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From Klein and Magruder to Haldeman RE: 1972 campaign. 12 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/8/1970
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From Klein and Magruder to Haldeman RE: 1972 campaign. 12 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/8/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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2
61
12/8/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Klein and Magruder to Haldeman RE:
1972 campaign. 12 pgs.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
g
December 8, 1970
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
By
E.O. Mh 12065, Section 6-102
GONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
08/103/11
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT:
Campaign 1972
This memorandum analyzes some areas on which this office might focus
as we move toward November of 1972.
Now that the 1970 campaign wrap-up has ended, we would like to discuss
in some depth the experiences we have had which would enable us effec-
tively to explore alternative approaches to the forthcoming Presidential
campaign. Decisions should be made now so that there is time to work
organizationally in preparation for an effective campaign in 1972.
We will mainly concern ourselves in these recommendations with those
areas in which we have had past experience; we shall suggest ways in
which those areas might be further developed.
Naturally, our domestic and foreign policies, the state of the economy,
the President's approach to the campaign, and the political operation will
have a major impact on the outcome of the 1972 election. We do not plan
to explore those areas in this memorandum, but rather will concentrate
on the organizational support activities where we can be of most
assistance.
We would view whatever, activities we undertake as an extension of the
President's office through you to the various sub-groups which will
ultimately be involved in the campaign. There will be, in 1972, the
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
2
Citizens groups, the RNC, the media and creative agencies, the Cabinet,
etc., all of which could be reached by the President and your office
normally through the mechanisms we would set up. We are fully aware
of the need for keeping in the background and this would be done particu-
larly prior to the convention. We believe our office has set a record for
handling things in this way. Obviously, there will be occasions also
when the President and his key political advisers will want to deal directly
with any of the above.
If you approve general concepts as outlined below, we can further develop
concrete, specific and detailed suggestions.
ADVERTISING
Drawing on our experience in 1970, and spending a good deal of time in
1971 studying campaign advertising, we would gear up to handle all of
the Presidential campaign advertising, including the print media; radio
and television; brochures; direct mail, both by the use of mailings to our
hundreds of opinion-leader mailing lists and specific voter mailings
where appropriate. Again, this would nican working through a group set
up at the National Committee or at the campaign headquarters, but it
would best use the mechanisms we have set up during the past years. It
would mean also that we would be consulting with outside experts we
have built up a relationship with.
Our proposal here is that we use the first part of 1971 to look at a number
of preferably small creative advertising agencies and also at various
individuals involved in advertising (e. g. : media buyers, copy writers,
and creative people). We would put together a number of various combi-
nations of individuals and agencies who could handle a national campaign.
Then, in November of 1971, we would present the best of these various
approaches and combinations to you and others you might select. A
decision could be made at that time as to which approach we wanted to
take.
The point here is that we would spend the necessary time to study all the
various agencies and individuals for example, direct mail plays a
greater role in each election and will probably be very big in 1972 due to
criticism of and possible regulation of the use of television. We would
3
carefully study all the large direct mail houses in 1971 to find out what
should be done in 1972. Obviously, the direct mail must be specifically
targeted, both politically and as to residents within key geographical
areas. This makes the mail house selection all the more important.
Such an experience in 1971 would enable us to put together Presidential
radio and television advertising, campaign films of the President with
certain candidates, radio tape endorsements, etc.
Therefore, we propose that we be given permission to commence such
a study which will result in a presentation to you next fall of the best
alternatives.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
SCHEDULING
Again, drawing on our experience in 1970, the Scheduling Office would
coordinate the political activities of (1) the First Family; (2) Cabinet
members, Administration officials and key White House staff who would
function as "surrogate candidates" as in 1968 and; (3) celebrities. This
office would perform its customary job of filling requests for speakers,
but it would also decide where our people ought to be, and then find
forums for them to appear.
A list of 1972 key states would be developed as soon as possible and up-
dated as often as necessary between now and the election. Appearances
by Cabinet members and others would place emphasis on these key states
immediately. Primary contacts in each state should be identified as
soon as possible so that the head of the scheduling operation could initiate
personal contact. The various state GOP and citizens organizations
would be instructed to contact the scheduling office regarding VIP
appearances.
We propose that we continue our efforts in scheduling the Cabinet and
other Administration officials, stepping up our activities in January of
1972 to focus almost exclusively on the key states.
