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This file contains:
From: Patrick Buchanan and Kenneth Khachigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Patrick Buchanan RE: Buchanan Memo of June 8th. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Kenneth W. Clawson Thru: L. Higby To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From: Al Haig To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: June 12th Memo RN Posture. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Analysis of 1960 and 1968 Campaign Polls and Surveys. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: Polls and the 1960, 1968 Camapigns. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
RE: Voter Characteristics. Missing first page. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Panel Interview Results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/31/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Inflation and Taxes. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/31/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1960 and 1968 Elections. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Reply to June 12 Memo. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From: Bryce Harlow To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Political Insights. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/16/1972
From: Kenneth W. Clawson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Presidential Posture. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Farm Scenario (written on the assumption there is a Russian grain deal). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Environment Scenario. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
From Haldeman to Whitaker RE: RN's role in the Republican National Convention and campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
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26145701
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WHSF: Contested, 16-10
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WHSF: Contested, 16-10
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This file contains:
From: Patrick Buchanan and Kenneth Khachigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Patrick Buchanan RE: Buchanan Memo of June 8th. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From: Kenneth W. Clawson Thru: L. Higby To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From: Al Haig To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: June 12th Memo RN Posture. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Analysis of 1960 and 1968 Campaign Polls and Surveys. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: Polls and the 1960, 1968 Camapigns. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
RE: Voter Characteristics. Missing first page. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Panel Interview Results. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/31/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Inflation and Taxes. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/31/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1960 and 1968 Elections. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Reply to June 12 Memo. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From: Bryce Harlow To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Political Insights. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/16/1972
From: Kenneth W. Clawson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Presidential Posture. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Farm Scenario (written on the assumption there is a Russian grain deal). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Environment Scenario. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
From Haldeman to Whitaker RE: RN's role in the Republican National Convention and campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
10
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Patrick Buchanan and Kenneth
Khachigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972. 7
pgs.
16
10
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Patrick Buchanan
RE: Buchanan Memo of June 8th. 2 pgs.
16
10
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July.
1 pg.
16
10
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Kenneth W. Clawson Thru: L. Higby
To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy.
2 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 1 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
10
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19. 2 pgs.
16
10
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Al Haig To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs.
16
10
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: June 12th Memo RN Posture. 3 pgs.
16
10
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: Analysis of 1960 and 1968
Campaign Polls and Surveys. 1 pg.
16
10
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: Patrick J.
Buchanan RE: Polls and the 1960, 1968
Camapigns. 7 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 2 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
10
Campaign
Memo
RE: Voter Characteristics. Missing first page.
7 pgs.
16
10
7/31/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark
MacGregor RE: Panel Interview Results. 2
pgs.
16
10
7/31/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark
MacGregor RE: Inflation and Taxes. 6 pgs.
16
10
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: 1960 and 1968 Elections. 4 pgs.
16
10
6/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: Reply to June 12 Memo. 4
pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 3 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
10
6/16/1972
Campaign
Letter
From: Bryce Harlow To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Political Insights. 4 pgs.
16
10
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Kenneth W. Clawson To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: Presidential Posture. 5 pgs.
16
10
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Campaign Strategy. 4 pgs.
16
10
5/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David
Parker RE: Presidential Farm Scenario
(written on the assumption there is a Russian
grain deal). 2 pgs.
16
10
5/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David
Parker RE: Presidential Environment
Scenario. 2 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 4 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
10
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Whitaker RE: RN's role
in the Republican National Convention and
campaign strategies. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 1 pg.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 5 of 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
June 18, 1972
By
Emp E. 12065, Section 6-102
Date 8-19-81
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972
Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault
Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively
upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations
in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's
take them point by point:
"1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the
necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In
other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition
should end up emphasizing our strengths. 11
We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of
Americans vote not for, but against -- their hostility toward one candidate
is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for.
And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on
RN -- would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing
voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this
new phenomenom. LBJ could not conveivably have gotten his sixty per
cent against RN he got it against Goldwater, not because of the
positive LBJ "ads, 11 but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat
to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially
millions of knee- jerk Democratic voters are goingto come our way, if
they come because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are
anti-radicalism.
Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points
in one week in California among Democrats, it is clear that there is
tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern from a
relatively small investment. On the other hand, we see that RN from
the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic
-2-
Moscow visit and SALT agreement has only risen seven or eight
points.
The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern --
downward is far easier and less costly, than the potential for
additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and
Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement and reams of hours of heroic
copy to move up up seven points -- while George can be dropped fifteen
in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks -- dollar-for-dollar
when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning
dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.
Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have
hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be
any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On
the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to
harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of
affecting a change in the present image of McGovern -- than we do in the
present image of the President.
Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the
vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than
likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the
President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK
in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is
it a major campa ign convincing them of what they already know farily
well -- that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign
affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it
more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that
the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone
who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote
for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative
foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN -- and he can still
vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign
need not be -- and should not necessarily be -- tied to a pro-RN pitch
at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly
to point one -- but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince
that McGovern is a wild man is ours -- for certain -- even if he at the
same time thinks RN is a conservative square.
Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an
anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with
McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather
than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with
the security of our country -- whereas we, too, have cut back, but only
responsibly on defense -- then we are weakening our case. Where the
-3-
President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean
as a whistle. I.e. McGovern favors abortion on demand RN thinks this
is morally wrong; i. e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN
thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should
keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what
they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be
comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates
which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.
Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news
footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-
RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a
minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the
time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition
of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign
is liekly to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern
materials that go out to the nation.
"2. We must not gettrapped into McGovern's bog of peddling
himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this
Administration has the boldest initiatives in history. 11
We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second.
The reason is this: We have spent co untless hours and unrecorded effort
selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution, 11 more effort
probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the
returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national
poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many
considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were
going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would
not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a
cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to
portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We
would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to
convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing
numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.
The first sentence about knocking down the "new face, 11 is right on
the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which
has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic
majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern
came to Washington.
-4-
Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed
to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for
the average man but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the
Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part sinc e
1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of,
absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit
them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as
not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new
billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed
over the last 16 years.
(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of
this issue.)
"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with
domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which
are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the
fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?"
Bascially, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President
and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe,
defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire
nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT -- the
coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that
appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation
already knows and already believes -- that RN is an imaginative statesman.
We should in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during
the camapign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative
statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But
we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one
is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals
and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks
we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If
George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in
questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a
light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast
than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There
is no other choice.
There are two foreign policy problems we see. One Vietnam. Polls
show McGovern's support is tied inextricably to the desire to get out of
Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the
Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by
-5-
Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our
prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also,
if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement -- we should lace
into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and
back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war -- while
McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not
end.
The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right
and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no
constituence left -- and McGovern recognized this. The argument
against spending our money for exotic weapons, whe n we need to re-build
here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for
themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern
constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign
aid [$11 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around
his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give
mor e billions of dollars away to Hottentots. ")
Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing
unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case
him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent
Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the
guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines,
rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we
did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.
"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our
point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped
into putting out the enemy line. "
We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.
"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of
the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other
words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-
reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let
an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at
this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White
House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and
-6-
naivety in the foreign policy field would be disasterous.
Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White
House?"
Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3 --
especially in a possible RN speech. How should we build RN up
while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:
The theme that RN has brought 500, 000 boys out of Vietnam, ha S saved
that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has
neogitated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most
historic arms agreement in history -- and, for God's sake, let's not
throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur
and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign
policy.
We can buil up this theme, and should. The United States today stands
on the threshhold of building a structure of peace that can last for the
remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not
a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half
built -- that for the remainder of this century no more American boys
will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the
architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an
engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians
at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer -- and
replacing them with some hippie medical students.
This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's
initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must
now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done --
and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down
the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still
soft -- it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.
Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of
McGovern who thinks that the wayyou negotiate with the Soviets is to cut
your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level,
mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent -- and
then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say -- We
have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be
impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.
-7-
They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect,
but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of
peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a
weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America
that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will
be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into
the sea -- the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us --
and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always
treated the weak.
Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally
reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. You cannot buy
security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half --
and doubling your hopes. 11
"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American
defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent
peace is guaranteed -- and we need not make any great sacrifices or
efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That is a dream from which
Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality. 11
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRAT To ARKING
June 12, 1972
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emp
NARS, Date 8-19-87
GONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT:
Buchanan Memo of June 8th
Some points that were raised with regard to your memorandum of
June 8th that you should take another look at and answer in an
addendum to your original:
1. The Buchanan memorandum falls to recognize
the necessity to keep our strength up front and
center. In other words, all of our attack lines on
the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths.
2. We must not get trapped into McGovern's bog of
peddling himself as a new face. If people want new
ideas, this Administration has the boldest initiatives
in history.
3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely
with domestic matters and totally misses our big
issues which are in foreign policy. Who is the bold
leader? Who is the fresh leader? Who is the dramatic
leader in foreign policy?
4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces
our point, not just hit his points. We should not get
trapped into putting out the enemy line.
2
5. We have to build the foreign policy issue
in terms of the question of changing horses in
mid-stream. In other words, President Nixon
has launched some very major, far-reaching,
foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to
let an inexperienced novice come in and pick up
the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have
McGovern in the White House in terms of foreign
policy. His inexperience and naivety in the foreign
policy field would be disastrous. Do we really
want "White Flag McGovern" in the White House?
In writing your addendum, take the point of view of how we can attack
McGovern in a way that builds the President's foreign policy image.
This is our strong point.
HRH:LH:kb:LH:pm
MEMORANDUM
Larry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
21 July 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM DOUG HALLETT
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July
I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the
President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then
that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous
memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my
position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear
to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention.
From September 1 on there should be a mix of D. C. -based substantive
activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most
for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should
just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the
last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be
one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in
mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance
should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day.
On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September,
three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be
at least theoretically government-related and he would appear talking
about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign
with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan
banalities the President can attract attention and dominate the airways
and the issues in other, more éffective -- and less destructive -- ways.
cc: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON KC
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy
executive posture between the conventions with the single
exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of
the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I
think this exception to the generally high-level tone
the President has set was a justifiable one and really
quite valuable.
(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high
level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but
it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and,
for that matter, the whole government apparatus is
campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.
I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably
maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in
how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus
really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less
effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary
for the President to come off his best posture and to, in
effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully
into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level
surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively,
but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates
program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every
ounce of energy into the campaign.
As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it
should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target
states and specific voting blocs.
1
-2-
(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern
as a "minority leader of a minority constituency." I
think we should give every indication that any "regular,
normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or
Independent, can find leadership and solice under the
Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like
"elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical"
to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every
effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal
backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and
the nation as a whole.
Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time
in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers
should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of
over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In
foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead,
McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel,
naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed
as an individual who is not the kind of man that world
leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed
as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without
backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who
lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to
them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida
when he indicated he would keep a residual force in
Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away
from it in the face of opposition from some of his more
radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.
(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people
will have the advantage of being able to attack every
little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch
to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and
foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted
Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner
and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the
country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability
starting now.
Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself,
will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's
wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping
for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern
loses in November that he did everything in his power to
elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a
team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.
Larry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
HR. R. HALDEMAN DM
DOUG HALLETT
RE:
Larry Higby's Memo of July 19
This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memoran-
dum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nix-
on, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.
I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great
asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She
should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition. she
should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects,
hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like
the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically gov-
ernmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another pos-
sibility these, however, would have to be carefully selected
obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.
I would combine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint
appearance with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the
dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern
talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone. But these
should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate
-- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appear-
ing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this
as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.
Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the
most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics,
volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these
are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I
think Julic does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be
-2-
programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York,
New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.
My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening
before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon
women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.
CC: Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
CC
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy Recommendations
I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the
subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following
points:
1.
The President should maintain a posture of being generally above
the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business
of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for
itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the
McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.
The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and
reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally
competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic
partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum
posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve
a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as
November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending
will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting,
tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President
rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a
speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision
to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is,
in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then
the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to
prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escala-
tion of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-
thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance
speech at Miami.
