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This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The New York Primary Returns. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Tested campaign slogan for Nixon's campaign, "President Nixon-Now More Than Ever." 1 pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Continuous study of the slogan, "President Nixon, Now More Than Ever." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Videotape Capability and McGovern's Documentary. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McGovern's Documentary and Spots. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates, and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From L. Higby to GS. RE: Indecipherable message. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Reasons behind McGovern's drop of fifteen points. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Article in the Evening Star entitled, "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Some lessons concerning the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry Dent to The President. RE: Analysis of the California Primary, and the Field Poll's results that say Nixon is up by twenty points. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed DeBolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: The effects of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the supposed shift of voters to Humphrey, and what this will mean for California voters. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern debates, and the images conveyed by both during the debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb Magruder to Haldeman. RE: The impact of the California debates, and the impressions given by the two candidates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore to H. RE: The recent debates, and whether or not they were a factor in the difference between the field poll and final results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: The predictions vs. results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: Humphreys's improved showing in California thanks in part to the previous three debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/9/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dinner reservations at the Kennedy Center, and their strict "no reservations" rule. 1 pg. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and the availability of the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/13/1972
RE: The transcript of the phone conversation with John Davies. 6 pgs. [Subject: Personal] [Other Document], 6/13/1972
Gallup Poll entitled, "McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents; Wallace Seen Winning Strong Sympathy Vote." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/9/1972
Gallup Poll entitled, "Nixon Holds Widest Lead to Date Over McGovern and Humphrey." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/11/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies concerning the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
RE: The Phone Conversation with John Davies that discusses issues such as, "Wallaces' lead among Independents." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Betty to Gordon. RE: The enclosed letter that was sent to Tom Wicker, the man who supposedly squashed unfavorable news regarding Kennedy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/2/1972
From Roger W. Eisinger to Tom Wicker. RE: The impact of the Chappaquiddick accident on a possible Kennedy presidential candidacy. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/2/1972
From Roger W. Eisinger to John B. Oakes. RE: The attached letter sent to Tom Wicker. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], 6/2/1972
An AP report that highlights the idea that "If Wallace accomplishes nothing else this year, he has succeeded in making a shambles of the once-formidable labor-union vote. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Fred LaRue's information conerning Kennedy. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surveys-Wave it-New York. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1672
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The RNC Convention, and the set up of specific arrangements. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Malek's analysis of the campaign organization. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Celebrities briefing-Kissinger's participation- California, June 17, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies to disclose the results. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Survey-Wave II. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/7/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The attachment of the latest draft of the Wave II survey. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Survey-Wave II. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The drafted questionnaire of Bob Teeter's proposed Wave II polls in Russia. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/3/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Meeting with Peter Dailey to discuss the campaign advertising. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145605
label
WHSF: Contested, 13-18
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145605
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 13-18
description
This file contains:
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The New York Primary Returns. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Tested campaign slogan for Nixon's campaign, "President Nixon-Now More Than Ever." 1 pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Continuous study of the slogan, "President Nixon, Now More Than Ever." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Videotape Capability and McGovern's Documentary. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McGovern's Documentary and Spots. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates, and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From L. Higby to GS. RE: Indecipherable message. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Reasons behind McGovern's drop of fifteen points. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Article in the Evening Star entitled, "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Some lessons concerning the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry Dent to The President. RE: Analysis of the California Primary, and the Field Poll's results that say Nixon is up by twenty points. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed DeBolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: The effects of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the supposed shift of voters to Humphrey, and what this will mean for California voters. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern debates, and the images conveyed by both during the debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb Magruder to Haldeman. RE: The impact of the California debates, and the impressions given by the two candidates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore to H. RE: The recent debates, and whether or not they were a factor in the difference between the field poll and final results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: The predictions vs. results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: Humphreys's improved showing in California thanks in part to the previous three debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/9/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dinner reservations at the Kennedy Center, and their strict "no reservations" rule. 1 pg. [Subject: Personal] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and the availability of the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/13/1972
RE: The transcript of the phone conversation with John Davies. 6 pgs. [Subject: Personal] [Other Document], 6/13/1972
Gallup Poll entitled, "McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents; Wallace Seen Winning Strong Sympathy Vote." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/9/1972
Gallup Poll entitled, "Nixon Holds Widest Lead to Date Over McGovern and Humphrey." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/11/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies concerning the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
RE: The Phone Conversation with John Davies that discusses issues such as, "Wallaces' lead among Independents." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Betty to Gordon. RE: The enclosed letter that was sent to Tom Wicker, the man who supposedly squashed unfavorable news regarding Kennedy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/2/1972
From Roger W. Eisinger to Tom Wicker. RE: The impact of the Chappaquiddick accident on a possible Kennedy presidential candidacy. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/2/1972
From Roger W. Eisinger to John B. Oakes. RE: The attached letter sent to Tom Wicker. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], 6/2/1972
An AP report that highlights the idea that "If Wallace accomplishes nothing else this year, he has succeeded in making a shambles of the once-formidable labor-union vote. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Fred LaRue's information conerning Kennedy. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surveys-Wave it-New York. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1672
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The RNC Convention, and the set up of specific arrangements. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Malek's analysis of the campaign organization. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Celebrities briefing-Kissinger's participation- California, June 17, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies to disclose the results. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Survey-Wave II. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/7/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The attachment of the latest draft of the Wave II survey. 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Survey-Wave II. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/6/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The drafted questionnaire of Bob Teeter's proposed Wave II polls in Russia. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/3/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Meeting with Peter Dailey to discuss the campaign advertising. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The New York Primary Returns. 1 pg.
13
18
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Tested campaign slogan for Nixon's
campaign, "President Nixon-Now More
Than Ever." 1 pg
13
18
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE:
Continuous study of the slogan, "President
Nixon, Now More Than Ever." 3 pgs.
13
18
6/20/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Videotape Capability and McGovern's
Documentary. 1 pg.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 1 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/16/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
McGovern's Documentary and Spots. 1 pg.
13
18
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The Humphrey-McGovern Debates, and the
Democratic Primary Results in California. 2
pgs.
13
18
6/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the
Democratic Primary Results in California. 7
pgs.
13
18
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby to GS. RE: Indecipherable
message. 1 pg.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE:
Reasons behind McGovern's drop of fifteen
points. 1 pg.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 2 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Article in the Evening Star entitled,
"McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter
Poll." 1 pg.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Some
lessons concerning the California Primary. 3
pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry Dent to The President. RE:
Analysis of the California Primary, and the
Field Poll's results that say Nixon is up by
twenty points. 3 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ed DeBolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey
on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates
on the California Primary. 4 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: The
effects of the Humphrey-McGovern debates
on the supposed shift of voters to Humphrey,
and what this will mean for California voters.
2 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 3 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The
Humphrey-McGovern debates, and the
images conveyed by both during the debates.
2 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Jeb Magruder to Haldeman. RE: The
impact of the California debates, and the
impressions given by the two candidates. 3
pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Richard Moore to H. RE: The recent
debates, and whether or not they were a
factor in the difference between the field poll
and final results. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: The
predictions vs. results in the California
Democratic Primary. 4 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE:
Humphreys's improved showing in California
thanks in part to the previous three debates. 3
pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 4 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Article from The Washington Post entitled,
"A Survey of California Voting: McGovern:
New Constituency." 4 pgs.
13
18
6/9/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Article from The Washington Post entitled,
"A Survey of California Voting: McGovern:
New Constituency." 4 pgs.
13
18
6/15/1972
Personal
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Dinner reservations at the Kennedy Center,
and their strict "no reservations" rule. 1 pg.
13
18
6/13/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Gallup Surveys, and the availability of the
results. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/13/1972
Personal
Other Document
RE: The transcript of the phone conversation
with John Davies. 6 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 5 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/9/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Gallup Poll entitled, "McGovern's Dramatic
Gains Due to Independents; Wallace Seen
Winning Strong Sympathy Vote." 1 pg.
13
18
6/11/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Gallup Poll entitled, "Nixon Holds Widest
Lead to Date Over McGovern and
Humphrey." 1 pg.
13
18
6/8/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John
Davies concerning the results. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Campaign
Other Document
RE: The Phone Conversation with John
Davies that discusses issues such as,
"Wallaces' lead among Independents." 4 pgs.
13
18
6/2/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Betty to Gordon. RE: The enclosed
letter that was sent to Tom Wicker, the man
who supposedly squashed unfavorable news
regarding Kennedy. 1 pg.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 6 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/2/1972
Campaign
Letter
From Roger W. Eisinger to Tom Wicker.
RE: The impact of the Chappaquiddick
accident on a possible Kennedy presidential
candidacy. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/2/1972
White House Staff
Letter
From Roger W. Eisinger to John B. Oakes.
RE: The attached letter sent to Tom Wicker.
1 pg.
13
18
Campaign
Report
An AP report that highlights the idea that "If
Wallace accomplishes nothing else this year,
he has succeeded in making a shambles of
the once-formidable labor-union vote. 1 pg.
13
18
6/13/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Fred LaRue's information conerning
Kennedy. 1 pg.
13
18
6/12/1672
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Campaign Surveys-Wave it-New York. 1 pg.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 7 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/10/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The RNC Convention, and the set up of
specific arrangements. 3 pgs.
13
18
6/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Malek's analysis of the campaign
organization. 1 pg.
13
18
6/8/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Celebrities briefing-Kissinger's participation-
California, June 17, 1972. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/8/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John
Davies to disclose the results. 3 pgs.
13
18
6/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The Campaign Survey-Wave II. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 8 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
13
18
6/6/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The attachment of the latest draft of the
Wave II survey. 2 pgs.
13
18
6/6/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Campaign Survey-Wave II. 1 pg.
13
18
6/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
The drafted questionnaire of Bob Teeter's
proposed Wave II polls in Russia. 17 pgs.
13
18
6/1/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Meeting with Peter Dailey to discuss the
campaign advertising. 1 pg.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 9 of 9
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
NUMBER
TYPE
RESTRICTION
NO WITHDRAWN ITEMS
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
H.R. HALDEMAN
238
FOLDER TITLE
STRACHAN CHRON- HR4 ONLY JUNE 1972
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 238
Folder:
Strachan Chron-HRH only June 1972
Document
Disposition
160
Retain Open
161
Retain
Open
162
Retain
Open
163
Return
Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAH TO HR-, 6/20/72
164
Return
Private/PoliticalmEm0, STRACHAN TO H.CH, 6/20/72
165
Return
Private/Politicalmm], STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/20/72
166
Retain
Open
167
Return
Private/Politicalm&m) STRACHAU TO ARH, 6/16/72
168
Return
Private/Political0, STRACHANTO NRH, 6/15/72
169
Return
Private/Personal MEMO, STRACHAN D HRA, 6/15/72
170
Return
Private/Political MEMO, STRACHANTO HRH, 6/15/72
171
Retain
Open
172
Retain
Open
173
Return
Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/13/72
174
Return
Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/13/72
175
Return
Private/Political MEMU, STRACHAN I HRH, 6/12/72
176
Return
Private/Political mEmu, STRACHAN TD HRH, 6/10/72
177
Return
Private/Politicalmtm, STRACHALI D HRH, 6/10/72
178
Retain
Open
179
Return
Private/PoliticalmEm), STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/8/72
180
Return
Private/Political MEMD, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/8/72
181
Return
Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAM TD HR. 6/7/72
182
Return
Private/Politicalmm), STRACHAN ii) He", 6/6/72
183
Return
Private/PoliticalmEm) STRACHED TO HRU 6/6/72
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 238
185
Return
Private/PoliticalmEm), STRAC-AN 7 HRH, 6/3/72
186
Retain
Open
187
Retain Open
188
Return
Private/PoliticalmEm), STRACHAN TO HRA, 6/1/72
189
Retain Open
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
1
Memo
Strachan to Haldeman re: Don Nixon. 2
06/15/1972
G
pgs
COLLECTION TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Contested Documents
10
FOLDER TITLE
WHSF: SMOF: H.R. Haldeman: Strachan Chron - HRH Box 238
PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:
D-DOG Personal privacy under deed of gift
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
New York Primary Returns
The President's name is not on the New York ballot.
Democratic candidates' names do not appear on the New York
ballot. Instead, delegates which are not legally bound
to a particular candidate are selected. McGovern's
delegates are expected to win over 200 of the 248 dele-
gates available today. An additional 30 will be selected
this weekend by the State Democratic Committee.
The New York City polls are open from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m.,
polls are open in the rest of the state between 12 noon
and 9 p.m. CBS and NBC will not have announced shows on
the results. Only spot announcements are scheduled on
NBC.
Harry Dent Will prepare a one page summary of the results
for the President. This summary will be on your desk at
7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the
President.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
On June 7 you asked that the suggested campaign slogan
(President Nixon - Now More Than Ever) be tested to
determine if Dent's concern -- it may be too sophisticated
for the average man -- was correct.
The results of the group sessions conducted by Teeter's
Market Opinion Research is attached. The research con-
cludes that the slogan is understandable and not too
sophisticated.
Dailey hopes to review the results with Mitchell today
and receive final approval for the slogan.
GS/jb
Committee for the Re-election of the President
DETERMINED TO RE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
MEMORANDUM
June 20, 1972
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By not NARA, Date 4/6/95
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
Rebertin
SUBJECT:
Further Study of Slogan "President
Nixon. Now more than ever."
We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan,
"President Nixon. Now more than ever. 11 to determine whether the
slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context
of other competing slogans. To study this question two group
sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35
years of age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session
we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and
Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results
of the research.
In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfin-
ished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past
record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept
of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by
anyone as anti-LicGovern.
The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with
the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express
this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal
which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the
slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were men-
tally added to the phrase "Now more than ever."
Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was
presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the
groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor bill-
board proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily
understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now"
with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very
strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view
it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor
proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and
the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of
the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal por-
trayed the President us sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of
using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.
-2-
In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than
ever. " Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the
statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate
its message. It is important to note that the participants generally
ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our
earlier study showed that "Now more than ever. II ranked behind the
statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the
slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional
appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job."
If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with
"Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication
device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason
to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.