In the past, most of the speeches have been made in response to invita-
tions. These are a good source, but we are compiling a list of national
4
association and organization conventions so that we may actively seek
spots on the programs of those conventions which are advantageous to
us. We also will seek information from the Cabinet officers regarding
major invitations they turn down so the possibility of filling these could
be reviewed. We are looking here at service clubs, fraternal organiza- -
tions, labor unions, ethnic groups and others. We believe this office
also can contribute more to suggestions as to possible Presidential
appearances which again would be ones we would look for rather than
waiting for invitations to come in.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
We propose further that we schedule celebrities and the First Family
(not including, of course, the President) beginning in June of 1972.
During 1971 we would set up our celebrities program drawing on our
experience in 1970.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
Advance men, schedule coordinators, transportation coordinators, a
pool of private aircraft, access to speechwriters, etc., will have to be
available to the Scheduling Office in 1972 but not until then.
The next section in this memorandum is "Broadcast Scheduling". It is
obvious that the person in charge of broadcast scheduling would work
very closely with the Scheduling Office to make certain that every time
an Administration official is sent out, that person would appear on local
and/or regional radio and TV talk shows.
BROADCAST SCHEDULING AND LIAISON
As mentioned above, this "office" would work closely with the schedul-
ing operation to place our traveling officials on TV. We have a good,
updated card file on several hundred radio-' TV talk shows, many of
which were used during the campaign. We know which are cooperative
and which have impact.
This office should also continue as the Administration contact point for
all national television including the Sunday interview programs and late
night talk shows. This avoids the problem of working at cross purposes
within the Administration and gives us clout when attempting to get our
5
people on these shows. This will be available in 1972 when we want to
get out our line each week.
Prime time special TV interviews have obvious impact. The 25 special
prime time, half-hour regional shows we arranged in the 1970 campaign
can be substantially increased now that we have a foundation of coopera-
tive station management people to work with.
The group station approach for interviews should be continued. This was
effective last time where we hit several key stations in a group set-up
with a single interview. Westinghouse, Cox and RKO General, among
others, were cager to cooperate and we can expand on this by working
with the major groups which together comprise a formidable TV-radio
network. We are now well plugged into the Washington bureaus of the
groups which generate much material for their stations.
During the campaign we learned that there is a growing availability of
top government officials to tape half-hour shows even in areas where
there are no regular talk shows. These are important in smaller states
which will have a major bearing on the election or in medium sized cities
such as Springfield, Illinois and Sacramento, California.
Where the Vice President is concerned, city or state-wide TV hookups
should be encouraged rather than giving a single station an exclusive.
Most stations will cooperate on this and did in North Dakota and North
Carolina.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
We want to stress here how important it is that the Scheduling Office,
which would plan the travels of the Cabinet, Administration spokesmen,
the First Family and celebrities, work closely with this "Broadcast
Scheduling and Liaison" office. By itself, a scheduling office can have
little effect but working in close harmony with the other people in our
office who have expertise in print and broadcast journalism, our sched-
uling operation can operate as a traveling press office for the Cabinet
member or celebrity on the road. For example, when the President
travels, the Chapin-Walker tour office plans the trip and the Ziegler
press office handles the media. It is important that when Administration
6
spokesmen ("surrogate candidates") travel, they can rely on this office
to (1) find the correct forums and; (2) get them in the local and regional
press and on local and regional TV. Unless we do a good job with the
second category (which we can do from this office), finding the forums,
getting the speakers, and advancing them means relatively little.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
Also, this broadcast operation can work closely with the developing
Chapin-Walker tour office to assist in top notch TV coverage of all
Presidential addresses and appearances. We would keep a video film
library of Presidential speeches (especially on the stump) for possible
rebroadcasts. This would be done through the Navy Labs as we have dis-
cussed in the past. Two top-flight Navy cameramen could accompany the
President to insure high quality film. This type of preparation would pro-
tect against media coverage and presentations of non-Presidential quality.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
ATTACK AND RESPONSE DESK
This office will focus on keeping track of the opposition and providing
assault material to keep them off balance. The success of such an opera-
tion depends on having, as soon as possible, the statements of the opposi-
tion. Once they come out (which we get from our research operation), we
can get to work immediately on counterattacking through the scheduling
operation: finding who is traveling, who has a forum, who can speak out.
Additionally, in this connection, the Response Desk can move swiftly to
get the Administration line out to all spokesmen and our people on the
Hill (through Nofziger) so that everyone has an answer in case he's
asked.,
Now is not too soon to start compiling good, comprehensive fact sheets
on specific policy areas, such as farm, the draft, manpower retraining,
trade, etc. Comprehensive sheets on these topics can be used with good
effect from now all the way to the campaign. The summer and fall of
1972 will be too late to get across the substantive correctness of the
Administration's accomplishments.
