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This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The attachment of Bill Safire's memo on the Kennedy victory scenario. 1 pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The number of youth appointments the Nixon Administration has made in comparison to McGovern's campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Salute to Presidential Dinner/November 9, 1971. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/10/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The reactions to the Presidential Dinners/November 9, 1971. 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/10/1971
Memorandum of Call from Nofziger to G. RE: Message that reads, "Have dinner material-sending you." 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/10/1971
Handwritten notes. RE: Salute to the President Dinners-November 9, 1972. Descriptions include: Reaction to dinners, Lee Nunn's descriptions, and reports from Bob Dole. 5 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Disagreement between Nofziger and Leonard concerning the delay in getting "First Monday" out. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/2/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Robert M. King. RE: Appreciation for Mr. King's offer to contribute to the re-election of President Nixon in the Campaign of 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 11/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Attachment of the DNC's report entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man…an In Depth Profile." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/30/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The "National Journal", and their summary of the DNC's report on Richard Nixon. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/29/1971
The "National Journal", and their report on "Democratic Presidential Contenders Studying Private Report on Nixon's Image." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Report], 11/27/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Arrangements with the RNC on how to handle letters concerning the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
From RMW to Haldeman. RE: Eleanor Smith of the RNC, and her plans for setting up a correspondence section to support the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/22/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The Mediators Inc., and their offer of media assistance for the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
Handwritten note from Bruce Kehrli to Gordon Strachan. RE: Message that reads, "H wants to be sure that we don't use this service-may be problems." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett. RE: Mrs. Garrett's offer to contribute the media services of The Mediators in President Nixon's campaign for re-election. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 11/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Senator Saxbe's letter indicating that Mr. Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising Coporation of America has an "excellent facility." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
From William B. Saxbe to Bob Dole. RE: The RNC's submission of recommendations for mail marketing, advice, systems and services to the "Committee for the Reelection of the President." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Letter], 11/22/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Advice on the upcoming plans to set up a mock convention at the University of New Hampshire. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/24/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Bill Safire's memo concerning the "Kennedy Victory Scenario." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1971
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. Re: The Kennedy Victory Scenario, and the probability that he may be the "easiest to beat" as the Democratic nominee. 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The Finch Memorandum on the Election of 1970. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Finch's memo on the 1970 election in which he articulates several key points that may be of use in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/2/1971
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: "What the 1970 Election Response Now Means for 1972." 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/26/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Democratic Contenders Stand on Bussing. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Muskie's statement that bussing is a "legitimate tool" that should be used in the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: "EMK", and the usefulness of the information being presented. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Dick Moore. RE: Attachment of President Nixon's thank you letter to Jack Wrather. 2 pg. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Salute to the President's Dinner, and report on its subsequent success. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/12/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Los Angeles Dinner, and Jack Wrather's hard work he put in as the dinner chairman. A suggested draft for a thank you letter to Mr. Wrather is attached. 2 pgs. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 11/12/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The 1948 election, and useful tactics to be implemented in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/2/1971
Handwritten note from Gordon Strachan to Larry. RE: Message which reads, "Since you are reading a book on the '48 election, Gregg's comments mights be of interest to you." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
A detailed report entitled, "Inside the Democratic Party," which describes Truman's success in the election of 1948. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Committee for the Re-Election of the President Hiring of a Staff Writer. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/1/1971
Scholar Source Context
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26145545
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WHSF: Contested, 12-11
core
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document
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pageCount
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Source metadata
id
26145545
sourceUrl
contentType
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title
WHSF: Contested, 12-11
description
This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The attachment of Bill Safire's memo on the Kennedy victory scenario. 1 pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The number of youth appointments the Nixon Administration has made in comparison to McGovern's campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Salute to Presidential Dinner/November 9, 1971. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/10/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The reactions to the Presidential Dinners/November 9, 1971. 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/10/1971
Memorandum of Call from Nofziger to G. RE: Message that reads, "Have dinner material-sending you." 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/10/1971
Handwritten notes. RE: Salute to the President Dinners-November 9, 1972. Descriptions include: Reaction to dinners, Lee Nunn's descriptions, and reports from Bob Dole. 5 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Disagreement between Nofziger and Leonard concerning the delay in getting "First Monday" out. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/2/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Robert M. King. RE: Appreciation for Mr. King's offer to contribute to the re-election of President Nixon in the Campaign of 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 11/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Attachment of the DNC's report entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man…an In Depth Profile." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/30/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The "National Journal", and their summary of the DNC's report on Richard Nixon. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/29/1971
The "National Journal", and their report on "Democratic Presidential Contenders Studying Private Report on Nixon's Image." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Report], 11/27/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Arrangements with the RNC on how to handle letters concerning the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
From RMW to Haldeman. RE: Eleanor Smith of the RNC, and her plans for setting up a correspondence section to support the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/22/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The Mediators Inc., and their offer of media assistance for the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
Handwritten note from Bruce Kehrli to Gordon Strachan. RE: Message that reads, "H wants to be sure that we don't use this service-may be problems." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett. RE: Mrs. Garrett's offer to contribute the media services of The Mediators in President Nixon's campaign for re-election. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 11/23/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Senator Saxbe's letter indicating that Mr. Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising Coporation of America has an "excellent facility." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/26/1971
From William B. Saxbe to Bob Dole. RE: The RNC's submission of recommendations for mail marketing, advice, systems and services to the "Committee for the Reelection of the President." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Letter], 11/22/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Advice on the upcoming plans to set up a mock convention at the University of New Hampshire. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/24/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Bill Safire's memo concerning the "Kennedy Victory Scenario." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1971
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. Re: The Kennedy Victory Scenario, and the probability that he may be the "easiest to beat" as the Democratic nominee. 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/16/1971
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The Finch Memorandum on the Election of 1970. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Finch's memo on the 1970 election in which he articulates several key points that may be of use in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/2/1971
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: "What the 1970 Election Response Now Means for 1972." 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/26/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Democratic Contenders Stand on Bussing. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Muskie's statement that bussing is a "legitimate tool" that should be used in the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/14/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: "EMK", and the usefulness of the information being presented. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Dick Moore. RE: Attachment of President Nixon's thank you letter to Jack Wrather. 2 pg. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 11/15/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Salute to the President's Dinner, and report on its subsequent success. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/12/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Los Angeles Dinner, and Jack Wrather's hard work he put in as the dinner chairman. A suggested draft for a thank you letter to Mr. Wrather is attached. 2 pgs. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 11/12/1971
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The 1948 election, and useful tactics to be implemented in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/2/1971
Handwritten note from Gordon Strachan to Larry. RE: Message which reads, "Since you are reading a book on the '48 election, Gregg's comments mights be of interest to you." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
A detailed report entitled, "Inside the Democratic Party," which describes Truman's success in the election of 1948. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Committee for the Re-Election of the President Hiring of a Staff Writer. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 11/1/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/19/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney
General. RE: The attachment of Bill Safire's
memo on the Kennedy victory scenario. 1 pg
12
11
11/15/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
The number of youth appointments the
Nixon Administration has made in
comparison to McGovern's campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
11/10/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
Salute to Presidential Dinner/November 9,
1971. 2 pgs.
12
11
11/10/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
The reactions to the Presidential
Dinners/November 9, 1971. 4 pgs.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 1 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/10/1971
White House Staff
Memo
Memorandum of Call from Nofziger to G.
RE: Message that reads, "Have dinner
material-sending you." 5 pgs.
12
11
Domestic Policy
Other Document
Handwritten notes. RE: Salute to the
President Dinners-November 9, 1972.
Descriptions include: Reaction to dinners,
Lee Nunn's descriptions, and reports from
Bob Dole. 5 pgs.
12
11
11/2/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
Disagreement between Nofziger and Leonard
concerning the delay in getting "First
Monday" out. 1 pg.
12
11
11/16/1971
Campaign
Letter
From Gordon Strachan to Robert M. King.
RE: Appreciation for Mr. King's offer to
contribute to the re-election of President
Nixon in the Campaign of 1972. 1 pg.
12
11
11/30/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney
General. RE: Attachment of the DNC's report
entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man an
In
Depth Profile." 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 2 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/29/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The "National Journal", and their summary
of the DNC's report on Richard Nixon. 1 pg.
12
11
11/27/1971
Domestic Policy
Report
The "National Journal", and their report on
"Democratic Presidential Contenders
Studying Private Report on Nixon's Image."
1 pg.
12
11
11/26/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
Arrangements with the RNC on how to
handle letters concerning the campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
11/22/1971
Campaign
Memo
From RMW to Haldeman. RE: Eleanor
Smith of the RNC, and her plans for setting
up a correspondence section to support the
campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
11/26/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
The Mediators Inc., and their offer of media
assistance for the campaign. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 3 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten note from Bruce Kehrli to
Gordon Strachan. RE: Message that reads,
"H wants to be sure that we don't use this
service-may be problems." 1 pg.
12
11
11/23/1971
Campaign
Letter
From Haldeman to Jacqueline Hopkins
Garrett. RE: Mrs. Garrett's offer to contribute
the media services of The Mediators in
President Nixon's campaign for re-election. 1
pg.
12
11
11/26/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
Senator Saxbe's letter indicating that Mr.
Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising
Coporation of America has an "excellent
facility." 1 pg.
12
11
11/22/1971
Domestic Policy
Letter
From William B. Saxbe to Bob Dole. RE:
The RNC's submission of recommendations
for mail marketing, advice, systems and
services to the "Committee for the Re-
election of the President." 1 pg.
12
11
11/24/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
Advice on the upcoming plans to set up a
mock convention at the University of New
Hampshire. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 4 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/19/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney
General. RE: Bill Safire's memo concerning
the "Kennedy Victory Scenario." 1 pg.
12
11
11/16/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. Re: The
Kennedy Victory Scenario, and the
probability that he may be the "easiest to
beat" as the Democratic nominee. 4 pgs.
12
11
11/18/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney
General. RE: The Finch Memorandum on the
Election of 1970. 1 pg.
12
11
11/2/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Finch's memo on the 1970 election in which
he articulates several key points that may be
of use in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
10/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE:
"What the 1970 Election Response Now
Means for 1972." 22 pgs.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 5 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/15/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE:
Democratic Contenders Stand on Bussing. 1
pg.
