabinet", "White House
Staff", "Agency Heads", "Others". There is no category for
Congressmen or Governors. The list that is submitted will
undoubtedly be modified and is probably intended as a first draft.
Jeb Magruder advises verbally that a tentative list of Governors
and Congressmen is currently being prepared. At some point in
the near future, however, we need to get a firm list of Governors
and Congressmen who can fill the role of surrogate for the President.
- 5 -
3.
Scheduling - there appear to be two major types of scheduling
for surrogates:
(a)
Opportunity Scheduling - an event for which a specific
man is appropriate for a specific function (e.g.,
Senator Goldwater to the YAF Convention).
(b)
Creative Scheduling - finding an event that acts as a
vehicle to get the proper spokesman into the right area
so that he, with the support of the Snyders, Shumways,
and the advance operation, can maximize his exposure
through the regional media as well as our established
techniques of promotion and communication.
4.
That individual or group responsible for scheduling the surrogate
must be fully familiar with the overall strategy, the points of
strength and weakness in the various areas, and the availability
of the surrogate SO that maximum benefit from the event of the
surrogate visit can be realized.
5.
Right now the talent and resources are in the White House and
1701 is incapable of providing the necessary support to operate
a full-fledged surrogate program.
Specific Recommendations for Surrogate Program
A meeting was held in Dwight Chapin's office on Tuesday, September 14,
which was attended by Messrs. Chapin, Colson, Magruder, Strachan and
Bull. Following are recommendations for a surrogate program resulting
from that meeting:
1971
1.
Between now and mid 1972, Chuck Colson continue to operate the
Administration spokesmen for official, non-political events,
through the existing Speakers' Bureau program.
Approve
Disapprove
- 6 -
2.
Senator Goldwater, other Congressional spokesmen designated
as surrogates, selected Governors, and all Administration
spokesmen participating in strictly political events will be
scheduled, coordinated, and handled through 1701. 1701 would
be responsible for providing full support for these political
activities, including arrangements for TV appearances, news-
paper interviews, and essentially the same support that the
Speakers' Bureau provides Administration spokesmen for
official functions.
Approve
Disapprove
3.
Coordination between activities of the Speakers' Bureau for
official functions and 1701 for political functions will be ac-
complished through Pat O'Donnell, and the 1701 representative,
who will work together in this effort.
Approve
Disapprove
4.
Ron Walker has a sizeable list of advancemen, some of whom
are untested, others who are not ready to be lead advancemen.
Ron would make these advancemen available to the Speakers'
Bureau and 1701 for their respective activities. This would
provide training for the new advancemen and better results on
the road for the spokesmen.
Approve
Disapprove
5.
Progress reports and evaluations of appearances by political
surrogates would be submitted by Jeb Magruder to the Attorney
General and Mr. Haldeman upon request.
Approve
Disapprove
- 7 -
1972
1.
The Speakers' Bureau will continue to schedule and operate the
official spokesmen for official non-political functions up through
the Convention and perhaps even afterwards. 1701 will develop
its political surrogate program, staffing up appropriately and
commensurate to the development of the campaign.
Approve
Disapprove
2.
The decision on who schedules and advances Mrs. Nixon and
the First Family will be made as the Convention approaches.
Approve
Disapprove
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
NARS
Date
GONI DENTIAL
1/17/80
September 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
FROM:
STEPHEN BULL it
RE:
Scheduling of Senator Goldwater and
Other Surrogate Candidates
A memorandum dated September 2nd from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Chapin
directed the establishment of a procedure for working with Senator
Goldwater's schedule and assigning advance support to him. The imple-
mentation of such a program immediately introduces a much broader
subject with which we will have to deal in the very near future, namely,
the total program for surrogate candidates. In fact, since the September
2nd memorandum, Secretary Connally has been added to the list of those
who should be supported by an advanceman. Therefore, the subject of
this memorandum is intended to be:
1.
General discussion of the manner in which Administration speakers
(i.e., surrogates) are currently handled.
2.
What the various recommendations are from staff members as well
as officers at the Citizens Committee headquarters.
3.
A concensus recommendation for the establishment of a surrogate
program.
By way of a personal disclaimer, I am setting forth some observations
that may be rather naive since I have approached this subject rather
superficially because of the lack of information readily available as well
as the time requirement for this report, and have attempted to proceed
without stirring up too much confusion by my inquiries. The lack of hard
information available, I believe, is the result of the necessity for secrecy
at this point. I assume that many of the questions and approaches have been
thoroughly discussed and probably many of the elements already resolved
in personal discussions between Mr. Haldeman, the Attorney General and
the President. However, the decisions have not been reduced or otherwise
transcribed to written form, and those with whom I discussed the subject
of the surrogate program either were not aware of these decisions or the
information had not filtered down to them.
