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This file contains:
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH June 12 Memo. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From: Donald Rumsfield To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your memo of June 12th on the president and the Campaign. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Peter Flanigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your request for views on President's posture between the conventions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Herbert G. Klein To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign 1972. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: MacGregor Strategy Meeting-July 11. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Second Wave Polling Results. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/3/1972
From: Arthur J. Finkelstein To: Dr. Robert H. Marik RE: Priority States. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/7/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: TV Convention Group. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: J. Bruce Whelihan To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session-Wednesday, July 12, 1972 Democratic National Convention Observations. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Alvin Snyder To: Dwight Chapin RE: The Democratic National Convention Coverage. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Russ Freeburg To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session, Democratic National Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Democratic Convention Third Session. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Leonard Garment To: Dwight Chapin RE: Reaction to and opinion on McGovern's Interview. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From: William Carruthers and Marke Goode RE: Democratic National Convention July 12, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: RN Posture. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
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26145699
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WHSF: Contested, 16-9
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1
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26145699
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WHSF: Contested, 16-9
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This file contains:
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH June 12 Memo. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From: Donald Rumsfield To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your memo of June 12th on the president and the Campaign. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Peter Flanigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your request for views on President's posture between the conventions. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Herbert G. Klein To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign 1972. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: MacGregor Strategy Meeting-July 11. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Second Wave Polling Results. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/3/1972
From: Arthur J. Finkelstein To: Dr. Robert H. Marik RE: Priority States. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/7/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: TV Convention Group. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: J. Bruce Whelihan To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session-Wednesday, July 12, 1972 Democratic National Convention Observations. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Alvin Snyder To: Dwight Chapin RE: The Democratic National Convention Coverage. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Russ Freeburg To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session, Democratic National Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Democratic Convention Third Session. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Leonard Garment To: Dwight Chapin RE: Reaction to and opinion on McGovern's Interview. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From: William Carruthers and Marke Goode RE: Democratic National Convention July 12, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: RN Posture. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
9
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Response to HRH June 12 Memo. 10
pgs.
16
9
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Donald Rumsfield To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Response to your memo of June 12th on
the president and the Campaign. 6 pgs.
16
9
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Peter Flanigan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Response to your request for views on
President's posture between the conventions.
2 pgs.
16
9
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Herbert G. Klein To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Campaign 1972. 4 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 1 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
9
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: MacGregor Strategy Meeting-July 11. 4
pgs.
16
9
7/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark
MacGregor RE: Second Wave Polling
Results. 4 pgs.
16
9
7/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Arthur J. Finkelstein To: Dr. Robert
H. Marik RE: Priority States. 5 pgs.
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: TV Convention Group. 1 pg.
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: J. Bruce Whelihan To: Dwight Chapin
RE: Third Session-Wednesday, July 12,
1972 Democratic National Convention
Observations. 6 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 2 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Alvin Snyder To: Dwight Chapin RE:
The Democratic National Convention
Coverage. 1 pg.
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Russ Freeburg To: Dwight Chapin
RE: Third Session, Democratic National
Convention. 2 pgs.
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Democratic Convention Third Session. 2
pgs.
16
9
Campaign
Memo
From: Leonard Garment To: Dwight Chapin
RE: Reaction to and opinion on McGovern's
Interview. 2 pgs.
16
9
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: William Carruthers and Marke Goode
RE: Democratic National Convention July
12, 1972. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 3 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
9
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: RN Posture. 3 pgs.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Page 4 of 4
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
EMP E.O. 12065, NARI, Section Date 8-19-81
By
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Dr
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH June 12 Memo
1.
What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
ANSWER
- Continue non-political approach
- Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which
serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements
in office.
Example:
- Tricia to China
- Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
- Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)
- First week after Democratic Convention, offer their
candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
- One or two half day trips to key states, i.e. Ohio Armstrong
Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
- Remain every bit the President.
- A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate.
Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the
Democratic support on our side.
- If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured,
if this is possible, SO the least amount of political
brutality is expanded upon. A sloppy move here no matter
how well planned will have serious consequences.
-2-
2.
What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election?
ANSWER
- He should move into and out of the Convention in a way
which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level.
The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely
necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their
great President. He should be aloof from the political
hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except
his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance,
(unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change--
and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his
appearing before the Convention).
- After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go
right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to
Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after
the Convention which only the President can handle and
that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.
- In the second week of September, go to California, hold
the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for
massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in
September or the first of October. Then let him break
loose.
- The President will want to campaign hard and should.
- The obvious which everyone will say is, the President
should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does
not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.
-3-
A. When should he start campaigning?
- All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the
earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the
Surrogates will start on Labor Day.
B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?
- This really depends on the polls. I would envision
his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the
four regions once. Our current key state list would
probably be the most logical list of locations. Where
he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling
data.
C. What type of activities should he engage in?
- This is probably the most important question.
- Only the President can have "Presidential press
conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or
once every other week activity.
- Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies
are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the
Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.
- Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks
on a network we put together. This would be in addition
to one or two national T. V. talks.
- Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise
they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.
- Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight
in the White House.
- His schedule when in Washington should include items
only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news
we want to hypo.
- Quadriad or CCEP meetings
- Cabinet meeting on a key subject
-4-
- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
- An emergency meeting with another head
of state - i.e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt,
or Golda.
Special Note: As with 1968 except even more so--
we should strictly limit his activity putting time against
only what counts. Figure our news cycles- have one
national event per day and keep any other activity regional
oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time
to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.
3.
Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign
on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
ANSWER
There are three general points.
- We should not launch all of our issue attack rockets
too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed
which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted
as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility
and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily
plans in the T. V. area).
Our tendency is to use the sledge hammer approach
and we should have a calculated release of issue positions
and attack so that halfway through October we still have
something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.
- We should keep the debate on issues (if the war is not
over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue
campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be
avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception
would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one issue which everything we do and say (beginning
now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon.
Our surrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our
-5-
printed materials -- everything should build credibility.
Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary
infers and once again directly states, "we need a
President we can believe in. " The President has
credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it--
once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very
difficult to recover.
- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am
for third party persons or organizations attacking him
lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic
Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues
but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience
and understanding of the institution of the Presidency.
There is no reason to let the Honest George image
keep floating.
4.
Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
ANSWER
The Attack on the President
- Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark
for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must
move on.
- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say it
hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- - Nixon did
in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a devisive President. He wins by dividing
Americans. The people want to be brought together.
We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.
-6-
- The most isolated President. Makes decisions alone,
doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House
constantly -- no consultation with Congress.
- And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility.
Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother
Don, anything that helps to point negatives.
