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This file contains:
From Higby to Strachan RE: R.W. Apple and Tom Weicker. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/1/1972
From Higby to Haldeman RE: scheduling problems. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/4/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 7-44
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WHSF: Contested, 7-44
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This file contains:
From Higby to Strachan RE: R.W. Apple and Tom Weicker. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/1/1972
From Higby to Haldeman RE: scheduling problems. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/4/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
7
44
5/1/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Strachan RE: R.W. Apple
and Tom Weicker. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 1 pg.
7
44
5/4/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Haldeman RE: scheduling
problems. 3 pgs.
Friday, July 02, 2010
Page 1 of 1
H
THE WHITE HOUSE
FY
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1972
s/o
5/18
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
IMEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY L
The fact that you reported that Gallup has been under
extreme pressure not to conduct its Chappaquiddick
anniversary poll this year and that R. W. Apple and
Tom Weicker have been pushing this, should cause
us to do something to hit them. Perhaps the best way
to handle this would be some anonymous letters to
Apple and Weicker with copies to the editors of the
TIMES. It might be good for them to know that others
are aware of their activities and also, of course, we
can play on the angle here of biased journalism, etc.,
by this and the public' right to know all.
yes - asloyal Dem, Ap + are agents dEMK
Pultrzer Paper
FU al Reems
Betty knowland-
5/15 Parade
drapts tow illers apple
Topic
Personality
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 4, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
L
SUBJECT:
Surrogate Scheduling
In a memorandum (Tab A) to Colson and Magruder, you requested
that they work out the problems surrounding our scheduling of surrogate
candidates for the period between now and the election to assure that the
President's interest in maximum utilization of surrogates takes place.
BACKGROUND
Magruder and Colson have been unable to agree upon a satisfactory
solution to this problem. Their lack of agreement is primarily a
territorial dispute, centering around who will be the contact point for
certain surrogates.
Magruder maintains that it is highly desirable to have one contact point
and that contact point should be the Committee at 1701. He believes this
is true for everyone except Mel Laird and Secretary Rogers, who should
continue to be programmed by the White House. He cites the fact that
Mitchell has sent a letter to all our surrogate candidates (including
Cabinet Officers) indicating that 1701 is to be the contact point. Allowing
Pat O'Donnell of Colson's operation to continue scheduling Cabinet
Officers or other Administration representatives, is not a good solution.
His position paper is attached at Tab B and is not worth reading.
2
Colson, on the other hand, feels that the White House should
continue to schedule Administration spokesmen as long as
possible that the more we can do from the White House in
scheduling spokesmen, the better impact these spokesmen will
have.
Essentially, it's a battle for control rather than a logical argument
on what is really best for the President.
Colson's draft position paper is attached at Tab C with my notations
and is reasonably close to being the best arrangement from the
President's standpoint. It does, however, suggest a continuing
split operation, something that you wanted to try and avoid, but
proposes continual coordination which should minimize the hazards
of a split operation. As a general rule, a speaker will always have
greater impact when he is viewed as an Administration or White House
spokesman, rather than as a partisan-political speaker. The only
exception to this would be at the times when he is speaking at partisan
events.
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
Assuming a split operation is desirable, there is, nonetheless, the
need for a central control and someone who is clearly acting as a
director of the overall operation. The central point of control in the
final analysis has to be first of all the President, and then 1701.
Political considerations must take priority the majority of the time.
This does not mean, however, that White House input should not be
included and the suggested strategy board that is included in Howard's
memorandum probably can adequately fill this requirement. The
implied weak point in the Colson plan is his continuing control of
O'Donnell. If there is to be a coordinated effort, O'Donnell must be
part of that coordinated effort. He can't be given counter-instructions
by Colson. Therefore, while O'Donnell may in fact remain under
Colson, he will actually have to work out all his plans in coordination
with and with the approval of 1701 and the master scheduling operation.
3
The Director slot -- O'Donnell isn't heavy enough to do this
and neither is anyone who is currently working over at 1701.
My suggested solution here is one that we've discussed before,
John Whitaker. John's role would be to act as an overseer for
the operation to meet with the different scheduling people
involved each day to make sure everything is on track. He
would be able to make decisions but would not be put in the
position of having to spend full time on this. He should be able
to continue his duties in the Agricultural and Enviornmental areas for
the Domestic Council. This gives John, as we've discussed, a link
to the Campaign. He's someone the President would trust and would
also have Mitchell's confidence. I've mentioned this idea casually to
Magruder and he thinks it is sensational and knows Mitchell would
buy it. I assume Colson would react in a similar manner.
Most of the other points mentioned in Dick Howard's memorandum are
okay and can be worked out. Setting the line will be taken care of,
hopefully, on a day-to-day basis through your political meeting.
The one other area that needs to be tightened-up is the handling of
invitations that are Presidential turndowns. Obviously these can't be
handled at 1701. They are almost inevitably for non-partisan forums
and even if they are partisan forums, they should be handled as if
they were non-partisan to keep us above the battle. The schedule
group that Whitaker is in charge of probably should meet to consider
these and how best to fulfill them. They should not be turned whole-
sale over to 1701. A White House invitation can't be responded to by
our political apparatus as you have already indicated.
I would hope that when you meet with Ehrlichman and Mitchell you
can get them to agree upon the Howard paper as modified herein.
I would suggest you send a copy of it up to John before the meeting
with my notations on it.
You also might want to discuss the Whitaker idea with Ehrlichman
ahead of time so that the two of you are on the same track when you
talk to Mitchell.
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