CONFIDENTIAL
SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS
It has emotional appeal.
We need him more than ever.
He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better,
so we still need him.
He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.
We need him more now than we needed him before.
He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.
It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.
It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking
over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do
of his past record.
I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.
It means we need him more than ever. He ain't going to do anything
in the next four years anyway.
I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there
are the things
that he's planning for the future and why
change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still
there.
We do need him if he will finish the job he started.
I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You
don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I
think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and
can go from there.
Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name --
when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is,
what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his
name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because
the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Videotape Capability and
McGovern Documentary
At Peter Dailey's suggestion we now have a cassette video-
tape machine for you to view the three documentaries, 1701
spot advertisements when they are developed, and the 23-
minute McGovern biography. By having this cassette facility
in our office, the Signal videotape system (Channels 2 and 6)
will not have to be used, assuring security.
Your television has been prepared to use the system and you
might want to try it on the McGovern biography, which Chapin,
Higby and I believe you should watch.
The McGovern biography was prepared by Guggenheim. Buchanan
does refer to the biography in his McGovern memoranda.
Buchanan is anxious to see the biography.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRETIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
McGovern Documentary and Spots
The 23-minute McGovern documentary and spots used in
California are on the Signal videotape system. Chapin,
Higby and I have watched the documentary and recommend
that you also watch it.
At 1701 Magruder and Dailey's November Group say the
documentary yesterday in New York. Mitchell will see
the McGovern documentary next week when he returns from
California.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern Debates
and the Democratic Premary
Results In California
Question:
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey
and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from
the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote.
Conclusion:
The Hart Survey in the Post found that 538 of the Democrats
saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16%
thought Humphrey won, 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's
voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought
he won.
Finch, Colson, Dent, Magruder/La Ruse, Safire, Tester,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased
Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.
Analysis:
Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the
debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and
McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch,
Dent, Buchanan).
The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out
of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had
a large audience, the California media began emphasizing
Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).
- 2 -
The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to
his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions.
However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly
constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire,
Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).
Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also
considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was
wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and
he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been
larger.
A more detailed analysis is attached as well as the original
memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper
reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.
GS/jb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern
Debates and the Democratic
Primary Results in California
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and
McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters'
projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue,
Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses
(attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in
light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at
least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey
won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and
30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich
surveys are also attached.
Finch believes:
1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was
patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has tradi-
tionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But,
there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the
election, McGovern had a clear lead probably 10 points --
over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face
value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went
over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.
2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
2
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain
costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme
positions taken by the S outh Dakota Senator.
3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be
interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air.
He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War
issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New
Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact
on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress
Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed
HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her
visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange
Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he
"wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and
leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California
jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics,
although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's
vulnerability in the "Three A's" Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
Dent believes:
1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions,
especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat
primary closer in California than expected.
2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of
the HHH atacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced
more by HHH in the closing days.
3
3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's
positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One
in five found the debates important in voting, the majority
of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of
McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense
spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed
disapproval here.
4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out
of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos.
This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout"
views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean
that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better
informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than
ever black and brown vote.
Safire believes:
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern
won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered
Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48%
no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should
expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since
McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie
(too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or
Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is
now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 the man
who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with
the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal
opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in
his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and
columnists we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing
to his fade-out at the end.
2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher
issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's
softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not
vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say
they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against
Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.
4
3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern
keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic
voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two
weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions
because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's
clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected
because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the
purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.
Buchanan believes:
1. The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the
Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was
larger than twenty points.
2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off his attacks primarily
on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give
aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey
stridency and panicky approach he must have sufficiently
frightened many people to convince 300, 000 to come his way.
This I believe explains it coupled with:
(a)
The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH,
which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks
on McGovern as a radical; and
(b)
The surfacing in the California press of increasing
numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an
extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.
3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over
Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went
from 26% to 40% in a week so, did McGovern really lose any
votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats
and pick up all the undecideds as well by scaring the hell out of
them?
5
Teeter believes:
1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to
Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of
voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey
prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the
undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When
they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition
to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique
and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign
was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort
than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the
undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about
the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field
poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field
poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters
would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those
positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided
voters back to Humphrey.
Colson believes:
1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both
candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and
vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost
debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because
of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern
did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary.
He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some
extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern
looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that
to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate,
the debates had a significant effect.
6
Magruder and LaRue believe:
1. Although neither the public nor the media ever
declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial
damage was done to McGovern. The media began to
emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then
occupied the least advantageous position in the political
arena that of being on the defense. He spent the next
several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey
kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians.
Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point
while McGovern had begun saturation.
2. The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey
in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept
questioning the economic impact the McGovern Défense cut
would have on the working man of California. Again the
results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave
maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters
considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote.
The majority of those who relied on the debates favored
Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against
Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate
because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey
received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received
one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote
would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift
to McGovern and 20% is undecided.
Moore believes:
1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting
for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.
2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:
(a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence
by McGovern workers and greater effort by
Humphrey workers.
(b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure
for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously
7
indicating over-confidence and taking
California for granted.
(c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey
has a knack for a strong finish. On the last
two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously
up and down the state with good T.V. coverage,
while McGovern was absent.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old
rule - if ahead, don't debate -- applies. As to specific recommen-
dations:
1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming
radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken
T.V. manner will destroy the label;
2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands
without Presidential involvement;
3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific
attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET
JOURNAL ad to students;
4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and
scare the hell out of the voters;
In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern
results are:
1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico
and Houston indicating he took California for granted;
2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;
3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out
Humphrey voters.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Date: WASHINGTON 6/12
To As_
From :
L. Higby
The the/ bour abould beclase
on Julia 67
theories, not people -
How may baun example
are there?
L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern
drop of fifteen points:
a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a
source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread,
which was larger than twenty points.
b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on
defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of
McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency,
and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many
people to convince 300, 000 to come his way. This I believe explains
it coupled with:
1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended
to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical;
and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers
of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who
will sink the whole ticket, etc.
What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George
McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at
least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they
are not firm impressions.
What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey
got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40%
in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH
simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the
undecideds as well by scaring the hell out of them.
Buchanan
McGovern 'Weakness'
Located in Voter Poll
By JACK ROSENTHAL
The debates appeared to be
New York Times News Service
unimportant, however, com-
LOS ANGELES Substan-
pared with the substance. And
tial voter displeasure with his
positions on defense spending
the single most damaging sub-
reductions and welfare re-
stantive point for McGovern,
form appeared to have cut
according to the survey, was
deeply into Sen. George Mc-
this proposal to recalculate-
Govern's margin of victory
and sharply reduce-the na-
in Tuesday's California presi-
tion's defense budget.
dential primary.
Among all voters, more than
This was the major conclu-
a third expressed strong dis-
sion of a survey of 570 Dem-
ocratic voters as they left the
agreement with this proposal.
Among those who voted for
polls in 11 counties. The sur-
candidates other than McGov-
vey was conducted by the
New York Times and Daniel
ern, the disapproval rate rose
to two-thirds.
Yankelovich, Inc., a major
social and market research
concern.
The McGovern positions be-
came a focus of attack from
his principal rival, Sen. Hu-
bert H. Humphrey of Minne-
sota, notably in three na-
tionally televised debates be-
fore the election.
EVENING STAR 6/8/72
Proposal Ridiculed
In those debates, Humphrey
sharply assailed his South
Dakota opponent's call for a
reduction in defense spending
to $55 billion and ridiculed
his proposal to grant a $1,000
allowance to every needy
American.
As the debates began, the
statewide California poll con-
ducted by Mervin D. Field
reported that McGovern held
a 20-point margin over Hum-
phrey. In the final election
returns, McGovern came out
5 points ahead, totaling 45
percent of the Democratic
vote.
Field blamed "voter volatil-
ity" yesterday for the discre-
pancy. He told United Press
International the undecided
voters, who were listed at 13
percent in the poll a week be-
fore the primary, probably
had decided on Humphrey.
Field also said the poll,
taken a week before the pri-
mary, "created an unprece-
dented impact on the cam-,
paign itself. We have not wit-
nessed in the 26 years we have
been polling in this state any-
thing like the attention it re-
ceived in the media."
One in Five
The Times-Yankelovich sur-
vey suggested that one voter
in five found the debates im-
portant in deciding which can-
didate to vote for. The major-
ity of these voters turned to
Humphrey. This appears to
have raised the Minnesotan's
proportion of the vote by sev-
eral percentage points.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Some Lessons of the California Primary
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won
by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New
Hampshire because he got "only" 48% no such bad luck for McGovern.
Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner
help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters
than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously
charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly,
McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 --
the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press.
Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel,
Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash,
however newsmags and columnists we can do a lot to slow his
momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.
2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler.
Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey. HHH broke
even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would
have gotten most of hers.
3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here
probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast.
We should study closely what HHH did with the Jews in California the
last two weeks; I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate
because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote
against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately
would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant
in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in
vote patterns. and is a subject we should do a lot of thinking about. A
-2-
survey of the Jewish vote in the California primary -- depth stuff --
would be money well spent.
4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern key-
word. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became
disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had
their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because
of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that.
One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his
positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a
virgin.
I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to
neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and
concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of
leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of
his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic
appeal comes from "honesty" if we can dramatize and ridicule the
McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.
One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Commitee
for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-
sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in
which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says
that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in
quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to
Wall Street: Not to Worry. 11 Then, in the margins around the re-
printed ad, write in the McGovern quotes that sharply conflict with
what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two.
Message on the back: "Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern
but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in
areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course,
would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that
is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.
Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about
"disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with
F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern's neck like an
-3-
albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it
in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum:
the story about maybe George ain't the man he's cracked up to be.
We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."
I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT ASD
SUBJECT:
Analysis of California Primary
Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially
welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat
primary results closer in California than projected by polls
and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with Cali-
fornia leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York
Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a tele-
phone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.
Most feel the Field Poll has never been too accurate. It
showed a 20-point lead. McGovern claimed his poll showed 16.
Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his
dime and hit harder.' He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.
The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a mini-
mal impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go
more for HHH.
The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but
pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the
closing days. One of 3 voters said they decided on their candi-
date in the last 3 weeks. HIIH carried these 5-4.
Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates.
They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said
even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won
and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.
Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense
and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important
- 2 -
in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich
says this raised HHH's vote by several points.
The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drasti-
cally reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than
1/3 expressed disapproval here. Among those voting for someone
other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to 2/3.
HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put
Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and
Lyn Nofziger agree, especially Nofziger.
Newsmen who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob
Novak, and Bob Semple.
An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the
black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could
mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through
the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the
more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed,
since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black
and brown vote.
Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin
a steady "drip, drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and
keep it going til election day.
Contacts with other Californians confirm the view that HHH's
attacks helped.
The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap.
Here are other factors:
1) McGovern peaked too soon.
2) Polls gave sympathy to HIIH and caused labor and others to
work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than
McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and IIIIH acted and
- 3 -
talked like the President.
4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to
leftist extremism.
5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.
6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on
Monday.
RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates, et al, begin
the "drip, drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential
involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited
and used.
lican
Committee.
June 8, 1972
To:
Harry Dent
From:
Ed DeBolt
Re:
Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern
Debates on the California Primary
As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division
has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by
Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern-Humphrey debates.
During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fer-
nando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and
contacted. The results were as follows:
Number of registered Democrats contacted
112
Number voting
77
Number that did not view at least one debate
51
Number influenced by debates
3
Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the
sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated
that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and
that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.
Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown
of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.
The results of the survey and an analysis follow.
KHU RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS
A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted
on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal
effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the
poll indicated that only 6! of those surveyed even watched any of the
debates and of those that did only 3 said these debates influenced
their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering
that Neilsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew
the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker
stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California
tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")
In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey
was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%).
If the debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in
the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did con-
tribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overcon-
fidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of
the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period
to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as
California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic
governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an addi-
tional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote
was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have
been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California
primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.
Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in
the final days of the campaign must have come from undectried voters.
According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and
black - - groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support.
Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product
of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's cam-
paign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor
does our survey indicate that l'umplirey's blasts at McGovern played a
decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for
Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early
in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy).
As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have
gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after
having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with
McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive
attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.
CONCLUSION
The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of
the Denocrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a
decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other
factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending
in the closing days by the McGoverr campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey
gaining ground while Retiovern heid the 45 attributed to him by the Field
Corporation pull it week before the election.
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY RESULT
Date of Survey: June 8, 1972
Actual Democratic turnout: 72%
True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) If 57%
I.
Question: Are you a registered Democrat?
Yes
No
Total
112 (53%)
98 (47%)
( If a registered Democrat, ask following question )
II.
Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?
Yes
No
Total
77 (68%)
35 (32%)
( If answer is yes, ask following questions)
III.
Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?
Total
Humphrey
33
McGovern
29
Wallace
5
Other
10
IV.
Question: When did you make up your mind to vote for the Democrat
candidate of your choice
a month or more ago;
two weeks ago; or one week ago?
Humphrey
McGovern
Wallace
Supporters
Supporters
Supporters
One month or more
25
14
4
Two weeks
4
11
1
One week or less
4
3
0
V.
Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between
the Democrat candidates?
Total
All 3
9
1 2
33
None
35
VI.
Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect
your decision in voting in the California primary?
Humphrey
McGovern
Voters
Voters
Yes
1
2
No
32
27
Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825
Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216
Republicans-1,145,172
Unidentified- 215,437
Sample
N = 210
Women = (D) = 73
D = 112
Men = (D) = 49
R = 75
I = 23
*
Committee for the Re-election of the President
DETERMINED TO AN
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
ADMINIST
E.C. 12353, Section 1.1
CONFIDENTIAL
By now NARA, Date 4/6/95
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
California Primary
This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the
effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of
voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely
based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New
York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have
collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the
important points:
1. I doubt that there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey,
rather I suspect there were a large number of voters who were
originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and tem-
porarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign.
