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This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Meeting of June 29, 1971. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/28/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site; specifically, the RNC Site Committee's visit to San Diego. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder Meeting with the Attorney General-June 23. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: RNC Delaware Study. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby to Haldeman. RE: Alabama/Indiana Polls; specifically, suggested questionnaires. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Indiana: Gene Pulliam. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder's Projects. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: American Association of Political Consultants. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Telephone Call of June 14. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The use of Gregg Petersmeyer at "Citizens". 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/10/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Developed questions for the Alabama/Indiana Polls. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: In- Depth Poll on the public's psychological attitudes. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee Contributions. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/2/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The City Council of San Diego's vote to make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1971
From Harry Dent to Chuck Colson. RE: The making of former Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman of the Committee of Ex-Senators for the President. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/10/1971
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. Undecipherable note. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], no date
From Lee Nunn to John Mitchell. RE: Former Senators, Former Governors for the President. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. Re: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. To Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1971
From William E. Timmons to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention, and how many White House staff members will require accomodations. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1971
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. RE: Undecipherable message. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], no date
From Robert C. Odle to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site and the results of the bid. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lists and information on Key States. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From W. Richard Howard to Gordon Strachan. RE: Selection of Key States. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Lewis Dale to Gordon Strachan. RE: Target States, which are subject to change as relevent data becomes apparent. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Ed Debolt to Tom Evans. RE: States not included in the previous memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Frank Shakespeare to Haldeman. RE: Observations on political moods by Bill Gavin. 7 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman. RE: An enclosed copy of John Bucci's booklet concerning the survey in Delaware. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Haldeman to Rose Mary Woods. RE: The RNC's involvement in a Delaware survey research project. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Rita E. Hauser to John. N. Mitchell. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1971
From Bob Marik to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: Simulation for 1972 with the voters chategorized into a matrix, or groupings. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1971
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145509
label
WHSF: Contested, 11-5
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145509
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 11-5
description
This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Meeting of June 29, 1971. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/28/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site; specifically, the RNC Site Committee's visit to San Diego. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder Meeting with the Attorney General-June 23. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: RNC Delaware Study. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby to Haldeman. RE: Alabama/Indiana Polls; specifically, suggested questionnaires. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Indiana: Gene Pulliam. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder's Projects. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: American Association of Political Consultants. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Telephone Call of June 14. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The use of Gregg Petersmeyer at "Citizens". 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/10/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Developed questions for the Alabama/Indiana Polls. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: In- Depth Poll on the public's psychological attitudes. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee Contributions. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/2/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The City Council of San Diego's vote to make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1971
From Harry Dent to Chuck Colson. RE: The making of former Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman of the Committee of Ex-Senators for the President. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/10/1971
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. Undecipherable note. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], no date
From Lee Nunn to John Mitchell. RE: Former Senators, Former Governors for the President. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. Re: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. To Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1971
From William E. Timmons to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention, and how many White House staff members will require accomodations. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1971
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. RE: Undecipherable message. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], no date
From Robert C. Odle to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site and the results of the bid. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lists and information on Key States. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From W. Richard Howard to Gordon Strachan. RE: Selection of Key States. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Lewis Dale to Gordon Strachan. RE: Target States, which are subject to change as relevent data becomes apparent. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Ed Debolt to Tom Evans. RE: States not included in the previous memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Frank Shakespeare to Haldeman. RE: Observations on political moods by Bill Gavin. 7 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1971
From Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman. RE: An enclosed copy of John Bucci's booklet concerning the survey in Delaware. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Haldeman to Rose Mary Woods. RE: The RNC's involvement in a Delaware survey research project. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1971
From Rita E. Hauser to John. N. Mitchell. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1971
From Bob Marik to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: Simulation for 1972 with the voters chategorized into a matrix, or groupings. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/29/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
1972 Convention Site. 1 pg.
11
5
6/25/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Dent Office Analyses of States. 2 pgs.
11
5
11
5
6/28/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Kalmbach Meeting of June 29, 1971. 1 pg.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 1 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon. 1 pg.
11
5
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
1972 Convention Site; specifically, the RNC
Site Committee's visit to San Diego. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Magruder Meeting with the Attorney
General-June 23. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 2
pgs.
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
RNC Delaware Study. 4 pgs.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 2 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby to
Haldeman. RE: Alabama/Indiana Polls;
specifically, suggested questionnaires. 7 pgs.
11
5
6/15/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Indiana: Gene Pulliam. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/14/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Dent Office Analyses of States. 7 pgs.
11
5
6/15/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
McCarthy Plans for 1972. 1 pg.
11
5
6/15/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Magruder's Projects. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 3 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/14/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
American Association of Political
Consultants. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/14/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Kalmbach Telephone Call of June 14. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/10/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The use of Gregg Petersmeyer at "Citizens".
1 pg.
11
5
6/9/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum. 1 pg.
11
5
6/8/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Developed questions for the
Alabama/Indiana Polls. 3 pgs.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 4 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: In-
Depth Poll on the public's psychological
attitudes. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/2/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee
Contributions. 1 pg.
11
5
6/1/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The City Council of San Diego's vote to
make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican
National Convention. 1 pg.
11
5
6/10/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Harry Dent to Chuck Colson. RE: The
making of former Senator Bourke
Hickenlooper the chairman of the Committee
of Ex-Senators for the President. 1 pg.
11
5
White House Staff
Letter
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. Undecipherable
note. 1 pg.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 5 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/16/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Lee Nunn to John Mitchell. RE:
Former Senators, Former Governors for the
President. 1 pg.
11
5
6/23/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. Re:
Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/22/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. To Jeb S.
Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/21/1971
Campaign
Memo
From William E. Timmons to Haldeman.
RE: 1972 Convention, and how many White
House staff members will require
accomodations.
1 pg.
11
5
White House Staff
Letter
From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. RE:
Undecipherable message. 1 pg.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 6 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/23/1971
Memo
From Robert C. Odle to Jeb S. Magruder.
RE: 1972 Convention Site and the results of
the bid. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Lists and information on Key States. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From W. Richard Howard to Gordon
Strachan. RE: Selection of Key States. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Lewis Dale to Gordon Strachan. RE:
Target States, which are subject to change as
relevent data becomes apparent. 4 pgs.
11
5
6/16/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Ed Debolt to Tom Evans. RE: States
not included in the previous memo. 1 pg.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 7 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
11
5
6/16/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Frank Shakespeare to Haldeman. RE:
Observations on political moods by Bill
Gavin. 7 pgs.
11
5
6/9/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman. RE:
An enclosed copy of John Bucci's booklet
concerning the survey in Delaware. 3 pgs.
11
5
6/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Rose Mary Woods. RE:
The RNC's involvement in a Delaware
survey research project. 1 pg.
11
5
6/8/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Rita E. Hauser to John. N. Mitchell.
RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 2 pgs.
11
5
6/10/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Bob Marik to Jeb S. Magruder. RE:
Simulation for 1972 with the voters
chategorized into a matrix, or groupings. 3
pgs.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
Page 8 of 8
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 231
Folder:
Gordon Strachan-Chron (Memos to HRH only) June 1971
Document
Disposition
358
Retain Open
359
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Open
360
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361
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Close
Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
362
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
363
Retain
Open
364
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRW, 6-25-71
365
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-28-71
366
Retain
Open
367
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Open
368
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-25-71
369
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
370
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Open
371
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRN, 6-23-71
372
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
373
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Open
374
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Open
375
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Open
376
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Private/Political Memo, Stracnan to HRH, 6-17-71
377
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
378
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan & Hiabu to HRH, 6-17-71
379
Retain
Open
380
Retain
Open
381
Retain
Open
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 231
382
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-71
383
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
384
Retain
Open
385
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-71
386
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRW, 6-15-71
387
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Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
388
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
389
Retain
Open
390
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Open
391
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-71
392
Retain
Close
Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-71
393
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Open
394
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-9-71
395
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-71
396
Retain
Open
397
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Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-71
398
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Open
399
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Open
400
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Open
401
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Open
402
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Open
403
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Open
404
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Close
Invasion of Privacy Memo, Stracnan to HRH, 6-4-71
405
Retain
Open
406
Retain
Open
407
Retain
Open
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 231
408
Retain Open
409
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-2-71
410
Retain
Open
411
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRN. 6-1-71
BACK UP $ AHACHMENTS
IVE
ARE IN "RNC CONVENtioN
June 29, 1971 File"
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
1972 Convention Site
Magruder delivered the 1972 Convention Site decision paper
to the Attorney General today. Your copy is attached.
As you know, Magruder and Timmons have developed a scenario
that the Attorney General told you on June 23rd he would
slow down until the President has had an opportunity to
give serious thought to San Diego.
The decision paper offers the facts for the President's
consideration and recommends that San Diego be selected as
the site for a three day convention beginning August 21,
1972.
To summarize:
1. The Democrats announced today that their convention
will be held in Miami Beach beginning July 9, 1972.
Miami Beach bid $950,000 for the honor.
2. Bids for the Republican Convention have been received
from cities which are listed in the order of preference:
San Diego, Miami Beach, Houston, Louisville, Chicago,
and San Francisco.
3. The Summer Olympics will be held in Munich beginning
the last week of August. Therefore, the 1972 Convention
should begin on August 21, 1972 and continue for three
days.
GS:1m
June 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Dent Office Analyses
of States
Dent forwarded analyses of Idaho, North Dakota, Arizona,
Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas. To summarize:
Idaho: The President should carry Idaho; Senator
Jordan should be re-elected, and the two Republican
incumbents will probably not have a strong challenge
because the Democrats will concentrate on the state
legislature to capitalize on their gubernatorial
victory in 1970; the Republican Party is faction-
ridden, so Lt. Governor Jack Murphy seems to be our
best political information contact.
North Dakota: The party believes the President would
lose North Dakota because the farmers feel they have
a Madison Avenue salute to agricultre instead of a
"Kissinger of Agriculture". Republican Lt. Governor
Dick Larsen could win the gubernatorial race if the
current Democrat, William Gay, does not seek re-
election. Presidential visits to the heartland are
suggested. One possibility is the Midwest Republican
Conference in October in Indianapolis.
Arizona: The President should carry Arizona. There
is neither a gubernatorial nor a Senate race in 1972.
The only House seat in question should go Republican.
Rosenzweig, the State Chairman, asks to be consulted
before any Citizens leaders for Arizona are chosen.
Indianam The economy has cost the President some support.
The farm issue is not that strong, though Wallace still
is. Two House seats can be gained without losing the
current six seats. Governor Whitcomb cannot run for
re-election and would lose anyway because of the party
feuds. Most factions seek a meeting with the Attorney
General without Whitcomb.
-2-
Illinois: The farm situation and unemployment would
make the race for the 26 electoral votes very close.
Percy should be re-elected and would run stronger than
the President. Governor Ogilvie faces a very tough race
for re-election. The party is weak and in debt.
Kansas: The President would carry Kansas in spite of
the farm issue (DOA is considered antagonistic) and
unemployment. Democratic Governor Docking would be
re-elected if he chooses to run as would Senator Jim
Pearson. GOP Lt. Governor Reynolds Schultz is considering
a challenge to the one Democratic incumbent. The party
organization is weak though Senator Dole is frequently
in Kansas defending the President.
