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This file contains:
From Colson to Haldeman RE: the debts of various Democrats. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/31/1970
From Colson to Haldeman RE: how to use debt against the Democrats. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Colson to Haldeman RE: suggestions for the next chairman of the Republican National Committee. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/7/1970
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: Harris polling involving Democratic candidates for the presidential nomination and RN. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/1/1970
From Colson to Buchanan RE: an attached document, authored by Lasky, concerning Muskie. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/3/1970
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WHSF: Contested, 4-21
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WHSF: Contested, 4-21
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This file contains:
From Colson to Haldeman RE: the debts of various Democrats. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/31/1970
From Colson to Haldeman RE: how to use debt against the Democrats. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Colson to Haldeman RE: suggestions for the next chairman of the Republican National Committee. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/7/1970
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: Harris polling involving Democratic candidates for the presidential nomination and RN. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/1/1970
From Colson to Buchanan RE: an attached document, authored by Lasky, concerning Muskie. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/3/1970
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
4
21
12/31/1970
White House Staff
Memo
From Colson to Haldeman RE: the debts of
various Democrats. 1 pg.
4
21
12/9/1970
White House Staff
Memo
From Colson to Haldeman RE: how to use
debt against the Democrats. 1 pg.
4
21
12/7/1970
White House Staff
Memo
From Colson to Haldeman RE: suggestions
for the next chairman of the Republican
National Committee. 2 pgs.
4
21
12/1/1970
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman
RE: Harris polling involving Democratic
candidates for the presidential nomination
and RN. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
4
21
12/3/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Buchanan RE: an attached
document, authored by Lasky, concerning
Muskie. 1 pg.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Page 2 of 2
December 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
Democrats' Debts
This refers to my memorandum 66 December 9, copy attached. We
have thus far been unable to obtain an accurate list of creditors. We
do know that the Democrats owe approximately $1 million to AT&T
($300, 000 directly and $700, 000 carried over from the Kennedy and
Humphrey pre-convention expenses.) Unfortunately, however, the
RNC also owes $270, 000.
AT&T cannot forgive or write off the debts: that would be a corporate
political contribution. In accordance with the long-standing practice,
they are charging no interest to either of the national committees.
AT&T will insist upon full payment of the debts prior to the next campaign,
however.
American Airlines is also a large creditor of the DNC. Our relationships
with American are not such that I would attempt to urge that they press
for collection.
Basically the problem remains that a judgment would be uncollectable;
hence, no one wants to precipitate a counterproductive law suit.
All in all, I come to the conclusion that we are much better off not
surfacing this issue right now. It could cause the Democrate to issue a
sympathy fundrraising appeal. Rather, we should put the screws on
hard in the summer of 1972 to be absolutely certain these creditors
extend no further credit until they are paid. The over-hanging debt is
of value to us in that a lot of people won't want to contribute to pay off
the debts of a prior election; yet, if the creditors hold firm, that is the
way it will have to be in 1972.
Tickler - January 1, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
December 9, 1970
E.O. 120S5, Section 6-102
By yew NARS, Date 10/20/81
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
DEMOCRATS' DEBTS
This is in response to your memo of November 30th regarding the
debts of the Democratic National Committee.
When I was in private law practice we were retained by a creditor and
were on the verge of suing during the 1968 election. We did not do so
because the judgment, even if obtained, would have been uncollectable.
One of my partners negotiated a long term pay out instead. The reason
for this, as I recall, was that many of the debts were incurred by com-
mittees which had no assets.
I have a line out now to obtain a list of the creditors. This may not be
easy to come by.
There is one question that you should think about. If a rash of law suits
began we might martyr the Democrats, create public sympathy and give
them a good fund raising issue. We might be better to let the debts
carry and then try to block the Democrats from getting further credit --
at least from the same creditors -- the next time around. I have some
questions in my own mind about this. What do you think?
In any event, as soon as I am able to obtain a list of creditors I will take
a hard look at how feasible a series of suits would be.
EYES ONLY
December 7, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
Assuming Bryce says no or that the price is not right, I am passing
along a few thoughts for what they are worth. I am aware of the back-
up choices -- they are really superb men; none of them, however meet
all three of what I think are the major qualifications:
1. Total, exclusive commitment to the President. The Chairman
should have no conflicting political ambitions of his own; he
should regard himself as the President's agent in making the
party machinery function for the President's campaign. Every-
thing else is secondary. The man has to be resigned to being
egoless and expendable.
