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This file contains:
From Haldeman to Colson RE: McGovern's position on defense. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Haldeman to Colson RE: Democratic and Republican Conventions of 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: celebrities. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: 1972 Republican Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
Strategy formulated for the Election of 1972 for RN. Author and recipient unknown. 6 pgs. Campaign [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: planning for the election. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1972
From Chaipn to Dick Moore RE: women and the Republican Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 2-42
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26144405
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WHSF: Contested, 2-42
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This file contains:
From Haldeman to Colson RE: McGovern's position on defense. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Haldeman to Colson RE: Democratic and Republican Conventions of 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: celebrities. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: 1972 Republican Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
Strategy formulated for the Election of 1972 for RN. Author and recipient unknown. 6 pgs. Campaign [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: planning for the election. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1972
From Chaipn to Dick Moore RE: women and the Republican Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
2
42
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Colson RE: McGovern's
position on defense. 1 pg.
2
42
6/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Colson RE: Democratic
and Republican Conventions of 1972. 1 pg.
2
42
6/28/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: celebrities. 2
pgs.
2
42
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: 1972
Republican Convention. 2 pgs.
Friday, March 05, 2010
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
2
42
Campaign
Other Document
Strategy formulated for the Election of 1972
for RN. Author and recipient unknown. 6
pgs.
2
42
Campaign
Other Document
Strategy formulated for the Election of 1972
for RN. Author and recipient unknown. 6
pgs.
2
42
6/9/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: planning for
the election. 2 pgs.
2
42
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chaipn to Dick Moore RE: women and
the Republican Convention. 1 pg.
Friday, March 05, 2010
Page 2 of 2
June 26, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. COLSON
FROM:
H.R. HALDEMAN
I am sure you noted in yesterday's Washington POST an article on McGovern in
which they called him a disciple of Dwight David Eisenhower - this related to
his position on defense expenditures.
We should have a rebuttal written to that particular article placed in next
Sunday's POST. Get a well-known personality to write the article (someone
like Maxwell Taylor or General Omar Bradley) who can refute the McGovern
assumptions.
We cannot let McGovern get away with drawing the analogy that his posture on
defense is the same as Eisenhower's.
CC: Mr. Buchanan
June 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
We should lay out a plan whereby over the next two weeks
we are in contact with the major anchormen and correspondents
who will be covering the Democratic Convention. Our strategy
should be to give them the proper lines about the forthcoming
Republican Convention. If we get the proper material to them
in the right way, it is conceivable that they will use the same
in some of their Convention commentary.
You should work with the 1701 group, as well as with Ziegler,
Moore, Scall, Klein, Safire, Clawson and Chapin.
This effort should be handled as much as possible on a
one-on-one basis with people contacting those correspondents
whom they know fairly well.
Will you please give me a report on this by Friday, June 30.
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
Celebrities
I called Taft Schreiber last evening to review with him the plan for another
celebrities event to involve Kissinger. Taft said that he had gone over the
list with Dick Zanuck and that they had gone over the undecideds and had
come to the conclusion that any event that they would put on would be so
insignificant as compared to what Taft threw a couple of weeks ago that it
would seem like a secondary party. Taft evidently has explained this to
Kissinger and, according to Taft, Kissinger agrees.
Evidently, Taft has talked to Norton Simon and Simon has agreed to hold
a dinner on July 7. They will invite some of their celebrity friends. As you
know, Simon is now married to Jennifer Jones. According to Taft, Norton
Simon is going to come aboard and Kissinger has agreed to do this event.
Obviously, the group is going to be liberal-oriented and Taft feels it will be per-
fect for Kissinger.
When Taft talked to Kissinger, Kissinger asked about the possibility of an
event on July 8 and this is when Taft told him about his conversation with
Zanuck and got Kissinger to agree to not having a celebrities event.
They have given a list of celebrities to Norton Simon which includes many of
the uncommitted people and Taft feels fairly sure that Simon is going to invite
them to the Kissinger dinner.
In terms of an event on July 14, Taft is very much in favor of this. He feels the
guest list, including wives and girl friends, would carry the number upward to
about 300. He says that they had 150 committed prior to the dinner which
Mrs. Nixon attended and they have 16 new commitments from young people whom
he says, "are damn good". A list of the new commitments is attached.
I have talked to Dr. Kissinger and he substantiates all of the above. It is his
opinion that he should not go with any event with celebrities other than
2.
the Simon dinner. I have asked Henry to call Norton Simon today (Wednesday)
and encourage him to invite some of the uncommitted celebrities so that Henry
will have a chance to talk with them.