When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to
Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively
unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more
obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have con-
tributed to the shift to the undecided category. This is a phenom-
enon I have seen in other elections where a new "rising star" was
running against an older, well-known established political figure.
The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the
election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the
undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to
the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates also seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions.
Apparently many of these views were unpopular with the Humphrey
voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews). This pro-
bably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.
3. McGovern outspent Humphrey in the media by a considerable margin,
while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised
a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. This expos-
ure came shortly after the Field poll was conducted and at the time
when the shift back LU Humphrey was occurring.
1
-2-
4. While I have not had a chance to study the turnout figures,
the active business-labor campaign against the environmental pro-
position may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people
who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey
voters. This is supported by the Yankelovich survey which found
that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the
proposition while a large majority of McGovern supporters voted
for it.
5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving
Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among
McGovern supporters, although I doubt that this effect was very
great.
We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study
which we are starting next week which should give us some insight
into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
California Primary
I believe the debates had a very significant effect. As I indicated
in earlier memoranda, both candidates lost. Humphrey because
he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because
he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of
his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
I am sure that the Field poll was off, as was the ABC poll and
that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the
primary. On the other hand, I suspect he had better than the
5 point margin by which he won. He peaked early plus the fact
the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in
the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and
I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan
for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect.
I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates
but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My
reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally begin-
ning to gain momentum in the closing days on thatissue with the
blue collar workers.
The New York Times' Yankelovich survey today is very revealing
on this point (attached).
:
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Thursday, June 8, 1972
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Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
By
ADH
4/6/95
June 8, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDE
SUBJECT:
Impact of California Debates
Background
The California debate between McGovern and Humphrey served as
a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between
the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have a
large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey
to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing
defense spending to $55 million and welfare reform to grant a
$1000 allowance to all needy Americans. Although neither the
public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the
debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media
began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied
the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of
being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying
to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This
was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid
commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
The second debate, viewed in prime time, presented Humphrey in a
much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the
economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working
man of California. In order to dramatize his point, Humphrey asked
McGovern "What do you plan to do with the air bases in California -
make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were
a toss-up. But the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's
attack. Humphrey continued to campaign furiously throughout
California receiving good press coverage with the attacks.
CONFIDENTIAL
:-
- 2 -
The third debate I generally a wash-out because, with five
participants, neit major candidate was allowed enough time
to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension
by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern
by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.
Analysis
The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched
at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the
surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut
winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern
won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off,
and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters
thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern
voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.
The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three
voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three
weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted
for Humphrey.
The Yanklevich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered
the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority
of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.
The Yanklevich Survey also indicated that more voters voted
against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters
preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent.
Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator
McGovern received one third. It is very probable that the debates
triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for
the first time was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's
programs.
CONFIDENTIA
- 3 -
Conclusion
It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern
on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-
organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably
peaked several days before the election. It is difficult
however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's
surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:
1. The impact of the California poll may have
spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency
in the McGovern camp.
2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as
well coordinated as the voter identification
canvass.
3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-
ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9
and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter
spent over one million dollars in an anti Proposition
9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the
latent Humphrey support to the polls.
4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days,
while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston
to the Governor's conference.
CONFIDENTIAL
**
THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dictated by phone
WASHINGTON
from Los Angeles)
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON-SIRICHAN
FROM:
RICHARD MOORE
Seems unlikely that debates by themselves were major factor
in difference between field poll and final results. Field
poll was taken May 30 and 31 and released June 1. Poll
consisted of 857 completed phone calls to self-identified
Democratic voters.
Note, however, that first debate where Humphrey was
on the attack and generally considered most effective had
already taken place when poll was taken and second debate
took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the
third debate which included Yorty and Shirley Chissom
took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los
Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate,
13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings
in other California cities probably somewhat higher
but still each debate was probably not seen by 80%
of the voters. Reasons given by various observers
here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and
actual difference of only 5% include the following:
1. Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern
workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his
departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday
hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and
taking California for granted.
3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a
knack for a strong finish. On last two days,
Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State
with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.
- 2 -
4.
Nofziger reports that ^l Barkan, political person from
COPE, came into State during last two weeks and the
labor effort appoors to have been effective in closing
days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey
carried.
Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal
voters who might not otherwise have voted.
Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be
defective in commerical marketing, it has spotty record
in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.
My total impression is that debates did help by generating
word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the
important factor was McGovern's departure.
Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman
Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's
China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging
news from Orange County.
***
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ED HARPER
FROM:
ROY D. MOREY
SUBJECT:
Predictions VS. Results in
the California Democratic
Primary
Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated
California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McGovern was favored by
46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The
final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44. 2
percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.0 percent
write-in and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons
for Humphrey's better than predicted showing, lets first look at the
primary results.
The Results
Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results
in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48),
San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and
Santa Clara (95-60).
Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472)
but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange
(83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).
Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart
Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had
been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in
previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%.
In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from
72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's
popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from
13% to 36%.
2
The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern
is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than
two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin.
Humphrey scents to have increased his suburban strength (29% up
to 43%) at the expense of core city support.
Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior
set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters
classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part
for his strength in surburban Los Angeles County.
McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to
24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives
he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern
had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in
California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey,
and only 3% better among the women.
A Last Minute Shift?
There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better
than predicted Humphrey showing: The McGovern decision to leave
the state the day before the election; a last minute sympathy vote for
Humphrcy; McGovern's position on the issues as exposed in the
television debates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While
there is insufficient data to assess each of these theories, there is
some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the
television debates in influencing voter decisions.
It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed
in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during
the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult
to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%)
watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there
was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came
out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the
debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much
evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either
insuring a McGovern victory or in decreasing his winning margin.
There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for
the better than predicted Humphrey showing. First is the matter of
voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California
3
primary in particular. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that
public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather
than general elections.
More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward
Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before
the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll
and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was
especially true among older voters who made up a majority of
the undecided group. The Hart poll conducted for the Washington
Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make
up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that
Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.
In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually
decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey.
Humphrcy picked upmore of these nominal Wallace supporters than
did McGovern.
Weighing the Results
In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one
should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only
67% of California's 5. 1 million Democrats turned out for this election
as compared with the 73% turn out in the 1968 contest between
Kennedy and Hartke.
We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a represent-
ative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As
Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political
Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections
differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The
Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent,
better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background.
They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there
were a few voter group reversals for McGovern from his experience
in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended
to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.
Among voters with incomes over $15,000 he did as well as he has in
other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated
and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among
those who classified themselves as liberals.
4
The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment)
were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey
supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction
between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey
supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his
stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters
tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal
income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction
drawn in voter's minds seem to be more a matter of style than
substance.
Judging from the success McGovern had with the more affluent
and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence
to support the contention that those with incomes above $15, 000 were
scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income
redistribution scheme.
This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express
their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the
successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will
have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general
election. In'the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment
on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of
the Presidency.
cc: Bradford Rich
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Impact of the "Debates" on the
Democratic Presidential Primary
in California
The question has been raised as to whether the three
"debates" were in large part responsible for Humphrey's
highly improved showing on June 6 in California.
Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in
California on and off throughout the period involved, the
answer is unequivocally: Yes!
Two points need to be made before a discussion of the
debates themselves. First, the Field poll showing McGovern
with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest.
As you know, in the past Field has traditionally "over-
sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is
no question but that at a point approximately two weeks
prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably
somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over
Humphrey,* and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if you accepted the Field
poll at face value, it would have to be argued that the
13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey an unheard
phenomena.
The following comments relate only to the first two debates
since the third discussion, which included Yorty, Chisholm,
and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.
While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs
of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions
taken by the South Dakota Senator.
- 2 -
In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not
have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had
a more confident air. He did separate himself from
McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly
appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal consti-
tuencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
In my opinion, the third discussion, with the five
participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar
way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong
defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day
before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility,
picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
It seems to me that Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles,
San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin
Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox
New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on
defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to
have scored well with Catholics although he probably did
not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in
the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
As the Los Angeles Times reported:
McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco,
Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others,
and this more than made up for the beating he
took from Humphrey in Los Angeles, Orange and
San Bernardino counties.
McGovern cut into Humphrey's strength in the
black communities but preliminary figures showed
he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-
Americans nor with some suburban voters.
A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts --
No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent
Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. -- covering
different economic groups showed Humphrey winning
by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.
A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate,
Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey
beating McGovern 54% to 33%.
- 3 -
McGovern staffers said the decision to go into
the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut
into campaign time which had been allocated to
the blue-collar areas.
As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts
-- two in the Watts area and two in Willowbrook --
showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.
The final point to me would be that care must be utilized
in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern
as a "flaming radical. Rather, it can be argued that
he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that
North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once
we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters.
In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out. "
The reason this is important is that he does come across
on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy
sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance
belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements
and programs.
*
Charles Kerch prediction
Actual results
Field Poll
(week of May 28)
(May 30-31)
McGovern
54%
45%
46%
Humphrey
26%
40%
26%
Wallace
9%
5%
8%
Muskie
4%
2%
1%
Chisholm
3%
4%
2%
Yorty
2%
1%
1%
Jackson
2%
1%
1%
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
Survey of California Voting
Mc Govern: New Constituency
By Haynes Johnson
nucleus of the Humphrey strength in
Govern among blue-collar workers by
Washington Pos: Staff Writer
other contests-the blacks, the poor,
a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.
LOS ANGELES. June 7 --- Although
the urban dwellers. the blue-collar
(MeGovern's principal pollster, Pat
George MetGovern did not win the
workers. the ethnics-deserted him in
Caddell, estimated that McGovern took
California primary by the landslide the
California.
polisters had projected, Democratic
47 or 48 per cent of the state's black
The most striking evidence of Me-
voters in the nation's largest state
Govern's broader appeal came in two
vote to 43 per cent for Humphrey and
handed him another kind of vietory:
voting groups. the blacks and the blue-
that he picked up 57 per cent of the
for the first time this year he has
collar workers. In previous primaries
Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Hum-
emerged as the cundidate with the
Humphrey had been getting anywhere
phrey. But Caddell said Humphrey
most broadly bewed constituency.
from 70 to 80 per eent of the black
seemed to have won the Jewish vote
in other primaries his strength was
vote.
by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won
concentrated :.. the young voters at-
Humpbrey also had been running
the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)
fluent suburbannes and liberals. Me-
about 2-10-1 ahead of McGovern among
The Hart survey, of 847 voters in 26
Govern basically hebithat constituency
blue-collar workers.
counties throughout the state. also
yesterday. and FIN subsidicantly netter
1 survey by Hart Research Asso-
turned up other evidence of McGov-
among noters who previously had been
cintes conducted for The Washington
orn's increasing acceptance among di-
the strendest supporters of his op-
verse elements of registered Demo-
Post showed Humphrey actually losing
ponent. Hubert Humplarey
the black vote by 2 percentage points
crats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-
These voters who had formed the
in California and running behind Mc-
- 2 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY
Govern by 61 to 31 per cent
What is intriquing about
for Humbhrey.
California-and unanswera-
In other words, people
his at this state-is how the
who were undecided tended
incomes
polls erred SO badly here.
to be more influenced by
the
McGovern came into elee-
Humphane than M Govern
evenly discled the i.
ton day seemingly headed
in in clusing days of the
Previousl: Dennyr
for a landslide victory. The
election.
nia. and %
respected California Poll
Phe television debates are
incles :- Butt Past 0.00
conducted by Mervin Field
less conclusive.
showed Humbbrow running
showed him ahead by 20 per-
Hume 53 por cent of all
anywhere from 2
centage points. But as they
Demecratic voters in the
1 over McGovern in :....
have demonstrated all year
state, reoresenting well over
in the privacy of the voting
enterory.
a Mullion persons. said they
booth, citizens refused to be
Finally, II
but watched at least one of
catalogued in advance of the
standing urban vit
the three TV encounters.
election.
ers plainmeted in Califor
Bin despite such wide expo-
Various Theories Offered
nia. in Cultornia the under
sure. neither candidate re-
vote represents 1.
There are any number of
used a clear signal of sup-
the potential Democrs
theories being advanced to
and based on the way he
electronate Yesterday Union-
explain the fur-better Hum-
over the set
please took only 27 per
phrey final vote: that the in-
When asked which candi-
N that In Pent. :-
tensely personal nature of
date was the winner, the cit-
11 by contrast. he pad
his campaigning against the
zens responded this way:
home 48 31 of the
odds spurred a last-minute
Sixteen D. cent of all
urban vote and in Ohio he
sympathy vote: that Mc-
Democratic voters thought
Govern's position on specific
Humplines came out ahead
insues, including income re-
accomeras maram CARD
Seventeen per cent said
distribution and cuts in de-
McGovern.
from 23 per cent of the "r.
bun vote in Pennsylvania 10
fense spending. cast new
Twenty 140" cent thought
doubt on his candideer: that
32 per cent in California.
the debates were a stand-
tite television debates caused
off.
Suburban Vote Divided
2. significant switch to Hum-
And the remainder didn't
The key to the eloseness
phrey.
watch.
of the Calitornia vote invoice
None of these can he veri-
The same kind of incon-
cally lies in the and and
fied with any accuracy.
clusive breakdown a me
hat had been the
They remain theories.
among these who voted for
or George MeGos the
The Hart survey data
either McGovern or Hum-
-nburbs. The two e
does. however, cive c'ues to
phrev.
wided that vote
what was taking place as the
Of these who backed
and in the
evertion !. Veters
Humbliney on Tuesday, only
wakes up nec. of 1.12
were asked 1965 made
30 cent thought he was a
"emderatic electrice
up the mines to support (if.
Hear-cut winner 111 the de-
In Pennsylvania Humair
ther Humbre or No
bates. Of those who voted
PCN had earcied = ..... error
Govern. One or of the
for McGovern. the same THE
". the suburban voie to Vic-
voters said they necided on
ure of 30 per cent Cave their
Covern's $. :a Calliernia,
their candidate within the
man the clear edue.
