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This file contains:
From RN to Haldeman RE: meetings with Finch, Mitchell, and Dole on RN's political activities in 1971 and early 1972. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/18/1971
From RN to Haldeman RE: Billy Graham's analysis of the southern view on Muskie. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/8/1971
From RN to Haldeman RE: political strategies and White House advice for RN in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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WHSF: Contested, 10-45
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This file contains:
From RN to Haldeman RE: meetings with Finch, Mitchell, and Dole on RN's political activities in 1971 and early 1972. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/18/1971
From RN to Haldeman RE: Billy Graham's analysis of the southern view on Muskie. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/8/1971
From RN to Haldeman RE: political strategies and White House advice for RN in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
10
45
1/18/1971
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: meetings with
Finch, Mitchell, and Dole on RN's political
activities in 1971 and early 1972. 3 pgs.
10
45
2/8/1971
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: Billy Graham's
analysis of the southern view on Muskie. 1
pg.
10
45
>
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Haldeman RE: political
strategies and White House advice for RN in
1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown.
5 pgs.
Monday, December 06, 2010
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 18, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Bm
I would like for you to have a discussion with Finch and Mitchell
prior to the time that you, Dole, Mitchell and I meet after the
State of the Union with regard to our long-range political activities.
Let us begin with the proposition that for the whole of 1971 I want
to keep my own political activities to an absolute minimum. The
tough question will come with regard to what we do in the primary
states in 1972. For example, if we have to make a decision to
enter the primaries, it will have to be made before the end of
1971 in order to handle the situation in New Hampshire. What
I see ourselves being drawn into is a whole year of campaigning
in 1972 in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Oregon, Nebraska and
California due to their laws which put candidates' names on the
ballots whether they approve it or not. There will be a tendency
for some of our people to want us to move in this direction in
order to preempt the field. My own view is that if possible
I ought to avoid getting involved in any of the primary states,
including California, even if it meant that this might open up
those states for someone else to get their votes at the Con-
vention. Far more important than getting support in such
primary states for the Convention is to allow me to conduct
myself in 1972 for as long a time as possible in a way that will
help us win the election.
In any event, I will under no circumstances agree to do any cam-
paigning whatever in the primary states. What I am thinking of
is going even further: avoiding becoming a candidate at all until
shortly before the Convention. I am sure that you can see the
great advantages of this approach. Talk this over with Finch
and Mitchell and then at a later time we will talk it over in a
broader group.
Preservation Copy
- 2 -
What led me to write this memorandum is the fact that several
of those who attended the National Committee reception asked
about coming in to see me about the political situation in their
states. Greg Evens (sp. ?) for example said he'd like to come
in to talk about the situation in South Carolina. Bill Fettridge
said that he had written me a letter about Sam Witwer, and I
assume that the letter dealt with either Witwer's being used
in our campaign or perhaps for some other appointment. When
Buz Lukens came in to see me, he talked about the situation in
Ohio and his desire to work for us in Ohio.
Taking each of these individuals in order, I should under no
circumstances have any discussions with Greg Evens (?) about
the political situation in South Carolina and this should be a
rule with regard to anybody during the year 1971. You, Mitchell
and Finch should find a way, however, to follow up with a fellow
like Evens (?) so that he feels that the message is getting through
to me. Incidentally, in his case, you will have to determine whether
or not Evens (?) and Dent get along. I am not sure that they do.
In the case of Witwer, the Illinois situation requires a very thorough
examination of all the power units there. In any event, a fellow
like Witwer should be used but it is important immediately as you
can see that we have some one man in charge in Illinois so that
when I get a question about somebody like Witwer, I will know
where to refer it.
In the case of Lukens, as you know, this involves John Andrews,
the Ohio political hierarchy and a lot of other wheels within wheels.
My general impression of him is about what yours is but, on the
other hand, he has a lot of drive, a lot of friends and could probably
turn out to be quite useful to us provided it will work out in coopera-
tion with Andrews and others in Ohio. I would like for you to see
that all three of these are followed up so that they know that I have
passed the information on. Lukens, incidentally, tells me that the
County Chairman in Cuyahoga County, Hughes, was the real culprit
in the 1970 elections and is bad news as far as we are concerned.
