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From Chapin to Haldeman RE: memos related to the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman RE: improving RN's public image. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 7-85
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This file contains:
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: memos related to the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman RE: improving RN's public image. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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7
85
6/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: memos
related to the campaign. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 10 pgs.
7
85
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman
RE: improving RN's public image.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
Friday, July 02, 2010
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Memoranda
In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from
you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects
of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.
It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in.
Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda
and give you my conclusions.
One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like
this for you, I probably shoult not be requested to do a memorandum of my own
on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep
from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate
my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.
Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines
for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing.
But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move
ahead - not that they are not already there!
BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been
known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's
"Fort Knox' is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied
not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount
national concerns,
BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high
clouds. The President should not act so Presidential SO as to be
out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from
a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.
2.
A.
BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS
1.
The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and
should continue the same through the Convention period. The
general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I
guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his
pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloof-
ness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed
to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the
country; increase the number of official meetings - Cabinet,
Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. -- all which show the President
working against the problems of the people.
2.
With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings
designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to
pressure for legislation should be highly visible. The greatest
amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive
aspects of his foreign policy -- however, this should not only be
done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways
which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that
the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT,
etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our
advantage.
3.
When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the
orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin.
The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our
lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A
well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN
PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform)
should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our
Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform
hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic
platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and
we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as
to justify the equal time.
3.
B.
PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS
1.
The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September
toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously,
we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so
dictate.
2.
Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends -
Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a
Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to
Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible,
always return to the White House over night.
3.
Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern,
at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will
look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done
right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard
attack (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation.
Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head
it?)
4.
During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the
President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's
desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and
that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what
is wrong with McGovern.
5.
Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive
accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle
of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same
visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his
foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the
problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-
minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses, We might see if a
five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one
4.
of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would
give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in
a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.
7.
The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others
do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum --
advance it a notch -- and everything falls into place. Our tempo is
firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running --
but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work
up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)
8.
The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special
voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an
argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the
Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory.
Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish com-
munity and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The
problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how
the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will
have to move to a plan on this.
9.
Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a
problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance
is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the
structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed
to make the evening news versus evening --type events. A key
question here is at what point do we saturate and become over-
exposed? The other question would be at what point does
McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to
become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown
is McGovern helped?
10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region
and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed
for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by
utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get
into key locations.
5.
C.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND
POINTS OF ATTACK
1.
Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong
suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to
engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no
reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely
defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key
to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting
the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's
economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering
of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's
policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make
our charge about the "McGovern Market.'
2.
I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential
actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes,
"How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be
part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3.
I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made
the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms
of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by
the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting
a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue
charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the
offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend.
As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation,
as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4.
Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This
is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff
at Blair House about attacking straw enemies, We should take the
straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps
Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists,
and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general
public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our
surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them
on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat
to our constituency than they do presently.
6.
5.
Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-
emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the
broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and
order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play
to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The
exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.
6.
Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is
expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility.
We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples
of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out
front a President and an Administration that has done everything
possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on,
we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would
undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the
surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising,
other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the
President's credibility.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS
1.
Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and
the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be
developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic
Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance.
The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should
assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION
MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION
HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
2.
The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during
the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can
be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good
recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special
voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN
SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN
3.
Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his
domestic philosophy -- what he stands for -- what he is for and against domestically."
He states a little later, " .he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and
how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his
domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the
Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our
domestic philosophy is at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
2.
4.
It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators
are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be
to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.
CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER
DROP IDEA
OTHER
5.
Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and
do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some
food chain retailers.
HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
DROP
6.
Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a
week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials
to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we
should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CHECK MITCHELL FIRST
7.
Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot
every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that
McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule
for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it
under control?
COMMENT:
8.
Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding
ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to
ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this -- examples or techniques of how he
would go about it.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
9.
Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the
economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from
these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed
internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-
being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the
economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put
this together? Under Colson?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL
COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ
DROP IT
10.
Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price,
suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the
Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.
YES
NO
OTHER
11.
Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit
in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could
be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the
memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently
on that memorandum.
YES
NO
12.
Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders,
abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies
now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start
cranking into their talks.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
13.
In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our
Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually
the credibility of the President?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS
HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
4.
14.
Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight
the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration
officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we
draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about
McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates.
Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic
Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT
BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE
OTHER
15.
Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this
election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly
find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He
also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".
Should Colson go ahead with this?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY
OTHER
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINIS MARKING
E.O. 12005, Sociion 6-102 10-2-80
By Emp
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS/HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues --
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio; take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour --
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side --
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
CONF IDEN
EYES ONLY
4.
EYES ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pa ce should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
LYES ONLY
4
EYES
ONLY
CONFIDENTAL
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc. ) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and
negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
CONTIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help Mc Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc.
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
CORPLIENTIAL MM
EYES ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget -- or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers.
would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i.e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish-
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
CANN
CON IDENTIAL