Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
From RN to Haldeman RE: the youth vote. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: preparing RN's daughters for political questions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From RN to Mitchell RE: the formulation of campaign strategies in light of McGovern's inevitable Democratic Party nomination. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: Don Kendall's efforts to rally business figures behind RN. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: using newspaper editor Schurz during the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/15/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145259
label
WHSF: Contested, 8-25
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145259
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 8-25
description
This file contains:
From RN to Haldeman RE: the youth vote. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: preparing RN's daughters for political questions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From RN to Mitchell RE: the formulation of campaign strategies in light of McGovern's inevitable Democratic Party nomination. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: Don Kendall's efforts to rally business figures behind RN. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From RN to Haldeman RE: using newspaper editor Schurz during the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/15/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26145259
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
e161168f57c2a68e
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
8
25
7/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: the youth vote. 2
pgs.
8
25
6/6/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: preparing RN's
daughters for political questions. 2 pgs.
8
25
6/6/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Mitchell RE: the formulation of
campaign strategies in light of McGovern's
inevitable Democratic Party nomination. 3
pgs.
8
25
5/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: Don Kendall's
efforts to rally business figures behind RN. 2
pgs.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
8
25
8/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: using newspaper
editor Schurz during the campaign. 1 pg.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Page 2 of 2
(Item N-5]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Sunday - July 23, 1972
Camp David
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
PM
In studying the New York Times release of the Gallup Poll
on youth one lesson comes through loud and clear -- it is
imperative that we limit our registration efforts wherever
possible, without announcing that that is our tactic, to the
non-college youth. Of course, some registration of college
youth on a very selective basis should be undertaken, but
generally speaking we have to realize that there is about a
two to one chance that college youth will vote for McGovern.
There is about an even chance that the non-college youth
will vote for us.
If a youth registration drive begins, pushed by the McGovern
forces, every effort should be made to get them to direct
that drive to non-college as well as to college youth. I
know that our plan is to register youth selectively by
finding out in advance which side they are on and then going
forward in the registration. Here it is very important that
the question asked not be on partisan terms. Over half of
all youth list themselves as Independents rather than
Republicans or Democrats. Consequently, it should simply
be a question of asking whether they are for McGovern or
Nixon and then registering those that are for Nixon.
Of course, it could be argued that the registration drive
among youth, even non-college youth, is not one that we
should undertake at all, since at the very best they would
split 50-50. This is much poorer than the national average
and much poorer than what we would do among older voters.
However, to avoid the effect on older voters of our conceding
the youth vote to McGovern, we need to make some effort in
this area. Let us limit it to the target states, particularly
- 2 -
the big city areas and the down-state areas where we might
pick up support and except for a token effort let us concen-
trate on non-college, blue collar youth, among ethnics and,
of course, among those few that might lean to our side
because of their background in a Republican family.
I emphasize again that the whole youth effort should be one
that gets across the idea that youth will not overwhelmingly
be in McGovern's pocket, that we have in the nation very
substantial support among younger voters and that we are going
to get more as they learn what the issues are. In fact,
something can be gained by pointing out that we are concen-
trating on registering all youth and that the McGovern
people are limiting themselves to the elite youth who have
gone to college or are in colleges and universities.
[Item N-8
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
@m
Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind
of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination
seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked
their opinion on the man or his stands.
My advice off the top of my head was for them to decline to
get into personalities, but to simply say that they didn't know
much about it except that from listening to the debates and
what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would
appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.
What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all
the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia
and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few
months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which
will keep them from getting involved personally, but which
will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such
a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that
they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the
President are attacking the Democratic nominee. The more
off-hand, subtle kind of answer is what I have in mind. This
is not generally Buchanan's approach, but I think if you explain
it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be
very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he
prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should
be done before the end of this week because they are both going
to be on shows next week and the week after, as I understand it.