Response to the attack
- The President never takes on McGovern by name or
directly. If he does it should be during the last days
of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around
McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservative Democrats who are popular in key
states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell.
We can use them in the State where they' re popular just
at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before
McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that
it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is
headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works-
under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off
any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has
done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous
amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which should be
made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means
using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby
has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the
basis for the McGovern attack.) We must make sure our
attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR
and build him into a martyr.)
-7-
- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena.
Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits
and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated
level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)
What the opposition strategy will be and how we should
meet it.
NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a
combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades.
They are organized, have good supporting people, great
merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal, "
an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent
President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government
in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-
nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership
capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must
recognize they have much going for themselves.
- The first most important strategy for the opposition out
of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would
expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his
own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party
from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of
the country holding private unity meetings and striking
deals.
Response:
State by state McGovern should be hit by sign carrying
mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers ($1000 to
everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a
truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up
for air from the time he leaves the convention.
- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President
(if Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the
period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see
him, Brezhnev, Golda, Heath, Pompidou?
Response:
Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other
governments know confidentially our displeasure at any
such meetings.
-8-
- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels-
Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban
and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern
solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention
and forces the President into highlighting his domestic
program. We would be very much on the defensive.
Response:
A PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet
task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a
stunt early in its planning.
- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the
Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President
has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress,
the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a
good idea - for them!)
Response:
Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?
- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always
do (like the right wing).
Response:
Early on our surrogates - everyone - should say -
Iswonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack.
It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a
joking way.
- As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car,
throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have
his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.
Response:
Pray all is o.k.
-9-
- Television is paramount. It is the single most important
element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California.
Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers,
the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish
all this T. V. has been the key.
We must assume crowds, events - everything will be
staged effectively for television. It has got to be their
feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a
regional, or state by state basis can defeat the
President.
Via television they will show:
- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public -
understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American,
you name it, rallying around one man. The one man
who really can "bring us together again" and unite the
nation.
- They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby
Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against
big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As
they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness
and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will
avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good
solid T.V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach-
after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power
Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor
doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.
Response:
Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should
look very seriously at how we would run a T. V. campaign
against the President. This exercise on our part might
give us some specific thoughts.
-10-
- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a
source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common
Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket
will be running their own campaign against the President.
I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will
coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as
anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.
Response:
Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups
who are for US. Or, we should get readings on those
groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next
we should set up front groups playing to the same
constituency, using a similar name and launch some
back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about
Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right
direction.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DONALD RUMSFELD
SUBJECT:
Response to your Memo of June 12th
on the President and the Campaign.
1. The President's posture between the Conventions
The President should:
-- Be Presidential;
-- Not engage in partisan activities;
-- Use the platform and power of the office
to show a President governing--let the
distinction be drawn between a partisan
Democratic office seeker versus an
incumbent President governing;
-- Travel only under the mantle of "official
business";
-- As suitable occasions are developed, be
photographed with prominent non partisan
citizens (Democrats, citizens, etc.)
-- Keep his options open. It will be a tough
election. Maintain a moderately active
profile, unless spectacular opportunities
for greater visibility occur.
Page 2
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention
to the Election -
-This will depend somewhat on who the Democratic
nominee is and who the Vice-Presidential nominees
are, as well as the situation in Viet Nam.
In general, and importantly, the President should
remain Presidential. Richard Nixon, the President
of the United States, is a winner. Richard Nixon,
campaigning as another office seeker, would create
unnecessary problems.
--To the extent possible, the President should be
involved in campaign travel as part of some
"official business". To the extent that a cam-
paign event is secondary on a trip he could travel
as early as six or eight weeks before the election.
However, travel throughout the election' should be
moderate. Avoid the impression of a frantic, hectic
three or four campaign-stop pace on a given day.
The target states, and enough others to show breadth,
need to be visited and appropriate events can be
developed for such visits.
3. Strategy for the President's campaign -
The theme, "Re-Elect the President", is sound.
If the campaign is consistent with that theme
we should avoid conjuring up the image of
Richard Nixon the office seeker. Activities
where he is functioning as President should be
highlighted. A great deal will turn on how
accurately the President is portrayed as a
competent, and bold, forward-looking and effective
President. Enhance the President's advantage of
incumbency by finding ways to contrast his
Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric.
The opponent will be a member of the Party
responsible for a number of the problems of this
country, and his solutions will be fuzzy and
unsound, but there are plenty of people available
to make the attack besides the President.
Page 3
Issues the President should emphasize:
- His Foreign policy leadership
- A strong America versus a weak America
- Performance versus promises (results versus
"effort", "concern", "commitment", etc.)
- Avoiding crisis versus crisis management
(Action versus reaction)
- The importance of the individual, individuality,
diversity, and pluralism versus centralization
and control.
4. The opposition's strategy -
-- If the opponent is McGovern he will try to
hold the left (his enthusiastic corps of
workers and media support) by holding to his
Viet Nam position and calling for an end to
"senseless killing." He will move to the
middle on other issues to gain labor support,
a degree of legitimacy in the south and the
support of the Democratic power men. He will
be less idealistic and more practical. Hope-
fully, the Convention struggle will dramatize
his problems in this respect.
-- He will pound the so-called bread and butter
economic issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty
and inflation. (Larry O'Brien talks about almost
nothing else.) I can hear him now:
"When Nixon came in, unemployment was
under 4 percent--after 4 years of Nixon
it is up to 6 percent."
"When Nixon came in, your dollar was
worth a dollar--after 4 years of Nixon,
it is worth 90 cents."
He will portray the President as the handmaiden of
big business and special interests.
Page 4
"Jack Kennedy did battle with big steel,
Nixon gives loans to Lockheed.'
"The Democratic Party pushed for higher
Social Security benefits for the elderly
and higher minimum wages for workers, Nixon
makes deal with ITT in return for contribu-
tions."
"Democratic Presidents like Roosevelt,
Kennedy, and Johnson found jobs for millions
of unemployed Americans, Nixon freezes wages."
"Nixon means high unemployment and high
inflation -- your wages are controlled and
business profits soar and taxes, rents and
food prices climb."
How to meet the opponent's strategy:
McGovern's weakness will be a lack of "competence".
If he is elected it will amount to "on-the-job
training" - that is risky for the country.
We should seek some of the Wallace, McCarthy,
McGovern support that wants change, by driving
home the President's record on reform -- govern-
ment, draft, etc.
The way to do it is to take on Congress -- they
have failed the people. The laundry list of their
failures is persuasive. This will associate the
President with a desire for some change and his
hope to make things better.
Administration spokesmen can associate McGovern
with his unpopular extreme supporters and positions,
but the President should not.