2.
With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will
have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,
-2-
continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure
especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic,
business -of-State schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure
but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential
in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a
statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind
him, i.e., not just as another candidate. Venues should focus pri-
marily on opportunities which can be nationally televized. These are
the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater
importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's
acceptance speech.
Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National
Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and
order, philosophy of government and welfare.
3.
In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of
the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated
willingness to make tough, courageous decisions in times of national
crises, i.e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia.
For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and
November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the
issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as
before, American youths are not being drafted and most Americans
attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans
sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in
Vietnam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American con-
fidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumu-
lative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have
in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five
minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detri-
mental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great
risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.
4.
I agree completely with the theme that we should generally
posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personal-
izing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue
by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his
most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed
and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it
acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all
of its resources to counter.
-3-
The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop
is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified
Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out
of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the
record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do SO.
Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from
earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme con-
stituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.
5.
To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its
greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest
and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political,
international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U.S.
Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental
shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately,
there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals
and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits
them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are
obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason,
it is essential that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this
approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important
that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a
successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience,
brought about more change than could ever be experienced be the ill-
conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern
platform.
These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically
tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must under-
stand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings
for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that
their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their
heirs.
In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned
at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i.e., McGovern
seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of
our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the
country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed,
i.e., military strength and responsible international evolvement.
-4-
6.
I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through
which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at
every turn in the months between now and November. The President's
family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the
girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect
way to the great theme that President Nixon represents the personifica-
tion of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example
the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be
to the misfits in American society.
7.
Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding
merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written
strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for
us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all,
disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective
way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A
perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or
sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational
arrangements and the detailed development of themes, scheduled
Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely
delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly
in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the
overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --
A)
Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between
Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal,
eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should
be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That
is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the
dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana,
abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by
the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again,
however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine
this.
B)
Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a
posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention,
a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and
he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign.
Since our strength is foreigh policy in a world where there is a deep
desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings,
high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken
contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan
argumentative campaign.
C)
RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.
Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the
effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether
RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit
is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In
any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the
drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.
-2-
D)
Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised
address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between
the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have SO
much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in
a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual
messages on the stump.
E)
Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office
fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board
of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American
people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government VS. less
Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be
candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between
the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with
my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying
the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and
McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)
F)
Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President
in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all.
The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address
in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should
be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences --
but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us.
The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters
in this election -- who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who
cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.
G)
One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it
is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day
Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understan ds that
what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs
(we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we
stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class,
many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.
(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills
integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with
Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by
liberal bureaucrats.)
H)
On strategy for attack my thoughts are already largely in
hand. However, just some reminders:
1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that
as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one
charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto
the serving board.
-3-
2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of
this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press
here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of
the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the
polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all
our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to
New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains. 11
We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly
and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold
our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway
in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the
general election of 1968 or of 1970 the flexibility to shift
gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto
another.
OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK
Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust"
thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while
Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character
of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to
move off their "tinkertoy proposals. 11 They don't want their man to be
in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of
them fear that worse than the radical charge.)
Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get
harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack
accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character
assassination against the President of the United States and demand
that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest
and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say
it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an
evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and
of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us
on the issues, I don't see how if they are clearly and politely and
consistently made we can lose this one.
Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to
keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular
point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning
is essential; plans are worthless.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN
V
You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960
and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and
surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was
tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go
ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though
not one which necessarily reflects his views.
Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon
as he is able.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN the
SUBJECT:
POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS
Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus
those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November,
the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same
percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June
than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August
went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November.
It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about
the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over
HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.
In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this
was immediately following the Republican National Convention -- after
which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the
lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the
hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls,
it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him
throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches
and undecideds.
What does this all mean?
One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean
to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult
to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the
election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage
points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a
doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June
and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that inter-
pretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent
President and will be much more in command of the determining events.
The other way to interpret these phenomona, however, is in terms of
the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this
interpretation especially in a year where we control the levers of govern-
ment.
