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This file contains:
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Bruce Kehrli To: Charles Colson RE: McGovern Defense Proposal. Includes attatched memorandum describing the McGovern Defense Proposal in depth. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/18/1972
From: Harry S. Dent To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Request of July 19. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: John C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign Strategy. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Larry Higby To: John Whitaker RE: Camapaign Strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/19/1972
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on Campaign Strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: Larry Higby RE: July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: William Safire To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: Bryce Harlow To: Larry Higby RE: Follow-Up on Campaign Strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Clark MacGregory To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention Questions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: John Scali To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Election Strategy. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: William Carruthers To: H.R. Haldeman RE: The Republican National Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From: Kenneth Cole To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Opinion on the President's posture and campaign strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From: William E. Timmons To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your June 12th Memorandum. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1972 Campaign Memorandum. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
From: Ronald L. Ziegler To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Views and Analyses Requested in Memorandum of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your Memo of June 12. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
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26145697
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WHSF: Contested, 16-8
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26145697
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WHSF: Contested, 16-8
description
This file contains:
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Bruce Kehrli To: Charles Colson RE: McGovern Defense Proposal. Includes attatched memorandum describing the McGovern Defense Proposal in depth. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/18/1972
From: Harry S. Dent To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Request of July 19. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: John C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign Strategy. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Larry Higby To: John Whitaker RE: Camapaign Strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/19/1972
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on Campaign Strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: Larry Higby RE: July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: William Safire To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From: Bryce Harlow To: Larry Higby RE: Follow-Up on Campaign Strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Clark MacGregory To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention Questions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: John Scali To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Election Strategy. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: William Carruthers To: H.R. Haldeman RE: The Republican National Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From: Kenneth Cole To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Opinion on the President's posture and campaign strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From: William E. Timmons To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your June 12th Memorandum. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1972 Campaign Memorandum. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
From: Ronald L. Ziegler To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Views and Analyses Requested in Memorandum of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your Memo of June 12. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
8
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July.
1 pg.
16
8
7/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Bruce Kehrli To: Charles Colson RE:
McGovern Defense Proposal. Includes
attatched memorandum describing the
McGovern Defense Proposal in depth. 5 pgs.
16
8
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Harry S. Dent To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy
Memo. 1 pg.
16
8
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Larry Higby's Request of July 19. 5 pgs.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Page 1 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
8
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: John C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman
and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign
Strategy. 8 pgs.
16
8
7/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Larry Higby To: John Whitaker RE:
Camapaign Strategy. 1 pg.
16
8
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Update on Campaign Strategy (In light
of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs.
16
8
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: Larry Higby
RE: July 19 memorandum on campaign
strategy. 1 pg.
16
8
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: William Safire To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Convention. 1 pg.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Page 2 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
8
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Bryce Harlow To: Larry Higby RE:
Follow-Up on Campaign Strategy. 1 pg.
16
8
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Clark MacGregory To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: Convention Questions. 2 pgs.
16
8
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: John Scali To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Election Strategy. 3 pgs.
16
8
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: William Carruthers To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: The Republican National
Convention. 3 pgs.
16
8
6/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Kenneth Cole To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Opinion on the President's posture and
campaign strategy. 4 pgs.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Page 3 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
8
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: William E. Timmons To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: Your June 12th
Memorandum. 3 pgs.
16
8
6/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: 1972 Campaign Memorandum. 10 pgs.
16
8
6/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Ronald L. Ziegler To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Views and Analyses Requested in
Memorandum of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs.
16
8
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Your Memo of June 12. 5 pgs.
16
8
5/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Page 4 of 4
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
21 July 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM DOUG HALLETI
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July
I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the
President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then
that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous
memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my
position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear
to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention.
From September 1 on there should be a mix of D.C. -based substantive
activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most
for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should
just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the
last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be
one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in
mid-October, and two during the last two weeks - and any rally appearance
should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day.
On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September,
three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be
at least theoretically government-related -- and be would appear talking
about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign
with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan
banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways
and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.
cc: Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDI M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 18, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
BAK
SUBJECT:
McGovern Defense Proposal
It was requested that you review the attached and note the under-
lined portion on page 4.
Referring to the underlined section, it was noted that this should
always be treated as a $30 billion cut and we should be pointing out
what a cut of this magnitude would do. This should be included in
a brief, simple, hard-hitting analysis for use by our speakers.
Please follow up and submit a report on actions taken to the Office
of the Staff Secretary by July 21.
cc: Henry Kissinger
Ron Ziegler
H.R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield
5213
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger H
Y
SUBJECT:
The McGovern Defense Proposal
Senator McGovern's defense proposals may become a major issue in
the coming campaign. This memo summarizes the Senator's proposals
and evaluates their substance and professional quality.
The McGovern program was apparently designed to reach a predetermined
budget total. It purports to support our current strategy and broad reduc-
tions in all forces categories are justified in an overly optimistic "best
case" analysis of a relatively benign international environment. This is
inconsistent with existing intelligence estimates and is highly unlikely
because of a total neglect of Arms Limitations and other diplomatic
initiatives.
Finally, because of faulty costing, we estimate budgetary savings would
be about $15-20 billion instead of the $32 billion claimed.
Strategic Forces
Regardless of the outcome of arms limitation negotiations, the McGovern
proposal would:
-- Reduce the strategic bomber force by over half and terminate the
B-1 bomber modernization program.
Halt the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs at 200 and
112 missiles respectively instead of the 550 and 496 currently planned.
(This alone would reduce our available strategic warheads by nearly
5000 a 50 percent cut in our planned capability in 1975.)
-- Terminate the ABM deployments.
-- Delete hedge programs designed to guarantee the survivability of
our deterrent against unexpected Soviet threats (Hard Site Defense research
and bomber rebasing). Only Trident would be continued at a slower pace.
These severe cutbacks are justified by the Senator's belief that in the past,
hedge programs have turned into "self fulfilling prophecies" and actually
2
caused the Soviets to deploy the threat they were designed to counter.
He concludes that not planning these hedge programs will lead the Soviets
to cut back their forces in the future.
Obviously, this is a weak assumption upon which to ba se our strategic
planning. If the assumption does not materialize, the McGovern program
would put us in an unstable and highly dangerous situation of strategic
inferiority.
For example, the Senator indicates that if a Soviet threat to the sur-
vivability of our deterrent does emerge in the future, we could resort
to actions such as launch on warning for the ICBMs and airborne alert
for the bombers. The implications of these policies for crisis stability
and cost are ignored.
Finally, the Senator's program does not provide the necessary flexibility
to support our allies, and reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
In fact, he seems to accept a concept of deterrence that is based on a
minimum capability to destroy about 200 Soviet cities -- hardly a credible
threat in today's situation of nuclear parity.
General Purpose Forces
The same simplistic approach is evident in the analysis of general purpose
forces which recommend reducing:
-- Both land forces and tactical air forces by 25 percent (four Army/
Marine Corps divisions and ten Navy, Air Force and Marine wings)
-- Naval ships by over 30 percent and aircraft carrier forces from
16 to 6. Only submarine force levels are preserved.
-- Force deployments in NATO are cut by 170, 000 men (over half)
and 2-1/3 divisions. All troops on the Asian mainland are removed with
two carriers continuously deployed in the Mediterranean and one in the
Pacific.
-- All large modernization programs except attack submarine pro-
curement are terminated.
Despite these drastic force reductions, McGovern's overly optimistic
analysis assumes no change in strategy. The unlikelihood of a simulta-
neous major conflict in Europe and Asia is acknowledged and a priority
is given to the defense of NATO.
3
These general purpose force suggestions would:
-- Provide insufficient reinforcement capability for NATO increasing
the risk of a European conflict escalating to general nuclear warfare.