GS:1m
DETERMINED TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
By
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
Emprise NARS, Date 1-15-80
June 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
ave
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Kalmbach Meeting of
June 29, 1971
You suggested that a meeting with Herb Kalmbach and John Dean
be arranged tomorrow, June 29th. The President meets with
the NSC at 3:00 p.m., so that time for a meeting in your
office is suggested. Two questions remain:
1. Ehrlichman's office (Jana Hruska) called and asked
that Ehrlichman "sit in because it would avoid two
separate meetings, and that is the way it was done
before".
Advise Ehrlichman to attend
Advise Ehrlichman not to attend
2. John Dean wonders whether Jack Caulfield should
attend the meeting at any point or should all requests
flow through Dean.
Caulfield not to attend
Caulfield to attend when called
Caulfield to attend entire meeting
Concerning the Citizens Committee and RNC financial situation,
you mentioned that the entire budget and control procedures
should be discussed "when Kalmbach here next".
Upon completion of the Kalmbach, Dean (and Ehrlichman?)
meeting, do you want the Attorney General to arrive to dis-
cuss the financial situation?
Yes
Arrange 4:00 p.m. meeting
Set different time
No
GS:1m
June 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
1972 Convention Site
Technically the RNC will decide on the site for the 1972
Convention on July 22-23, based on the last Site Committee
meeting and recommendation of July 211 so the specific,
technical answer to your question as to the final date for
a decision on the 1972 Convention site is July 21.
However, Timmons, who as Chairman of the Attorney General's
task force on the Convention has developed scenario that
requires a firm decision earlier:
1. Late today, Timmons will submit his analysis of
Chicago:
2. Next week, Timmons will meet with Dole to determine
the Site Committee's preferences; and will submit to
you and the Attorney General a formal decision paper.
This paper will attach the formal bid by San Diego,
which is expected to be $500,000 in cash and $1,000,000
in inflated price services;
3. Upon decision by the President on the location of the
Convention, Timmons hopes to relay this to Dole, who will
in turn have the Site Committee decide on the same
location;
4. If the location is San Diego, Timmons suggests that
Dole, during the San Clemente trip, formally advise the
President and then immediately make the announcement to
the media;
5. If San Diego is not chosen, the same scenario would
be followed except that there is no need to make the
announcement from San Clemente.
GS:1m
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
HARRY DENT
ASD
Lee Nunn is taking over the project of organizing a committee
of ex-senators for the President. He would like to make former
Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman. He says he has plenty
of time on his hands and is in the Washington area all the time.
He also suggests we get together a committee of former governors.
Also, he is going to increase the list of former senators to include
a number of others not mentioned in the memo.
If we want the ex-governors committee formed, we need to let
him know that also.
CC: Bob Haldeman
THE WHITE HOUSE
+
WASHINGTON
neinn
Date
TO: G.S.
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
H hes NOT seen yet.
are all of
there efforts
Coordinated By
Someone? OR, one
we duplicating?
B
Personal & Confidential
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN MITCHELL
FROM:
LEE NUNN
SUBJECT:
FORMER SENATORS, FORMER GOVERNORS FOR THE PRESIDENT
It has been suggested by the White House that the political
apparatus should be visiting with former senators who could
perhaps form a Senators for Nixon Re-election Committee.
This could be done if you feel it advisable. It should be
possible to form a similar committee of ex-governors.
Senator Hickenlooper would be a prospective organizer of
the senators. Then, too, his former Director of the
Republican Policy Committee, Fred Rhodes, No. 2 man at
the Veterans Administration, might be helpful to such a
project.
If you approve, what would be your thoughts on timing and
organization?
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
1972 Convention Site
Magruder will meet the Attorney General today and discuss
memorandum attached at Tab A concerning the RNC Site
Committee's visit to San Diego.
To summarize:
1. The Site Committee found the same faults Bill Timmons'
noted in his May 6 memorandum (limited office space at the
convention hall and barely adequate hotel accomodations)
2. The local politicians are indifferent, but the State
officials, especially Ed Reinecke, are enthusiastic.
3. The San Diego bid is $500,000 in cash and $1,000,000
in inflated price services. This excellent bid is con-
sidered primarily the work of Reinecke and Magruder will
suggest that the Attorney General call Reinecke and thank
him.
4. San Diego is the favored site of the Attorney General's
task force, though Chicago, Miami, and Louisville are still
under serious consideration by the Site Committee.
5. Dole, Timmons, and Magruder believe the Convention Site
Committee's request to see the President should be denied.
Rather, Timmons should see the President, get his decision,
relay it to Dole, and have Dole program the Site Committee
to recommend formally to the President and announce to the
media the location of the 1972 RNC Convention.
6. A formal decision paper will be presented to you and the
Attorney General when San Diego submits its formal bid,
hopefully this week.
On a related matter, Timmons submitted the memorandum attached
at Tab B concerning the number of White House Staff who
would be attending the convention. Timmons believes all
commissioned personnel (approximately 50) are "entitled to
be present whether or not they are actively engaged in the
Convention.
-2-
The following are the options of which I recommend
number two.
1. All commissioned personnel attend
2. Only those Staff who are contributing, whether
commissioned or not
3. All male Staff down through Staff assistant
level (150)
GS:1m
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006
DETERMINED TO BE AN June 22, 1971
(202) 333.0920
ADMISSIS TRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12005. Soct' 6-102
By
Emprire
MARS,
Date
1-15-80
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.
SUBJECT:
1972 CONVENTION SITE
The RNC's Convention Site Committee has now returned from San Diego,
thus completing its series of visits to all the cities which have bid
for the 1972 Republican National Convention. The Committee was not as
impressed with San Diego as we hoped it would be, citing the lack of
office space for the media and the RNC at the convention hall as the
main drawback. Also, some political officials in the city, chief among
them the mayor, either suggested that the city did not want the conven-
tion, or were at best indifferent to the prospect of getting it. On the
other hand, business leaders and state officials, led by Lieutenant
Governor Ed Reineke of California, were very enthusiastic and members of
the Site Committee reacted favorably to these people.
Bill Timmons reports that his contacts in California tell him the city
is now offering $400,000 in cash and approximately $600,000 in services
bringing the total offer to approximately $1,000,000. However, the city
is putting very high pricetags on the services, so in reality the figure
might be more like $800,000. The final bid is being prepared this week
in San Diego and should be received by the National Committee at the end
of the week -- we will obtain a copy of it. It is our understanding that
in this bid, the city will offer to construct a building adjacent to the
convention hall which can house offices for the media and also for the
RNC. San Diego will donate the use of the convention hall for as long a
time as is needed to ready it for the convention, and also for the con-
vention sessions.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Incidentally, San Diego Democrats are reported to be upset that the
city did not bid for the Democratic convention and therefore San Diego
has decided to put in a pro forma bid for the Democratic convention.
It also should be noted that the Site Committee believes the list of
cities under serious contention is now down to San Diego, Miami,
Louisville, and Chicago. The committee has ruled out Houston because
it has not expressed a real interest in the convention and has refused
to make a firm offer of cash and services. San Francisco was ruled out
because the committee fears possible problems with the nearby campuses
and does not feel the convention hall and hotel situation is as good
as it is in other cities.
In the meeting of our convention strategy task force on Friday, San Diego
emerged as the very clear favorite, followed by Houston. There was no sup-
port for any of the other cities. Those attending that meeting were Pat
Buchanan, Bill Safire, Dick Moore, Harry Dent, Len Garment, Don Rumsfeld,
and Bill Timmons. Dwight Chapin, Fred La Rue, and Frank Shakespeare were
out of town. In addition to favoring San Diego, the task force agreed
that the convention should begin the week of August 21, 1972, and should
be a three day convention.
Jo Good told me today that members of the Convention Site Committee are
in Washington this week and that she would like Chairman Dole, Fred
Scribner, and the vice-chairman of the committee to meet with the Pres-
ident later this week or next week to review with him the thoughts of
the Site Committee, so that the President might be informed of everyone's
views before making up his mind. I have advised Bill Timmons and Gordon
Strachan of this, and the three of us have agreed that the following
strategy should be employed rather than having the committee see the Pres-
ident. Also, Timmons tells me that Dole agrees with him that we should
pursue the following scenario:
As soon as the bid from San Diego comes in, we (Timmons, Magruder, Odle)
will examine it. If our inclination is still to go with San Diego, I will
prepare a decision paper for the Attorney General and Mr. Haldeman. As-
suming their concurrence, we will then request that Timmons discuss with
the President his views on all the cities in contention for the convention
site and our recommendation that we go to San Diego. Assuming the Presi-
dent concurs with this choice, Timmons would then talk with Dole and com-
municate the President's decision to him. Dole would talk with the members
of the Site Committee regarding this and at some future point in time (next
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
week or the week after), either Dole by himself or Dole with the other
members of the Site Committee would meet with the President and announce
to him their decision that the convention go to San Diego. The President
would tell the Site Committee that he concurs with their recommendation
that the convention be held there. Members of the Site Committee could
then go into the Briefing Room and announce to the media that they had
recommended to the President that the convention be held in San Diego,
that the President had approved their recommendation, and that they
hoped the Republican National Committee would approve the recommendation
in Denver on July 23. This would put us publicly on record as having
chosen a convention site before the Democrats.
If the general strategy as outlined above is approved, we will proceed
as suggested with the initial decision paper.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
bcc: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan (for Mr. Haldeman's approval and concurrence
if necessary)
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
BT
SUBJECT:
'72 Convention
In preparing my preliminary plan for next year's convention,
I need to know how many White House staff we may be required
to accommodate with rooms, transportation, tickets, etc.
No doubt a number of key staffers will be involved in the
convention campaign and, of course, those will be included
in our early plans.
I personally feel that all commissioned personnel are
entitled to be present whether or not they are actively
engaged in the convention. not. This would be a morale booster,
give staff a greater insight into politics, and serve as Crowd
fillers" for selected events.
RECOMMENDATION:
That I include plans for having all commissioned White House
staff attend the '72 Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OPTIONS:
If the recommendation is disapproved, then
1. Only those staff who can make a contribution to the
Convention
If the recommendation is approved, then
1. Include male staff down through staff assistant level
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date
TO: G-S.
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
Amy THoughts on TONS?
Commissioned 45
Deen thru slaff as about 7 150
Total
possil.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/23
TO: LR
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Put this with the
back up to my
memo to H on
72 convention. This
attached odle memo
does not go to H lowever
pemot
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
6/23
WASHINGTON
SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000
June 23, 1971
(202) 333-0920
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.
SUBJECT:
1972 CONVENTION SITE
The San Diego City Council met last night and in conjunction with the
county and the state authorized the following bid for the 1972
Republican National Convention:
$600,000 in city services
$200,000 in county services
$200,000 in state services
$500,000 in cash
$1,500,000 total in cash and services
This came as a very pleasant surprise and far exceeded the $800,000
which we had asked and which was bid by Chicago. Miami had bid $400,000.