12
11
10/14/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE:
Muskie's statement that bussing is a
"legitimate tool" that should be used in the
campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
11/15/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE:
"EMK", and the usefulness of the
information being presented. 1 pg.
12
11
11/15/1971
Personal
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Dick Moore. RE:
Attachment of President Nixon's thank you
letter to Jack Wrather. 2 pg.
12
11
11/12/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Salute
to the President's Dinner, and report on its
subsequent success. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 6 of 7
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
12
11
11/12/1971
Personal
Memo
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Los
Angeles Dinner, and Jack Wrather's hard
work he put in as the dinner chairman. A
suggested draft for a thank you letter to Mr.
Wrather is attached. 2 pgs.
12
11
11/2/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
The 1948 election, and useful tactics to be
implemented in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg.
12
11
Campaign
Other Document
Handwritten note from Gordon Strachan to
Larry. RE: Message which reads, "Since you
are reading a book on the '48 election,
Gregg's comments mights be of interest to
you." 1 pg.
12
11
Campaign
Report
A detailed report entitled, "Inside the
Democratic Party," which describes
Truman's success in the election of 1948. 2
pgs.
12
11
11/1/1971
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE:
Committee for the Re-Election of the
President Hiring of a Staff Writer. 1 pg.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Page 7 of 7
November 19, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Bill Safire's memorandum on the Kennedy Victory Scenario is
attached. Mr. Haldeman has a copy.
GS:elr
November 15, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Youth Appointments
You commented on my memorandum to Fred Malek regarding the
percentage of people under 30 in this Administration. Your
question was how many under 30 year olds does McGovern have.
According to Ken Rietz of the 160 staff members working for
McGovern, 95 are under 30. This fact will, of course, be
considered when Fred comes back with the figures for this
Administration.
GS:elr
Administratively Confidential
November 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Salute to Presidential
Dinner/November 9, 1971
Discussion with Tom Evans, Lyn Nofziger, and Barry Mountain
of the RNC developed the following information about the
19 fund raising dinners last night:
Finances:
1) The gross received was
$4.5 million
a) Senate Campaign Committee automatically
receives
#400
b) TV expenses
200/
c) Dinner costs
200 /
Net to RNC
1.75
Net to States
-----
1.75
2) City by city breakdown:
City
1968 Received
1971 Received
1971 Goal
Atlanta
---
100
100
Boston
183
150
500
Charlotte
----
100
100
Chicago
556
700
750
Cleveland
214
125
250
Dallas
70
220
200
Houston
145
200
200
Los Angeles
1 million
500
1 million
Miami/Orlando
43
225
200
Minn./St. Paul
181
165
500
Nashville
75
200
200
continued
-2-
City
1968 Received 1971 Received 1971 Goal
New York
907
850
1 million
Philadelphia
92
81 ]
250
Pittsburg
----
165
250
Rochester
-----
90
150
San Francisco
125
200
200
St. Louis
10
100
100
Washington
163
250
500
Wilmington
113
100
100
Reaction to Dinners:
Tom Evans (RNC) -- The event technically ran very well.
The closed circuit TV connection was done well. "I
would have heard of complaints, had there been any."
In spite of the fact that the entertainers were old,
the speakers and entertainment came across very well.
The dinner not only raised funds but morale. (Evans
was at both New York and Chicago dinners.)
Lyn Nofziger (RNC) -- At the Washington dinner there was
plenty of enthusiasm and spontaneous applause for the
President and his speech "were better than I have seen
in a long time. It was Dick Nixon at his best." There
was some distortion on the closed circuit screen due to
the cameras being too close "too tight" on him. His
voice came over perfectly. Nofziger has not heard any
complaints and will make calls today to the cities to
check each dinner specifically.
Lee Nunn (Committee forrthe Re-Election of the President) --
Nunn checked several cities including Houston, Dallas,
and Nashville and the "TV coverage was excellent". The
only technical problem was Bob Hopes surprise when he was
supposed to introduce the President. Nunn says he
definitely would have heard of complaints and he has heard
none. He will continue to check today for both reaction
and confirmation of the financial situation.
GS 1m
Administratively Confidential
November 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Salute to President
Dinners/November 9, 1971
Reaction to Dinners:
Lyn Nofziger made calls to individuals at several dinners
to assess the enthusiasm and reaction to the President's
address and dinner in general. The results are:
Chicago -- William Croft (Dinner Chairman) "The President
was great. Hope was terrific. Perhaps 1450 attendees.
Good news coverage. We are sending Lyn clippings.
Only complaint is that Percy took 8 minutes instead of
2 minutes which ran into extra time and will cost
extra money."
Cleveland -- Gilbert Humphrey (Dinner Chairman) There
were 330 attendees. Excellent reaction to the President's
speech. Apparent teleprompter problems as Mr. Nixon
didn't look up much. Their big problem is Standart
Oil (mad about the North Slope) and Continental Oil
(mad at Ruckelshaus). Neither helped very much.
Usually big contributors."
Houston --- James Barnes (Dinner Co-Chairman) -- "It was
a fine dinner with very favorable reaction from the
guests. We lined up a nice evening and it was carried
off well. I enjoyed the whole affair and we got just
about the number which we expected which is 350."
Minn./St. Paul -- Donald Dayton (Dinner Chairman) -- "It
ran very smoothly. Didn't have a hitch. Dominick was
great. Good reception. The President got a lot of
applause but it wasn't the same as in person. Other-
wise it went very well. The VP got some good hands.
We didn't loose any people. It was the toughest selling
job for fund raising that I have ever done, but most
people thought of it as the first of a new year and
left with a lot of enthusiasm."
-2-
Atlanta -- Bo Callaway (Dinner Chairman) --- "It was
great. Went very smoothly. Pat Boone was excellent.
We should use him more. Goldwater, unfortunately, didn't
speak well but everybody loves him anyway. The President's
speech was great. All in all it went without a hitch.'
Boston -- Dick Carlson -- "There were 300 attendees.
Should net about $100,000. Audience very impressed
by President's talk. Good coverage in Herald today.
Have not seen Globe.
Charlotte -- John Walker --- "The President laid 'em in
the aisles. 263 attending. 207 paid. 25 newspapers.
Front page in today's observer. Romney did stem-
winder speech that brought them to their feet."
Miami/Orlando -- Joseph Fogarty -- "We were extremely pleased,
everyone had an awfully good time." David Zachman:
"It was extremely successful. There were over 350 in
Miami and 120 in Orland. I heard people's remarks
on the President's speech that they liked his technique
and hoped he would use it publicly -- he spoke from the
heart. What impressed me most was that when we sent
out 5,000 invitations, we got contributions from people
who couldn't make it to the dinner, but just wanted to
contribute--$5 from one man, $100, $500, and even $1,000.
We have never had a financial effort in Miami that has
come even close to half the money I have in hand to date
($45,000)."
Nashville -- E. Bronson Ingram --- "We consider it successful.
It was as much ef a tribute to Tennessee as it was to
the President."
New York City -- Bernard Lasker -- ""I have never presided
over a dinner that was better. The President was right
on target. It had all the qualities of a private affair.
It was gay, magnificent. The best dressed, best looking
dinner ever. It was a giant step toward 1972 and we
all feel that President Nixon will be re-elected."
Pittsburg --- Richard Scaife -- "Tremendous success. Highly
enthusiastic. From leftwingers to rightwingers--the
President was just fabulous. And they loved Bob Hope.
Rochester -- E. Ritter -- "It went very, very well. They
had so much enthusiasm that we thought we were there --
it was even better than being in New York! Stans was
very reassuring on Phase II. It was a very enjoyable
evening. It started a commitment to 1972."
-3-
San Francisco - Ransom Cook --- "It was very successful --
better than anticipated. The crowd was in a very happy
mood. It was a first class job. The President's speech went
over very well --- very strong, forceful, indicating
excellent leadership.'
St. Louis -- Lawrence Roos -- "It was the most successful
fund raising dinner that Republicans have seen here in
a long time. We sold out the facility, with no one but
paid customers present. And the representation from
civic leaders was unusually impressive. The speech was
top notch. We couldnt possibly have sold so many tickets
if these attending didn't think we would win in 1972."
Wilmington -- John Remer -- "It was just a flaming success --
we went over target. Secretary Richardson was sensational;
we were extremely happy with the President's address.
The whole affair went like clockwork. One thing we did
for the first time was to solicit guests from groups who
haven't contributed in the past, thus hoping to improve
communications with them on a larger basis and hoping
that they would contribute on a quarterly basis instead
of this crash program. We certainly appreciated the
help we got from the headquarters in Washington."
Lee Nunn also checked tpday!
Chicago -- Bill Fetridge -- "A spectacular success; superb;
very well done. The show was good and the President
excellent. The event went very well and the demonstrations
did not detract from the overall success."
Washington -- Glee Gomian -- "The President's message was good,
though he was not as relaxed as usual. The only problem
was timing; the event came too early in the evening."
Dick Howard for Chuck Colson -- "All believe the President and
Bob Hope were great. They carried the show, but the
speakers were generally dull and disasters -- example:
Boston where Gerry Ford and Governor Sargent were terrible."
"At several places conservative contributors were conspieuo
wases in their absence. No specifics available yet."
Bob O'Dell of the RNC reports that Bo Calloway thought it was
great; he was exstatic. Calloway didn't think a dinner in
Atlanta could be done at first. There
-4-
There were demonstrations in vartually all cities, but
no incidents in any cities. The best cities were not
in the South but in smaller places where such fund
raising events had never been held.
There were no TV hook-up problems. In fact in Charlotte
the technicians were brought on to the stage for applause.
The larger projectors really helped.
Pat Boone was very impressive in Atlanta.
Pete Peterson did a very good job in Miami but he came
across as a guy at the White House who is really dedicated.
Also in Miami, Bill Cramer introduced Gurney, a surprising
event.
The Press covered the dinners heavily in all cities.
In Charlotte, Thurmond and Romney were the speakers and
Romney was excellent -- the dinner sponsors had a
birthday cake for his wife. He was exstatic and his
speech was very well received.
In Pittsburg the highlight of the very good dinner was
Gloria Loring, an excellent singer and performer.
In Rochester, Stans threw away his prepared text and
warmed up to the audience and did very, very well. The
event was a high quality affair.