Provide insufficient reinforcement capability to support our
Asian allies in both Korea and Southeast Asia unless we were willing to
make severe reductions in those forces earmarked for use in NATO.
These weakened general purpose forces imply a heavier dependence upon
nuclear weapons in both Europe and Asia -- an implication totally ignored
by the Senator's analysis. In fact, these reductions approach a return to
the massive retaliation strategy of the late 1950s. Such a strategy is
simply not credible in today's situation of strategic nuclear parity.
Effects on our Allies
Diplomatically, the McGovern proposals would reverse much of the
progress we have made over this past year and introduce a new and
serious instability into the international situation.
In NATO, the removal of 2-1/3 divisions and 170, 000 men in two years
would cause serious havoc within the NATO alliance. Recent progress
towards NATO force improvements and economic offset arrangements
would be eradicated. Movement towards mutual balanced force reductions
would be halted and tensions in central Europe and Berlin would probably
increase. The political reactions of the European nations are predictable.
They would quickly adjust their foreign and economic policies to improve
relations with Eastern Europe at our expense.
In Asia, the total withdrawal of all troops in Southeast Asia, Korea, and
Japan would be carried out within two years. This abandonment of our
allies in Southeast Asia and complete withdrawal of U. S. military power
would have enormous consequences. Our emerging relationship with
China would also be undermined and we must anticipate the possibility
that the PRC would move to repair its relations with the Soviet Union. It
would undoubtedly drive the Japanese both to rearm and to accommodate
with the Soviet Union and the PRC.
4
Recent progress towards the reduction of tensions in Korea would
unquestionably also be set back if ROK confidence were undermined
by the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Neutralist countries
throughout Asia (e. Indonesia) would fall increasingly under PRC in-
fluence.
The Soviets would interpret force reductions as a reduction in our
willingness to defend our vital interests. This would almost certainly
reduce the credibility of both our strategic and conventional deterrents
and lead to an increase in Soviet military and diplomatic aggressiveness.
Our resolve would very likely be tested just as it was in the 1961 Berlin
crisis and in Cuba in 1962.
Finally, "dormant" nuclear powers such as India, Japan, and perhaps
even Israel would feel less secure, increasing the likelihood of their
making a decision to build nuclear weapons. Such proliferation would be
a most destabilizing development and would increase the likelihood of a
nuclear conflict.
McGovern Savings
Despite these unprecedented force reductions, the McGovern budget would
not save the S32 billion claimed. We believe his budget estimates are $10-
15 billion too low because:
-- The assumptions made about Vietnam spending are too high and
thus too much budgetary credit is taken for ending the war.
The budget provides insufficient funds for training, command,
supply, and other support functions. His analysis assumes these functions
would absorb 22 percent of the budget in 1975 compared to 30 percent today
For smaller forces, the percentage of funds required for support would
likely increase not decrease. Major base closures would be required to
reach the McGovern objective, which would have serious economic implica-
tions.
A force posture costing about $55 billion could, of course, be designed but
only by making much deeper force cuts -- primarily in manpower (about
300, 000 men). This would equate to a force posture of seven or eight Arm},
Marine divisions or about half of today's forces, clearly insufficient to
support our national security interests even based on McGovern's
excessively optimistic analysis.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
HSD
SUBJECT:
Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo
I still agree with the basic suggestions contained in my June
16 memo. I add these post-convention suggestions:
1) A special organization to enlist blue collar workers similar
to the proposed Democrats for Nixon organization.
2) Play up the snubbing of all the groups not given a quota at
Miami--like farmers, blue collars, ethnics, senior citizens,
veterans, et al. This can be done at our convention.
3) Establish McGovern's campaign emblem as the white flag--
pictures of him with the white flag behind his head.
4) Devise a PR program for Wallace people showing that RN
got "the message." Voter ID programs and polls should reveal
potential Wallace votes for us and how to get them.
5) Set up a realignment operation now to exploit switchover
possibilities while the convention is fresh and as campaign
heats up. This can be continued after the campaign to encourage
and speed switching which should be good between now and 1976.
The South is particularly ripe on this. If we don't program
and plan on this, we won't reap our potential.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Doug GHARL Hallett
SUBJECT:
Larry Higby's Request of July 19.
The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and
amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memo-
randum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice
you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half
a joke. )
The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may
recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good
opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful
Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.
My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier
memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a
local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt,
and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics
and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West,
and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election and
that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive
positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off
people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local,
regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should
be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homsexuality, our
more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare
reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably
printed and front group formats SO that we ourselves are not hurt by our
own efforts.
2.
To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being
contravened. In particular, our positive national material the pamphlets,
the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen is
the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968.
More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so
far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive
way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator
Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric "white flag budget" and under-
researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice
President's rhetoric "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about
Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating
posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol
Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are
all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's
extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They
undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency
while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation
to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we
know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward,
P rogressive and potentiall/even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.
On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem
satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting
irgorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's
views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues
Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national
security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings,
particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense
budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not
know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending
a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we
know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to
expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one
Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example,
that is true.
There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign SO
far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going
after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary
how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use
the Democratic Convention that we were going to encourage division,
have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. how much was done?
3.
And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern
get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on
the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?
In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization
and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is
going to get him re-elected if only because nobody else will but
there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:
1.
Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there
may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do
the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive
duplication of effort, inter -office rivalry, competition, holding back
of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting
the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
(a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's --
1701 would get lead responsibility - - and it would also get Colson.
Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts dinners,
funding requests, etc. have already been accomplished. (If
they haven't, it's too late. ) Now what we need is a hard-driving
organizational and political effort and that can only be done from
a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as ma ny people from
here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people,
etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would
have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
(b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with
authority to run all over the place. It needs it still.
(c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction
to provide such support activities as are needed agency contact,
White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming,
etc.
(d) Writing now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and
God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief
perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No
matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy
and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that
one guy.
4.
(e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity and,
in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate
pretty well with the Shumway operation. P. R. -types like
Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P. R.
activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled
within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining
at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
(f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation
presumably Ed Harper would report to Colson at 1701.
(g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with
the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as
it is now as a separate Connally-Colson preserve it is
going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
(h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be
visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for
two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the
President. Starting now, the President should have a series of
afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at
least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't
believe how lax people are around here and mainly, I think,
because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal
identity with the President.
2.
Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to
remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only
Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so
response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the
McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the
President should be locked in and something attached to the
President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The
same goes for everybody else.
3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our
constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of
awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything
else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign,
with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's
substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We
would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around
with a sense of humor.
5.
4.
Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know
anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available
for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been
around the President for more than one campaign.
I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.
cc: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the
President might do from now through November, and Larry
Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update
of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.
First, there are a number of things that the President can do
that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President.
He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one
frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive
meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he
can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors
(McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the
stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)
The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some
problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto mes-
sages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it
seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either
domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or
international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume,
have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that,
particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national
addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Demo-
cratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not
- 2 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-
White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me
that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements
which we traditionally handle by a 2, 000-word handout from
Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might
better be handled from now to November by the President him-
self making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's
shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity
for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news
which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting
event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.
At the Convention
I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of
Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of
confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best in-
telligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The
relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive
the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street
drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be,
would probably be more photogenic than the business of the
convention. Any interplay between the President and the demon-
strators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers
with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies
in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an
overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because,
even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably
be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound.
Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the
President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least
had the guts to talk to.
Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with
Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on
Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of
- 3 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing
State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence).
I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but
closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the
convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance
speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the
Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately
after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unex-
pected visit to a separate location where a large, screened
youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the
President would join them. The point would be to have all
under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home
the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for
McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to
this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening
enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter
and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be
back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would
try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National
Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly
"playing President. 11
If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday
TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show,
I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved
up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without
ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely
anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having
a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having
the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought --
if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to
assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announce-
ment of the President's choice of a running mate until then? - -
That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the
President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.
Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the
risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to
Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice Presi-
dent. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their
4
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of
defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the
President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the
youth forum described above.
General Campaign Strategy
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition almost - -
and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and
Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should
push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace
the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just
endorsing the Mills bill. - - I know some Christian Scientists
who don't buy this.
Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now
about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless
that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously.
The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign
without appearing to be doing SO. Here is my list of don'ts:
-- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
- - Don't engage in any debates.
- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press
that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.
The press is vital. The President has won when the press was
with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).
(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red
meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of ac-
cessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as
radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-
looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our
domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews
with pundits would be good.
- 5 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe
2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do
quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national
scribes don't come in loaded for bear.
(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media
in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis,
Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warn-
ing. While the national press would have to be included in these,
and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer
questions from the more numerous regional reps should pre-
dominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like
these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters
in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick
his way through personally. For example, we could cover the
southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and
New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in
and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the
New England impact should be worth the aggrevation). -- Denver
for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest.
We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise
these in the particular region. The first few we might get away
with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas
where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without
having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago
for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences
in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance
buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks
if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase
the risks.
I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the
President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the
risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them
is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in
the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to
substantive events. The motorcade can stop occassionally and,
if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car
- 6 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we
must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn. ) This
will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a
series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for
rallies that he has used in past campaigns.
One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local
color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can
help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the
Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him.
I remember the success of the President's early morning visit
to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope
that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar
"unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a. m.
and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.
I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for
a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international
town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network repre-
sentatives in a number of international capitols relaying live
questions answered by the President here in Washington. This
would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even
hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers,
tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them. 11 A "foreign
heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would
love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so
much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can
get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize
with the foreign heckler a good trap.
Pace of Campaign
Before the convention I think the President should schedule one
major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be
visible going about the serious business of Government. Right
after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his re-
turn from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic
- 7 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago
because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day,
although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important
date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event
could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with
Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although
I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-
time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes
of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should
go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John
Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but be-
cause that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need
another event besides screwworns with a Mexican-American flavor
done the same day.
As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more
than one trip a week and always substantive. The only out-of-
country trip I can foresec might be one to Mexico, depending on
how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest
of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the
exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths
of being President.
The First Family
I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington
and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington
papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought
I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so
successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing
that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.
Theme of Campaign
From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made
an important start at restructuring international and domestic
affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms
- 8
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only
halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase
to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's "Come home,
America. 11 The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that
McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokes-
man for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the
polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got
to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should
try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one
of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in pro-
posing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit
from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds
on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate
it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HIGH PRIORITY
July 19, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN WHITAKER
FROM:
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
Bob asked that you forward to him by Friday of this week
any updated thoughts or analyses that you have regarding
his memorandum to you on "Campaign Strategy" (attached)
of June 12, 1972. There is no need to completely redo the
memo, just update or alter any of the original thoughts you
had in light of the Democratic National Convention.
He also asked that you do a separate memo forwarding your
thoughts on the best use from a scheduling standpoint of
Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julic during the period between now
and the convention; and during the campaign period.
Attachmant
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Update on Campaign 005 Strategy
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
(In light of the Democratic
Convention)
In addition to what was set forth in my earlier memo,
I would argue that the only way we can lose the election
is to foul up our own convention.
We must not make Miami Beach an armed camp.
We must tag those who want to embarrass and confront us
as McGovern supporters.
It must be a Party convention simply re-nominating the
President for re-election --- not a White House operation.
The Convention must not disintegrate into youth VS. the
President.
How do we accomplish this?
Let's have Republican senators (i.e. Scott, Brooke, Javits
et al) take the Senate Floor and insist that McGovern,
Eagleton (and the few avowed Democrat senators who support
their ticket) ask their supporters to refrain from violence
at Miami Beach.
MacGregor and/or Dole should lay down a firm line dis-
tinguishing protest from violence. In other words, the
Party wants discussion but will allow no disorder.
-2-
We should see to it that a large number of our young
people move among the demonstrators. A few thousand
Billy Graham Dallas-Explo types committed to non-violence
could dilute the critical mass of hot and frustrated
militants.
The Party should organize a group of young Administration
spokesmen as a "communications corps" to offer to talk to
demonstrators or be near by any television situation.
Young Administration officials and Republican office
holders who have had experience handling young, explosive
crowds can be sent out where needed to avoid dangerous
confrontations and to show the television audience that
this Administration does communicate and listen. The
group should have the proper racial, ethnic, and sex
balance as well as being able to withstand verbal and
physical abuse.
Let's have other events at the Convention which show
continuity and confidence in our system, and in our Party,
like the President meeting with former Republican
National Chairmen. This will appeal to a lot of
organization Democrats who have been badly treated and
points up the ignoring of the LBJ types so obvious at
their convention.
One final thought: Let's not indulge in overkill to the
point where McGovern becomes a sympathetic figure. We
have enough good, substantive material on the issues
without getting into personalities.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
2:00 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Of
Regarding your July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy,
any alterations I would make in my original remarks are
minute. Therefore, I'll let my original memo stand as is.
Regarding a separate memo on the best scheduling use of
Mrs. Nixon, Tricia and Julie, Parker and I have a memo
on the way to Bob. It covers the President plus the ladies
and their husbands. That memo will be in to you tomorrow.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
RE:
CONVENTION
I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for
television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a
pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets.
That's not good will associate us with violence, inability to reduce
dissent, etc.
Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup - - President
and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He
suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights,
they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.
Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit
through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if
the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's,
and if it is no good, it loses the audience.
Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political
conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him
accept that night, and do the President the next night?
This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional,
but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first
determine the Presidential nominee and have himselect the running
mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before
the Convention, that reason is obviated.
Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better
ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night.
Worth considering?
cc: Dick Moore
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
SUBJECT:
Follow-Up on Campaign
Strategy
I stand on my previous memo as amended in the
two meetings I have just attended with HRH.
(I talked with Mr. Harlow this morning and he
asked that I submit this comment.) CaR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972 -- 6:15 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CLARK MacGREGOP
Q-1.
What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
A.
The President's posture from July 17th through August 18th should
be precisely what it has been during the past five weeks. He should
continue to perform as President, with only minimal public
visability as a candidate for re-election.
Q-2.
(I will not here repeat the question.)
A.
The President should continue his Presidential activities through
Friday, October 13th. He should not start campaigning until
Saturday, October 14th*. From mid-October until Election Day
the President should spend each Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday
in Washington as President and should campaign each Friday through
Monday. During the period October 14th-November 6th, the Presi-
dent should visit each of the top 15 or 16 electoral-vote states,
plus a representative and easily accessible number of states with
lesser electoral votes (marginal or "swing" states). The
activities should be related where possible to events or situations
associated with some aspect of his accomplishments as President -
or to his hopes for the future.
Q-3.
Any general thoughts
A.
The President's outstanding record of accomplishment on key issues
(peace, prosperity, performance) must be constantly emphasized,
and the attack must be directed to taxes, welfare, and national
security.
Q-4.
(.
.
.
opposition strategy
)
A.
The opposition strategy will be concentrated on domestic policy
attacks and will seek to portray Richard Nixon as the Herbert Hoover
* except, of course, for one-shot opportunities for significant addresses
such as Detroit on Labor Day.
Page 2 - Memorandum for H.R. Haldeman - June 29, 1972
of the '70's. We will hear a great deal about favoritism for the
rich and the corporate giants, insensitivity to the concerns of the
elderly and the poor. Every opportunity must be naturally
developed to demonstrate the Nixon Administration's performance
and plans for progress in aid of "the little man" and the disadvan-
taged. "The re-election of President Nixon" will guarantee a
"fair shake" for every American.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN SCALI
SUBJECT:
Election Strategy
I am not an expert in this matter, but here are my thoughts for
what they are worth:
1.