Included in San Diego's offer of $600,000 of services are enough funds to
construct a building adjacent to the convention hall which will house
offices for the media and the RNC. The lack of such a building was the
Convention Site Committee's main objection to San Diego, and this defect
is now cured.
We can now expect to receive the bid within the next few days and at that
point move ahead along the lines outlined in my convention memo of yester-
day's date.
California's Lieutenant Governor Ed Reineke and the GOP State Vice Chairman,
Gordon Luce, are the two men who put this all together for us, and Bill
Timmons feels it would be very appropriate and most helpful if the Attorney
General could call Governor Reineke and express to him our appreciation for
getting the city, county and state governments to cooperate in making such
a bid. The Attorney General could say something to the effect
I
understand, Ed, that you are to a large degree responsible and I just wanted
you to know that we appreciate your efforts
It
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
2
Secondly, Bill Timmons wants the state GOP Vice Chairman, Gordon Luce,
to be "our man" in San Diego now that the convention is virtually
certain to go there. Luce is a San Diego resident and the number two
man in the California party -- he has been of great help to Bill in
putting this all together and Bill feels that before very long he will
be asked by the GOP to serve as local host for the convention, i.e.,
making him responsible to the national party for all convention arrange-
ments which must be made locally. Before this happens, Bill wants
permission to name him (not publicly at this point necessarily) the
Nixon host so that he would be available to make all the arrangements
which must be made locally for the President's campaign committee,
rather than for the RNC and the national party. In other words, this
guy is so good that Bill wants him for us before he's taken by someone
else.
Luce, incidentally, is one leader in the California party who is respect-
ed by supporters of Governor Reagan and Mr. Finch alike.
Therefore, we request permission at this time to informally designate
Gordon Luce as the campaign committee's local host.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
One last point: it occurred to me that California Democrats might force
a similar bid for the Democrat convention. While the city will make a
pro forma bid, as was stated in the memo of yesterday's date, Timmons
feels that the size of the Democrat convention makes it impossible for
San Diego to be seriously considered for the site of the Democrat con-
vention. There simply are not enough hotel rooms.
bcc: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan (For Mr. Haldeman's approval and concurrence
if necessary.)
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Magruder Meeting with
the Attorney General -
June 23
Today Magruder discussed the following subjects with the Attorney
General:
1. RNC Budget Problems:
Pursuant to the Attorney General's request, Magruder examined
the RNC cash flow, payroll, and organization chart. Magruder's
report, which the Attorney General reviewed quickly, is
attached. To summarize:
a) The RNC will have a deficit of $2,000,000 by
December, 1971; this results from $1,000,000 less
income and $1,000,000 more in expenses;
b) The RNC asserts that $900,000 is solely for the
support for the re-election of the President. This
is an overstatement;
c) The RNC is asking Citizens for $1,000,000. The
other $1,000,000 of the deficit will be raised by
the RNC. Magruder offers several options assuming
the decision is made to assume $1,000,000 of the RNC
deficit. The options include: Have Kalmbach, Nunn
and Sloan re-direct their efforts to acquire $1,000,000;
Citizens assume financial responsibility for some of the
functions that may be related to the re-election of the
President; fund the RNC with Citizens funds on hand; or
cut back RNC programs to fit the budget.
The options involving the fundraisers or funds on hand
will result in formidable difficulties, including the
possibility of resignation by Lee Nunn and Hugh Sloan.
2. Ken Rietz
Senator Brock urged the Attorney General to hire Ken Rietz
to be Executive Director of Young Voters for Nixon. Rietz
-2-
will sever all relationships with Treleaven, Allison and
Rietz and begin working at Citizens on July 1st at a total
salary of $36,000. Brock argued that Rietz should receive
$48,000, and the Attorney General finally approved $28,000
from the Citizens budget and $8,000 from a discretionary
account (see below #3).
3. The Attorney General has authorized a "limited discre-
tionary account" for Magruder. Only Hank Buchanan, who is
not yet doing the accounting work, will know of the account
at Citizens.
The amount of the account as well as Rietz's salary might
be an appropriate subject to raise in the general finance
review session to be held next week with the Attorney General
and Herb Kalmbach.
4. The Attorney General reacted very favorably to the polling
plan prepared by Higby and Magruder. The Attorney General
believes the polling structure suggested will be an excellent
solution to the current confusion. He would like to meet with
you and Flanigan next week to review the system.
5. Apparently, a personality clash is developing between
Lee Nunn and Tom Evans. This has been aggravated by the
recent interest in RNC financial problems. The Attorney
General is concerned but has not decided upon a solution.
GS:1m
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emprise NARS, Date 1-15-80 June 23, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Key States
Ken Cole asked you for a list of key states. Independent
contact with Colson, Dent, Evans, and Flemming developed
the recommendations attached at Tabs A, B, and C respectively.
The chart at Tab D depicts 18 possible key states with
notations as to who suggested which states.
Each of the individuals contacted indicated that lists are
sterile and offered the following information:
1. To the five that everyone agrees on, Dent added
New Hampshire, Oregon, Wisconsin, and North Carolina,
primarily because of primaries and electoral votes.
Dent does not believe that New York, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania can be carried. Indiana is not on his
list because if we can't carry it, we cannot win the
election.
2. Tom Evans' suggestions are the result of his directing
the RNC to do an extensive "statistical, socio-economic
and survey data analysis" that developed a list of 39
states broken into four priority groups. The explanation
of the selection process appears with the Evans list at
Tab C. Magruder's recommendation of key states will
attach the Tom Evans' list.
3. Flemming argues that any selection of key states must
be separated on the basis of pre and post-Convention
considerations. On the chart attached at Tab D, only the
big nine states that Flemming thinks will be crucial
after the Convention are listed.
Flemming's pre-Convention states include the seven that
have laws which may require the President to enter the
primaries as well as those states which he may have to
enter for other reasons - New Hampshire, California, etc.
-2-
Of course, Flemming's concern about pre-Convention
states indicates that others are thinking about the
subject of your request of the Attorney General that
a "formal recommendation ... to the President covering
strategy, timing, and surrogate candidates" in primary
states be prepared.
Recommendation:
That Ken Cole be advised that the Colson 10 key states
represents the current consensus of opinion.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
GS:1m
KEY STATES
CALIFORNIA
Colson
Dent
Evans
Flemming
FLORIDA
Colson
Dent
Evans
Flemming
ILLINOIS
Colson
Dent
Evans
Flemming
NEW JERSEY
Colson
Dent
Evans
Flemming
OHIO
Colson
Dent
Evans
Flemming
TEXAS
Colson
Dent
Flemming
INDIANA
Colson
Dent
MISSOURI
Colson
Dent
NEW YORK
Colson
Flemming
PENNSYLVANIA
Colson
Flemming
IOWA
Evans
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Dent
NORTH CAROLINA
Dent
OREGON
Dent
TENNESSEE
Evans
VIRGINIA
Evans
WISCONSIN
Dent
MICHIGAN
Flemming
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN
Mr. Colson considers the following to
be the key states:
California
Texas
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
-Illinois
Missouri
Florida
Indiana
New Jersey
Dick
W. Richard Howard
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Harry Dent called and left the following
message:
THE KEY STATES:
California
Illinois
Ohio
Texas
Missouri
New Jersey
THe following are included primarily
because of the primaries and electoral
votes:
Florida
- Wisconsin
- North Carolina
a New Hampshire
Oregon
The following were left off because he
does not feel we can get them:
New York
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Indiana - Because if we cannot take it
we cannot win the election.
Republican
National
Committee.
June 17, 1971
Thomas B. Evans, Jr., Co-Chairman
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PATKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emprise NARS, Date 1-15-80
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM TO:
Gordon Strachan
FROM:
Lewis Dale Than
RE: Target States
Enclosed is the material you
requested. Tom asked that I emphasize to you that this material
must be held in the strictest confidence. If such information
finds its way into the press, the President's chances of re-election
will be badly damaged.
Another point to remember is
that this list is continuously updated and is subject to change,
based on analyses of relevant data constantly being gathered here.
Enclosure
Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 484-6500.
June 16, 1971
MUST
2nd PRIORITY MUST
13 Indiana
26 Texas
RECEIVED
8 Iowa
12 Missouri
JUN 16 1971
12
Virginia
10
Maryland
17
Florida
13
North Carolina
10
Tennessee
27 Pennsylvania
45
California
41
New York
26 Illinois
11
Wisconsin
17
New Jersey
8
Connecticut
25 Ohio
10
Minnesota
173
158
3rd PRIORITY MUST
PLUS
8
South Carolina
5
Nebraska
9
Washington
4
Idaho
4
New Mexico
6 Arizona
3
Vermont
3
Wyoming
4
Montana
7
Kansas
3
Nevada
4
Utah
7
Colorado
3
North Dakota
4
New Hampshire
8
Oklahoma
6 Oregon
4
South Dakota
9
Kentucky
44
3
Delaware
4
Maine
64
4.
June 15, 1971
The following target states are the result of analysis of current
statistical, socio-economic and survey data, The electoral vote
totals of each section are noted and followed by a brief description
of the reasons for their selections.
PLUS STATES
The Plus States are defined as those areas that traditionally
support the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable
national atmosphere towards the President, we should do well in
these states. They are also states that tend to be more single issue
oriented. For example, if farmers are feeling fairly comfortable
about Nixon and the agriculture policy of the Administration, the
chances are that these areas will be in our column. If, on the other
hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture policy is negative,
there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.
MUST STATES
The Must States are defined as areas that statistically and
historically support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that
without all these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance
of being re-elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never
failed to be in the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The
reasoning behind the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must
States, he won't be elected President," is that if one of these states
is not carried, there is little chance of finding a second or third priority
state which would make up this loss more easily.
SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES
The Second Priority Must States represent those states that
statistically have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the
less, are within striking distance. These states represent the next best
opportunities in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some
of these be moved into the win column for Nixon.
THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES
The Third Priority Must States represent those areas that
statistically Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral
vote totals, but about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must
States. Nixon must win some of these.
The method of arriving at these target states included a ten
year analysis of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968
and 1970 Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an
analysis of polling trends of various regions in the country and
state polls where available, RNC state issue files of the past year
to see if there have been any major trends or shifts in public opinion
that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publications, as
well as the reports of the RNC field staff.
It should be reiterated that this is the status of state
priority selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive,
but only a device to serve the needs of those who must make early
resource allocations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.
TO BEAN
By Emprise NARS, 1-15-80
CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO: Tom Evans
FROM:
Ed D DeBolt
States not included in previous memo:
9 Alabama
3 Alaska
6 Arkansas
3
District of Columbia
12 Georgia
4 Hawaii
10 Louisiana
14
Massachusetts
21 Michigan
7
Mississippi
4
Rhode Island
6
West Virginia
99
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gavin Memorandum on
Political Moods
Frank Shakespeare forwarded Bill Gavin's very interesting
memorandum on political moods. To summarize:
1) The New York Times - McNamara papers controversy
will hurt the Nixon Administration because the
public doesn't distinguish LBJ's duplicity from
the wheeling and dealing of any Administration.
