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Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE: the vice president and the 1970 campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
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Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE: the vice president and the 1970 campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
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6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the elections of
1970 and 1972. 11 pgs.
6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE:
the elections of 1970 and 1972. 11 pgs.
6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE:
the elections of 1970 and 1972. 11 pgs.
6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the vice president
and the 1970 campaign. 4 pgs.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
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No Date
Subject
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Document Description
6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE:
the vice president and the 1970 campaign. 4
pgs.
6
4
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to RN RE:
the vice president and the 1970 campaign. 4
pgs.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Page 2 of 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE president
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & 172
"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a
credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. This is a
volume the President cannot afford to overlook. Its three hundred
pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in
1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-
strategy which Republicans are going to have to adopt if they are
not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.
We can no longer count on our democratic friends to co-operate
in their own demise as they have in recent years. Liberals are
waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harrict
Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians like
HHH, Muskic and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course
a
course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order;
they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black radicals;
they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for
Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back
their white collar and blue collar defectors and they are going about it
the Scammon-Wattenburg way.
Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and
strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a
counter-strategy I believe we should follow in the 1970 elections.
-2-
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972
and relatively stabilize the economy, presidential elections throughout
the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue, 11 First discovered
by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which
Middle America will vote if one canidate is OD the wrong side as
Humphrcy was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demon-
strations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash, " permissiveness,
violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate "a liberal, 11 on
these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as
victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee,
Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and
polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants
tougher administrators On campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography
and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on
the "Social Issue, 11 then "goodbyc Democrats. "
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in
which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party
will be in America in the years to come. 11
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves
as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent -- while those
identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gallup)
( The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative
Moderate Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
No Opinion
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
-3-
In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican)
should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat.)
However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is
that when individuals consider themselves "conservative, 11 it is
"conservative" on the Social Issue Americans will not abide a
"liberal" on the social issue, At the same time, however, polls
show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty
efforts, aid to education issues traditionally defined as "liberal. 11
How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:
11
the attitudional center of American politics today
involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness
on the Social Issue. 11
The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to
31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been some-
thing tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being
perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were
also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash, "
morals and disruption
The villans in Agnew's tirade were almost
exclusively white (kids) but throughout the South bumper stickers
blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero, 11 and a Southern politican was
quoted as saying he was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant
voting for Nixon, SO be it
In no Southern State are there enough
Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority
Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which
of the two suitors the South will accept: Wallaceite or Republican. 11
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70S
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats,
by carrying non-Southern States of Quadcali (California plus the
Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachuscits*) can win
national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than it
used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the
4-
electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be
able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the
society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build
upon it.
"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970
the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very
much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to
leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or
allace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats
fecl that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if
she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood,
picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures
and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then
goodbye, lady and goodbye Democrats. 11
(Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country
from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors
say it is the key to victory in presidential elections; and they dump
generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This
is the weakest part of the book. It is an effort to contrast their
approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which
is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two
strategics more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to
admit. )
ON LOW -KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even
glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day ? Twenty-five thousand ?
Fifty thousand ? A hundred thousand ? Two hundred and fifty thousand ?
A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humphrcy or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark,
Camden, and Tenafly all in the same day. 11,
-5-
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the
personal appearance
"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one
must remember that far more party workers the oughout the nation
are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot
on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by
a candidate's visit to Wechawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills
11
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be
judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national
television, national magazines, national columnists, and national
reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national
issues and national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals
in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts
deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as
well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or
crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys,
only bad environments
11
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican
gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President
Agnew says:
'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country docs
not share the philosphy of permissiveness expressed
by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of
our society. Be read with disgust all the rave reviews
the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book
1
than it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy 11
-6-
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of contrism. Democrats must heal the
wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are
1 he party of Middle America and not of the fat cats. 11
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left
party would take almost all its votes from one party the Democratic
party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left
party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of
the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue.
The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three
of five New Yorkers voted against returning him to the mayoralty in
the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not
been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino
would have cleaned up the floor with him.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat. "
"What other phrase better describes the results of an
election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman, 1 or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential
Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to
say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time
out. 11
As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN would
crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivably
bring about the election of George Wallace so much for Big John.