Jumpheey captured 43 per
last three weeks. or these
Marked by Disterness
0.00 of the suburban vote
voters. Humbre: best
while McGovern won 41 per
McGovern by a 5-10-4 mar-
The Hart results do cost
g.n.
li.ht on another element of
Sumpliney's strength was
critical importance to not
conventrated 111 one major
only Humphrey and Me-
area-sprowling Los An-
Govern, but to their party's
Leles County.
chances against Pacend
reating of Lite Califor-
Nixon in the tall. This-com-
nia returns tous BY
paign was marked 03 C cur-
shows have Me-
rent of hitterness, some-
Govern in estable
times muted. cometimes
li-hing as a cande
flaring into the new he-
date WILL with bel. leal PD.
tween the two senator: who
peal. standment
have be time :: J.IS
his publicit
in Washington.
the time. months
DATE which 11.
unded entelle
date who could not First
above To DEC cent in the na-
tional polis.
- 3 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
Oi election day. that bit-
In other states. the issues
terness was most notably ex-
of inflation or taxes ranked
McGovern maintained his
pressed by the Headby
high. but the California Yes.
position among young vot.
reters. Almost et
er.; were saving yesterday
ers. liberals, the more afflu-
who voted for
that their oconomic
ent and among professional
said they would and Mr.
lems are more acute and
groups.
Ninon if McCovern :- THE
more dentary of solution.
In California, as in other
mocratic miner in Nov.
Tense 199 concerns. the
primaries, in took better
ember Amenz
WAY and the economy. will
than 70 per cent of voters
supporters, however, two
probably deminate the ac-
between the ages of 18 and
out 0. ren and the would
tual presidential campaign.
24. With voters earning
back Humparez sins
When it comes to distin-
more than $15,000 a year, he
the Democration instion
guishing between the two
did as well in California as
next months No. Brden.
reading Democratic candi-
in other states.
But a 10 per cent of
dates. mere is little in voter
Among voters classifying
the delie Volves -hid
responses to distinguish
themselves as liberals. Me-
they would no participate
them. A majority of the
Govern received two out of
at all a THE
"Tumphrey voters said thes
three of the balots cast. In
election if the choices are
thought he would honorably
the professional-executive
the same 03 four years 320
end the war. Only two other
category of voters, Mc-
-andlar Humphre%-Nrton
issues were strongly asso-
Govern received a clear-cut
mater.
crated with Humphrey in
majority. running more than
Impliet in these findings
their minds. These were his
2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.
is potentially periton
positions on full equality for
In a political season of
ation forms the Democratic
blacks and on tax reform.
contradictions and confu-
Party. They rase THE pros-
For McGovern. two out of
sion. these elements among
per of 3 party SQ Maliy di-
three of his supporters men-
the voters retrained con-
vid. THAT the Republicans
tioned his call for immedi-
stant factors. There was one
could ... returned to office
ate withdrawal of American
group in the California elec-
as result.
troops from Vietnam. And
torate. though. that defied
On the surface that is
almost half cited his stand
the standards set in other
come **** for the
on guarantee.net a minimum
primaries.
Pressent But
income for the poor. About
McGovern had been doing
a careful qualification has
40 per cent mentioned his
consistently better among
to 60 mided to that Jua-
tax reform
women voters all across the
Uon.
The votors seemed to per-
country. The Hart survey
In trial heats among Dem-
ceive the men in different
yesterday turned up yet an-
current : They,
ways. Met. 'ven supporters
other contradiction to the
bown computer and Me.
were more inclined to stress
political norm.
Govern secred substantial
his stand on specific issues
In California George
viewores WHEN pittel inco-
McGovern ran significantly
to-face advinst Mr. Newa.
than RS personal qualities,
better amore men than
The flure for Humpt Day
while the Humphrey back-
women, holdin" a 15-point
was one cent to Mr. Nix-
ers spoke more about their
man's personality. his speak-
suread over Humphrey
on's 21 per cent. McGovern
11:22 ability. has warmth and
among men hut only 3 per
termed the Presider by 36
cent among women.
to cent.
sincerity,
Whether that is an indica-
Findings Contirmed
Support of Ebterly
Bob of further change in a
The confirm the find-
In only one segment of
changing eleviorate or
inzs of other mublish wills
the voting segulation did
merely a quirk of California
this work that showed Vic.
Humphrey the
no one can sav. Even the
Gen: to healthg Mr. Newn
strength he has donton-
polisters won't venture an
one call Chisterria S.
strated in other primaries.
opinion of why that is SO.
San 20. this
Voters ased in and over.
has withings
and these are retired,
This story is based on inter-
the AM
violes conducted for The
gave inm a Described 2-to-1
the by 00
martin-over
Wishington Po in 11, it. Re.
1:00 and 1963.
such Associates of Wash-
His Californa consti-
way.
becaus The Day inter-
fuence WE marked by an-
the strentsh 61 the
847 Califor: voters
6th assess 1.00
Protent in his nraive
in 26 of the 58 coun-
than hall of sorms class
the There noting represent
sitit !11, converv-
2 0: the corential
card
allows That PM
11. speratic clearance in Call.
Colifornia, as "
in street showing
Tie notor: con-
:
is A. CORDS
consent 0
offer
sulemban Palifor-
But
belled Treatmen's
meand James South
dection.
em ..11
of the sugurits want 10010
one
these in of
street
the common.
1..1 12
1,1
01 paramement
more conservance.
reped.
importance.
of
received
realary
- 4 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
4-Primary Record
of Rivals' Strength
B7 a Washington
LOS ANGELES, June T-The changing nature of the
McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the
following table. based PI! volor surveys conducted in
four presidential primores by Hart Research Associates
for The Washington P
P.
Vania
Only
Maryland
California
25
May 2
May 16
June 6
Urban Voters
"
%
Humbursy
:-
53
48
27
McGovern
25
34
13
52
Suburban Voters
Humphrey
29
33
22
43
McGovern
45
49
37
41
Workers
Humerlary
4.1
54
33
38
MeGovern
19
35
16
46
Blacks
Humplarey
72
80
67
34
MeGovern
13
16
12
36
Low-Incesse Voters
Humplarey
44
59
34
42
McGovern
20
32
12
42
I
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
Structy: Defections
Indianly 23 McGovern
By JACK ROSENTHAL
TOS ANGELES. June S - S A one out of every six California
of VOIDE D. merats (Mr. Humphrey not
Sension Hubert to per cent of the vote in the
in California sold D. meratic primary Tuesdays.
: 2 that if Senntor :: is significantly higher than
Beorge :: Covern won the the rate measured in any Ci the
Democratic indention. they four previo- 1.1 primary election
their pally and surveys conducted by The
Nitzon in Titles and the Ya delovich re-
November.
search concern.
Accordin to a cross-section The California survey was of
sur missied 4.2 prister a scientide sampling of 570
cap here :... The New York VITERS in 11 counties who were
That and D nicl Y. akelovish, interviewed as they left the
Insurance ) P.P control Hum- 3 R. The total included an
arey was ser they would oversumpting of 56 black
defect to the President in a VOLOCA
worn race.
The Humplirey defection rate
Another 10 cent say they contrasted markedly with that
would the by Mr. McGovern among McGovern voters. If
2411.0 D nummer VIA Amator Huntribuy should win
1: mainder OF the nomination, fewer then 20
they
cent 01 the McGovern %
The 00 CARD defection
rate is to the on Continued on Page 18, Column 4
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
ere
ons
ce
fovern
Page
1.
Cel.
vilved 37
told
in
McGo
Wisconsin
CTS say
int
the Pre
23
a
not
ONE
The
ghtly more
compan
ters cc:
about in-
tion rate
a
Ham
Con
Senator
signs
more con-
ab
property
Tavor
nator Hum.
cated th.
Value
less
comerner
of McG
.On
which
about 13
war
ayed CR
ro'e in
more 3
productic
to
Wisconsin
George
of
Alabama
ti.>
than were VP
are
mon appeared
divide along
NY. For OK-
And.
Senstor
The
primer
more voters
time
idened
inflation fa-i
tively
conservative
in
of
So.
won his
who
would
McGovern.
me
concerned it out
the Callioron
campaign
pror
$ favored
to a close
the
lator Hu
haid to the South Dakotan's
Young more McGovern
CAn almost
proposals.
exactly equal
Senator
proportion-
res-of the
won
restructs
SHE
IDEV would
ering surport from
and TO
ort eith
voters
the
tor Modov-
dusing days of
It
subs:
to 8034
the car
or
His
Humplitey
and
the
awainst Pr.
Mixon in the
among
voters,
with
a
$1,000
November
dection.
13 to 24.
to its
cr-person
chamance
for
(If Senz
level of a
the
five
chrey were
nominated
The C:
one
that the
South
In
the
Florida
L
primary,
in 10
inc would del
coton
were
cent
C
rev
not to
all. About,
of this
voter
into
was a young
to
inst-time
13 00 24
NOTOS,
on
ju
Winconsin
(California
scrats AP-
about
n°
cent:
in
red not
on it came
580,000
his
cent,
and
Governor
a write-
margin
condidate
bout ball
Humber
California was
his
should at
about
Other S Hadings
be gn
place in the
S
of
Al 1.10
to
Were
the
time,
Mit in-
even co.
who
"dward M
d
heen
orma DE:-
draw
Senators
ton
N-
for
SIDET the
with
to the
mator Me-
SCOOOL
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
Times Study: Defections Face McGovern
Continued Front Page I, Col. C
statewide California Poll played an important role in
norted a 20-point McGovern Senator McGovern's Wisconsin
crs say they would defect to but in the final remins. Sena victory the two men appeared
the President.
300 McGovern wor by a 45-to- to divide about evenly.
To high Humphrey defec-
:0 cent margin.
For example. slightly more
Another sign of the compara-
voters concerned about in-
tien rate mind 2 series of
shert of rein
Sumphrey
flation favored Senator Mc-
was
the
Itss
Govern. Slightly more con-
among the Minnesota Senator's
supporters.
The
then
half
think
any
Democrat
cerned about high property
survey
cared they were less concerned
of
President
Nixon.
By
taxes favored Senator Hum-
about
the
Vietnam
war
and
control
two-thirds
of
McGov-
1.0n economic issues, which
ern voters think so. Among all
played an important role in
more sympathetic to Gov.
California Democratic voters,
Senator McGovern's Wisconsin
George C. Wallace: of Alabama
only a little over hall are opti-
victory, the two men appeared
than were McGovern voters.
to divide about evenly. For ex-
And, the "rvey indicated,
mistic about November.
Senator Humpliney's compara-
The vice from primary to
ample. slightly more voters
tively conservative positions
primary in the number of Hum-
concerned about inflation fa-1
vored Senator McGovern.
wor him growing support as
phrey loters who would not
Slightly more concerned about
the California campaign drew
support Senator McGovern par-
high property taxes favored
to a close.
allels the increasing attention
paid to the South Dakotan's
Senator Humphrey.
Young Support McGovern
CAn almost exactly equal
programs.
Senator McGovern won gath-
proportion-two-thinds-of the
These include restructuring
ering support from younger!
voters surveyed said they would
the defense budget and reduc-
voters in the closing days of
support either Senator McGov-
ing it substantially to $55-bil-
the compaign. His support
ern or Senator Humphrey
lion, and replacing the present
among first-time voters. aged
against President Nixon in the
welfare system with a $1,000-
18 20 24, jumped to its highest
November general election.
level of any of the five surveys.
per-person allowance for the
Olf Senator Humphrey were
The California survey showed
poor.
nominated, however. one young
that the South Dakotan wont
In the Florida primary, 25
voter in 10 said he would de-
about three-fourths this large
per cent of Humphrey voters
cide not to vote at all. About
black Translated into total
said they would prefer
Mr.lone voter in six was a young
Nixin to Senator McGovern in
first-time voter. aged 18 to 24.
votes. that would mean he won
In Wisconsin the
about 425,000 of an extimated
California Democrats ap-
580.00 with votes. His total
figure was 29 per cent; in
beared polarized when it came
Pennsylvania, 34 ner cent, and
to Governor Wallace, a write-
marain of victory over Senator
in Michigan. 22 per cent.
in candidate here. About half
Humphrey in California was
Other Survey Findings
thought his views should at
about 175,000.
least 11 given a place in the
Mounwhile, however. Senator
Aniong other findings of the
Democratic platform. At the
Humphrey appeared to make California survey were the fol-
same time, the other half fa-
on Patting goins mmong voters loviling:
vored ignoring-or even de-
who
were
Ilis
net
Henator McGovern strongly
not
g-him.
gam
of
about
30
whent
wed
his
showing
among
M
Senator Edward M.
cat
of
Sen-
bloos
former
immat-
Ken.
of Massachusetts been
atem
el
OV
Seaator
at
ite, he might have nar-
among
blacks,
older
adults
blue
nowler
the
California
pri-
servictive
and
voters.
But
the
Mc-
drawing
almost
equal
to Secator Hum Govern gains were somewhat numbers away from Senators
The ship attacks on Me- Hiset by Humplyey gains McGovern and Humphrey, Ai-
pronotals is versing sming younger and lowing for statistical error the
riters.
three nicn would have run with-
of
late
two men enpeared to in
percentage points of
parafiels
the
black
and
the
according
to
the
This
serveys,
the
the
a
at
im-
issue.
It
was
by
IT
V
was
cited
of
the
vot-
noter.ly, 37 of Senater Mc-
to. Cebates mist to experience in heavy support
Relection.
concerned
about
the
A week before the election,
Cn economic issues, which war.
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
Times Survey: Defections
In Party Face McGovern
By JACK ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times
LOS ANGELES, June S - A :one out of every six California
seriking proportion of voters Democrats (Mr. Humphrey got
ho supported Senator Hubert 40 per cent of the vote in the
24. Humphrey in California said Democratic primary Tuesday).
in a survey that if Senator It 15 significantly higher than
George McGovern won the the rate measured in any of the
Democratic nomination, they four provious primary election
would abandon their party and surveys conducted by The
Vale for Divesident Nixon in Times and the Yankelovich re-
November.
search concern.
According to a cross-section The California survey was of
survey conducted on primary a scientific sampling of 570
day here by The New York voters in 11 counties who were
Times and Daniel Yunkelovich, interviewed as they left the
Inc., about 40 per cent of Hum- polls. The total included an
phrey voters say they would oversampling of 56 black
defect to the President in a voters.