President's Posture Between Conventions:
High-level, statesmanlike, tending to the business
of running the government without appearing worried
or nervous about whoever the Democratic nominee
is, or what he is saying. Normal flow of appointments
and movements, rather than any hyped-up schedule,
but with emphasis on efforts to build a strong military
defense for the nation Vietnam peace negotiations if
developments break our way, plus attacks against the
cost of living, pa; ticularly food prices and unemployment.
In the meantime, convention leaders, Governors,
Senators and Party spokesmen would be building a plat-
form, in sharp contrast to McGovern's positions, and
pledging to work for the President who would continue
to be above the battle.
2.
After the Convention:
I would favor substantial campaigning with at least two trips
to California, New York, Ohio, Michigan and Southern
Wallace states if he chooses not to run. Kick-off time for
the campaign could be about September 15.
EYES ONLY
Mr. Haldeman
- 2 -
June 29, 1972
3.
Campaign Issues and Points of Attack:
If the candidate is McGovern, he would be extremely
vulnerable on national defense, welfare money
scheme, plus his incredible posture of begging the
enemy or potential foes for mercy, either for
release of prisoners or creating a utopian world
where magically we could all live in peace. By
sharp contrast, the President should bear down on
how he has served the nation as a proven leader in
the "real world", dealing with Moscow and Peking
at the summit from a position of military strength,
which is the only way to build a genuine peace
instead of an illusion of harmony which betrays rather
than serves the hopes of our people. I also suspect
it would be possible to build a powerfully effective
campaign issue on McGovern's half-baked ideas of
welfare and tax reform to show that this threatens to
destroy the free enterprise system which has been the
springboard for our greatness.
4.
Opposition Strategy and Points of Attack:
A.
Nixon is an outdated political hack who favors
the status quo because it helps his rich friends.
He is an isolated, suspicious loner who fails
to recognize the massive forces of change
sweeping our land, demanding more jobs, a
redistribution of wealth, and an end to the Nixon
inflation. It is long past time to reduce insane
military spending and devote the resources to
rebuilding our cities and providing adequate
medical and retirement care for all.
EYES ONLY
Mr. Haldeman
- 3 -
June 29, 1972
B.
Nixon is anti-Black, anti-poor, and an enemy
of the laboring man, particularly the union
member.
C.
The credibility gap that afflicts the Nixon
Administration has widened into a chasm. The
President relies on Madison Avenue public
relations hucksters to hide the real truth from
the American people as demonstrated by the
Pentagon papers and the India-Pakistan
documents. Actually he is a slippery politician
who is seeking to make himself a "King" by
disregarding Congress and relying on secret
diplomacy and foreign deals which he hides from
the American people.
D.
Vietnamization is a fraud, propped up by the most
ruthless bombing in history, an act bordering on
genocide. At best, he is substituting Asian bodies
for American bodies. Meanwhile, Nixon has
stubbornly resisted the act of statesmanship that
would bring this insane war to an end - withdrawal-
and relying on Hanoi to free the Amer ican
prisoners just as every foreign government has,
once the shooting stops. Instead, Nixon clings to
some fictitious "honor" and for four long years has
been responsible for the death of tens of thousands
of additional fine American boys, proving he lied
when he said he had a peace plan.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL CARRUTHE
From the first of July until the evening of the 22nd of August
when the President is asked to appear at the Republican
National Convention, in Miami, to accept his party's
nomination, he should maintain his Presidential posture.
In his role as a world leader performing the duties of the
most complex and awesome office in the history of mankind,
he is operating at a level that obscures the counter efforts
of the Democratic candidate. He must maintain the tremendous
momentum that he has created in the area of foreign affairs and
focus on generating an equal momentum on the domestic side.
In order to generate this "domestic momentum", I recommend
that we create a series of substantive Presidential events
in the key political states. The justification for these events
must be to attend to the domestic needs of the people in these
areas.
In the period between the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions, the President should hold a series of domestic
summits at the White House dealing with the key issues and
they should be, obviously, widely publicized. Consequently,
in his role as the President, he sets the stage for his domestic
trips, which should begin shortly after the Labor Day weekend.
The sooner we begin to publicize these domestic summits at
the White House, the better.
If we create considerable media interest in the domestic
summits, we will accomplish the two most important things:
1. We will increase the exposure of these summits
between the conventions and, therefore, steal
the lead from the Democrats.
2. We will provide credibility to the President's
domestic trips following the Republican Convention.
- 2
I recommend that we create a media campaign
around each of these domestic events. We
should provide day-to-day media input to the
television and radio stations and major newspapers
in these areas each day leading up to, during and
following the event. By creating our own regional
network in each of these key political areas, we
will totally dominate media coverage for a
concentrated period of time. Our goal, of course,
is to leave a lasting impression with the voter
that Richard Nixon is responding to the domestic
needs of the people at their level. These trips
beginning in early September should continue
through the month of October. Each of these
major domestic events should be supported with
side trips and human interest type drop bys.
The President should avoid attacking the opposition between the
conventions. However, that does not prevent the other members
of his political family from doing so.
The Democrats will dominate the media during the first two weeks
in July. It will be most difficult to steal the spotlight from them,
but we should try. One or two dynamic events or announcements
could have a devastating effect on the Democrats; i.e., while the
Democrats are fighting it out on the convention floor, Richard
Nixon continues to implement his far-reaching and inventive
foreign and domestic programs.
If we can gain this domestic momentum and maintain our foreign
posture, we leave the Democrats with very little to talk about
except themselves, and in that respect, no matter who their
candidate is, there is no contest.
Our major area of concern is our lack of ability to communicate
the President's interest in, and compassion for the people.
Richard Nixon has approached the office of the Presidency with
great dignity and formality and, in many cases, his Presidential
posture has been misconstrued as being abstract, private and
secretive. While these aspects of his personality create a certain
intrigue around the office of the Presidency, we are being
criticized for being out of touch with the people.
- 3
I feel that the November Group's media campaign and the
Wolper documentaries will do a great deal to offset this
thinking, but I also think that it is our responsibility to
persuade the voters that Richard Nixon is not out of touch
with the people and that he does care for each and every
citizen and that he has great compassion for his fellow man.
In addition, whatever hostility the voters have toward their
government, they translate it through the incumbent as
opposed to the challenger. I believe that the main reason
that Hubert Humphrey lost the California primary is because
he was construed by the California voter as the incumbent
and a representative of the establishment, while George
McGovern was clearly cast as the voice of the people and
the challenger.
I think the American public wants to get to know their President
better and that we have the obligation to provide that contact.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which
requested my views and analysis of the following points:
1. The President's posture between the Conventions.
Most people are "down" on politicians and political
campaigning. The longer the President can stay
above the battle, the better off he will be. The
President should keep being "President" just as long
as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue
as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.
During the Convention interlude, the President should
be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him -
follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at
ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the suc-
cess of his economic program and his concern for the
still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one
last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining
legislation proposed by this Administration. This
could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate
and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee
members. In addition, the President could meet with
supportive special interest groups.
Meetings such as these would allow the President the
opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic
legislation and to articulate the principles which
support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed
with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if
desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,
- 2 -
if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network
and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the
President is trying to correct and how his solution
would work. For instance, on the environmental issue,
we could encourage the networks and local TV stations
to get film of water pollution which could be utilized
in their reports of the President's meeting with Congres-
sional representatives to encourage them to pass his water
pollution legislation.
Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday
we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy
and the balance of international power. He needs to
re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what
he stands for - what he's for and against domestically.
It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention
would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic
philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis,
but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for
the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to
the Election.
Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better
off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress
is in session will have some bearing on what the President
is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President
should continue the scenario outlined for the between Con-
ventions period. If it is not in session, then we must
find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the
failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips
to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a
problem to go on because of their failure to pass the
legislation the President recommended. These trips should
be "non-political".
In either event, the President should not start political
campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October.
If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of
Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be
stretched to include one trip during the week, although I
think it is important to convey the image of the President
being in Washington "running the country" while others are
out campaigning.
- 4 -
such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate
their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the
Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get
a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.
The President should stay above all of this. He should
be on the offensive with issues like peace, the economy
and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic
reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the
Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should
be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared,
in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the
fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposi-
tion for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme
and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be
too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long
as the President is not making them. Presidential spokes-
men will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than
will the President.
We should have our own plan as to how to win this election,
and the development of the plan should assume that the
worst charges possible are made against the President.
We should then operate against this plan, and never, once,
deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some
false charges, the President should not be rushing out to
respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a sur-
rogate handle it.
My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the
people of this country desire most a President who is
strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments
and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they
have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I
believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit,
Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong
action to bring the economy back in line is becoming
increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything
the President does between now and the election must be
geared to contribute to this image.
- 3 -
The President's efforts should be concentrated in key
states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but
he might make some regional visits which would include
states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states.
He should do events which provide for some kind of
encounter with the "average man". Generally these
should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he
should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and
although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited
the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which
was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we
can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging
the panel.
3. Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
The President should not attack anyone for anything
during the campaign. This should be left to the
surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman
who has brought peace to the world and economic stability
to our country. And, who has applied and intends to
continue to apply these same visionary attributes to
our domestic problems. The President should articulate
only positive things relative to key issue areas and key
interest groups.
The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack
beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention.
What they should be attacking will, of course, be depen-
dent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own
positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the
candidate is there are two things which we can challenge
regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the
second is the inability of the Federal Government to
produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should
have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment,
even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although
I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.
4. The opposition's strategy and what we can do.
The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and
his lack of concern for the average man. They will have
absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their
charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food
prices and high unemployment - and other people issues
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
SUBJECT:
Your June 12th Memorandum
1.
I believe the President's posture between the Conventions should
be non-political, statesmanlike, our national leader. However, the
President can use those six weeks to set the stage for election issues
by taking positions which the public approves, but which contrast with
the opposition. He should consider built-in appearances before
national conventions and regularly scheduled meetings (Jaycees, Older
Americans, Spanish-Speaking, etc.) where he can appear as President,
not candidate.
For example, if busing is a campaign issue, the President might meet
with school superintendents, hold legislative sessions on his busing
proposals, submit a Constitutional Amendment, engage in discussions
with parents and students who suffer under excessive busing, etc. In
this way, in his proper role as President, the Chief Executive would
be building on an issue to exploit in the campaign. The same could be
applied to POWs, Vietnam, defense spending, drugs, amnesty, 6th
Fleet-Israel, or other issues which may be politically attractive.
Since his opponent will come from Congress, the post DNC Convention
period should see implied criticism of the Democratic controlled Senate
for not acting on the President's substantial legislative recommendations.
Making Congress a whipping boy is always difficult but it will at least
highlight the President's initiatives.
Cabinet officers, Congressmen, Governors and other surrogates should
use this time to attack the opposition: its candidates, record and platform.
Since Party behavior is the first test of voters, one of the most important
activities would be the President's personal and private involvement in
getting Democrats to switch parties after McGovern is nominated. I
believe there is a possibility in this area and the President could negate
the party issue substantially.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
2.
The President, I feel, should hold back from overt political
action until early in October, staying above the partisan fights.
Then I recommend an aggressive, concentrated campaign for the
final weeks.
Earlier, the President will have developed issues and the Surrogates
battered the opposition, leaving the President free to revitalize the
campaign and deliver the "knock-out" in the closing days.
I think the President should schedule a number of regional addresses,
rallies, parades, news conferences, telethons, etc. in major cities
like New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, Seattle.
Additionally, he should concentrate his time in the target states,
planning at least two appearances in each. The "quickie" swings of
1970, stopping in three or four states in one day, provide a good
format for a short campaign. Each event should be built around the
key campaign issues as they develop to mòre dramatically focus
attention on the President's positions. The President should resist
personal attacks on his opponent.
3.
Until the Democratic Convention and its platform, specific
issues are difficult to guess. Obviously, the Vietnam War will be an
issue, taxes, busing, jobs, cost of living, etc. George McGovern has
a record in Congress he must defend as well as his positions during
the campaign. Careful research will develop his weak points. I think
over-all he should be projected as an extreme radical whose wild ideas
would destroy the country. With this general strategy every issue can
be tailored to make the point. (McGovern is already in trouble over
his welfare-taxes proposal and has been backtracking on defense
spending.)
4.
"Right from the Start" McGovern is considered a one-issue candi-
date who created a good grass-roots organization to deliver delegates.
Should Vietnam be removed as an issue, McGovern would appeal only
to a few and certainly not the middle-road. At any rate, we can look
forward to the war issue and must publicize the President as the one
who is getting us out honorably and most important will never turn
his back on our POWs.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-3-
I suspect the Democrats are sitting on several potential scandals (like
ITT) in the government and will try to show the Administration as
corrupt, handling favors, pro-big business, etc. Unemployment and
food prices surely will be Democratic issues. The opposition is
certain to attempt to use the "trust" issue in an effort to show a
credibility gap.
The best defense is a good offense, and several attractive issues
should be constantly repeated to drive points home. For example,
the surrogates can talk about the President's handling of his job,
experience, ability etc.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN H
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Memoranda
In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from
you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects
of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.
It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in.
Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda
and give you my conclusions.
One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like
this for you, I probably shoult not be requested to do a memorandum of my own
on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep
from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate
my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.
Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines
for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing.
But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move
ahead - not that they are not already there!
BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been
known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's
"Fort Knox" is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied
not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount
national concerns.
BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high
clouds. The President should not act so Presidential so as to be
out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from
a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.
2.
A.
BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS
1.
The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and
should continue the same through the Convention period. The
general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I
guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his
pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloof-
ness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed
to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the
country; increase the number of official meetings - Cabinet,
Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. - all which show the President
working against the problems of the people.
2.
With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings
designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to
pressure for legislation should be highly visible. The greatest
amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive
aspects of his foreign policy - however, this should not only be
done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways
which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that
the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT,
etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our
advantage.
3.
When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the
orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin.
The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our
lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A
well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN
PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform)
should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our
Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform
hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic
platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and
we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as
to justify the equal time.
3.
B.
PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS
1.
The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September
toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously,
we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so
dictate.
2.
Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends -
Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a
Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to
Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible,
always return to the White House over night.
3.
Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern,
at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will
look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done
right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard
attack. (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation.
Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head
it?)
4.
During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the
President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's
desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and
that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what
is wrong with McGovern.
5.
Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive
accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle
of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same
visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his
foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the
problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-
minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses. We might see if a
five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one
4.
of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would
give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in
a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.
7. The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others
do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum -
advance it a notch - and everything falls into place. Our tempo is
firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running --
but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work
up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)
8. The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special
voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an
argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the
Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory.
Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish com-
munity and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The
problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how
the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will
have to move to a plan on this.
9. Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a
problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance
is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the
structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed
to make the evening news versus evening-type events. A key
question here is at what point do we saturate and become over-
exposed? The other question would be at what point does
McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to
become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown
is McGovern helped?
10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region
and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed
for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by
utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get
into key locations.
5.
C.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND
POINTS OF ATTACK
1.
Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong
suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to
engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no
reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely
defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key
to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting
the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's
economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering
of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's
policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make
our charge about the "McGovern Market."
