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From Finch to RN RE: ramifications of the 1970 midterms for the next presidential election, as well as in-depth breakdowns of voter trends. 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/26/1971
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Document Description
8
7
10/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to RN RE: ramifications of the
1970 midterms for the next presidential
election, as well as in-depth breakdowns of
voter trends. 22 pgs.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Page 1 of 1
POLL
STAT
$
FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
ПОО
SUBJECT:
What the 1970 Election Response
Now Means for 1972
Contents:
Page
I. Trends, highlights, and results related
to the 1972 framework
2
II. The 1970 returns, in votes for Congress
by states, and in past support of Nixon
for President
4
III. In the 1970 election, support of which
by whom? Breakdown of House and Senate
support, based on a November-December
1970 voting behavior study
5
male-female
black-white
age
education
income
union/non-union
party
religion
IV. Voter attitude comparisons on Presidential
and Vice Presidential principals, November-
December, 1968 and November-December, 1970
7
V. Which groups showed what support (intensity
of like or dislike) for which principals in
November-December, 1970?
9
VI. Suggestions for action
11
VII. Tabs
- 2 -
I. MEANING OF THE 1970 ELECTION FOR 1972
The 1970 election does not afford an overall basis for
the planning of the 1972 campaign. The usual number of
claims and counterclaims followed within a month after
the election and were of concern then. They may be again
when individual states and their electoral prospects are
examined. But these peculiarities, and those news commen-
taries about which senator or governor was elected and who
was defeated should not obscure the basic national trends
that apparently will be present in 1972.
In this memo, there is little consideration of campaign
funding or campaign organization -- two other important
parts of the whole campaign process. These data refer
only to voter reaction and returns. The other sides of
the triangle should get full attention too, of course,
using other information sources.
Looming over all is the voting population explosion, and
the thought that the turnout may be eighty million in
1972, and forty-one million or more of these must be
Nixon voters (Tab A).
Highlights in this report are:
The 1970 House and Senate elections reverted to party
proportions. While many GOP governors were defeated,
the gubernatorial returns were somewhat more favorable.
Here is further evidence that in the 1972 Presidential
campaign, the emphasis must be on the Nixon record,
leadership, and on issues; and not on the party.
The hardening of the Black vote. Evidence indicates
that it is heavily non-Republican and non-Nixon in
the North, but less non-Nixon in the South.
--The Jewish vote remained heavily Democrat.
--The union vote remained heavily Democrat.
- 3 -
--In 1972, unless there are significant changes in issues
and policies, a Wallace candidacy can hardly get off
the ground. There are only small pockets of strong
support for him. Wallace now has nuisance value, and
that's about all.
The educational revolution increases voter concern with
issues and policies. Voters are increasingly informed,
and opinionated. Appeal to their individuality can be
effective.
Because the President is now SO well known, and because
only a few voters remain neutral on him as a person,
his campaign efforts should be at an absolute minimum,
at least until October of 1972. Having already covered
fifty states puts "a "lot of hay in the barn.
Presidential emphasis can be on issues, on conduct of
the Office of the Presidency, and on the handling of
economic and foreign affairs.
The opposition will need to catch the President (not
the party), and to carry its campaign to him.
The ingredients are there for considerable Nixon gains,
in the South. These may not be party gains, but issue
and President Nixon gains.
- 4 -
II. THE 1970 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION RETURNS (Tab B)
Altogether the House returns came out about 45% Republican
and 53% Democratic. In the Senate races, the Republican
plus the conservative (Buckley) vote came to 46.5% and the
Democrat plus Independent (Byrd of Virginia and Dodd) votes
total 53.5%.
Slightly more favorable to the GOP, the combined Republican/
Conservative vote for gubernatorial candidates came to 52.7%
compared to 47.3% Democrat.
In Congressional voting, then, the Democrats had a plurality
of about four and a half million votes.
Converted into electoral college results, for 1972, the 1970
House vote gave the Republicans thirteen states, and the
Democrats thirty-seven plus the District of Columbia. The
thirteen states can cast 83 electoral votes in 1972 (Tab C).