Nixon-McGovern race.
The Humphrey defection rate
Another 40 per cent say they: contrasted markedly with that
would stand by Mr. McGovern among McGovern voters. If
as the Democratic nominee. The Senator Humphrey should win
remainder are undecided or suy the nomination, fewer than 20
they would not vote.
per cent of the McGovern vot-
The 40 per cent defection
rate is equivalent to the loss of Continued on Page 18, Column 4
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Dinner Reservations at
the Kennedy Center
I regret to report that dinner reservations cannot be
made for either the Gallery or the Promended. Discussion
with Gilles Savin, who runs the restaurants at the
Kennedy Center for Canteen, and others at the Center
disclose that there is a very firm "no reservations" rule.
These two restaurants are strictly first come, first serve.
Mr. Savin emphasized that whatever the rule, there was no
side or back entrance to preclude standing in line. He
cannot hold a table either. According to Savin, the number
of Trustee and VIP requests for "special service" at these
two restaurants has been very high. He claims the rule
has not been violated in spite of all the requests.
To stand in line at the Gallery at 6:30 or 7:00 would
take 15-30 minutes according to Savin. At the Promenade,
which is a self-service, cafeteria-style restaurant, the
line will be 15-20 minutes at least.
To say that the food at the Promenade is undistinguished
would be charitable. At the Gallery it is fair -- the
Quiche Lorraine and House Wine are acceptable.
If you want to eat at Le Grande Scene, Pascal, the new
maitre'd has a reservation for you for 4 at 6:30-7:00.
Pascal has served you before and will have a good table.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gallup Surveys
Discussion with John Davies developed these interesting
points:
1) The next Presidential popularity figures will be
available June 25th based on field interviewing June 16-18,
2) The Gallup Survey for Friday, June 16, will show
that "the public does regard George McGovern as rather
liberal, but he's not a radical among the public in the
same sense as the columnists have painted his image". The
Republican Party has not been successful in pinning the
radical label on McGovern. Davies says that "in a sense
they (the Republican organization) are hitting a nerve
there (mainting McGovern radical) and it is a successful
campaign ploy, but at the same time, McGovern isn't seen
by the public to be radical";
3) The Gallup Survey for release Bunday, June 18
will show that the Republican share of the Catholic vote
today is higher than it has been since 1956. Davies says
that, "and a lot of that can be directly pinpointed to the
President's strong positions on aid to private education
and also abortion",
4) In asking Davies for more detailed information on
Wallace's vote as reflected in the June 9 release (McGovern's
Dramatic Gains Due to Independents), he mentioned that
Wallace's strengths were among Independents in the South,
the South generally, and among the younger non-college
segment of the population. Davies said the sample was too
small to permit more detailed cross-breaks,
- 2 -
5) Finally, Davies confirmed again that Gallup would
not conduct their annual Kennedy-Chappaquiddick poll in
spite of the recent Quayle poll in Harper's, and "independent"
letters to the New York Times, Apple and Wicker. Davies said
that the Wall Street Journal survey on Kennedy was the only
Kennedy/Chappaquiddick poll that would be done unless Kennedy
became the Democratic nominee.
GS/jb
:
PHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN DAVIES -- JUNE 13, 1972
D - Gordon, how are you?
G - Pretty good.
D - We've been having a little problem touching base here.
G - Oh yeah, back and forth. That happens.
D - I'm in and out of this place.
G - I wanted to thank you for letting us know about those releases
last weekend. They came as a very pleasant surprise to us.
D - Well, I wouldn't think it would be that much of a surprise.
G - Well, it's always a surprise to do that well. On a sort of
a further question on that, were popularity questions also taken
on that, Presidential popularity?
D - No, sir.
G - Nothing, huh? On either of those polls that were released,
either the May 26th or the
D - Right. The most recent popularity figure of course was the
61%.
G -- 61%. Nothing since then?
D - There'll be a popularity figure, we just sent a questionnaire
out as a matter of fact this morning that will be maturing,
let's see, on June 16, 17, 18. It will mature sometime about
the 23rd.
G - I see.
D - If you're desperately interested in the figures, be sure you
contact me before the 26th, because the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th
and the 1st of July I'll probably be in Memphis and Los Angeles
- 2 -
G - So you're out from the 26th to the 30th, huh? OK.
What are we releasing this week of interest?
D - We are releasing, let me check into those, we didn't send one
out yesterday. It's going out later today. I'll have to check.
I'll be right with you.
G OK.
D - In strictly public relations form, the story for Friday will
answer the question: "Has the Republican Party been successful
in pinning the Radical label on McGovern?" The answer is yes
and no. I don't have all the data in front of me so I can't
give you a specific reading on it, but yes the public does
regard George McGovern as rather liberal, but he's not as
radical as the columnists have, I mean, he's not known as
radical among the public in the same sense as the columnists
have painted his image.
G - I see. But the title is not "Has the Republican Party been
successful, is it?
D - You know, the Republican organization obviously in the last
2 or 3 months in the newsletters SO on and SO forth has tried
to paint George McGovern as a wild-eyed radical. In a sense
they are hitting a nerve there and it is a successful campaign
ploy, but at the same time, McGovern isn't seen by the public to
be as radical
G - I see, I see.
- 3 -
D - And the story for Sunday, I think, will be very interesting
to the President, particularly, because it shows that the
Republican share of the Catholic vote today is higher than
it has been since 1956.
G - That is interesting.
D - And a lot of that can be directly pinpointed to the President's
strong positions on aid to public, aid to private education and
also abortion.
G - Any regional breaks on that, I mean, is that abortion issue
D - Yes.
G - I see.
D - But I don't have anything yet. I probably won't until midday
tomorrow.
G - OK. We'd be very interested in that because as you know Catholics
are of considerable interest to US.
D - Absolutely.
G - One last question, if you've got another moment, John. On the
release for Friday, last Friday, June 9, it says, "McGovern's
dramatic gains due to Independents?"
D - Right.
G - In that last column, it says, "Wallace leads among Independent
voters"
D - That's correct.
G - And our question 1S, do you have some crossbreaks on where those
Independents are, are they in the South, or are they ?
***
- 4 -
D - They are primarily in the South, yes, but also among the younger
segment of the, the younger non-college segment of the population.
G - I see. Any further geographic break on those Independents that
are for Wallace?
D - Not at this point, no, no. The sample is rather small to permit
that kind of an analysis, but we can say that it is primarily
in the South and also among the Independents, particularly the
young Independents. Those of course non-college educated and
mostly the young people.
G - That is interesting for support level. One final question,
we have noticed that in Harpers ran a story on Chappaquidick
recently based on a Quail poll. Did you see that?
D - No, I didn't.
G - Yes, the most recent issue of Harpers has a whole series of
questions on the Chappaquidick incident done by a pollster
named Quail. I don't know how good he is.
D - He's terrible.
G - Is he?
D - Just between us, he's awful.
G - Well, whatever. It shows a sort of an interesting change.
They use something called a Trust Index, and slightly different
questions than the usual.
D - How do spell that Gordon? Truss?
G - No joke intended, huh?
D OK.
- 5 -
G - Anyway, I thought you might be interested in that.
D - Great, I sure would be and I presume you saw copies of the
Wall Street Journal survey on Kennedy.
G - Yes, I did.
D - That was also done by our organization.
G - Right, I know that.
D - How does that compare with what Quail found?
G - Oh well, Quail asked some different questions that indicate that
Kennedy's trust is up some. That sort of screwy questioning,
I don't know if that's your criticism of him as a pollster,
but
D - No, just the way
G - He asked some really crazy questions, like "44% agree that'in
my opinion EMK behaved immorally before his car went off the
bridge", "He has redeemed himself enough", while, you know, he
goes on and on. "70% were sure he didn't tell the whole truth
about what happened"
D - The one thing I don't think anyone has touched on and maybe
they did, maybe in the article, but many people now say that
you know that he has redeemed himself and that he didn't give
the whole story, well nobody has gone farther and asked "Well,
does that make any difference to you?"
G - Yes, right.
D - Now that's the important thing, the fact that they didn't think
he told the whole truth. I'm inclined to believe that the public
- 6 -
D - is a very forgiving people
...
G - I think so too. If you guys do run down on that, we'd be
fascinated of course.
D - I don't think we will. Of course if Kennedy should by some
chance get the nomination, then there' 11 be a lot of that
G - Sure.
D - There really is no license for it at this point. There is no
sense in kicking a dead horse.
G - No, No, OK. Well, I'll call you tomorrow afternoon if
you have some more breaks.
D - Very excellent. And I said, I'll probably be in Washington
on the 22nd
G - Look forward to seeing you.
D - I just may have those data at that particular point in time.
G - Good.
D - Maybe I'll stop by for a minute. I won't be able to stay long,
though.
G - Understand.
D - OK, sir.
G - Good, John.
D - Righto, bye, bye.
The Gallup Poll
For Release: June 9, 1972
Now Leads Among Democrats, Independents Combined
McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents;
allace Seen Winning Strong Sympathy Vote
By George Gallup
Conyright, 1972,
Wallace, however, is ahead of both
Field Enterprises, Inc.
men. winning the support of 31 per
dependents than among Democrats.
cent of Democrars and Independents
Even during the early period of the
combined.
March 24-27 31
5
17
primaries. M.Govern ran virtually even
A total of 661 Democrats and 489
III. Primary: March 21
with Humpbrey among this group. Fol-
A survey complete May
Independents, out of a total sample of
-- Fl.r. Primary: March 14
consistent N:
lossing the Massachusetts and Pennsyl-
1540 adv.its, 18 and older. were inter-
N. 11 Primary: March 7
stow Vi Goven
vania primaries, however, McGovern
viewed ID person in the falest survey
recorded a surce of popularity with
March 3.6 3:
6
Hea -0%
is
which was conducted May 26 to May
that M.
Independents from IS per cent to
29. This question was asked:
26 yet cent.
Choices of Independents
slowed drovent vario
Here is a liv of people who have
For 1972 Nomination
of 51 ,`c of Devependent 35%
This sharp optum for McGovern
been mentioned as possible press-
(from a list)
when ma did Name a
Independents occurred roughly
dentral candidates for the Democratic
late. com FOR to: Estra
one month after a similar jump among
Survey Dates:
party in 1972 ONE would
parey
Donocrats from 5 per cent to 17
111111 McGovern Wallace
you like to see ominated as the
per sent following the Wisconsin pri-
Democratic candadate for Pre sident
.:
maty.
in 19721
11
25
educated. termsome
The following tables show the trend
- Oregon Primary Man
Location
Wallace Leads Among
May 20-24
36
Independent Voters
Surveys Filere J
toten. M Govern holds all advantage
May are in
in support for Humplitey, McGovern
April 28
Cive Visitance 1-: AMA
over Humplex and Wallace in that
and Wallace among Independents and
among both Democrats and Indepen-
May
18
26
22
: 10 present
Democrats. Both survey dates and pri-
in
dent. be appeals far more to college-ed-
Man. Pa Primaries: April 25
we Avea of Humplitey has &
mary are given:
ind M.Goven with Independents It'
unated and higher income persons.
April 21-24
18
18
26
eats M. Wallace sparted a clear
These proups vote m greater proportions
Choice of Democrats
had of
(1) the primaries and work harder to
For 1972 Nomination
Will Primary: April 4
meang totors
supporters to the polls. Among
(from list)
March 24-27 16
15
21
it, plat H.
Do ocrats and In dependents with a
Surrey Date:
III. Panary: March 21
lloke of per we if baked this
college background, for example, Mc-
1111H McGovern Wallace
Fla. Primary: March 14
this stratey. it, ; er M.
Govern 15 preferred over Humphrey by
for
%
ci
a 3-10-1 margin.
%
N. H Primary: March 7
Govern and 10 per en for Heing Crey.
Walface
May 26-20
26
25
26
March 3-6
Warker has as registered Juns
II
II
23
McGovern Leads HHH
at long Democrats Jang
Hum
By Seven Points
Ore, Primary: May 23
WHENGE the
Trial Heats Show McGovern's
and of to c. going 1: 18 per cm
When the choices of Democrats and
- Md. Primare May 16
Strength with Independents
in cash May to 26 per cent it ti.
na.
Independents in the latest survey are
very
April 28.
McGovern's greater appeal than
est survey and 1% pow in a rad it
combined, McGovern emerges ahead of
May
is
20
18
Humplirey with Indepen lents is seen
with Hun phrey an \ alovers
Humpliney for the first time. He leads
Mass... Pa. Primaries: April 25
not only in his support among this
A national survey DOA underway will
Humplarey by the margan of seven per-
April 21-24 30
group for the nomination. but in test
determine what changes have in and
along
17
19
centage points, 26 per cenr to 19 per
races against President Nixon and Gov.
IR the na norwide an l-date standings
In-
cent.
Wis. Primary: April 4
ernor Wallace.
since the California primary.
The Gallup Poll
For Release: Sunday, June 11, 1972
McGovern Seen as Stronger Challenger than HHH
Nixon Holds Widest Lead to Date
Over McGovern and Humphrey
By George Gallup
Copyright, 1972,
Field Enterprises, Inc.
PRINCETON. N J.. June 12-Gov.
sharp
as
the
Sen Groree
Me
Presi-
their support to 25 per cent for Mc-
NIXED And
d...
over
Sept. '68 Results
Govern and 11 per cent for Humplirey.
and M Govern da.
Nixon Humphrey Wallace Trend
Match Today's
we of Nich's
Remarkably. the September, 1968
If Wallace
y-way-ra
;0
14.
Hum- Wal- Un
respons
Nixon plrey lace dec.
trial heat figures almost exactly match
Does Not Run
2-way 53
E
;
vality May.
:
%
%
2
those recorded i. the latest Nixon-
With many political observers of
1.
better
showing
Humphrey trial heat. Nixon
the opinion that " allace will not run
X
May 26 24)
13
26
22
9
that heats,
won ti.e support it 43 per cent in the
as a third party candidare das year. it
He trads Nic
April 28
earlier survey (of) pared to 28 per cent
is important to see where his vote would
3-way 43
20
22
4)
To
1**
cent.