It is most useful for the individual candidates to receive material before
or right after a given event. The RNC should use more phone contact
7
with the Senate races and utilize more greatly the Republican Congres-
sional Campaign Committee's telex hookup. For the Presidential cam-
paign, getting key information to speakers ahead of the event will be
particularly important.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
In 1968, there were hundreds of requests by magazines and newspapers
for statements or written interviews by the candidate. Working with the
Keogh staff, the Response Desk should begin during late 1971 to gear up
for the deluge of requests so that we may take proper advantage of them.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE REORGANIZATION
Proposals relative to our liaison with the RNC will be forthcoming after
the structure of the Committee under its new chairman has been deter-
mined. However, we should give consideration as to whether the
research and communications departments at-the RNC ought to be
organized under the direction of a single head who would, in addition to
reporting to the Republican National Chairman, develop a close relation-
ship with this office. In other words, it might be useful to maintain the
research and communications department at RNC while having someone
in whom we have confidence oversee those two operations and undertake
responsibility to see that they get the job done.
A consolidation of this nature would result in a greatly improved and
more responsive RNC press operation, clipping and retrieval system
and mailing system. Our having one person to make sure the job gets'
done will avoid the possibility of the two departments working at cross.
purposes.
The proposal here is that we work with the new RNC chairman in sug-
gesting the consolidation of the research and communications depart-
ments with an eye to improving the operations just described.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
8
A separate memorandum, which was sent over earlier, outlines some
of the thoughts with respect to National Committee publications and
guidance of those publications by an editorial board made up of some
of the creative White House staff members. There also is a need in
this structure for someone of stature and press respect to be head of
the press department of the National Committee.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
As you have previously approved, in connection with the research and
retrieval systems, we would step up our efforts in collecting newspaper
clippings and data on potential Democratic Presidential and Vice Presi-
dential candidates and also Democratic spokesmen such as Fulbright.
We would go back and pick up old quotes and stay on the alert for new
ones.
We found that the current research and retrieval operation at the RNC
did not fill our current needs or the needs we expect to have in 1972.
Too much time was spent on general clipping and too little in Democra-
tic candidates' home states, e. g. : Maine. Consequently, we are cur-
rently working hard with the RNC to get their system moving and we will
discuss with the new RNC chairman the need for a man with enough
political savvy to run this operation. We will also focus on issues in
addition to candidates.
The system we are aiming at is a full text retrieval computer system
where the full text of the document is entered retrieval is then done by
searching for key words which appear in the text. This can be done with-
in the budgetary limits now set at the RNC we expect to have, within
these limitations, the best system possible.
CITIZENS FOR NIXON/AGNEW
As the various Democratic candidates for the Presidency begin to set up
"citizens for" organizations and offices, we should also. This should
be done on a small scale during 1971 so that our massive citizens effort
can be well underway in 1972. Just as the 1968 citizens operation got
going much sooner than the 1960, the 1972 organization should be put to-
gether in 1971. We would begin by setting up a group of young people in
their 20's and 30's in a Washington office building we would like to
9
take a hand in the recruitment of these people and direct them to some
extent over the next few months. Each of them would be assigned a
region of the country much as the Ellsworth-Kleindienst operation in
1968 assigned various people responsible for certain geographical
sections. The purpose of this would be to find in each state the citizens
group leaders with whom we would work in the 1972 campaign. Persons
such as Charlic Mc Whorter could be utilized in this connection.
Ultimately, the purpose of the citizens operation would be to involve tens
of thousands of people on behalf of the Nixon-Agnew ticket; hundreds of
store fronts should be used throughout the country to enlist support for
the President. Using this organization and the store fronts, we could
begin to organize various ethnic and special interest groups to support
the President (e. g. Italians for Nixon).
Although we would, of necessity, have to finance the initial stages of the
citizens operation, and also a Washington headquarters, the citizens
operations throughout the country ought to be self-supporting. We would
give them the ability to buy materials through.a catalog of campaign
materials which would be made available by the Washington headquarters.
Our proposal now is to set up in the carly months of 1971 a small citizens
operation in a Washington office building, manned by several young
people who we would hire after consultation with Messrs. Chotiner, Dent,
Finch, and Mitchell, the new Republican National Chairman, and whom-
ever you might designate.
This office would work closely with Attorney General Mitchell if he is,
as we assume, to be actively involved in the 1972 campaign. The finance
people could also have offices with the citizens group, although the two
operations would probably be kept separate as they were in 1968.