It should be noted that the best electoral college showing
produced by this method of tabulation (247 votes based on
1966 House results) fell quite short of the 270 needed for
a bare electoral college majority.
To assist in 1972 planning, the states have been ranked
according to the number of times they have given a plurality
of their votes to House candidates (Tab D). The number of
1972 electoral votes for each state also appears, as does
each state's electoral college record in the Nixon (1960 and
1968) Presidential elections. (The lower House tallies are
used because they are regular and recur nationwide every two
years. They do not vary as do gubernatorial and senatorial
contests, and they are not usually affected by heavy media
or other outside efforts.)
In 1970 only one of the thirteen states that had a plurality
of GOP congressional votes was a large state. Ohio, which
will have 25 electoral votes in 1972, stood alone. The other
twelve were small states with Iowa (8 votes) the largest of
these (Tab D).
All thirteen of these states voted for Nixon in 1960 and 1968,
and all but two of them (Delaware and New Mexico) did so in
1960. Only one of them (Arizona) voted for Goldwater in 1964.
- 5 -
For planning purposes it can also be remembered that eleven
states have not voted Republican in the last four House
elections, and did not vote for Nixon in 1960 or 1968 (Tab E).
They appear to lack party bases which can cope with the
opposition on national or federal matters, and they also
appear to lack an affinity with the President.
III. IN 1970, SUPPORT BY WHICH GROUPS?
A reliable voting behavior study that went into the field
in November and December 1970 produced these results: (Tab F) *
A.
Women continued to vote a bit more Democrat than
did men. They also did so in 1968 (Dem. 45%, Rep.
43%, Wallace 12% according to Gallup). For women
there was no change in '70. For men, return to
party was more pronounced in 1970.
B. In 1970 the national black vote for Congress stayed
rigidly just where that vote was in the 1968
Presidential election.
Dem.
Rep.
Wallace
Cons.
1968 Pres.
85%
12%
3%
--
1970 House
87
13
--
--
The 1970 black vote for senator was almost all Democrat.
The black vote continues to be Democratic property.
Given this complete commitment, reduced black turnout
or neutralization of black issues must be considered.
C.
Among the age groups, only those 65 and over gave a
majority to the Republicans, and that in the House
only. For the Senate, this age group followed all
the others in showing preference for Democrat candidates.
This decision by those over 65 may have been issue
oriented.
*The next eight paragraphs are supported by Tab F.
- 6 -
D. As usual, those with more education tended to
vote Republican a bit more. But not as much in
1970 (college graduates and post graduate were
Dem. 49%, Rep. 51%) as in 1968 (college educated
were Dem. 37%, Rep. 54% and Wallace 9% -- Gallup).
Significant here are results for the 1970 "some
college education" category, which includes junior
and community colleges as well as two-year technical
schools. For this group the returns were 55% - 45%
Republican in House returns. This was not matched
in 1970 Senate results which were 54% - 39% Democrat
with Conservative 7%, but a like tally of 1970
gubernatorial voting showed the "some college
education" group at 60% - 40% Republican. There
is support here for cultivating the junior college--
community college--state teachers college groups,
including their alumni.
Among those with just grade school and some high
school education, Republicans did not do well.
Blacks and Spanish speaking, the early dropouts,
appear to be included in these returns.
E. In terms of 1970 family income, the House results
for those who earned $4,000 to $7,400 for the year
were identical with the results for those who
completed high school (52% - 48% Democrat). The
lower income group, below $4,000, and the higher
income group, $7,500 to $14,900, were each heavily
Democrat. Only in the $15,000 per year and over
bracket did the House returns favor the Republicans.
The returns for Senate seats remained Democrat
(Dem. 51%, Rep. 44%, Cons. 4%) for this high income
group, however.
F. Union membership explains itself. Union households
went heavily Democrat, 65% - 35%, while non-union
households went but slightly so, 52% - 48%. It
should be remembered here that non-union households
are three to one in the majority.
