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This file contains:
From Ray Price to Haldeman RE: schedule of RN and his family. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: Higby's previous memo on the First Family. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: analysis of previous election year polls. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 7-84
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This file contains:
From Ray Price to Haldeman RE: schedule of RN and his family. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: Higby's previous memo on the First Family. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: analysis of previous election year polls. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
7
84
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to Haldeman RE: schedule
of RN and his family. 2 pgs.
7
84
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: Higby's
previous memo on the First Family.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs.
7
84
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: analysis of
previous election year polls. Handwritten
notes added by Haldeman. 5 pgs.
Friday, July 02, 2010
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
First Family Scheduling
I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope
that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate
asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as
possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening
and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things,
and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans
are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about
alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters
like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus
-- especially with parents and grandparents.
Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where
I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a
chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense
of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got
to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials
to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels
Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by
visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can
remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political
visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things
for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks
ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to
Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people, " etc., that
there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap:
I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly
come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, in-
volved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous
pleasure-seeker from Camelot.
-2-
I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly.
Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous
non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were
represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular
would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.
A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could
organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as
an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that
maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in
Peoria.
RaSA
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
HR. R. HALDEMAN Dell
DOUG HALLETT
RE:
Larry Higby's Memo of July 19
This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memoran-
dum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nix-
on, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.
I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great
asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She
should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she
should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects,
hospitals, schools, etc. these she does fabulously well. Like
the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically gov-
ernmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another pos-
sibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected
obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.
I would combine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint
appearance with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the
dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern
talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone, But these
should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate
-- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appear-
ing before women's Republican lunches and I hope as little of this
as possible can be done Tricia is the one.
Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the
most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics,
volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these
are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I
think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be
-2-
programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York,
New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.
My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening
before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon
women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.
cc: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 27.
Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost
no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline
wrong
during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is
other than a big after Repub
Conv. Nikwere even three entire
true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than
it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but
since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures
cappaign period
are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the
attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent
shift
support his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to
nutsig.
47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the wrong
campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz.
Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking
most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the
election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was
Right-
remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall.
What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the elec-
torate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote
declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas
in 1960 the President's actions, both effective the TV blitz and
steady live.
ineffective the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the
cait prove
declined from 2
but lead over
electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base
this
of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned
maybe it would have evoded if he had not
In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the compaigned?
convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing
with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appro-
priate and given the situation effective during the preconvention
period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-
media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as
The undecideds always godnen by
definition - end at nao. In 1960 they
moved evenly to N+ K. In 68 they all
went to H.
2.
usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum
with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across
the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford
it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur
his campaign forward in the final weeks; i.e. the "security gap" speech
and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign
continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the
he would have - but he want deam on mon iTu's
White House. Wrong - had been two days earlier
Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was would
better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, have
1960.
approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates,
deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-
Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtus
observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and
steel strike activies in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not
done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's
attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me)
and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented,
even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his
office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage
of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and
wrong
permie
the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before
that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually
losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative
what?
media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give
decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on con-
stant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would
have probably won.
Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The
1968
tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance
of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate
is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of
rallies and the institution of thoughful speeches, etc. The failure in
1968 was one of execution. not design. The mechanisms through which
the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out;
only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there
were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and being
radio speeches and not visual events poorly designed to attract attention
from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly
3.
designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening
on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the
1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried
out, both by the President and the people around him.
1972
What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz
the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led
to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that
he should remain above and beyond the battle remain Presidential is
the way Ray Price would put it as he did in 1968. The first approach
Baty
would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the cam-
paigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled
it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's
Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach,
avoutta
in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public
attention it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could
manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate,
and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to
ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican
majority.
1972
What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism
of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days,
with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's
incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should
be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices,
fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax
reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and
although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P.R.
wise bringing about a new structure of peace and he should be doing
all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve
some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking
should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the
media operation our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential
appearances made should be information. not rhetoric, oriented. Political
rally appearances made should be few and far between and the rallied
should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not
just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed
suggestions and I will not repeat them here.
4.
I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is
beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of Geo rge McGovern galavanting
around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to
resist, Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of
the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him
in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-
charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960
campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President,
we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving
the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't
done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our
domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with
business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few cor-
porations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the
environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed
out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at govern-
ment expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the
substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the
President now in the White House.
The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not and should not
be taken as doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and
I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can
lose it assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach the
only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take
advantage of his governmental tools and by failing to reflect a sense
of dynamism, motion and anti-status-guoism, all of which will turn off
those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who
can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the
President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good.
But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office,
not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive
against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad,
not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new
sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican
or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference,
and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of
what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our
advantage in the election campaign now facing us.
GALLUP POLL
1960
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
Early June
48
- 4
52
Late June
48
- 4
52
July (After Convention)
50
+ 6
44
6
August
47
=
47
6
September
47
1
48
5.
October
48
=
48
4
November 6
48
- /
49
3
GALLUP POLL
1968
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
June
35
-
in
40
16
9
July
40
+ 2 38
16
6
August
45
+6
29
18
8
September 3-7
43
+ 12
31
19
7
September 20-22
43
+
28
21
8
September 27-30
44
+ 15 29
20
7
October 3-12
43
+ 12 31
20
6
October 17-21
44
t 8 36
15
5
November 1-2
42
1 2 40
14
4