GS:1m
-
MEMORANDUM
OF CALL
TO:
G
YOU WERE CALLED BY-
YOU WERE VISITED BY-
OF (Organization)
nofziger in
Kleine PHONE NO. office
PLEASE CALL
CODE/EXT.
WILL CALL AGAIN
IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
RETURNED YOUR CALL
WISHES AN APPOINTMENT
MESSAGE
Have dinner
material- - sending
you
attached
RECEIVED BY
DATE
TIME
10
4'o
STANDARD FORM 63
GPO : 1969-c48-16-80341-1 332-389
63-108
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
Boston -- Dick Carlson reports 300 attendance, should net
about $100,000. Audience very impressed by President's
talk. Good coverage in Herald today. Hasn't seen Globe.
President
Charlotte -- John Walker -"Laid 'em in the aisles" 263 attending.
207 paid. 25 newspapers. Front page in today's bserver
Romney did stem-winder speech that brought them to their
feet.
Demon's at NY, Chi + S.F.
WOmengton Denner -Elliot Recharlon 1
very impossed well, very-mach
WHAT THE DINNER CHAIRMEN SAID
10 Nov 1971
Joseph Fogarty (Miami, Orlando): We were extremely pleased, everyone had
an awfully good time." David Zachem: "It was extremely successful.
There were over 350 in Miami and 120 in Orlando. I heard people 's
remarks on the President's speech that they liked his technique and
hoped he would use it publicly--he spoke from the heart. What
impressed me most was that when we sent out 5,000 invitations, we
got contributions from people who couldn't make it to the dinner, but
just wanted to contribute--$5 from one man, $100, 500, even$1,000.
We have never had a financial effort in Miami that has come even
close to half the money I have in hand to date ($45,000)."
E. Bronson Ingram (Nashville): "We consider it successful--it was as much
as tribute to Tennessed as to the President."
Bernard Lasker (New York City): "I have never presided over a dinner that
was better. The President was ** right on target. It had all the
qualities of a private affair. It was gay, magnificent--the best
dressed, / best looking dinner ever. It was a giant step toward 1972
and we all feel that President Nixon will be re-elected."
Ritter
Shumway (Rechester)
It was a tremendous success. The guests were
highly entrusisastic from rightwingers GO leftwingers. They had
SO much enthusiasm that it was almost better than being in New York.
Sec. Stans was very reassuring in regaard to Phase N It was a
enjoyable evening. It started a comm tment to 1972. 11
Richard Scaife (Pittsburgh): "Tremendous success. Highly enthusaisticm, from
The President was just
leftwingers to rightwingers. XX fabulous. And they* loved Bob HOPe.
2-2-2-2
E. Ritter Saumway (Rochester): "It went very, very well. They had so
much enthusiasm that we thought we were there--it was even better
than being in New York. Stans was very reassuring on Phase II.
It was a very enjoyable evening. And it started a commitment to
1972."
Ransom Cook (San Francisco): It was very successful--better than anticipated.
The crowd was in a very happy mood. It was a first class job.
of
Thom the audience/the guests the President's speech went over very
well--very strong, forçeful, speeeh, indicating excellent leadership.x"
Lawrence Roos (St. Louis): "It was the most successful fund raising dinner
that Republicans have seen here in a long time. We sold out the
facility, with nath RBR no one but paid customers present. And
the representation from the civic leaders was unusally impressive.
The speech was top notch. We couldn't possibly have sold so mnay
tickets if these attending didn't thing we would win in 1972."
John Remer (Wilmington): "It was just a flaming success--we went over target.
Sec. Rager Richardson was sensational, we were extremely happy
with the President's address--thw whole affair went like clockwork.
One thing we did for the first time was to solicit guests from groups
who haven't contributed in the past, and then we WEK will improve
communcation with them on a larger basis, hoping they will contribute
on a quarterly basis instead of this crash program. We certainly
appreciated the help we got from the headquarters in WAshington."
11-10-71
FROM LYN NOFZIGER:
Chicago -- William Croft (Dinner CHairman) - "The President
was great. Hope terrific. Perhaps 1450 attendees.
Good news coverage. Tell Gordon that we are sending
Lyn clips. Only complaint is that Percy took 8
min. instead of 2 min running them extra tnt time
which will cost them extra money.
Cleveland -- Gilbert Humphrey (Chairman) 330 attendees.
Excellent reaction to Pres. talk. Apparent teleprompter
problems. (as Mr. Nixon didn't look up much. Their
big problem is Standart Oil (mad about North Slope)
and Continental Oil (mad at Ruchelshaus). Neither
helped very much. Usually big contributors.
Houston -- James Barmes (CoChairman) - "It was a fine
dinner with very favorable reaction from the guests.
We lined up a nice evening and it was carried off
well. I enjoyed the whole affair add we got just
about the number which we expected which is 350.
Minn./St. Paul - Donald Dayton (Chairman) - "It ran very
smoothly. Didn't have a hitch. Dominick was great. Good
reception. The Pres. got a lot of applause, but it wasn't
the same as in person. Otherwise it went very well. The
VP got some good hands. We didn't loose any pepole. It
was the toughest selling job for fund raising that I have
every done, but most people thought of it as the first of
a new year and left with a lot of enthusiasm".
Atlanta - - Bo Callaway (Chairman) -- "It was great. Went
very smoothyy. Pat Boone was excellent. W eshould use him
more. Goldwater, unfortunately, didn't speak well but
everybody loves him anyway. The Pres. speech was great.
All in all it went without a hitch."
HOLD
MF
CH
11/10
F
S.
Salute G to President
Denners - noc. 9, 1972
Reaction to Dinners:
Lyn nofziger are had these made
calls to individuals at several
dinners to assess the reaction
enthusiasm and reaction
to One P's address and dinner
in general The results are:
(L R put city 1st chen
name indented the quote
:
goate
Lee Runn also dected today:
Chicago - Bill Fetridge:
"a spectacellar
success superb,
very well done;
the show was
good and the
P excellent." The
FRUENK event
went very well
did not detract from
and the demonstrators
the oveall success.
w ashington - Glee Gomian:
"Tene P's message
was not as relaxed
was good, tho he
as usual. " The
only problem was timing;
the event came too
early in the evening.
chuck
believe P. + superpe were
great; canied the shore
but speakess generally
dall t desasters. Ex
in Boston Gerry Ford + Governor
sargent were termble.
Rat several places
conservative contributors
were conspecuous in
their absence. . no specifus
I
Bob 01 Deal of the Rn C reports
available yet.
that Bo colloway newas -though it was
Calloway Dedn't think & could are
great exotatic a
dinner in
at
be done but t was
Demon's invertally all cities,
/
there were
wilmong S.F., chi,
last R
AV none incidents in
The Best cities
any cities.
but maller where
there never had event
before such Rundraing
events orad never beenled
of
4
P. There were No TU herd-up proelgm
no complaints. TV
on fact in charlotte ^ itechnicians
people the
were brought on to stage
for applause
Thehurger projectors
A Pat Boone was very impressive
really Chelped.
in atlanta.
PT Pete Peterson did avery
good joe in miami
beef he came across
as a guy at. w H who
is really dedicated
Miami - Prill cramer
introduced Gurney,
Preepress covered denner
a supiesing event.
IE
heavily cities in all
of In Charlotte
Thurmand Romney worethe speakers
The dinner abirthday calle Rer
Ronney excellent;
his wife He was eculatic
and his speech was very well received.
R the bighlightol the
In Pitts very good desiner
wosGloria horing artxcellent
singer + performance
In Rarhester - Slang threw
event The
a was riga quality affair +
away prepared test
Rx
adrmed up
to audience + diel
very, very well.
Administratively Confidential
November 2, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Frank Leonard
Discussion with Len Nofsiger this morning indicated
that he had had another "heated discussion" with
Frank Leonard regarding the delay in getting First
Monday out. Len did not think the discussion would
lead to Frank Leonard's resignation because Len
realises his responsibility to work pursuant to
Haldeman's recent memorandum. However, since you
deal with Leonard directly, you should be aware of
this most recent disagreement between Nofsiger and
Leonard.
GS:1m
November 16, 1971
Dear Mr. King:
Mr. Haldeman asked me to thank you for
your letter of November 8 outlining your
desires to contribute your services to
the campaign.
I'm forwarding a copy of your letter to
the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President which, as the title states, is
a group of citizens like yourself who
have begun thinking and planning for
the campaign.
You should be hearing from them in the
near future. Thanks again for your offer
of support.
Sincerely,
Gordon Strachan
Staff Assistant
to N. R. Haldeman
Mr. Robert M. King
Executive Producer
Time-Life Productions/Pacific
Suite 2000
3435 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90005
November 30, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY COMFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Bob Haldeman asked me to send you this Democratic National
Committee report entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man ... an
In Depth Profile" with the National Journal summary.
Press reports indicated but Lou Harris has denied that he
had been involved in the preparation of the report.
Attachment: As mentioned above
GS:elr
GS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: Nov. 29, 1971
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
The National Journal has summarized
the 40 page Democratic National Com-
mittee Report on "Richard Nixon, the
Man
... an In Depth Profile." (Full
report attached.)
Colson submitted a separate memor-
andum pointing out that Harris had
demanded a retraction from the
Democratic National Committee be-
cause he didn't supply the polling
information.
Suggest you send a full copy to the
Attorney General.
H Agree
Disagree
Other
income groups, with little divergence
11/27.71
2035
of opinion within each bracket from
NATIONAL
the over-all national mood.
DURNAL
©1977
Q Blacks are far more antagonistle
toward the President Jhan any other
single group. In fact, they are the
effort .0 forge in political battle
only group-induding Democrats-
1972. the Democratic Nation-
that is on balance more negative
Committee has prepared an analy-
than positive toward the President.
of President Nixon's personal
Strategy: The DNC report predicts
and weaknesses with the
that "as long as nothing visible is
electorate.
accomplished by the (Nixon) Admin-
The 40-page DNC report, entitled
istration, his position will erode
Richard Nixon. the Man
an
In-
slowly," thus making him "ctearly
Depth Profile" and marked "confi-
vulnerable in a personality contest."
dential." was provided last month in
However, the DNC report con-
red-bound covers to several but not
cludes,
should
...
all of the Democratic Presidential
offensive and assume decisive action
candidates.
key areas, public opinion will be with
Its conclusions are based in the
him because "they will 500 man WILL
main on polling data secured by Louis
has accompushed something
Harris and Associates Inc. and fur-
was generally believed notimg
nishea to the DNC, although some
be done."
material came from the American
"With his penchant for the
Institute of Public Opinion, a firm
The White House:
dramatic stroke' and his broad powers
headed by George H. Gallup. The
The 'outs' want in
as the incumbent President, the 1..0
pollsters gave the Democrats detailed
offensive will be taken at the oppor-
breakdowns of nationwide survey
tune time is a foregone conclusion."
material which is not normally pub-
"President Nixon suffers from a
the report states.
lished.
bland personality," the report said.