G. Voting responses are tied directly to party identi-
fication. Strong Democrats voted 91% Democrat
while strong Republicans voted 96% GOP. In the
middle came the Independent. Their return of
- 7 -
Dem. 52%, Rep. 48% in House elections and Dem. 56%,
Rep. 42%, Cons. 2% for the Senate gave Republicans
too little support. Figures in the Party Identifi-
cation category also show that party cohesion was
stronger for the Republicans in House voting, but
stronger for the Democrats in Senate voting.
Republicans tended more to cross party lines in
Senate races. The relationships shown here do
emphasize the importance of party affiliation in
a mid-term election.
H.
The Republicans did not win favor in any religion
category, in either the congressional or the
senatorial races. Should these figures be a true
representation, the party is embarrassed. In
particular, the Catholic and Jewish tallies should
be noted, particularly for the Senate.
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
Dem.
Rep.
Dem.
Rep.
Cons.
Protestant
52%
48%
53%
45%
2%
Catholic
58
42
68
25
7
Jewish
86
14
87
13
0
Other or None
68
32
72
28
0
Catholics did vote Conservative in greater proportion
than did those of other faiths, but the total shift
had little electoral significance, because over two-
thirds of the Catholics remained in the Democrat
column in the Senate races. In proportions, the
Catholic vote is not quite 30% of the size of the
Protestant vote. The Jewish vote is about 5% as
large as the Protestant vote.
IV.
ATTITUDES ON PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, 1968 and 1970
National surveys of intensity of feeling for or against
each principal or candidate were conducted after the 1968
election and after the 1970 election. On a 0-100 degree
scale (thermometer) each interviewee indicated his feeling
toward each candidate. A mark at fifty or thereabouts
indicated neutrality. A mark above or below showed,
respectively, like or dislike and the degree thereof. The
results are shown on Tab G.
- 8 -
They show:
A. The President in first place in average (mean
score) with Muskie slightly behind. But both
declined from 1968 to 1970. In fact, most mean
scores declined from 1968 to 1970.
B. First choices are significant here because a first
choice translates into a vote. The President has
confirmed his position of leadership, and Senator
Kennedy, according to this approach, is his
closest competitor. Muskie and Humphrey lack the
hard core support a strong first choice showing
will indicate.
Except for Wallace, Senator Kennedy has a high
score in "last choice" mentions, while Muskie is
not greatly disliked. For the President, last
choice mentions increased slightly, as they did
for Humphrey from 1968 to 1970.
The neutral score combined with the "don't know"
score will indicate, roughly, just how much of the
electorate remains undecided on a candidate and is
therefore "persuadable" through campaigning. The
lower the total (17% for the President) the less
effect campaigning may have. Presently Muskie can
win people to his side, and he is apparently
following that strategy. For Ted Kennedy, however,
there are few "neutrals" or "don't knows" to win.
Instead he must attack the President and the Admin-
istration. He is doing that with help from McGovern.
The results here again indicate that the President can gain
little from aggressive campaigning at this time or in the
immediate future, all things remaining equal. He may best
serve political purposes by stressing leadership and admin-
istration at home and particularly abroad.
The Democratic contenders and the eventual Democratic
candidate will need to carry the campaign to the people
and against the Administration.
- 9 -
V. PARTISAN AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL
PRINCIPALS, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1970 -- includes
18-22 year olds
The sources of candidate strength, or weakness, appear
in these columns (Tab H). The President leads because
of his strength with Republicans and Independents. In
contrast to the Congressional results, 52% to 48% Democrat,
the President led the field of candidates in Independent
support at the end of 1970. The rank order is as follows:
Rank Order According to Partisan Support
Republicans
Independents
Democrats
Nixon
81
Nixon
58
Kennedy, E. 64
LIKE
Reagan
65
Muskie
54
Muskie
64
Agnew
60
Reagan
52
Humphrey
61
Lindsay
51
Lindsay
51
Lindsay
53
50%
McGovern
51
Muskie
48
Agnew
47
McCarthy
48
McCarthy
39
Humphrey
45
Nixon
47
DISLIKE Humphrey
37
Kennedy, E.