A FINAL THOUGHT -
The President has hopes and ideals yet correctly
understands human characteristics. He knows that
to actually move the maximum distance toward those
ideals, those hopes of most human beings, you have
to be tough, pragmatic, courageous. That's what we
need as President, and we've got it. Thank God.
Page 5
-- But, as the President has said, not every
voter fully understands that. People can
be moved and persuaded by appeals to their
hopes and aspirations even though the approach
is fuzzy, impractical, even counterproductive
or dangerous.
-- The President effectively communicates his
toughness, strength and pragmatism. More can
be done to show that those qualities are necessary.
More can be done to show why the President is this
way--because that is how to move toward those
idealistic goals of peace, etc. He knows there
are damn few short cuts, that "caring", "wishing",
or "hoping" is not enough.
Further, more can be done to show that he has those
same hopes and ideals. We should seek some oppor-
tunities for him to dramatize his interest in
individual human beings, his personal concern where
personal concern is justified, his ideals, his hopes.
A chunk. of the American people must have the feeling
that he personally cares about their problems, not
in general but in the specific--about them, about
the kinds of concerns they have for themselves and
their families. Only then can many be sure he is
leading where they want to go. There are such
opportunities, but they must be seized.
The President knows that feeling moves some people.
He is capable of doing it and does it well. But
our Administration does it only reluctantly.
A danger for our Administration is in its competence
we seem harsh, in our strength we seem tough, in our
pragmatism we seem goalless and idealless.
McGovern is weak and would be a disastrous President.
But his warmth, concern, decency are appealing because
people dream, hope, aspire, and want to be better
than themselves, want better for their children, and
because they have fears.
Page 6
The campaign must scrupulously avoid going "over the
line. Our "reservoir", in this respect, is shallow.
The more people "feel" and believe (as opposed to
understand) that the President has ideals, hopes
and concerns, the more they will accept his approach
based on the vital qualities of strength, courage,
brilliance and competence, because they will feel he
is going-- and taking them-where they want to go,
and doing it skillfully.
And when a human being walks into the voting booth
pulls the curtain, shrugs his shoulders at the com-
plexity of the mechanism and then votes, that's
what he wants - to know and or feel, or at least
hope that that man, Richard Nixon, is leading him
where he wants to go.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PETER FLANIGAN The
This memo is in response to your request for my views as
follows:
1. The President's posture between the conventions should
be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy
a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that
period.
To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection
of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians",
political activity by the President would be a negative. To the
extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced
statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the
Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican
Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a
positive.
2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to
some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid.
Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to
get on with the business of politicking. This President, however,
can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive
saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary.
Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried
to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law
and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage
of time dedicated to campaigning:
-- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
-- From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
-- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the
President's time.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have
it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of
movement available to a President, as well as the national and
regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily
on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign
I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political"
activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent
Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will
recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The
1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when
they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate
rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for
the incumbent.
3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack
will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign
developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam
continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues
to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover,
I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record
against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments
in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the
frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the
Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes
right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through
to the end.
4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam
and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the
matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the
general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the
voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility
of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will
have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This
might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into
relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and
are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to
create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take
these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt
to move to the middle.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
emp E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
WASHINGTON
By
NARS, Date 8-19-81
June 17, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
RE:
Campaign 1972
Between Conventions
1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President
concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will
be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build
on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will
be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform
and the Democratic performance in Congress.
I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be
an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the
environment and to point up his legacy of parks program
while people vacation. The trip should include a stop
in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to
inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer
to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national
parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events
where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer
facilities, see some animals, etc.
Post Convention
2. After the convention and into the fall the President
should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly
on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly
so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which
might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should
maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a
fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis
on rallies and quiet talk on television.
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
- 2 -
I would use the week after the convention for meetings
with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This
could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would
give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong
Presidential interest. I believe the President should
launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity
in key states during the first week in September. This
would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder
of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington,
invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only.
We also have the fund raiser on September 26.
In early October I would step up the President's campaign
activities to travel one or two days during the week and
then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I
think this should lead up to intensive travel and
campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to
campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should
be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it
won't appear to be last minute panic.
Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but
particularly in September, it should emphasize places
which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble.
Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close
by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some
time in California, Texas and Illinois.
Some of the first week of September activities should be
rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the
President will be leading in the polls. We have the
early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some
events to tours of facilities such as high trade manu-
facturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't
done this. He should have one or more events each
emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some
way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 3 -
avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout
the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities,
particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice
President should work these areas hard, also.
General Thoughts
3. I would hope that the President personally would use
informal television considerably, interspersed with short,
direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most
rally television even on a state basis. If the President
is to answer questions on television, either regionally
by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize
more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge
that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the
other programs.
I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by
the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses
should be of high tone-the Presidency and the record. A
contrast should be built between professionalism, calm
competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism,
uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when
the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some
examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you
didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream.
A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.
4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the
economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes
and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done
more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank
new face which is credible. They will try to focus on
distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.
One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership
meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the
nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an
idea I had: After this was printed without attribution,
several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this
has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 4 -
In a more major way, I believe the President should spend
most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader
and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying
above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken
at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if
Q and A television is used, the President could do this
to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter
battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion
by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional
candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they
are organized.
My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate
to me that at this moment, the people are interested more
in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown
in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction
of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates
(particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on
personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.)
and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even
three months ago.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
MacGregor Strategy
Meeting - July 11
Clark MacGregor met with the Campaign Strategy Group
(Teeter, Magruder, Malek, Dailey, Marik, Finkelstein,
and Miller) to discuss the Key States in light of Wave II
polling results.
MacGregor opened the meeting with two comments. He said
he planned on meeting with Mitchell, Connally, and possibly
Colson to determine how the Democrats for the President
would be arranged. Second, he advised the group that an
appropriate approach was being made to Mayor Daley and
that you had been informed.
MacGregor told the group that Governor Love and Secretary
Morton would be in Miami Beach to welcome disenchanted
Democrats. They will also push the line that McGovern
heads an extreme elitist machine that has replaced the
"party of the people". The Democrats cannot be allowed
to keep that label. Many liberal Democrats are calling
MacGregor to indicate their concern about McGovern.
MacGregor agreed with Teeter that the campaign should
concentrate on the great national issues and McGovern's
extreme positions. It is Teeter's view that McGovern's
perception will be set in the minds of the American people
in the next 2-3 weeks. MacGregor said the campaign will
continue to hit McGovern through MacGregor's "Issues and
Answers" appearance this Sunday, the. distribution of the
Wicker article, and the Pierre Rinfret discussions with
economists. When Malek pressed for a single person within
1701 to run this operation, MacGregor deferred.