As matters stand, the Democrats
Plus and minus: "The forces working
"He, in addition, gives the appear-
are forced "to assume the guilt of
in the President's favor fairly well
ance of not really standing for any-
having developed the impossible cir-
balance the forces working against
thing. He has no personal warmth, no
cumstances in which Richard Nixon
him," the report concludes.
color; it is felt that he has not kept
now finds himself while disallowing a
According to the report, the posi-
his promises."
set of criteria by which success or fail-
tive side of the President's image
Breakdown: The pollsters broke down
ure must be judged."
shows him to have been placed in a
their data on attitudes toward the
Therefore, the DNC document rec-
very difficult situation- man "who
President by region, age, size of com-
ommends that "a concerted effort be
is doing his best in such circum-
munity, educational attainment, in-
made
to force the responsibility"
stances: who is experienced and ca-
come, party affiliation and race.
upon Mr. Nixon.
pable, especially in foreign affairs, and
Among the findings:
One suggested means is to stress
who is not afraid to make a decision."
Compared to the nation as a whole,
that "his best is not good enough." As
Americans tend to attribute more
the East harbors the strongest con-
the DNC report put it: "The theme:
positive qualities to the President
centration of the President's critics
'Is this the best we can do?' might be
than negative ones, the polling data
while he is most admired in the South.
developed. Is Carsweil/Haynsworth
showed. Thus, one out of every four
Attitudes toward the President
the best we can do? Was this slow
persons interviewed volunteered the
correlate directly with age: the young-
withdrawal from Vietnam the best we
statement that Mr. Nixon is doing the
est voters are most critical and the
can do? Is 6 per cent unemployment
best he can. This turned out to be
eldest most positive.
the best we can do?"
the President's single strongest posi-
City dwellers are more antagonistic
(The Supreme Court nomination of
tive attribute. On the other hand, the
toward the President as a group. But,
G. Harrold Carswell in 1970 and the
most commonly offered criticism-
somewhat surprisingly, so are subur-
nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth
that he has a poor personality was
banites, who tend to rank the Presi-
Jr. in 1969 were both rejected by the
volunteered by only 11 per cent of the
dent low in warmth. On the other
Senate.)
Harris-Gallup sample.
hand, Mr. Nixon does above average
Background: The analysis of the
In drawing the President's nega-
in towns and rural areas.
President's personal appeal was under-
tive portrait, as seen by the electorate,
Those with the least education are
taken by David A. Cooper, who plans
the DNC report said: "Perhaps the
also the least critical of Mr. Nixon,
to resign in early December as the
most important thing working against
even though it is widely believed that
DNC's director of research to open his
Richard Nixon is his inability to in-
persons with less education are apt to
own polling firm in Washington.
spire confidence in the American
be Democrats. Conversely, those with
(For a report on political polling.
people." (Some 50 per cent of the
the most education are the most criti-
see No. 33, p. 1693; for a report on the
sample agreed with the statement that
cal.
Democratic National Committee, see
Mr. Nixon does not inspire confi-
Positive and negative feelings to-
No. 42, p. 2092.)
dence.)
ward the President cut across all
Andrew J. Glass
November 26, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Correspondence
It is my understanding that you have made arrangements with
the RNC and the White House correspondence section to handle
letters concerning the campaign. The attached memorandum
from Rose Mary Woods asks Bob Haldeman for advise regarding
methods of handling correspondence during the campaign. He
has not seen this request, therefore, you should get in touch
with Miss Woods and advise her of your system.
Attachment
GS:elr
FU - 1 week
RMW
Nov 22
11:35
Eleanor Smith of RNC is presently setting
up a corres pondence section to support the
campaign. Would like to discuss with RMW
the numbers and types of thing for which
she should plan.
484-6753
BOB HALDEMAN
To whom should we refer this woman? I have no
idea of any of the plans for the campaign period and, therefore,
do not feel I should try to give her advice.
RmW 11/22/71
November 26, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
The Mediators Inc.
Bob recently sent the attached letter to Jacqueline Hopkins
Garrett, Vice President of the Mediaters Inc. in response
to her offer of her media buying services for the campaign.
Bob wants to make absolutely sure that we don't use this
service. You may want to cover this with Peter Dailey and
Cliff Miller to make sure that everybody who might be
involved with media services understands.
FU - March 1, 1971
GS:elr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date
TO:
H. R HALDEMAN
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
H wants TO Be
Sche TAAT we
don't use
THIS SEWICE-MAY
Problems
November 23, 1971
Dear Jackie:
Thanks for your letter of November 15 and the
material on your media buying service.
A copy has boon forwarded to the Committee for
the Re-Elaction of the President for their
review. They will be handling these matters
and you should be hearing from them in the
near future.
Olad to hear that things are going well for
you --- say hello to Joy for all of us.
Sincerely,
II. R. Haldenas
Assistant to the President
LIS. Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett
Vice President
The Modiators, Inc.
Suite 208
3440 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010
November 26, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Letter from Senator Saxbe
Senator Saxbe recently wrote Bob indicating that he felt that
Mr. Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising Coperation of
America, had an excellent facility. Senator Saxbe sent a
blind carbon copy to Mr. Haldeman.
It is my understanding that you are still looking for someone
to fill the spot for Director of Mailing. Maybe this is the
man.
FU: 2 weeks
GS:elr
JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
JOHN G. TOWER, TEX,
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.
THOMAS J. MC INTYRE, N.H.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
United States Senate
HAROLD E. HUGHES, IOWA
WILLIAM B. SAXBE, OHIO
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
November 22, 1971
Honorable Bob Dole
Chairman
Republican National Committee
Washington, D. C.
Dear Bob:
Recently I was contacted by Mr. Jack R. Cole, President
of the Mail Advertising Corporation of America, advising
me that the Republican National Committee would submit
recommendations for mail marketing, advice, systems and
services to the "Committee for the Re-election of the
President."
I know Jack Cole personally and have had an opportunity
to inspect the Corporation's facilities in Lincoln,
Nebraska. I am convinced that, having seen this operation,
they will be able to do a very outstanding job for the
Committee, and I give Mail Advertising Corporation my
highest personal recommendation.
Sincerely yours,
(signed) William B Saxbe
William B. Saxbe
United States Senate
WBS:cmp
bcc: Mr. Bob Haldeman
November 24, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
New Hampshire Poll
It was my understanding that you and Ken Riets were
working on a mook convention at the University of
New Hampshire. Yet, in this morning's news summary
(copy attached), there is a comment about the University
of New Hampshire students voting overwhelmingly for
McGovern for President.
Would you and Ken Rietz please review this situation
and advise me of your plans. In light of the long-
term interest in mook conventions, a report at your
earliest convenience would be helpful.
Attachment
25
Time leads with 2 pages on "Politics: Who Should
Pay?" and "Ot Fat Cats and Other Angele. 11 The
various proposals are reviewed in straight fashion
with the mag clearly feeling something must is
done if "still greater dominance of US public 11/0
by the fat cats" is to be avoided. Altho the Dems
are in "penury" compared to the GOP, HHII, Musicle,
McCarthy, Jackson and McGovern aren't seen to have
any major finance problems. McCloskey is "in the
tightest financial bind" of all the candidates and Time
concludes its piece on the lat cais with Pete's appeal
for small contributors -- "It's an old-fashioned,
democratic idea. "
Newsweek says the Dems' new campaign funding
plan "undoubtedly will give their debt -ridden
a better shot at the WII in 172 -- and could
the shape of national politics" by decreasing the
traditional dependence on unions, millionaires and
special interests. But Newsweek notes the WH
dissent on the bill, the facts that Wallace will more
likely run as a result and that it does nothing re:
expansive pre-convention fights.
POLITICS
A survey of listees in Who's Who anong US High
School students indicates they would not reelect
RN in '72 tho they think he is doing a fairly good
job and generally approve his positions on public
issues. The findings indicate that any serious
Dem candidate for the presidency -- except HHH --
could get a majority of their votes. A Dem candidate
would get 43%; RN-33%; Wallace -3%. Muskie is
most popular with 57%. 45% felt RN was doing a good
job domestically, internationally or both; 43% said no.
Some 49% rated VP Agnew's performance as VP as
excellent or satisfactory.
Univ. of New Hampshire students voted overwhelming]
for McGovern for President in a recent campus poll.
Asked who they would like for President in 172 890
favored McGovern out of 1, 552 responses. Muskie
425; McCloskey 66; RN 45; EMK - 39; Lindsay 39;
HHH-12 and McCarthy 10.
November 19, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Bill Safire's memorandum on the Kennedy Victory Scenario is
attached. Mr. Haldeman has a copy.
GS:elr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 16, 1971.
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Kennedy Victory Scenario
I notice some people around here actually looking forward to
Kennedy as the Democratic nominee as "easiest to beat. " To
dispel that notion, here is a quick rundown of ways he can be
expected to turn Chappaquiddick to his advantage.
Pre-Convention
1. Carrying the torch. "The torch has been passed" was a
memorable quotation from JFK. Teddy will constantly harp on the
brother's fallen torch theme. Not subtly, either "we Kennedys
can't make plans" is a sledgehammer, strictly emotional, playing
on the guilt feelings of many Americans, and because it is bad
taste does not make it bad politics.
2. The Sudden-Maturity rationale. How do they come to grips
with the failure of courage at the bridge? Answer: Each of the
brothers underwent a deep sea-change at some stage of their lives.
The Bay of Pigs changed JFK, enabling him to rise to greatness at
the Cuban Missile Crisis; Bobby, too, underwent an enormous
change from the McCarthy counsel, ruthless and coldblooded, to the
warm and compassionate friend of the underprivileged he came to
appear to be in 1968. Similarly, the story will go, Teddy went from
the high-living, irresponsible boy pre-Chappaquiddick, to the "man
of the family" after being deeply sobered by that tragedy. Kennedys
traditionally overcome their pasts; the "record" has never been
held against them, and to more people than we like to think, will not
be this time either.