2. It must be a full time job. (Bob Dole is a great guy but, in addition
to having his own ambitions, he is a very busy Senator.)
3. The major task of the Chairman should be to make the machinery
of the party operate. He must, therefore, be a consummate political
pro like Bryce a Cliff White type who knows ladtv to organize
and use the organization (or a Chotiner type without the Chotiner
image).
Almost all of our problems with Morton resulted from (1) or (2) above.
He wasn't there or he was worried about himself. I am well aware of
the President's desire for a spokesman who can tangle with Larry
O'Brien. When a party is out of power, its national chairman must be
an attractive, articulate spokesman who can put a good face on the party.
When a party is in power, its chairman ought to be its best technician
and the partisan agent of the President.
We have many attractive, articulate spokesmen in the Administration.
We don't need to add another one. Least of all do we need a spokesman
who is competing with the President and the Administration for public
attention.
-2-
The partisan machinery that exists at the Committee can be enormously
valuable to us in 1972. The Chairman ought to spend full time making
It work in our interest -- and the less he is seen on TV, the better.
The new Chairman should not look upon it as an opportunity to help him
build his own political image but rather as a dirty, grimy job to make
the Republican political apparatus viable in 1972 tn support of the
President's campaign.
I know this is none of my business but I've lived in this town through a
lot of chairmen -- and rd like to see us learn from past mistakes.
P.S. How about John Volpe -- loyal and a good organizer (Ehrlichman
would second him).
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By you NARS, Date 10/22/81
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
The President asked me yesterday to talk to Dan Lufkin regarding the
latest Harris Poll. I did so. Lufkin talked to Harris, which doesn't
help with this one but keeps some pressure on for the future.
I am convinced that Harris will jab us everytime he can; it is some-
what significant that in yesterday's poll on the impact of the Presi-
dent's campaigning, Harris did not publish a positive/negative break-
down. For the first time he printed all four categories of response.
This is one of the promises, you may remember, that we extracted
from him.
Following my conversation with Lufkin, and at his request, I called
Harris directly last evening. He gave me a very interesting analysis
of the poll.
Kennedy, Humphrey and Lindsay all run strong with certain groups,
badly with others. For example, Kennedy does poorly with older
voters, Humphrey badly with younger voters. Lindsay does well in
the suburbs, Kennedy does not. Kennedy runs very badly in the south
and border states, Humphrey not so bad. Kennedy does well with the
Catholics. In short, each of the three arouse strong support in certain
areas but strong animosity in others.
What distinguishes Muskie and what causes him to run stronger --
is that he does not have the areas of opposition that the other potential
candidates do. In addition to holding the Democratic strength, he also
picks up Republican and Independent votes in the higher income brackets
which the other candidates do not.
Muskie, while he benefits from not having the liabilities of the other
candidates, also inspires no enthusiasm. The underlying poll data
(interviewee impressions) show that his support is very soft. Harris
describes it as "passable," he is an accommodating candidate, no one
is really excited about him either way.
From this Harris concludes that when the infighting begins Muskie's
soft support will not hold up (Harris gave me some gratuitous political
advice to the effect that we should continue to push Muskie to the left).
-2-
Harris further concludes that in any two-way race no candidate against
the President could get more than 45-46% of the vote, except Muskie
at this time but Harris does not believe that Muskie's support will
continue at this level.
Harris is doing another analysis which will be released next week.
It shows the President doing as well today as he did in 1963 with
virtually every group and with each geographical area except in the
middle west where the President's support is badly off from the 1968
levels.
Harris believes that the mid-west has been particularly affected by a
recessionary psychology, farmer discontent and the GM strike. He
regards this as a "special situation" and concludes that because of
the basic Republicanism of the mid-west, we will be able to recover
our support there.
The point of his analysis which he says he will make publicly (I will
believe it when he does) is that the President is in very good shape
when his present support is compared to his 1968 performance except
in the mid-west where he believes that the damage will be repaired.
Charles W. Colson
EYES ONLY
December 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR PAT BUCHANAN
Attached is what I promised you -- a draft of a Lasky piece on
Muskie.
There are two caveats. The first two paragraphs were basically
what the President dictated. The second caveat is that I am no
writer or columnist. I think the meat is here, however, for you
to apply your fine hand.
We want to circulate this very, very widely so it should really
make its point very hard.
Charles W. Colson