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This file contains:
From Buchanan to Haldeman and the Attorney General RE: the Manhattan Twelve. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/13/1971
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to Haldeman RE: analysis of potential Democratic presidential candidates in 1972. Handwritten note on original added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/10/1971
From Ken Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Muskie's announcement of his candidacy and the White House's response. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/8/1971
From Buchanan to the Attorney General and Haldeman RE: second, less productive meeting with the Manhattan Twelve. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/3/1971
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: "The Conservative Case for Richard Nixon." Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/1/1971
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WHSF: Contested, 7-23
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This file contains:
From Buchanan to Haldeman and the Attorney General RE: the Manhattan Twelve. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/13/1971
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to Haldeman RE: analysis of potential Democratic presidential candidates in 1972. Handwritten note on original added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/10/1971
From Ken Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Muskie's announcement of his candidacy and the White House's response. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/8/1971
From Buchanan to the Attorney General and Haldeman RE: second, less productive meeting with the Manhattan Twelve. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/3/1971
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: "The Conservative Case for Richard Nixon." Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/1/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
7
23
12/13/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman and the
Attorney General RE: the Manhattan
Twelve. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
7
23
12/10/1971
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Buchanan to
Haldeman RE: analysis of potential
Democratic presidential candidates in 1972.
Handwritten note on original added by
unknown. 1 pg.
7
23
12/8/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Ken Khachigian to Buchanan RE:
Muskie's announcement of his candidacy and
the White House's response. 1 pg.
7
23
12/3/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Buchanan to the Attorney General and
Haldeman RE: second, less productive
meeting with the Manhattan Twelve. 3 pgs.
Friday, June 25, 2010
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
7
23
12/1/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: "The
Conservative Case for Richard Nixon."
Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 2 pgs.
Friday, June 25, 2010
Page 2 of 2
Chilielma (12/21
HAS
seen
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes Only
December 13, 1971
fyi.
MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
SUBJECT:
THE MANHATTAN TWELVE
Sunday, for five hours at the Watergate Apartment, Chuck Colson,
Dave Keene, Max Friedersdorf and Imet with five members of the
Manhattan Dozen; they included Jeff Bell and John Jones of ACU,
Wayne Thorburn, one of the two leaders of YAF, and both Tom Winter
and Allan Ryskind of Human Events. In our judgment the meeting was a
success. Of the conservative "planks" which had been set down, Chuck
Colson answered the majority of domestic questions to their satisfaction;
and indicated that the "thrust" of the Defense Budget coming up would be
clearly in the direction that many of us inside, as well as the Conservatives
outside, would like to see,
The President's veto of Child Development, the nature of that veto, clearly
established our credibility with the conservatives, and set a positive
framework for discussions.
As a consequence of those five hours, the following:
1. The conservatives agreed to talk to Ashbrook and to try to convince
the rest of the Twelve that this week Ashbrook --when he makes his
promised statement should state that he needs far more time to think
over the requirements and complexities of a primary run, and will make
a final decision at a press conference "before the First of January."
2. The conservatives agreed, after considerable debate, that Ashbrook --
in light of the day care veto -- would not "move his candidacy forward" this
week if the five conservatives could prevail on the others. They agreed
that the best approach would be not to give a "go signal" althis point. They
agreed further that Ashbrook's New Hampshire effort should take no public
forward steps and that the conservatives themselves should make no
subrosa efforts, except those currently essential to Ashbrook's running --
should that decision come before the First of January.
Eyes Only
-2-
3. What the conservatives are looking for is a) Signals of intention to
move in the domestic direction, which we indicated the President was
moving and most specifically b) Solid evidence that the new Defense Budget
will be what we indicated it would be
i.
"thrusting" in the direction
of stronger defense posture for U. S., especially in the strategic sector
which is their most immediate and direct concern.
4. They will get back to me to indicate whether or not the objective
conditions in New Hampshire (i. , time needed for petitions and lining
up delegates) permits them to hold back any public action until the last
minute, which as of now we agreed should be as close as possible to the
first of the year.
