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From: Jeb S. Magruder and Frederic V. Malek RE: Critique of the 1972 Campaign. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/29/1972
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From: Jeb S. Magruder and Frederic V. Malek RE: Critique of the 1972 Campaign. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/29/1972
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16
4
11/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Jeb S. Magruder and Frederic V.
Malek RE: Critique of the 1972 Campaign.
17 pgs.
Monday, February 07, 2011
Page 1 of 1
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINIGINATIVE MARKING
E.O.
100.00
Section
6-102
November 29, 1972
By BMP
8-18-81
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FREDERIC V. MALEK
SUBJECT:
Critique of the 1972 Campaign
The attached report is an overview of the 1972 campaign. It is
divided into several sections, reflecting the chronological
development of the campaign:
1. Basic Assumptions at the Start - the assumptions
which set the direction of the campaign strategy.
2. Early Strategy - the concepts incorporated in the
initial planning phase, beginning in May, 1971.
3. Conduct of the Campaign - I: The Primaries - earliest
application of the planned campaign programs.
4. Conduct of the Campaign - II: Between the Primaries
and Labor Day - critique of program activities during
the summer lead-time before the active campaigning
began.
5. Conduct of the Campaign - III: After Labor Day -
description and critique of the implementation of
campaign programs during the final two months of
the campaign.
6. Overall Review - general comments on the conduct of
the campaign.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
CRITIQUE OF THE 1972 CAMPAIGN
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AT THE START
The Re-election Committee began in May of 1971. With the nomination
assumed not to be in doubt, there was a unique opportunity to plan
carefully for the general campaign and begin early on long lead
time programs. During the next six months, basic plans and budgets
were developed for all major program areas. Program directors were
added to the Committee staff as their activities became operational.
The early concepts of the campaign were based on four assumptions:
1. The election would be close, with less than 4% separating
the top two candidates. Both of President Nixon's prior national
campaigns had been very close. The polls showed leading Democratic
hopefuls within striking distance. Governor Wallace's plans were
uncertain. Finally, the President was seen as a partisan leader of
a minority party, particularly after the 1970 Congressional elections.
2. There were some fundamental shifts occurring in the attitudes
of the electorate. Certain elements of the New Deal coalition were
showing signs of reduced support for the national Democratic Party.
In particular, southern whites, blue-collar urban ethnics and Jews
had the greatest potential to increase their vote for the President
in 1972.
3. The President was well-known by all segments of the electorate.
Unlike almost all of the Democratic hopefuls, with the possible
exception of Kennedy and Humphrey, he faced the problem of avoiding
over-exposure to the public as a candidate in a long campaign.
4. The greatest campaign asset to the President was his incumbency.
EARLY STRATEGY
From the basic assumptions, several strategic decisions were made on
key elements for the campaign.
Comprehensive System of Voter Contact. In 1968, the President
used television extensively to gain voter support. In 1972, because
of his high visibility and familiarity to the electorate, other
means had to be found to take his campaign to the people. The
decision was made to develop a system of individual voter contact
more sophisticated than had ever been used in previous national campaigns.
Door to door canvassing, telephone canvassing and targeted direct
mail would be carried out on a large scale in the key states. They
- 2 -
would all be coordinated by the use of one common list of registered
voters on a computerized data bank. In target areas, selected house-
holds, whose demographic characteristics were included in the data
bank, would receive persuasive, issue-oriented direct mail in late
September. They would also be telephoned or visited door-to-door
in September or October. If they were favorable to the President,
that information would be transmitted back to the computer center.
At the end of the campaign, all favorable voters would receive a
get-out-the-vote telegram-letter to augment the turnout activities
in the field. It was intended particularly to target and identify
Democrats who supported the President. In the remaining states,
computer lists and telephone centers were not provided from Washington.
They relied more heavily on door-to-door canvassing, using local lists,
augmented by more informal telephone centers, where they were established.
In all states, the strategy was to identify favorable supporters, rather
than to persuade undecided voters by personal contact.
Surrogate Program. The surrogate speaker program was developed
as another means of reaching the voters while controlling the exposure
of the candidate. Thirty-five public figures, including Cabinet
Officers, Senators, Congressmen, Governors, one Mayor and members
of the White House Staff, were brought into the program. Schedules
of speaking events would be developed so as to give appropriate
coverage to media markets of key states over the duration of the
campaign. The speakers would be advanced by the Tour Office and
provided with speech materials by several sources in the Committee
and the White House. As the campaign progressed, these surrogates
proved to be effective in presenting the President's record and in
attacking McGovern. They received wide media coverage, thus allowing
the President to remain above the day-to-day campaign. McGovern
made the mistake of taking on the surrogates, further reinforcing
his image as a second-level political figure. Later in the campaign,
a women's surrogate program, involving Cabinet and White House wives
and high women appointees would be implemented to augment the program
described above.
Voter Bloc Programs. Because of the potential loosening of the
New Deal coalition, special attention was given to several segments of
the voting population which have historically supported Democratic
candidates. In addition, for the first time young voters represented
a new force in the electorate, and were widely believed to be strongly
in the Democratic camp. Some normally Republican groups were also deemed
to merit special attention, particularly older voters and farmers.
Ultimately, organizations were established to focus on the following
demographic voter groups:
- 3 -
Agriculture
Black
Elderly
Jewish
Nationalities
Spanish-Speaking
Youth
At the same time, several groups were formed to focus on specific
occupational groups such as lawyers and educators.
The purpose of the voter blocs was two-fold:
a. Persuasion: to focus attention on segments of voters with
common characteristics and to gain support for the President from those
voters on the basis of their identity with a given group.
b. Provision of Volunteers: to draw on the membership of the
voter groups for volunteers to work in organizational activities such
as canvassing and "Get-Out-The-Vote".
Advertising. It was decided at the outset to form an in-house
advertising group, rather than to use an outside agency. This strategy
had several objectives:
o
To assure that all persons involved in developing the
advertising were loyal to the candidate.
o
To assure that the key persons involved did not have
conflicting obligations to commercial accounts which
would limit their time available for the campaign.
To bring together the best talent available to focus
on the Presidential campaign.
o
To reduce the cost of advertising.
The advertising campaign would be designed to:
o
Emphasize the competence and incumbency of the President.
Raise doubts about the competence of McGovern and the
soundness of his policies.
o
Legitimize, in the minds of the Democrats, the idea of
voting for a Republican President. During the campaign,
this was done through the vehicle of Democrats for Nixon.
- 4 -
Polling and Demographics. A comprehensive plan for polling was
developed to give a continuing evaluation of the state of mind of the
electorate throughout the campaign. Polls were to be taken in key
states, as well as nationally. The first survey would go to the field
in January, before the primaries; the second in June, between the
California Primary and the Democratic Convention; and the third
immediately after Labor Day. Finally, daily telephone polls were
scheduled from September 25 through October 30. In the early development
of campaign strategy, the polls were instrumental in identifying the
target states. As the campaign unfolded in September and October,
they were useful in decision-making on allocation of resources among
the states, particularly speakers, media and funds. Throughout, they
served to identify the important issues and show how the voters perceived
the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. In particular, they
gave tangible data to evaluate potential points of vulnerability for
both attack and defense.
During the campaign, demographic data was combined with polling
information to a greater degree than ever before. Several new
demographic tools were available:
The 1970 Census data. Not since 1952 had a Presidential
Campaign been conducted so soon after completion of a
census, when the information on social characteristics
was so current. With the high mobility of the American
population, such demographic data rapidly depreciates
in value. The 1960 Census, for example, was becoming
obsolete by 1964.
Large-capacity computers and sophisticated techniques in
direct mail targeting. Mailing lists are now correlated to
demographic characteristics within Census tracts. For
example, if Mr. Jones lives in a Census tract whose median
housing value is $35,000, he is considered to be of that
income group. Other factors, such as number, type and age
of automobiles owned, are known to correlate with important
demographic characteristics such as age, income, children
living at home, etc. With the capability of assigning
demographic characteristics to individual voters, by name
and address, a powerful method was introduced for targeting
direct mail, selecting priority precincts, and many other
campaign techniques. This was done for the first time in
1972 in the ten key states (see below).
**
- 5 -
Computer Maps. Computers now have the ability to print
out shaded maps which present census data, such as
concentration of the blue collar workers, on a geographical
format. Such maps were produced for major metropolitan
areas in several key states. By overlaying several
characteristics, such as income, race, occupation and
age, target areas could be sharply distinguished.
This refined demographic data, when combined with polls showing
the attitudes of various voter groups, allowed very precise
targeting of key precincts. These methods were particularly
useful in the selection of precincts where Democratic voters
were to receive issue-oriented mail from Democrats for Nixon.
These combined polling and demographic techniques were also
important in developing the strategy toward "Peripheral Urban
Ethnics". The computer maps showed that in almost every metro-
politan area there is a black ghetto, surrounded by a ring of blue
collar, middle income, Democratic voters, of European ethnic back-
ground. Past voting data showed that these voters had given Wallace
much of his support in 1968 and in the 1972 primaries. Polls showed
that they were close to the President on the issues, particularly
the social issues (crime, drugs, busing) and foreign policy.
Accordingly, a strategy was developed to give high priority to the
ethnic precincts and to target them for the voter contact program,
as well as for appropriate issue-oriented material to them through
advertising and direct mail. On the basis of the election returns,
that strategy was effective.
One shortcoming was that the demographic data was not used extensively
by the Political Division or the states. That might have been corrected
by better liaison within the Washington Committee and earlier planning
for the state campaigns (to be discussed later in this report).
Targeting of Key States. An ongoing analysis of polling and
demographic data and electoral strategy yielded a list of ten
projected "battleground" states. Relative priorities varied some-
what through the campaign, as updated polls showed large leads for
the President in several states; however, the basic list remained
the same. The states were as follows (in order of electoral votes):
California
New York
Pennsylvania
Texas
- 6 -
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
Maryland
Connecticut
The significance of the target states was that they received the full
voter identification system, with telephone centers, door-to-door
canvass, direct mail and computerized lists of voters. In general,
the state re-election committees had more financial resources at
their disposal. The target states also had the heaviest scheduling
of speakers, most intense local advertising and greatest scrutiny
in public opinion surveys. Other campaign programs also gave them
top priority.
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - I: THE PRIMARIES.
As 1972 approached, the President was challenged on the left by
Representative McCloskey, and later on the right by Representative
Ashbrook. That made it necessary to enter contested primaries,
starting with New Hampshire in early March. It also created an oppor-
tunity to test some of the programs which had been planned for the
general campaign, and to test the abilities of the Committee's organi-
zation. In retrospect, the experience was beneficial, because mistakes
were made and corrected in the primaries, leading to a much sounder
national campaign in the summer and fall.
The objective in the primaries was to overwhelmingly defeat the
opposition so as to firmly establish the President's political
strength in his own party. That was accomplished by winning New
Hampshire with 69% of the vote, at a time when the heavily-favored
Muskie was unable to reach 50% on the Democratic side. That campaign
was run mainly on voter contact through telephone and direct mail.
Every Republican voter in the state was called and sent at least two
letters. Subsequent results in Florida, Wisconsin and California, as
well as other states, conclusively demonstrated that the President
had the strong allegiance of Republicans throughout the nation. In
California, the names of over 30,000 potential volunteers were obtained
through a mailing to all registered Republicans.
The campaign programs which benefitted the most during the primaries
were advertising, direct mail, telephone centers, surrogates, communications
and the political division.
- 7 -
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - II. BETWEEN THE PRIMARIES AND LABOR DAY.
During the early months of the campaign the Political Division was
concerned chiefly with designation of state chairmen. By July, the
polls began to show a substantial lead for the President. Therefore,
the decision was made to concentrate the remainder of the field cam-
paign on the fundamental premise that the President had sufficient
support to win the election. Efforts were aimed at identifying
favorable voters rather than persuading undecided voters and
guaranteeing that the support was translated into votes on election
day. Emphasis was shifted to the development in every state of a
strong field organization, capable of implementing an extensive
program of favorable voter identification, registration and turnout.
An evaluation in July indicated that only half of the states had
approved budgets and that there was not enough money in those budgets
to finance storefront headquarters and the voter contact program.
Likewise, there appeared to be shortages for other activities, such
as the absentee ballot and ballot security efforts. In late July
and early August, substantial time and effort were devoted to
correcting these deficiencies and bringing the state organizations
up to speed.
Another serious problem facing the campaign as of the first of July
was the absence of a specific plan of action in the states. A State
Chairman's Organization Manual had been prepared and distributed in
early June to local leadership, but there was no agreement on how to
implement its contents, or the amount of emphasis to be given to the
program. In July, a standard plan for voter identification, registration
and turnout was launched immediately with a series of orientation and
training conferences in Washington to give state leaders a clear concept
of the campaign and the responsibilities which they were expected to
meet.
The delay in establishing state budgets and developing a standard plan
for the state campaigns set back the lead time in several key programs.
In the absence of specific guidance from Washington, some of the
states had begun to implement their own plans. In most states it was
not possible to accomplish adequate organizational staffing and training
in time to conduct the voter identification program to the full extent
desired.
Many of the voter blocs had developed their programs to the point of
implementation before state plans were in place. In some cases, they
had begun activities in the states before other programs were finalized.
The result was a distortion of priorities and misallocation of re-
sources all of which had to be re-oriented in July and August. That
re-orientation was never fully accomplished. The fault here was not
with the voter blocs, whose directors were moving ahead with their
specific areas of the campaign, but in the belated completion of the other
state plans.
- 8 -
During the late spring and summer, extensive preparations were also
made for the other elements of the voter identification system. Lists
of registered voters were acquired from local officials in target
states. Computer systems were designed to process the names so that
they could be printed out on precinct canvass lists and on direct
mail. This was the first time that a national campaign had attempted
to purchase such lists for target states. The lists were scheduled
to be sent to the local storefronts and telephone centers by Labor Day.
Because of the long lead times required to obtain and process the lists,
many locations did not receive them until later than anticipated. That
delay was costly in lost campaign momentum after the Convention. In
addition, there were technical problems with the computer lists in
several localities. Some had to be discarded and reproduced in
corrected form. In future campaigns, the computer data system should
be started as early as January prior to the election, rather than in
May. The present system can be used again, if it receives minimum
maintenance during the intervening years.
In the telephone campaign, the lessons of the primaries were incorporated
into the program for the general election. This was the first time that
a national campaign designed and provided complete instructions, forms,
procedures and materials for telephone center operation. The program
was carefully refined so that volunteers could operate the local centers
effectively with very little training or supervision by state or national
telephone leaders. A center in Westchester, New York was run just like
one in Sacramento, California, and their results could be compared against
the same standard. A system of reporting and accountability allowed
continuous management review at the state and national levels. Here,
again, the required lead-times for design and production of materials
were underestimated, and the national staff had to work under heavy
pressure of deadlines. That effort should have started in April,
rather than in June, after the California primary.
The telephone campaign proved to be a highly efficient means of
contacting voters. In a campaign such as this one, where identification
rather than persuasion is the purpose of the voter contact, the tele-
phone is ideally suited. In retrospect, an even larger program, covering
more states, might have been a wise use of resources. In Texas and
Michigan, where the Senatorial candidates were included on the telephone
identification canvass, the Republicans ran well against strong opposition.
Other parts of the Committee also prepared for the fall campaign. The
November Group developed the theme and slogan for the advertising and
promotional materials. A system of distribution was set up for the
buttons, brochures, bumper strips, etc., which was designed to avoid
the failures of the past. By Labor Day, however, it was clear that
- 9 -
stocks were inadequate and that orders by the states could not be
filled promptly. Those delays and back-orders caused a great deal of
ill-will and resentment in the field and seriously hampered the imple-
mentation of other important campaign programs at the local level.
In any future campaign, the materials distribution problem must be
given the highest priority and be organized with plenty of lead time
to spare.
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - III: AFTER LABOR DAY.
By the kickoff of the fall campaign, the operating pattern had become
one of intense activity in the field, backed up by national programs
which kept the President and his record before the American public
without over-exposing the candidate.
A nationwide Canvass Kick-Off was held on September 16, to intensify
the push for all-out effort by state organizations on door-to-door
canvassing. Surrogates participated in fifty local headquarters
throughout the country and received wide media coverage. This event
highlighted the grass-roots campaign and motivated the state organizations
to push their canvassing efforts.
The people-to-people programs sought to generate increased activity at the
local level to offset over confidence in the state leadership. Gradually
abandoning the "trickle-down" approach, with its extensive reliance
on official state campaign leadership, the Committee moved toward
greater direct contact and activity at the local level, through
mailings and telephone calls to county leadership and increased
numbers of national personnel working in the field to assure effective
implementation of the core organization programs.
Local storefronts were used in the programs of voter identification,
registration and turnout. Approximately 2,000 such headquarters
were open for the final eight to ten weeks of the campaign.
Meanwhile, other national programs were also being activated as the
campaign progressed. The telephone campaign established 250 centers
in the ten key states. Contrary to the experience of several primaries
in the spring, it became difficult to recruit volunteers for telephoning
in many areas after Labor Day. The President's large lead in the polls
had created considerable apathy among his supporters. Other potential
volunteers had turned their attention to state-wide or local races.
In this scarce market of volunteers, the telephone program found itself
in competition with the door-to-door canvass effort.
- 10 -
In the original Washington Committee organizational structure, the
Political Division, responsible for the conduct of the campaign in
the states, had been placed under one Deputy Campaign Director.
National programs, including the telephone program, had been placed
under the other Deputy Campaign Director. The Political Division
had direct responsibility for the door-to-door canvass, and they
tended to press the states to give that top priority over other
volunteer-oriented activities. The telephone centers thereby
suffered, not being a part of that Division. Later in the Campaign,
the two programs acquired a better balance and both did well. In a
future campaign, it would be better to have the telephone program
as a part of the organization which is responsible for the field
activity in the states. That would encourage more cooperation be-
tween the various canvass programs leading to a more effective
overall effort.
In general, the voter identification canvass was most successful.
On the basis of an average of two voters per household contacted,
some 45 million voters were reached through this activity. The two
central purposes of the canvass were clearly fulfilled: (1) identi-
fication of a sufficient number of the President's supporters to fuel
an effective voter turnout effort; and (2) development during the canvass
in September and October of a field organization capable of delivering
a strong Election Day effort. While all states did not perform as well
as they might have, the key and battleground states, where canvassing
could have meant the difference, performed well beyond early expectations.
The final results are summarized in Tab A.
The Surrogate program required more time than anticipated from the
staffs of the state re-election committees. The arrangements for
speaking appearances, advance work and coordination with Washington
often demanded time which had to be taken from other important activities.
In future campaigns, if an extensive surrogate program is used, the
state committees should be better staffed to fulfill their responsibilities.
It seems clear, however, that the surrogate program was extremely worth-
while and proved to be one of the most effective weapons for keeping
McGovern on the defensive.
The Advertising program succeeded in reinforcing the President's image
of competence, while creating doubts about McGovern's ability to meet
the demands of the Presidency. In the latter effort, John Connally
and the Democrats for Nixon were particularly effective.
In July, when the decisions were made to give top priority to programs
in the field, major cuts were made in the advertising budget. As a
result, it was not possible to conduct a strong media campaign until
the last week of the campaign. There should have been more financial
reserves kept for advertising; the campaign was vulnerable if McGovern
had begun to gather momentum in September.
- 11 -
The television advertising was delayed until late in September.
From then on, a pattern of gradually increased media exposure was
implemented. The President's radio and television appearances
were a part of the pattern and served to project him into the
campaign arena just enough to keep McGovern on the defensive.
Throughout the campaign, the Presidential strategy of limited
campaign appearances and maximum use of his office left McGovern
no target and no opportunity to close the great gap in public
support.
To keep McGovern on the defensive and to coordinate public relations
efforts against him, the Attack Group met each morning to plan tactics
for the day. This group orchestrated the attack plans of the
Communications Division, the surrogate speakers, the White House Staff,
the Vice President and the RNC. The Communications Division prepared
press releases, speech materials, audio feeds for radio, and television
film service to aid in implementing the attack plans, as well as to
publicize the positive side of the President's record.
Throughout the campaign, one consistent game-plan was followed. That
was to keep McGovern identified with his earlier statements and never
to let him get off the defensive. At the same time, the President's
strengths were constantly reinforced. McGovern, on the other hand,
never did adopt a consistent strategy, except possibly to keep attacking
on Watergate. He was never able to position himself firmly on the right
side of a policy issue.
The final pre-election day organizational activity of the national
campaign was the October 28 Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) Kick-Off. This
event was held in 44 areas in 22 key and battleground states.
Surrogates visited storefronts and telephone centers in these areas
to emphasize the importance of GOTV and to participate in the actual
work of preparing for Election Day. For the most part, the GOTV
Kick-Off accomplished its main purposes:
1. It forced the end of the voter identification effort and
oriented field organizations for the coming get-out-the-
vote activity.
2. It demonstrated the high priority to be placed on GOTV
and publicized the need for, and importance of, volunteers.
Early experiences demonstrated the necessity of deploying more
national staff to the field in areas where the core program was
being inadequately implemented. Beginning with preparation of the
September 16 Canvass Kick-Off, the Political Division and the Telephone
Campaign, in coordination with the RNC, dispatched an increasing
number of Washington staff members to assure necessary local performance.
**
- 12 -
By mid-October, most voter bloc activity was concentrated in direct
assistance with the voter turnout program in the priority areas,
and substantial numbers of voter bloc staff were assigned to the
field to assist with the final effort. By the end of October,
almost 100 national Committee staff members and another 25 from the
RNC were in these states helping to implement GOTV activity. This
strong performance at the local level by so many Washington staff
members was a high point of the campaign. In retrospect, the deployment
would have been even more effective is it had been started a few weeks
earlier.
OVERALL REVIEW.
In large measure, the campaign succeeded in its objectives. The voter
contact programs of door-to-door canvass, telephone canvass, direct
mail and get-out-the-vote were particularly successful. Frank Mankiewicz
has said,
"To sum it all up: When we talk about the McGovern
campaign, we ought to look at the Nixon campaign,
which was a model. It spent an inordinate amount
of time and money that originally was ticketed for
television and ended up on the street in one of the
best get-out-the-vote operations in terms of direct
mail and telephoning that many of us have ever seen.
I have a feeling that the time we spent on election
day getting out the vote was in part responsible for
turning out so large a Nixon vote.
"I would think the figures will show that the Nixon
campaign beat us at what we do best--getting out the
vote. It's probably the first time a Republican
campaign has ever done that so successfully. It was
a remarkable job."
On the other hand, several improvements could have been made.
Generally, the campaign could have been run better if the states had
had less autonomy. Comments have been made previously relating to
the timing of state budget approvals and completion of plans for the
field programs. Some of that planning should have been started early
in the life of the Committee, in 1971. One of the original staff
members should have been experienced in precinct politics, and charged
with the planning of that program. The detailed program should have
been completed by August or September of 1971, well before the state
organizations became active.
- 13 -
Many new procedures had to be developed to meet the requirements of
the new campaign spending act. Although it did create several new
layers of record-keeping and administration, it also gave Washington
far greater control over the state committees. That factor was very
instrumental in the unprecedented success of the nationwide grass-roots
programs of telephone and door-to-door canvass and get-out-the-vote.
Even more control could have been exercised, however. The extraordinary
leverage of an incumbent Administration, heavily favored to be re-elected,
with patronage and programs to administer, was not used to its maximum
advantage. Better performance could have been required and achieved
from the states.
Another means of improvement in the state campaigns would have been to
have had a larger field staff at the national level, which could have
been deployed early. Valuable time sometimes passed before Washington
was able to determine that a local organization needed help and then
to provide it. This field presence would have been particularly useful
in interfacing with target Senate campaigns.
Throughout the campaign there was a massive cash flow through the
Committee. Frequently, long delays occurred in processing and writing
checks for expenditures previously approved in the budget. It might
have been better to have had the disbursement side of the Finance
Committee as a function of the Campaign Committee, where it could have
been more responsive to the time requirements of the various divisions.
The total cash flow could still have been controlled by the Finance
Committee.