They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these
political questions up to this point, although I realize they have
had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on
- 2 -
where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the
Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked
what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond
that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely
important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would
be their opinion that most young people, as well as other voters,
would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates
was best qualified to lead the United States in international
affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun
in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more
intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such
questions in the light of our recent Moscow trip, having in
mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers
talking about our issue which is international affairs, and
except for domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing,
amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.
I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably
put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare
reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things
to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather
irrelevant as the campaign heats up.
[Item N-9]
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MITCHELL
FROM THE PRESIDENT
@
This memorandum is for your information and guidance, and
the contents and observations should only be used on your own
and not attributed to me since some rather sensitive political
matters are contained in it.
In talking to John Connally he has decided within the last two
weeks that McGovern will probably be nominated.
As you know, it has been his thought all along that Kennedy
would inevitably pick up the marbles at the crucial time just
before or during the Convention.
However, from a number of sources it is becoming apparent
that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to
have a deadlock so that Kennedy could still get the nomination.
This seems unlikely in view of his decision to get rid of his
Secret Service, but on the other hand that might just be a ploy
for the purpose of playing that game. There is no question but
that there has been and probably still is a deal between Kennedy
and Mills. In fact, from sources that I believe are absolutely
reliable, Mills desperately wants to go on the ticket with
anybody, including McGovern. This, incidentally, I think would
be a great mistake on the part of whoever is at the top of the
ticket because I think Mills is a shrewd operator in the House
and a lousy national candidate.
In talking to Connally he made one point very strongly with
which I totally agree. To put it in perspective it is necessary for
me to point out that one of the major mistakes we made in 1960
was to allow Republicans, particularly in the Southern states,
to control the Nixon organization and also to be out front in the
Nixon effort. Their interest, of course, was to use the
Presidential campaign for the purpose of building the Republican
Party in their states. This was particularly true in Texas and
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
some of the other critical states in the South which we lost.
It was also a national phenomenon. We avoided it in a state
like California only because Bob Finch was totally aware of
the California problems and saw to it that we ran a campaign
that did not cut out the Independents and Democrats.
Connally's admonition is that as we see the inevitability now
of a McGovern nomination we must "leave the door open" for
Democrats and Independents not only to join us but to have
positions of real leadership in the Nixon campaign. I can't
emphasize too strongly how much I agree with his position.
You will get squeals of outrage from the National Committee.
and from State Chairmen, but we must remember that if the
Republican Party, weak as it is, is to be rebuilt it cannot be
done so at the expense of risking losing the Presidential election.
The time to do it will be after the election.
Every state is to be examined with a merciless and impartial
eye as to what people in that state we need in order to carry it.
Generally speaking, you will find that what we need are
prominent Democrats and Independents who will join our cause
and if possible who will take positions of leadership in it.
In California one of the reasons we probably have less of a chance
in 1972 than we had in 1960 or in 1968 is the fact that Reagan
and the regular Republicans will insist on running the campaign.
This will make it a walking disaster and the same is true of
Texas and all the Southern States as well as some of the other
states, including states like Pennsylvania where we need
prominent Democrats. For example, Rizzo is infinitely more
important to us in Pennsylvania than Scott or Schweiker. Ways
have got to be found to allow Rizzo to be out in front if he is
willing to do so.
The purpose of this memo is simply to make sure that an
examination is made of the state's situation with only one view
in mind -- what men and women can do us the most good in
getting us the votes we need -- the votes of Independents and
Democrats ? Always have in mind that only 24 percent of the
people in the last Gallup Poll were willing to admit that they
were Republicans. With this kind of a base, putting Republicans
out in front, is simply asking for suicide. This does not mean
that the Republican organization should be cut out -- it does
mean that we should avoid identifying too closely with Republican
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
candidates who are weaker than we are or with Republican
organizations that are in ill repute. It does mean that whenever
we can get Independents or Democrats to take a lead role
this could make the difference between winning or losing the
state and even possibly the election.