45
Reagan
44
McGovern
37
McGovern
45
Agnew
37
Kennedy, E. 33
McCarthy
44
Wallace
30
Wallace
30
Wallace
35
It is noteworthy that Lindsay had slightly more appeal to
Democrats in late 1970 than to either Independents or
Republicans.
Among the potential very young voters, Edward Kennedy ranks
high, but Muskie and the President are not that far behind,
nor is Lindsay in this tabulation.
18-22 year olds (candidate rank order)
E. Kennedy
64
Muskie
57
LIKE
Nixon
56
Lindsay
55
McCarthy
54
50%
McGovern
51
Humphrey
48
Reagan
47
DISLIKE
Agnew
38
Wallace
35
- 10 -
To reopen the question of the President's strength in the
North and in the South, these figures apply:
Northern Whites
Northern Blacks
Nixon
60
Kennedy, E.
87
Muskie
60
Humphrey
72
Lindsay
53
Muskie
67
Reagan
52
Lindsay
61
Humphrey
50
McGovern
53
50%
McCarthy
52
Kennedy, E.
49
Reagan
37
McGovern
47
Nixon
35
Agnew
46
Agnew
22
McCarthy
46
Wallace
9
Wallace
28
The attitude distance between whites and blacks in the
Northern areas on the President is considerable. So is
the distance between whites and blacks on Senator Kennedy,
but the blacks are highly favorable to him and the whites
are reserved.
In the South, however, the profiles change. While the
black support for Kennedy increases slightly, the black
antagonism to the President disappears. Simultaneously
his support from whites increases, while white favor
for Muskie, Humphrey and Kennedy declines.
Southern Whites
Southern Blacks
Nixon
61
Kennedy, E.
92
Reagan
53
Humphrey
81
Agnew
50
Muskie
61
*
Lindsay
53
50%
Nixon
50
Muskie
48
McCarthy
49
Lindsay
48
McGovern
46
Wallace
47
Reagan
45
Humphrey
41
Agnew
34
McCarthy
40
Wallace
12
McGovern
40
Kennedy, E.
39
In these rankings, the nuisance effect of a Wallace candidacy
is clear. His support at the end of 1970 is about identical
with what it was in 1968. His candidacy in 1972 would draw
from the President, and probably more SO than from Kennedy,
Muskie, or Humphrey. This would be particularly true in the
South, of course.
- 11 -
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION
All of the studies alluded to here and others as well
indicate increased volatility in the electorate. The
disparities between House and Senate election returns
may be sought in this discerning judgment. The coming
of age of the post World War II youngsters, most of whom
are better educated has an effect, and so now may the 18
year old vote to a limited extent. Alongside this is
the decline in party membership, loyalty and association.
Increasingly voters, particularly young voters, are
declaring themselves as Independents (Tab I).
More to the Republican point, there is statistical evidence
which relates an increased feeling of "personal competence"
to increased turnout and increased Republican voting.
Emphasis on the individual as a voter who can comprehend
government issues and who can make a difference can
increase 1972 electoral support for the President.
The current postures of the Democrats who seek nomination
are in line with the results shown in these tabulations.
For example, Senator Muskie needs to convince the many who
are uncommitted on him, and to prove he is in command. He
probably will not make an all-out attack on the Adminis-
tration itself until late. In contrast Senator Kennedy
needs to hold his large dedicated group, to avoid antagoni-
zing further those who dislike him and to establish himself
as the Administration-killer. Because Lindsay has few
enemies outside New York, apparently his only strategy is
to try to establish himself as a compromise candidate.
The President needs to maintain his position with the
Independents and increase his hold there. Large gains in
the Black vote cannot be expected. Low Black turnout should
be sought -- perhaps by defusing Black issues.
Obviously, if the Wallace campaign can be minimized, the
President may make key gains in the South, particularly
if the Democratic nominee is not appreciated there.