- 2 -
The Key State discussion focused on the three attached
memoranda. There were two views expressed. Some thought
the results showed the President so far ahead in Illinois,
Texas and Ohio that the primary effort should be placed
in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, New
York and Michigan. All agreed Washington should be dropped.
Malek led the argument to work in the big states regardless
of what the polls indicate. MacGregor concluded that there
should be three states for maximum effort -- California,
New York and Pennsylvania. New Jersey and Cook County in
Illinois should also receive First Priority attention.
The Second Priority states would be Texas, Michigan, Ohio,
Maryland and Connecticut.
MacGregor also emphasized that the campaign would not shift
its attention to Senatorial or Congressional races because
if the President wins by 54-55%, Congressional races will be
helped naturally.
TALKING PAPER
In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group,
established three groups of priority states for the campaign:
Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources. and focus of management
attention.
"Must win" states.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
California
45
+0.2
+3
Illinois
26
-0.3
+3
Texas
26
-2
-1
Ohio
25
+6
+2
New Jersey
17
-1
+2
139
Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
New York
41
-6
-5
Pennsylvania
27
-2
-4
Maryland
10
-8
-2
Michigan
21
-2
-7
Connecticut
8
-8
-5
Washington
9
+3
-2
116
Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
Missouri
12
-0.5
+1
Wisconsin
11
+4
+4
Oregon
6
+6
+6
West Virginia
6
-6
-9
35
- 2 -
The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic
nominee, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives
of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing
in the large population states.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether
the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors
to be considered include:
1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic
efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.
2. How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral
votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large
states must we win in order to carry the election.
3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking--
How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 3, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Second Wave Polling Results
Attached are the sample ballot results from the second wave poll-
ing. The interviewing for this polling was all done between
June 14 and June 25. I have noted differences in the two Nixon/
Humphrey races from the first wave where applicable. We did not
measure McGovern in the first wave which was done in December and
January.
I. will have the results from the National poll later today or
tomorrow morning, the New York data in about ten days, and the
Indiana data in about three weeks. The New York and Indiana polls
were delayed to begin after the primary in New York and the State
Nominating Convention in Indiana.
Generally these results are very optimistic and indicate that
the President has improved his position since January. I think
it is particularly significant that his committed vote is above
or very near 50% in the two-way races against McGovern in the top
priority states. This, as I am sure you are aware, has been a
problem in the past.
While our situation has improved, we still appear to have some
problems in Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington.
Also I just got an advance report of a telephone poll taken by
Becker Research for the Seston Globe in Massachusetts which will
be published tomorrow. It shows McGovern with 47%, Nixon with 44%,
and 9% undecided. This is obviously a most optimistic result.
We will have the complete data from this second wave polling by
July 15.
I will be happy to discuss these figures and the first wave data
at your convenience.
Note: I will i.e giving these results to Gordon Strachan of Mr.
Baldemen's office on the telephone at 5 o'clock, Pacific
Time, this evening.
CONVIDENTIAL/fYES ONLY
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
1
U.S.
ALABAMA
CALIFORNIA
CONNECTICUT
INDIANA
ILLINOIS
MARYLAND
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
I.W
20
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
IW
2%
+/-
Nixon
54
47
65
+18
47
47
0
--
56
53
--
56
49
58
+
9
Humphrey
40
18
20
+2
40
40
0
--
32
---
38
---
34
45
36
9
Undecided
6
35
14
-21
13
13
0
---
12
---
9
--
11
5
6
+ 1
Nixon
48
29
34
+5
44
42
-
2
--
50
47
45
43
+ 3
44
48
+ 4
Humphrey
35
14
15
+ 1
37
35
-
2
--
27
----
33
36
28
8
43
29
14
Wallace
12
36
43
+7
6
13
+ 7
--
13
---
11
7
15
÷ 8
00
17
÷ 9
Undecided
5
21
9
-12
13
11
- 2
--
11
---
8
12
10
- 2
5
6
+ i
Nixon
--
--
63
---
--
48
---
--
54
--
--
56
---
--
52
McGovern
--
--
23
----
--
42
---
--
37
---
--
--
35
---
---
42
---
Undecided
--
--
14
---
--
11
---
--
10
---
--
--
10
---
--
6
Nixon
--
--
35 V
---
42
---
--
47
---
--
--
47
---
--
44
McGovern
--
--
15
---
39
---
--
33
---
---
--
31
---
--
35
---
Wallace
--
--
43
--
11
---
--
10
---
--
--
12
---
--
16
Undecided
--
--
7
----
--
8
---
--
10
--
--
10
--
4
1 First wave figures from a survey for Winton Blount, June, 1971.
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
1
MICHIGAN
MISSOURT
NEW JERSEY
NEW YORK
OHIO
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
IW
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
IW
2W
+/-
IW
2W
+/-
IW
2W
+/-
IW
2N
+/-
Nixon
--
49
---
43
48
+ 5
54
52
-
2
50
53
58
+ 5
48
50
+ 2
49
49
0
Humphrey
--
39
-----
45
42
-
3
36
38
÷ 2
40
40
37
-
3
33
31
- 7
43
41
- =
Undecided
--
12
---
12
10
-
2
10
10
0
10
S
5
-
3
13
19
+6
8
10
+ 2
Nixon
--
36
---
37
37
0
49
44
-
5
47
43
50
+ 2
43
44
+ 1
44
43
- i
Humphrey
--
30
---
40
35
-
5
33
30
- 3
39
3S
30
-
8
36
24
-12
41
35
- C
Wallace
--
24
12
20
+:- 8
S
13
+10
5
8
15
+ 7
9
18
+ 9
8
13
+ 5
Undecided
--
11
---
11
8
-
3
10
9
- 1
9
7
5 - 2
12
15
+ 3
8
9
+ 1
Nixon
--
45
---
--
44
---
--
49
---
--
--
55
---
--
42
---
--
49
---
McGovern
--
45
---
----
45
-
--
42
--
--
38
---
--
45
---
--
42
Undecided
--
10
---
--
10
---
--
9
---
--
--
6
---
---
13
---
--
9
---
Nixon
--
33
---
---
35
--
41
---
--
--
47
--
37
42
McGovern
--
36
---
--
37
36
----
--
--
33
---
--
39
----
--
33
---
Wallace
--
23
--
20
--
16
---
--
--
15
--
15
---
--
12
Undecided
--
8
--
8
---
8
--
6
--
10
---
---
S
1 First wave figures from a survey for Robert Griffin, February, 1972 with Muskie, not Humphrey, as opponent.
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%
MICHIGAN
IW
MICHIGAN
1W
Nixon
41
Nixon
38
Muskie
42
Muskie
40
Undecided
17
Wallace
7
Undecided
15
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
WASHINGTON
WISCONSIN
TEXAS
IW 2W +/-
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
Nixon
45
---
46
56
+10
49
55
+ 6
Humphrey
--
39
46
35
-11
40
35
-
5
Undecided
--
16
7
9
+2
11
10
- 1
Nixon
--
38
44
43
+4
42
43
÷ 1
Humphrey
--
32
42
31
-11
36
28
-
S
Wallace
17
---
8
12
+ 4
12
22
+10
Undecided
--
13
---
7
9 + 2
11
7 - 4
Nixon
--
41
---
--
44
---
--
54
---
McCovern
45
---
--
52
---
--
35
---
Undecided
--
13
--
5
--
11
----
Nixon
--
34
---
--
39
---
42
---
McCovern
--
39
---
47
---
--
29
---
Wallace
--
16
--
10
--
22
---
Undecided
--
12
--
4
---
--
7
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%.