H. R. Haldeman -2
3. The loss of the job of Majority Whip will be turned around
to show that he is not a member of the "Club"; that he is anti-
establishment; that he follows his own star. There is romantic
appeal there.
4. Purity of motives. He is the only one on the political scene who
can get away with saying he is not seeking the Presidency. Everybody
else is driven by ambition; he's just speaking his mind.
Convention
1. There is a myth that "no one is really drafted. " The truth
is, Adlai Stevenson was really drafted in '52. Kennedy could arrange
for a draft that appears quite real -- and, in a sense, would be.
2. Apart from the Camelot partisans, there would be a strange
group of supporters pushing his nomination: Democrats who think
Nixon is unbeatable in 1972 and want to get Kennedy to run and get
beaten, and thus be out of the way for '76. Certainly the Lindsay
people feel this way. So, oddly, would some Democratic conservatives.
The Campaign: Making Chappaquiddick work for Kennedy.
This sounds insane, I know; the episode at the bridge is an enormous
liability. But there are ways to handle it.
1. Charging "gutter politics. " There will probably be people
with signs that say "What about Mary Jo ?" at every rally. This is
dirty politics; has nothing to do with "the issues"; offends the sense
of fair play of many voters. Demands will be made that Nixon
disavow this sort of dirty pool. If he does not, he will be charged
with being secretly behind it; if he does disavow it, he will be charged
with calling it to everybody's attention by his very act of disavowal.
If resentment against innuendo builds, we will be busy scotching
references to Chappaquiddick by our supporters, while theother side
will be blowing on the sparks. Dirty jokes about Kennedy will abound;
this will offend many other people. "See how this fine man is being
villified" will be their theme, and the charge will be that it is all
generated in the White House.
H. R. Haldeman - 3
2. At an appropriate time in the campaign, Mr. and Mrs.
Kopechne will come out for Kennedy.
3. The pressure to open up the sealed verdict will be allowed
to grow; then, probably in Houston, scene of the Ministers Conference
where JFK "faced up" to the Catholic issue, Teddy will break his
silence on Chappaquiddick. The same people who deride a "Checkers
speech" as cornball will see this as a human appeal for fairness and
a brave exposition of a man's soul. The tape will then be played
wherever it is most useful to Teddy.
4. If the war in Vietnam is over and the economy here is in
good shape, it would be to Nixon's advantage to campaign on peace
and prosperity; it would be to Teddy's disadvantage to address those
themes; therefore, it would be his strategy to center the campaign
on his own character. This is a dangerous play of the dice, but it
is at least arguable that it benefits the challenger if the campaign
focuses on him and his possibilities instead of the incumbent and his
successes. Of course, if there is trouble with war and the economy,
he would go the other way.
5. The President can avoid television debates with any other
candidate; but a public yearning for a Nixon-Kennedy rematch on
television would be well-nigh irresistible. Ducking or delaying would
only play up their "courage" pitch, which would directly answer that
loss of courage at the bridge.
6. The polls will be far more volatile than usual, reflecting
the emotional responses sure to be triggered in a campaign that
plays on national guilt, past assassinations, pleas to rise above
vicious innuendo, and the like. A sudden shift in polls toward the
end, no more than a quirk, could be played into a bandwagon swing
to overcome voter reservations with the "legitimacy" of majority
opinion.
7. Great stress will be laid on the number of threats he receives,
the impassioned pleas of the Secret Service to limit his campaigning
to safe television appearances, and his courageous refusal to be kept
away from crowds. He will motorcade Dallas. The "old" Teddy ran
away from trouble; the "new" Kennedy will not run away. He will
prove his courage once and for all in Dallas, on the final weekend of
the campaign.
H. R. Haldeman -4
Why do I write this memo ?
I think we can beat Kennedy. But it is important that we recognize
the wild and woolly nature of the campaign he could put on and stop
thinking he would be the easiest candidate to beat. Also, we would
do well to start thinking now about the sort of thing that could happen
should he get the nomination.
November 18, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Finch Memorandum on 1970
Election
Mr. Haldeman asked me to send you the attached analysis
of the 1970 election by Counsellor Finch. The President
has not seen this analysis.
GS:elr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Administratively Confidential
November 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Finch Memorandum on
1970 Election
On December 21, 1970 Counsellor Finch received an action
memorandum requesting his analysis of the 1970 election.
Finch's memorandum contains several interesting
observations, which do "not afford an overall basis
for the planning of the 1972 Campaign, but should
nevertheless be considered by the Attorney General.
You directed me to send Finch's last political memorandum
on the California situation directly to the Attorney
General.
H Attorney General
Strachan send this 1970 election memorandum to the
Ha Ideman send this memorandum to the Attorney
General
Strachan ask Finch to send this memorandum to
the Attorney General
Original memorandum should go to the President
with a copy to the Attorney General
Other
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
ПОЯ
SUBJECT:
What the 1970 Election Response
Now Means for 1972
Contents:
Page
I. Trends, highlights, and results related
to the 1972 framework
2
II. The 1970 returns, in votes for Congress
by states, and in past support of Nixon
for President
4
III. In the 1970 election, support of which
by whom? Breakdown of House and Senate
support, based on a November-December
1970 voting behavior study
5
male-female
black-white
age
education
income
union/non-union
party
religion
IV. Voter attitude comparisons on Presidential
and Vice Presidential principals, November-
December, 1968 and November-December, 1970
7
V. Which groups showed what support (intensity
of like or dislike) for which principals in
November-December, 1970?
9
VI. Suggestions for action
11
VII. Tabs
- 2 -
I. MEANING OF THE 1970 ELECTION FOR 1972
The 1970 election does not afford an overall basis for
the planning of the 1972 campaign. The usual number of
claims and counterclaims followed within a month after
the election and were of concern then. They may be again
when individual states and their electoral prospects are
examined. But these peculiarities, and those news commen-
taries about which senator or governor was elected and who
was defeated should not obscure the basic national trends
that apparently will be present in 1972.
In this memo, there is little consideration of campaign
funding or campaign organization -- two other important
parts of the whole campaign process. These data refer
only to voter reaction and returns. The other sides of
the triangle should get full attention too, of course,
using other information sources.
Looming over all is the voting population explosion, and
the thought that the turnout may be eighty million in
1972, and forty-one million or more of these must be
Nixon voters (Tab A).
Highlights in this report are:
--The 1970 House and Senate elections reverted to party
proportions. While many GOP governors were defeated,
the gubernatorial returns were somewhat more favorable.
Here is further evidence that in the 1972 Presidential
campaign, the emphasis must be on the Nixon record,
leadership, and on issues; and not on the party.
The hardening of the Black vote. Evidence indicates
that it is heavily non-Republican and non-Nixon in
the North, but less non-Nixon in the South.
--The Jewish vote remained heavily Democrat.
--The union vote remained heavily Democrat.
- 3 -
In 1972, unless there are significant changes in issues
and policies, a Wallace candidacy can hardly get off
the ground. There are only small pockets of strong
support for him. Wallace now has nuisance value, and
that's about all.
The educational revolution increases voter concern with
issues and policies. Voters are increasingly informed,
and opinionated. Appeal to their individuality can be
effective.
Because the President is now so well known, and because
only a few voters remain neutral on him as a person,
his campaign efforts should be at an absolute minimum,
at least until October of 1972. Having already covered
fifty states puts a "lot of hay in the barn.
Presidential emphasis can be on issues, on conduct of
the Office of the Presidency, and on the handling of
economic and foreign affairs.
The opposition will need to catch the President (not
the party), and to carry its campaign to him.
The ingredients are there for considerable Nixon gains
in the South. These may not be party gains, but issue
and President Nixon gains.
- 4 -
II. THE 1970 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION RETURNS (Tab B)
Altogether the House returns came out about 45% Republican
and 53% Democratic. In the Senate races, the Republican
plus the conservative (Buckley) vote came to 46.5% and the
Democrat plus Independent (Byrd of Virginia and Dodd) votes
total 53.5%.
Slightly more favorable to the GOP, the combined Republican/
Conservative vote for gubernatorial candidates came to 52.7%
compared to 47.3% Democrat.
In Congressional voting, then, the Democrats had a plurality
of about four and a half million votes.
Converted into electoral college results, for 1972, the 1970
House vote gave the Republicans thirteen states, and the
Democrats thirty-seven plus the District of Columbia. The
thirteen states can cast 83 electoral votes in 1972 (Tab C).
It should be noted that the best electoral college showing
produced by this method of tabulation (247 votes based on
1966 House results) fell quite short of the 270 needed for
a bare electoral college majority.
To assist in 1972 planning, the states have been ranked
according to the number of times they have given a plurality
of their votes to House candidates (Tab D). The number of
1972 electoral votes for each state also appears, as does
each state's electoral college record in the Nixon (1960 and
1968) Presidential elections. (The lower House tallies are
used because they are regular and recur nationwide every two
years. They do not vary as do gubernatorial and senatorial
contests, and they are not usually affected by heavy media
or other outside efforts.)
In 1970 only one of the thirteen states that had a plurality
of GOP congressional votes was a large state. Ohio, which
will have 25 electoral votes in 1972, stood alone. The other
twelve were small states with Iowa (8 votes) the largest of
these (Tab D).
All thirteen of these states voted for Nixon in 1960 and 1968,
and all but two of them (Delaware and New Mexico) did so in
1960. Only one of them (Arizona) voted for Goldwater in 1964.
- 5 -
For planning purposes it can also be remembered that eleven
states have not voted Republican in the last four House
elections, and did not vote for Nixon in 1960 or 1968 (Tab E).
They appear to lack party bases which can cope with the
opposition on national or federal matters, and they also
appear to lack an affinity with the President.
III. IN 1970, SUPPORT BY WHICH GROUPS?
A reliable voting behavior study that went into the field
in November and December 1970 produced these results: (Tab F) *
A. Women continued to vote a bit more Democrat than
did men. They also did so in 1968 (Dem. 45%, Rep.
43%, Wallace 12% according to Gallup). For women
there was no change in '70. For men, return to
party was more pronounced in 1970.
B. In 1970 the national black vote for Congress stayed
rigidly just where that vote was in the 1968
Presidential election.
Dem.
Rep.
