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From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman presenting a general campaign strategy. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman RE: campaign strategy. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
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This file contains:
From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman presenting a general campaign strategy. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman RE: campaign strategy. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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8
1
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman
presenting a general campaign strategy.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs.
8
1
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman
RE: campaign strategy. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the
President might do from now through November, and Larry
Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update
of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.
First, there are a number of things that the President can do
that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President.
He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one
frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive
meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he
can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors
(McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the
stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)
The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some
problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto mes-
sages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it
seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either
domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or
international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume,
have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that,
particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national
addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Demo-
cratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not
- 2 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-
White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me
that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements
which we traditionally handle by a 2, 000-word handout from
Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might
better be handled from now to November by the President him-
self making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's
shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity
for free reply - - and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news
which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting
event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.
At the Convention
I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of
Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of
confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best in-
telligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The
relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive
the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street
drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be,
would probably be more photogenic than the business of the
convention. Any interplay between the President and the demon-
strators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers
with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies
in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an
overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because,
even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably
be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound.
Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the
President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least
had the guts to talk to.
Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with
Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on
Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of
3
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing
State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence).
I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but
closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the
convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance
speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the
Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately
after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unex-
pected visit to a separate location where a large, screened
youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the
President would join them. The point would be to have all
under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home
the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for
McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to
this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening
enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter
and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be
back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would
try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National
Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly
"playing President. "
If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday
TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show,
I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved
up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without
ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely
anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having
a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having
the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought
if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to
assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announce-
ment of the President's choice of a running mate until then?
That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the
President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.
Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the
risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to
Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice Presi-
dent. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their
- 4 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of
defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the
President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the
youth forum described above.
General Campaign Strategy
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost - -
and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and
Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should
push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace
the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just
endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists
who don't buy this.
Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now
about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless
that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously.
The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign
without appearing to be doing so. Here is my list of don'ts:
- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
Don't engage in any debates
- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press
that are advertised in advance. East Room format.
The press is vital. The President has won when the press was
with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).
(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red
meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of ac-
cessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as
radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-
looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our
domestici problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews
with pundits would be good.
5
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe
2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do
quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national
scribes don't come in loaded for bear.
(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media
in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis,
Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warn-
ing. While the national press would have to be included in these,
and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer
bad
questions from the more numerous regional reps should pre-
dominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like
these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters
in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick
his way through personally. For example, we could cover the
southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and
New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in
and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the
New England impact should be worth the aggrevation). -- Denver
for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest.
We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise
these in the particular region. The first few we might get away
with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas
where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without
having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago
for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences
in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance
buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks
if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase
the risks.
I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the
President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the
risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them
is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in
the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to
substantive events. The motorcade can stop occassionally and,
if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car
- 6
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we
must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn. ) This
will require us to develop a pithy five minute speech, or a
series of them but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for
rallies that he has used in past campaigns.
One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local
color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can
help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the
Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him.
I remember the success of the President's early morning visit
to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope
that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar
"unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a.m.
and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.
I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for
a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international
town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network repre-
sentatives in a number of international capitols relaying live
questions answered by the President here in Washington. This
would play to his strength international affairs, and even
hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers,
tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them. 11 A "foreign
heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would
love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format SO
much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can
get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize
with the foreign heckler a good trap.
Pace of Campaign
Before the convention I think the President should schedule one
major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be
visible going about the serious business of Government. Right
after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his re-
turn from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic
- 7
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago
because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day,
although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important
date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle. ) The Chicago event
could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with
Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although
I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-
time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes
of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should
go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John
Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but be-
cause that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need
another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor
done the same day.
As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more
than one trip a week - - and always substantive. The only out-of-
country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on
how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest
of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the
exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths
of being President.
The First Family
I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington
and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington
papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought
I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so
successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing
that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.
Theme of Campaign
From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made
an important start at restructuring international and domestic
affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms
- 8 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only
halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase
to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's? ) "Come home,
America. 11 The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that
McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokes-
man for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the
polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got
to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should
try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one
of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in pro-
posing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit
from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds
on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate
it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON KC
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy
executive posture between the conventions with the single
exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of
the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I
think this exception to the generally high-level tone
the President has set was a justifiable one and really
quite valuable.
(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high
level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but
it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and,
for that matter, the whole government apparatus is
campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.
I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably
maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in
how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus
really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less
effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary
for the President to come off his best posture and to, in
effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully
into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level
surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively,
but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates
program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every
ounce of energy into the campaign.
As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it
should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target
states and specific voting blocs.
-2-
(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern
as a "minority leader of a minority constituency. 11 I
think we should give every indication that any "regular,
normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or
Independent, can find leadership and solice under the
Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like
"elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical"
to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every
effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal
backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and
the nation as a whole.
Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time
in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers
should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of
over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In
foreign policy, where we are, in my opinion, miles ahead,
McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel,
naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed
as an individual who is not the kind of man that world
leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed
as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without
backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who
lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to
them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida
when he indicated he would keep a residual force in
Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away
from it in the face of opposition from some of his more
radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.
(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people
will have the advantage of being able to attack every
little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch
to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and
foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted
Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner
and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the
country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability
starting now.
Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself,
will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's
wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping
for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern
loses in November that he did everything in his power to
elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a
team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.