Committee for the Re-election of the Presider.t
MEMORANDUM
July 7, 1972
TO:
Dr. Robert H. Marik
FROM:
Arthur J. Finkelstein
&gF
SUBJECT:
Priority States
Please find attached several charts depicting my thinking
on the electoral vote situation that would exist in a
Nixon-McGovern contest. As you can tell the Nixon total
electoral vote surpasses by 16, the 270 votes needed for
election. Further, there is an additional 188 electoral
votes which realistically can still be considered
undecided. Due to recent information, states such as
Illinois, Maryland and Ohio have been added to the safe
Nixon total. Wisconsin, Oregon and Missouri have been
added to the McGovern total. Of the 188 undecided
electoral votes, on the basis of recent information and
past election analyses, it can be assumed that 104 are
leaning to Nixon. With New York State's 41 electoral
votes kept completely in the undecided column, the
President receives a stunning 390 electoral votes, the
making of a real electoral landslide.
Considering the possibility of an electoral landslide,
it would make great sense to solidify those states which
would clearly give us the margin of victory. Therefore,
our priority states should be those which are not sure
states but large electoral states now leaning slightly
to the President. California, Pennsylvania and New Jersey
fit this criteria. I would also add Connecticut, New York
and Michigan because of the very nature of the clossness
of this election.
You will note that I suggest dropping five presently
targeted states either because we have secured them or
because to win them would take more effort than frankly is
essential or necessary for this campaign. Three of those
five states dropped, Texas, Illinois. and Ohio, account for
77 electoral votes which should be constantly kept track of.
I would suggest greater than normal emphasis upon the
states organizationally and the use of the telephone
operations.
- 2 -
Dr. Robert H. Marik
July 7, 1972
Finally I include a list of third priority states which are
chosen because of the strength of the President. None of
these ten states are target states. All of these ten
states will have senatorial contests in 1972, where
Republicans can either hold on to a seat (Kentucky), or
as in the case of the other nine, gain a seat. In each
of these states with the exception of Rhode Island, a
Nixon--Senatorial Candidate Compaign would be helpful
to the Republican Senatorial candidate's chances. Since
the Republicans only need to gain five or six seats in
the Senate to take control of that body, I would strongly
suggest that the campaign strategy develop which would
emphasize in these areas the ideal Republican ticket.
A. J. F.
AJF:kvf
Attachments
CC: J. Magruder
PRIORITY STATES
First Priority
1.
California
-
45
A
2.
Pennsylvania
-
27
3.
New Jersey
-
17
4.
Connecticut
-
8
B
5.
New York
-
41
6. Michigan
-
21
159
Second Priority
1. Texas
-
26
2. Illinois
-
26
3. Ohio
-
25
77
Third Priority
1. Alabama
-
9
2.
Georgia
-
12
* 3.
Kentucky
-
9
4.
Montana
-
4
5.
New Hampshire
-
4
6.
New Mexico
-
4
7.
North Carolina
-
13
8.
Oklahoma
--
8
** 9:
Rhode Island
-
4
10. Virginia
-
12
TOTAL STATES
N
M
U
Alabama
9
Alaska
3
Arizona
6
Arkansas
6
California
45
Colorado
7
Connecticut
8
Delaware
3
D. C.
3
Florida
17
Georgia
12
Hawaii
4
Idaho
4
Illinois
26
Indiana
13
Iowa
8
Kansas
7
Kentucky
9
Louisiana
10
Maine
4
Maryland
10
Massachusetts
14
Michigan
21
Minnesota
10
Mississippi
7
Missouri
12
Montana
4
Nebraska
5
Nevada
3
New Hampshire
4
New Jersey
17
New Mexico
.4
New York
41
North Carolina
13
North Dakota
3
Ohio
25
Oklahoma
8
Oregon
6
Pennsylvania
27
Rhode Island
4
South Carolina
8
South Dakota
4
Tennessee
10
Texas
26
Utah
4
Vermont
3
Virginia
12
Washington
9
West Virginia
6
Wisconsin
11
Wyoming
3
286
64
188
UNDECIDED STATES
N
M
U
Alaska
3
California
45
Connecticut
8
Maine
4
Michigan
21
Nevada
3
New Jersey
17
New York
41
Pennsylvania
27
South Dakota
4
Washington
9
West Virginia
6
-
-
104
43
41
Safe
286
64
--
-
-o
-
390
107
41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: July 13, 1972
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Chapin's TV Convention group. sub-
mitted these memoranda.
The L.A. and N.Y. Nielsen Overnights
are not yet available. They will
be dexed as soon as available.
July 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
BRUCE WHELIHAN
SUBJECT:
Third Session - Wednesday, July 12, 1972
Democratic National Convention
Observations
The nominations of, and the balloting for, the Presidential nominee
of the Democratic Party was not good television. The world knew
by 7:00 p.m. last night who would get the nomination. There was
no contest, so the only people that were watching were die-hard
Democrats and McGovernites. It will be interesting to compare
the ratings of this session with first and second session, when
there was a contest, and with tonight's session, when "their"
man will appear.
Cronkite did a poor job anchoring the CBS coverage. He did not have
control of his players (reporters) at all. Chancellor and Brinkley did
a much more masterful job anchoring, but the NBC reporters on the
floor didn't quite do the job that the CBS team did.
The point I wish to make is that all attention is focused on the floor -
because the networks are focusing their coverage there. There is
an important lesson in this. There will be no contest on the floor
at the Republican Convention, but we can create a great deal of in-
terest there by programming the appearance and interviews of surro-
gates, Cabinet members, contenders from '68 (Reagan and Rockefeller)
and key Republicans, such as Ford, Scott and other former National
Chairmen, Buckley and Bailey.
I'm sure you are already moving on this, but I wanted to raise it again,
as I think it is damn important. Also, we should make a great effort
to focus coverage on Republican women and on those with identifiable
constituencies - such as Javits and Brooke. The networks are going
to want to get to all these people anyway. If we know when they are
going to appear, it can help greatly in pacing the entire Convention.
Tally
The networks have pooled their resources and they are using one
tally system. It is not fast enough. You can do the arithmetic in
your head, often, faster than they are doing it on the screen.
Podium Chronology
The anchormen are not giving an account of what goes on, or is supposed
to be going on at the podium. There is no possible way, from reviewing
last night's coverage, to know what the agenda was for the entire evening.
We should be sure the networks have a run-down well in advance of air
time - so that they may prepare graphics for the evening's program if
they want to. For example, if entertainment is going to be offered from
the podium time and time again, they may want to make up a slide to
flash on the bottom of the screen during interviews, stating that enter-
tainment is in progress - or that platform debate is being offered, etc.
Issues
Television has paid very little attention to the issues. The coverage of
the Republican Convention provides us with our last opportunity to get
out in fromt on issues. McGovernhas stayed away from specifics. We
will have a monopoly on the air waves during the period of the Convention
and should make appropriate use of this opportunity. How we turn the
networks to the discussion of the issues and get them to focus on the issues
instead of personalities, I am not sure.
McGovern has said that he is going to run a campaign on the issues. From
his performance to date, it seems that he is going to run the campaign
around the issues. Last night, all he did was listen and attempt to es-
tablish in the minds of his audience that there was an exchange of views
taking place - from which all would benefit. Such "openness", is very
deceptive.
McGovern is turning into the great Pied Piper. Maybe we ought to say
as much. He is starting to peddlo a very simple tune - taking a very
simplistic approach, even glossing over the details of what were
originally "his" issues. I wouldn't be surprised if McGovern runs a
"moet the people" campaign. This didn't work with Harold Hughes,
but then he didn't have guaranteed TV coverage. He established this
last night in his television interviews after his confrontation in the
lobby of the Doral. The other thing that the Democrats established,
which disturbs me, is the precedent of extensive coverage of the
candidate watching the proceedings on television.
No doubt, the networks are going to press for coverage of the
President and First Family viewing the proceedings. I am sure
they are going to want to light the outside of the House, and have
a live camera (pool) - either to show the President and family
observing, or to show the President cloistered.
I am not sure how we get around this. The family could go out to
dinner, the President could be at Grand Cay, he could go to Bebe's
for a cook-out, or he could be working in his study with Kissinger.
Naturally, there could be pictures of Kissi nger coming and going -
carrying hamburger patties and cottage cheese.
Naturally, I prefer Grand Cay. He could go fishing with David - or
have meetings with Kissinger and Rogers - and even go over to Walker's
Cay and talk with the pool.
JBW
FOR RAY PRICE
FROM:
LEN GARMENT
CONVENTION NOTES
A brief summary of the points I discussed with you on the phone Saturday -
plus a few others.
1. The only thing that emerges with sharpness from the collection of essays
on convention themes is Bakshian's phrase: "A Better Future For All. "
The conventional, and correct perception, 10 that for the voter what's done
is done and the past is relevant only as a prologue to the future. The
convention themes should therefore be future-oriented, and pointedly so.
While this is hardly a revolutionary idea, it's important to have it in mind
when executing things like Jack McDonald's platform presentation. The
function of parts 1 and 2 of his outline are to reinforce bolief % in the
President's special capability to carry out part 3 ("The Unfinished Agenda"),
and, as a general guideline, more weight should go to the last than to the
first two.
2. I doubt that thore's any single theme that will do a great deal for the
convention or the campaign. The important thing (and this relates not only
to themes, but to everything else in the convention and campaign) is to
do appropriate things, and not to charge off in wrong directions, striking
strident notes, overstating the case for the President ugainst the Democrats,
stretching credibility, straining nerves, and, in the process, alienating
independent support.
3. The cross-pressured complexity of the contemporary U.S. sceno not
only makes it risky to put too many cage in any one thematic basket, but
peculiarily difficult to define that basket. There are very few rallying
points X a positive nature those days. The President as Peacemaker"
io onc, of course, but beyond that the going gets uncertain - and even the
President's foreign policy accomplishments have to be tied to domestic
concerns - to jobs, to inflation, to the availability of resources to deal
with domestic needs, etc., and not merely to "abstract" issues (for today's
U.S. electorate) like national occurity and the U.S. "role" in the world.
2
As Irving Kristol points out, one of the main qualities of populism is
that it is paranoid and therefore simplistic, xenophobic, and anti-
bureaucratic. McGovern is therefore building his appeal to a coalition
of these feelings rather than to conventional issues and groups. The
intonse personal feelings Kristol identifies are the McGovern target.
An understanding of these feelings and sympathy for the specific grievances
they represent should be reflected in the convention and campaign themes
and materials. (It occurs to me that on the whole basic subject of Presidential
accomplishments the foreign policy/domestic policy dichotomy is not only
a false one but a harmful one, and a deliberate effort should be made to
overcome it. I think we should talk about this/little bit of detail.)
4. A good theme (like a good slogan) should convey the feelings of an
equation. It should be logical, simple, unambiguous, non-verbal in its
thrust. It should not invite argument. It should have an apparent quality
of inevitability, and therefore capable of producing the widest immediate
concurrence, That was the value of "Nixon's The One" and "Reelect the
President. Compare, "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) and McGovern's
"Demand the Truth" (very sound). The problem with "Now More Than
Ever" ds that it is ambiguous (and on the negative side), slightly mysterious,
elightly threatening, sets up a debate, etc. All of which 18 to say that
"A Better Future For All" strikes me s/appropriate convention theme,
Just as "Reelect the President" strikes me as an effective campaign-slogan.
But none of this 10 of crucial importance. In fact, it might be best - given
the lack of a rallying issue - to float several slogans around the convention.
They might work together in a helpful way.
5. The tone of the convention materials should be crisp rather than emotional,
confident without being-smug or complacent, lively and factual rather than
grandiloquent and self-serving. We should demonstrate not only a grasp of
the kind of concerns for the future that are widely shared, but should also
make clear that there are specific programs under way to deal with each
of these concerns. We've talked about a structural metaphort. The
President designed the Nixon Doctrine to build a now foreign policy structure
in order to create safer conditions in the world 00 that life will = better
in the United States. Payoff examples of this comprehensive Presidential
design are beginning to emerge. The Soviet Summit has produced a market
for $750 million in U.S. grain. The China meetings have lod to the sale of
jet transports. Trade and currency nogotiations similarly translate into
dollars and jobs for Americans. And 80 on. These links are matters best
handled by explanation, not by exhortation. The role of the Republican
Convention is basically to report on an Administration very much at work,
s
not to prepare for a political fight with the Democrate: Whatever conveys
this senso of continuity, of work in progress, of a professional President
assisted by a highly professional Administration, of quiet long-range
planning that is now surfacing results, will serve to highlight the "better
future" theme. (Max Ways has an interesting essay in FORTUNE about the
new international economic complexities, 1.e., a profoundly important
shift has taken place from a world preoccupied with military issues to one
focussing on economic competition and this promising change is the
proximate result of the President's first-term diplomacy.)
6. To sum up: The McGovern strategy is to unito "the dissatisfied"
across all conventional political lines and to propose fundamental change
even at the risk of social and economic convulsion. But most of the dis-
satisfied" want a sonso of order and personal security, and are open to
a program that offers "change without chaos" + and this 10 what the Nixon
philosophy is all about. Whether the problem is an overactive Court,
an omnipresent bureaucracy, the ineffective rendition of costly government
services, excessive commitments and contributions to foreign countries,
etc., basic change 1s, in fact, taking place and without wrecking the system
upon which Americans depend for the cake which so many now want to eat
and have as well. Getting across the details of this message is the job of
the Republican Convention and the campaign which it keynotes.
# #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
10:45 a. m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
ALVIN SNYDER
#
SUBJECT:
The Democratic National
Convention Coverage
1 believe the Democrats have succeeded in drilling
home to the viewer the picture of a new vibrancy within
the party, due in large measure to delegato selection and
floor procedures banning "old style" demonstrations.
McGovern's top spokesmen, including Gary Hart, are
fresh young faces and lend credibility to pronouncements
of great nationwide reform within the Democratic party.
This may be the single most important message left with
the American public, through the dullness of it all.
There is something to be said for reviewing the matter
of floor demonstrations, and whether they fit into the look
we want to achieve. At the same time, our floor information
booth, or hospitality suite, if we have one, ought to be
manned with spokesmen such as yourself, Don Rumsfeld
and others who come across well on TV, underlining before
the TV cameras the youth and vitality of our group. Others
such as Stan Scott, Gregg Petersmeyer and Dave Parker
would also be there to be seen and perhaps interviewed. This
might also be the place the President comes to following his
nomination for a staff pep talk.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:-
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
RUSS FREEBURG RuD
SUBJECT:
Third Session, Democratic National Convention
McGovern and the SDS.
I think it was bad judgement for McGovern to go to the Doral Hotel lobby for
a face to face confrontation with angry SDS members just before his nomination.
He looked tense and fearful, although he personally handled himself well.
However, he could not control the manners of the SDS members, therefore he
appeared in a weak position as a candidate for higher office. A candidate
cannot win popularity or build confidence with the public by confronting
demonstrators that have no intention of compromise. The fall out will always
be anti-candidate. The candidate is reduced to the demonstrators' level, the
demonstrators are never raised to the candidate's level in the public mind.
The SDS is discredited in the public mind generally therefore a candidate mingling
with them is automatically discredited somewhat by associating. Demonstratione
are no longer chic. The public is about three years beyond inquisitiveness
about demonstrations. It was not worth the risk for McGovern to expose himself
to such a miniscule, unpopular part of the electorate. He had much to lose and
really nothing to gain by appearing in the lobby. The appearance will not increase
his vote getting ability with normal voters. I think the appearance was a minus
for McGovern with most voters although some of the media will picture him as heroic
to go into a lion's den.
McGovern Nominating Speech.
The only plus in Ribicoff as. McGovern's nominator was religion. This might
have been counteracted to some degree however, immediately by the blandness of
the speech. Ribicoff did not make a good case for McGovern. He appeared
unemotional and aloof. His speech was not well structured. It was rambling
and did not bring the main points together sharply. The speech was a blur of
disconnected reasons to have McGovern as President.
The Seconding speech by Valerie Kushner was better structured. The only phrase
of both speeches that was really fresh and catchy was Mrs. Kushner's - McGovern
would bring her husband home; BRING AMERICAPHOME. I think it is pretty poor
pickings when you can get only one phrase out of two speeches that has any
schmaltz.
McGovern Nomination.
It was interesting that Shirley Chisholm could not bring herself to mention McGoyern
by name when she appeared on the podium after his nomination. When Mrs. Corretta
King was interviewed by Dan Rather, I thought her comment that McGovern probably
did not really understand black problems because he came from South Dakota where
there are few black people' was an interesting comment and indicated only lukewarm
MEMORANDUM TO
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM
RUSS FREEBURG
Page Two
July 13, 1972
backing and not frenzied all-out support. I do not suppose it could have been
expected that McGovern's nomination would ever be by acclamation, but I think
it is interesting that no one ever raised the motion to make it unanimous.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
10:00 a.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
Democratic Convention
Third Session
This morning's Washington Post has a story on page 14
which says, "To TV viewer, it's been a dull show."
I think this is very true of last night in particular. The
only real highlights were McGovern going into the lobby
of the hotel and confronting the SDS types (a move that
I feel was staged and worked to McGovern's favor in order
to separato him from the radicals), the interview with
Mrs. McGovern in the box when McGovern went over. the
top and the demonstration for McGovern after O'Brien
announced the numbers.
Walker and Timmons have made the point that it's a very
dull convention there on the scene. Evidently, there is very
little hooplah and spirit. If we can find the magic combination
of having our delegates radiate enthusiasm and dedication
to the President without looking staged our convention might
seem much more lively than the Democrats.
What we need are one or two lively or very controversial
things which cannot damage the President but yet can create
enough public suspense and interest to help us generate and
maintain some interest on the part of the public in our convention.
How we use the First Family during the prime time hours is
extremely important. We have watched how they cover
Mrs. McGovern, Mrs. Humphrey, Wallace and other VIPs who
have appeared at the hall and we know that we have a golden
opportunity to score a lot of points by using the girls and
Mrs. Nixon during the prime time hours. All of this is obvious.
2
I was amazed that McGovern would go on the air to be interviewed
immediately after the nomination by Ribicoff and thereby
eliminate for awhile coverage of the POW wife seconding him
on two of the major networks. It was a stupid mistake.
McGovern obviously feels that any exposure that he can get
at this point is good since he is still such an unknown quantity
and, therefore, overexposure is not a problem. They also
are struggling desperately to pull him more toward the center
through the free time vehicle they have in the convention.
Whelihan makes a constructive point that we should give
one-liners to the people who will announce the votes for
President Nixon from the various delegations. For example,
when Michigan comes up, the head of their delegation may say,
"Michigan, the State which represents where America stands
on busing, casts its 100 votes for President Richard Nixon".
We can play off of positive points which we want to emphasize
by feeding these one-liners to the various heads of the delegations.
I was intrigued with the fact that they did not have a large
demonstration at the conclusion of Ribicoff's speech and prior
to the seconding speeches. If we go with Rockefeller doing the
nomination and then have a very small demonstration, gavel
the convention back to order quickly, move on with the seconding
speeches which will probably be done from the floor if it can be
staged properly, then on to the vote, and end with the massive
demonstration at the end of the evening, it may work more in
our favor. This is something we're going to just have to debate
and come in with a plan on.
I was surprised that McGovern did not go to the hall. I do not believe
it would have been anti-climatic for him to have appeared last night
and then again tonight. It would have seemed to me that they would
have gone for the picture of him at the hall on the podium for
today's papers (assuming they could have still made most of them)
and then the picture of McGovern with the Vice Presidential nominee
for tomorrow morning's papers. They may have been banking on
use of his appearance in the lobby of the hotel. However, that does not
appear in the Washington Post.
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: LEN GARMENT
I was home administering true-false questions to Grace at 8:00 last
night - she is taking her final exam in an Economics Course today so that
she can earn a degree and start supporting me. Accordingly, I missed all
the excitement in the lobby of the Doral. This morning I heard a variety
of different reactions to it, then saw it on videotape and.had these reactions:
1. It probably annoyed some people who felt the SDS loudmouths should
have been thrown out of the lobby or, in any event, ignored by a Presidential
candidate. But these are people who are lost to McGovern under any cir-
cumstances.
2. It almost certainly impressed a great many more people with McGovern's
coolness; and this would include a lot of people who don't like what McGovern
says and stands for, and are unlikely to vote for him under any circumstances.
3. The incident, in short, was one more piece in the mosaic of impressions
and feelings that constitute the McGovern campaign so far and no doubt, to
come. This particular impression - a tough, nervy and very cool "handler"
of troublesome kids, P particularly because it happened in such an attention
riveting setting - struck me as a definite plus for McGovern.
The rest of the evening must have been a big anti-climax; it was to me,
and I didn't even see the lobby incident. Again, the only item of interest
-2-
was McGovern's ability to concentrate on a badly-timed hotel-room inter-
view during the only useful speech of the evening (and one he obviously
wanted to see) namely, the seconding speech by the wife of the POW.
That's the dominant impression of the Convention that persists: a. cool,
surprisory
convinced man and a calm professional crow imposing a supprossing degree
of order on a crazy-quilt new-type convention. (It reminds me of the
sense of surprise I felt when I read the LIFE cover interview. There has
rarely been a more skillful combination of talking, writing and editing
to achieve a precisely-targeted effect.)
3
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
BILL CARRUTHERS
MARK GOODE M.D.
SUBJECT:
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
July 12, 1972
Observations on the third session of the Democratic National
Convention are:
1. Personal Exposure by McGovern: It was our feeling that
McGovern's "impromptu" question and answer session in the
hotel lobby was not effective. True, he showed himself again
to be interested and a good listener; however, his responses
were not strong, and the total effect did not inspire confidence.
It seemed almost incredible that he would allow a live television
camera into his hotel room to photograph his reaction during
the balloting.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from both of these
incidents is that he and his people have decided to accept almost
any exposure offered. These appearances can serve to dilute
the impact of his acceptance speech tonight. McGovern is not
a strong speaker. His primary media campaign has been
centered around his being an interested listener, receptive to
the "problems of the people." It is felt that he has been
intentionally cast in this role due to his not being a dynamic
speaker.
2. Spirit The convention to date has reflected good discipline
and greater unity than was expected. It has, however, lacked
excitement. Tuesday night's session became a total borc.
Last night's did not even reach a crescendo when the nomination
became official - there was some show of enthusiasm, but no
real excitement of the variety which becomes contagious to the
television viewer.
It is essential that we create an overriding spirit of enthusiasm
for Richard Nixon from the very outset of the convention. This
spirit must build at each session and climax with his nomination.
We must limit and carefully weigh each appearance he makes
prior to his acceptance speech. The feeling of the President
at work as President during the convention can be used to
advantage.
3. Impressions: - The Democrats have thus far left a better
impression on the viewing public than expected. They have
generally been more business-like than many observers
anticipated. It is incumbent upon us to leave an even stronger
impression of efficiency and organization. Without sacrificing
spirit, the key to our convention must be brevity. Let's get
into Miami, do our business, and get out!
4. Roll Calls: - The traditional system of conducting roll calls
in alphabetical order should be preserved. The strange, out of
sequence system employed by the Democrats is confusing.
5. V.I.P. Hotel Interviews: - Experienced television people
should be assigned to check out all set-ups for V.I.P. interviews
in hotels. Those surrounding the Democratic convention have
all been sub-standard.
6. Seconders: - We should hand-pick all individuals who will
make seconding speeches, not just for variety of background,
but for physical appearance. The first seconder for McGovern
was outstanding ... an attractive, articulate, P.O.W. wife.
Her appearance and delivery attracted the networks to stay on
the seconder, rather than immediately cutting away for interviews
or commentaries.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --
A)
Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between
Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal,
eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should
be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That
is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the
dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana,
abortion or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by
the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again,
however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine
this.
B)
Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a
posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention,
a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and
he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign.
Since our strength is foreigh policy in a world where there is a deep
desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings,
high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken
contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan
argumentative campaign.
C)
RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.
Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the
effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether
RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit
is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In
any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the
drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.
-2-
D)
Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised
address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between
the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so
much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in
a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual
messages on the stump.
E)
Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office
fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board
of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American
people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government VS. less
Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be
candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between
the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with
my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying
the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and
McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)
F)
Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President
in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all.
The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address
in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should
be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences --
but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us.
The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters
in this election who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who
cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.
G)
One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it
is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day
Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understan ds that
what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs
(we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we
stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class,
many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.
(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills
integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with
Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by
liberal bureaucrats.)
H)
On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in
hand. However, just some reminders:
1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that
as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one
charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto
the serving board.
-3-
2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of
this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press
here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of
the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign unless we are behind in the
polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all
our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to
New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains. "
We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly
and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold
our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway
in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the
general election of 1968 or of 1970 the flexibility to shift
gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto
another.
OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK
Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust"
thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while
Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character
of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to
move off their "tinkertoy proposals. " They don't want their man to be
in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of
them fear that worse than the radical charge.)
Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get
harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack --
accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character
assassination against the President of the United States and demand
that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest
and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say
it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an
evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and
of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us
on the issues, I don't see how if they are clearly and politely and
consistently made we can lose this one.
Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to
keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular
point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning
is essential; plans are worthless.
Buchanan