This office has worked with Mr. Mitchell and the others mentioned above
in the 1970 campaign, and could continue this relationship very effectively
in 1972. We would work on the organizational end of the citizens group
the political dealings would be left to the political offices at the White
House.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
10
We could recruit young people to work on the citizen's effort, in part,
by our Administration officials who speak before the various Jaycee
groups, YR's, and other youth-oriented organizations. This would
have to be, of course, closely coordinated with whoever is selected
as chairman of the overall citizens' effort.
Since it would be difficult to get the more experienced political opera-
tives for a full year-and-a-half, these young people could lay the
necessary groundwork SO that the 1972 Nixon field operation would be
&
ready in the spring of 1972 for the more experienced types (as in 1968,
Sears, McWhorter, Kleindienst and Ellsworth) to take over.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
WHITE HOUSE-RNC COMMUNICATION
We will explore with WHCA and other people with technical know-how the
various telephonic and electronic devices which would provide better
White House-RNC communication so that paper could be transmitted back
and forth more quickly than by messenger.
PRINT MEDIA LIAISON
With the addition of Van Shumway to the staff, our office will have the
ability to get our line out in the print media as the Broadcast Liaison
shop gets it on the air. Shumway can spend 1971 getting to know every
key reporter, bureau chief, and columnist in Washington whereas
Mr. Klein is the best person to get out our line to these people, his
time is naturally limited and Shumway can assist him in this connection.
Then, when a campaign game plan calls for getting a lint in print, we
can draw upon our contacts and move swiftly to plant our line just as
our project managers move quickly in their fields. Also, we can use
this concept to quickly plant leaks.
This work would be, of course, augmented by the National Committee
staff and further developed in special interest areas by the citizens
organization.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
11
POLLING
We propose to continue coordination of the polling and simulation activi-
tics between now and November of 1972 with the exception of the "quickie"
telephone surveys which have been conducted directly from your office.
Between now and June of 1972, we would plan approximately six to eight
field polls (perhaps four polls in 1971 and three in the first six months
of 1972). Then, in the remainder of 1972, quickie telephone surveys as
appropriate. In the fall of 1971, we would want to plan for the spring of
1972, and probably poll on a closer time cycle, with concentration per-
haps on the key states.
These polls would continually check the President's image and also
issues as they come into play. We would also move ahead with the simu-
lation experiments as outlined in Mr. Magruder's memorandum to you
dated July 9, 1970.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CONVENTION
Although we do not, of course, expect a challenge to the President's
nomination at the Republican National Convention in 1972, we neverthe-
less ought to be prepared for any eventuality which might create a floor
fight either on the nomination of the President or the Vice President, or
on any issue or platform plank before the convention. This means, dur-
ing early 1972, that we should prepare extensive background data on each
delegate and alternate to the convention as they are selected beginning in
New Hampshire. The person who kept these records for the President in
1968 is, as you know, on the staff in this office and could supervise the
collection of similar data in 1972 the records could be housed at either
the RNC or the citizens headquarters. In 1968 we had the most extensive
records in American political history and we should do no less in 1972 in
order to control what happens on the convention floor.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
Furthermore, we can work with others involved in the campaign to make
certain we have the proper communications equipment in the President's
hotel command center, the convention hall trailer, etc. At least one
person on this staff was actively involved in this area in 1968.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
12
Lastly, because the Presidential Press Secretary will not arrive at the
convention until the President arrives, this office can take the lead in
establishing a Press center at the convention which is operative as soon
as the first reporter arrives at the convention city. Naturally, this
Press Center would work closely with the press officers of the RNC and
the citizens. Herb Klein could act as the spokesman at the Center and
Ron Ziegler, of course, would use the Center when he arrived with the
President.
The Press center would depend on the National Committee for the rou-
tine logistical work, as in the past. When purely partisan announce-
ments or statements are necessary, RNC or citizens personnel could
make them.
In 1968, we gained a major foothold by moving more rapidly in press
activities than any other candidate which gave us the advantage of con-
stantly making news. We must make certain we are prepared to do this
again in 1972. This is particularly important in a convention where,
presumably, there will not be a challenge to the President's or Vice
President's nomination and where the reporters will be left to make up
their own stories, which inevitably will be based on divisiveness.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
There is also a major need for coordinated activity to streamline the
entire convention. We believe this office could make major inputs into
this area in matters ranging from the problem of press on the floor of
the convention hall to the best use of television. There needs to be
considerably more input from others with creative ideas in Keogh's
shop and from the political operatives.
We do not believe this convention should be an Atlantic City "Kingmaking"
operation, but should be designed to hold TV audiences which we want to
reach. This has never been accomplished since TV began at this type
of convention. The National Committee has a study regarding the con -
vention problem and we will look at it as a basic, continuing activity
perhaps headed by you so that we can examine the whole problem.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment