Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
From Colson to Leonard RE: the failure of "First Monday" to capitalize on a speech given by RN involving the Soviets. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Colson to Harper RE: the Democratic platform. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Colson to Dick Howard RE: Billy Graham's efforts to organize RN's supporters. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies on a plethora of issues. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26144711
label
WHSF: Contested, 4-38
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26144711
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 4-38
description
This file contains:
From Colson to Leonard RE: the failure of "First Monday" to capitalize on a speech given by RN involving the Soviets. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Colson to Harper RE: the Democratic platform. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Colson to Dick Howard RE: Billy Graham's efforts to organize RN's supporters. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies on a plethora of issues. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26144711
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
a7f41ac99a92a918
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
4
38
White House Staff
Memo
From Colson to Leonard RE: the failure of
"First Monday" to capitalize on a speech
given by RN involving the Soviets. 1 pg.
4
38
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Harper RE: the Democratic
platform. 1 pg.
4
38
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Dick Howard RE: Billy
Graham's efforts to organize RN's supporters.
1 pg.
4
38
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman
RE: general campaign strategies on a
plethora of issues. Handwritten notes on
original added by unknown. 5 pgs.
Friday, August 20, 2010
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FRANK LEONARD
FROM:
CHUCK COLSON
SUBJECT:
First Monday
I have just read First Monday and what is otherwise a brilliant
job is marred terribly in my mind by your failure to do what
we agreed upon -- that is, include a more prominent play of
the President's speech about Tanya to the Soviet people. While
substantively it may not have been as important as his speech to the
Congress, it had a much greater emotional impact and I think
an enormous political effect. I cannot conceive for the life of
me why you saw fit not to do what you had agreed to do. This is
the second time this has happened and we simply cannot have it.
I expect from you immediately an explanation of how this happened.
I hope that you did not make a unilateral decision but I would like
to know who decided to countermand the instructions from here
which were clear and precise.
ccs Van Shumway
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ED HARPER
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
Do I correctly assume that you are doing an analysis of the
Democratic Platform both as to cost and political impact It
would seem to me if we analyse the Democratic Platform, it
will give rise to thoughts for our own where we want to draw
a contrast or alternatively where we want to duck an issue.
I noted with very special interest George Meany's comments
yesterday and he raised what is with labor a very key point, i.e.
the export of jobs. If you read Meany's remarks in full, you
will see that what he is saying is the Democratic Party should
be more concerned with American capital going abroad resulting
in exports of jobs than in such things as abortion, women's lib,
etc. In this area, I think we could do some very, very effective
demagoguing if we could write a plank that hits this issue head on.
It would not only ring bells with Meany, but would give Don Rodgers,
our labor man, something to really sell across the country. The
labor people don't understand the issue of "export of jobs" has
become something of a code word with labor, but that language
alone would be useful. Could you explore this and let me know
what the prospects are because there is an opportunity for real
political exploitation here.
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK HOWARD
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
I want a report on what we have done in connection with
Billy Graham's Explo. I am appalled that we only had an
"observor" present. Based on what Billy Graham told the
President, these were our people. They want to go out
and campaign for us and we should exploit this as fully as
possible. This can be an enormous campaign resource.
I think last week or the week before I made a notation in
the News Summary to Howard Cohen telling him to be sure
that our people were involved with this. I can't believe with
Rietz' operation going the way it is, that we didn't get very
deeply involved with this. It probably is not too late to do
so; we should have had our operatives there circulating
through the crowd.
I want to be absolutely certain that this is followed through on.
Assign it to Cohen and be sure that I get follow through reports.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
In response to your memo of June 12 regarding the campaign strategy,
I think you already have my thinking on most of the points you have
asked about. You probably have an ad nauseam in some areas like
aid to parochial schools.
Without asking you to go back and look at all my old memos I have
written, I am enclosing for your quick perusal my memo of May 17
on "Issue Management". There is nothing issue-wise that I feel any
different about nor to my knowledge have we made much progress
since May 17. Just ticking through the items in that memo:
1.
We have made a little start on the tax issue.
2.
We have done nothing separating ourselves from the bureaucracy
or attacking the bureaucracy.
3.
On busing, we have got to do much better and have an opportunity
to begin when the President blasts the higher education bill while
signing it.
4.
The inflation/food price issue I talked about yesterday. I feel it is
coming on us very hard and very fast and I believe we should be
prepared with the necessary contingency plan wish
C
5.
Welfare. The President has indicated that he likes the idea of
implementing the Talmadge Amendments with a lot of fan-fare
which is basically what I had proposed in this memo, but there will
be a lot of bloodshed because the faint hearts will fight this to the
death.
2.
6.
No Fault. This one happily we have done and in fact without much
involvement of any of the President's time. We got a good bit of
mileage out of it and for once our mechanism produced something.
7.
Catholic Schools. Maybe we are coming to grips with this. I will
believe it when it happens.
8.
Social Security. In my memo of May 17, I said we are "treading
water". I said it again yesterday. We are.
In response to the other questions that you raised in your June 12 memo
I don't think it is necessary for the President to be travelling between the
Conventions. Indeed, I would rather see him remain here while the
Congress is here. Perhaps he could do one or two highly visible domestic
events; for example, call in the food chain retailers and lay them out in
lavender. Perhaps we will have an opportunity for a highly visible veto,
but I think we can use that period of time also to rail against the
Congress for its inability to deal with major national problems.
I still don't feel that the Jaycees or Rotary type appearances are good.
I believe there is more to gain by keeping the President on the pedestal
he is on, a little bit aloof and non-political, dealing with the great issues
of our time. I disagree strongly with Hallett's point about a foreign trip.
