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This file contains:
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a project designed to analyze public opinion toward political parties. Information on the role of political parties in the 1972 election and notes attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/15/1972
From Higby to Strachan RE: an attempt to measure public opinion on political parties. Handwritten notes added by Strachan. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/3/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: whether or not to transfer control of a valuable database to the RNC. Memo from Morgan to Magruder attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/14/1972
From Sam Wyly, through Haldeman, to RN RE: an important database used during the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Letter], 11/28/1972
Talking paper from Strachan to George Bush RE: the transfer of a direct mail list to the RNC. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/14/1972
Page of notes, possibly authored by Strachan, relating to thank-you letters for important campaign figures, as well as other campaign matters. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From George Collins to Strachan RE: legal and statistical information on the database. 11 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/4/1972
Resume of James W. White. 3 pgs [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
List of volunteer and contributor files for various states. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a preliminary analysis of voter turnout in 1972. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/14/1972
From Bob Marik to Malek RE: the fate of various Republican candidates for office in 1972. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/20/1972
From Rick Fore to Malek RE: various Republican Senate defeats. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/28/1972
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26145671
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WHSF: Contested, 15-13
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1
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26145671
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document
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WHSF: Contested, 15-13
description
This file contains:
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a project designed to analyze public opinion toward political parties. Information on the role of political parties in the 1972 election and notes attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/15/1972
From Higby to Strachan RE: an attempt to measure public opinion on political parties. Handwritten notes added by Strachan. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/3/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: whether or not to transfer control of a valuable database to the RNC. Memo from Morgan to Magruder attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/14/1972
From Sam Wyly, through Haldeman, to RN RE: an important database used during the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Letter], 11/28/1972
Talking paper from Strachan to George Bush RE: the transfer of a direct mail list to the RNC. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/14/1972
Page of notes, possibly authored by Strachan, relating to thank-you letters for important campaign figures, as well as other campaign matters. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From George Collins to Strachan RE: legal and statistical information on the database. 11 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 12/4/1972
Resume of James W. White. 3 pgs [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
List of volunteer and contributor files for various states. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a preliminary analysis of voter turnout in 1972. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/14/1972
From Bob Marik to Malek RE: the fate of various Republican candidates for office in 1972. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/20/1972
From Rick Fore to Malek RE: various Republican Senate defeats. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/28/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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26145671
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
15
13
12/15/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a project
designed to analyze public opinion toward
political parties. Information on the role of
political parties in the 1972 election and
notes attached. 8 pgs.
15
13
12/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Strachan RE: an attempt to
measure public opinion on political parties.
Handwritten notes added by Strachan. 2 pgs.
15
13
12/14/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: whether or
not to transfer control of a valuable database
to the RNC. Memo from Morgan to
Magruder attached. 7 pgs.
15
13
11/28/1972
Domestic Policy
Letter
From Sam Wyly, through Haldeman, to RN
RE: an important database used during the
campaign. 3 pgs.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
15
13
12/14/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
Talking paper from Strachan to George Bush
RE: the transfer of a direct mail list to the
RNC. 1 pg.
15
13
Campaign
Other Document
Page of notes, possibly authored by Strachan,
relating to thank-you letters for important
campaign figures, as well as other campaign
matters. 1 pg.
15
13
12/4/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From George Collins to Strachan RE: legal
and statistical information on the database.
11 pgs.
15
13
>
Domestic Policy
Other Document
Resume of James W. White. 3 pgs.
15
13
Domestic Policy
Other Document
List of volunteer and contributor files for
various states. 1 pg.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
15
13
12/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a
preliminary analysis of voter turnout in 1972.
5 pgs.
15
13
11/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bob Marik to Malek RE: the fate of
various Republican candidates for office in
1972. 3 pgs.
15
13
11/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Rick Fore to Malek RE: various
Republican Senate defeats. 4 pgs.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Page 3 of 3
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
December 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Political Parties Project
You wanted the question of the public's attitude toward
political parties considered. This would include a
review of the CRP campaign surveys and the private ORC
materials.
I discussed the project at length with Bob Teeter and
Tom Benham independently. Both were intellectually
intrigued by the project. Both want to spend substantial
time and personal effort on the project. Teeter is
further along in his thinking because I talked to him
shortly after Larry discussed the project with me on
December 3. Teeter has submitted the attached rough
statement of his initial thoughts. Tom Benham was on
vacation until December 11 so has only begun thinking
about the project. He will submit his thoughts hopefully
early next week. Both have begun the computer work on
their respective previous data. Both want to spend the
next two to three weeks going over already available data
before submitting recommendations on whether or not to
conduct a new survey on the entire subject. This three
week thought time will not delay the survey should you
eventually decide to conduct one because both strongly
recommend against interviewing during the Holidays.
They cite last year's Wave I surveys conducted in
December as examples of the problems that develop. You
may recall that several states were late, had to be re-
interviewed and then weighed heavily to obtain reliable
data.
- 2 -
As to costs that Benham and Teeter may incur, I told
them that we would pay them at an appropriate, to-be-
negotiated rate. Neither considered this a problem
because all campaign polling bills have been paid.
Also, both are so professionally fascinated by the
project that we will receive a substantial amount of
personal effort and commitment unrelated to the details
of interviewing costs, etc.
GS/jb
POLITICAL PARTY ANALYSIS AND REALIGNMENT
The 1972 election was unique in several ways:
1. A Republican President won with over 60% of the vote.
2. There was a further trend toward ticket-splitting. There was
more ticket-splitting than in any previous election and it
appears that a disproportionate share of the new ticket-splitters
came from the previous Democratic core.
3. Turnout was extremely low with only about 55% of those
eligible actually voting.
4. A major new segment (18-24 year olds) was added to the electorate
for the first time since women's suffrage.
5. It was the second consecutive election in which the Democratic
candidate for President received less than 45% of the vote.
Clearly the coalition which had made the Democrats the majority
party since 1932 has broken up.
The fact the "new majority" was apparent only at the Presidential
level and that it was accompanied by an unprecedented amount of
ticket-splitting raises several fundamental questions about
the future of the present political parties in the country. Among
these are:
1. Is this increase in ticket-splitting over the past several years
transitory and the means to realignment or is it permanent
brought about by the increase in information the voters receive?
Should the objective of the President's political apparatus be
increase the base Republican vote or to hold what we have and
increase ticket-splitting among Democrats.
2. Can the new majority be consolidated under the Republican banner
or will it have to be done with some other device?
3. Do the present major political parties serve any useful purpose?
What are they? What is their influence on voting behavior?
4. What should be the role of political parties in the future?
How can they increase and maximize their influence on voting
behavior?
5. Should they promote ideological realignment?
6. What affect does the addition of a major new segment (18-24
year olds) have to the electorate?
7. Should a new political party be formed? If so, how, when?
How should it be positioned?
-2-
Given the results of the 1972 election a detailed study of changes
in voting patterns and attitudes toward political parties should
be made with the objective being to determine how the President's
new majority can be consolidated and built into a new long-term
political force which will support the President's positions and
which can be repeated electorally nationally and at state and
local levels.
I think such an analysis should have five components?
1. Voting Analysis
A detailed voting analysis to clarify what actual changes in
new voting patterns occurred and where the President increased
his strength disproportionately compared to a state or the
nation as a whole. The voting data, along with census data
should tell us if the President actually created new voting
patterns in addition to simply increasing his strength every-
where, and where, and with whom those patterns occurred.
In addition to providing some additional insight into the 1972
election this data is critical to campaign planning in 1974
and 1976. We used this data for many major decisions during
the campaign but had to collect and analyze it on a crisis
(and incomplete) basis in June because no one had done it
after previous elections.
This is something that could and should be done by the RNC
with some guidance. They have the staff and EDP capability
to do and are the only permanent continuing operation where
it could be kept and updated after each election. Ed DeBolt
and his staff did an excellent job in helping us with this
type of analysis during the campaign. It is all public data
and not particularly sensitive.