My reading of them is this:
There is a disposition among most of them there (especially the Human
Events people) not to run anyone against the President if they can possibly
do that. What they are interested in is some policy direction changes
not in a primary challenge. If we can come through on the Defense side,
and can send some public signals, then my view is that Colson, Buchanan
and Keene have convinced this group that not to run is the best possible
course for the future effectiveness of the conservative movement.
We indicated that the leverage of conservatives within the White House and
the Administration would not be enhanced by an Ashbrook candidacy; it could
well nigh be terminated; further that any open public moves right now toward
candidacy would not lead toward the objectives they want within the Adminis-
tration. Rather, such a course would induce a "To hell with the Kooks"
attitude in the White House, which would militate against the very objectives
they pursue. In my judgment, again, we persuaded the majority of those
present of the wisdom of this course and they will attempt to so persuade
the balance of their delegation.
However, if we cannot deliver anything of substance on the Defense Budget
despite the doubts of some of them about this course of action -- they will
gear up a campaign against the President in New Hampshire and elsewhere.
Whether or not they want to go against the President, and many of them like
Bartleby's Scrivener 11 would prefer not to, 11 they will have to; indeed they
have to go to vindicate their threat, if nothing is forthcoming.
What's To Be Done?
In my judgment we should immediately send out a signal or two to them.
-3-
Specific examples would be:
1.
Appointment of a strong security man like John Foster to the empty
Packard post as Assistant Secretary of Defense.
2. Public announcement by a high Administration official, that, given some
of the abuses to which the Legal Services Corporation in legislation --
was being opened we intend now to "ask for a Governor's veto" of all legal
services programs. We could argue this on the grounds: a) majority of
Governors are Democratic; and for Congress to be against this provision
implies a lack of trust in their own state leaders b) the possibility of abuses
which could injure the program's effectiveness and diminish its support
are SO rife, that a veto now seems essential.
Finally that, considering the principle of accountability we believe that any
such controversial program as Legal Services should win the support of a
Governor of a State, as, after all he is the highest elective official of that
state, and the one who must necessarily be responsive to the people. This
is democratic principle; this is the essence of majority rule.
Last point: Methinks the groundwork, at this point in time, has been ploughed
to abort the Ashbrook candidacy. There are "hawks" among the conservativos;
William Rusher, Stan Evans, Mr. Loeb, and others, who would like to "go"
under any conditions. But 11 we can produce something tangible in the
Defense Budget (reportedly Goldwater has already been given such assurances)
then we can abort this candidacy before it is born. In my view that is surely
in the President's long-term interest. If the Far Right of our party goes
charging off in New Hampshire, and is humiliated and routed, a good many
people will be embittered; wounds will have been opened within the party which
may not have healed in time for November when we need everyone.
On the other hand, if we can provide these assurances on defense, I think
perhaps we can program Ashbrook in the end of December to give a ringing
endorsement the President, and to call on all conservatives everywhere
to maintain his principles, build for the future, and work out their problems
within the framework of a Nixon Presidency, which is the most effective
vehicle for the kind of changes we want. If Ashbrook used the occasion for
a "let's get aboard speech" instead of an announced candidacy, it would truly
help us in resolving our difficulties with the Right and unite the party for
an election where we are going to have to be united.
Buchanan
CC:
Colson
Keene
Goodearle
bat
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Thanks
December 10, 1971
t
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Reason for that piece was this:
What we want is a deadlocked, divided convention, just as the
Democrats wanted a knock-down drag-out between Nixon-Rockefeller-
Reagan in 1968. Instead, we moved steadily and early - and all
but locked it up.
Muskie, in my view, is quietly locking out the bloodbath possibility
with few people aware of how far along his campaign is. If
Kenned-- the columnists and, most important, the far left are
cognizant of how close Muskie is, if this is publicized, the
possibilities are greater that they will get off their McGovern fling,
get together and get into the race to stop the guy. If Muskie is seen
as so close and otherslike Humphrey want it, then they might start
to work on him and might work to block him. What I am afraid of
is that the Democrats are going to wake up in March, and find the
nomination closed . accept that fact, and rally behind him. One
friend high up in the Democratic National Committee tells me that
there is a possibility if Muskie rolls through Wisconsin, Kennedy
will endorse him. I can't believe that -- but if something like that
occurred we've got problems.
