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This file contains:
Document detailing advice from Bob Dole. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: RN's image in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
Telephone call recommendation sent from Colson, presumably to Haldeman, suggesting that he contact Thatcher Longstreth in Philadelphia. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
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WHSF: Contested, 7-18
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26145071
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WHSF: Contested, 7-18
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This file contains:
Document detailing advice from Bob Dole. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: RN's image in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
Telephone call recommendation sent from Colson, presumably to Haldeman, suggesting that he contact Thatcher Longstreth in Philadelphia. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
7
18
>
Campaign
Other Document
Document detailing advice from Bob Dole. 2
pgs.
7
18
11/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman
RE: RN's image in the 1972 campaign.
Handwritten notes on original added by
unknown. 4 pgs.
7
18
11/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
Telephone call recommendation sent from
Colson, presumably to Haldeman, suggesting
that he contact Thatcher Longstreth in
Philadelphia. Handwritten notes added by
Haldeman. 1 pg.
Friday, June 18, 2010
Page 1 of 1
Speeches -
Dole blames lack of coverage on press operation at the RNC; says
no matter how many speeches you give or how good they are, if they
don't get to the press, they're useless. I asked him whose fault it was
they don't get to the press, and he said the Committee operation is a
disaster. Says Nofziger has a bunch of people who can't produce. I
asked why not fire them. He said they're Lyn's people and Lyn is the
President's man. I said, the consensus at the White House is that
you ought to take hold of that operation and make it work. Dole says
Nofziger takes three-hour lunches -- 12 to 3, that's when everything
happens on the Hill, and you have to be around then. Lyn apparently
has no working relationships with the press.
Dole said Committee is falling apart. I said if it falls, it'll fall on
you. He disagreed, said he has a letter, either from RN or Mitchell,
delineating responsibilities -- Tom Evans is supposed to run the Com-
mittee; Evans has big ego problem. He already put two secretaries in
hospital; brought in Barry Mountain -- his friend - - now Mountain
wasn't speaking to him. RN told Dole not to get involved in penny-ante
operations, to concentrate on big stuff and leave the driving to Evans.
Evans can't drive.
Dole supposed to meet next week with MacGruder and Fleming; said
there is rumor Evans may quit. Dole says MacGruder and Fleming
-2-
won't deal with Evans. Morale is rock bottom at Committee.
Dole suggested meeting with communications people at White House.
I said it should be with Colson. Dole agreed to this; wants Nofziger
there also to get everything on the line. I said I would arrange for
Tuesday.
Colson can't make Tuesday. It is presently set up for Thursday
at 11:00 a.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 4, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
The President's posture in
the 1972 Campaign
The President should carry into 1972 the ground rules he laid down
in 1971 about discussing politics and being involved in obvious political
activities only if and when necessary. We have a great opportunity in
the first six months of 1972 to portray the President as the world states-
man that he is and to bring into very sharp focus the contrast with all
of the Democratic candidates who will be cannibalizing one another
throughout primary time. The President will be the peace-maker --
the Journey for Peace to China, the consummation of SALT, the end
of the Vietnam involvement, the progress of the Nixon Doctrine and
the Soviet Summit. If the economy is neutralized as an issue, then
the major emphasis of the first six months should be on Nixon's world
leadership.
(The unfinished agenda in foreign policy is as important as the accom-
plishments that he brings about next year. Winston Churchill ended
World War II and the British people decided they didn't need him any
more his job was done; hence, all of the things we do in the first
six months of next year are but a prelude to the events which lie ahead,
which events can create generations of peace. In short, next year should
not be the culmination of the successful Nixon foreign policy; it must
represent a major half-way point.)
The President probably cannot get away with refusing to answer political
questions in press conferences in the coming year but, whatever he does,
he should dust them off lightly and quickly. He should show a distinct
lack of concern with politics. Whatever McCloskey does in New Hamp-
shire, it is of no consequence the President's mind is on bigger things.
If McCloskey does badly, let the Republican Party not the President
do the cheering. If McCloskey does relatively well, it is of no concern
to the President. There are no visible political strategy sessions at the
White House; there is no political crisis involving the President's personal
participation; there is no lack of confidence in the inner circle.
-2-
The President is on a very high plateau of leadership at the moment.
If we are successful in sustaining it and, if the foreign policy initiatives
develop as planned, he should be on that same plateau in June of next
year.
Those of us within the President's political family should be fastidi-
ously cultivating key voter blocs, promoting politically appealing
programs, maximizing favorable media exposure and organizing like
hell -- but it should be low profile. We shouldn't talk about it. It
shouldn't be evident or in any way visible. The President and the
men around him are concerned with the enormous progress that he
is making in achieving a more rational, peaceful world order. In
this same vein, the President should not reply to critics and should
avoid any strident attacks on any one. Let the Vice President and
the Cabinet do the hatchet work. We want a picture of a President
who is consumed with his quest for peace, restoring a peacetime
economy and pursuing vigorously and personally two or three key
domestic initiatives.
This is not to suggest that we ignore subtle political opportunities.
Speaking forums should be carefully selected for the greatest impact
they have on key voting blocs -- veterans. aging. ethnics. Catholics,
etc.
The transition next summer should be as gradual as possible. Obvious-
ly, the political fat will be in the fire after the Republican Convention
at which point the President's rhetoric shifts to the great promise
which the future holds for America in terms of peace in the world, a
strong and competitive economy, and a government responsive to the
needs of the American people (whatever our key domestic thrust is --
the value added tax and school proposal, welfare reform or whatever).