Wallace
Cons.
1968 Pres.
85%
12%
3%
--
1970 House
87
13
--
--
The 1970 black vote for senator was almost all Democrat.
The black vote continues to be Democratic property.
Given this complete commitment, reduced black turnout
or neutralization of black issues must be considered.
C. Among the age groups, only those 65 and over gave a
majority to the Republicans, and that in the House
only. For the Senate, this age group followed all
the others in showing preference for Democrat candidates.
This decision by those over 65 may have been issue
oriented.
*The next eight paragraphs are supported by Tab F.
- 6 -
D. As usual, those with more education tended to
vote Republican a bit more. But not as much in
1970 (college graduates and post graduate were
Dem. 49%, Rep. 51%) as in 1968 (college educated
were Dem. 37%, Rep. 54% and Wallace 9% -- Gallup).
Significant here are results for the 1970 "some
college education" category, which includes junior
and community colleges as well as two-year technical
schools. For this group the returns were 55% - 45%
Republican in House returns. This was not matched
in 1970 Senate results which were 54% - 39% Democrat
with Conservative 7%, but a like tally of 1970
gubernatorial voting showed the "some college
education" group at 60% - 40% Republican. There
is support here for cultivating the junior college--
community college--state teachers college groups,
including their alumni.
Among those with just grade school and some high
school education, Republicans did not do well.
Blacks and Spanish speaking, the early dropouts,
appear to be included in these returns.
E. In terms of 1970 family income, the House results
for those who earned $4,000 to $7,400 for the year
were identical with the results for those who
completed high school (52% - 48% Democrat). The
lower income group, below $4,000, and the higher
income group, $7,500 to $14,900, were each heavily
Democrat. Only in the $15,000 per year and over
bracket did the House returns favor the Republicans.
The returns for Senate seats remained Democrat
(Dem. 51%, Rep. 44%, Cons. 4%) for this high income
group, however.
F. Union membership explains itself. Union households
went heavily Democrat, 65% - 35%, while non-union
households went but slightly so, 52% - 48%. It
should be remembered here that non-union households
are three to one in the majority.
G. Voting responses are tied directly to party identi-
fication. Strong Democrats voted 91% Democrat
while strong Republicans voted 96% GOP. In the
middle came the Independent. Their return of
- 7 -
Dem. 52%, Rep. 48% in House elections and Dem. 56%,
Rep. 42%, Cons. 2% for the Senate gave Republicans
too little support. Figures in the Party Identifi-
cation category also show that party cohesion was
stronger for the Republicans in House voting, but
stronger for the Democrats in Senate voting.
Republicans tended more to cross party lines in
Senate races. The relationships shown here do
emphasize the importance of party affiliation in
a mid-term election.
H.
The Republicans did not win favor in any religion
category, in either the congressional or the
senatorial races. Should these figures be a true
representation, the party is embarrassed. In
particular, the Catholic and Jewish tallies should
be noted, particularly for the Senate.
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
Dem.
Rep.
Dem.
Rep.
Cons.
Protestant
52%
48%
53%
45%
2%
Catholic
58
42
68
25
7
Jewish
86
14
87
13
0
Other or None
68
32
72
28
0
Catholics did vote Conservative in greater proportion
than did those of other faiths, but the total shift
had little electoral significance, because over two-
thirds of the Catholics remained in the Democrat
column in the Senate races. In proportions, the
Catholic vote is not quite 30% of the size of the
Protestant vote. The Jewish vote is about 5% as
large as the Protestant vote.
IV.
ATTITUDES ON PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, 1968 and 1970
National surveys of intensity of feeling for or against
each principal or candidate were conducted after the 1968
election and after the 1970 election. On a 0-100 degree
scale (thermometer) each interviewee indicated his feeling
toward each candidate. A mark at fifty or thereabouts
indicated neutrality. A mark above or below showed,
respectively, like or dislike and the degree thereof. The
results are shown on Tab G.
- 8 -
They show:
A. The President in first place in average (mean
score) with Muskie slightly behind. But both
declined from 1968 to 1970. In fact, most mean
scores declined from 1968 to 1970.
B. First choices are significant here because a first
choice translates into a vote. The President has
confirmed his position of leadership, and Senator
Kennedy, according to this approach, is his
closest competitor. Muskie and Humphrey lack the
hard core support a strong first choice showing
will indicate.
Except for Wallace, Senator Kennedy has a high
score in "last choice" mentions, while Muskie is
not greatly disliked. For the President, last
choice mentions increased slightly, as they did
for Humphrey from 1968 to 1970.
The neutral score combined with the "don't know"
score will indicate, roughly, just how much of the
electorate remains undecided on a candidate and is
therefore "persuadable" through campaigning. The
lower the total (17% for the President) the less
effect campaigning may have. Presently Muskie can
win people to his side, and he is apparently
following that strategy. For Ted Kennedy, however,
there are few "neutrals" or "don't knows" to win.
Instead he must attack the President and the Admin-
istration. He is doing that with help from McGovern.
The results here again indicate that the President can gain
little from aggressive campaigning at this time or in the
immediate future, all things remaining equal. He may best
serve political purposes by stressing leadership and admin-
istration at home and particularly abroad.
The Democratic contenders and the eventual Democratic
candidate will need to carry the campaign to the people
and against the Administration.
- 9 -
V.
PARTISAN AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL
PRINCIPALS, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1970 -- includes
18-22 year olds
The sources of candidate strength, or weakness, appear
in these columns (Tab H). The President leads because
of his strength with Republicans and Independents. In
contrast to the Congressional results, 52% to 48% Democrat,
the President led the field of candidates in Independent
support at the end of 1970. The rank order is as follows:
Rank Order According to Partisan Support
Republicans
Independents
Democrats
Nixon
81
Nixon
58
Kennedy, E. 64
LIKE
Reagan
65
Muskie
54
Muskie
64
Agnew
60
Reagan
52
Humphrey
61
Lindsay
51
Lindsay
51
Lindsay
53
50%
McGovern
51
Muskie
48
Agnew
47
McCarthy
48
McCarthy
39
Humphrey
45
Nixon
47
DISLIKE
Humphrey
37
Kennedy, E.
45
Reagan
44
McGovern
37
McGovern
45
Agnew
37
Kennedy, E. 33
McCarthy
44
Wallace
30
Wallace
30
Wallace
35
It is noteworthy that Lindsay had slightly more appeal to
Democrats in late 1970 than to either Independents or
Republicans.
Among the potential very young voters, Edward Kennedy ranks
high, but Muskie and the President are not that far behind,
nor is Lindsay in this tabulation.
18-22 year olds (candidate rank order)
E. Kennedy
64
Muskie
57
LIKE
Nixon
56
Lindsay
55
McCarthy
54
50%
McGovern
51
Humphrey
48
Reagan
47
DISLIKE
Agnew
38
Wallace
35
- 10 -
To reopen the question of the President's strength in the
North and in the South, these figures apply:
Northern Whites
Northern Blacks
Nixon
60
Kennedy, E.
87
Muskie
60
Humphrey
72
Lindsay
53
Muskie
67
Reagan
52
Lindsay
61
Humphrey
50
McGovern
53
50% %
McCarthy
52
Kennedy, E.
49
Reagan
37
McGovern
47
Nixon
35
Agnew
46
Agnew
22
McCarthy
46
Wallace
9
Wallace
28
The attitude distance between whites and blacks in the
Northern areas on the President is considerable. So is
the distance between whites and blacks on Senator Kennedy,
but the blacks are highly favorable to him and the whites
are reserved.
In the South, however, the profiles change. While the
black support for Kennedy increases slightly, the black
antagonism to the President disappears. Simultaneously
his support from whites increases, while white favor
for Muskie, Humphrey and Kennedy declines.
Southern Whites
Southern Blacks
Nixon
61
Kennedy, E.
92
Reagan
53
Humphrey
81
Agnew
50
Muskie
61
Lindsay
53
50%
Nixon
50
Muskie
48
McCarthy
49
Lindsay
48
McGovern
46
Wallace
47
Reagan
45
Humphrey
41
Agnew
34
McCarthy
40
Wallace
12
McGovern
40
Kennedy, E.
39
In these rankings, the nuisance effect of a Wallace candidacy
is clear. His support at the end of 1970 is about identical
with what it was in 1968. His candidacy in 1972 would draw
from the President, and probably more so than from Kennedy,
Muskie, or Humphrey. This would be particularly true in the
South, of course.
- 11 -
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION
All of the studies alluded to here and others as well
indicate increased volatility in the electorate. The
disparities between House and Senate election returns
may be sought in this discerning judgment. The coming
of age of the post World War II youngsters, most of whom
are better educated has an effect, and so now may the 18
year old vote to a limited extent. Alongside this is
the decline in party membership, loyalty and association.
Increasingly voters, particularly young voters, are
declaring themselves as Independents (Tab I).
More to the Republican point, there is statistical evidence
which relates an increased feeling of "personal competence"
to increased turnout and increased Republican voting.
Emphasis on the individual as a voter who can comprehend
government issues and who can make a difference can
increase 1972 electoral support for the President.
The current postures of the Democrats who seek nomination
are in line with the results shown in these tabulations.
For example, Senator Muskie needs to convince the many who
are uncommitted on him, and to prove he is in command. He
probably will not make an all-out attack on the Adminis-
tration itself until late. In contrast Senator Kennedy
needs to hold his large dedicated group, to avoid antagoni-
zing further those who dislike him and to establish himself
as the Administration-killer. Because Lindsay has few
enemies outside New York, apparently his only strategy is
to try to establish himself as a compromise candidate.
The President needs to maintain his position with the
Independents and increase his hold there. Large gains in
the Black vote cannot be expected. Low Black turnout should
be sought -- perhaps by defusing Black issues.
Obviously, if the Wallace campaign can be minimized, the
President may make key gains in the South, particularly
if the Democratic nominee is not appreciated there.
- 12 -
The need to overcome the numerical advantage of the
Democrat Party is clear. The appeals which will be
based on the role and achievements of the President
should be accompanied by an emphasis on the ability of
each voter, as an individual, to think and choose for
himself because he, as a citizen, can make a difference.
The President's high order of stewardship for the nation
should be the keystone for the coming campaign. No
other theme should be allowed to replace the primary
emphasis on that stewardship at home and abroad.