-7-
MYTHS & ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth
after another in this volume.
Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election
in 1968 was a vote "against Victnam. 11
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the
total vote in that state and a University of Michigan survey showed
that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from bawks dissatisfied that
LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time
of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop
the bombing; by 44 to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of
North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking
about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds:
That same day an anti-war amendment in doveish Madison as defeated
58-42; a law-and order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal
anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one
nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN
crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.
F inally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and
McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the
word Vietnam though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices
Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the
popular choices of. their parties (RN over Rocky 60-23; HHH over
McCarthy 58-38) and thus the only democratic choices. Rigged
conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-
five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was
not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and
the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new
and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a prescrip-
tion for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote
-8-
is the lowest percentages of any groups in America. Secondly, the
young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor
white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the
South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrcy
voter. Noither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns.
More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their
parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish
than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21.29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are no re
likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about
Ph. Ds the Democratic vote is greater here but the number of
voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also
true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest
11
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in
the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the
total number of black votes cast in 1968. 11
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, un-intellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old
housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is
herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to
18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock
out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back
seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car
won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is. 11
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the
papulation could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be
down to 15 percent; further
11
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went
for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrcy.
The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut went for HHH. 11
-9-
(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black
represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered
and voting, since unlike the poor and young blacks do vote in blocs
Democratic blocs,)
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor,
nine out of ten are white. 11
'PACKAGING' NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another.
But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with $3600 spent. While HHH was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV,
Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls yet Agnew
had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrcy. "Voters
are not nitwits. 11 RN was ahead because he
11
was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger
segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He was
a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is
simplistic and accurate
The feelings that Nixon
capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a
Border State Strategy they were part of a national
strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have
discussed earlier
It may be said in fact that Agnewism
as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew,
the individual, almost lost it for him. "
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats
and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again ---- no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the
union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or
HHII, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one
or the other of these groups.
(The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to
the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied
campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,
accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated
-10-
in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and
Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but
simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half
the women are afraid to go out at night.
WALLACE '72
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million
votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on
preciscly how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:
"Do Not Say: 'Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they invade a college
president's office, but I can understand their deep sense
of frustration. 1
Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be
treated as lawbreakers. 111
Example:
The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law
and order is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the
Social Issue -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against
crime. 11 They should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy. "
Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side
or the other on Vietnam rather than leave the impression of being
wishy-washy.
-11-
CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view
about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the
suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black,
to know that her brother-in-law - is a policeman, to know that
she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood
deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her
son is going to a community college where LSD was found on
the campus to know all this is the beginning of contemporary
political wisdom. 11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72
"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a
credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. This is a
volume the President cannot afford to overlook. Its three hundred
pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in
1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-
strategy which Republicans are going to have to adopt if they are
not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.
We can no longer count on our democratic friends to co-operate
in their own demise as they have in recent years. Liberals are
waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harriet
Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians like
нин, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course E.
course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order;
they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black redicals;
they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for
Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back
their white collar and blue collar defectors and they are going about it
the Scammon-Wattenburg way.
Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and
strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a
counter strategy 1 believe we should follow in the 1970 elections.
...
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972
and relatively stabilize the economy, presidential elections throughest
the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue, 11 First discovered
by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which
Middle America will vote if one canidate is on the wrong side as
Humphrcy was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demon-
strations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash, 11 permissiveness,
violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate "a liberal, 11 on
these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as
victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maior in Milwaukee,
Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and
polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants
tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornograph
and drugs. Jf. the Democrats do not move into that center position on
the "Social Issue, 11 then "goodbye Democrats. 11
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in
which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party
will be in America in the years to come. 11
THE RJSE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves
as "conservative" has risen from 16 to 51 percent - while those
identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gallup)
( The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative Moderate Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
No Opini:
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
-3-
In any normal election the moderate conservative (Repablican)
should have all advantage over the moderate liberal (Democral.)