There is no way that we can top the last two and it would be transparently
political. In short, let's keep the President tending to his knitting. But
the most important point in my mind is that he be prepared to move in
swiftly, firmly and very decisively to capitalize on any domestic issues
that can either be turned into an asset or as to which we can block a negative.
Food prices and busing are two that are in this category. If the Congress
won't act on the moritorium as apparently they are not, let's take every
opportunity between the Conventions to bang them hard. Let's be prepared
to do something very dramatic on the food price front. We may have to go
way beyond jawboning or attacking the food chains. We may have to have
an Executive Order ready to issue to nail this very hard.
I very much like theidea of the President being in California for the first
two weeks of July. In fact, there would be nothing wrong with him being
there the first three weeks in July. We have no problem with the public
thinking that the President spends all of his time relaxing. To the con-
trary, I think there was even a ripple of concern in the country that he was
pushing himself too hard during the Soviet trip.
3.
In any political campaign the most critical strategy call is momentum and
timing. July is a month for us to be locking up all of our positions on the
issues, exploiting constituency groups, having the President come forward
strong and hard on critical domestic issues, but at the same time letting
him get some rest, do some thinking and not be moving at a very rapid
pace.
I think you know exactly what I believe the opposition strategy will be.
They will hit us on the following issues:
1.
We are in bed with big business and don't give a damn about
the little guy. Off of this they play ITT, a $10 million secret
slush fund, vetoing of Social Security, etc.
2.
Ineffectiveness on the domestic front, the President doesn't care
about domestic issues and we have no domestic program.
3.
The economy is in trouble, prices are rising, people are out of
work.
As to these, I have no concern except over point one. That goes to the
trust-confidence-credibility factor which maybe one of the most important
things that the public uses to measure candidates. Here we have some
real work to do.
You said yesterday that everyone was saying that we should worry about
complacency. Obviously that is so, but in my mind it is a very serious
problem. It is infectious organizationally, it does have an impact on
voter turnout, but the worst thing it does is to permit people to throw
away their votes. By this I mean the Democrats who might otherwise
be frightened to have McGovern in the White House feel they can go to
the polls and still cast a straight Democratic ticket because there is no
chance of him being elected. This phenomenon was very evident in the
Goldwater campaign. Many of my Republican friends said, "I can cast
a vote for Goldwater because I know he can't be elected but if I thought
my vote made a difference, I would be scared to vote for him!" That
is also why Goldwater did better than the polls showed he would do. In
my opinion, we have to contrive adverse polls if necessary to let the
Ameri can people know this is a real test and we have to cleverly find a
way to scare hell out of them at the prospect of a McGovern Presidency.
4.
One thing we must do is to store up a whole slue of goodies that we can
come out with in September and October. I have been mentioning this in
every memo I have written during the past year and have yet to see any
evidence that we are doing this. Shipyard contracts, parks to the
people, Executive Orders, etc. etc. With a little imagination a program
for this is not hard to develop. It does not need the involvement of the
President unless we want him to but it gives a steady flow of government
activities that have a positive impact on the people. I would like to see
us have at least one a day in September and October.
You also know my thoughts on the campaign issue. Assuming it is
McGovern and that our strength remains as it is or even close to what
it is today, we need a real hatchet operation going on McGovern full
time, but far removed from the President. Democrats for Nixon could
carry the load. The President himself should go on doing those things
which as President put him before the American people, visibly dealing
with issues that are of concern to the American people. In short, we
want to slide into the campaign period by just doing more of the kind of
things that we have been doing. I agree with Hallett that we should only
have a few partisan rally type appearances in October.
Lou Harris made a very interesting point this week suggesting that the
President: meet the domestic issue head on, saying in effect that we have
not made as much progress on the domestic front as we would like (this
kind of humility would help our credibility enormously), that the President
had to deal in the first four years with the most pressing problem which
confronted this nation, the search for peace and the strength of America's
position in the world, etc. He would then say that he is happy to let the
American people judge his Administration on his record in foreign affairs,
ending Vietnam, SALT, China, etc. Now that we have made such enormous
progress in the foreign field, which programs will continue (SALT continuation,
etc. ) that we are going to turn this energy, imagination, drive, etc. to
solving the nation's most critical domestic problems, making government
more responsive, lowering the cost of government, straightening out
welfare, etc. etc. It is an interesting point because it is disarming. and
readily acknowledges we have not done everything in the domestic field
that we want to. It suggests that the President's enormous skill in foreign
affairs, which is well and firmly established in the public's mind, is
transferable to handling the domestic issue and it somewhat co-opts the
enemy's attack line. It also holds out the promise of things to be done
because as Harris points out, people are much less concerned with what
has happened in the last four years than what they think will happen to them
over the next four years. Hence they are more concerned, even in the
5.
case of an incumbent, with what he hopes to do during the next term
than what he did do in the first term. This also keeps us from being
put on the defensive.
One other point worth mentioning; Dick Scammon believes the public mood
is just right for the kind of speech that Prime Minister McMillan gave in
1959 in the closing days of his campaign which according to Scammon was
one which moved the British people and according to Scammon was one of
the most brilliant political speeches ever. I haven't reviewed it although
I have asked for it. The thrust of it was, interestingly enough, somewhat
similar to Harris' point. In effect, "I have shown you what I can do, put
your faith in me. Here are the things we need now to do together and
you can trust me to do them. 11 It was calming, soothing, low-key. It
inspired trust and it suggested that the strong points that McMillan had
demonstrated could be used to solve the problems of the British people,
which he, McMillan, readily identified -- as I say, somewhat similar
to the Harris point.