- 12 -
The need to overcome the numerical advantage of the
Democrat Party is clear. The appeals which will be
based on the role and achievements of the President
should be accompanied by an emphasis on the ability of
each voter, as an individual, to think and choose for
himself because he, as a citizen, can make a difference.
The President's high order of stewardship for the nation
should be the keystone for the coming campaign. No
other theme should be allowed to replace the primary
emphasis on that stewardship at home and abroad.
The secondary theme (carried by others for the time being)
should be to lay a solid foundation of irresponsibility
on the part of the Democrats in Congress for failing to
respond to the President's leadership.
TAB A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: RETURNS AND FORECAST 1960-1972
1960 ELECTION
68.3 million votes
49.9%
Nixon
34,108,546
50.1
Democrats
34,227,096 (J. Kennedy & H. F. Byrd)
1964 ELECTION
70.3 million votes
38.6
Goldwater
27,176,799
61.4
Johnson
43,126,506
1968 ELECTION
73.0 million votes
43.6
Nixon
31,783,783
42.9
Humphrey
31,271,839
13.5
Wallace
9,899,557
1972 ELECTION (estimates)
80.0 million votes (est.)
76 million aged 21 and
51.25
Nixon
41,000,000
over plus 4 million
48.75
Democrat
39,000,000
aged 18 to 21 (36.3%
of 11 million eligible)
With Wallace Running Strong
47.5
Nixon
38,000,000
46.25
Democrat
37,000,000
6.25
Wallace
5,000,000
TAB B
1970 NATIONAL VOTE BY PARTY
FOR CONGRESS, SENATE, AND GOVERNOR
Per cent
Plurality
CONGRESS
Republican
24,339,240
45.1
Democrat
28,841,106
53.4
4,501,866 (D)
Other
832,500
1.5
TOTAL
54,012,846
SENATE
Republican
19,471,069
41.6
Democrat
24,276,217
51.8
4,805,148 (D)
Conservative
2,276,321
04.9
Independent
809,294
01.7
TOTAL
46,832,901
GOVERNOR
Republican
20,479,892
51.6
1,734,061 (R)
Democrat
18,745,831
47.3
Conservative
424,476
01.1
TOTAL
39,650,199
PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TOTAL VOTE FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES, 1960-1970
1960
45.0%
1962
47.7
1964
42.5
1966
48.7
1968
48.9
1970
45.6
NUMBER OF STATES HAVING A REPUBLICAN PLURALITY OF TOTAL
CONGRESSIONAL (HOUSE) VOTE, 1964-1970
Year
Number of States
Total of 1972 Electoral
Votes, All Such States
1964
9
50
1966
23
247
1968
25
235
1970
13
83
TAB C
1970 NATIONAL ELECTION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
States Whose Voters Cast More Votes for Republican Candidates
1972 Electoral Votes
State
6
Arizona
7
Colorado
3
Delaware
4
Idaho
8
Iowa
7
Kansas
5
Nebraska
4
New Hampshire
4
New Mexico
3
North Dakota
25
Ohio
4
Utah
3
Vermont
83
13
In Arkansas more GOP than Democrat votes were cast
in the one House contest, but three Democrats were
unopposed.
STATES DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO TIMES WHEN THEIR VOTERS CAST
MORE REPUBLICAN THAN CRAT VOTES FOR CONGRESSIONAL (LOWER HOUSE) SEATS
Last Four Congressional Elections: 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970
No. of Times
Electoral
Cast Electoral Vote for Nixon (N)
Republican Plurality
Votes
1960
1969
1. In all four elections 64-70
Kansas
7
N
N
Nebraska
5
N
N
Idaho
4
N
N
North Dakota
3
N
N
Vermont
3
N
N
22
2. In 1966, 68 and 70 (not 64)
Ohio
25
N
N
Iowa
8
N
N
Arizona
6
N
N
New Hampshire
4
N
N
Utah
4
N
N
Delaware
3
0
N
50
3. In 1964, 66 and 68 (not 70)
Montana
4
N
N
South Dakota
4
N
N
8
4. In 1968 and 70 (not 64 nor 66)
Colorado
7
N
N
*Arkansas
6
0
0
New Mexico
4
N
N
17
5. In 1966 and 68 (not 64 nor 70)
California
45
N
N
Illinois
26
0
N
New Jersey
17
0
N
Indiana
13
N
N
Wisconsin
11
N
N
Minnesota
10
0
0
Tennessee
10
N
N
Oregon
6
N
N
Alaska
3
N
N
Wyoming
3
N
N
144
6. In 1966 only (not 64 nor 68 nor 70)
Pennsy lvania
27
0
o
Michigan
21
0
0
48
7. In 1964 only (not 66 nor 68 nor 70)
Alabama
9
0
0
8. No G.O.P. plurality in any of last four Congressional elections
New York
41
0
Q
Texas
26
0
0
Florida
17
N
N
Massachusetts
14
0
0
North Carolina
13
0
N
Georgia
12
0
0
Missouri
12
0
N
Virginia
12
N
N
Louisiana
10
0
0
Maryland
10
0
0
Kentucky
9
N
N
Washington
9
N
0
Connecticut
8
0
0
Oklahoma
8
N
N
South Carolina
8
0
N
Mississippi
7
0
0
West Virginia
6
0
0
Hawaii
4
0
0
Maine
4
N
0
Rhode Island
4
0
0
Nevada
3
0
N
237
9. District of Columbia
3
-
0
538
TOTAL
few contests, scattered elections
TAB E
STATES WHICH HAVE NOT VOTED REPUBLICAN IN THE LAST FOUR HOUSE
ELECTIONS, AND DID NOT VOTE FOR NIXON IN 1960 OR 1968
State
1972 Electoral Votes
New York
41
Texas
26
Massachusetts
14
Georgia
12
Louisiana
10
Maryland
10
Connecticut
8
Mississippi
7
West Virginia
6
Hawaii
4
Rhode Island
4
142
Alabama and Arkansas can be added to this group.
Their ventures into voting for Republican congressmen
have been just about that SO far.
TAB F
These figures on Congressional and Senatorial vote and
Congressional turnout relate to various demographic, socio-
economic and political factors. The results are based on
in-depth interviews with a selected national cross section
of 1513 citizens of voting age. Interviewing took place
after the election, during the months of November and
December, 1970. The study was another in the regular
series which the Center for Political Studies at the
University of Michigan has conducted since 1948.
N = weighted number of interviews and shows relative size
of each category.
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
olo
%
olo
oto
olo
Dem.
Rep.
N
Dem.
Rep.
Con.
N
1.
Sex
Male
54
46
(390)
60
38
2
(340)
Female
56
44
(427)
59
37
4
(402)
2.
Race
White
53
47
(767)
57
40
3
(700)
Negro
87
13
( 52)
97
1
1
( 44)
3.
Age
Under 35
57
43
(193)
58
37
5
(167)
35-44
58
42
(143)
64
35
2
(145)
45-54
54
46
(171)
59
37
4
(153)
55-64
59
41
(158)
64
35
2
(135)
65 and over
45
55
(148)
53
43
3
(139)
4.
Education
Grade School
66
34
(161)
65
34
1
(147)
Some High School
66
34
( 98)
72
27
1
( 88)
High School
Completed
52
48
(287)
59
36
4
(253)
Some College
45
55
(130)
54
39
7
(125)
College and
Post Graduate
49
51
(142)
50
48
2
(130).
TAB F (page 2)
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
off
op
oto
%
%
Dem.
Rep.
N
Dem.
Rep.
Con.
N
5.
1970 Family Income
Under $4000
68
32
(125)
70
29
1
(108)
$4000-$7400
52
48
(151)
56
43
1
(145)
$7500-$14900
56
44
(345)
63
33
4
(310)
$15000 and over
44
56
(170)
51
44
4
(161)
6.
Household Union Membership
One or more members 65
35
(194)
67
30
3
(200)
No union members
52
48
(615)
57
40
3
(536)
7.
Party Identification
Strong Dem.
91
9
(191)
99
1
0
(166)
Weak Dem.
77
23
(174)
85
13
2
(153)
Indep. Dem.
75
25
( 68)
84
16
0
( 70)
Independent
52
48
( 71)
56
42
2
( 73)
Indep. Rep.
35
65
( 62)
31
65
4
( 59)
Weak Rep.
17
83
(143)
19
73
8
(135)
Strong Rep.
4
96
(107)
6
88
7
( 88)
8.
Religion
Protestant
52
48
(578)
53
45
2
(481)
Catholic
58
42
(167)
68
25
7
(171)
Jewish
86
14
( 25)
87
13
0
( 36)
Other or none
68
32
( 46)
72
28
0
( 54)
TAB G
SUMMARY OF 1968 AND 1970 CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS
Principal
First Choice
Last Choice
Neutral
Standard
(Candidate)
Mean Score
Mentions
a
Mentions
a
(50° scores)
Don't Know
Deviation
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
Nixon
66.5
59.0
36%
38%
8%
14%
16%
16%
1%
1%
23
28
Muskie
61.4
57.0
16
20
10
10.
31
26
8
17
22
26
Lindsay b
--
51.8
--
9
--
11
--
31
--
21
--
23
Reagan
49.1
51.6
5
14
17
14
34
25
5
9
22
26
b
Kennedy, E.
-
50.3
--
26
--
28
--
13
--
2
--
33
Humphrey
61.7
49.9
25
18
13
19
14
20
1
3
27
27
Agnew
50.4
45.9
4
13
13
26
41
18
7
4
21
28
McGovern b
--
45.5
--
4
--
12
--
40
--
36
--
22
McCarthy
54.8
44.3
11
6
14
17
32
33
5
17
23
24
Wallace
31.4
31.7
11
12
62
54
13
14
2
6
31
32
a These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give
the same highest or lowest score to several principals.
b
Ratings were obtained for this principal in only one of the two election years.
TAB H
DEMOGRAPHIC AND PARTISAN BASES OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT
18-22
North-
North-
South-
South-
Overall
Demo-
Inde-
Repub-
year
ern
ern
ern
ern
Average
Candidate
crats
pendents
licans
olds
Whites
Blacks
Whites
Blacks
59
Nixon
47
58
81
56
60
35
61
50
57
Muskie
64
54
48
57
60
67
48
61
52
Lindsay
53
51
51
55
53
61
48
53
52
Reagan
44
52
65
47
52
37
53
45
50
Kennedy,E.
64
45
33
64
49
87
39
92
50
Humphrey
61
45
37
48
50
72
41
81
46
Agnew
37
47
60
38
46
22
50
34
46
McGovern
51
45
37
51
47
53
40
46
44
McCarthy
48
44
39
54
46
52
40
49
32
Wallace
30
35
30
35
28
9
47
12
Source:
Jerrold Rusk, Purdue University &
Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan
"Perceptions of Presidential Candidates:
A Midterm Report" (mimeo, September, 1971)
TAB I
The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States,
1952-1970
Question:
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong
(R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D) ? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as
closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Nov.
Oct.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
Democrat
Strong
22%
22%
21%
23%
21%
23%
26%
18%
20%
20%
Weak
25
25
23
24
25
23
25
27
25
23
Independent
Democrat
10
9
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
Independent
5
7
9
8
8
8
8
12
11
13
Republican
7
6
8
4
7
6
6
7
9
8
Republican
Weak
14
14
14
16
13
16
13
15
14
15
Strong
13
13
15
13
14
12
11
10
10
10
Apolitical,
Don't know
4
4
3
5
4
4
2
2
1
1
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Number of Cases
1614
1139
1772
1269
3021
1289
1571
1291
1553
1802
Center for Political Studies
The University of Michigan
November, 1970