My guess is that Andrews is our best contact in Ohio but again
let's be sure that we just don't line up with one power faction against
another. Lukens, incidentally, also wants to talk about political
activities in other states where some of his PR people will be
working. Just see that somebody responsible handles him in a
proper way.
- 3 -
All of this, of course, points up the necessity at the earliest
time possible of having our political situation put down state
by state as far as the major states are concerned, in a way
that we can use the people who will be helpful to us and keep
them from getting me involved.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Sometime ago I pointed up the importance of
unmasking Muskie's moderate image and I urged that this
particularly be done in the South.
In talking to Billy Graham Sunday he came
at this point very strongly and said that Muskie was becoming
increasingly acceptable in the South because most southerners
thought that he was a moderate,. both domestically and in the
field of foreign policy.
The purpose of this memorandum is two-fold:
What happened to the suggestion that I made
with regard to getting the true facts across in the South?
And, second, can we put somebody on this
project now who will follow through on it effectively?
Dent, of course, can be helpful, but I was
thinking of somebody on the PR side like Buchanan. And, of
course, everything should be worked through Nofziger and Dole.
The Muskie record, for example, voting against both Haynsworth
and Carswell; his record of opposition on Cambodia and supporting
peace groups generally; and anything else that might be helpful
in getting the true picture across in the South should be developed
as effectively as possible.
1
Tape 2
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Memo to H
I have now had an opportunity to read all the memorand submjtted by
membrs of the staff on the '70 d ampaign, and the period immediately
ahead, and also to bring together some of my own thoughts on those
subjects. This memorandum will edeal with the problem generally,
and in certain cases, quite specifically. You will note that in several
instancs it will require definite follow-through. Where that is the
case, I would like for you togive me a report on what has or has not
b een accomplished. I do not expect you to follow through in every
respect, in most cases it will be a matter of your delegating the project
to someone you have confidence in. This brings me to my first
recommendation for the next two yerars.
1.
I can think of noghting more important than for you to have
four top-notch aides of the quality of Ed Morgan and Colson,
H.
who will carry out the policies we may decide are appropriate.
staff
I am suggesting here not pœople who are burdened down
Ehrlichman-staff as will be the Ehrlichman staff
with the problem of programs. This is the least slifficult
of our assignme nts, because programs in one Administration
Colom
a/r/ or another will always someway be handled, sometime
better sometimes worse, we probably will do them better.
But in the final analysis, elections are not won or lost by
programs. They are won or lost on how those programs are
Huston
presented to the country and how all the political and public
relations considerations are handled. Ed Moegan is an ideal
man for one of these posts - Colson may be, to an extent,
for another. /,/AX/ although he may be tied down t/o/ t/o/
Nofgeger
with too many other assignements. It is vitallly important
that you get four, or preferably, even five men who are
completely selfeless, who will sevear on a bible that they
will never talk to the press under any circumstances and
who will work togeyher for our common goads. Each of
them should have three or four under them of exactly the
same quality with the same commitment. I cannot
emphasize too strongly that the major weakenss of our
OH WH staff has been the almost unbelieavable passion
compassion which so manh otherwise very good men have
for giving some tidbit to the press. This would be understandable
if it were in the Kennedy Adm. when the pressis friendly.
When the press is unfriendly, it is absolutely inexcusable
and self-defeating. The latest example of this, of course, was
the leak on Romney. This could have only come from someone
who had beentold about it - probably not in Romney's shop
- 2
tape 2
MORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
I know
although I-know-that will be the excuse/you will-probably hear from
membrs of the staff who were familiar with what we were going to do.
It simply wouldn't have served his interests to put it out.
In any event, I emphaixe again, able men like Morgan, selfless men
who are not seeking anything except to get the job done and completely
anonymous men who will only show up in whatthey do, and not because
they are trying to make points with the press by appearing to be in on
the know.
This is one of the items I would like for you to report
to me personally//h/ on perhaps within thirty or sixty days as to
what men you have selected that we can depend up0n for specific
assignments who will meet these specifications.