- 2 -
Present Speakers' Program
Currently all turndowns of invitations to the President that have any
significance or potential are referred to Pat O'Donnell in Chuck Colson's
office by Dave Parker. Pat O'Donnell subsequently evaluates the
invitation and considers an appropriate Administration spokesman to
fill the speaking engagement. The evaluation is done pretty much solely
by Pat and, according to him, his criteria include many elements such
as whether the event is in a key State, type of event, the media area, etc.
At this point Al Snyder and Van Shumway become involved, Al arranging
for appearances on TV shows in the area where the event is to be held, and
Van arranging for newspaper interviews with the Administration official.
The Administration spokesmen are limited to members of the White House
staff (approx. 8), OMB (approx. 3), members of the Cabinet (approx. 12),
members of the Sub-Cabinet (approx. 20), occasionally Senator Dole, and
occasionally some outsiders, e.g., Pat Moynihan.
Although Pat O'Donnell is the scheduler and titular head of the speakers'
program, Dick Howard is the supervisor and, according to all sources,
is the true backbone of the operation. Without getting into an evaluation
of personalities and individual abilities, the job of making effective use
of Administration spokesmen, even now during this "non-political" and
relatively inactive time, can and should be done better. When we get into
the campaign situation which is rapidly approaching, the amount of activity
will be multiplied manyfold.
Currently I discern a lack of overall strategy to the manner in which the
speakers' program is operated. Specifically, there is no guiding philosophy
that seems to dictate who should go where and why except for where the
President is concerned. This conclusion was arrived at quite simply; when
asked what the guiding philosophy was, no one could give me one.
Possible Approaches to a Surrogate Program
In 1968 John Whitaker, who scheduled Candidate Nixon, also scheduled
the surrogates. An individual was assigned the task of actually running
the surrogate candidates, and second and third string advancemen were
used to serve these surrogates. In 1970 Nick Ruwe operated the
surrogate program which was less complex than that of 1968 and
depended more on Administration spokesmen.
- 3 -
In a discussion of a surrogates program, John Whitaker laid forth
the basic philosophy that the principal objective should be to find an
event for the appropriate spokesman for an appropriate area, and
let that event be the vehicle to get him into the area. Once in the area,
however, the event becomes secondary to a more important operation
which would be to give the surrogate the widest exposure which can
usually be obtained by getting him on TV talk shows, special interviews
with the newspapers, and all of the things that we are supposedly doing
now with our current speakers' program.
In a memorandum I received from Dwight Chapin on September 13, the
comment was made that "everyone is trying to stake out his claim to
handle the scheduling operation of surrogates and Cabinet members over
the next few months". This may be one of the better understatements.
Additionally, there seems to be a bit of wrestling over where the
surrogates program will be run.
John Dean has expressed to Colson and others that the campaign be kept
out of the White House and that only the President and Vice President be
scheduled politically from here. He has even suggested the possibility
that the First Family be scheduled out of 1701. This plan would go into
effect after the official kickoff of the campaign, presumably after the
first of the year. Colson recommends that for a period of time, possibly
January 1, 1972, we continue operating the speakers' program as we have
through O'Donnell and that setup, but that any Congressional spokesmen
such as Goldwater and others that we will undoubtedly pick up between
now and January, be scheduled and operate from 1701. Colson's feeling
is that the White House is put in an awkward, if not untenable, position
by making specific engagements for members of Congress, particularly
during this non-political year of 1971. As a commentary to this point,
however, Dick Howard notes that the RNC, which normally schedules
Congressmen, is a bit jealous of its prerogative in this area and might
not take kindly to it.
- 4 -
On July 28 Jeb Magruder submitted a memorandum for the Attorney
General, copy of which was submitted to Mr. Haldeman, setting forth
a preliminary recommendation for "SPOKESMEN RESOURCES", which
is, in effect, the 1972 surrogate program. The recommendations in
this memorandum are summarized as follows:
1.
Cabinet, selected agency heads and White House staff members
be scheduled in the Colson/O'Donnell operation for the remainder
of 1971.
2.
The President and Vice President continue to be handled separately.
3.
Colson hire a new staff man to train with O'Donnell and then move
over to 1701 in 1972 and operate Spokesmen Resources from there.
4.
RNC handle Congressmen until the end of 1971.
There are many other minor elements in that memorandum, none of
which seem to be of particular consequence to the development of a
well-defined, coordinated surrogate program.