Buchanan
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
December 8, 1971
ARKING
E.O. 12006, Section 6-102
By EP
MARS, Date 2-2-82
GONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN then
Muskie is going to announce on January 4 from news
accounts. I recommend that we ask John Ehrlichman and
Bob Haldeman to give some consideration to an "important"
administration announcement on the same day.
It would be nice to blow Muskie off the front page or at
least prevent him from grabbing headlines and maybe even
pushing him back a little bit on the network shows.
Do we have anything ready to go that we can cut loose
on January 4th?
1 AOH NA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 3, 1971
By
CONFIDENTIAL / IMMEDIATE
MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
The Manhattan Twelve gathered again Wednesday. From the White
House point of view, the convocation was the least constructive to date.
They were not dissatisfied with the Administration (Colson, Buchanan)
response to their list of "demands;" they were outraged. For some.
the meeting served as a catharsis, a point of final departure from the
Nixon Administration. My friend, Bill Rusher, the most hawkist, leader
of the group and designated spokesman, would tell me nothing other than
they were heading off, and "you are welcome to join us." Rusher, as
in will 1110 some time age, made a personal commitment to sever any
remaining ties with the Administration, if Taiwan were expelled. By
written memorandum, Rusher has urged upon the twelve the case for
the defeat of Richard Nixon -- "at all costs" as they put it even if it
carries with it the certainty of electing Teddy Kennedy. His memorandum,
which argues the case that this is the last best hope for conservatives, is
reportedly witty and well-written -- but badly argued. Have been unable
as stated, to lay hands upon a copy, so that I could write a rebuttal for
the next meeting.
The Twelve have maintained an utterly close-mouthed attitude about
both proceedings and decisions. From outside sources, however, have
learned the following.
1) A number of options are being explored; they run from an open
challenge to the President in the New Hampshire, Florida and California
primaries to a Third Party effort in the General election. My source
indicates that they have already made contact with Bill Loeb of the
Union-Leader; their political man, Jerry Harkins, has explored the
possibility of running a primary candidate against the President.
2) Some of them are now so anti-Nixon that they cannot, under conceivable
circumstances, be brought back into the fold. Among the twelve and
their other colleagues assembled, the following are the anti-Nixon hawks:
-2-
William Rusher (Publisher, NR)
M. Stanton Evans (Indianapolis Trib Ed Page Editor; ACU Chief)
James Burnham (Columnist, NR)
Frank Myer (Vice Chairman, N. Y. Conservative Party)
Ron Docksai (YAF Chairman)
Neil McCaffrey (Conservative Book Club)
Jerry Harkins (Political Operative -- Crane's Campaign Manager)
John Jones (ACU Exec -- was not present Wednesday)
3) In the middle, those perhaps amenable to an accommodation, but
still disenchanged, are Dan Mahoney of the N. Y. Conservative Party,
and Jeff Bell, Editor of ACU publication. Anthony Harrigan was not
present; don't know where he stands.
4) Doves include the Human Events people, Allan Ryskind and Tom
Winter, and William F. Buckley, Jr. (Apparently, Bill regaled the
gathering with his wit; his political recommendations, however, were
themselves the subject of some humor. My guess is that since Bill is
such = independent spirit, he must be a hit uncomfortable being yokea in
harness in a twenty-mule team whose direction he alone cannot possibly
control.)
5) The YAF leaders are reportedly anxious to make a go against the
President, both to show their youth turn-out to the media and for
organizational and other purposes.
6) The elements upon which any challenge to the President would be
raised would include the editors and writers here involved, their publica-
tions, the New York Conservative Party, the Michigan Conservative Party,
the United Republicans of California, Phyllis Schlafly and her women
supporters, and the ACU organizations that seem to be popping up, in
New Jersey and elsewhere.
7) My source indicates that they have covert support within the Republican
Party in the Congress; and that there is no problem for a money standpoint.