With regard to the memoranda submitted by members of the staff,
my first reaction which is most reassuring that is that each of
them has shown in his own way, a grreat deal of understanding ofall
the problems involved and has made some significant recommendations
which we should consider. I will comme nt on each of them as we go
along in this memorandum, but all in all I think you might well profit
by bringing this group togeyher fromtime to time, prbly by having
them submit such memoranda in advance and then having a mtg
with them without my being present, in which youbestir-their--
bestow distill their major recommendations and ddopt a line
to be followed. I couldn't agree more that having people in a mtg without
forcing them to think the problem thru and putting it down in writing,
is useless and a waste of everyone's time. On the other hand, once
they have put it down in writing, you can then get four, five, six
or maybe seven major issues clearly delineated - bring the whole group
together so that they will have a weeling of participation and contribution
and discuss the policy to be adopted.
As I consider the memoranda as well as the news columns which are
prepared in the news summaries/in and my own reading since the
campaign, these conclusions seem inescabable.
an
1. The rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech was/inexcusable, technical
error. On this score I have alrdy discussed with you the heart
Phone in
of the problem - never let a speech writer have a vested interest
in determining whether that speech is to be used on television.
He will always make the wrong decision - even a man as experienced
and as devoted to ur success as Safire is. The whole press
campaign with regard to "tone" and of our activities in 22 states
have has grown out of that one broadcast. For example, several
ofthe press commentators, prior to the time that that broadcast
appeared were writing that the P's campaign was very different
from the V. P.'s campaign - high-level, no personalities, etc.
You will recall that I urged you to get Zieg, K1 et all to emphaisze
ORANDUM
tape 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
this point. I know they tried, but obviously they failedto get it across.
The fault was not theirs, r/ tje one broadcast allowed all of our
enemies of the press to color the entire compaign with that one failure.
Completly forgotten was the fact that in state after state I never
mentioned a Democratic Senator by name, I never attacked the Democratic
Party, I always distinguished on the basis of the issues, as in Utah, in
the closing speech, I said over and over ggain that the choice bwas btwn
two men who honestly disagr eed on those issues. This would have been
the lasting impression of the campaigm had it not been for the final
boracast and in that connection the technical factor was decisive.
The content of the speech that Safire wrote was actually recognized
by the press who had been through the traumatic experience at San Jose
was that I had said some things that needed to be said, but as a result
of all the technical imperfections our enemies in the press were
able to sieze on this one booboo and to color our entire campaign efforts
with it.
There is a good lession out of this - apart fromthe fact that we must never
again 1/e/ allow a speech writer have anything to do with production.
It is that in this age of television technical quality is jprobly more important
than the content of what is said, We learned this from the first debate
with Kennedy ane now we have had to relearn it in/a less decisive forum in
and-our handling of this particular matter.
The important thing is for
us not to brush it off as something that "was'nt all that bad", but to
recognize that it was a mistake and to be very sure that kind of mistake
is not made again. In that connection. on an urgent basis, I want a ful-time
television man, even it it costs $100.000 to $150, 000 a year to have ine.
This is the name of the game and it is ridiculous for us to do this on a hit
and miss basis as has been the case too often over thep ast two years.
The man fromCalif seems to me to be perfectly adequante if he will do
the job. If not, we could take Scott, who is unimaginative but at least
modestly competent and easy to get along with. This is one of the items
that I would 1 ie a report on fromyou as soon as you have a re ommendation
to make.
3. It would be well to have Ron Z read through these memoranda
because he and perhaps Herb Klein as wele, could get an idea as to
wherewe need to do a more effective job of getting across in a public
relations sense our areas of performance. For example, five of the
memoranda recommended that the trips to KB and SE- to Calif should
b e taken only wheere theere was some indicationthat there was some
other purpose than going for a vacation. As you know, I have had
a concern abt this matter for the past year and a half and have
emphasized on a number of occasions the necessity for to build up
the "hardworking TP President. I think that the reaction of al 1 of our
tape 2
ORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
"the President is working too hard". On the other hand, where these
people on our staff who should know better, have the impression
that we need to create a workinb image on these trips, than we have
obviously failed rather dramatically. This not pose any particular
problem to me, because astime goies on I ahd more an d more prefer
to go to Camp David for a day or a day and a half than to go all the
way down to Fla for two and a half, three days. And of course as
far as Calif is concerned, I would under no circumstances consider
going there unless it was for a week in which work would be the primary
prupose. The problem in handling the trips to Calif and Fla is not
great, In the future I simply will not go either to Calif or Fla unless
I am satisfied by what Zig is going to put out that a working trip
is going to be the outcome in the press This will be easy as far as
Calif OS concem ed, becase we will always have a mtg out there -
it should not be too diff as far as Fla is concerned for you can always
have a staffbrieginf or a staff mtg or something of that sort and
perhaps run a picture with it, if necessary. It will simply mean
that I will not go to D Fla quite as often something that which is
not particularly a problem, due to the fact that I have not-found now
found Camp David to be just as relaxing ddf as I above.