However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is
that when individuals consider themselves "conservative, " it is
"conservative" on the Social Issue Americans will not abide a
"libeval" on the social issue. At the same time, however, polls
show Americans clearly favor inedicare, aid to cities, anti-poyerty
efforts, aid to education issues traditionally defined as "liberal. 1'
How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:
11
the attitudional center of American politics today
involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness
on the Social Issue. 11
The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to
31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been some-
thing tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being
perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were
also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash, 11
morals and disruption
The villans in Agnow's tirade were almost
exclusively white (kids) but throughout the South bumper stickers
blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero, 11 and a Southern politican was
quoted as saying be was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant
voting for Nixon, so be it
In no Southern State are there enough
Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority
Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which
of the two suitors the South will accept: Wallaceite or Republican. 11
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70S
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats,
by carrying non-Southern States of Quadcali (California plus the
Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts#) can win
national elections without the South, although it is more difficuli than it
used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the
...
electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be
able to cope V ith the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the
society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build
upon it.
"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970
the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very
much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to
leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or
Wallace or their ideological descendants, If she thinks that Democrate
feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if
she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood,
picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures
and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, thei
goodbye, lady and goodbye Democrats. 11
(Quadcali consisis of the Northeast Quadrant of the country
from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors
say it is the key to victory in presidential elections; and they dump
generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This
is the weakest part of the book. It is an effort to contrast their
approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which
is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two
strategies more than Scainmon and Wattenburg would care to
admit. )
ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear OF even
glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day ? Twenty-five thousand?
Fifty thousand ? A hundred thousand ? Two hundred and fifty thousand?
A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate au audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montelair, Newark,
Canidon, and Tenafly all in the same day. 11
-5-
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the
personal appearance?
"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one
must remember that far more party workers the oughout the nation
are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot
on a ncws-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by
a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short llills
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americaus will be
judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national
television, national magazines, national columnists, and national
reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national
issues and national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals
in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts
deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as
well as leading to do. There can be no pandering 1.0 disruption or
crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys,
only bad environments
11
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican
gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President
Agnew says:
"The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does
not share the philosphy of permissiveness expressed
by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of
our society. llc read with disgust all the rave reviews
the press gives the latest dirty movie or diity book
I
than it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy. 11
-6-
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of contrism. Democrate must heal the
wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are
i be party of Middle America and not of the fat cats. 11
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left
party would take almost all its votes from one party the Democratic
party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left
party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazios out of
the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue.
The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three
of five New Yorkers voted against returning him to the mayoralty in
the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not
been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino
would have cleaned up the floor with him.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat."
"What other phrase better describes the results of an
election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman, I or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential
Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to
say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last U.
out. 11
As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN would
crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivably
bring about the election of George Wallace so much for Big John.
-7-
MYTHS {: ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth
after another in this volume.
Myth No. ]: The vote in the primaries and general election
in 1968 was a vote "against Victnam. 11
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the
total vote in that state and a University of Michigan survey showed
that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that
LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time
of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop
the bombing; by 11 to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of
North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking
about it, but Vicinam was not the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds:
That same day an anti-war amendment in doveish Madison was defeated
58-42; a law-and order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maior) won over a liberal
anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one
nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN
crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.
F inally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and
McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the
word Vietnam though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged the popular choices
Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense Nixon and Humphrcy were far and away the
popular choices of their parties (RN over Rocky 60-23; Illum over
McCarthy 58-38) and this the only democratic choices. Rigged
conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-
five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was
not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and
the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new
and winning condition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a prescrip-
tion for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote
-8.
is the lowest percentages of any groups in America, Secondly, the
young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor
white from the Midwest was a Bkely Nixon voter; a poor white in the
South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Uumphrey
voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns.
More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their
parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish
than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21. 29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are 100 I'C
likely to vote Republicau than Democratic. If you are talking about
Ph. Ds the Democratic vote is greater here
but the number of
voters in SO miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also
true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest
11
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in
the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the
total number of black votes cast in 1968. "
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unperr,
unyoung, unblack, un-intellectval. The average voter is a 47-year-old
housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is
herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to
18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock
out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back
seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, OI the unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car
won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is.
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the
papulation could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be
down to 15 percent; further
11
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went
for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrcy.
The richest state in the nation Connecticut went for IDI
-9-
(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black
represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered
and voting, since unlike the poor and young blacks do vote in block
Democratic blocs.)