2.
I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential
actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes,
"How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be
part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3.
I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made
the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms
of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by
the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting
a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue
charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the
offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend.
As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation,
as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4.
Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This
is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff
at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the
straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps
Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists,
and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general
public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our
surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them
on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat
to our constituency than they do presently.
6.
5.
Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-
emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the
broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and
order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play
to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The
exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.
to
6.
Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is
expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility.
We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples
of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out
front a President and an Administration that has done everything
possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on,
we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would
undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the
surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising,
other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the
President's credibility.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS
1.
Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and
the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be
developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic
Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance.
The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should
assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION
MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION
HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
2.
The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during
the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can
be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good
recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special
voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN
SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN
3.
Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his
domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he is for and against domestically."
He states a little later, "..he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and
how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his
domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the
Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our
domestic philosophy is at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
2.
4.
It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators
are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be
to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.
CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER
DROP IDEA
OTHER
5.
Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and
do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some
food chain retailers.
HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
DROP
6.
Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a
week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials
to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we
should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CHECK MITCHELL FIRST
7.
Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot
every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that
McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule
for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it
under control?
COMMENT:
8.
Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding
ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to
ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this - examples or techniques of how he
would go about it.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
9.
Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the
economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from
these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed
internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-
being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the
economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put
this together? Under Colson?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL
COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ
DROP IT
10.
Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price,
suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the
Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.
YES
NO
OTHER
11.
Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit
in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could
be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the
memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently
on that memorandum.
YES
NO
12.
Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders,
abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies
now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start
cranking into their talks.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
13.
In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our
Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually
the credibility of the President?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS
HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
4.
14.
Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight
the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration
officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we
draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about
McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates.
Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic
Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT
BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE
OTHER
15.
Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this
election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly
find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He
also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".
Should Colson go ahead with this?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY
OTHER
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
RONALD L. ZIEGLER
SUBJECT:
Views and Analyses requested R3 in memorandum
of June 12, 1972
There probably is no one who would not say the President should best
campaign by being President; that the most effective candidate posture is
the Presidential posture. That is not so much a recommendation as it is
fact.
The posture exists because it is his posture. It is present because of his
accomplishments as a statesman both in his widely approved foreign initia-'
tives and in the less appreciated domestic initiatives.
That posture cannot be split in two. The campaign is what the President
wants to do for the nation and the world. So there cannot be candidate actions
and Presidential actions, or a Presidential period and a campaign period.
He cannot be two people or approach events or actions into two kinds.
So we can direct our attention not to what the President should be, but what
opposition strategies will be used in an attempt to diminish what he is.
These fall into two areas:
1. Tactics to describe statesmanship as aloofness.
2. Approaches which will grant foreign affairs accomplishments
but suggest this has been a preoccupation to the expense of
domestic needs.
Page 2
Taking the Offense
Both strategies should be approached by undercutting them rather than by
responding to a series of charges and by taking steps to do so at once
rather than waiting for the attack to surface.
1. The charge of detachment from concerns of the electorate cannot
be allowed to set in; we must not lose the ability of people to
relate comfortably to the man in the office. It is important that
he be seen not as someone seeking power -- he already has the
power others are seeking -- but that it be understood this power
is being used well.
2.
We cannot run the risk that people won't know our domestic
achievements in the economy, health, nutrition, education, and
the other areas of expansion and improvement. These must be
demonstrated and greater focus placed on them, and on the
unwillingness of Congress to act on many of his initiatives.
And all of this must be done from a position of self confidence and in such
a way as to convey our positive posture.
The Advocate's Role
Attention to our positions needs to be drawn not just through travel but
through the President's words. What he says in forums about the nation's
problems and our solutions will demonstrate action and initiative (focus on)
and his words will have to be reported and those reports, coming from
periodical press conferences, meetings, appearances, receptions, will
get people talking about what he has to say. As the President is an advocate
of his programs, his spokesmen and surrogates will gain increasing atten-
tion and copy.
In facing a Democrat attempt to portray the Presidency as unconcerned or
aloof, Congressional leaders can be called in with greater frequency so that
the President can be noted and quoted on what he has put forth.
Receptions for an increased variety of publics and groups can give an oppor-
tunity for him to tell them directly his concerns, and again be quoted.
Page 3
A Cumulative Effect
These need not always be page one or the television lead; they will have a
cumulative effect which will force the press to report the actions he has
taken and the inaction of Congress in responding in many cases. The
forcing of attention should begin now, before Congress adjourns and before
activities can be colored as part of the campaign.
None of this suggests that we should not organize ourselves and our state-
ments to achieve news leads nor that activities should not be planned and
organized. But they must not appear to be part of a campaign nor an
attempt to gain time or space. Presidential activity is not candidate
campaigning. (On this point also, it would be helpful for the party-rally
and fund-raising kind of events to be started as late as possible.)
Focus on Activism
Without discussion, for the moment, of press bias, we should be aware that
the press, seeing the President in his activities, observing -- not necessarily
questioning -- him will force them to focus the activism and concern taking
place. We should be led to conclusions rather than being presented with
them, note what we are doing rather than hear what we say we are doing,
hear the President put forth his views instead of others putting them forth
on his behalf.
Drawing attention to the Presidential force behind positions and people should
not lead to a process of cluttering the President's schedule; periods of 3 -
4 hours, twice a week, begun soon can accomplish this.
Painting the White House Grey
Another strategy which should be undercut is one which the opposition will
use to paint the White House a shady grey.
Every appearance of conflict of interest, favoritism or misconduct will be
seized upon. Because opponents will have so little to grab onto in foreign
policy and domestic activity, and because there is an attitude on the part
of much of the press that we are the guys in black hats, it will be extremely
difficult to disassociate the President from clumsiness or failures in any
of the lower forms of campaign techniques which perhaps must be used.
Page 4
We should reassess our whole approach to the campaign apparatus in this
light.
Do we have adequate controls and checks to prevent
blotches from occurring?
Should we have in the White House and EOB the political
activists who work with special interest groups or should
some of these be transferred to 1701?
I am not advocating these, but I do advocate rigorous examination of these
kinds of questions in light of what we can lose through inuendo and guilt by
association.
We have been faced with this time and time again, being brought down from
a high crest achieved through hard work and true leadership, because of
clumsy efforts on matters of secondary importance. I don't know how it
happens; only that it must not.
Avoiding Clumsiness
I am not worried about the President's posture and am not presumptuous
enough to say what it is or should be. But I am concerned that as an organ-
ization, including the campaign structure, we clearly be seen as positive
and aggressive, and not as negative or deceptive.
The most counter-productive activities we could undertake are those which
would give the Democrats another ITT, or to have them uncover some kind
of GOP intelligence operation in their convention as the nation watches.
This is not to say we should be overcautious or that we shouldn't be aggres-
sive and tough. But there are some kinds of activities in which only minimal
skill has been shown. Worse, there has been a particularly acute ineptness
which invariably leads to linking these activities to the Presidency.
Note on Convention Period
As for the President's activities during the Democratic convention, it should
be business as usual, not especially active, but not hibernating; not pre-
occupied by what's happening at Miami, but at least mildly interested in
the outcome.
Page 5
About the Press
On the matter of press, my experience as Press Secretary over three
years of day-in and day-out dealings with the press corps gives me little
doubt that on the whole the press is philosophically untuned to us, biased
in their copy and approaches, and often better to work around than through.
Our success in dealing with the press has come from keeping them off
balance, proving them wrong when they are, and not permitting them to
feel we are on the defensive. There should be no lack of understanding of
their motives or attitudes. We have not changed their views entirely nor
their methods of operating at all; but they have been kept on the defensive
and we have maintained a working relationship.