A number of traditional GOP moneymen, whose names I could not acquire,
are said to be willing to fund the effort, when it goes.
8) F. Clifton White was not present at this meeting.
9) Am unable to determine just who they would focus upon as a candidate,
should they decide to go either in the primaries or the General. Got a
soft -- not a hard -- impression that Reagan is privately concerned about
-3-
trends within the Administration. There was no negative word with
regard to Jim Buckley (whose defense man, Bill Schneider) was present --
but there is a feeling among them that Senator Goldwater did his job in
1964 and could not be expected or counted upon to support them now.
10) The major issues which concern them, despite the laundry list are
a) Defense and b) FAP. One source indicated that if there were some
way we could indicate something positive from the Defense Budget, that
might help create some dissent from the prevailing view within the ranks.
They are cognizant, however, that the Budget is not presented until after
the filing deadline for New Hampshire is passed.
11) From comments from those who refuse to talk, one gets the
impression that they are readying some media-making event in the near
future. Don't know what it is or what form it will take -- but something
nice I am sure.
BUCHANAN ASSESSMENT: This seems a fairly serious problem. Right
now, we could win without these conservatives and their train; but right
is not October of 1972. So long as they command meeting and
talking, there was no great problem. But, should they "get it all together"
and announce something rather exciting, then their efforts would take on
a new momentum of their own. A National Conservative Party in the
General election, if the threat is to be taken seriously, could be a
problem (There was talk further of canalizing efforts and running a
conservative candidate only in those states where it would be sure to
cost the President the state.)
While the possibility exists, it would be an error to write these fellows
off as bluffers or talkers without follow-through. Currently, they resemble
a milling herd of cattle, making considerable noise and doing little harm;
but if they start moving off together in one direction -- picking up every
stray anti-Nixon conservative in the country -- they could be difficult to
stop.
My hope had been that something like Child Development-OEO could be
brought down here for a Presidential veto, with a tough message, which
might then cause at least some of them to say, wait a minute, the returns
aren't all in. But that does not now seem in the cards, as the House is to
do the honors.
Any event, will keep on top of this; the ACU board is meeting Sunday;
perhaps something may come out of that.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 1, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
agree
H
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Would be happy to put together The Conservative Case for Richard
Nixon -- but the time to do that is not now. Definitely not.
First, The Conservative Case for Richard Nixon, if it is to be
effective, would have to be comprehensive. What Nixon has done
for Conservatives in three years. Thus, we would throw the book
at them (Four Justices of the Supreme Court, the unleashing of the
Vice President, ABM, Vietnam, Cambodia, Middle East crisis,
Law and Order, etc., etc., etc.)
Methinks a very convincing case could be made -- but once made, the
job can't be done again, with the same dramatic impact. And we don't
need it done SO much now -- as we are going to need it done later.
The reasons are these:
Coming up are the trade with the Soviets decision, which is
going to outrage them further, the Budget which they will look at
extremely closely in the defense area, the trips to China and the
Soviet Union, about which they are deeply apprehensive, the decision
on FAP, and the outcome of SALT. These are the Big Rocks.
The time to make the case for the President is after these are behind
us.
If we shoot our wad now, many conservatives will say, "Well, that's
a powerful argument; I think we have to be for Nixon." But then comes
some supertrade deal with Moscow, and FAP and any gains we made
go right out the window -- and the Conservative Case for Richard Nixon
cannot be made again; and then is when it will be most needed.
We ought to compile all the materials for The Conservative Case for
Richard Nixon, but go with a piece for massive mailing -- only when
the crunch comes and we need it. Not a year before the election.
-2-
Right now, the Manhattan Twelve have decided upon a course of
action, I know not what. And if they go the primary route, which
I suspect they desire, then, when the primary date approaches,
we will have to go with it.
But there are yet more arguments to be heard, with months to go
before the convention, before the time for a summation of the
Conservative Case for Richard Nixon. We will lose some of those
battles in the interim, with conservatives; we will win some. Let's
wait until the conservative case for the prosecution of Richard Nixon
has completed its clsoing arguments, before we make our pitch in
his defense.
Buchanan