2) A politician has three things to work with:
reason, passion, and imagination.
3) In the public's mind Nixon is eminently reasonable
and reasoning; only Muskie among the Democrats is
close in this, our strongest attribute. Although
the public wants things to be thought through
reason is politically dull.
4) Agnew represents passion (energy, comment, waves-making
regardless of content). With Agnew, no one (including
Wallace) can "out-passion" us. The problem is that
the public is confused by Agnew as passion and Nixon
as reason. The result is that the Administration
doesn't project a definite image. This is to be
contrasted with 1968 when the Republicans were a
bit dull but solid. This confused image is a bad
sign.
5) This Administration is wholly without imagination.
There is no Peace Corps or Great Society, and even
the six great goals of the New American Revolution
are solid, reasonable, and prudent, but imimaginative.
Only Kennedy has imagination.
6) Nixon will be re-elected if Kennedy doesn't run.
Agnew shouldn't be replaced because his passion
pluses and minuses are already engraved on the
public's mind.
-2-
7) The Administration should not try to build an image
that appeals to the imagination because no one
will believe it. Rather the Nixon Administration
should run on stark, statistical appeals to reason.
Television and other media appeals to reason.
Television and other media should not be exciting
as in 1968 or arty, "cinema-verite." Charts and
figures not gimicky media should be the Campaggn
72 approach (Shakespeare agrees with this Gavin
argument).
8) Approach youth as Americans not young Americans,
because the Democrats already have the "youth
issues" locked.
9) Gavin concludes: "Wouldn't it be ironic if the
Nimon Administration was defeated because the
Democrats were able to state that while they
were for sane defense spending, they never
meant we should be in second place as far as
missile defense is concerned?"
Recommendation:
That Bill Gavin's memorandum be forwarded by you to:
The Attorney General
6/28- allea magrader
John Ehrlichman
6/287 Hullin
Dwight Chapin
6/28
Pat Buchanan
6/28
Ray Price
6/28
GS:elr
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON
DIRECTOR
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Honorable
H. R. Haldeman
The White House
These observations by Bill Gavin on political moods
in the United States are worth noting.
I am inclined to agree with Bill's thoughts on
television spot advertising in the 1972 campaign.
Just Frank Shakespeare
EYES ONLY
June 15, 1971
Covering Note
I wrote this memo before the disclosures in the Times. My
feeling is that in the final analysis, the President will not benefit
from these disclosures. I think the public will identify any
Administration with the kind of wheeling-dealing that has been
disclosed. I think Teddy will benefit, not because of any rational
reason, but because people can project their fantasies of 1000%
purity in government and a thousand-year peace unto Teddy. Our
Administration and all respect for authority has been terribly
damaged by these disclosures. Anyone who thinks this will be a
partisan issue ("see what LBJ did? ") is missing the point: the
Times wants Americans to think that anyone connected with this
war in any way is bad.
I know there is an argument that says we look better than the
Democrats because LBJ has been caught in a lie. I don't agree. The
public won't make the distinction. If I were LBJ, I'd go on nation-
wide television and make my case.
B.
Bill Gavin
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Shakespeare
Some Thoughts on 1972
What, ultimately, does any politician have to work with?
Three things: reason, passion and imagination. Even if he
successfully mixes these three it won't assure him political
success because events might go against him. But without
these qualities, even events can't save him.
Looking coldbloodedly at 1972, how will the President
appear to the voters insofar as these three qualities are
concerned? And how will his opponent shape up?
1. Reason. It seems to me that this is our strong point.
Nixon is in the public mind an eminently reasonable and reasoning
man (two different attributes). There is not a Democrat who
can match Nixon's reputation for thinking things through, sorting
things out, balancing all things. Muskie comes close but there
is nothing in his record that shows he can appeal to the voters
as the candidate of pure reason.
Now this is all to the good. Contrary to what the pundits
say, there is great comfort to be taken by the electorate from
knowing that they can count on a certain kind of familiar- if dull--
rational process in decision making. Nixon is perhaps the best
example of the "reason-candidate. 11 LBJ had everyone on the
point of a nervous breakdown because no one knew what he was
going to do next, i.e., everyone began to doubt his capacity for
thinking things through.
EYES ONLY
- -2-
EYES ONLY
But reason, politically speaking, is dull. It is good, but good
only in that way that medicine is good. Reason is appreciated only
when things are going wrong (JFKs much publicized discussions with
wise men during the missile crisis proved to be as much help to him
as the ultimate decision did; people knew things were "being thought
through" and had confidence in Kennedy.)
The Nixon Administration has been marked by this: we are
reasonable (we set reasonable goals--reorganization--and go about
them in reasonable ways) but dull. Yet no one quite knows whether
this is good or bad, as far as sizing up our chances for 1972. For
the moment lets content ourselves with the facts: we are the first
Administration in ten years to be almost universally thought of as
one in which "thinking things through" is taken for granted. This
quality of course works against us also: we are accused of balancing
too many things, of trying to be too rational, of attempting to avoid
needed risks, etc. But in any event, we are associated in the public
mind with reason.
2. Passion. Passion, in this Administration means Agnew and
Agnew means passion. The documentation of his arguments, the
precise nature of his claims, the moderate speaking style with which
he made them all of these are as dust compared to the one single
fact about the Vice President: he represents passion in this
Administration.
Like all passion, the passion represented by Agnew is pure
energy, i. e., in the public mind the content of his passion has become
almost unimportant (even to his friends); what counts is that he is
what he is, breaking the rules of political decorum, saying things,
making waves, in short, making a passionate appeal to the passions
of the public. Not to put too fine an edge on this thing, it can be said
in a very real sense that Agnew's appeal is the appeal of the lover: it
is direct, forceful, open, full of energy and rather unfocused.
Does anyone "out-passion" us? I think not. No one running for
President can afford to take the chances Agnew has. He is the single
most passionately discussed, admired, hated politician alive today,
including Old George Corley Wallace.
-3-
But passion is too much for most people. Most of us can take it
only in bits and pieces and Agnew has in three years made a mini-
career out of it. He has, as they say, enflamed the hearts of the
faithful.
Many questions arise: does the public distinguish the passionate
politics of Agnew from the rational politics of Nixon? Does Agnew's
style hurt or help or really have no affect on Nixon's image? It is
difficult to say but my guess is that something entirely unexpected has
happened: the public has become confused by the Agnew style in
contrast with Nixon's style. The public simply doesn't know what to
think. I'm not saying the public disagrees with his content; I'm saying
it has completely forgotten his content. All they'll remember in 1972
about Agnew is a big cliché in which sound and fury make up the
greatest part.
Thus, I think we are going into 1972 (no matter who is on the ticket
as Vice President for us) with a paradoxical, but very real problem:
the very quality lacked by Nixon in the eyes of most people is precisely
that which Agnew has, but in such a way that people are not certain
what to make of it all. Is Agnew, Nixon? Is Nixon, Agnew? This
uncertainity about the image of the ticket is, in my mind, a danger. In
1968 everyone knew what the Republican ticket was: a bit dull, but solid.
But now? Solidity of image (I'm not talking about programs) is gone.
A bad sign.
3. Imagination. Here we have an Administration that has called
for a revolution, that has called for revolutionary new systems of
welfare, revenue sharing, etc. But in the public's mind it is an
Administration wholly without imagination. I don't know why this should
be so but I'm positive it is so. And here is where the danger lies. In
order to win in 1972 a candidate is going to have to be reasonable, have
mini-passion but also appeal to the imagination of the voters. We
simply don't do that and we never have. Voters voted for us in 1968
not because they imagined what we were going to do but because they
knew what we are going to do. After five years of LBJ, intellectual
certainity became almost politically sexy. But now after four years
of dull reason with eruptions of (Agnevian) passion and few if any
appeals to the imagination (the Peace Corps was such an appeal, so
in it's way was the Great Society) have been made. Even the six
great goals have been sold as well-thought-out goals that can be
reached through reason and prudence.
-4-
We are going into 1972 with absolutely no appeal to the imagination
and there is, as far as I can see, no way out of it. No gimmick will
suffice. Either you have it or you don't and we don't as far as
imaginative appeal goes.
Now what does all this add up to? It means that we are in very
big trouble as far as image is concerned. We will be the party of
peace--but people expect peace.
The great strength we have, however, is that there is only one
possible candidate who could appeal to the imagination of the voters,
sweep through the words, add the logic and the record and hit them
in the gut: Teddy. And he ain't running. If he does run, we are in
a fight for our political future. No other Democrat has even the
slightest chance of appealing to the fancies and fantasies of the public
as does Teddy. We will win if he doesn't run. * Not because we are
going to overwhelm the voters with our record or our charm (they are
not really interested in either) but because we can out-reason all of
them and none of them has that much more going for him as far as
imagination is concerned. Passion could well be our undoing. But if
this is so, it is already a political fact simply waiting to be recorded
in November 1972. Thus, any attempt to remove Agnew in order to
"clean-up" the ticket is fruitless. His pluses and minuses have already
been engraved on the public's mind and have been associated with the
entire "Administration-image. 11 Replacing Agnew would, I think, solve
nothing and probably harm our chances on the right.
What does this all add up to?
1.
We should not attempt to build some kind of image that appeals to
the imagination for the simple reason that no one will believe it. Any
energy used during the campaign to make us look "exciting" is, to me,
a waste. Thus television and other media should be used in a different
way from 1968. Instead of the fast-moving, exciting "cinema-verite"
technique in spots, we should make stark, statistical appeals based on
documented facts. At first glance this seems to be disastrous, but I
think our hope lies in sticking to what we do best (reason) and what we
are identified with in the public mind. We can't turn our back on four
years of reasoned, prudent progress and try to excite people with dreams
of grandeur or majestic sweeping visions. An explanation of what I
mean: the numbers of Americans that were in Vietnam when we came
We can, of course, win if he does run, providing two things occur:
(1) Chappaquiddick is engraved in the hearts of the voters and (2) the
voters don't want fantasies, Both seem unlikely to occur.
-5-
in and numbers of how many there are when the campaign takes place:
stark, unadorned, repeated over and over and over- this kind of thing
will do more than a thousand arty camera angles.
2. Quite literally everything depends on the public mood. If the public
is looking for excitement after four years of reasoned progress, than it
is my feeling we are in big trouble and that there is little if anything
we can do about it as far as a media campaign is concerned. They
voted for us because they thought we were solid; we have been solid;
we must run once more as the solid party.
3. Gimmicky media appeals to the youth vote simply are a waste of
time. Our appeal to youth must be an appeal to their concerns as
Americans, not as young Americans and I think the President should
say this. The Democrats are starting out with a wide spread in youth
registration and we can't get them by appealing to the "youth issues"
that the Democrats already have tied up. Let the Democrats cozy up
to "youth"; we will treat the new voters as Americans first, i. e., we
will take them as seriously as they take themselves.
A final--and to me, frightening--point. History has been known
to deal in ironies before. Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration
was defted because the Democrats were able to state that while they
were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should be in second
place as far as missile defense is concerned? And wouldn't it be ironic
if the Democrats said that they could do better than we could in our
own programs vis-a-vis China?