Recommendation for a Surrogate Program
This is where I may be overstepping my bounds and getting myself into
trouble, but it appears to me that the overall campaign strategy is still
obscure to the operatives, i.e., the Magruders, the Howards, the Porters
and the O'Donnells who have been charged with the responsibility for
planning some of the specific tactics for campaign '72. A surrogate program
should be one of the major tactics directly related to the overall strategy.
By the end of 1971 the President will probably have visited all 50 States and,
from what little I have learned about what will be the President's posture
during the campaign, there will be emphasis on major TV appearances,
much less personal campaigning than in 1968, and much of the campaign
period will be spent being the President as opposed to being the candidate.
This means that the personal appearances will be through the surrogates
in the key States.
- 5 -
Considerations for Surrogate Program
1.
"Key States" is a fluid entity that will probably be readjusted as
the campaign develops. For planning purposes in the formulation
of the surrogate program, those States, and perhaps specific areas
within the somewhat larger States, need to be specified to those who
will operate the program. The Magruder memo to the Attorney
General lists 21 States as "key States". I have also heard the
figure 14. One of the questions is -where should be the area of
emphasis.
2.
The aforementioned memorandum provides a listing of potential
surrogates, utilizing four categories: "Cabinet", "White House
Staff", "Agency Heads", "Others". There is no category for
Congressmen or Governors, although I would assume that there
are still one or two Republican Governors left over who could
do us some good (e.g., isn't Rockefeller lobbying for Secretary
of Defense these days?). The list that is submitted, I presume,
will undoubtedly be modified and is probably intended as a first
draft. At some point in the near future, however, we need to get
a firm list of Governors and Congressmen who can fill the role of
surrogate for the President.
3.
Scheduling - there appear to be two major types of scheduling
for surrogates:
(a)
Opportunity Scheduling - an event for which a specific
man is appropriate for a specific function (e.g.,
Senator Goldwater to the YAF Convention).
(b)
Creative Scheduling - finding an event that acts as a
vehicle to get the proper spokesman into the right area
so that he, with the support of the Snyders, Shumways
and the advance operation, can maximize his exposure
through the regional media as well as our established
techniques of promotion and communication.
- 6 -
4.
That individual or group responsible for scheduling the surrogate
must be fully familiar with the overall strategy, the points of
strength and weakness in the various areas, and the availability
of the surrogate SO that maximum benefit from the event of the
surrogate visit can be realized.
5.
Right now the talent and resources are in the White House and
1701 is incapable of providing the necessary support to operate
a full fledged surrogate program.
Specific Recommendations for Surrogate Program
1971
1.
Between now and January 1, 1972, Chuck Colson operate the
surrogate program through its speakers' bureau program
(O'Donnell and Howard).
Approve
Disapprove
2.
Assuming that the campaign will require an increase in personnel
to administer such a program, additional people who will
ultimately serve in a supervisory role during the campaign
be hired now (but be paid by 1701 due to the wage-price freeze)
and work with those individuals administering the speakers'
program. The purpose would be to learn how to run a surrogate
program while beefing up our existing speakers' bureau.
Approve
Disapprove
3.
Senator Goldwater and other key primary surrogates such as
selected Governors and others outside of the Administration
would be scheduled and coordinated through the speakers' bureau
for the remainder of 1971. Those events appropriate for this
select group would be determined by the speakers' bureau operation,
but would be nominally set up through 1701 in order to maintain
the appearance of detachment between the political operation and the
White House. In actuality, however, coordination, supervision and
implementation would be effected through the speakers' bureau
operation. As a concession to the RNC, they could be called upon
for their assistance in schedule planning and responses to
correspondence and other relatively harmless activities.
Approve
Disapprove
- 7 -
4.
A full effort be made to coordinate with the key personnel at
1701 all of the activities that will be taking place at the White
House until 1972. This would include providing full information
on the Presidential activities.
Approve
Disapprove
5.
Ron Walker has a sizeable list of advancemen, some of whom
are untested, others who are not ready to be lead advancemen.
Ron would make these advancemen available to the speakers'
bureau now for support of not just Senator Goldwater and
Secretary Connally, but others as well. This would provide
training for the new advancemen and better results on the
road for the surrogates.
Approve
Disapprove
6.
Progress reports and evaluations of appearances would be
submitted by the administrator of the speakers' bureau
(Chuck Colson) to Mr. Haldeman directly.
Approve
Disapprove
1972
1.