May
15
34
15
6
for Humplirey and 21 per cent for
go in the event be does not enter the
2-way
nie
52
14
las behind Nixon
Wallace. with 8 per cent undecided.
race
April 21.21 14
37
16
9
The litest mul leas are 14
From that time however, the Wal-
(cit.
lace vote started fade. with bis losses
To determine this, registered voters
impersor BRIVINGS with
(carly May) trial
Wallace Vote
choosing Wallace were asked TO select
LINE interest
Itits New High
translating into grains for Humphrey
View
By election eve, . the Gallup Poll
between just the two major party can
samplet 15,0 and May
::
points
The latest findings indicate that a
didates in each of the two trial heats
.
indicated. Nixon and only a slim mar-
"synnative vote" may be operating for
the nation These
gin over Humpling.
Wallace following the May 15 attempt
Nixon Gains Most
COA the trued in
With Wallace Out
Mill
on his life.
Wallace Also Gains
(id-April with
NAME 1.1.1 RAF of
As Nomination Choice
The national findings show Nixon
Waller in haded as at
Wallace's current vote of 22 per cent
Nover ;... the
Wallace's gains in the latest trial
benefitting each of has two leading
carebolate
III a matching with Nixon and Hum-
J.M. (it (, V.G
heats (up seven points from the pre-
rivals. if Wallace is not in the pature.
phrey represents his highest score yet
Handy 31 to
Nivon McGovern Wallare Trend
Nixon would gain 10 points with
recorded His previous high of 21
vious test against Humphrey, up four
have and (...
...
W.W.
Un
Wallace out. while McGovern would
per cent was recorded during the presi-
versus McGovern) reinforce survey
Gateral like dr.
dential campaign in late September.
findings reported Friday. These show-
pick up only four points. The Presi-
all i and
:;
:
1968 His support steadily fell off
ed Wallace now shed with Humplirey
dent would gain mine points to only
and
11)
8
from then until the election when he
and McGovern as the top choice of the
six for Humphrey.
Saft TAX : .
won 13.6 per cent of the vote to 43.0
nation's Democrats for the nomination,
The following tables show the vote
which ordiante you
B
35
15
7
per cent for Humphrey and 43.4 per
and far ahead of his two rivals among
to the latest test runs, with and without
Name M.G N/A.
is
32
16
7
cent for Nixon.
Independents, winning 36 per cent of
Wallace:
phrey)?
Daires
June 8, 1972
HEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gallup Surveys
Discussion with John Davies this morning disclosed that
the Gallup release for Sunday, June 11 will contain trial
heats with these results:
RN
NeG
Wal
Und.
G - May 26-29
43
30
19
8
G
G - Apr 26-
43
35
15
7
May 1
RN
HHH
Wal
Und.
G - May 26-29
43
26
22
9
G - Apr 28-
45
34
15
6
May 1
The trend page on trial heats from your poll book is
attached.
In addition, Sunday's Gallup release will refute the
assertion in the June 8 New York Times editorial: "At
best the party must face the possibility that Governor
Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics of
disaffection in this strange primary campaign, will seek
to rally his followers behind a third-party bid. Whether
such a bid would, on balance, take more electoral votes
away from the Democratic nominee or from President Nixon
is an open question. But whatever chances a Democrat
- 2 -
might have to triumph in the face of a Wallace defection
would plummet to near-zero if a convention gang-up on
McGovern sparked a fourth-party challenge led by the army
of young activists so prominent in his dramatic spurt to
the top." The Gallup release will say: "Many political
observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as
a third party candidate this year. It is important to see
where his vote would go in the event that he does not enter
the race. The national findings show Nixon benefitting over
each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the
picture. Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while
McGovern would pick up only 4."
Other interesting comments by John Davies include: "The
Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in the
South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South
will be greater than any help that the Democratic candidate
could possibly get outside the South. He find that the
Wallace vote goes about 2 to 1 to Nixon in the South, and
it goes to the Democratic candidate by about 3 to 2 outside
the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace
vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only
about 7-108 outside the South, and that, on balance, the
President stands to benefit the greatest."
I will meet with John Davies when he is in Washington again
on June 22, 1972.
GS/jb
F/U every XMMX Tuesday
PHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN DAVIES -- THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1972
G - on the last column of the release the survey alluded to was in
early May and it seems to indicate that you ran a trial heat poll.
We would be very interested in the figures.
D - Now that was the last column - I'm trying to find that now. Is
that under subhead "Wallace Leads Among Independents"?
G - No, that's just above that. The paragraph just above that.
D - OK.
G - When matched against Nixon and Wallace.
D - That's the one on Independent voters. It wasn't in the index
was it?
G - No.
D - Well, you would want the national figures, right?
G - Yeah, if you have them. That would be great.
D - I think that's in the --- let's see that's in the -- let me have
those stories for Sunday please. That's in the one that's coming
out now. The new trial heats show Nixon just murdering everybody
now. If you'll excuse the expression.
G - That'll be the Sunday release?
D - And here it is right here. OK. Now. Nixon-McGovern-Wallace.
In a survey taken May 26-29, which is the most recent
G - May 26-29 -- RN-McGovern
D - Right. Which shows Nixon 43%, McGovern 30%, Wallace 19% and 8%
undecided. Now the April 28 through May 1, that's the one that
started the first two. Shows 43% for Nixon, 35% for McGovern,
Wallace 15%, undecided 7%.
- 2 -
G - Does it have some of the other contenders also.
D - There's Humphrey in there too.
G - Oh, what's Humphrey?
D - Uh, Humphrey is. Nixon is 43%, believe it not 26% for Humphrey,
Wallace 22%, undecided 9%. And the April 28th through May 1 it
was Nixon 45%, 34% for Humphrey, 15% for Wallace and 6% undecided.
G - That's -- that will be Sunday's release?
D - Right. You'll probably get that today.
G - OK. Anything else of interest?
D - Yes. There was an editorial this morning in the New York Times.
I don't know if you've had a chance to see it or not. But the
story, I mean the text read as follows and I shall read it for
you here: " At best the Party must face the possibility that
Governor Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics
of disaffection in a strange primary campaign, will seek to
rally his followers behind a third party bid. Whether such a
bid would on balance take more electoral votes away from the
Democratic nominee or from President Nixon is an open question. "
Now I claim it is not an open question. But since the New York
Times sees fit to print what it sees fit to print, we will put
"
in here in this story
The
national
Many political
observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as a third
party candidate this year. It is important to see where his vote
would go in the event that he does not enter the race: Now
here's
the interesting part The National findings show Nixon benefitting
over each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the picture.
:
- 3 -
D (cont) - Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while McGovern
would pick up only 4.
G - Now do you have those broken by region or is that just nationwide?
D - That's just nationwide.
G - I wonder what it is in the South vs, you know, the Northern industial
states? Because that's always the way the argument goes too.
D - We're probably going to tab that for the next index.
G - Gee, that would be fascinating. There are some who say that although
Wallace would help the President in the South by dropping out, he
hurts us in the North. Especially in the
D - That is true. We have shown that all along, but Gordon I think you
have to put it in its proper, the Wallace vote, in its proper pro-
portion. The Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in
C
the South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South will
be a greater than any help that the Democratic candidate could
possibly get outside the South.
G - Yeah.
D
We find that the Wallace vote goes about two to one to Nixon in
the South and it goes to the Democratic candidate by a about 3 to 2
outside the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace
vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only about
d
7-10% outside the South, that on balance the President stands to
benefit the greatest.
G - I see. That's amazing. OK. What else of interest is there
around?
D - Not too much.
- 4 -
G - Coming down here again soon?
D - The 22nd of this month.
G - Oh great.
D - I will be down at the Department of HEW hearing a seminar on
the "Mood of America".
G - Oh, excellent.
D - The Public Affairs officers. We're going to be there with Albert
Kantzel, Dr. Kantzel, the fellow who wrote "Hopes and Fears".
G - "Hopes and Fears" - right. Feel free to stop in.
D - I sure will if I get a free moment, well I'll call you well in
advance, so you know.
G - Oh, good.
D - Very good.
G - All right, John, I'll be talking with you.
D - Good enough, Gordon.
G - Thanks a lot. Bye.
***
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
June 2, 1972
Gordon --
The enclosed letter was sent to Tom
Wicker, and a copy to the Times
editorial page editor. It was fairly
difficult to get someone to sign the
Wicker letter, and I had a couple
false tries. People seem to get
nervous when the Great and Grand
Times is mentioned!
Also, a very good woman out in
Montgomery County knows William
Shannon through family connections
and sees him socially. She has
written to him -- an informal but
concerned note -- indicating that
she has heard the rumor about Wicker
squashing news unfavorable to a Kennedy
and is concerned that it might be true.
Will send any answers on to you.
***
4538 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20016
June 2, 1972
Mr. Tom Wicker
c/o New York Time S
1920 L Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Wicker,
I heard something recently -- one of those nothing political
comments so common in this city. But as I thought about it, I
realized that, if true, it is a very serious matter. The comment
concerned George Gallup's annual July poll to measure the impact
of the Chappaquiddick accident on a possible Kennedy presidential
candidacy. According to the rumor Gallup is being pressured, by
yourself and others of the Times staff, to drop the Chappaquiddick
poll, as not of public interest.
Washington is a rumor-filled city, and this may be just
another false potshot. But, considering your personal attitudes
and your belief that these rightly belong in your professional
writings, it is not difficult to believe that you could be working
to eliminate the Chappaquiddick poll. If true, your attempt to
deny people an opportunity to express and know public opinion
would appear to conflict with your often-stated commitment to
the public's right to know. Or does the public perhaps have a
right to know only what you approve?
Senator Kennedy cannot evade Chappaquiddick by striking
it from public print, regardless of the cooperation of his friends,
or the media or even the judiciary. (I am still incredulous that
nobody in the media has done anything about the people's "right
to know" about the Edgartown inquest hearing.) But more impor-
tant than Senator Kennedy, or Chappaquiddick, or even a public
2
poll, is the danger implicit in any covert laison between a
politician and a major news source. Mr. Wicker, are you
attempting to prevent a new Gallup poll on Senator Kenne dy,
and how does this square with your responsibility to public
truth?
Sincerely,
Roger W. Eisinger, Sr.
CC: Mr. John B. Oakes
Editorial Page Editor
The New York Times
4538 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20016
June 2, 1972
Mr. John B. Oakes
Editorial Page Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, N. Y. 10036
Dear Mr. Oakes:
The attached is a carbon of a letter sent to Tom Wicker.
I thought perhaps it would be of interest to you also, as edi-
torial page editor.
Sincerely,
Roger W. Eisinger, Sr.
Davies
Galleep
John Dames
23
An AP report leads: "If Wallace accomplishes nothing else this
year, he has succeeded in making a shambles of the once-formidable
labor-union vote. Organized labor has fought Wallace at every turn
in the primaries and, except in W. Va, has come away beaten or
bloodied each time. "
Tagge of the Trib quotes Tommy Corcoran and an unnamed top
Ill Dem MC who feels Connally would be the best choice their party
could make
A Quayle poll conducted in Ill. for Harper's indicated
"the stigma of Chappaquiddick" still persists for EMK and it may be
getting worse. Using a "trust index, " EMK scored 47, down 1% from
last Nov., while RN rose 6 to 66 in Ill. The national "trust index" in
April was 53 for EMK to 59 for RN. The Ill. poll showed RN preferred
60-40 over EMK, compared with 55-45 last Oct. 44% agreed; "in my
opinion, EMK behaved immorally before his car went off the bridge. "
60% believed he "has redeemed himself enough, 11 while 75% said "the
matter should be dropped. " However, 70% were sure he "didn't tell
the whole truth about what happened. 11 36% were willing to say, "I
trust EMK more than RN, 11 while 60% agreed that "I trust RN more. 11
NBC film of EMK speaking at a fundraiser after Utley noted the
alternative to McG is not brought among the candidates but that leaves
EMK. Reporter said EMK is not a candidate but whatever he is doing
he did more of it last night. EMK on film saying the nation faces a
crisis of faith in gov't that has failed the people. The dinner was all
politics as he insisted he's not running. He said it so many times,
concluded reporter, that many are beginning to believe it altho they
wish it weren't true.
"EMK brought excitement to the Pitts. Platform hearings, 11 leads
Trib. account. Pa. Dems stood along the streets to watch his car.
They crowded around him with one idea to shake his hand to touch
him or to be spoken to by him. " This account also tells how EMK's staff
culled out the inarticulate and unattractive who wanted to testify
The Post report on the hearings leads: "If applause means anything,
the economic issue that matters the most to the average man is tax
reform that makes the rich pay their fair share and cases the burden
on the poor. 11 Tho the session was called to hear mainly from the
people, the Post says "it developed mainly into a recitation of EMK's
views. 11
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Fred LaRue
Fred LaRue called today with some information on Kennedy.
LaRue said he could only discuss it with you or Mitchell,
who is out of the city today. LaRue would not discuss
the Kennedy matter with me, even though we have covered
many sensitive items in the past.
I think you should give him a call.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Surveys -
Wave II - New York
Rockefeller's assistant in New York, Mr. Bixby, appealed
directly to John Mitchell over the weekend and convinced
him to delay the survey interviewing in New York Intil
after the New York primary on June 20. Mitchell directed
Teeter to have the New York interviewing begin on June 22
instead of June 14 as originally planned. The New York
results will not be available until eight days after the
other states have been submitted to you.
ЛИНИ
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
RNC Convention
Bill Timmons returned from Miami Beach, June 8, 1972.
Extended discussions with him June 1 and yesterday
covered several follow-up matters from your May 19
meeting with Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Timmons.
Many very specific aspects of the Convention arrangements
have been set. These included: redesigning the podium;
fanned seating for 13,600; using three sculptured projection
screens (12' X 25') for the documentaries and slides; and
the office and command post locations. The Doral is set as
the Headquarters Hotel for which separate non-White House
passes will be required for admission. Timmons has "cut
deals" on rooms, food, security, etc. Rietz' 3000 youth will be
housed in 20 inexpensive hotels. Staging areas for concerts,
etc. are near. There chartered planes are set for the Campaign
and White House Staff. Dean has ruled the Cabinet can take
their own cars.