Righting Wrongs
They should continue to be called when they are wrong. Prompt, fact-filled,
firm responses should continue to follow every distortion. The process
should be improved in view of the fast-firing developments of campaigns,
and our response should not be scattered or fractionalized as has been the
case too often in the past. We dilute the effect of our response to media
mistakes and distortions when media get called one day by a Scali, next
day a Colson, then a Ziegler, Clawson, Snyder, Klein, Shumway and virtually
anybody else.
The responses should be sharpened so that the Press Secretary can deal
with distortions or ommissions concerning the President in the most effective
way; the Director of Communications can do so for the Administration.
I am not saying thatDole or Mitchell cannot make a point now and then; I
am describing what the White House posture should be for maximum results.
Avoiding Uptightness
The scattered approach suggests to the media an uptight, overly sensitive
image which is contrary to the posture of confidence required; thus we
find ourselves dealing from a position of weakness rather than strength in
these situations. The President is known as a man who understands the
press and the realities of the media. He is not affected by their bias -- is
more interested in doing a good job. This is what they say and know. That
is what will affect the election.
Page 6
Just as we should give the Democrats no advantage, we should not give
an advantage to a press corps which is largely sympathetic to it. We
could easily solidify the situation if we were to take on an overt attack on
the press as a whole.
Discussing this, there seems to be broad agreement to the above point.
Yet a consensus is developing among the press that discrediting the Ameri-
can press is a pillar of our campaign effort. It creates the thought that we
are uptight about them and that we can talk about only the press and not the
issues. Key advisors often focus more on press than on accomplishments
of the President.
This approach would make us look anything but confident; frightened instead
of bold; reluctant to be observed rather than proud of demonstrating what
we are doing and have done.
We would divert energies which should be used against the opponent rather
than against those writing about him. We should be aware of press failings --
weakness, vanity, selfishness, the herd instinct -- but should use these to
our advantage rather than simply denouncing them. Any appearance of an
organized overt anti-press campaign would help strengthen the press bias,
portray ourselves poorly and draw energies off into secondary battles at
the expense of the primary objective.
It would invite the press to throw off caution and give the justification it
now lacks for being self-righteous.
The media now expect an offensive of this kind; we would appear weak to
give it to them.
Who Loves Whom?
If McGovern is the Democratic candidate, I am not at all convinced that the
bulk of the press will have a love-feast with him. Should this prove to be
wrong, we will have to reassess our position and approach. But it is
entirely possible that much of the press will not be smitten and we should
be open to that possibility in our thinking and strategy.
SUMMARY
Summing up, we move in an atmosphere of confidence and power to drama-
tize real accomplishments by drawing attention to Presidential action in
such a way'as to undercut opposition strategies without appearing artificial
Page 7
or campaign-oriented. The spotlight on what the President does and
says should not be pulled away from him and his accomplishment -- onto
clumsiness or appearances which permit the opposition and a largely
unsympathetic press to portray whatever characteristics would be least
useful to us and least attractive to voters.
Attitude toward the press should reflect the President's own concern on
getting the job done rather than what's being said by media. To do other-
wise would place those around him and therefore the Presidency itself in
a defensive overly sensitive position. Press weaknesses are more to be
used than labelled and press distortions should be responded to in a precise
and effective manner. Presumptions of widespread press affection for the
opposition candidate may be premature.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
In response to your memo of June 12 regarding the campaign strategy,
I think you already have my thinking on most of the points you have
asked about. You probably have an-ad nauseam in-some areas like
aid to parochial schools.
Without asking you to go back and look at all my old memos I have
written, I am enclosing for your quick perusal my memo of May 17
on "Issue Management". There is nothing issue-wise that I feel any
different about nor to my knowledge have we made much progress
since May 17. Just ticking through the items in that memo:
1.
We have made a little start on the tax issue.
2.
We have done nothing separating ourselves from the bureaucracy
or attacking the bureaucracy.
3.
On busing, we have got to do much better and have an opportunity
to begin when the President blasts the higher education bill while
signing it.
4.
The inflation/food price issue I talked about yesterday. I feel it is
coming on us very hard and very fast and I believe we should be
prepared with the necessary contingency plant wick
5.
Welfare. The President has indicated that he likes the idea of
implementing the Talmadge Amendments with a lot of fan-fare
which is basically what I had proposed in this memo, but there will
be a lot of bloodshed because the faint hearts will fight this to the
death.
2.
6.
No Fault. This one happily we have done and in fact without much
involvement of any of the President's time. We got a good bit of
mileage out of it and for once our mechanism produced something.
7. Catholic Schools. Maybe we are coming to grips with this. I will
believe it when it happens.
8.
Social Security. In my memo of May 17, I said we are "treading
water". I said it again yesterday. We are.
In response to the other questions that you raised in your June 12 memo
I don't think it is necessary for the President to be travelling between the
Conventions. Indeed, I would rather see him remain here while the
Congress is here. Perhaps he could do one or two highly visible domestic
events; for example, call in the food chain retailers and lay them out in
lavender. Perhaps we will have an opportunity for a highly visible veto,
but I think we can use that period of time also to rail against the
Congress for its inability to deal with major national problems.
I still don't feel that the Jaycees or Rotary type appearances are good.
I believe there is more to gain by keeping the President on the pedestal
he is on, a little bit aloof and non-political, dealing with the great issues
of our time. I disagree strongly with Hallett's point about a foreign trip.
There is no way that we can top the last two and it would be transparently
political. In short, let's keep the President tending to his knitting. But
the most important point in my mind is that he be prepared to move in
swiftly, firmly and very decisively to capitalize on any domestic issues
that can either be turned into an asset or as to which we can block a negative.
Food prices and busing are two that are in this category. If the Congress
won't act on the moritorium as apparently they are not, let's take every
opportunity between the Conventions to bang them hard. Let's be prepared
to do something very dramatic on the food price front. We may have to go
way beyond jawboning or attacking the food chains. We may have to have
an Executive Order ready to issue to nail this very hard.
I very much like theidea of the President being in California for the first
two weeks of July. In fact, there would be nothing wrong with him being
there the first three weeks in July. We have no problem with the public
thinking that the President spends all of his time relaxing. To the con-
trary, I think there was even a ripple of concern in the country that he was
pushing himself too hard during the Soviet trip.
3.
In any political campaign the most critical strategy call is momentum and
timing. July is a month for us to be locking up all of our positions on the
issues, exploiting constituency groups, having the President come forward
strong and hard on critical domestic issues, but at the same time letting
him get some rest, do some thinking and not be moving at a very rapid
pace.
I think you know exactly what I believe the opposition strategy will be.
They will hit us on the following issues:
1.
We are in bed with big business and don't give a damn about
the little guy. Off of this they play ITT, a $10 million secret
slush fund, vetoing of Social Security, etc.
2.
Ineffectiveness on the domestic front, the President doesn't care
about domestic issues and we have no domestic program.
3.
The economy is in trouble, prices are rising, people are out of
work.
As to these, I have no concern except over point one. That goes to the
trust-confidence-credibility factor which maybe one of the most important
things that the public uses to measure candidates. Here we have some
real work to do.
You said yesterday that everyone was saying that we should worry about
complacency. Obviously that is so, but in my mind it is a very serious
problem. It is infectious organizationally, it does have an impact on
voter turnout, but the worst thing it does is to permit people to throw
away their votes. By this I mean the Democrats who might otherwise
be frightened to have McGovern in the White House feel they can go to
the polls and still cast a straight Democratic ticket because there is no
chance of him being elected. This phenomenon was very evident in the
Goldwater campaign. Many of my Republican friends said, "I can cast
a vote for Goldwater because I know he can't be elected but if I thought
my vote made a difference, I would be scared to vote for him That
is also why Goldwater did better than the polls showed he would do. In
my opinion, we have to contrive adverse polls if necessary to let the
Ameri can people know this is a real test and we have to cleverly find a
way to scare hell out of them at the prospect of a McGovern Presidency.