The secondary theme (carried by others for the time being)
should be to lay a solid foundation of irresponsibility
on the part of the Democrats in Congress for failing to
respond to the President's leadership.
TAB A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: RETURNS AND FORECAST 1960-1972
1960 ELECTION
68.3 million votes
49.9%
Nixon
34,108,546
50.1
Democrats
34,227,096 (J. Kennedy & H. F. Byrd)
1964 ELECTION
70.3 million votes
38.6
Goldwater
27,176,799
61.4
Johnson
43,126,506
1968 ELECTION
73.0 million votes
43.6
Nixon
31,783,783
42.9
Humphrey
31,271,839
13.5
Wallace
9,899,557
1972 ELECTION (estimates)
80.0 million votes (est.)
76 million aged 21 and
51.25
Nixon
41,000,000
over plus 4 million
48.75
Democrat
39,000,000
aged 18 to 21 (36.3%
of 11 million eligible)
With Wallace Running Strong
47.5
Nixon
38,000,000
46.25
Democrat
37,000,000
6.25
Wallace
5,000,000
TAB B
1970 NATIONAL VOTE BY PARTY
FOR CONGRESS, SENATE, AND GOVERNOR
Per cent
Plurality
CONGRESS
Republican
24,339,240
45.1
Democrat
28,841,106
53.4
4,501,866 (D)
Other
832,500
1.5
TOTAL
54,012,846
SENATE
Republican
19,471,069
41.6
Democrat
24,276,217
51.8
4,805,148 (D)
Conservative
2,276,321
04.9
Independent
809,294
01.7
TOTAL
46,832,901
GOVERNOR
Republican
20,479,892
51.6
1,734,061 (R)
Democrat
18,745,831
47.3
Conservative
424,476
01.1
TOTAL
39,650,199
PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TOTAL VOTE FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES, 1960-1970
1960
45.0%
1962
47.7
1964
42.5
1966
48.7
1968
48.9
1970
45.6
NUMBER OF STATES HAVING A REPUBLICAN PLURALITY OF TOTAL
CONGRESSIONAL (HOUSE) VOTE, 1964-1970
Year
Number of States
Total of 1972 Electoral
Votes, All Such States
1964
9
50
1966
23
247
1968
25
235
1970
13
83
TAB C
1970 NATIONAL ELECTION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
States Whose Voters Cast More Votes for Republican Candidates
1972 Electoral Votes
State
6
Arizona
7
Colorado
3
Delaware
4
Idaho
8
Iowa
7
Kansas
5
Nebraska
4
New Hampshire
4
New Mexico
3
North Dakota
25
Ohio
4
Utah
3
Vermont
83
13
In Arkansas more GOP than Democrat votes were cast
in the one House contest, but three Democrats were
unopposed.
STATES DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO TIMES WHEN THEIR VOTERS CAST
MORE REPUBLICAN THAN DEMOCRAT VOTES FOR CONGRESSIONAL (LOWER HOUSE) SEATS
Last Four Congressional Elections: 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970
No. of Times
Electoral
Cast Electoral Vote for Nixon (N)
Republican Plurality
Votes
1960
1969
1. In all four elections 64-70
Kansas
7
N
N
Nebraska
5
N
N
Idaho
4
N
N
North Dakota
3
N
N
Vermont
3
N
N
22
2. In 1966, 68 and 70 (not 64)
Ohio
25
N
N
Iowa
8
N
N
Arizona
6
N
N
New Hampshire
4
N
N
Utah
4
N
N
Delaware
3
0
N
50.
3. In 1964, 66 and 68 (not 70)
Montana
4
N
N
South Dakota
4
N
N
8
4. In 1968 and 70 (not 64 nor 66)
Colorado
7
N
N
*Arkansas
6
0
0
New Mexico
4
N
N
17
5. In 1966 and 68 (not 64 nor 70)
California
45
N
N
Illinois
26
0
N
New Jersey
17
0
N
Indiana
13
N
N
Wisconsin
11
N
N
Minnesota
10
0
0
Tennessee
10
N
N
Oregon
6
N
N
Alaska
3
N
N
Wyoming
3
N
N
144
6. In 1966 only (not 64 nor 68 nor 70)
Pennsylvania
27
0
0
Michigan
21
0
0
48
7. In 1964 only (not 66 nor 68 nor 70)
Alabama
9
0
0
8. No G.O.P. plurality in any of last four Congressional elections
New York
41
0
0
Texas
26
0
0
Florida
17
N
N
Massachusetts
14
0
0
North Carolina
13
0
N
Georgia
12
0
0
Missouri
12
0
N
Virginia
12
N
N
Louisiana
10
0
0
Maryland
10
0
0
Kentucky
9
N
N
Washington
9
N
0
Connecticut
8
0
0
Oklahoma
8
N
N
South Carolina
8
0
N
Mississippi
7
0
0
West Virginia
6
0
0
Hawaii
4
0
0
Maine
4
N
0
Rhode Island
4
0
0
Nevada
3
0
N
237
9. District of Columbia
3
-
0
538
TOTAL
* few contests, scattered elections
TAB E
STATES WHICH HAVE NOT VOTED REPUBLICAN IN THE LAST FOUR HOUSE
ELECTIONS, AND DID NOT VOTE FOR NIXON IN 1960 OR 1968
State
1972 Electoral Votes
New York
41
Texas
26
Massachusetts
14
Georgia
12
Louisiana
10
Maryland
10
Connecticut
8
Mississippi
7
West Virginia
6
Hawaii
4
Rhode Island
4
142
Alabama and Arkansas can be added to this group.
Their ventures into voting for Republican congressmen
have been just about that so far.
TAB F
These figures on Congressional and Senatorial vote and
Congressional turnout relate to various demographic, socio-
economic and political factors. The results are based on
in-depth interviews with a selected national cross section
of 1513 citizens of voting age. Interviewing took place
after the election, during the months of November and
December, 1970. The study was another in the regular
series which the Center for Political Studies at the
University of Michigan has conducted since 1948.
N = weighted number of interviews and shows relative size
of each category.
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
%
or
%
%
%
Dem.
Rep.
N
Dem.
Rep.
Con.
N
1.
Sex
Male
54
46
(390)
60
38
2
(340)
Female
56
44
(427)
59
37
4
(402)
2.
Race
White
53
47
(767)
57
40
3
(700)
Negro
87
13
( 52)
97
1
1
( 44)
3.
Age
Under 35
57
43
(193)
58
37
5
(167)
35-44
58
42
(143)
64
35
2
(145)
45-54
54
46
(171)
59
37
4
(153)
55-64
59
41
(158)
64
35
2
(135)
65 and over
45
55
(148)
53
43
3
(139)
4.
Education
Grade School
66
34
(161)
65
34
1
(147)
Some High School
66
34
( 98)
72
27
1
( 88)
High School
Completed
52
48
(287)
59
36
4
(253)
Some College
45
55
(130)
54
39
7
(125)
College and
Post Graduate
49
51
(142)
50
48
2
(130)
TAB F (page 2)
Congressional Vote
Senatorial Vote
oth
%
%
%
%
Dem.
Rep.
N
Dem.
Rep.
Con.
N
5.
1970 Family Income
Under $4000
68
32
(125)
70
29
1
(108)
$4000-$7400
52
48
(151)
56
43
1
(145)
$7500-$14900
56
44
(345)
63
33
4
(310)
$15000 and over
44
56
(170)
51
44
4
(161)
6.
Household Union Membership
One or more members 65
35
(194)
67
30
3
(200)
No union members
52
48
(615)
57
40
3
(536)
7.
Party Identification
Strong Dem.
91
9
(191)
99
1
0
(166)
Weak Dem.
77
23
(174)
85
13
2
(153)
Indep. Dem.
75
25
( 68)
84
16
0
( 70)
Independent
52
48
( 71)
56
42
2
( 73)
Indep. Rep.
35
65
( 62)
31
65
4
( 59)
Weak Rep.
17
83
(143)
19
73
8
(135)
Strong Rep.
4
96
(107)
6
88
7
( 88)
8.
Religion
Protestant
52
48
(578)
53
45
2
(481)
Catholic
58
42
(167)
68
25
7
(171)
Jewish
86
14
( 25)
87
13
0
( 36)
Other or none
68
32
( 46)
72
28
0
( 54)
TAB G
SUMMARY OF 1968 AND 1970 CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS
Principal
First Choice
Last Choice
Neutral
Standard
(Candidate)
Mean Score
Mentionsᵃ
Mentionsᵃ
(50°
scores)
Don't Know
Deviation
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
1968
1970
Nixon
66.5
59.0
36%
38%
8%
14%
16%
16%
1%
1%
23
28
Muskie
61.4
57.0
16
20
10
10
31
26
8
17
22
26
Lindsay
b
--
51.8
--
9
--
11
--
31
--
21
--
23
Reagan
49.1
51.6
5
14
17
14
34
25
5
9
22
26
Kennedy, E. b
--
50.3
--
26
--
28
--
13
:
2
--
33
Humphrey
61.7
49.9
25
18
13
19
14
20
1
3
27
27
Agnew
50.4
45.9
4
13
13
26
41
18
7
4
21
28
b
McGovern
--
45.5
--
4
--
12
--
40
:
36
:
22
McCarthy
54.8
44.3
11
6
14
17
32
33
5
17
23
24
Wallace
31.4
31.7
11
12
62
54
13
14
2
6
31
32
a These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give
the same highest or lowest score to several principals.
b
Ratings were obtained for this principal in only one of the two election years.
TAB I
The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States,
1952-1970
Question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong
(R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D) ? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as
closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Nov.
Oct.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
Democrat
Strong
22%
22%
21%
23%
21%
23%
26%
18%
20%
20%
Weak
25
25
23
24
25
23
25
27
25
23
Independent
Democrat
10
9
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
Independent
5
7
9
8
8
8
8
12
11
13
Republican
7
6
8
4
7
6
6
7
9
8
Republican
Weak
14
14
14
16
13
16
13
15
14
15
Strong
13
13
15
13
14
12
11
10
10
10
Apolitical,
Don't know
4
4
3
5
4
4
2
2
1
1
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Number of Cases
1614
1139
1772
1269
3021
1289
1571
1291
1553
1802
Center for Political Studies
The University of Michigan
November, 1970
November 15, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB MARIK
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Democratic Contenders
Stand on Bussing
The material you had the RNC prepare on the bussing stands of
the Democratic Contenders should have one important aspect
added. Mike Wallace 60 Minutes did a story on the children
of Washington politicians who attend St. Albans, an exclusive
private school. I understand that Wallace interviewed most
of the Democratic Contenders and only Senator Jackson had
his children in public schools. The inconsistency of
publicity favoring improving public schools (by bussing)
while sending your own children to private schools should
be pressed. Governor Holton of Virginia has done very
well with this issue on the positive side.