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpown,
ninc out of ten are white. 11
'PACKAGING NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another.
But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with $3600 spent. While IIDUS was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV,
Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls yet Agnew
had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Votors
are not nitwits. 11 RN was aboad because he
11
was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger
segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He was
a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is
simplistic
and accurate
The feelings that Nixon
capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a
Border State Strategy they were part of a national
strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have
discussed earlier
It may be said in fact that Agnewism
as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnow,
the individual, almost lost it for him. 11
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats
and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and :
union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace 03
HHD, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one
or the other of these groups.
(The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to
the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied
campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,
accusing McCarthy of seeking to have backs from Watts forcibly integra
-10-
in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and
Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but
simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half
the women are afraid to go out at night.
WALLACE '72
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million
votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on
precisely bow to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:
"Do Not Say: Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they invade a college
president's office, but I can understand their deep sense
of frustration. I
Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be
treated as Jawbreakers. 111
Example:
The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law
and order is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the
Social Issue they should say "I am for civil rights and against
crime. 11 They should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy. "
Humpbrey would have been better off had he come down OD one side
or the other on Victnam rather than leave the impression of being
wishy-washy:
-11-
CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view
about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the
suburbs she lived in a neighbor hood that because all black,
to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that
she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood
deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her
son is going to a community college where LSD was found on
the campus to know all this is the beginning of contemporary
political wisdom. "
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINVTON
August 2,1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & 172
"Tho Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains 2
credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. This is a
volume the President cannot afford to overlook. Its three hundred
pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in
1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-
strategy which Republicans are going to bave to adopt if they are
not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.
We can no longer count on our democratic friends to co-operate
in their own demise as they have in recent years. Liberals are
waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harriet
Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians EM
HIII, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course
:
course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order;
they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black radicals;
they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for
Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back
their white collar and blue collar defectors and they are going about it
the Scammon-Wattenburg way.
Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and
strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a
counter strategy ] believe we should follow in the 1970 elections.
-%-
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972
and relatively stabilize the economy, presidential elections the oughor :
the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue. 11 First discovered
by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which
Middle America will vote if one canidate is on the wrong side as
Humphrcy was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demon-
strations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash, 11 permissiveness,
violence, riots, crime, The voters will not tolerate "a liberal, 11 on
these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as
victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee,
Stenvig in Minucapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and
polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants
tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography
and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on
the "Social Issue, 11 then "goodbye Democrats. 11
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in
which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party
will be in America in the years to come. 11
THE RJSE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves
as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent while those
identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gallup)
( The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative Moderate Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
No Oph.
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
-3- 3
In any normal election the moderate conservative (Repablice)
should have all advantage over the moderate liberal (Domocrat.)
However, what this simple analysis fails in take into consideration ::
that when individuals consider themselves "conservative, " it is
"conservative" on the Social Issue
Americans will not abide a
"Biberal" on the social issue, At the same time, bowever, polls
show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poyer()
efforts, aid to education issues traditionally defined as "liberal. "
How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:
11
the attitudional center of American politics today
involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness
on the Social Issue, 11
The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to
31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it. has been some-
thing tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being
perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were
also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash, "
morals and disruption
The villans in Agnew's tixade were almost
exclusively white (kids)
but throughout the South bumper stickers
blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero, 11 and a Southern politican was
quoted as saying be was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant
voting for Nixon, SO be it
In no Southern State are there enough
Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority
Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which
of the two suitors the South will accept: Wallaceite or Republican. 11
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70S
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrate,
by carrying non-Southern States of Quadcali (California plus the
Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts%) can win
national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than in
used to be. Assuming that Republicans day near the center, One
.....
electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrate will be
able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the
society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build
upon it.
"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1975
the votes of the unyoung, uppoor, unblack Quadcalians are still vory
much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to
leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Ninon or
allace OF their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democra's
feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if
she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and 1.1
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood,
picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Démocrats are for the hip cultures
and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, the
goodbye, lady and goodbye Democrats. 11
* (Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country
from Wisconsin to Massacbuseits including California; the authors
say it is the key to victory in presidential elections; and they dump
generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This
is the weakest part of the book. If is an effort to contrast their
approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which
is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two
strategies more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to
admit. )
ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear OF OVCD
glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day ? Twenty-five thousand?