But in view of the fact that our trips to Fla and Calif, excpet for
those few times when I fly over to Walkers Cay for 24 hours, have been
primarily working trips. Our failure to get aeress - this across to the
press, and even members of our own staff shows our virtually insurmountabke
media problem We have to continue to work on it but the best answer
is simply not to give them something to shoot at. I think one mistake we've
made is Z's understandable desire to make it pleasant for them in both
Calif and Fla - give them plenty of notice - let their families go, etc.
In the future in the case of both places, I am going to make decisions at
the last moment as to when to go and let them pack their bags and go if
they want and then make it a working trip all the way.
The other side of this coin however is more fundamentla. I think Z simply
has to do a more effective job, of getting out my schedule in terms of its
work.prospects. Perhaps he should start putting out the time that I start
in the morning- he could say that the P began his work day at 8) o'clock
in the Residence where he either had brkfst with somebody, or if that
were not the case, he worked iuntil 8:30 and was in the office and that he
left the office at 7 o'clock at night - that he had dinner for an hour
and worked from 8 until midnight in the EOB. I think just putting this out
bland without any attempt to oversell might have a salutary effect. In any
evet except for your piece in U.S. News, this idea of the working P
has throughly failed to get across and we have to take responsiblity for
that failure since we ewere aware of what th press was d oing to us on
this score. Th S should be our easisest public relations problem in 1971
tape
2
IORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
and 1972 because it happens that the facts are 180 degres different
from the myth. It is time for us to recognize that we have completey
failed in getting across the facts an d have allowed a myth to be built
up not only in the press but in the country at large, but one tht is
so effecitve that even members of our own staff is concerned about it.
4. The wisdom of our trying to get acros our version of the campaign
results is shown by the fact that over half of the-sftaf staff memoes
understandably frelfect the current mood among the columnists in
Washington - that we had "lost" in 1970 - the gain of two in the Sera te -
the minimal loss of 9 in the House obviously faile d to get through
to most of the people who listened to the media, including members of
ou staff, excpet for the political sophisticats like Chot and Dent this means
again emphaisis needs to be given to what I have mentioned in several
occasions previousl, the need for staff members who work and live in
Washington and who are constantly exposed to the Washington press corps
and the Washin ton chit chat a balanced point of view. Otherwise they
are going to relfect the downbeat attitude of most of Wahsingto n to everything
that we are doing. We went rhough this same thing 00 on a much greater scale
at the time of Cambodia - not only two of the group/submitted memoes on
this occasion really supported what we were doing in Camboida, that does
not mean the others were wrong - it simply means that they were complete y
overwhelmed by the public position/z/d opposition and it has taken them
6 months to recover from it. As a matter of fact the failure of most of our
eandidates the great majority of our candidates to use their opponents'
oppositiin to the Cambodian venture effectively is an indication of how we
failed from a public relations standpoint to get this one across. Let me be
very fair in point out that the failure is not due to a lack of trying, but to
the insurmountable problems we face with the media. Again however we
must recognize that our whole staff needs to be bucked up every day
or they are going to buy the current media line. That is one of the reasons
why I thought that the- a good editorial or column or some other statemnt
tha5 is curculated virtually dilay-mongh daily among memberso f the
staff, with a particular mark on it might be helpful. In addition to
that, we need a holler guy on the staff who constantly speaks in an upbeat
way about what we are doing - nh just as we need a holler guy on the Cabinet
to do the-same- exactly the same thing.
end of tape