Please determine whether we have the factual information
(quotes from 60 Minutes, etc.) and some plan for using
this information successfully.
CC: Jeb Magruder
GS:elr
THE WHITE HOUSE
FU
WASHINGTON
11/14
Administratively Confidential
October 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB MARIK
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN 91am
SUBJECT:
Muskie Bussing Statement
The Muskie statement about bussing being a legitimate
tool that can "be used, and should be used, and the
courts have said it must be used", must not be lost.
Please run periodic -- monthly -- tests of the RNC's
capability of retrieving this and other bussing state-
ments by the Democratic Contenders.
Godon
10/21
I have set this up, and will be back
In a month with the pist results.
Ray
TAB H
DEMOGRAPHIC AND PARTISAN BASES OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT
18-22
North-
North-
South-
South-
Overall
Demo-
Inde-
Repub-
year
ern
ern
ern
ern
Average
Candidate
crats
pendents
licans
olds
Whites
Blacks
Whites
Blacks
59
Nixon
47
58
81
56
60
35
61
50
57
Muskie
64
54
48
57
60
67
48
61
52
Lindsay
53
51
51
55
53
61
48
53
52
Reagan
44
52
65
47
52
37.
53
45
50
Kennedy E.
64
45
33
64
49
87
39
92
50
Humphrey
61
45
37
48
50
72
41
81
46
Agnew
37
47
60
38
46
22
50
34
46
McGovern
51
45
37
51
47
53
40
46
44
McCarthy
48
44
39
54
46
52
40
49
32
Wallace
30
35
30
35
28
9
47
12
Source:
Jerrold Rusk, Purdue University &
Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan
"Perceptions of Presidential Candidates:
A Midterm Report" (mimeo, September, 1971)
November 15, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB MARIK
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
EMK
This is the type of information I trust your people are
keeping. The opening sections may prove particularly
useful.
GS:elr
In
November 15, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK MOORE
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Jack Wrather -
Presidential Letter
In response to your suggestion that the President write and
thank Jack Wrather for his efforts in Los Angeles, I have
attached a copy of the letter the President sent to Mr.
Wrather on November 11. Other November 9 Dinner Chairmen
also received letters of gratitude from the President.
Attachment: Copy of November 11, 1971 letter to Jack Wrather.
GS:elr
Com
PLE
November 11, 1971
Door Jack.
The overwhelming success of the "Satute to the
President = in 200 and others Like
it in twenty cities across the nation clearly
denchatrates the vitality and unity of the
Republican Parev. It not only natiolishoo a
sound financial base tor our National Committee
but also serven as an institution to Republicant
everyvhers. working covition 1.0.0 1 postane as
we approach one elections we 1072 than to convey
to all Americans the strength of our Republican
convictions And the brynes. of our accomplism
ments in this Administration.
Your rolo 1., the Severber DC. dinner in en mainr
scep toward achieving 2.13 you! and has earned
my deep admiration and cracitude. Through your
efforts we will no shie to hount as effective
campaign which will surply have encomous imact
on the future of the Republican Party and the
nation we servs.
with by best missnes,
Sincerely,
BNG
NO. Jick
270 North/Chnon Urive
Deverly 11113, California 30213
RN:RHC:
CC: AVII
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DICK MOORE Bn
SUBJECT: Salute to the President Dinner
Just a brief report on the Los Angeles dinner which was a
total success in terms of both attendance and enthusiasm.
The official count was 1005, which I understand was con-
siderably more than originally anticipated.
One good feature was the projection system which was ab-
solutely perfect, both video and audio. As a result, the
President's address from Chicago came across almost as
well as if he had been there.
To say the reaction to the speech was favorable would be
to understate the case. For example, Donn Tatum, President
of the Disney company, came over to our table to tell me
that it was the best speech he had ever heard the President
make, and I could tell he was not just being polite.
I realize that most of the remarks I heard were from the
President's friends, but even allowing for that bias, their
comments were exceptionally enthusiastic. Among those I
talked to were: Taft Schreiber, Ted Cummings, Peter Pitchess,
Gordon Luce, Mr. and Mrs. William French Smith, Emmett Jones,
Pete Dailey, Roy Disney, Earl Adams, Jack Wrather, Jack Warner,
and Henry Salvatori, to name only a few.
The separate local program of Art Linkletter, John Mitchell
and Governor Reagan was very good. The Governor went out of
his way to endorse the President's Peking initiative and he
did it very effectively.
An interesting footnote: Mr. Frank Sinatra attended the
dinner and sat at the table of the Attorney General of the
United States.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DICK MOORE
M
SUBJECT: Los Angeles Dinner
Several people told me that Jack Wrather, the dinner chairman,
really worked his head off, and he was obviously thrilled by
the result. I had a brief talk with him, and for future ref-
erence I think it would be a good idea for the President to
write him a thank you letter. A suggested draft is attached.
Attachment
DRAFT
11/12/71 (Moore)
Dear Jack:
John Mitchell and a number of those who were there
have told me that the Los Angeles dinner Tuesday night
was an outstanding success in every way. They also
told me of the tremendous contribution of time and
effort which you personally made and which meant so much
to the success of the evening.
It is already clear that the dinners have given a
great lift to Republican spirits throughout the country.
As you can understand, I was particularly delighted to
know that this is so true of Southern California.
I hope you will extend my sincere thanks to all your
colleagues. Meanwhile, I want you to know how deeply
I appreciate your continuing friendship and support.
Pat joins me in sending our best to you and Bonita.
Sincerely,
Mr. John D. Wrather, Jr.
207 North Canon Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90210
RN: RAM: hmd
Administratively Confidential
November 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
1948 Election
A review of some of the books written about the 1948
election (the last time an incumbent President was really
challenged) indicates several items which you should
consider for the 1972 Campaign for the President:
1. Jack Redding in Inside the Democratic Party attributes
Truman's success to the "American people's love of the
underdog". President Nixon has been an underdog for
many years. We may be faced with a situation where
he would be characterized as all powerful - "victory
similar to the LBJ defeat of Goldwater" was Oberdorfer's
quote. You may want to have your strategy group consider
ways of countering this psychology.
2. Apparently one of the really valuable tools for
Truman was something called "Capital Comment", a four
page weekly news letter which served as a mouth piece
to reach party workers. It would be interesting to
compare this document with Monday and whatever other
Campaign publications you have in mind.
3. In addition, a daytime television program was
created and aimed at housewives. It was called The
Democrat's Record and it satirized the Republican
"do nothing" Congress. Maybe someone should be
encouraged to start a television talk show or series
of radio talk shows or some other independent --- non
campaign form of getting information to the people
without appearing that the President is personally
"campaigning". I realize that your strategy group
focuses mostly on strategy for the primaries, but
since the primaries will be of much less importance
in 1972, would you have them give these ideas some
thought?
GS:1m
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
10/30
TO: honey
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Since you are
reading a book on
the'48 election Gregg's
comments might
be of interest to
you.
INSIDE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Jack Redding
Having served as publicity director for the Democratic
National Committee under the Truman Administration, Jack Redding
is eminently qualified to write this account of the two year
Party effort that preceeded Truman's surprising victory at the
polls in November, 1949.
Redding recalls the atmosphere of gloom and the total
disorganization which surrounded the Democratic Party in early
1947 and goes on to tell of the men, the ideas, and the events
which led eventually to the reorganization of the Party and to
one of the most successful political campaigns in American history.
The author attributes Truman's victory in large part to
the man himself; his spirit and courage and his never ending drive
to carry his story directly to the people. He attributes Truman
success as well to the American people's love of the underdog
and to their eventual recognition of Truman as a man of the people.
But the campaign workers and their ingenious ideas carried
the President's message. They sought to build all levels of the
Party organization to their best efficiency in spite of division
within. They up the publicity department, set up long distant
telephone soundings to weigh reactions to Truman's speeches. They
organized Party leader conferences, later dubbed "thought control
clinics", where party leaders from every state met each week
with the President. They organized the "Truman File" which
catalogued quotes from Truman's speeches on various topics which
could be used in Party groups and could be food for press releases.
One of the most valuable campaign tools was the creation of
"Capital Comment", a four page weekly newsletter which served
womfore
as a mouthpiece to reach Party workers and which brought additional
newspaper publicity.
The Party made special appeal to the 25% of the population
which was of foreign origin. A national committee of leaders
from the different language groups was organized representing
the 22 million Americans who spoke in their native tongue. They
helped to advise and to translate campaign material for foreign
newspapers and radio stations.
A day time television program was created and aimed at
housewives. Called "The Democratic Record", it satarized the
Republican "do nothing Congress", the problem of increasing taxes,
the Dewey campaign, etc. It proved an enormously successful
tool for testing voter concerns and reactions.
but
Why not start our sum talk show?
to
-2-
The workers published a picture book of Truman's life story
which was widely distributed as well as 2,000 prints of a film
depicting the story of the President. For six days before the
election, no one could go to the movies without seeing the film.
Television time was purchased SO that prominent Party leaders
could address the nation and listening posts were set up across
the country where Party groups could gather to hear and discuss the
broadcast.
The tone of Truman's campaign was characterized by his decision
to travel across the country speaking to the people from the rear
platform of a train.
While Inside The Democratic Party is a factual account of
all that took place within the Democratic Party in 1947 and 1948,
Redding is primarily interested in exploring the specifics which
made the eventual victory possible. The most important was the very
personal nature of the campaign -- Truman's concern with Party
leaders and their thoughts and suggestions as well as with the
common man and his desire to have them know him and his story.
Gregg Petersmeyer
November 1, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Committee for the Re-Election
of the President Staff Writer
You asked me whether it would be possible for the Committee to
hire a writer but have him physically located in Ray Price's
office so that he could act as liaison between the Committee
and Price and be available to Price as the need arose.
The answer to your question is no the Committee writer should
not be located in Price's office, but at 1701 with the rest
of your Campaign staff.
GS:elr