Fifty thousand ? A hundred thousand ? Two hundred and fifty thousand
A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humplieey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if be says something banal in Prenton, Montelair, Newrek
Camden, and Tenafly all in the same day. 11.
-5-
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the
personal appearance?
"There in probably seme limited birth to this, but again one
must remember that far more party workers the oughout the nation
are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot
on a nows-broadcast appearance 00 television than can be enthused by
a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short 1111) s
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americano will be
judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national
television, national magazines, national columnists, and national
reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national
issues and national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals
in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts
deep and must be approached on litile cat feel. There is learning as
well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption 00
crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys,
only bad environments
11
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican
gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President
Agnew says:
"The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does
not share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed
by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of
our society. De read with disgust all the rave reviews
the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book
1
than it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy. 11
-6.
FORMUL AS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of contrism. Democrate must heal the
wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are
i be party of Middle America and not of the fat cats. 11
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthern TO, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left
party would take almost all its votes from one party the Democratic
party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuri
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left
party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazics out of
the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue.
The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three
of five New Yorkers voted against returning him to the mayoralty in
the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not
been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacin:
would have cleaned up the floor with him.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat. 11
"What other phrase better describes the results of an
election in which a politician with national aspirations palls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman, 1 or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential
Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to
say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last
out. 11
As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN yo
crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivab'
bring about the election of George Wallace
so
much
for
Big
John.
-7-
MYTDS & ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth
after another in this volume.
Myth No. ]: The voic in the primaries and general election
in 1968 was a vote "against Victnam. 11
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the
total vote in that state and a University of Michigan survey showed
that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from bawks dissatisfied that
LBJ bad not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time
of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop
the bombing; by 14 to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of
North Victnam. Candidates and press may have been talking
about it, but Victnam was not the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds:
That saine day an anti-war amendment in doveish Madison was defeated
58-42; a law-and order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal
anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one
nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN
crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Engene.
F inally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and
McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the
word Vietnam though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged the popular choices
Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense Nixon and Ilumphrey were far and away the
popular choices of their parties
(RN over Rocky 60-23; IIIIII over
McCarthy 58-38) and this the only democratic choices. Rigged
conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-
five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was
not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and
the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a now
and winning coalition. Scanmon and Waitenburg believe this a prescrip
tion for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote
-8- 8
is the lowest percentages of any groups in America. Secondly, the
young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor
white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the
South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey
voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns.
More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their
parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 yéar olds are more hawkish
than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are ITD IC:
likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about
Ph. Ds the Democratic vote is greater bere but the number of
voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also
true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest
11
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in
the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the
total number of black votes cast in 1968. 11
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unper,
unyoung, unblack, un-intellectual. The average voter is a 17-year-old
housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is
herself married to 2 machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to
18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock
out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back
seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car
won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is.
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 7.2 percent of the
population could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be
down to 15 percent; further
11
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went
for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrey.
The richest state in the nation Connecticut went for 1110
-9-
(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black
represents it great plus for Democrats if they can got them registered
and voting, since unlike the poor and young blacks do vote in blocs
Democratic blocs. )
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are uppo in,
nine out of ten are white. 11
'PACKAGING' NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another.
But Stenvig won in Minncapolis with $3600 spent. While INHI was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV,
Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls yet Agnew
had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrcy. "Votors
are not nitwits. 11 RN was ahead because he
11
was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger
segment of the electorate than was his opposition. llc was
a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is
simplistic and accurate
The feelings that Nixon
capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a
Border State Strategy they were part of a national
strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have
discussed earlier
It may be said in fact that Agnewism
as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnow,
the individual, almost lost it for him. 11
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats
and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and 11
union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or
IIHII, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one
or the other of these groups.
(The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to
the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied
campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,
accusing McCarthy of seeking to have Backs from Watts foreibly integrat
-10- -
in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and
Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but
simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half
the wornen are afraid to go out at night.