It should be done on two levels. The first step is to collect
and analyze the county data and the ward and township data for
the major SMSA's. It is the easiest to get, there are no com-
parability problems, and consequently can be combined easily
with the census.
Second, the present data for all the states should be collected
along with complete sets of present maps. This would allow a
finer level of analysis and be of tremendous use in future
elections. This data has to be collected early next year as
we found much of it unavailable for 1968 when we tried to go
back and get it this year.
This analysis should look at turnout, the Wallace vote, increase
in ticket-splitting, and changes in base party strength. The
first phase could be completed fairly soon if the staff help were
available to collect the data but the second will take several
-3-
months due to severe and varying data collection problems in
the different states. This is, however, the time when it
should be done as many of the precinct maps and much of the
data will be unavailable two or four years from now.
2. Further Analysis of 1972 Polling Data
Although we didn't study attitudes toward the parties in the
campaign polling, some further analysis may give us additional
insight into the President's majority. It would be particularly
useful to look at the similarities and differences of those
people who split their ticket for the first time and those who
have been splitting in past elections but largely for us.
It also appears that the conventional liberal and conservative
ideological groups are breaking up. This is particularly true
of those whose vote for the President was their first Republican
vote. They appear to be ideological hybrids who hold fairly
conservative views on some issues but fairly liberal views on
others. It is no longer possible to predict where a voter will
stand on a given issue from his position on another issue.
This point will be critical to building the new majority.
3. Post Election Studies
There are at least four good sources of reliable post election
data. We (MOR) have done five states (Michigan, Ohio, Illinois,
Indiana, Pennsylvania) on our own and the data will be avail-
able in early January. They were all telephone panels and the
interviewing was done within two weeks after the election.
AMPAC (American Medical Political Action Committee) had DMI do
several states (California, New York, Colorado, South Dakota,
Tennessee) and this data will be available in mid January.
They did not collect much information but it should at least
tell us who voted for who in those states.
Gallup did a national after-election which has been published
in part and presumably will be published in his printed
January report.
The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan did
a very comprehensive after-election in which they questioned
about the major parties. It will be the most useful data of
the three but will not be available until about April 1. I
have their questionnaire and will have access to their data.
4. A search for other data on realignment and attitudes toward
parties should be made. This should include talking with
those academics who are studying this phenomena. To my know-
ledge the SRC at the University of Michigan and William Dean
Burnham at MIT have done the most in this area and I have dates
to see them both in January.
-4-
I don't, however, think the academics will be of much help
to us as most of them are Democratic theologians at heart and
are trying to keep this old Democratic coalition together.
5. The primary data along with the voting analysis should be a
national poll designed for this purpose. It would give us
detailed data on the public's attitude toward parties and test
various hypotheses of how we can consolidate the President's
majority. It should give us good data on the geographic regions
and on those groups which the voting data and after-election
surveys indicate have actually changed their voting behavior.
This study should identify the commonalities of the two groups of
ticket-splitters who emerged in this election. Prior to this
election we have had a group of white upper-middle ticket-splitters
who have voted for more Republicans than Democrats and who were
fairly liberal before issues like busing, drugs, crime and property
taxes became acute. This year a new group of voters, largely
previous Democrats, split their ticket for the first time. This
was apparently because the President represented most of their
social values while the Democrats threatened them. Both of these
groups now have many of the same values and I think can be forged
into a majority along with the present Republican base. The one
common characteristic of them we observed in the campaign polling
is that both groups were comprised largely of people who had recently
or were in the process of moving up a socio-economic class. They
are the ones who are realizing the American dream.
We also need to find out if we can rid the Republican party image
of its rich big business aspect. The one common attitude among all
of the elements of the old Democratic coalition is their dislike
for wealth and big business.
It should also pay particular attention to non-voters. The rate and
way they might enter the electorate in the future could easily deter-
mine the majority party for the next generation. When major new
coalitions have been formed in the past it has often been done by
bringing new groups into the electorate. This was true of the
recent Democratic majority. Prior to 1932 many blue collar laboring
people didn't vote and when they entered the electorate in 1932 they
helped form the Democratic majority that lasted over 30 years. We
are currently doing a small scale study of non-voters in Ohio as
part of our after-election poll.
Other areas the poll should cover:
Basic attitudes toward parties.
What function do they serve? If any?
Does party affect voting behavior?
What function do people think parties should serve?
What do Republicans and Democratic parties stand for?
Does either represent them?
-5-
Is a new party needed?
Around what principle should it be formed?
What should it be called?
How should it be created?
What would attract people to it?
What groups would be available to a new party?
What should tie be between national and local parties, candidates?
Do voters want ideological realignment?
Are conventional ideologies definition valid?
What are the social values of the new majority?
Are Wallace voters significantly different from other new
majority voters?
The county level voting analysis could be and should be done
immediately. I don't know how long it will take to complete due
to the data collection problems but can work out a schedule with
the RNC people. The precinct level analysis should be started now
to insure comparability with the county data but will probably take
at least six months to complete.
The analysis of the campaign and after-election polling could be
done concurrently with the voting analysis and completed in January.
It will take some money for computer time to rerun the data but
should not take a lot. The data is all in computer readable form
at MOR.
The poll should be done as soon as these projects are completed.
The results from them should improve the design of the questionnaire
and provide some hypotheses to test. This poll should be a personal
interview study and should be large enough to provide a reliable
sample of both voters and non-voters. Separate questionnaires
should probably be used for voters and non-voters.
I think this analysis will also refute the liberal establishment
claim that the election was the defeat of McGovern personally and
of his campaign and not of his ideology. I think we can prove that
the election was a defeat of the far left and a victory for the
middle who support the traditional American values.
I also think our state after-election studies will prove that
there was very little or no relationship between the President
and most of the state and local races. It appears from the data
we have now that most voters viewed the Presidential and state
elections as two completely separate events that just happened to
be held on the same day. I see no evidence in our after-election
surveys that indicates Republicans stayed home because of the
President or that a disproportionate number of Democrats turned out
to vote for the President and voted straight Democratic on the rest
of the ballot.
EM L
12/3
- - need polling data to get
broad sense re
Parties -
- Rep, Dem, mo,
unseu
whe another party shed
- Party Image
be fermed
maybe date get all over pere Dee
- Race date -how identif
covelate u/ lil concert
cor " w/ Rn vote
a ver last yr, how has
trend of hil/conare.
- - whe post gone elee Survey
S hanlle.
How pay per t
whe 350 shed lg over funds
over etc next 4 yrs her poll
)
-Oreck whe clean then Innaig
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
As I discussed with you on the phone, we need to give some
Poll
consideration to developing a poll that tests the g general feelings
not
people have with regard to images of party, etc. For example,
set
how many people now tend to consider themselves Republicans,
Democrats, Independents? What do these parties stand for in
their minds? What are people's general feelings about parties,
why is there a trend toward Independents? Do people feel it's
time for the formation of a new party? How would they feel is
the best way to go about the formation of a new party, etc. ?
In addition, we should take a look at our pre-election data and
Teeter
try to get what information we can out of that as to what people
identify themselves with in terms of Republican, Democrat.
O'neill
One way to do this also would be to divide it up between the
pre-September data and the post-September data and compare
this. Another thing to do would be chart the trends on Republican,
Democrat, Independent over the last year from our data. It's
important here we use the raw data since the weighted data would
reflect a different situation.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
QUESTIONS
Two of the questions that should be included on the poll on
parties are:
Do you believe that one of the two major parties (Republican
or Democrat) basically represent your views or do you feel
there should be a new party?
If so, would you consider it to be a Liberal or Conservative
party?
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
December 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Computer Data Base
Assets at CRP
The CRP collected and used 31 million names for the
direct mail programs. The information related to
these names -- address, income, make of car, etc.,
is stored at UCC of which Sam Wyly is Chairman. In
addition to Wyly, access to the information is limited
to Jeb Magruder, Bob Marik, and Bob Morgan.
After November 7, Magruder asked Bob Morgan to prepare
a proposal on the value of maintaining the data base.
Morgan's proposal is at Tab A. The proposal makes two
essential points. First, the mobility of Americans
results in 20% moving each year. To maintain accurate,
usable lists they must be mailed and cleaned periodically.
Second, no one currently at the RNC has the loyalty or
talent to use the lists correctly.
The value of these lists should not be underestimated.
Bob Dole's first comments to the press after the
election included reference to seeing White House Staff
members to get the lists to the RNC. The Democrats use
the Minnesota-based firm of Sherman-Valentine, which
reportedly has 30 million names which are used at
Humphrey's direction. Sam Wyly has written the President
urging him to maintain and use this resource for the
1974 Congressional and State races. (Letter at Tab B.)
Magruder has been in touch with Wyly to indicate that he
will be advised of a decision soon.
Now that it is public information that George Bush will
be taking over the RNC on January 19, you should consider
- 2 -
transferring these mailing list assets to him. They will
substantially increase his clout and remove one of the
last points of dispute between the CRP and the GOP. For
the assets to be maintained and used correctly, we need
one technical person familiar with the collection and use
during the campaign. The candidate recommended by Magruder
and Morgan is Jim White, who worked during the campaign for
Morgan. The salary recommended is $30,000, which is too
high. He probably could be obtained for $25,000.
To transfer these assets to Bush at the RNC with appro-
priate emphasis of who is to direct their use, I recommend
that you call George Bush. A talking paper is attached at
Tab C.
GS/jb
DESCRIPTION TOBEAN
Novenber 20, 1372
1-15-80
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
BOB MORGAN
SUBJECT:
Future of Datr Base
This memorandum is designed to give an overview of the Data Base
and present viable alternatives for its future maintenance and
use.
The Voter Registration Data collected for the 1972 Presidential
Election could be used at President Nixon's discretion to support
Republican candidates during the next four years. However, since
the mobility of the American populace is such that 20% or more
move each year, the validity of the lists in 1976 will be minimal
unless a thorough Date Base naintenance Program is developed.
The results of integrating the Voter Identification Program with
the Political Direct Mail Program contributed greatly to the
higher turnout of voters favorable to President Nixon. This
concept will most likely be utilized in future campaigns at the
local level, as well as in future Presidential primaries and most
certainly in the General Election in 1976. The key states and the
volume of voters will remain approximately the same. The costs of
recreating the Data Base far exceed the cost of a four-year Data
Base Maintenance Program as shown at TAB A. This maintenance
program could either be funded through remaining campaign funds or
through a self-liquidating process.
RECOMMENDATION:
That a separate non-profit corporation called, "information Systems,
Incorporated" (151), be created to control the Data Base and have
ownership of the system at President Nixon's discretion. A draft
contract between UCC and ISI is attached as TAB B.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
- 2
RECOMMENDATION:
That at the first Board of Directors Meeting of ISI, the Finance
Committee to Re-elect the President assign ownership of the Data
Base, systems, and all other computer files of volunteers and
contributors to ISI, including the Finance Committee lists.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
RECOMMENDATION:
That a General Manager be named. The General Manager should be a
marketing-oriented systems expert able to sell these services, as
well 83 plan orderly, sophisticated improvements.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
I personally recommend Jim White for the position of General Manager
at ISI at a salary of $30,000 annually, plus expenses. Jim was a
Project Manager on the Political Direct Mail staff and as such, was
the trouble shooter in the systems area. His background includes
both marketing and systems experience so he fits the needs perfectly.
The fact that he is knowledgeable about the Data Base makes him
uniquely qualified for this assignment. His resume is attached as
TAB C. This could be a self-supporting program if --
- Republican Senators and Congressmen utilize the list
for monthly segmented franking mail at $15.00 per
thousand.
- The Administration uses the list for polling and other
selective mailings through 1SI.
- The list is used by commercial mailers through the
Direct Mail Standard Rates and Data Book.
RECOMMENDATION:
That services be sold to all approved Republican office-holders and
candidates at $15.00 per thousand as a base price, and that computer
services be made available at breakeven costs.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3
It seems more logical to expect a loss of $50,000 to $100,000
in 1973, however, the loss would be made up in 1974. Breakeven
could be expected in 1975, and substantial savings accrued for
the 1976 Election. A pro rata Profit and Loss Statement is
shown at TAB A. TAB A shows that if only 5,000,000 names were
used each year from 1973 through 1975, $31,750 would be lost
versus creating a new Data Base in 19761 for over $1,000,000.
If between 10,000,000 and 30,000,000 names were used each year
through the franking privilege, gross profits would be generated
that could be put back into the system to develop voter registration
lists in other battleground states.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Data Base for eight (8) states be registered in the
Direct Mail Standard Rates and Data Book for lease at $30.00 per
thousand.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
In order to determine public reaction and opinion to various
domestic and international issues, stratified samples including
all voter types, could be retrieved from the Data Base. The sample
size should vary with the reliability desired. Selected samples
could also be retrived for opinion to specific programs, i.e.,
older voters, urban voters, ethnics, youth, etc.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Administration sources request that polling samples be
purchased through ISI. (Just provide the source, not conduct the poll).
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
PRESENT VOTER IDENTIFICATION DATA BASE SUMMARY
The Political Direct Mail Department developed a Voter Registration
Data Base of approximately 31,000,000 registered voters in nine (9)
key states at a total cost of $1.1 million without any application
of overhead costs. During the first phase, individual vendors were
contracted to collect the voter registration lists of specific states
and to computerize this information into a standard format. Standard
edit programs were supplied to each vendor to validate the data. In
the second phase, at University Computing Company in Dallas, the Voter
Registration Data Base was expanded with specific demographic information
added.
- 4
In the nine (9) key states, those non-Republicans who were identified
as favorable to President Nixon were indicated on the file. These
states are:
STATE
NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS
CALIFORNIA
8,626,372
CONNECTICUT
1,373,465
ILLINOIS
2,682,289
MARYLAND
1,349,118
MICHIGAN
1,688,634
NEW JERSEY
3,196,192
OHIO
3,381,464
PENNSYLVANIA
5,157,088
TEXAS
3,970,274
TOTAL
29,736,262
Additionally, partial lists of registered Republican voters were
developed for four (4) states. These are:
STATE
FLORIDA
MASSACHUSETTS
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW YORK
EXPENDED EFFORT IN DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT
The development of the Voter Identification Data Base initially began
in those states which conducted Presidential primaries. The effort
for the nine (9) key states took about 3 1/2 months to obtain, convert
and edit the voter registration lists. Another month was spent
updating the names of favorable non-Republicans.
COMPUTER LISTS DEVELOPED AS BYPRODUCTS
The Committee for the Re-election of the President presently has
computer files containing over 56,000 names of contributors and
volunteers and 51,000 names of active youth volunteers. These
Contributor/Volunteer Lists are presently being converted to the
COMPLEMENTAL
5 -
standard 200-character format. TAB D shows the "Survey of Volunteer
and Contributor Files" outlining the title, format and quantity
of records for each list.
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR/VOLUNTEER LISTS
There are several lists of contributors' and volunteers that are
potentially available from the 1972 Campaign organizations. These
lists are:
- Telephone Program Key Leaders Lists (approximately 2,400
names)
- Telephone Centers' Volunteer Lists (approximately 75,000
names)
- State Chairmen's Volunteer Lists (approximately 170,000
names)
- Finance Committee Contributor Lists (quantity unknown)
- Democrats for Nixon Volunteer Lists (from other than Direct
Mail returns)
Another alternative would be to turn the Data Base and systems over
to the RNC. This alternative is not suggested for these reasons:
1. President Nixon looses direct control.
2. The Republican National Committee does not really
have a professional staff for control of the systems.
3. The Republican National Committee does not get
involved until after the candidate is nominated and
the President might want to support a candidate early
in the primary campaign.
4. The system in 1976 must be developed in January 1976,
at the latest or a useful product will not be ready
for voter identification after the Republican Convention.
Attachments:
TAB A
TAB B
TAB C
TAB D
CC: Dr. Robert H. Marik
SAM WYLY
P.O. Box 6228
DALLAS, TEXAS 75222
and
November 28, 1972
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
My family and associates are most grateful for America's
overwhelming affirmation of your record of accomplish-
ment and powerful leadership.
While it's fresh in my mind, I want to call to your attention
the existence of a very powerful direct mail campaign tool
in the combined data base, programs and expertise which
exist in the Committee to Re-Elect and in University
Computing Company.
This asset was created by work that was done for the sole
purpose of your re-election this year (and in retrospect you
most certainly would have won without it or most any other
specific campaign investment for that matter), but it is an
asset that can be used to add Republican Congressional
support for your Administration in 1974 and to assist the
Republican Presidential nominee in 1976 and in later years.
But unless you make a decision to maintain this resource
with a few people and a small budget over the next two years,
its value to you will quickly dissipate.
Bob Morgan (under Jeb Magruder) knows those resources in
detail.
Sincerely,
Sam Wyly
Sam Wyly
P.S.
The obvious answer seems to be to turn it over to
the Republican National Committee. But the talent to
make good use of this system, and to improve it,
simply is not in the Republican National Committee at
this time. It is in the Committee to Re-Elect the
President.
cc:
Mr. John Ehrlichman
SAM WYLY
P.O. Box 6228
DALLAS, TEXAS 75222
To The President
Through Mr. Bob Haldeman
TALKING PAPER FOR GEORGE BUSH
Re: Direct Mail Lists -- Transfer to RNC
1) During the campaign 31 million names were
collected and used in the direct mail, get-out-the-vote
program. The President sent 9 million telegrams based
on these lists.
2) The lists and backup computer information are
currently held at UCC (Sam Wyly). Only Jeb Magruder
and two technical people have access. These assets must
be maintained and used to make them fully effective in
1974 and 1976.
3) The GOP through Bob Dole has expressed a desire
for them to be transferred to the RNC. The President has
decided to do this, but I must emphasize that in every
respect these assets, which cost $5 million to develop
during the campaign, are his personal property to be used
as I direct.
4) One person who worked on the collection and use
of these assets during the campaign is Jim White. As
you re-staff the RNC you should consider hiring him at
the approximate salary of $25,000.
GS
12/14/72
Perman - -Valentine - Mimn based
HH werd orig in 20
bury no gent world for mcG,
the some selle leral cono
P 4- - # of regis votes
18,626,372 000 - # of Hscholds
92% of the voting
36 biganties in we - tape less
all Regis coters not brolen
by whe Cava or oppose P.
Thank you letters - pund up on
computer - same time
- all Jones on Mergan's lists
Fore + maril
- Balsden - nen edited lists
Shld all be under ( format
- all contril lists on std
form edited
- Use overhead of Pal Data Base
Sent 21,000,000 1 pleces 9mil in
nJJ Cal
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date 12/4
TO: GORDON STRACNAN
FROM:
GEORGE COLLINS
EVEN though you're now
with USIA, It MIGHT be
best FOR You to DiRecT
this
DATA BASE
PAIRATA P&L STATEMENT
TAbA
NAMES USED
1913
1974
1975
10AM
20144
30mm
Sam
14/21/19
20mm
30AM
SHM
10MM
20AM
3004
IN.
E
Names@YIS/A
* 75000
4,50000
$ 30 0000
$ 450000
# # 75000 750.00
$150000
$ 300000
$ 450000
4
75000
1/150000
&
300000
$ 450.00
Reserved Polling Selective
20,000
10000
20000
20000
20000
20000
2000
20000
20000
20000
20000
20200
Commercial USE
25000
15000
25000
ESETO
75000
35000
25000
25500
3000
7.5m
25000
25279
AL
9
120000
# 195000
$ 345000
4950000
#120000
195000
#345000
495000
$ 120.00
$ 195000
$345000
a
495000
in
5-June white SALARY
30000
100
30000
30000
30000
30000
30000
36000
30000
30000
90000
30020
July Who to Expenses
6000
170
6000
6000
coor
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
OFFICE Rent
6000
1:50
6000
6000
6010
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
Tel E/MISC
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
Part Hame Steretary
son.
5000
5000
5000
5002
Sen
5000
5000
Im
50.00
5000
570
DATA Processing " losts "
20000
HOOD
80000
130000
20000
40000
80000
120000
win
46000
T0000
120000
set
Sir
5030
5000
SER
5022
5000
5000
5.22
5020
5000
'0.0
in
14
6250
(250
6250
6750
6250
6250
6250
6250
650
6250
USO
6250
LIST CLEANING
4500
75000
135000
195000
40000
55000
95000
135000
40000
35000
95.00
135000
PROGRAMING losts
10002
20000
30000
40000
5000
10000
15020
20000
5000
10000
10000
10000
# 137250
* 197250
#307250
#417250
127250
67250
252250
331250
$ 127250
it
187250
247250
327250
PROFIT
$1725
(#250)
$ 37720
$ 77750
$
(7250)
#
27750
#
92750
a
157750
if
(7250)
as
1750
ind
97750
2.65750
14/3-1975
5AM NAMES USED.
(9(31150)
10mm NAMES USED
$ 33250
DOMM NAMES USED
$ 228250
30/MM NAMES USED
$ 403250
D
R
a
F
T
DIVICES
Agreement, entered into as of the 1st day of December, 1972, in the city
of Dallas, Texas, by and between UNIVERSITY COMPUTING COMPANY, having its
principal place of business at 7200 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, Texas
(hereinafter referred to as "UCC"), and INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC PROBATED,
having its principal place of business at Washington, District of Columbia
(hereinafter referred to as "ISI"),
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, UCC desires to store and protect two (2) copies of the Voter
Registration Data Base (VRDB), and to provide data processing services on
as required basis; and
WHEREAS, ISI has need of such services in the conduct of its business;
NOW THEREFORE, UCC and ISI in consideration of the mutual promises and
commitments made herein, hereby mutually agree as follows:
A. BASIC SERVICES. UCC agrees to provide the following services for ISI,
and in this regard agrees to commit its best efforts to perform hereunder to
the satisfaction of ISI, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set
forth:
- 2
1. ISI will assign ownersnip 002 termined cabinets remaining
from the six thousand (6,000) purchased under the Agreement for Services
between the University
Re-elect the President
executed as of the Is:
072, which
described in EXHIBIT A attached to and incorporated
herein by reference.
2. UCC will store and protect two (2) copies of the Voter
Registration Data Base (VRDB) for California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas, as well as all other tapes
and systems of ISI in exchange for the tapes and cabinets as described in
Item I above, which are more particularly described in EXHIBIT B attached to
and incorporated herein by reference. It is understood by both parties that
UCC will store one (1) copy of the VRDB at the UCC facility located at
2910 Avenue F, Arlington, Texas, and will physically protect and preserve the
integrity of the VRDS. A second copy will be stored under the same conditions
in a separate location acceptable to both parties.
3. As pait of the storage of the VRDB, UCC will perform the
following maintenance tasks:
2. Store large counties with greater than 100,000 households
of the VRDD on single tape reels.
b. Combine small counties of less than 100,000 households
of the come stat. to reduce the number of tape reals stored.
C. Read and duplicate the primary copy once each year to
ensure readability.
d. Clean and re-wind the second copy once each year.
e. Upon request from ISI, UCC will make available a copy of
the VRDB to their representatives who will be designated to UCC in writing.
4. UCC will provide physical protection through the use of
restricted access to the locked areas in which the copies of the VRDB is stored.
During periods of maintenance or requested processing by 151, UCC will exercise
the same precautions used in handling UCC private and confidential data to
protect the integrity of the data contained in the VADB.
5. At the request of ISI, UCC will provide data processing services
required to process, modify or update, or other similar services associated
with the VRDB. In the event such request is made by ISI and performed by UCC,
than ISI will pay UCC for such services in accordance with the rate schedule
in Part B of this Agreement. ISI in such request of services will use all
existing programs such as:
H0060
Match File Edit
H006)
Chick Digit Match Key
H0062
Match File Update
H0063
haven File Ubdate
H0064
Street Report Formatter
H0065
Telephone Report Formatter
H0070
Card Looder
40065
E-11-
H0072
Data Base Update
Additional programming will be billed by UCC to ISI as indicated in Part B
of this Agree lent.
B. PAYMENT AND PRICING
1. It is agreed that ISI transfers, assigns 171 conveys all rights,
title and ownership of
as described in Section
A.1 of this Agreement for the services set forth in A.2, A.3 and A.4 (Less
those used for tapes kept).
2. EXTRA SERVICES. All requirements of ISI for service not
identified and described as "Extra Services" in the Agreement shall be
considered as "Extra Services" and shall be determined in accordance with this
paragraph. ISI may make requests for "Extra Services" from time to time after the
date of this Agreement. All such requests shall be subject to the mutual
agreement of the parties as to scheduling of performance, and charges to ISI
for such "Extra Services". All such services, and the agreements as to
scheduling and charges in relation thereto, shall be fully described and
reflected in ATTACHMENT "A" to this Agreement and subsequent amendments to said
attachment as shall be hereafter attached to this Agreement and incorporated
by reference. UCC shall invoice ISI for requested services provided on or
about the 1st and 15th of each month, as applicable. ISI will make prompt
payment of all invoices within fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, remitted
Pursuant to the instructions appearing in related UCC Invoices.
There shall be added to said charges amounts equal to any taxes, however
designated, levied or based on such charges or on this Agreement, or the services
provided hereunder, including present or future state and local sales, use,
priviloge. excise or other taxes applicable to the sale of services herounder.
- 5 -
and any taxes or amounts in lieu thereof paid or payable by UCC in respect
of the foregoing, exclusive, however, of personal property taxes assessed
on USC 11.E. i..us Cases base. on net income.
C. LIAISON. UCC and 151
7
in UCC's successful
rendering of the services under 113 3 Agreement is continuing and effective
cooperation and liaison in all areas related to data processing and the prompt,
effective support from ISI and all involved third parties. ISI agrees to.
designate in writing to UCC the identity of qualified personnel whose direct
assignment will be to work with and give direction to UCC personnel in the
implementation of this Agreement, and when decisions are required, to make
available officers or authorized representatives of ISI who shall have the
authority to make such decisions in a timely manner. UCC will also designate
in writing to ISI the identity of its qualified personnel whose direct
assignment will be to work with ISI and to make required decisions in a timely
manner.
D. PROPRIETARY NATURE OF SUBJECT MATTER. UCC agrees not to sell, reveal
or otherwise distribute copies of any informational, technical, or other
materials to be provided pursuant to this Agreement. All tapes, software
and information belonging to ISI are proprietary and UCC has no rights whatsoever
in ISI's data.
E. WARRANTY DISCLAIMER. Both parties agree that this is and shall be
construed to be a contract for services only, regardless of the tangible form
in which or by which the services may be from time to time presented to ISI.
The parties contemplate that their cooperation pursuant to this Agreement
should produce performance of the data processing requirements at the lowest
feasible rate of error, and both parties agree to use their best efforts in
achieving this goal. ISI holds UCC responsible for all reports and programs
generated and hence, any decisions based on information given to ISI from
UCC has to be considered correct and proper. UCC will be held responsible for
financial losses based on incorrect data generated.
F. LIMITATIONS. Notwithstanding the form (e.g., contract, negligence,
express or implied warranty or otherwise) in which any legal or equitable action
or claim may be brought or alleged against UCC, UCC shall be liable for all
seeable liability for damages, including, but not limited to special or
exemplary damages. UCC's liability, if any, arising out of or in any way
related to its performance of the services or furnishing the supplies covered
by this Agreement shall not be limited to the actual damages incurred by ISI as
the result of UCC's failure to perform as agreed or otherwise implied. UCC
shall not be liable for any damages caused by ISI-furnished data base, data
or programs.
G
EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE. Neither UCC nor ISI will be liable to
the other for non-performance of contract terms, damages or delays prominently
caused by fire, electrical failure, stroke, boycott, war, civil disturbance,
sabotage, risk, Act of God, governmental orders or regulations, or other causes
- 7 -
similar to any of the above, which is beyond the control of either party.
UCC will not be responsible for schedule delays or other non-performance under
this Agreement when caused by incorrect, inadequate or incompatible data
furnished by ISI or those third persons designated by it, or when ISI is in
breach in any term or condition of this Agreement.
H. TERM AND TERMINATION
1. This Agreement is effective as of the date first above written
and shall continue in effect until November 2, 1976, at which time it shall
expire unless terminated earlier as hereinafter provided:
2. EARLY TERMINATION. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of
the above paragraph, this Agreement may be terminated at any time at the option
of 1SI. In the event of such early termination, payment will be made to ISI
by UCC at a rate of Thirty-One Thousand Dollars ($31,000) less Seven Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($750.00) for each month that this Agreement has been effective.
3. In the event notification is received from ISI for permanent or
early termination, all data, magnetic tapes, computer programs and other
technical used will net :- the importy of ISI and UCC will provide
such date. thous, corrers and off me! time to any third conts designated in
writing by 1S1. UCC has no title or interest in said data and said magnetic
tapes, said programs and said technical aterials.
1. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
in
performance of its obligations under
this 000 shall DU at indepe However, ISI
reserves the sole right to approve all management and technical personnel;
supervise management; control direction, procurement and performance by UCC;
and further, ISI reserves the right to approve all subcontractors
1. NOTIFICATION CF HITENDED USE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR BY UCC.
Notification of the intent of UCC to use a subcontractor in the performance of
services for ISI must be in accordance with the notice provisions set out in
this Agreement.
J. GOVERNING LAW. This Agreement and the performance thereunder will be
governed by the laws of the State of Texas.
K. NOTICES. Any notice required or permitted to be delivered hereunder
shall be deemed to be delivered, whether actually received or not, when
deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, registered or certified
mail, addressed to the parties hereto at their. respective addresses as they
may hereafter designate by written notice delivered pursuant to this article.
IF TO UCC:
University Computing Company
P.O. Box 6171
Dollas, Texas 75222
ATTENTION: General Counsel
IF TO ISI:
L. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. The entire Agreement between the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof is contained in this Agreement and the
attachments hereto. Any terms and conditions to any letter, memorandum,
purchase order or other instrument issued prior to the Execution DATE (specified
below) by ISI or UCC in com.
-
with
is Agreement which are in addition
to or inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall not
be binding on either party. It is understood, however, that the terms of any
written amendment or other written agreement executed by the parties subsequent
to the Execution Date of this Agreement shall be binding notwithstanding the
fact that they may be in:addition to or inconsistent with the terms and
conditions of this Agreement.
EXECUTED as of the date first above written.
ATTEST:
UNIVERSITY COMPUTING COMPANY
WITNESS
WITNESS
ATTEST:
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED
WITNESS
WITNESS
JAMES W. WHITE
1400 South Jove
28202
703/521-6098
EDUCATION
B.S.
Psychology and Business, Florida State University
M.B.A.
Industrial Management, Florida State University
Graduate coursework in Management Information Systems
Wharton Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania
Honors
University Teaching Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
Graduate Assistantship, Florida State University
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
7/71 - present
INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
As a self employed consultant, he has consulted with various commercial
and local government organizations concerning the planning, design, and
implementation of computer information systems. Primary clients
have been: Data Dynamics, Inc., Knowledge Networks International, Inc.,
the City of Tallahassee, Florida, and GTE Information Systems.
8/68 6/71
COMPUTER DATA SYSTEMS, INC.
Director of Marketing and Public Relations
In 1970, he was promoted to direct the marketing and public relations
activities of the corporation including client relations, stockholder
relations, new business development, technical proposals, and
governmental relations. His primary effort was devoted to meeting
the management of commercial and government organizations and
defining their management information needs in order to begin the
system analysis Dinction as consuments.
Director of Advanced Programs
For 18 months he had responsibility for the direction of all new
consulting and contract programming activities of the firm. He was
Project Director for a large information retrieval system for the
National Institutes of Health, where he supervised a staff of 35
professionals. He was Project Manager for the design of a
MEDICAID Fligibility and MIS System utilizing S/360-50 with OS,
MFT, BTAM, FASTER sollware.
Resume' - Page 2
Manager, Management Information Systems
As MIS Manager, he was responsible for the analysis, design, and
programming of three management information systems: a Financial
Management Information System utilizing S/360-OS, B1AM for the
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOONDAI an Intelligence
System utilizing S/360 NIPS for the U.S. ARMY CONTIS
Management Information System to define the optime
routing air mail utilizing S/360-CS for the U.S.
DEPARTMINT.
7/66 8/68
N/1. VAL malla.
PENTAGON SUPPORT CENTER
Management Information System Project Manager
Responsible for the design and programming of a major MIS for
budgeting, direct costing, indirect costing, cost modeling, the
operations of a $20 million per year operation. The project was
completed in 18 months on schedule. He,designed the sub-systems
for independent operation by separate departments utilizing an
integrated data base. The syster operates in the on-line updating
mode using BTAM and produces both printed reports, CRT queries,
and hard copy graphics.
Senior Systems Analyst
He served as a systems analyst and programming supervisor for
the design and programming of the sub-systems of the NMCS Manage-
ment Information System. Additionally, he conducted hardware
feasibility studies, cost benefit analysis, computer equipment
evaluations, and wrote management plans for installation of five
IBM S/360 Model 50's and 65's.
9/64 6/66
WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Instructor in Industry
Teaching courses such as Indust 1.11 Management, Management
Systems, and Social Psychology of Industry. Conducted research
and ore mining in On are. of CORD er similation,
9/61 8/64
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
Instructor in Management
Teaching courses such as: Principles of Management, Business
Policy And Decision Making, and Homan :1 Relations in Business.
Airo worled as a carch Assistant and Computer Programme: for
Argonne Research Foundation,
Resume' - Page 3
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
1.
:: By Execution and the
Regional Corference 00 Manugement S
2. "Reciness S. lation For C .1 Condrol
stitute Working Paper.
3.
Starly of you of Performance
on Business subjection Com: der Owmes", 1964, Master's Thesis,
Florida State University Graduate School.
4.
"System Design of A Financial Management Information System",
1969, National Science Foundation.
5. "System Design Specifications for t' NMCS Management Information
System!! 1968, NMCS Technical Publications, Classified.
6. Other:
In the past five years, Mr. White has written numerous tech-
nical proposals for the analysis, design and development of
information systems. Some of them are:
Implementation of a Legal Information Retrieval System
for the State of California.
Data Processing Requirements for On-Line - Systems, City
of Tallabassee.
Statewide Criminal Justice Information Syste, for the
State of Delaware.
Regional Criminal Justice Information System, for the
City of Jacksonville.
City Criminal Justice Information System, for the
City of Nashville.
G
Design and Imprementation of a Management Information
System for the National Science Foundation.
c
Development of Message Switching and Data Management
Systems for the U. S. Navy, NAVCOSSACT,
Job Bank Retrieval System, States of New Jersey,
Deleware, and Texas.
MEDICAID On-Line Eligibility Information Retrieval
System, City of Washington, D. C.
SURVEY OF VOLUNTEER AND CONTRIBUTOR FILES
I
VENDOR
FORMAT
QUANTITY
51.00
irn Cards " Republican
Nichols
OPSCAN
26,000
D of
urn Card
Democrat
Nichols
200 CH.
5.000
Y: his
List
Nichols
LABEL
54,500
Fl: id:
eers - Amary
Donnelley
150 CH.
43,
Florida C
ibutors " Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
5.000
--
Mar lan Not itec 3 - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
6.057
Moryland Cont i are - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
7
Mic igan Volunt no - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
849
Michigan Contri ors - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
453
New Hampshire Volunteers - Primary
Donnelley
150 150 CH.
227
Now Ham-shire C... ributors - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
595
Wis onsin Volum :rs - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
1,400
Wisconsin Contributors - Primary
Donnelley
150 CH.
3:0
TOTAL:
107,460
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
December 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Preliminary Election Turnout
Analysis
A substantial amount of information has been received
concerning voter turnout on November 7, 1972. Some
reliable information on turnout in certain demographically
interesting political units has been analyzed. Preliminary
conclusions by Tom Benham, Bob Teeter, John Davies at
Gallup, and Fred Malek are presented below.
A great deal more definitive information will be received
during the next four weeks. John Davies has promised me
the opportunity to go through the demographic tables of
the Gallup post-election survey. Although Davies has not
yet delivered on his promise, I plan to insure my access.
Bob Teeter's partner, Fred Currier, is supervising part
of the Survey Research Center's post-election study.
Preliminary results will be available in early January,
in spite of the fact that the formal study will not be
available until April. Bob Teeter also conducted post-
election surveys for unrelated clients in Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. In Ohio an additional
survey will be conducted only among those who did not vote.
The first data will be available the first week of January.
Finally, precinct abstracts from most counties are required
to be certified by states during December.
To summarize the currently available information and
conclusions:
1) Tom Benham says the addition of 25 million 18-20
year old voters to the rolls substantially reduced the
overall percentage turnout. Under 30 year olds historically
have the lowest turnout percentage and the addition of
this low vote turnout group brought the percentage of the
entire population down. Only 12 million of the 25 million
youth vote went to the polls, confirming the pattern of
only 50% turnout by the under 30 year olds. Teeter calcu-
lates this only accounted for 2% of the 7% national turnout
percentage drop.
2) Benham believes there was a low level of interest
in the election. His discussions with the Gallup Organization
confirm that there was apparently little enthusiasm for either
the President or McGovern. Benham's personal view is that
the generally low morale of the regular Democrate and their
losses resulted in little effort to turn out their votess.
3) Benham also believes that many dedicated Wallace
voters would not vote without their candidate on the ballot.
McGovern also lost some of his most ardent supporters
because of his post-Democratic Convention activities
(Eagleton, waffling, etc.).
4) Benham contends that the general trend in turnout
percentage since 1960 (1960-64%; 1964-628; 1968-618; 1972-
54.5%) has been accentuated by the increased mobility of
people which disenfranchiees them because they do not get
re-registered. Benham again relies heavily on the Gallup
post-election survey which indicates that 38% of the 45.5%
didn't bother to registereor were prevented from registering
by residence requirements.
5) Bob Teeter has reviewed the demographic information
gathered by the RNC on the top 15 SMSAs (statistical units
that are basically the large metropolitan areas). The
conclusion is clear that in big cities there was a signifi-
cantly lower turnout. Teeter theorizes that this was attri-
butable to the decline of big city machines, disenchantment
of labor Hosses with McGovern, and apathy among the suburban,
upper-middle income ticket splitter.