Page 2
In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school),
there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you
start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by
the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up
steam and momentun in order to have the campaign "peak" on election
day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time"
his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans. " On the contrary,
in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events
as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy one of
the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad
game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until
too late.
The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan"
lines because of all the interrupting factors RN's knee injury, the
debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events
as they came.
Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in
issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role -- it always
does but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned
important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things
were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but
that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK,
of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his
suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line
with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.
Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was very
little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising
that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the
campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck -- the heavy beard in
the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys,
the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois made the difference.
In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was
not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision
was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until
the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with
the liberation of HHH at the time of his Vietnam speech -- and once he
was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the
bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly
to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, J. do not doubt for a minute that
Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on
the move.
Page 3
The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death
over issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs
these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until
too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and
they were the "outs. " We had the basic issues going for us but used
them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.
Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between
1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference,
I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the
campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH
figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against
Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of
the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960
(which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).
The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with
two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We
are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues,
and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of
personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept
the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean
four or five big ones -- not revenue sharing or the environment), then
broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences
sharply at the outset of the campaign.
Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost
already have) the campaign is going to be one like 1960 -- of playing
that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not
letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike
1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with
McGovern; i. e., in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960,
there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted.
Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and
pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak
links which could bring us down.
Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern,
my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let
the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every
two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan
accordingly -- following a basic outline, but not being so blind as to
ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something
works, let's keep using it; if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go
with something else.
Page 4
I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short
time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are
in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968;
the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate
was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and
hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic
similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique, 11
not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between
1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we
are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.
80%
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
70%
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
60%
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50%
RN
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
early June late June July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
November 6th
PERCENT
POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
80
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
August 24
40%
34%
17%
70
November 1-2
42%
40%
12%
November 3
40%
43%
13%
60
HARRIS POLL
50
NIXON
40
HUMPHREY
30
20
10
WALLACE
DATES
August 24,
November 1-2,
November 3,
1968
1968
1968
POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
PERCENT
80
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
August 21
45%
25%
18%
70
Early Sept.
43%
31%
19%
Late Sept.
43%
28%
21%
Early Oct.
44%
29%
20%
Mid Oct.
43%
31%
20%
October 27
44%
36%
15%
60
November 4
42%
40%
14%
GALLUP POLL
50
NIXON
40
30
HUMPHREY
20
WALLACE
10
DATES Aug. 21
Early
Late
Early
Mid
October
Nov. 4
(1968)
Sept.
Sept.
October
October
27
-2-
The second group are those who have only begun to split their
ticket in the past few years and who have previously voted straight
Democratic. Even though they are now clearly ticket-splitters and
are available to us in this campaign, they will still probably vote
for a majority of Democrats. Many of them split for Wallace in the
last election and many switched from Wallace to Humphrey late in
the campaign. This group is lower on the socio-economic scale than
the first group and age is somewhat less of a factor. They are
often (but not necessarily) Catholic, and in the large cities of
the East and Midwest, often have ethnic backgrounds. They are
essentially the blue collar working middle class.
Candidate Perception
The President is rated quite well on the three key personality
dimensions -- trustworthiness, strength, and competence. He is
rated higher on the trustworthy dimension now than he was in
January and this is a scale on which we rarely see any movement
for a well-known figure. However, there is no significant differ-
ence between the President and McGovern on the trust or strength
dimensions. He gets his highest ratings by far on the competence
dimension and has a large advantage over McGovern.
Several specific questions were asked concerning credibility and
the results indicate that a significant number, though a minority,
do not think the administration has been completely honest with
them, particularly with regard to Vietnam. However, when viewed
against the President's personal trustworthiness ratings I think
that the problem is as much one of government not being credible
as it is of the President himself not being credible. More impor-
tantly, I think this is a problem that can be at least partially
solved by separating the President from it and then having him
attack the problem. Although he hasn't gotten much credit for it,
he appears to have done this to a degree by ordering the reviews
of classification and secrecy procedures. Another possibility
might be for him to attack the pork-barrelling practice of Congress
adding non-related spending items to major appropriation bills if
and when he vetoes some major spending bills.