WALLACE 172
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million
votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on
precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voicrs. Example:
"Do Not Say: "Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they invade a college
president's office, but I can understand their deep sense
of frustration. I
Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be
treated as Jawbreakers. 111
Example:
The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law
and order is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the
Social Issue they should say "I am for civil rights and against
crime. 11 They should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy. 11
Humpbrcy would have been better off had be come down ()) one side
or the other on Vicinam rather than leave the impression of being
wishy-washy.
-)]-
CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know the : she has a mised view
about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the
suburbs she lived in a neighbor Loss that because all black,
to know that her brother. in-lay is i' policeman, to loos. the
she does not have the money to mos C if her new neighborhood
deteriorates, to know that she is deoply distressed that her
son is going to EL community college where LSD was found on
the campus to know all this is the beginning of contemport
political wisdom. 11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scammon Wattenburg thesis which I believe is
right on the mark for Democrats we are in serious danger of
being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs scent
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right
side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right HOW
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
S tick as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black
rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their
record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest
with them primarily on the Economic Issue Big Spenders, etc.
as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success.
Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses
with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those
Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism"
and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are strong
and they are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970 ? We must assume left-
wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Repub-
licans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing
voters are thus Democrats law and order Democrats, conservatives
on the "Social Issue, 11 but "progressive" on domestic issues. This
is the Wattenburg thesis
and I think it is basically correct. How
to conduct ourselves then.
-2-
Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical"
label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist"
label on the President's programs for reforming society, for
getting America moving.
Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats. 11 No one
can do this better than the Vice President but we cannot get these
voters by using rehashed Republican arguments or stale
Republican rhetoric.
"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with
our Republicans we are using it in all our GOP literature but
will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may
mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress"
does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)
3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on Tiots etc. by
Democrats may anger "liberals, 11 but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's
go straight after the Daley Democrats.
4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the
Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on
dome stic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership
of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
P ornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man
trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of in flation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in forcign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the
dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong
but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could
best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats whore
the missing element in the Grand New Party.
-3-
5. There is move afoot to "low-key" the Vice President's
campaign in 1970 to have him focus specially on the local issue
and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between
garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates
the two are thoroughly complimentary.
The Democrats see Scammon's book - are only now coming
around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 that a strong
statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey
than a baual statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The
way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to
praise him to the skies, fine but to hammer the national
Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press
corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if
possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial
Candidate while we are helping the local one.
Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the
potential best show in town. All we hav C to do to forfeit that national
P ublicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper,
as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that
when we give up the television time on the networks someone
else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.
Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete
with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here
which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues
that carry no national wallop.
We should have something topical and tough for the national
media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican
Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his
decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like
raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, fromthe Scammon book, we should tar the
Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of
bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, 11 the party whose
last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to
testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this
-4-
country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking
RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has
altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student
radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as
selling out to the crazies in their own ranks and selling out the
interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in
the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-
liberals" in his own party.
7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive)position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishnent" that is responsible
for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)
8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or
not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea
since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not
likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhotoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same
kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social
Issue.
9. Finally, to change the Vice Presi dent now into the
traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for
a losing one.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHUNGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scammon- lattenburg thesis which I believe is
right on the mark for Democrats we are in serious danger of
being driven back to our minority party posture Our needs seem
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrats to got back on the right
side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
S
tick as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black
rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their
record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest
with them primarily on the Economic Issue Big Spenders, etc.
as the major assault scenis to me not a prescription for success.
Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses
with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those
Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism"
and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are strong
and they are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970 ? We must assume left-
wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Repub-
licans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing
voters are thus Democrats law and order Democrats, conservatives
on the "Social Issue, 11 but "progressive" on domestic issues. This
is the Wattenbur 8 thesis
and I think it is basically correct. Bow
to conduct ourselves then.
-2.
Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical"
label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist"
label on the President's programs for reforming society, for
getting America moving.
Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats, 11 No one
can do this better than the Vice President but we cannot get these
voters by using rehasbed Republican arguments or stale
Republican rhetoric.
"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with
OUT Republicans we are using it in all our GOP literature but
will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may
mean the medicare for bis mom or old man ? (Foot-dragging Congress"
does not seem charged with much electricity, either. )
3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by
Democrats may anger "liberals, 11 but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (ro Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's
go straight after the Dalcy Democrats.