The Host Committee has been cleared by Bebe Rebozo (list
at Tab A) but not yet announced.
There have been several interesting substantive developments
involving security arrangements. Miami Beach Police Chief
Pomerance has agreed there will beeno demonstrations up Collins
Avenue. There will be no march on the Doral; however, isolated
longhairs may be able to trash on Collins Avenue which the
police may not have the capability to stop. Timmons believes
Pomerance ts à pretty good man caught in a tough bind because
the Mayor and certain members of the City Council have been
encouraging demonstrates to come to Miami Beach by offering
camping and other facilities. The prime political security contact
with Pomerance is Deputy Assistant Attorney General Harlington
"Woody" Wood. Mitchell and Kleindienst chose him. Wood will be
-2-
in the hardened underground command post with the FBI,
USSSS (Paul Rundell), Army (Ken BeLieu or direct designee),
local and state police leaders. There will be a direct line
from this command post to John Dean's room where he,
Fred Fielding and Dave Wilson and secretaries will prepare
hourly reports for Mitchell. There will be no political
types (Dean or Timmons) in the command post because if something
goes wrong, Mitchell doesn't want us to get blamed.
Timmons faces several problems and needs some answers from
you. The first concerns the handling of the President's
family and special friends. Timmons needs guidance on the
Ryans, Drowns, Billy Graham, etc. Timmons asked Rose Mary
Woods when he gave her the 1968 list of VIP's. She has
not responded and Timmons wants you to prod her. (a memorandum
for your signature is attached at Tab B).
The program is being developed and a more detailed version
than the one you reviewed on May 19 will be submitted early
next week. However, Timmons asks for your reaction to using
the U.S. Marine Band on the evening the President delivers
his acceptance speech. Brenman discreetly approached the
Marines and discovered reluctance because a "political funtion."
Their use could be criticized as militaristic and as an incorrect
use of a government unit. Timmons and his program committee would
meet the "political" argument by offering the band to the Demo-
crats and believes the patriotic benefits outweigh the negatives.
RECOMMENDATION
That a commercial, non-military band be obtained for the
acceptance speech evening. Chapin and Butterfield agree -
not to use military band.
AGREE
DISAGREE
COMMENTS
Housing arrangements for VIP's and the White House Staff
continue to cause Timmons problems but he believes they are
solvable. He has not located a private home for the Vice
President that meets his requirements. Other private homes
are much harder to acquire than in San Diego.
Concerning the White House personnel and the Presidential
party in Miami Beach, Timmons submitted three memoranda
(attached Tab C). Timmons philosophy on who should be
invited and where they stay is 2) include as many political
types as possible to preclude numerous appeals, jockeying, and
- 3 -
private arrangements as possible; b) discourage staff
members from taking wives by not offering free transpor-
tation or food, c) put the great bulk of White House Staff
in the Doral with a limited Presidential Party at the Key
Biscayne Hotel, which would be treated as a regular Presi-
dential trip outside Timmons' control.
One of the problems with Timmons' plan is that it suggests
Kehrli and Hoopes go to the Convention to run a "government
information" office for the White House Staff and Cabinet.
Kehrli recommends that he stay here to handle regular
Presidential and Haldeman matters just as if there were
a trip but no Convention. I would suggest that we let
the Cabinet members continue their current system of
information gathering rather than try to set up a special
office. Another problem with Timmons' White House list
to the Convention is that it doesn't include most Staff
Assistants from the Domestic Council, In spite of
Ehrlichman's agreement to the number of Domestic Council
members on May 19, this may become a problem when Cole
learns who else is attending the Convention. Finally,
there may be appeals from Flanigan, Colson and Malek
since they have the lowest portion of their staffs attend-
ing. The best stance is to give Timmons the final word
and concentrate the resultant flak away from you.
To summarize, Timmons requests that 1) you relinquish
three of the twelve villas at Key Biscayne for the
Ehrlichmans, Magruders and Maleks, 2) that you approve
the staff list, and 3) that you approve the President's
travelling party. Higby's comments appear in pencil.
GS/car
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GRADON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Malek's Analysis of the
Campaign Organization
Malek discusses the campaigns serious organizational prob-
lems in tough, readable language. His comments on the
disastrous field organization (Flemming, Mardian, et al)
will not come as a surprise to you. Nor will the criticism
of the surrogates operation be a surprime. I agree with
Malek that the direct mail, telephone and canvassing problems
may be solvable because Bob Marik and Bob Morgan are
basically capable managers.
The real problem, which Malek discusses at length in the
Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a
tough, hard-driving, ass-licking manager. This may be
the role Flanigan served in 1968. Colson is filling this
void in some way on particular projects, but this is a
structurally unsound arrangement. If there is a plan to
shift Flanigan or equally senior, tough manager to the
campaign, it should be done quickly. If there is no
such plan, consider Malek. The Voter Bloc groups have
been planned, staffed and can be run with little of
Malek's time by Chuck Shearer. Occasional revisions
(e.g. older voters) can be handled directly by Malek. I
believe Malek had developed Mitchell's confidence and has
the respect of the rest of the campaign organization.
There will be obvious positioning problems by Magruder, Mardian,
La Rue and others, but these problems will be nothing com-
pared to the country's if McGovern wins.
Malek wants the job.
GS:car
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Celebrities Briefing -
Kissinger's Participation-
California, June 17,1972
There are conflicting views about whether Kissinger will
attend the briefing for celebrities, arranged by Taft
Schreiber in California on June 17, 1972. The facts
are:
1) Taft Schreiber issued invitations to a party
featuring John Mitchell and Henry Kissinger;
2) Kissinger "committed" (word confirmed) to
Schreiber (source: Porter) the June 17,1972 date;
3) Kissinger "committed" (word confirmed) to
Mitchell (source: Magruder);
4) The date of the event had been changed 3 times
at Kissinger's behest. Mitchell accommodated each
time;
5) Rumor had it that Kissinger did not want to do
the event because Martha Mitchell would be there.
Magruder checked with Haig, who said this was not
the case;
6) Campbell, Kissinger's aide, believes the chances
are 40-60 that Kissinger will do the ement.
Magruder believes Kissinger wants to do the event but alone,
without Mitchell, because of an ego problem.
All feel the event is crucial to the success of the President's
celebrities program.
If possible, you should talk with Kissinger and ask him to
-2-
stand by the commitment to attend the celebrities
briefing on June 17 in California.
GS:car
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gallup Surveys
Discussion with John Davies this morning disclosed that
the Gallup release for Sunday, June 11 will contain trial
heats with these results:
RN
McG
Wal
Und.
G - May 26-29
43
30
19
8
G
G - Apr 28-
43
35
15
7
May 1
RN
HHH
Wal
Und.
G - May 26-29
43
26
22
9
G - Apr 28-
45
34
15
6
May 1
The trend page on trial heats from your poll book is
attached.
In addition, Sunday's Gallup release will refute the
assertion in the June 8 New York Times editorial: "At
best the party must face the possibility that Governor
Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics of
disaffection in this strange primary campaign, will seek
to rally his followers behind a third-party bid. Whether
such a bid would, on balance, take more electoral votes
away from the Democratic nominee or from President Nixon
is an open question. But whatever chances a Democrat
- 2 -
might have to triumph in the face of a Wallace defection
would plummet to near-zero if a convention gang-up on
McGovern sparked a fourth-party challenge led by the army
of young activists so prominent in his dramatic spurt to
the top." The Gallup release will say: "Many political
observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as
a third party candidate this year. It is important to see
where his vote would go in the event that he does not enter
the race. The national findings show Nixon benefitting over
each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the
picture. Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while
McGovern would pick up only 4."
Other interesting comments by John Davies include: "The
Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in the
South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South
will be greater than any help that the Democratic candidate
could possibly get outside the South. We find that the
Wallace vote goes about 2 to 1 to Nixon in the South, and
it goes to the Democratic candidate by about 3 to 2 outside
the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace
vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only
about 7-10% outside the South, and that, on balance, the
President stands to benefit the greatest."
I will meet with John Davies when he is in Washington again
on June 22, 1972.
GS/jb
F/U every THNK Tuesday
6/8/72
TRIAL HEATS
1972
Poll
Dates
MUSKIE
KENNEDY
HHII
McGOV
WALLACE
H - Jan.
45-48-7
42-42-11-5
46-37-12-5
T - Jan.
52-42-6
51-40-9
54-40-6
3-20
46-37-11-6
46-37-10-7
48-35-12-5
G - Jan.
47-37
7-10
43-42-12-3
O - Jan.
52-36-12
52-41-7
58-33-9
26-27
46-32-13-9
45-37-12-6
50-30-12-8
G - Feb.
4-7
43-42-10-5
47-39-9-5
46-39-10-5
49-34-11-6
H - Feb.
47-45-8
51-41-8
8-14
44-40-11-5
47-36-12-5
H - Feb. 28-
50-37-13
53-37-10
59-32-9
Mar. 7
47-35-12-6
48-35-12-5
53-28-13-6
O - Mar.
52-37-11
49-43-8
55-37-8
66-24-10
18-19
44-30-17-9
41-38-15-6
44-32-17-7
G - Mar.
69-23-8
24-27
46-36-14-4
46-35-15-4
H - Apr.
50-42-8
54-34-12
1-7
44-33-15-8
45-35-14-6
42-36-16-6
47-29-16-8
G - Apr.
15-16
46-36-12-6
46-31-15-8
G - Apr.
21-24
44-31-16-9
45-32-16-7
G - Apr. 28-
50-38-12
49-39-12
May 1
45-34-15-6
43-35-15-7
H - May
50-42-8
48-41-11
9-10
41-37-16-6
40-35-17-8
G - May
26-29
43-26-22-9
43-30-19-8
June 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Survey - Wave II
John Mitchell decided to meet with Bob Teeter privately at
10 a.m. today instead of at 3 p.m. with his political group
as scheduled. The questionnaire will not be discussed at
3 p.m.
Mitchell directed Teeter to make the following changes in
the Wave II Survey:
1) Develop and add two follow-up questions on national
defense. The first question would cover whether those who
believe the government should spend less on national defense
believe that because the U.S. does not need such arms or
because there is too much waste,
2) Develop and add a welfare question which asks
whether those with over 12,000 income should be taxed to
assist those with less than 12,000 income. Then a series
of welfare proposal questions including the President's
and McGovern's would be tested,
3) Develop and add a question on "change" - whether
people believe the country needs a radical reorganization;
4) Develop and add a question on the nature of cam-
paigning. The question would be something to the effect
that "in light of the Wallace shooting, should the President
not campaign in public",
5) Drop the Humphrey's handling of the issues sections;
6) Drop the Richard Nixon-Edward Kennedy trial heats.
- 2 -
The reason the Humphrey section is dropped is because Mitchell
wants a Richard Nixon-McGovern poll. The Edward Kennedy trial
heats are dropped because Mitchell and Teeter believe people
are taking Kennedy at his word that he will not be a candidate
and so their answer to trial heat questions are inaccurate.
Also, Mitchell believes both Harris and Gallup will supply
adequate trial heat results on Kennedy.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDEN TIAL
June 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR :
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM :
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT :
Campaign Survey - Wave II
Attached is the latest draft of the Wave II survey. John Mitchell reviewed
the questionnaire and met with Teeter on May 30 to discuss his suggested
changes. They are indicated. The questionnaire attached at Tab A has
been pre-tested in Detroit.
Teeter needs a commitment from you and John Mitchell on the final
questionnaire on June 7. Mitchell has agreed to have all his changes in
by then. The vendors -- ORC, Decision Making Information and Market
Opinion Research -- will begin field interviewing June 13 and 14. After
10-14 days of interviewing, the vendors will tabulate the results. Teeter
hopes to have the trial heat figures on July 3 but has told Mitchell they may
not be ready until July 5. The complete reports on each of the states from
the vendors is due to Teeter on July 15. You should receive your copies
July 16. The suggested form for reporting the results is attached at Tab B.
Mitchell is not particularly interested in the format of the results. Teeter
will change the format in any way to suit your requirements.
You may want to discuss with Mitchell whether to have a final review of
the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group -- Colson, Harlow,
and MacGregor. Due to the length of the questionnaire, many of the suggested
questions prepared by the Domestic Council (Cole, Harper, and Morey) were
not included. After the first series of campaign surveys in January, the
Domestic Council complained that they had not had sufficient input and there-
fore the issue materials were not very helpful. In light of your comment
yesterday on the advertising -- that you and Mitchell would tell Ehrlichman's
group what you were planning to do to protect against a gross oversight --
you may want to do the same with this Wave II survey questionnaire. Mr.
Ehrlichman will not be back until Thursday evening so he could not review
the questionnaire until Friday. This would cause a delay in the results.
2
As to the substantive aspects of questionnaire, the three areas Mitchell
added on May 30 were amnesty (Question 22); marijuana (Question 24);
and abortion (Question 24). Pursuant to your decision on May 19, there
are no Vice Presidential trial heats on this questionnaire.
The standard trend questions on Presidential and Vice Presidential
popularity, Vietnam, and the economy are included. However, the
President's credibility on Vietnam question "As far as the War in
Vietnam is concerned, do you think that President Nixon has been frank
and straightforward about the War or do you think that he has not told the
American people the real truth about the situation there?" -- is not
included. Mitchell believes "Catholics and credibility" will be crucial
in this election so the credibility question should be included. This
question could be added or substituted for Question 27 -- "How much do
you care who wins the Presidential election this fall?"
The alternate green pages in the questionnaire assure that one-half of the
interviewees will be asked questions about Hubert Humphrey while the
other half will be asked questions about George McGovern. If Humphrey
does poorly in California you may want to reduce the Humphrey questions,
though Teeter recommends against this.
On a related polling matter, ORC has conducted seven private telephone
surveys for us. The amount of their latest invoice is 44. Dean and Kalmbach
believe that unacceptable risks of violating the campaign spending law would
be incurred if ORC were paid in green either from your 300 fund or from
1701. However, ORC received a prepayment of 50 before the April 7 dead-
line. This was to be applied toward Wave II polling expenses. Instead,
the 50 could cover the private telephone polls and ORC would receive a full
payment for its share of the Wave II surveys (approximately 123). The
payments to the three polling vendors ORC, DMI, and MOR -- will appear
on the September 10 public disclosure statement. ORC's figure will be 50
higher, which can be explained as "additional campaign surveys and analyses".