6) Teeter does not believe that the decrease in
turnout was partially attributable to the fewer number
of statewide contests. Many states have shifted to electing
their Governors in non-Presidential years. Some people
argue that the statewide races increase the percentage of
turnout for the Presidential contest. Teeter cites Ohio
- 3 -
and Pennsylvania where there were no Gubernatorial nor
Senatorial races. In 1968 the Ohio turnout was 63%
compared with 56% in 1972. Pennsylvania had 65% in
1968 and 55% in 1972. Yet in Illinois where both
Senatorial and Gubernatorial seats were contested the
turnout in 1968 was 69% and the turnout in 1972 was 58%,
a drop of 11% compared with Pennsylvania's 10% dopp and
Ohio's 7% drop.
7) Teeter says that states which have historically
high turnouts dropped in 1972, while states with histori-
cally lower turnouts remained relatively constant. For
example, the Minnesota turnout trend is 1960-76%, 1964-
76%, 1968-740, and 1972-64%. New York continued its
downward trend: 1960-67%, 1964-65%, 1968-60%, and 1972-
57%. Yet the New Mexico trend is 1960-62%, 1964-628,
1968-618, and 1972-59.8%. In the South the historically
low turnout did not drop precipitously. In Alabama the
1960 percentage was 31%, in 1964-36%, in 1968-53%, and
in 1972-44%. So the 1972 deviation from the 1960, 1962,
and 1968 averages was not great.
8) Concerning the toughest question of whether the
Republican Party, both organizationally and in high
Republican precinct areas, delivered their vote, the
tentative conclusion is no. The most accurate information
available is from Ohio. Malek considered it one of his
best states, organizationally. Yet the percentage of total
turnout dropped from 63% in 1968 to 56% in 1972. In Teeter-
identified core Republican precincts which in 1964 and 1968
turned out 91-93%, in 1972 only 85% turned out. However,
in a poorly organized state such as Pennsylvania, the drop
was 10% (1968-65% to 1972-55%). Malek argues that the
organizational effort kept Ohio from dropping from 7% to
10%. The CRP efforts could also be credited with holding
the California turnout drop to 2% (1968-60%, 1972-58%).
In those states where a purely Republican organization was
responsible, the deop in turnout was even more precipitous.
In Idaho, the 1968 turnout was 73% and in 1972 it was 57%.
Even in states with statewide races and limited CRP efforts,
the drop in Iowa was from 70% in 1968 to 63% in 1972 and in
Kansas the drop was from 65% in 1968 to 56% in 1972. Both
of these drops are more than the national average of 6.5%.
- 4 -
9) On the more theoretical level, Teeter has dis-
cussed the reasons at length with Jack Saloma, the MIT
political science professor and author of The Parties.
Neither can point to any specific factor, but both agree
that the intensity of opposition to McGovern convinced
many to vote for the President and many not to vote at
all. Also, the President held a fairly firm 20% lead
which increased the apathy/election sewed-up attitude.
Finally, neither can establish that the Watergate and
related incidents had any substantial influence on the
turnout. Sindlinger of course contends otherwise.
CRP Analysis
Malek received two detailed commentaries on the 1972 election.
One was prepared by Rick Fore, who wrote the original analysis
of the McGovern California campaign. Fore analyzed the indi-
vidual Senate races. The other is by Bob Marik who supervised
all the research, direct mail, and telephone operations at
1701. Marik's memorandum describes the plans for complete
analysis of the 1972 election. Malek approved all aspects
except the nationwide post-election survey. Both memoranda
are attached. Several of Fore's comments on the Senate
races deserve your consideration:
1) Republican Senators lost seats because of poor
individual campaigns;
2) Alabama -- The President carried Alabama with 76%
while Blount received 34% to Sparkman's 66%. Wallace and
major newspapers endorsed Sparkman. Alabamans felt there
was no White House support for Blount. Blount's personality
and media campaign turned voters off;
3) Maine -- The President received 70% and Smith only
47%. Her age had been an issue in the primary. She would
not accept assistance from the Administration or CRP. She
campaigned only on weekends while Hathaway campaigned
aggressively;
4) Kentucky - The President received 65% but Nunn
received only 48%. GOP infighting in Kentucky became a
liability. Nunn's tax increase resulted in him being tagged
"Nickle Nunn".
- 5 -
5) Colorado -- The President received 64% and Allott
49%. Allott was over-confident until it was too late.
Allott was old and was on the wrong side of the ecology
issue and Winter Olympic referendum;
6) Georgia -- The President received 75% and Thompson
only 45%. Thompson's poor campaign staff did not tie in with
the President's advertising, canvassing, and get-out-the-
vote efforts;
7) Iowa -- The President received 59% and Miller 45%.
Miller was over-confident and a poor campaigner. Miller
did not cooperate with either the CRP or GOP, and had voted
against Butz;
8) Delaware -- The President received 60% and Boggs
49%. Biden's aggressive personal campaign was made more
effective because of good media. Boggs' age and tie to
unpopular Governor Peterson were negatives;
9) Montana --- The President received 60% and Hibbard 49.8%.
No one in Washington thought Hibbard had a chance and so no
money, surrogates, or effective CRP leadership were sent to
help;
10) South Dakota -- The President received 54% and
Hirsch 43%. Abourezk was a popular, good campaigner while
Hersch's chances were over-rated because he had poor name
identification, no professional management and little money;
11) Rhode Island -- The President received 53% and
Chafee ran away from the President to 46%. Chafee had ppor
management and an ineffective personal campaign.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORATCUM
November 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Analysis Ra C: the Coattail
FRED MALEK
FROM:
ВОБ MARIK
SUBJECT:
Effect on the 1972 Election
This memo outlines recommendations for analyzing why Republican
candidates for statewide and local offices did not fare better
in the wake of the landslide for President Nixon.
The election of 1972 had several unique aspects:
A landslide of unprecedented proportions for a
Republican President.
Unexpectedly poor showings by Republican candidates
for Senate, Governor, Congress and state legislatures.
The Lovert percent turnout of eligible voters for a
Presidential election since 1948.
The participation of 18-20 year olds for the first time
in a Presidential election.
One of the most concerted person-to-person grass roots
effort ever conducted by a national Republican campaign.
Kevin Phillips has suggested that large numbers of Republicans
and Republican-leaning Independents stayed home on Election Day,
possibly because of Watergate. Others have suggested that the
President's overwhelming lead in the polls created apathy on the
part of his partisans. Conversely, many candidates for statewide
and local races felt that the Committee turned out many Democrats
who voted for the President and then voted for Democrats on the
rest of the ticket.
The last minority party Presidential landslide took place 16
years ago. Since then, the voters have become much more sophis-
ticated in the splitting of their ticket. In addition, some
profound party realignments appear to be in progress. Elements
of the Roosevelt coalition, especially blue collar ethnics,
Southern whites and Jewish voters are showing increased inclination
to vote for the Pepublican Presidential candidate. At the same
time, upper-middle income subsibinites, the "high-end" ticket-
splitters, are tending to vote more often on the Democratic line.
-2-
For all of the foregoing reasons, the generalizations of the past
relating to landslides and coattails may not fit the 1972 voting
results. à carsful, in-depti. analysis of the election returns
must be made before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the
President's effect on the rest of the ticket.
Proposed Method of Analysis
Three projects are contemplated to analyze the election results.
Post-Election Poll. Bob Teeter has proposed a poll to be conducted
on a nationwide sample of registered voters. The purpose is to
determine the reasons why support was given to the Presidential
candidates, and how that support extended down the ticket. The
survey will also examine the reasons why the non-voters stayed
home. The questionnaire is projected to go into the field on
November 24 or 25. It will require about ten days in the field
and another ten days to two weeks for analysis. Early results
would be available by mid-December, with the completed analysis
by the last week of the month.
In addition, several post-election surveys are being conducted in
separate states. Market Opinion Research is conducting polls in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Indiana. California
and Colorado are being surveyed by AMPAC. Those results will be
available within a short time.