4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the
Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on
done stic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership
of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
P ornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man
trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of in flation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the
dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong
but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could
best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats whome
the missing element in the Grand New Party.
-3-
5. There is move afoot to "low-key" the Vice President's
campaign in 1970 to have him focus specially on the local issue
and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between
garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates
the two are thoroughly complimentary.
The Democrats see Scanmon's book are only now coming
around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 that a strong
statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey
than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The
way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to
praise him to the Jes, fine but to hammer the national
Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press
corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if
possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial
Candidate while we are helping the local one.
Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the
potential best show in town. All we hav C to do to forfeit that national
P ublicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper,
as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that
when we give up the television time on the networks someone
else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.
Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete
with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here
which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues
that carry no national wallop.
We should have something topical and tough for the national
media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican
Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his
decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like
raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, fromthe Scammon book, WC should tax the
Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of
bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, 11 the party whose
last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order 10
testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this
4-
country Lum into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking
RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has
altered its historic foreign policy position in kow-tow to student
radicals who bully ragged those same leaders in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as
selling out to the crazies in their own ranks and selling out the
interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in
the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-
liberals" in bis own party.
7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive)position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible
for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)
8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or
not we are in it, "recession" seems to me a ulterly foolish idea
since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not
likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same
kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social
Issue.
9. Finally, to change the Vice dont now into the
traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for
a losing one.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHING TON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scammon. Wattenbung thesis which I believe is
right on the mark for Democrate we are in serious dauger of
being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right
side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
S tick as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black
rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their
record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest
with them primarily on the Economic Issue
Big Spenders, etc.
as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success.
Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses
with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those
Congresses, Jo, these same Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism" "
and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are strorg
and they are weak.
2. Where are the awing voters in 1970? We must assume left.
wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Repub.
licans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swire
voters are thus Democrats law and order Democrats, conservative
on the "Social Issue, 11 but "progressive" on domestic issues. This
is the Wattenburg thesis
and 1 think it is basically correct. How
to conduct ourselves then.
-%
Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "redical
Jabel on social policy; tar them as well with the "obs tructionist"
Jabel on the President's programs for reforming society, for
getting America moving.
Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats. 11 No one
can do this better than the Vice President but we cannot get these
voters by using rehashed Republican arguments or stale
Republican rhetoric.
"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with
OUT Republicans we are using it in all our GOP literature but
will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may
mean the medicare for bis mom OT old man ? (Foot-dragging Congress
does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)
3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by
Democrats may anger "liberals, 11 but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's
go straight after the Daley Democrats.
4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the
Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on
dome stic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership
of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
P ornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man
trying with voto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of in flation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the
dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong
but these 1 would think would be the ways the Vice President could
best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats whote
the missing element in the Grand New Party.
-3-
5. There is move afoot to "Jow-key" the Vice President's
campaign in 1970 to have him focus specially on the local issue
and not seek the nation al publicity. There is no conflict between
garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates
the two are thoroughly complimentary.
The Democrats see Scammon's book - are only now coming
around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 that a strong
statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey
than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The
way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Gandidate is to
praise him to the skics, fine but to hammer the national
Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press
corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if
possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial
Candidate while we are helping the local one.
Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the
potential best show in town. All we hav C to do to forfeit that national
P ublicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper,
as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that
when we give up the television time
on the networks
someone
else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.
Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete
with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here
which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues
that carry no national wallop.
We should have something topical and tough for the national
media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican
Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his
decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like
raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.
A hard-hitting lough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, fromthe Scanmon book, we should tax the
Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of
bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, 11 the party whose
last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to
testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this
-1-
country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking
RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has
altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student
radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Beadership should be portrayed 2.S
selling out to the crazies in their own ranks and selling out the
interests and views of the good patriotic Derucrats who number in
the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-
liberals" in his own party.
7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive)position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible
for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishme: :
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)
8. The Economic Issue, To get into a debate on whether or
not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea
since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not
likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhotoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhotoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same
kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social
Issue.
9. Finally, 10 change the Vice Presi dent now into the
traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for
a losing one.