The McGovern strategy is becoming very clear now that he
believes that he has the nomination wrapped up. His going to
the Governors' Conference for the purpose of "clarifying his
stand on amnesty, marijuana, abortion and welfare is a case
in point. I know there are those who will say that he can't get
away with it any more than Goldwater was able to get away with
it when he tried to enlist Republican Governors in Cleveland
in 1964. There are two very significant differences. McGovern
is more clear and less principled than Goldwater and will say
anything in order to win. And second, McGovern will have
about 100 percent support from the media in his effort to clean
himself up so that he can beat us in the final. This points up
the necessity at this time to get Democrats and Independents,
not Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road
which his record so clearly identifies him with. We must
remember our experience in 1970. We thought that with people
like Adlai Stevenson, Burdick, Moss, et al and their total
record of permissiveness, anti-defense, anti-law enforcement,
a good hard-hitting supporter on our side could win. What
happened was that people like Stevenson ended up riding in
police cars and wearing American flags and the media, of
course, completely refused to point up their hypocrisy in
making the change. We are going to be up against exactly the
same problem with the media in this case and every possible
effort must be made to develop a program now to counteract
this obvious tactic which is being developed.
[Item N-10]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
I was distressed to learn from Don Kendall that in his trying to get
Business Chairmen for us in the various States, he had struck out
in city after city after going down the list of names that he received
from people on the White House staff, the Campaign Committee, and
from other sources. He said that he had to date called 12 business
leaders in San Francisco and not one of them would agree to serve
as the Nixon Chairman. He said that he had also had some difficulty
in Los Angeles although he had finally come up with a name. Only
through Connally's intervention was he able to get Clement to take
the job in Texas.
As I have already told you, Kendall's reaction of course was that,
immediately after the election we had to spend more time romancing
the business community and developing a group of them to support us.
I told him that, if I looked back over my calendar for the last three
years, that businessmen probably took two-thirds of my time when
we figured my appearances before Chambers of Commerce, NAB,
the Business Council, and the terribly boring series of meetings
I have had with business advisors and consultants on a number of
issues.
I told Don that we have to realize that the old establishment just like
the old establishment in the university community and in the media
simply weren't going to be with us and that we had to build a new
establishment. I told him that we needed people like himself, Bob
Abplanalp, Mulcahy and others who, though they don't fit socially
with the business elite, have real character. There are simply
bound to be a number of people around the country who will fit this
category. Stans probably knows some of them because he had to
build a whole new group of contributors when he went through the
last campaign. I would also imagine that the wire and letter response
to the May 8 speech might prove very useful in getting some names
for Kendall to approach.
- 2 -
What I am sure of is that what we have been doing to date with
the business community is altogether wrong. When I think that
we have had the likes of Irwin Miller in to Blair House meetings
and when I look over the lists as I sometimes do of those who are
invited to such meetings, I find that even our most conservative
people on the White House staff inevitably go to the so-called
business elite when they want to get support for some of our policies.
I want you to have a really tough talk with Flanigan and Ehrlichman
on this subject and eventually, as a result of your discussions, per-
haps we can give Kendall some help in attempting to develop this new
group on the business side. Malek, of course, could be helpful in
such a discussion and Stans, also, from time to time.
In sum, what I am trying to say in this memo is that we have been
striking out over and over again in attempting to enlist business
support for our policies due to the fact that we have been talking to
the wrong audience. The business elite, if anything, has less guts
than the labor elite or the farm elite. What we have to do is to find
those few people in the business community who have some reputation
as being successful in business but who haven't been taken in by the
idea that they must only attach themselves to "fashionable" causes.
THE PRESIDENT
[Item N-12]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT Pm
I want you to follow through to see if we can get the editor
from Maryland - Schurz -- who was formerly on the San
Francisco Examiner to come with us on some sort of basis
during the campaign. Unless he turns out to be a nut I think
he could be extremely effective. He has the ability that Klein
lacked of really seeing how the press jobs us. One assignment
you might give him is to check up on photo editors, the wire
services primarily and less importantly of some of the major
papers. He strongly believes that photo editors do us in more
effectively than some of the managing editors. In any event,
follow up and see if we can find a place for him, provided he
is willing to come.