Ghastly thoughts.
Bill
Bill Gavin
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
RNC Delaware Study
Tom Evans has directed Ed DeBolt to spend $35-40,000 studying
the effect of selective media and campaign devises on voters.
Canvass polling of test and control precincts will attempt
to assess the impact of targeted approaches to voters by
direct mail, telephone, and door-to-door personal persuasion.
The test is described in some detail in the Draft Memorandum
attached at Tab A. Magruder will advise the Attorney General
of this project sometime next week.
Rose Woods sent you a memorandum on June 9 suggesting that
a survey be conducted in Delaware. Her memorandum with
baltimp is attached at Tab B. A suggested response to Rose
Woods for your signature is attached at Tab C.
Attachments: Draft memorandum.
Memorandum from Rose Woods, dated June 9.
Suggested response to Rose Woods.
GS:elr
DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM
TO:
Bob Marik
FROM:
Ed DeBolt
SUBJECT: Delaware Test
PURPOSE
The purpose of the RNC's Delaware Test is to prove that voter
perception of President Nixon can be changed or fortified by utilization
of selective media and campaign devices. Delaware's modest size and proximity
to Washington makes for ease of supervision, low expenses, and relatively
inexpensive computer utilization. The test sample is a microcosim of the
Northeast, in that it has an urban area (Wilmington), a suburban ring and two
rural counties.
TIMETABLE
June 28: Precinct-by-precinct vote profile analysis will be completed. From
this analysis areas of Republicans, Democrats, and "ambivalents" will be
identified and displayed visually. The RNC will complete a precinct socio-
economic analysis that will locate areas of voters with a potential to
support the President based on Census data (Ist and 4th count) such as:
income, race, housing, education, etc. A state-wide survey commissioned by
a Delaware group will be completed and the results will be made available to
the RNC.
July 8: An in-depth precinct canvass will commence. Utilizing the precinct
and socio-economic analyses and the state-wide survey results, approximately
five weathervane, thirty test and thirty control precincts will be canvassed.
Approximately one hundred interviews will be conducted in each precinct. The
test questions will be developed and the technical supervision will be conducted
by Market Opinion Research.
July 20: Utilizing the results of the target precinct canvasses, the first of
twenty to thrity tests will be put into the field. The RNC is currently
developing the methodology for these tests which will include direct mail
techniques, utilization of telephone banks, door - to - door programs, printed
flyers and other communication techniques professionally designed to present
the President and his programs in a way to favorably stimulate a prospective
voter.
September: The test, control, and weathervane precincts will be recanvassed
to assess the impact of the twenty to thirty media and campaign tests.
MANAGEMENT
The RNC will be responsible for all aspects of the Delaware test including
management and recruitment of personnel to carry out the test goals.
PRESIDENT NIXON'S GOALS FOR A GREATER AMERICA
Frontal Attack on the Deadliest Disease
CANCER CURE
CAMPAIGN
Available in bulk for immediate
shipment. Order direct from :
H. A. Post Associates,
1028 Connecticut Ave., N. W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036
Check must accompany order.
1,000, $28; 500, $17: 100, $5.
Price includes postage.
Bob Dole, Chairman Republican National Committee 310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Permission to reprint this pemphiet is grented-and encouraged.
Cancer Cure Campaign
The Healthiest Nation in the World
issued; in March, herbicides were under investigation. May marked
the presentation of the President's Cancer Cure Campaign.
I. On May 11, 1971, President Nixon launched a major frontal attack
against cancer, a disease which claims one out of every four Ameri-
cans and strikes two out of every three American families.
II. What makes the Cancer Cure Campaign different from any other
This however is only one of many health battles which have been
federally funded project?
waged throughout the Nixon Administration.
First, it is financed with an independent budget.
Almost two years ago, President Nixon said there would be a
Second, it's administrator will be directly responsible to the
massive crisis in health unless something were done within the next
President
two or three years.
Third, it is based at the National Institutes of Health for the purpose
Anticipating the crisis the Administration launched a study into
of co-ordinated research.
cancer-linked products.
Fourth, it will have an advisory committee (Cancer Cure Advisory
In 1969 cigarettes (June), cyclamates (October) and DDT (Novem-
Committee).
ber) were put under surveillance. In December, a White House Con-
In 1970, the American Cancer Society said "Today's research will
ference on Food, Nutrition and Health was held.
determine the length of tomorrow's death list."
President Nixon's program is a constructive approach to basic
In March 1970, radio and TV advertisements of cigarettes were
problems through research. It is revolutionary. It has both commit-
banned. In May, at the Tenth International Cancer Congress, Vice
ment and resource.
President Agnew declared a "Decade Against Disease." In August
"No other administration," said the Washington Star, "has sought
a panel on pollution was formed, and in December predictions were
to come to grips with (the U.S. health problem), let alone offer
made concerning a National Health Policy being formulated for
solutions on so broad a scale."
early 1971.
In his January State of the Union message, Mr. Nixon said:
"America has long been the wealthiest nation in the world. Now
In January, 1971, Mr. Nixon, in his State of the Union message,
it is time we became the healthiest nation in the world."
declared war on cancer. By February, a national health strategy was
He is moving to turn those words into reality.
June 9, 1971
MEMORANDUM
FROM:
FOR ROSE BOB MARY HALDEMAN WOODS Rosey
John Bucci who, you will recall, is with the Pennsylvania
Opinion Poll, has written me as per the attached letter.
I am enclosing the copy of his booklet which he sent to
the President and call your attention to his remarks con-
cerning a survey in Delaware, since I do not know what, if
any, plans are made for this type program at this time.
Attachments
copy of handwritten letter
Dear Miss Woods:
I thought the President & you would like to have copies of
our newly issued booklet.
We feel it can be very helpful.
Best wishes - also tell the President it would be very
valuable to conduct a survey in Delaware at this time.
Mr. Rollins usually arranges for. this.
Sincerely,
S / E. JOHN BUCCI
June 9, 1971
Dear Mr. Bucci:
Many thanks for sending along a copy of
your newly issued booklet, "What Really
Decides An Election. " As you requested,
I have passed along to the President the
copy which you enclosed for him. I
will also pass my copy and your comments
about the importance of conducting a survey
in Delaware along to the appropriate people.
With all good wishes,
Sincerely,
Rose Mary Woods
Secretary to the President
Mr. E. John Bueci
Pennsylvania Opinion Poll
P. O. Box 266
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081
Бс: Bob Haldeman w/incoming.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROSE MARY WOODS
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
Your memorandum of June 9 described John Bucci's suggestion that
a survey be conducted in Delaware.
The RNC is currently involved in a rather massive Delaware survey
research project. The initial work has been completed and the
questionnaire should go into the field in July.
I will see that you receive the results upon completion of the
project in September.
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
LARRY HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Alabama/Indiana Polls
Attached are revised suggested questionnaires for state
wide polls in Alabama and Indiana. Additional emphasis
has been put on state wide issues in each case. These
questionnaires include suggestions by ORC, Dave Derge,
and Harry Dent.
You raised the question of the price for these polls
versus the number of questions on each poll, as compared
to the price for national telephone polls. In response
to this, ORC has offered the following explanation:
There are ten (10) questions, including trial heats,
for state wide surveys because of ORC telephone line
limitations. In nationwide surveys, all the lines
that ORC has available may be used and the longer
interview (15 questions) is possible while still
meeting the deadline of a 2 day interview.
The price for a ten (10) question state wide survey
of 500 interviews is between $3,500 and $4,000.
Slight increases or decreases in the number of
questions has no effect on that cost.
In summation, the optimum number of questions for a
state wide 2 day poll or a nationwide 1 day pell is
ten (10) questions. The optimum number for a 2 day
nationwide poll is fifteen (15) questions.
LH:1m
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR ALABAMA
1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon
is handling his job as President?
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is
handling his job as Vice President?
3. How would you rate the job George Wallace is doing as
Governor of Alabama - excellent, good, fair, or poor?
4. Has George Wallace done anything about the Supreme
Court's bussing decision?
5. Between Richard Nixon and George Wallace, who can you
count on to minimise bussing?
6. Is the Supreme Court or Richard Nixon responsible for
the desegregation decision?
7. Do you believe President Nixon has handled the race
question correctly?
8. Have President Nixon's Supreme Court appointments been
helpful to the South?
9. Aside from the War, what do you think is the most important
problem facing this country today?
-2-
10. Trial Heats - with and without Wallace:
Muskie, Kennedy, Humphrey, Jackson
11. Most people believe that if George Wallace was a
candidate for President of the United States in 1972 he
would have little chance of being elected, yet you indicated
you would vote for him. Why is that?
ALTERNATE QUESTIONS FOR ALABAMA
1. Do you believe George Wallace should run for President?
2. If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate for President,
and if George Wallace ran as a third party candidate, would
Hubert Humphrey have a better chance to be elected?
3. Why does Wallace continue to run for President if he
has no chance of winning?
4. What are some of the things you like the most about
Governor Wallace?
5. If the election for Governor of Alabama were being
held today, would you vote for George Wallace if he
were one of the candidates?
6. In general, do you approve or disapprove of Governor
Wallace's position on Civil Rights?
-3-
7. If a candidate for President of the United States
was supported by Governor Wallace, would you be more likely
to vote for him, more likely to vote against him, or wouldn't
it make any difference?
8. Which one of these two statements is the better
description of Governor Wallace - he is opposed to equal
rights for all people regardless of race, or he is opposed
to the federal government interfering in the affairs of
a state?
9. Favorability - Wallace, Bayh, Nixon, Kennedy
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR INDIANA
1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon
is handling his job as President?
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is
handling his job as Vice President?
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the President's farm
program?
4. Do you believe the Indiana Republican Party has served
Indiana well?
5. Has Governor Whitcomb helped or hurt the Republican
Party in Indiana?
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Whitcomb is
handling his job as Governor?
7. Which party would best serve the interests of Indiana -
Democrats or Rephblicans?
8. If a candidate for President of the United States
was supported by Governor Wallace, would you be more likely
to vote for him, more likely to vote against him, or wouldn't
it make any difference?
9. Favorability - Nixon, Kennedy, Wallace, Bayh, Muskie, Jackson
-2-
10. Trial Heats - with and without Wallace:
Bayh, Muskie, Humphrey, Kennedy
11. Most people believe that if George Wallace was a
candidate for President of the United States in 1972 he
would have little chance of being elected, yet you indicated
you would vote for him. Why is that?
ALTERNATE QUESTIONS FOR INDIANA
1. Do you believe Senator Birch Bayh should run for President?
2. Why does George Wallace of Alabama continue to run for
President if he has no chance of winning?
3. To which of these two should government policy give the
highest priority - ending the Vistnam War or fighting
unemployment?
4. Do you believe President Nixon is too Republican Party
oriented?
5. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Dick Lugar is
handling his job as Mayor of Indianapolis?
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Republican
Party has handled the government of Indiana?