It is too early to analyze completely the performance of the Voter Blocs
and Citizens Groups. However, it can be said as of now that the persuasive
campaign was successful. The activities of the Voter Blocs, such as
Youth, Jewish, Ethnics, Older Americans and Spanish Speaking Americans,
received excellent coverage in national publications such as Time, Life,
etc. In addition, results indicate that the percentage of the vote
received by the President in various Voter Blocs increased considerably
over 1968. One of the most dramatic increases was in the Jewish Community
where the President received approximately 40% of the vote in 1972.
The success of the second objective of the Voter Blocs/Citizens Groups
campaign, volunteer recruitment, varied from state to state. On the
national level, it was not particularly successful.
Some of the voter blocs performed well and meshed their own programs
well with those of the overall campaign. Others persisted in fragmentary
efforts among their constituencies which competed with other programs
and drained limited management resources in the states. It would have
been more productive if the voter bloc leadership had directed greater
:
- 14 -
effort toward mobilizing volunteers from their constituencies for
the basic voter identification programs in the field.
This election was different from most in that the candidate had two
major organizations involved in the campaign. The White House staff
was responsible for speeches, policy on issues, the candidate's
personal travel, etc. The Committee had charge of the programs
relating to the conduct of the campaign. In general, the liaison
and coordination between the two was good. There were some cases
of conflict where both organizations sought to develop strategy
or operating guidelines, but these were generally resolved satisfactorily.
The dual structure did necessitate lengthy review and approval procedures
which sometimes made it impossible to meet desired deadlines.
Another important area of coordination was with the RNC. Generally
good liaison was established during the early planning phase of
1971. Some friction developed, however, as the campaign became
operational during the 1972 spring primaries and the months leading
up to the Republican Convention. Strong efforts at that point by the
Committee's Political Division restored a good working relationship
for the remainder of the Campaign. The RNC made significant contri-
butions with its Answer Desk on political issues, in providing
extensive demographic data for the campaign, in working with the
Political Division in the development of plans for the campaign in
the states, in the work of their field organization in helping to
implement the grass-roots program, and with the publication of
Monday.
An area of disappointment in the campaign was the poor showing of
many statewide and local Republican candidates in the wake of the
Nixon landslide. As discussed earlier, the President's campaign
extended beyond the normal Republican constituency to other voter
segments which had historically voted Democrat. Moreover, these
groups had been propelled toward him by their active opposition to
McGovern. Candidates who successfully positioned themselves close
to the President, or their opposition close to McGovern, were generally
successful. Tower of Texas and Griffin of Michigan merged part of
their campaigns with the President's, as has been mentioned. Helms in
North Carolina created coattails for himself by running very closely to
the President in his own campaign, and invoking the President's name
frequently.
From the beginning, it had been determined that the President's
campaign would not give priority attention to concurrent statewide
and Congressional races. Accordingly, mechanisms were not set up
for liaison with local campaigns for monitoring the standings of
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the various Republican candidates, or for providing technical and
campaign management advice. It was not until very late in the campaign
that active concern was turned toward these races. By that time, it
was difficult to get reliable intelligence on the races and quite
late to reverse negative trends. Some close Senate losses might
have been averted if one of the early Committee objectives had been
to work closely with the state-wide contests.
In summary, the campaign had considerable room for improvement, as
all campaigns do. On the other hand, it was probably superior in
every element to that of the opposition; moreover, it helped sustain
and then deliver to the ballot box the full measure of support that
its candidate had gained from the voters.
TAB A
FINAL CANVASSING RESULTS
The final results of the door-to-door and telephone voter identification
canvass are as follows:
Total households in the U.S.
63,316,000
Total households in priority counties
48,149,000
Total households contacted door-to-door
16,075,000
Percentage of priority households
canvassed door-to-door
33%
Total households contacted by telephone
6,543,000
Total households contacted door-to-door
and by telephone
22,618,000
Percentage of total households contacted
36%
Percentage of households in priority
counties contacted
47%
As shown below, key state results are particularly good:
Number of households in priority counties
25,924,000
Households canvassed door-to-door
8,284,000
Percentage of priority county households
canvassed door-to-door
32%
Households canvassed by telephone
6,543,000
Percentage of priority county households
canvassed by telephone
25.9%
Total households canvassed
14,827,000
Percentage of priority county households
canvassed
57%
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