4.
One thing we must do is to store up a whole slue of goodies that we can
come out with in September and October. I have been mentioning this in
every memo I have written during the past year and have yet to see any
evidence that we are doing this. Shipyard contracts, parks to the
people, Executive Orders, etc. etc. With a little imagination a program
for this is not hard to develop. It does not need the involvement of the
President unless we want him to but it gives a steady flow of government
activities that have a positive impact on the people. I would like to see
us have at least one a day in September and October.
You also know my thoughts on the campaign issue. Assuming it is
McGovern and that our strength remains as it is or even close to what
it is today, we need a real hatchet operation going on McGovern full
time, but far removed from the President. Democrats for Nixon could
carry the load. The President himself should go on doing those things
which as President put him before the American people, visibly dealing
with issues that are of concern to the American people. In short, we
want to slide into the campaign period by just doing more of the kind of
things that we have been doing. I agree with Hallett that we should only
have a few partisan rally type appearances in October.
Lou Harris made a very interesting point this week suggesting that the
President meet the domestic issue head on, saying in effect that we have
not made as much progress on the domestic front as we would like (this
kind of humility would help our credibility enormously), that the President
had to deal in the first four years with the most pressing problem which
confronted this nation, the search for peace and the strength of America's
position in the world, etc. He would then say that he is happy to let the
American people judge his Administration on his record in foreign affairs,
ending Vietnam, SALT, China, etc. Now that we have made such enormous
progress in the foreign field, which programs will continue (SALT continuatio
etc.) that we are going to turn this energy, imagination, drive, etc. to
solving the nation's most critical domestic problems, making government
more responsive, lowering the cost of government, straightening out
welfare, etc. etc. It is an interesting point because it is disarming and
readily acknowledges we have not done everything in the domestic field
that we want to. It suggests that the President's enormous skill in foreign
affairs, which is well and firmly established in the public's mind, is
transferable to handling the domestic issue and it somewhat co-opts the
enemy's attack line. It also holds out the promise of things to be done
because as Harris points out, people are much less concerned with what
has happened in the last four years than what they think will happen to them
over the next four years. Hence they are more concerned, even in the
5.
case of an incumbent, with what he hopes to do during the next term
than what he did do in the first term. This also keeps us from being
put on the defensive.
One other point worth mentioning: Dick Scammon believes the public mood
is just right for the kind of speech that Prime Minister McMillan gave in
1959 in the closing days of his campaign which according to Scammon was
one which moved the British people and according to Scammon was one of
the most brilliant political speeches ever. I haven't reviewed it although
I have asked for it. The thrust of it was, interestingly enough, somewhat
similar to Harris' point. In effect, "I have shown you what I can do, put
your faith in me. Here are the things we need now to do together and
you can trust me to do them. " It was calming, soothing, low-key. It
inspired trust and it suggested that the strong points that McMillan had
demonstrated could be used to solve the problems of the British people,
which he, McMillan, readily identified -- as I say, somewhat similar
to the Harris point.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you
regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with
the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is
not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having some-
one, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to
the issues we need to pursue, how we are going. to pursue them
and then let the troops execute.
One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has
to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks
very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we
have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all
results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens
to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am
also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues
or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image.
The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't
be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line"
of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's
personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of
the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close
the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on
the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum;
it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in
handling the tough issues.
The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on
the substantive follow-through we need.
2.
A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls
right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the
Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment
with government i.e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:
1.
We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard
to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we
can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to
you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we
can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and
sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our
pension program which we have totally neglected) then we
might be able to slide away from the big business label
somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible
association with big business or establishment-type events
should be considered for the President.
2.
There is no way politically that we can defend the present
tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern
will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of
their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can
be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins"
and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax
structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my
memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million home-
owners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should
be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an
unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property
tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the
Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.
Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't
going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite
candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient,
inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are
on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-
free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the.
most regressive and onerous of all.
3.
We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change
the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the
Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim
it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlich-
man got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if
it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps,
the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all
John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next
year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the
ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President.
The President should adopt the recommendation that property
taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should
then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the
preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific
objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by
various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas
of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the
architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the
President can direct a simplification of tax forms and proce-
dures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essen-
tail underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a
minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short
the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in
1969 and were defeated it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they
aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the
public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of
four or five key elements of the tax package that we will pro-
pose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the
President should have been seen visibly involved in managing
a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach.
In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar
as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts,
Treasury officials, etc. etc.
What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series
of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set
of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year
(and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground
out from under the demogogic arguments of McGovern and
Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting
defensively through the months of September and October.
4.
3.
Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign
against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of
Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very
effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred
with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put
some day light between the President and the bureaucracy.
We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will
use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect plat-
form to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and
issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done
this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but
need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster,
the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps
fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough
orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective
for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it
in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody
understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back
on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things
management-wise; now it is time to do a few demogogic things
which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful
President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to
the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the
people.
B. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is
that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against
busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing
plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see
the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the
gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area
and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.
In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is
in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the
North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the
South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If
Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute,
then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but
we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we
5.
have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major
effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the
President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment
making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing
plans can be undone.
Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly under-
stood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign
on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key
areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is
clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular
areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up
with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing,
but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday,
which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here
as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).
C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless.
People do not really know what the CPI means, hor is it terribly
important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price
of Ford Pintos by $30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity
that people buy every day -- food. Food prices have been rising so
long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They
are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we canhhope
for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand,
if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can
have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action,
perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I
happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a
significant political upheaval building in the country over this one
issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic
action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider
possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can
crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import
quotas).
All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion
either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing
things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either
6.
going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously
be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot
substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense
spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the
opponent.
In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not
much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that
we can doanything about).
D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from
the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If
we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would
urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger inso-
far as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is
later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem.
The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds
to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards,
(a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded
Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will
revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it
and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric
if it were done under the proper circumstances in September.
The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to
do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore
taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in
the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot
programs in New York and California as we have done to curb
excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to
the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which
would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the
same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I
watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a
gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons
why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how
we can if we want to.
E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional sub-
stantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of
the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive
initiatives in this area.
7.
P.R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by
building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the
final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is
much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned
a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits
to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.
F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will
be decided by the over $15, 000 a year, upper middle-class, white
suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to
promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions
that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good,
rather appealing little package that could be used especially with
certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because
none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we
need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for
exploitation of the good record we have made.
G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is' a real sleeper
issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particu-
larly in those states where it has either come irto effect or has
been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like
property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The
Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There
is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can
take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the
big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we
really have no position.
Key Voter Blocs
In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and
Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining
what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we
will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should
come to some subjective consensus.
I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of
May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the
8.
self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same
opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class,
Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have
a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other
area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal.
For example:
1.
We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan
cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have
children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited
to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7
or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is
one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic
hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational
effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial
schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this
issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are
immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly
exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2.
We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for
the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this
within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes
the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen
in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue
now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas
where it too can be a cutting issue.
3.
Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney
in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous
political dividends.
The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically
established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without
a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much
mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern
to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not
the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in
this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that
the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security
9.
benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in
the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign
issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could
lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of
H.R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this
one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property
tax issue is also hig with the old folks. We are badly treading water
in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will
be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really
hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.
In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the
over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics
(including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking -- we are doing well
in this area ) these two blocs could be decisive.
As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a
list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day
in September and October things like maritime contracts, parks being
returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc.
Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation,
and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum
impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become
ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be
used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving
the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears
blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the
President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to
do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political
or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to re-
mind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe
that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the
other side can do is promise.