-3-
7. How would you rate the job George Wallace is doing as
Governor of Alabama - excellent, good, fair, or poor?
8. What are some of the things you like the most about
Governor Wallace?
9. If the election for Governor of Alabama were being
held today, would you vote for George Wallace if he
were one of the candidates?
10. In general, do you approve or disapprove of Governor
Wallace's position on Civil Rights?
11. Which one of these two statements is the better des-
cription of Governor Wallace - he is opposed to equal rights
for all people regardless of race, or he is opposed to the
federal government interfering in the affairs of a state?
June 15, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Indiana: Gene Pulliam
Your May 28 memorandum (attached) to Herb Klein asked him
to contact Gene Pulliam about the Roger Ailes' report that
Pulliam is about to support Scoop Jackson.
Kejin talked with Pulliam for an hour recently and reported
to me yesterday that:
1) Pulliam is quite upset about a Romney-HUD housing
project. Klein has talked to Romney and will call
Pulliam back when he has the facts;
2) Pulliam believes Keith Bulen and Roger Ailes lost
the Roudebush race. Pulliam would be very angry
if Bulen received a top post in Indiana. In
Pulliam's mind Ailes adds little to White House
understanding of Indiana when Ailes visits
Indiana;
3) Pulliam might support Scoop Jackson, but he would
be the only Democrat he could consider supporting.
Otherwise he will support the President .
This information should probably be transmitted to the Attorney
General by Magruder.
GS:elr
May 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HERB KLEIN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
My most recent letter to Roger Ailes is attached.
Would you contact Gene Pulliam and see what is
really bothering him?
HRH:GS:dg
June =, 2971
done nogaze
Students not 102 the information on the Indiana
if There Alcin to contact
= 11 to is really as unlergy
= COMO of the INSURED indicate.
As you knov new we did not mito a trip to
but your information 10 certainly
approvised.
and best of Inck with your
expensing business.
Mild heat withes,
Sincerely,
1 of at
Assistant to the President
Mion
read
19263
bcc: Honorable John N. Mitchell
Herb Klein
HRH:GS:1m:BK:dg:LH:elr
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Dent Office Analyses of States
Dent forwarded the first two state analyses prepared by Tom
Davis, David Eisnehower's best friend. The discussions of
Delaware and Georgia are well done. To summarise:
Delaware: The war is the issue, Nixon is not blamed
for the economic situation; and the Wallace
appeal is down. Senator Boggs has not decided
whether to run for re-election in 1972. Tom
Evans argues that the President personally
encourage Boggs to run because his candidacy
is considered crucial in carrying the state
for the President. The Republican Party is
in shape and will be an asset.
Georgia: The President could carry Georgia if Wallace
doesn't run. (Bo Calloway thinks Wallace
will not run.) The Republican Party is
faction-ridden and would be little help
especially if Calloway enters the Republican
palmary for Senator Grambell's seat.
Attachment
GS:elr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY DENT
1500
Attached is the first in a series of state political reports
prepared by a summer intern in my office named Tom Davis.
Davis is a very sharp political science graduate who is David
Eisenhower's best friend.
I asked him for PR purposes and also to provide us with a
political analysis of each state, that he call key GOP leaders
in all of the states and put together a political summary on a
state by state basis.
I told him to record exactly what the people say, whether it be
gripes, praise, their analysis of our potential for 1972 and
what other races there may be and the effect these races may
have on our race in 1972.
DELAWARE
1968 Presidential:
Nixon
96,714
Humphrey
89,194
Wallace
28,459
Presidential prospects:
Both the State Chairman and Tom Evans agree that the Presi-
dent would face a very close race for re-election here if the
election were held today. The war is not popular, but as an
issue does not seem to hurt us as much as in other states.
Lay-offs at DuPont have brought the economic picture close to
the minds of the state's voters, but the Wilmington area faces
such cutbacks periodically and not so likely to "blame Nixon. "
Nevertheless, a unanimity persists among Party leaders that
the President has gained little ground since 1968. The Wallace
appeal is also perceived to be on the wane.
The leading Democrat appears to be Senator Muskie, at present.
He has been into the state a couple of times during the past
year and Party leaders seem to like him. Humphrey also has
some appeal here.
The State Chairman feels that we are hurting ourselves by not
using trade associations to help boost the Administration's
agricultural policies and that we have lost ground among the
farmers in the southern end of the state. He feels that the
Salute to Agriculture" day was pathetic in terms of utilizing
the resources we have available.
The Senate picture:
The great concern here is whether Senator J. Caleb Boggs will
seek a third term or not. If the Senator runs again, everyone
seems to agree that he will be unbeatable (he polled 59% in
1966). If he does not run, a bitter primary may develop over
who is to replace him. The leading contenders for the nom-
ination would be Congressman Pete DuPont and Wilmington Mayor
Hal Haskell. Tom Evans fears a divisive primary could cost us
the seat. He suggests that the President personally intervene
and ask Boggs to seek another term. He believes the Senator's
presence on the ballot would help the rest of the ticket as well
as hold the seat for us.
Delaware
Page 2
Governor's race:
Governor Russell Peterson is thought to be in excellent shape
for a second term. He will probably be opposed by Democrat
Sherman Tribbetts, a former Lt. Governor.
House race:
If Pete DuPont doesn't seek the Senate seat, he should be in
good shape for re-election. However, if he vacates this seat
it could go Democratic.
Comments:
The key to a strong state ticket would seem to be Caleb Boggs
If he retires, we could lose the Senate and House seats. If
he seeks re-election, we are virtually assured victory in the
top races - which would help the President along, too. Reed
thinks that the Senator is inclined not to run at present, but that
every effort should be made to keep him in the race.
The Party organization seems strong and well oiled. No Demo-
crat has managed a statewide victory for major office since
1964. The State Chairman is already pulling together the orga-
nization for 1972. The Party should be an asset to the President
here.
GEORGIA
1968 Presidential race:
Wallace
535,550
Nixon
380,111
Humphrey
334,440
Presidential prospects:
Both the State Chairman and Bo Callaway agree that Wallace
would win in a three-way race today by sweeping rural
Georgia, The President is not unpopular, "no one is cussin'
him", Bo Callaway says, but he doesn't seem to evoke much
enthusiasm either. Bussing has hurt us a great deal. How-
ever, with Wallace out of the race the President should he
able to win handily, sweeping rural Georgia and breaking
even in the metropolitan areas. Muskie appears to have some
support here and our leaders seem to agree that he has a
moderate image. Governor Carter and a lot of the Court House
crowd can be expected to line up behind him in a two-way race,
but this shouldn't stop a Nixon victory. Jackson and Mills are,
of course, very formidable Democrats if they could get a nom-
ination.
Senate race:
The Democratic Senate picture looks very crowded at present.
Maddox is a heavy favorite if he runs, but he has not yet
decided whether or not to make the race. Senator Gambrell
is probably too liberal for the state, but he has been cam-
paigning hard ever since he was appointed and will get a big
Negro vote. He will probably make the run-off. Carl Sanders
and Ernest Vandiver are making noises about running, but both
would have tough races. State Labor Commissioner Sam Caldwell
is also running and may pull some votes. Congressman Stuckey
is also running and could be the winner if Maddox doesn't run.
Stuckey is attractive, conservative and has lots of money. Bo
Callaway discounts him but the State Chairman feels that this
is the man to beat if Maddox doesn't run.
The Republican Party is unsure of its nominee as well. Con-
gressman Thompson is committed to making the race, according
Georgia
Page 2
to Callaway, and could run a strong race. Bo has not made
up his mind yet whether he will run or not. He says it is
too early for that, but he knows he can win against Thompson
in a primary.
Our chances for this seat depend on a couple of things. Most
importantly, it will be hard to win if the President doesn't
run well. Secondly, Gambrell or some other liberal would be
the most vulnerable in the opinion of our people. Gambrell
has moved steadily left since taking his seat and Bo thinks he
may have gone too far on SST and the European troop cut.
Another key factor in this race might be to keep a unified
Party together for the general election effort. The State Chair-
man fears that a blood-letting Callaway-Thompson primary
would seriously jeopardize any chance we might have for the
seat.
House of Representatives:
The Congressional districts are supposed to be reapportioned
sometime this summer. Population shifting within the state
gives the Atlanta area more Congressional clout. This could
result in a one seat gain for us, but more likely we will be
fortunate to hold what we have. Ben Blackburn is solid no
matter what the Legislature gives him. Thompson's seat, if
the black vote is consolidated, could go to a Negro. Thompson
may be forced into the Senate race simply because of a 40%
Negro district, according to Callaway. Cobb County will be in
a third district and will furnish a strong GOP base for a House
district.
There is an outside chance we could win Stuckey's seat (Way
Cross, Brunswick, southeast Georgia), but only in a GOP sweep.
Bo says that if Jack Brinkley goes for the Senate and vacates
the third district, we may be able to reclaim it -- but he bets
Brinkley will stay where he is.
Outlook:
The actions of George Wallace (Callaway doesn't think he will
run) and Lester Maddox will determine what happens to the
Georgia
Page 3
Republican ticket in Georgia in 1972. With both of them
out of the race, we have a real chance to make inroads.
At present, both look very strong if they decide to run.
The Party organization is badly faction-ridden. Our best
bet here seems to be to pay lip service to the Party and
work through the Citizens Committee. We need Demo-
cratic support to win here, much as in South Carolina, so
Party labels should be played down.
CONFIDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By imprese NARS, Date 1-15-80
June 15, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
McCarthy Plans for 1972
Rita Hauser (a member of the Citizens for the Re-Election of the
President), sent the attached memorandum to the Attorney General.
She met with Howard Stein of Dreyfus Fund about Gene McCarthy's
plans for 1972. The following points are made:
1) McCarthy is disenchanted with the DemocRatic Party
and he would be the philosopher, but not the organizer,
of a third party,
2) McCloskey, Lindsay, and Common Cause have not
captured McCarthy;
3) McCarthy could be brought into "the Mixon Administration
only if he could indicate satisfaction on Vietnam,
but this may not be too difficult to get."
Rita Hauser suggests that the Attorney General approach the
President about this intriguing possibility.
GS:elr
DETERMINED TO BE AN
MOLDO ER HAUSER STRAUSS & VOLIN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12005. Section
By Emp FIFT Date 1-15-80
CONFIDENTIAL
June S, 1971
MEMORANDUM
To: John N. Mitchell
From: Rita E. Hauser
new
Re: McCarthy Plans for 1972
Howard Stein asked me to breakfast with him
today at the Dreyfus Fund Offices. We spent two hours
in quiet talk about the political scene, and I derived
the following of interest to you:
1. McCarthy has absolutely no intention of
doing anything concrete for 1972. He plans to speak out
to push the Democratic Party in the "right" direction,
and will suggest frequently that if the Democratic contenders
do not change their views, only a third party can save the
Nation. He, McCarthy, will not organize such a party.
Rather, he hopes to be the philosopher of such a movement
which, if it did develop, will naturally choose him as its
leader. Under no circumstances will he enter any primaries.