Our next stop is to see whether you agree with the decision that there is not to be
a "celebrity dinner" at Zanuck's or Warner's home and that we will let the Simon
event serve that purpose.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Next, we need to develop a formal plan for the event at the compound. My suggestion
is that we take one of our best advance men - like Duval and put him on developing the
scenario for the reception. We should handle this just as we would any Presidential
event and do the basic work on it, using 1701 only for input as to names and checking
them all with Taft.
APPROVE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR A RECEPTION ON JULY 14
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
June 26, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
CONVENTION
Moore, Carruthers, Tex and I had lunch on Friday to discuss some ideas to sex
up our Convention and to keep the President on the highest possible plane.
I understand that it is in our best interest not to lock the President into anything
specific too soon. Therefore, we will just keep sending suggestions in. Toss those
you don't like and hold the others as options. We have some sensitional oppor-
tunities to show off the President during our Convention.
MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1972
A.
Monday night - first night of Convention. The S '76 arrives Homestead.
(A crowd of youth or closed.) The Convention is underway - a dead
TV period so the cameras switch live to Homestead. The President
escorts Mrs. Nixon to her helicopter which departs for the Convention
Hall. She will be there for Reagan and the key note. President Nixon
boards his helicopter for the compound.
B.
Half-way through the evening's activities, a couple of rumors start:
1.
The President has summoned the Cabinet to Key Biscayne
this evening immediately after the Convention gavel is down.
2.
Speculation in Chicago to the effect the President will address
the Legion tomorrow.
C.
When the evening session ends, the President has the Cabinet (maybe
we would add some 3 or 4 leaders or a couple of Governors) come to
the compound. The meeting is from 11:00 p.m. to midnight. There
are many things we can do. But look at the effect. The networks will
go out of their minds. The next day any of those who attended will
be sought after and ideal for interviews. Mystique, drama and
2.
speculation something is up. Plus it builds the President's team.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1972
A.
The President departs Tuesday morning in time to be in Chicago by 12:00 noon
to address the Legion. He finishes about the time the third session of the
Convention is called to order.
Ziegler does not confirm he is going until early Tuesday morning.
We go through Chicago around noon which gives us crowd possibilities.
Daley should be on stage for the event.
We have focused attention on the President. Not on Richard Nixon sitting
at the compound waiting to be nominated.
We have avoided having to do a raft of things in Miami in conjunction with
the Convention.
His remarks are key. They are defense oriented - the near end of the ten
year war . or something.
He is acclaimed by a "non-partisan" group.
Guess what the evening news is all about!
B.
When the President arrives back at Key Biscayne, he goes to the compound.
Later after the nomination (or maybe early before the nomination is placed)
he goes to the Youth Rally.
We are somewhat reluctant to have the President
two probably to our advantage.
evenings" If we can create ulternates to two 15
The option to the Monday night arrival would be to have the President fly into
Chicago from Los Angeles or Washington on Tuesday for the Legion. He could
go on to Florida. After the nomination, he could go with the Cabinet meeting.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS
1.
Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and
the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be
developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic
Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance.
The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should
assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION
MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION
HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
2.
The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during
the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can
be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good
recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special
voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN
SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN
3.
Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his
domestic philosophy - what he stands for -- what he is for and against domestically."
He states a little later, "..he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and
how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his
domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the
Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our
domestic philosophy is at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
2.
4.
It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators
are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be
to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.
CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER
DROP IDEA
OTHER
5.
Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and
do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some
food chain retailers.
HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
DROP
6.
Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a
week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials
to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we
should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CHECK MITCHELL FIRST
7.
Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot
every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that
McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule
for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it
under control?
COMMENT:
8.
Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding
ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to
ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this - examples or techniques of how he
would go about it.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
9.
Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the
economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from
these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed
internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-
being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the
economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put
this together? Under Colson?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL
COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ
DROP IT
10.
Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price,
suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the
Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.
YES
NO
OTHER
11.
Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit
in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could
be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the
memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently
on that memorandum.
YES
NO
12.
Do you agree that we should set up some villains - bureaucracy, big spenders,
abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies
now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start
cranking into their talks.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
13.
In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our
Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually
the credibility of the President?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS
HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
4.
14.
Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight
the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration
officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we
draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about
McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates.
Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic
Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT
BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE
OTHER
15.
Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this
election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly
find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He
also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".
Should Colson go ahead with this?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY
OTHER
5.
C.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND
POINTS OF ATTACK
1.
Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong
suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to
engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no
reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely
defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key
to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting
the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's
economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering
of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's
policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make
our charge about the "McGovern Market.'
2.
I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential
actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes,
"How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be
part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3.
I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made
the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms
of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by
the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting
a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue
charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the
offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend.
As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation,
as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4.
Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This
is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff
at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the
straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps
Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists,
and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general
public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our
surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them
on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat
to our constituency than they do presently.
6.
5.
Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-
emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the
broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and
order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play
to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The
exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.
6.
Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is
expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility.
We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples
of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out
front a President and an Administration that has done everything
possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on,
we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would
undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the
surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising,
other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the
President's credibility.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS
1.
Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and
the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be
developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic
Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance.
The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should
assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION
MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION
HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
2.
The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during
the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can
be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good
recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special
voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN
SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN
3.
Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his
domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he is for and against domestically."
He states a little later, " ..he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and
how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his
domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the
Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our
domestic philosophy is at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
2.
4.
It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators
are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be
to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.
CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER
DROP IDEA
OTHER
5.
Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and
do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some
food chain retailers.
HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
DROP
6.
Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a
week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials
to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we
should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CHECK MITCHELL FIRST
7.
Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot
every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that
McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule
for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it
under control?
COMMENT:
8.
Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding
ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to
ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this - examples or techniques of how he
would go about it.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
9.
Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the
economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from
these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed
internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-
being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the
economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put
this together? Under Colson?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL
COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ
DROP IT
10.
Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price,
suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the
Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.
YES
NO
OTHER
11.
Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit
in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could
be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the
memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently
on that memorandum.
YES
NO
12.
Do you agree that we should set up some villains - bureaucracy, big spenders,
abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies
now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start
cranking into their talks.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
13.
In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our
Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually
the credibility of the President?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS
HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
4.
14.
Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight
the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration
officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we
draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about
McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates.
Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic
Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT
BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE
OTHER
15.
Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this
election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly
find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He
also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".
Should Colson go ahead with this?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY
OTHER
5,
C.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND
POINTS OF ATTACK
1.
Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong
suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to
engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no
reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely
defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key
to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting
the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's
economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering
of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's
policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make
our charge about the "McGovern Market."
2.
I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential
actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes,
"How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be
part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3,
I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made
the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms
of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by
the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting
a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue
charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the
offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend.
As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation,
as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you,
4,
Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This
is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff
at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the
straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps
Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists,
and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general
public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our
surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them
on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat
to our constituency than they do presently.
6.
5.
Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-
emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the
broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and
order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play
to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The
exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.
6.
Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is
expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility.
We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples
of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out
front a President and an Administration that has done everything
possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on,
we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would
undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the
surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising,
other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the
President's credibility.
June 9, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
2:00 p.m.
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section
By run
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
General Thoughts
Some ideas were generated from the trip to California. Check
or comment on any which you feel have merit.
1.
Have Julie address a high school graduation, perhaps
a vocational college. We would keep it short and have
it reprinted in Readers' Digest.
2.
Make Len Garment our Hugh Sidey and get the
Newsweek/Washington Post syndicate to run him. He
has the flair and the emotional understanding of the
President.
3.
Give Dick Moore the job of figuring out how NBC or
Metromedia is purchased and develop a plan on it.
We could establish our own mini-network or better yet,
think big.
4.
Get educational TV, Metromedia or whoever to rerun the
July 4 Archives speech.
5.
Today McGovern is producing slick TV, spending a
fortune and using more Madison Avenue techniques and
people than we ever did or will. Tomorrow McGovern will
be the poor boy. We will be the big spenders, the slick
ones and be torn apart by the media.
Let's attack McGovern now. Let's say now that McGovern
is a TV age product who is meeting only the test of the
tube, not leadership.
2
6.
Send Julie, Tricia or both to the Summer Olympics.
The best dates are from September 1 to 4. ABC plans
massive coverage and we could do a lot of color things.
7.
Wolper says Teddy White told him, "McGovern is not a
smart man". Maybe we should get this talk circulated
among the press.
CC:
Dick Moore
June 28, 1972
11:45 a. m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK MOORE
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
I hope you follow-up with someone concerning your thoughts
about women and the Republican Convention. We tend to
downplay the importance of women in so much of what we do
and I think that If we take that attitude concerning the Convention
and the election we're going to find ourselves in deep trouble.
The idea you expressed about some of the trashy looking types
that will be used at the Democratic Convention and our putting
forward good solid positive-looking citizens at our Convention,
I think is outstanding. We can use housewives, secretaries,
teachers, nurses, you name it. This should all start with the
platform hearings and go right through the campaign.
One thing that we should keep in mind is the big issue that
single working girls have with the tax burden they must carry.
I'll bet If you took a poll among the unmarried secretaries in
the White House you would find the tax issue is one of their
major gripes.