Effective around the first of the year we admit that there is a
campaign going on, and that those support personnel in the White
House who have been administering speakers' programs be detached,
eleminated from the White House payroll, and transferred over to
1701 where they will operate the campaign. Those individuals who
had been training with O'Donnell and others administering the
speakers' program would move over to 1701 for the program
operation.
Approve
Disapprove
2.
That 1701 administer the scheduling and advance support of all
of the surrogate candidates with the exception of the President,
the Vice President, and Mrs. Nixon. The remainder of the family
would be scheduled through 1701.
Approve
Disapprove
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1971
4:45 p.m.
FOR:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
FROM:
STEPHEN BULL
PB
RE:
Random Thoughts on the RNC Convention
Provided that matters do not change drastically, the 1972 Convention
will be an exercise in confirmation rather than in nomination. This,
of course, could be altered by a real race for the Vice Presidential
nomination, but that could be a positive factor in that it might lend
color to an otherwise colorless event.
Concerning both of the 1972 Conventions, it is quite likely that the
Democratic Convention will be a lot more interesting than the
Republican since the Democrats will have a valid horse race going.
In the minds of most people, it is a foregone conclusion that Richard
Nixon will be the Republican nominee. Therefore, we must take a
different approach than the Democrats in order to make our effort
worthwhile. I am just speaking off the top of my head and do not have
before me the programs of the 1968 Conventions but, as I recall, there
are a number of aspects that are just downright boring. Elements that
come to mind that fall into this category include lengthy, dry key-note
speeches, lengthy reports from the Platform Committees, and reports
from the Accredidation Committees. Additionally, by the time that any
of the candidates receives his second or third seconding speech, I have
long gone to the refrigerator and turned the stereo up a few decibels.
In short, much of the traditional events of the political conventions just
turn people off, or cause people to turn the events off.
This need not be. The presentation of a platform committee report,
for example, could be an exciting thing. Instead of having some political
hack from the Mid West drone on and on in a monotone that it shall be
the policy of the Republican Committee to encourage, say, agricultural
development, think how much more exciting it would be to present this
idea graphically, e.g. a professionally produced film or video tape showing.
the verdant fields of corn, the State agricultural research facilities,
and clips of the President conversing with Dr. Borlaug in front of the
miracle wheat exhibit on Salute to Agriculture Day. A presentation on
the strides the Administration has made in the environment could be a
- 2 -
fantastic show with footage of the proverbial "purple mountains' majesty. 11
with occasional scenes of the President viewing Grand Canyon, or Yosemite
National Park. Such an approach would likely encourage the networks to
stay tuned in on this footage rather than breaking to the commentary as
they usually do during such periods.
Color, specifically rally-type activity, will be necessary and undoubtedly
we will engage in it rather extensively. But the "spontaneous" demonstra-
tions following the completion of the nominating speech for a candidate
will be a joke unless we put a new twist to it. The standard balloon drops,
balloon rises, and marches around the hall will be just old stuff and just
like the Democratic Convention. However, it is necessary, if for no other
reason, to generate as well as demonstrate enthusiasm for the candidate.
We should give some thought, however, to making the demonstrations
something more than a "whoopie session". Perhaps the signs and banners
should reflect accomplishments of the President's first four years in office
and that, rather than indiscriminate whooping and hollering and marching
around the convention hall, there be different segments that concentrate
on such things as the breakthrough in Southeast Asian relations, the
successful winding down of the Vietnam War. Again, with a little
originality, we can keep the TV cameras trained on what we want the
cameras to see. This is in contrast to the normal procedure of the
cameras carrying the first couple of minutes of the demonstration, and
then breaking to David Brinkley for a few sardonic comments, and then
a Gulf Oil commercial.
I see the 1972 Convention as an opportunity for President Nixon, and the
Republican Party, to set forth its philosophy on where we are and where
we are going. We are going to be dealing with a lot of free TV time,
and we can make this one of the greatest shows evers. The concept of
depicting where we are and where we are going parallels our approach
to the Bi-Centennial. On July 3rd the President declared the next five
years to be "the era of the Bi-Centennial". This concept demands a
review and appreciation of the 196 years of history that will have led up
to the 1972 Convention, and gives the President the greatest opportunity
to speak out on where we have been and the greatness that lies before
this country. The implicit message is that President Richard Nixon
will help us realize these goals. Perhaps the theme of the Republican
Convention in 1972 could tie in directly with the Bi-Centennial. Between
now and August of 1972 perhaps "the Spirit of '76" or the "era of the
Bi-Centennial" or some other slogan will be an appropriate one. We
can see what develops in the next year, but I would favor a close
association between those two events-the Bi-Centennial and the
Republican Convention- SO that we can get mileage out of the non-partisan
Bi-Centennial work that will be increasing from now on.