It is nearly impossible to draw a projected Presidential campaign
strategy today for the period of September and October 1972. If all
goes well and we are riding high, the President must remain very
Presidential, self-assured and above the battle. This would be parti-
cularly true if Kennedy is the opponent. Kennedy will be strident,
sharp, cutting and very divisive. He will have large, enthusiastic
youthful audiences and his campaign will seem to have great exuberance
but by his rhetoric and his style he will turn off one voter for every
voter he turns on. We will be sorely tempted to tangle with him.
We must ride above the battle to make the contrast as vivid as possible.
The polls next September could well dictate another strategy but if
the nominee if Kennedy, I doubt it. Our job will be to assist him in
defeating himself.
-3-
If the opponent is Muskie or another relatively non-controversial
centrist, the President's campaign strategy may well have to be
governed by the relative standing in the polls immediately following
the Convention. If we maintain the leadership plateau all year, we
should try to keep it through the campaign. If we are behind, we may
have to fight and meet our opponent head on and if the opponent happens
to be Muskie, then unlike the situation with Kennedy, it may be our
task to sharpen the issues. We may have to score on him and force
him to be fully tested in the eyes of the electorate. Depending again
on the standing in the polls, we might even need to come out swinging
with a Harry Truman 1948 style campaign.
Mv own guess at this time is that our opponent will be Kennedy. He
may start out relatively high in the polls but it will be all downhill for
him if we remain "above" him and demonstrate by contrast his imma-
turity against the President's leadership. If it is Muskie, I believe
we will start out well ahead in the polls and our principal concern
will be to ensure that he does not slowly creep up on us; that as the
campaign ho-hums along, he doesn't gradually rebuild the traditional
Democratic coalition. Muskie is the kind of candidate who could gain
momentum in a campaign and we might be forced, even if we start
out ahead, to take him to the mat and to sharpen the issues.
The foregoing points out how difficult it is to be specific as to Presi-
dential campaign involvement for the months of September and October.
Subject to unknown events, I feel relatively clear in my sown mind as to
the strategy we should pursue up until September 1st; beyond that, it
all depends.
Assuming we have it our way, that we are ahead, that the President
is on the plateau of leadership, that we have effectively organized,
that we have developed the issues and cultivated effectively the key
voting blocs then the President should maintain his high Presidential
posture throughout the campaign. This would mean very few campaign
stump appearances or political rallies, extensive use of radio during
which the President talks about leadership, the Presidency and the
goals for America in the next four years and. indeed. for the next
generation, a few direct television appearances to the American people
building our record, and more importantly our hopes for the future
and carefully timed Presidential news events and announcements.
The President should do just enough physical campaigning to keep the
spirit and enthusiasm of the party workers alive. If he is ahead and
riding the leadership plateau, he should not be seen going out to the
hustings. He should be seen frequently doing the job of the President
and leading the Government.
-4-
One point deserves very careful advance planning. We need in the
months of September and October to exploit fully the advantages of
incumbency but not to be obvious in doing it. We need to carefully
plan those news events which we can control, which will be positive,
appealing either to the vast majority of people or to key voting blocs
and have them ready to go in September and October. In other words,
we should store up a bag of "goodies" ready for use during the cam-
paign. Johnson's bombing halt in 1968 was about as subtle as a sledge
hammer. Obviously, it helped Humphrey but it is not the kind of thing
I am thinking of because we would have trouble with something that big
and major in the closing days of the campaign. The liberal press
would let one of their own get away with it but they would crucify us
and call it political treachery. The kind of thing I am thinking about
would be export grain shipments (for example, like the one we have
just engineered this week with the Soviets), the release of parks in
critical areas, announcements of a major work for welfare require-
ment, a significant policy decision affecting Indian lands, the release
of an Administration study calling for guaranteed annual wages for
construction workers, the announcement of increased veterans benefits,
perhaps some major defense contr act Some of these
could be done without the charge of politics. The selection process
will have to be extremely judicious. We also will want to begin saving
these up through the summer.
This is, to me, one critically important project that we annust undertake
regardless of onr campaign style. This we can use to our advantage
no matter what the Presidential posture is at that time.
Return to Mr. Colson tonight
A/NNY
SENSITIVE
TELEPHONE CALL RECOMMENDATION
THATCHER LONGSTRETH
Losing Candidate in Mayorial
Race in Philadelphia
RECOMMENDED BY:
CHARLES W. COLSON MR
BACKGROUND:
Your call to Rizzo to congratulate
him on his victory will have a
brilliant political effect. He may
didn't Re take
well help us next year.
The Republican organization that
on the Pathe
supported Longstreth, however, if
they hear about it, could well be
badly alienated. The perfect situation
admin in his
next year in Philadelphia would be to
have Rizzo neutral and the regular
Republicans solidly for us (I am not
concerned about the Jewish and Black
Campaign
If the the probably vote condolence Republican Rizzo that take call,
Longstreth got, but rather
mainline vote). Hence
a call to Longstreth would
any of the sting out of
should they learn of
As What specifically
the latter.
I realize that Longstreth is a jackass,
did he TALKING Day POINTS: ?
but I just think this call would be good
insurance with some of the Republicans.
1. You put on a good show and did
your best.
2. Hope you will continue to provide
leadership for the Republican Party
in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania.
Submission Date: November 4, 1971