Analysis of Voting Results by County. Dan Evans of Bob Teeter's
Re-election Committee staff, is collecting voting results for all
counties across the country. He will compare these turnout results
with 1968 statistics, and construct maps to graphically display the
trends. Although this analysis will be too coarse to discern
detailed patterns, it may uncover some of the basic factors which
combined to yield the extremely low turnout of 1972. The county
analysis is useful because that data is available much earlier than
precinct data in most states.
Analysis of Voting Results by Precincts. Precincts will be selected
to analyze turnout patterns by voter segment. For example, high
Republican precincts will be studied LO see whether Republican
turnout fell off more than proportionately from 1968. High Demo-
cratic precincts which supported the President will show whether
those Democrats turned out in high numbers and contributed to the
defeat of local Republican candidates. A complete grid of all
important voter segments should be constructed, so that the relative
turnout and ticket-splitting of each type can be analyzed. Some of
the more important characteristics are:
Party
Republicans
Democrats
Pro-Nixon
Pro-McGovern
Pre-Vallace in primorios
-3-
Social Group
Young Veters
Older Voters
Blacks
Jewish
Middle-income urban (Peripheral Urban Ethnic-type)
High income
Peripheral urban ethnics (blue collar)
Spanish surname
Location
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Impact of Campaign
Precincts of high telephone/door-to-door canvass/direct mail
Precincts of low campaign activity.
Bob Teeter has already begun some analysis of Ohio precinct results.
This work is being coordinated with this overall project to avoid
duplication. The RNC is also collecting and analyzing local election
data. Their activities should also be brought into the context of
one coordinated effort. I am working with Ed DeBolt to accomplish
that objective.
Data for many precincts will not be available until after January 1,
1973. Therefore, the analysis will have to extend until mid-January
or later. Interim results would be available sooner.
Most of the people now associated with this project will be working
at other jobs by January. A project coordinator is needed who can
maintain continuity and give professional judgment to the analysis.
Recommendation
That Bob Teeter be engaged, in a consulting role, to oversee the
precinct analysis until its completion. Bob is already coordinating
the first two parts of the overall post-election evaluation, as well
as doing some precinct analysis. The RNC would provide the staff
to perform the data collection and tabulation. Bob could spend
a few days per month to give the required overall direction.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
gordon Strachan
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM
November 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FRED MALEK
FROM:
RICK FORE
SUBJECT:
U. S. Senate Race Losses
In my post-election memo to you, I pointed out that our Senate race
defeats were cases of poor individual campaigns rather than a pattern.
After checking with our campaign leadership across the country, we
found that most of the losing campaigns had negative factors.
Following is a list of Senate races, along with the reasons that we
feel each Republican candidate lost,
ALABAMA Nixon 76%
Sparkman 66%
Blount 34%
1. Sparkman ran a strong campaign in a Democratic state.
2. Major newspapers endorsed Sparkman.
3. Wallace endorsed Sparkman more than nominally.
4. Alabamans felt there was no real White House support of
the Blount candidacy.
5. Sparkman reminded people that if he lost, Proxmire would
be the Banking Committee Chairman. This strategy brought
Sparkman a great deal of money for his pre-election TV and
newspaper blitzes.
6. Blount was not a good personality for campaigning.
7. Major criticism of TV advertising. The more exposure Blount
received, the more he lost.
MAINE
Nixon 70%
Hathaway 53%
Smith 47%
1. Smith ran campaign alone. Little if any coordinated effort
with GOP or CREP.
2. Refused all type of help from administration -- money, etc.
3. Smith's relationship to her administrative assistant.
4. The greatest negative of the race in Maine was the fact that
Senator Smith was 75 years old. This was an issue that
carried over from the GOP primary.
5. Smith campaigned very little -- mostly on weekends.
6. Hathaway campaigned aggressively in 482 communities.
U. S. Senate Race Losses
Noyember 28, 1972
Page 2
KENTUCKY
Nixon 65%
Huddleston 52%
Nunn 48%
1. The GOP infighting in Kentucky proved to be a liability,
2. The greatest negative of the Nunn campaign was that he
reneged on his promise of no new tax increase during his
term as governor. In raising the sales tax from 3c to 5c,
the Governor became known as "Nickle Nunn".
3. Another negative from Nunn's term as governor was his use,
or misuse, of patronage.
4. Huddleston was a clean candidate with no reasons for Demo-
crats to dislike him.
5. The incumbent administration of Governor Ford used all
possible leverage to assist Huddleston,
COLORADO
Nixon 64%
Haskell 51%
Allott 49%
1. Senator Allott was over-confident == did not feel he needed
the help until it was too late.
2. Allott upset farmers and ranchers by siding with ecologists
on the predator issue,
3, Allott supported a referendum for the Winter Olympics coming
to Colorado. This was defeated by the voters overwhelmingly,
4, Like many other races, Senator Allott's age 7 65 years old -
was a negative.
GEORGIA
Nixon 75%
Nunn 55%
Thompson 45%
1. Poor campaign leadership and staff.
2. No tie with President in advertising, canvassing and get out
the vote.
3. Thompson did not campaign on issues of concern to the voters,
but rather engaged in name calling with the opponent. He
failed to present himself as a statesman to contrast with Nunn.
4. Got caught abusing Congressional francing privilege.
U. S. Senate Race Losses
November 28, 1972
Page 3
IOWA
Nixon 59%
Clark 55%
Miller 45%
1. Miller was tremendously overconfident.
2. He was not a good campaigner
3. Huge lead in polls, 35% in spring, 20% sixty days before
November 7.
4. Operated alone; no cooperation with CREP or GOP.
5. Clark ran an excellent campaign. Walked across the state for
P.R.
6. The greatest negative was a Tax Exemption Bill introduced by
Miller. Clark used this as a "special favors" issue.
7. Turned off press - Des Moines Register battered Miller,
endorsed Nixon, Ray and Clark.
8. Miller voted against Butz.
9. In six months, Miller lost 40 points.
10. Miller is 56 years old.
DELAWARE
Nixon 60%
Biden 51%
Boggs 49%
1. Biden was aggressive, youthful and personable. Outspent
Boggs. Good media and lots of personal contact with the
voters. ($70,000 supplied Biden from COPE, rumored.)
2. Boggs remained on the Senate floor and did not return to the
state often to campaign.
3. Boggs campaign, especially in King County, was tied too
closely with the Governor's campaign. This was harmful as
Governor Peterson was not popular and was also defeated.
4. Boggs' age -- 63 years old -- was a negative.
MONTANA
Nixon 60%
Metcalf 50.2%
Hibbard 49.8%
1. No one in Washington ever thought we would have a chance to
win, Senatorial Campaign Committee, etc.
2. Montana CREP leadership was weak. They also did not believe
Hibbard had a chance.
3. There was little liaison between the Nixon and Hibbard campaigns.
4. No major surrogates were sent to help.
5. Hibbard was only average as a candidate, his campaign manager
was less than average caliber.
U. S. Senate Race Losses
Noyember 28, 1972
Page 4
SOUTH DAKOTA
Nixon 54%
Abourezk 57%
Hirsh 43%
1. We overrated Hirsh's chances originally.
2. Abourezk was popular and a good campaigner.
3. Hirsh did not have money; poor name identification.
4. No professional campaign management.
5. Bitter Primary.
RHODE ISLAND
Nixon 53%
Pell 54%
Chafee 46%
1. Pell ran a most effective campaign.
2. Chafee ran away from the President -- misjudged the
temper of the electorate.
3. There is a tradition of liking WASPish Newport Set.
4. Pell was non-controversial.
5. Chafee had poor, amateur campaign management.
6. Wouldn't effectively campaign -- wasn't warm.
7. Rhode Island is one of the most Democratic states in
the U. S.
CC: Jerry Jones
Gordon Strachan