Dick Goodwin, who is on consultative status and
payroll of the Dreyfus Fund, is writing McCarthy's major
speeches. He wrote the one in Minneapolis which got wide
interest. It is planned that McCarthy will announce a
series of positions on major issues sometime in the fall.
Goodwiin is drawing them up over the summer.
2. Stein is not impressed with McCloskey (this
derives from the fact that McCarthy is very down on McCloskey),
and has no interest in Lindsay, who he thinks has done a bad
job in New York. Common Cause is all talk and no action.
Consequently, Stein has not committed himself to anyone othe I
than McCarthy.
3. Stein repeated to me several times that he had
voted for Nixon in 1963. He is satisfied, but not totally,
as to the Nixon record on Vietnam. Here, too, his line is
strictly McCarthy's.
MOLDOVER HAUSER STRAUSS & VOLIN
- 2 -
I would react to the thought of the President "putting
McCarthy to use" in the negotiations on Vietnam in Paris.
McCarthy feels a coalition government can be negotiated,
and that he has the general formula.
I told Stein I would get back to him later
on this matter, and he obviously understood that I
would talk it over with various people.
I have the firm impression that McCarthy
can be grabbed by the President, as he is totally down
on all the Democratic contenders. This would take
nursing. It might be worthwhile to discuss with the
President the possibility of an informal talk between
him and McCarthy as a first step.
Nothing would be more sensational than
our taking him over. He has no particular employment,
other than lecturing, and I got a clear message from
Stein that he would like to do something for his
country as the next step. McCarthy could come into
the Nixon Administration only if he could indicate
satisfaction on Vietnam, but this may not be too
difficult to get.
4. Stein asked me to keep him posted on
things of interest and that I meet with him every
now and then. I agreed.
SUGGESTION: Would you sound this out with the
President and give me a general feeler? Played
right, I think McCarthy can be more or less with us
or, at the least, neutralized in 1972.
June 15, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Magruder's Projects
The Attorney General is finally pressing Jeb Magruder for
action by his Task Forces. Magruder is responding and
discussion this morning disclosed the following:
1) Magruder will draft the recommendation on Advertising
by Friday. He reports that he discussed the subject
with you and the Attorney General and is confident
that all necessary background work has been completed;
2) The Youth Task Force, of which Counsellor Finch is
Chairman, has not moved towards iss recommendation
stage as quickly as hoped. To solve this problem
T. Harding Jones from Finch's staff and Tom Bell
from Senator Brock's staff will work entirely on
youth questions for the next ten days. Bart
Porter, the Youth project manager, will submit
the recommendation to the Attorney General by
June 25,
3) Two week recommendation completion deadlines have
also been placed on the farm vote, (Whitaker), Middle
America, Ethnics and Labor (Colson), Primaries and
Field Organisations (Flemming), the Convention
(Timmons), Spokesman Resources (Rumsfeld), and
Democratic and Republican Contenders (Suchanan) ;
4) Three week recommendation completion deadlines have
been placed also on the Citizens activities (Magruder),
the Black and Elderly Vote (Garment), and the Women's
Vote (Hauser),
5) The Attorney General asked Magruder to review the
RMC cash flow, payrell, and organization chart. He
will receive these materials from Tom Evans on June
18. The question will then be whether the Citizens
should help fund the RNC. Apparently there has been
no discussion of what source of Citizens funds will
go to the RNC.
-2-
6) The question of whether we should proceed with
Simulation will be considered on June 24. Dr.
Derge and John Lindstrom, the IBM simulation
man from California, will make a presentation
to Flanigan (as Chairman of the Polling, Computers,
and Research Task Force), Nagruder, Martin Anderson,
Ed DeBols (RNC), Lance Torrance (Census), and
possibly Robert Finch. Flanigan will prepare a
recommendation for you and the Attorney General.
The question will be whether to proceed with the
$35,000 pilot project.
At Magruder's request, Bob Marik prepared a summary
of the Kennedy simulation system of 1960. A copy of th
the memorandum is attached with interesting sections
marked.
GS:elr
June 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
BOB MARIK
RHM
SUBJECT:
SIMULATION
As we approach a decision on simulation for 1972, I thought it might be help-
ful to summarize the techniques used by Pool and associates for Kennedy in
1960. 1
At the outset, the voters are categorized into a matrix, or groupings, accord-
ing to demographics and past voting behavior. For example,
Other
Catholic
Protestant
(Black, Jewish, etc.)
D* R* I*
D R I
D
R
I
For each Urban
of five
Suburban
regions
Rural
( * Democrat, Republican, Independent)
Figure 1
The matrix in Figure 1 establishes 135 categories: 3 ethnic/religious cate-
gories X 3 political affiliations X 3 demographic patterns X 5 geographic re-
gions.
For each voter category, attitudes on a wide range of issues are determined
from past public opinion polls. For example, in the limited matrix of Figure 1,
Northeastern urban Catholic Republicans may favor a hard line toward Moscow by
55% to 30%, with 15% undecided. That may have been determined from the results
of fifteen different but related questions on several different polls carried
out over the past few years. Basic attitudes do not seem to change drastically
over time unless some polarizing event has occurred which puts the issue into
new perspective.
The behavior of the voting population for a given campaign is determined by an
analysis of cross-pressures on voters. That is, the ambivalent voter is defined
as the one whose normal voting loyalties are in conflict with the perceived
issues or candidate images of the particular campaign. It is the bahavior of
this voter who decides the outcome.
1 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates,
Issues and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential
Elections, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1965)
-2-
For example, in 1960, assuming that the religious issue was second to party
affiliation in determining the vote, a Catholic Democrat had no trouble de-
ciding which candidate to support. A Catholic Republican, on the other hand,
felt some cross-pressures and would have been expected to break his traditional
voting pattern in some proportion of cases. On the other hand, if a Protestant
Democrat had run, instead of JFK, entirely different groups would have become
the voters under cross-pressure.
It is possible, by the use of the high-speed capabilities of the computer, to
estimate by calculation what the election outcome would be under a certain set
of assumptions concerning the sensitive issues. The interesting capability of
simulation, according to the 1960 experience, is that it can project reasonably
well what the ambivalent voter will do, based on past patterns of attitude and
behavior. Head-to-head polls early in the campaign merely measure this voter
at various stages of indecision, and therefore only converge upon the eventual
outcome as the election nears. They do not project, and do not claim to do
SO. Neither do they indicate the number of voters under cross-pressures.
In 1960, the simulation "synthesized" individual states by assigning appropriate
proportions of various voter categories from regional samples. This was done
because there were not enough individuals polled in any one state to yield a
sample of adequate size for statistical reliability. Thus, it was assumed that
an upper-income Jewish urban Democrat in Boston was statistically similar in
attitude and voter behavior to his counterpart in New York City, Philadelphia,
Buffalo, etc. That assumption was good enough to allow the simulation model
to predict electoral vote outcome about as accurately as it predicted total na-
tional popular vote, which was close enough to be useful.
In 1960, the simulation model told Kennedy that the religious issue would not
hurt him; that the pro-JFK effect in the close industrial states would more than
offset the anti-JFK effect in the Bible Belt and Deep South, where the Democrats
frequently had a large margin to begin with. That turned out to be the case.
Post-election analysis suggests that the net effect of the religious issue was
to give Nixon 1.5 million added votes, but to give Kennedy 10 additional electoral
votes.
Another interesting application, done after the election, showed a very different
result if the campaign had centered on foreign policy rather than religion. Polls
showed that the voters had substantially higher confidence in Nixon than in Ken-
nedy for the conduct of foreign affairs. If Nixon had advocated a tough line
toward Moscow, and if Kennedy had advocated a more conciliatory, negotiation-
oriented approach (which was essentially the case with Quemoy-Matsu), and if for-
eign policy had become the deminant issue, the simulation showed Nixon receiving
54% of the popular vote, and winning every state outside of the South.
In 1964, the Democrats did nct use the simulation group, but the group ran an
election prediction on their own. On the basis of three key issues:civil rights,
nuclear responsibility and social welfare, they predicted the LBJ landslide quite
well, both nationally and state-by-state.
-3-
Application to the 1972 Republican Campaign
I feel strongly that simulation deserves very careful evaluation in our 1972
planning because it can serve so well to re-enforce the techniques we are
contemplating for targeting the ambivalent voter. Simulation can be effective
at two levels: at the top-level Strategy Committee as one measure of the sen-
sitivity of given issues, and at the operating-level research and field effort
to more sharply determine who the target voter is, and on what issues he
should be approached. The sophistication of simulation is far greater for
the latter purpose than anything we now have, and it might be justifiable on
that basis alone - greater dollar effectiveness of target communications.
It should be remembered that the value of simulation is not to predict elect-
oral votes, but to suggest what changes might occur and who becomes the ambi-
valent voter, if given issues become dominant. It can be an effective -instru-
ment contributing to action decisions during the campaign.
We currently are thinking in terms of defining the ambivalent voter in terms
of past ticket-splitters, or other manifestations of voting behavior. In 1960,
however, Republican Catholics probably broke ranks for the first time in any
number. In 1964, Republican elderly voters probably become ambivalent for the
first time on the conflict between their party's candidate and social security.
A data bank that can give us this second-order capability to determine target
voters on the basis of issues that actually do become dominant in the campaign
would be invaluable. Today, the 1972 issues and the Democratic candidate are
not known, so we must design in a maximum of flexibility.
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
American Association of
Political Consultants
This bipartisan group, led by Cliff White and Joseph Napolitan,
met for two days to discuss "Surveys--Validity: Are they
Being Effectively Used?" Five of the ten presentations
deserve brief mention:
1.
Burns Roper, who, in spite of his age is quite
impressive, made the following points:
a. Most candidates mistakebly assume their election
is a mandate for all their programs. Instead, polling
should be used to indicate which issues should be de-
emphasized while in office to assure an accurate
mandate for re-election;
b. Favorable polls do not have a bandwagon effect,
concern for the underdog offsets the bandwagon -
Roper's argument is that the polls would always
underestimate the lead of the beneficiary of the
bandwagon. Be cites the 1968 election; if the
bandwagon had really been working the polls
which should Humphrey gaining would have under-
estimated his actual lead in the voters' minds.
Roper argues that the bandwagon effect on Humphrey
was offset by concern in the closing days for Nixon
the underdog.
C. The press is remarkably naive in its assessment
of polls, the press does not carefully distinguish
questions asked, sample size, percentage screened,
and other controlling factors;
d. Polls always over estimate a splinter candidate's
strength because in the polling booth the boter is
faced with wasting his vote;
e. All polls should be done as part of a series to
show trends.
-2-
2.
Joseph Napolitan, Humphrey's media consultant in
1968, argued that public polls should be relied
on to show who is ahead; private polls should be
used for issue information for the staff. lie
criticises the "locked drawer syndrome" of
campaign managers whereby private issue polls
are not made available to the campaign staff,
3.
Walter DeVries, Professor of Political Science at
the University of Michigan, is very impressive.
Cliff Miller has been asked to contact and assess
DeVries. His presentation covered:
a. Folls can do much more than determine who's ahead.