- 3 -
Even though the Convention will be centered in some large hall,
perhaps there can be participation by certain individuals from sites
other than the Convention Hall. For example, we might have a close-
circuit TV set up with Sec. Morton speaking from some park site that
he would be visiting in the northwest part of the country. Not only
would this inject a change of routine and additional color into the
Convention, but would highlight the Administration's efforts and
accomplishments in the development of parkland. Along the same lines,
Sec. Laird might be conveniently in Vietnam overseering the withdrawal
of the final contingent of American troops, and since he would not be able
to be in attendance at the Convention in person, we could conveniently
fly in some film footage of the Sec. of Defense reporting on the final
winddown of the war and extending his greetings to the assembled dele-
gates at the Convention site.
When it comes to the acceptance speech, I think that the President would
probably have to deliver his in person to the assembled delegates at
the Convention site, particularly if the Convention site is San Diego.
However, perhaps the Vice President's acceptance speech could be
delivered from a remote site utilizing closed-circuit TV. Along these
same lines, consideration might be given to having a nominating or
seconding speech given from a site other than the Convention center.
The logic behind going to remote locations would be to bring together
the various geographical locations rather than merely bringing human
representatives from as many geographical sections of the country as
possible. This also ties in to the extensive travel that the President
has done--hopefully, by 1972 he will have visited all 52 States.
Returning to the initial thought of this memo, I might summarize by
reiterating that our Convention is one of affirmation and confirmation,
which, in itself, does not provide a great deal of viewer interest.
However, since the TV time will be there we can get a great deal of
mileage out of this free TV time if we can plan a three-day program
that is exciting, relevant, and truly kicks off the campaign, not in
the "old politics" style of hoopla, but with imaginative and creative
flair which we are capable of providing. As usual, it would be necessary
to push aside some of the old party hacks who have "been doing it such
and such a way since Wendell Wilkie" .but then again we had to do this in
1968 so this will be nothing new.
MEMORANDUM
you.
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
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right
have
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By menwell NARS, Date 1/14/80 July 8, 1971
you
world
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
FROM:
Hem
or
and
STEPHEN BULL
SUBJECT:
Celebrities Program
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Working as an advanceman in 1968, I found that one of the greatest
problems is finding celebrities to appear at Nixon rallies.
Cy Laughter ran the celebrities program, but to the advancemen
Cy's program was known derisively as "has-beens for Nixon".
We have made some pretty good inroads in the last two years
in obtaining the favor and perhaps the cooperation of a number of
celebrities. I know that Henry Cashen theoretically has
cognizance over the area of entertainers and sports figures,
but I wonder just how much we are really doing. It seems to me
that now that we're starting to approach the campaign, we should
make an all out effort to cultivate the active cooperation of celebrities.
We've made a start with entertainers such as Glenn Campbell,
Vicki Carr, Johnny Cash and Pearl Bailey. Also, athletes such
as Carl Yastrzemski also may be of assistance to us later on.
Once we get into campaign '72, it will be such a terrific asset to
us, not just in drawing crowds, but in drawing votes, to have
respected big-name entertainers standing alongside the President.
The proper cultivation of these individuals is going to have to
include the President in one way or another. I would suggest that
Henry Cashen, in conjunction with the campaign organization and
other areas of the White House who are so involved, institute a
program that would include the following elements:
1. Determine now those individuals in the entertainment and sports
worlds who might be potential supporters of the President.
2. Of those who are selected, begin an immediate screening program
to eliminate those who will be of no value to us, either because of
ideological opposition or their lack of stature.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
CONFIDENTIAL princl MARIS, Date 1/14/802 2
3. Set forth a complete 12-month program of contact with the
White House. This would include:
a. Extension of an invitation to the individual and his or her
spouse to a White House function.
b. Inclusion in some sort of Presidential meeting (Open Door Hour,
drug conference with a large group, meeting with an ethnic
group, etc.)
c. Appointment to a Presidential Commission, e.g. Sammy
Davis, Jr. appointment to the Advisory Commission on OEO.
d. Continual contact and follow-up by Henry Cashen and
whoever else might conceivably have an excuse to contact
the individual.
It is very simple to say that these matters are being taken care of
by Henry, and although I don't wish to demean the job that he may
or may not be doing, I think that we can, and should, do a lot more.
People cast votes for some very illogical and irrational reasons and
I would certainly think that to a great many people, whether or not
Johnny Cash thinks that Richard Nixon is a good man will mean a
great deal more than whether President Nixon has been able to get
revenue sharing past the House of Representatives.