Recommendation
That Strachan instruct Hugh Sloan to pay the full Wave II cost to ORC and
apply the 50 prepayment to our pending ORC bill.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
GS:LH:pm
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Survey - Wave II
Bob Teeter called regarding approval of the questionnaire
for the Wave II series of campaign surveys. Mitchell has
agreed to give Teeter a commitment tomorrow afternoon, so
that Teeter can meet with the vendors in Detroit Wednesday
night. This change in the time frame somewhat modifies
the recommendations in my June 3 memorandum to you on the
Campaign Surveys. First, it precludes a final review of
the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group.
Ehrlichman's office advises that his plans now call for
his return from Stockholm late Thursday, June 8, 1972,
and that he does not plan on having a political meeting
until Monday, June 12. Second, Teeter may have to sub-
stantially revise the questionnaire if you and Mitchell
believe there should be less emphasis on Humphrey in light
of the projected California results. If Humphrey does as
poorly as most now suggest, the sections on Humphrey's
ability to handle the issues could be partially replaced
with substantive issue questions. Teeter recommends against
dropping any Humphrey questions because he is a bland,
middle-of-the-road representative of a possible compromise
Democratic nominee.
After Teeter meets with Mitchell and his political group
at 3 p.m. on June 7, I will prepare a written description
of the proposed changes for your review. If you have a
chance to review the changes and give final approval by
tomorrow evening, Teeter will be pleased. If not, I will
ask Teeter to delay the Wave II schedule.
GS/jb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Survey - Wave II
You reviewed the first draft questionnaire of Bob Teeter's
proposed Wave II polls in Russia. John Mitchell also re-
viewed the questionnaire and met with Teeter on May 30 to
discuss his suggested changes. The questionnaire attached
at Tab A has been pre-tested in Detroit.
Teeter needs a commitment from you and John Mitchell on the
final questionnaire on June 8. The vendors -- ORC, Decision
Making Information and Market Opinion Research -- will begin
field interviewing June 13 and 14. After 10-14 days of
interviewing, the vendors will tabulate the results. Teeter
hopes to have the trial heat figures on July 3 but has told
Mitchell they may not be ready until July 5. The complete
reports on each of the states from the vendors is due to
Teeter on July 15. You should receive your copies July 16.
The suggested form for reporting the results is attached at
Tab B. Mitchell is not particularly interessed in the format
of the results. Teeter will change the format in any way to
suit your requirements.
Concerning the June 8 deadline for the final questionnaire,
Teeter will meet on June 7 with Mitchell's political group --
Magruder, Malek, Marek, Finkelstein, LaRue, Miller, and
Flemming -- to make "final" changes in the questionnaire.
After that group makes its suggestions you may want to dis-
cuss the questionnaire with Mitchell and Teeter. You may
want to discuss with Mitchell whether to have a final review
of the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group --
Colson, Harlow, and MacGregor --- on Thursday, June 8. Due
to the length of the questionnaire, many of the suggested
questions prepared by the Domestic Council (Cole, Harper,
and Morey) were not included. After the first series of
- 2 -
campaign surveys in January, the Domestic Council complained
that they had not had sufficient input and therefore the
issue materials were not very helpful. In light of your
comment yesterday on the advertising -- that you and Mitchell
would tell Ehrlichman's group what you were planning to do
to protect against a gross oversight -- you may want to do
the same with this Wave II survey questionnaire.
Recommendation
That Haldeman and Mitchell tell Ehrlichman's group wheut the
Wave II survey questionnaire on June 8. Strachan will have
Magruder advise Mitchell.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
As to the substantive aspects of questionnaire, the three
areas Mitchell added on May 30 were amnesty (Question 22) 1
marijuana (Question 24), and abortion (Question 24). Pursuant
to your decision on May 19, there are no Vice Presidential
trial heats on this questionnaire.
The standard trend questions on Presidential and Vice Presi-
dential popularity, Vietnam, and the economy are included.
However, the President's credibility on Vietnam question --
"As far as the War in Vietnam is concerned, do you think
that President Nixon has been frank and straightforward
about the War or do you think that he has not told the
American people the real truth about the situation there?" --
is not included. Mitchell believes "Catholics and credibility"
will be crucial in this election so the credibility question
should be included. This question could be added or substi-
tuted for Question 27 -- "How much do you care who wins the
Presidential election this fall?"
Recommendation
That Strachan instruct Teeter to include the "credibility"
question.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
- 3 -
The alternate green pages in the questionnaire assure that
one-half of the interviewees will be asked questions about
Hubert Humphrey while the other half will be asked questions
about George McGovern.
On a related polling matter, ORC has conducted seven prevate
telephone surveys for us. The amount of their latest invoice
is 44. Dean and Kalmbach believe that unacceptable risks of
violating the campaign spending law would be incurred if ORC
were paid in green -- either from your 300 fund or from 1701.
However, ORC received a prepayment of 50 before the April 7
deadline. This was to be applied toward Wave II polling
expenses. Instead, the 50 could cover the private telephone
polls and ORC would receive a full payment for its share of
the Wave II surveys (approximately 123). The payments to the
three polling vendors -- ORC, DMI, and MOR - will appear on
the September 10 public disclosure statement. ORC's figure
will be 50 higher, which can be explained as "additional
campaign surveys and akalyses".
Recommendation
That Strachan instruct Hugh Sloan to pay the full Wave II
cost to ORC and apply the 50 prepayment to our pending ORC
bill.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
GS/jb
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
Trial Heats
1968: +0
McGovern
Humphrey
Kennedy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0) (+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0) (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+
0)
(+
0)
(+
0)
(+ 0)
(+
0)
(+
0)
(+
0)
(+ 0)
Rep.
T-S
Dem.
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
Mc-H-K
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
W
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
U
0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
(+ 0) (+ 0)
Approval
A.
D.
N.O.
Job
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Economy
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Vietnam
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Job/Agnew
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Issues
State
National
1
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
2
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
3
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
4
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
5
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Issue Handling
N
Mc
H
+
-
+
-
+
-
Vietnam
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0)
(+ 0)
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0)
(+ 0)
General Unrest
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0)
(+ 0)
Crime
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0)
(+ 0)
Unemployment
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+ 0)
(+ 0)
Drugs
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+
0)
(+ 0)
State
A.
D.
N.O.
Gov.
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Sen.
0 IT 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
Sen.
0 (+ 0)
0 0)
0 (+ 0)
State Ballots
Cov.
Sen.
Candidate A
0
Candidate A
0
Candidate H
0
Candidate C
0
Underided
0
Undecided
0
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
A
BALLOTS
Ticket-
Total
Republican
Splitter
Democrat
Nixon
0
0
0
0
McGovern
0
0
0
0
Wallace
0
0
0
0
Undecided
0
0
0
0
Nixon
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
Humphrey
0
(+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
Wallace
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
Undecided
0
(+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
Undecided
Nixon
McGovern
Undecided
Nixon
Humphrey
Undecided
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
A (i)
BALLOTS
Media Markets (ADI)
Total
Area 1*
Area 2*
Area 3*
Area 4*
Nixon
0
0
0
0
0
McGovern
0
0
0
0
0
Wallace
0
0
0
0
0
Undecided
0
0
0
0
0
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
Undecided
Nixon
McGovern
Undecided
Nixon
Humphrey
Undecided
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
*
Use descriptive words
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
B
Nixon
McGovern
Wallace
Undecided
Number
Total - 100%
0
0
0
0
0
Age
18-24 years
0
0
0
0
0
25-34 years
0
0
0
0
0
35-44 years
0
0
0
0
0
45-54 years
0
0
0
0
0
55-64 years
0
0
0
0
0
65 years +
0
0
0
0
0
Education
Less than High School
High School Graduate
College
Religion
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Other
Race
White
Black
Yellow
Brown
Union
Yes
No
Income
Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000 +
Sex
Male
Female
Geographic (Folitical)
Area 1*
Area 2*
Area 3*
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
B (i)
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
Number
Total 100%
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
Age
18-24 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
25-34 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
35-44 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
45-54 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
55-64 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
65 years +
0
(+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
Education
Less than High School
High School Graduate
College
Religion
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Other
Race
White
Black
Yellow
Brown
Union
Yes
No
Income
Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000 it
Sex
Male
Female
Geographic (Political)
Area 1*
Area 2*
Area 3*
* Use discriptive vords
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
B (ii)
Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
Undecided
Number
Total - 100%
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
Age
18-24 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
25-34 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
35-44 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
45-54 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
55-64 years
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
65 years +
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
(+ 0)
0
Education
Less than High School
High School Graduate
College
Religion
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Other
Race
White
Black
Yellow
Brown
Union
Yes
No
Income
Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000 +
Sex
Male
Female
Ceographic (Political)
Area 1*
Area 2*
Area 3*
:: Use Coderiptive colds
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
C
RATINGS ON ABILITY
TO HANDLE ISSUES
Total Rating
Total Rating
Total Rating
Nixon
McGovern
Humphrey
Pos.
Neg.
Pos. Neg.
Pos. Neg.
Vietnam
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
General Unrest
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
Crime
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
Unemployment
0 (+ 0)
0 (+ 0)
0
0
0
0
Drugs
Education
Taxes
Bussing
Health Care
National Defense
Environment
Race Relations
State
Dates
C (i)
No. of Interviews
RATINGS ON ABILITY
TO HANDLE ISSUES
Current
Rating
Rating
Rating
Issue
Voting
Nixon
McGovern
Humphrey
Pos.
Neg.
Pos.
Neg.
Pos.
Neg.
Vietnam
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Nixon
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Nixon
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Dem.
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Dem.
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Wallace
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Wallace
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
General Unrest
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Crime
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Unemployment
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Drugs
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dom.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
State
Dates
C (i) Cont'd.
No. of Interviews
Current
Rating
Rating
Rating
Issue
Voting
Nixon
McGovern
Humphrey
Pos.
Neg.
Pos.
Neg.
Pos.
Neg.
Education
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Nixon
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Nixon
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Dem.
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Dem.
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hard Wallace
0
0
0
0
0
0
Soft Wallace
0
0
0
0
0
0
Taxes
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Bussing
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Health Care
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
National Defense
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Environment
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Wallace
Race Relations
Total
Hard Nixon
Soft Nixon
Soft Dom.
Hard Dem.
Hard Wallace
Soft Callace
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
D
PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES
Total Rating
Total Rating
Total Rating
Nixon
McGovern
Humphrey
Trust
Close Minded
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Neutral
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Open Minded
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Dishonest
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Neutral
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Honest
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Unjust
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Neutral
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Just
0 (+ 0)
0
0
Competence
Inexperienced
Neutral
Experienced
Untrained
Neutral
Trained
Uninformed
Neutral
Informed
Incompetent
Neutral
Competent
Strength
Timid
Neutral
Bold
Dangerous
Neutral
Safe
Meck
Neutral
Aggressive
Soft
Neutral
Tough
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
D (i)
NIXON PERSONALITY. ATTRIBUTES
Current Voting
Hard
Soft
Soft
Hard
Hard
Soft
Nixon
Nixon
Dem.
Dem.
Wallace
Wallace
Trust
Close Minded
0
0
0
0
Neutral
0
0
0
0
0
0
Open Minded
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Dishonest
0
0
0
0
Neutral
0
0
0
0
0
0
Honest
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unjust
0
0
0
0
Neutral
0
0
0
0
0
0
Just
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Competence
Inexperienced
Neutral
Experienced
Untrained
Neutral
Trained
Uninformed
Neutral
Informed
Incompetent
Neutral
Competent
Strength
Timid
Neutral
Bold
Dangerous
Neutral
Safe
Meck
Neutral
Aggressive
Soft
Neutral
Tough
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
E
NIXON JOB APPROVAL DEMOGRAPHICS
Approve
Disapprove
Nixon
McGovern
Nixon
McGovern
No
Total
Voters
Voters
Total
Voters
Voters
Opinion
Age
18-24 years
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
25-34 years
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
35-44 years
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
45-54 years
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
55-64 years
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
65 years +
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
(+ 0)
0
0
0
Education
Less than H.S.
High School Grad.
College
Religion
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Other
Race
White
Black
Yellow
Brown
Union
Yes
No
Income
Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000 +
Sex
Male
Female
Geographic (Political)
Area 1*
Area 2*
Area 3*
* Use descriptive words
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
SUMMARY
Three pages of conclusions highlighting differences from tradi-
tional patterns and significant changes from first wave.
State
Dates
No. of Interviews
CAMPAIGN IMPLICATIONS
Three pages of recommendations and suggestions for campaign
action.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 1, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Advertising
You last met with Peter Dailey to discuss the campaign
advertising on January 12, 1972. In the last four months
Dailey has assembled the campaign advertising staff
(November Group) in New York and Washington. The staff
prepared three presentations for the Campaign Strategy
Group (Chapin, Buchanan, Garment, Magruder, Chotiner, Dent,
LaRue, Moore, and Teeter). These materials have been
summarized in the attached binder.
Peter Dailey is anxious to have you review the materials.
Dailey can give you an abbreviated presentation with his
two top ment (Phil Joanou and Bill Taylor) in 45 minutes
based on his attached agenda. In addition, Dailey would
like to discuss the documentary situation with you. That
would take 15 minutes.
John Mitchell has seen some but not all of the advertising
strategy and materials in informal sessions with Magruder
and Dailey. Mitchell is very interested in your suggestions
on the advertising. However, according to Magruder, Mitchell
might not be very anxious to have all the advertising reviewed
and commented on by the Ehrlichman political group of Harlow,
MacGregor and Colson. You may want to cover with Mitchell
whether it would be appropriate for Peter Dailey to present
the campaign advertising materials to this group.
Recommendation
That Dailey and his two top men present the campaign adver-
tising materials to you at 10 a.m. tomorrow for your comments.
Chapin should sit in the meeting due to his responsibility
for his documentary.
Approval, set meeting at 10 a.m.
Disapproval, re-schedule meeting.
Comments.
GS/jb
H-FU-6/2