New methods have been developed to assess the public's
perception of candidates and voter reliance on media.
b. In depth attitude studies show that TV (both news
and advertising) is more effective in September and
early October because the public is not yet tired of
campaign ads. Lagi October is best for a direct
mail effort because lower-middle class voters are
impressed with first class letters that appear to
be hand typed and signed. Voters above the middle
class consider direct mail, however carefully done,
"junk mail."
c. Today 300 of the population is "independent" and
570 of the population are "ticket splitters." The
result is that party labels, organisational affiliation
(union, church, occupation, etc.), and demographic
characteristics are of decreasing utility in predicting
voter behavior.
d. Interviews with panel> of undecided voters is
particularly helpful in assessing media markets.
These panel interviews, coupled with daily telephone
polling, enabled DeVries to identify the shift from
the "social issues" to the economy in early October
1970.
a. Young people do not trust the media but believe
TV over print.
f. TV advertisements are useful in primaries to build
an identity, but in the general election the standard
"spet" may even be counterpreductive. "Documentaries"
with the appearance of "news" are mere effective when
the candidate is known by the public.
-3-
4.
General Kline, from The Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan, discussed the youth vote. Be
concludes that the 10-20 year old vote "will have very
little effect on the 1972 elections." This conclusion
is based on their low registration, antipathy among
the better educated youths and apathy among the low
income, less educated youth voter. However, image
is more influential with youth because they tend to
be remantic about individuals and dogmatic about
issues.
5. Vince Barabba, the Chairman of the Board of Decision
Making Information, discussed his substantial involvement
with Reagan and his limited involvement with Rockefeller
in the 1970 campaign. He also discussed the post 1970
election telephone surveys DMX did for the American Medical
Association. California, New York and Minnesota guber-
natorial and Morth Dakota, Texas, Verment and Wyoming
senatorial races were analysed. Barbhha's presentation
was very impressive. His points included:
a. 720 of the voters saw TV spot ads but only 250
received information which influenced their decision
from this source;
b. In spite of the citicisms of direct mail, 450
who received it read it;
C. A pilot simulation project where DMI created a
computer model for the Reagan campaign did not prove
particularly useful. Daily telephone interviews over
the fifteen months up to the election supplied more
believable information;
d. DMI is currently analysing when the voter makes
up his mind and will try to correlate this with the
timing of media. Colson's office is trying to get
this study.
e. DMI believes that the better known the candidate
the lefs effective advertising is. From this premise
Sarabba alluded, in the general meeting, to some "very
interesting ideas about how the President should run
and which advertising he could use."
GS:elr
DETERMINED TO BE AN
Administrative MARKING
By Emprise NARS, Date 1-15-80
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
CONFIDENTIAL
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Kalmbach Telephone Call
of June 14
After your meeting Friday with the Attorney General and Herb
Kalmbach, several items remained unresolved. Discussion with
Mr. Kalmbach today focused on the following:
1) Contributors Dinners:
a) The Camp David Dinner, which was scheduled
for this Spring but cancelled, should be
reconsidered. The suggested invitees
were Clem Stone, Jack Mulcahy, Dick Scaife,
Kent Smith, Leonard Firestone, Al Rockwell,
John Olin, and DeWitt Wallace.
Dave Parker is submitting a proposal for
June 26 at Camp David.
b) A "B" group contributors' dinner could be
held in the last two weeks of July. Kalmbach
is preparing a suggested list.
2) The Attorney General was going to develop a series
of dinners for each state "Wixon men. Sue
Morrison advised Dave Parker today that such a list
had not been developed. She suggested that Magruder
develop the list for the Attorney General.
Kalmbach is reluctant to get involved unless asked
by the Attorney General.
Recommendation:
If this subject was not covered in your meetings with the
Attorney General on Friday and Monday, Magruder should
develop the proposal by June 19.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
-2-
3) Kalmbach wonders if the timing of the C. V. Whitney
move to Spain was discussed when Bob Hill met with
the Presidentoon Friday. Nunn has asked Kalmbach
to contact Whitney, who is interested in going to
Spain in Saptember/October
Whitney can be advised September set
.
Hill's departure date not discussed
.
4) Raymond Guest, formerly Ambassador to Ireland, is
interested in Bob Ellsworth's position at MATO.
Kalmbach wonders whether he should get involved
in this transfer. Kalmbach has no reading on
Guest's ability or Elleg@rth's departure.
Kalmbach approach Guest
.
Kalmbach avoid discussion of NATO
with Guest
.
5) Kalmbach requests authority to contact Fred Russell
(who wants to be Ambassador to Denmark). Colson
suggested Kalmbach approach Bill Paley of CBS,
and Kalmbach wants your approval.
Approve Russell
.
Approve Paley
.
Other
.
6) He has talked to Flanigan about Roche, Townsend, and
Ford and will contact them this week.
7) Instead of any written description, Kalmbach plans
to call weekly and itemize the status of pledges
and banked funds. Be will begin this Friday and
you will receive a memorandum mummarising his
description.
GS:elr
June 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gregg Petersmeyer
You wanted to discuss with the Attorney General the use of
Gregg Petersmeyer at Citizens this summer.
Magruder is in favor, but doesn't want to offer him a job
without you mentioning it to the Attorney General. Gregg
Petersmeyer will be available on June 20.
GS:elr
June 9, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum
Concerning the RNC financial situation, Magruder talked to the
Attorney General late yesterday and received the following
instructions:
1) Obtain and review RNC organizational charts and
all payroll information;
2) Work with Tom Evans in evaluating the RNC's severe
cash flow problems;
3) Prepare a proposal for the Attorney General regarding
Citizens funding of some RNC projects (e.g. film on
RN computer work, brochure preparation).
GS:elr
June 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Alabama/Indiana Polls
Discussion with Tom Benham and Harry O'Neill of ORC and Harry
Dent and Lyn Nofziger about questions for Alabama and Indiana
Polls developed the following questions:
ALABAMA
1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon
is handling his job as President?
2) Do you believe George Wallace should run for President?
3) Has George Wallace done anything about the bussing
decision?
4) Is the Supreme Court or Richard Nixon responsible for
the desegregation decision?
5) Between Richard Nixon and George Wallace, who can you
count on to minimise bussing?
6) If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate for
President, and if George Wallace ran as a third party
candidate would Hubert Humphrey have a better chance
to be elected?
7) Do you believe President Nixon has handled the race
question correctly?
-2-
8) Have President Nixon's Supreme Court appointments been
helpful to the South?
9) Why does Wallace continue to run for President if he
has no chance of winning?
10) Trial Heats - with and without:
Wallace
Muskie
Kennedy
Humphrey
INDIANA
1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon
is handling his job as President?
2) Do you approve or disapprove of the President's
farm program?
3) Do you believe the Indiana Republican Party has served
Indiana well?
4) Has Governor Whitcomb helped or hurt the Republican
Party in Indiana?
5) Do you believe Senator Birch Bayh should run for President?
6) Why does George Wallace of Alabama continue to run for
President if he has no chance of winning?
7) To which of these two should government policy give the
highest priority - ending the Vietnam War or fighting
unemployment?
-3-
8) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew
is handling his job as Vice President?
9) Do you believe President Nixon is too Republican Party
oriented?
10) Trial Heats - with and without Wallace
Bayh
Muskie
Humphrey
Kennedy
There are ten (10) questions including Trial Heats for State
surveys because of ORC telephone line limitations. In nation-
wide surveys, all lines may be used and the longer interview
(15 questions) can be used and still meet the two day interview.
The price for a ten (10) question state-vide survey of 500
interviews is between $3,500-4,000. Slight increases or decreases
in the number of questions has no effect on the cost, The
optimum number for statewise two (2) day poll or a nationwide
one (1) day poll is 10, while the optimum number for a two (2)
day nationwide poll is fifteen (15).
GS:elr
June 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
In-Depth Poll
A series of discussions with Chuck Colson, Cliff Miller,
Larry Higby, and Bob Marik indicate that we should consider
an in-depth poll on the public's attitudes. The poll would
go after what is really bothering people, what is on their
minds, what motivates them, what their concerns and fears
are, etc. The poll would emphasize the psychological attitudes
rather than a statistical assessment of the peoples reaction
to programs or policies.
The results of this survey would be used to correctly position
the Administration in the year before the election. Together
with the Image Poll and the Domestic Issues Poll this study
would serve as the benchmark research for the campaign.
Miller makes the aggument that if we are to spend $20 million,
we can hardly afford not to probe this area in sume fashion.
Colson and Miller are so convinced that this study is vital
that the following steps have been taken:
1) Miller has surveyed hhe consultants and pollsters
who could handle this project;
2) Colson, Miller, Marik and I met with Lloyd Free,
the individual Miller believes to be the best
qualified to act as supervising consultant,
3) Timing, cost, and feasibility matters have been
considered. The project could be completed in
6-8 weeks, and the cost would be $25-50,000
depending on whether a 750 or 1,500 interview
sample were used. As to the feasibility Miller
emphasizes that the project has some obvious
risks, but he is nevertheless convinced that
the project could be successfully completed.
--2--
The project could be handled as a Citizens Committee or RNC
project to avoid any publicity problem, but would clearly be
controlled and directed from this office.
The preliminary survey of the consultants and polling firms
indicates that Lloyd Free could be particularly helpful. He
served as a polling consultant to Eisanhower and Rockefeller.
Free would like to use Political Surveys and Analysts, a
Princeton-based outfit that draws on some Gallup resources.
This group is headed by Charles Roll, who has worked with
Lloyd Free and has his confidence. Free believes he would
be useful in developing the questionnaire.
ORC could also be used as the vendor though Miller argues
that we have received a great deal of information fright them
and now would be an appropriate time to get an independent
look.
Before proceeding with final checks of vendors and drafts of
questionnaires, Colson, Miller, and Higby believe you should
consider whether the project deserves the resources.
Recommendation:
The project should be broken down into two stages - the
development of a questionnaire and the actual poll. If at
the end of the questionnaire. development it becomes apparent
that the results would be negligible the project would be
turned off.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
GS:elr
June 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee
Contributions
Lee Nunn called and asked whether it would be appropriate
for him to use Manuel Giberga as the financial contact
with the Cuban refugees in Florida. Most of the Cubans
are concentrated in Dade County (Miami). Both Dent and
the RNC have talked to Giberga about non-related subjects
and were favorably impressed.
Nunn's question is whether his use of Manuel Giberga should
be cleared with Bebe Reboxo, who may already have assumed
control of the financial operation among the Cubans.
Herb Kalmbach could not be contacted for his suggestions.
Recommendation:
If Reboso has established an independent fund-raising operation
among the Cubans, it should be brought within the Kalmbach/Lee
Nunn structure. Nunn should be given authority to contact
Reboso to Cover fund-raising among Cubans and whether Manuel
Giberga is the right man to use.
Agree
Disagree
Comment
GS:elr
June 1, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
The City Council of San Diego voted this morning to
make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican National
Convention. The date offered will be the third
week in August.
Bob Dole will approach the Site Selection Committee
about journeying to San Diego. Timmons is aware of
this bid.
GS:dg