The President however does get fairly low ratings on the amiability
or friendliness dimensions. While he is seen as trustworthy, strong,
and competent he is not seen as warm, friendly, etc. There is no
indication, however, that this is detracting from his support. In
contrast to 10-12 years ago, being dynamic or friendly is simply not
viewed as being an important qualification for the Presidency. This
is not to say, however, that higher ratings on these scales would
not be of some assistance in attracting new votes.
The President is also seen to a degree as a one dimensional President.
That is, in contrast to some past Presidents, he is viewed almost
exclusively as one who is the chief of State, and the head of the
- 3 -
government rather than as the head or leader of an entire culture -
sports, the arts, life style, etc. In a sense he is viewed as. a
"professional" President, that is, one who is trained, experienced,
competent, respected for his ability, and concerned with the official
duties of his job full time. There is also no evidence that this
is losing us any votes at all.
McGovern's perception is still being set at this time. Although
most of the respondents could rate him on the various personality
and issue scales, his various ratings were similar indicating that
the knowledge of him is quite superficial.
Compared to the President, McGovern's ratings for trustworthiness,
strength, and amiability were not significantly different from the
President's but he was rated much less competent than the President.
I would expect to see McGovern's personal image take much more
definite shape in the next few weeks.
The most important issues continue to be Vietnam and the economy,
particularly inflation, both in terms of general concern and of
importance in voting for the President. Taxes, drugs, personal
safety are also important but definitely secondary to Vietnam and
inflation. The minor issues such as abortion and marijuana do not
appear to be affecting Presidential vote. The tendency to lump
amnesty, abortion, and marijuana all together is not supported by
the data. Amnesty is viewed as part of the Vietnam issues and there-
fore relatively important. Abortion is not seen as a major national
problem and the voters are split almost equally on this question of
liberalizing abortion statutes. Liberalization of the marijuana
statutes is opposed by a substantial majority, but is not seen as
an important issue in the Presidential election.
Bussing is seen as a moderately important problem in those local
areas where it is a reality or there is a pending decision but is
not at all an important issue outside of those areas. It is not a
major national issue and while we may want to use it in those areas
that have been directly affected, there is no reason for us to make it
a national issue.
Unemployment is a moderately important issue but not one which is
currently costing us any votes at this time. Very few people who
are most subject to unemployment are potential Nixon voters. This
will probably remain the case as long as it continues to decline.
There appears to be a threshold at which unemployment becomes a
major concern of large numbers of voters whether they are unemployed
or not but below that level only those who are unemployed are
immediately threatened are concerned. Undoubtedly this, is also
related to the trend of the unemployment statistics. The issue of
more and better jobs has, however, always been an effective issue
and even though unemployment per se is not a major concern, I don't
think we should overlook the job issue.
-4-
The general issue of national defense is also seen as a moderately
important issue but with varying attitudes about the specifics.
There is support for the idea that a strong national defense is a
means to peace. Yet a large majority think we should cut our armed
forces. The reason for this is, however, a belief that there is
great waste in the defense department, not that we don't need a
strong national defense.
% Mention As One of Top
Three Problems Facing U.S.
Vietnam
57
Crime
14
Inflation
13
Drugs
13
Economy
12
Race
11
Unemployment
11
Environment
11
Poverty
9
Taxes
7
Bussing
5
There is some concern on the part of a large group of voters, many
of them ours, or potentially ours, with the general issue of change
and of the concentration of power in large institutions -- govern-
ment, labor, business. This issue does not appear to be specific
or to have taken shape yet but looks like one which could become
of increasing importance. Any of our questions which even hinted
at the need for change or the concentration of power issue got
strong responses on the side of change and more concern for the
individual citizen.
This appears to be particularly true with regard to large unions.
More people blame them for inflation than blame business; or the
President and Congress combined and other recent data indicates a
real lack of sympathy with large or crippling strikes. With regard
to business, the problem seems to be one of a lack of faith in the
honesty or with being adequately concerned with either the customer's
or the public's welfare.
Government is seen as too expensive, distant, inefficient, and
simply ineffective. The citizenry simply does not think they are
getting their moneys worth for their taxes. At the same time,
however, they want and expect government to solve whatever problems
they presumably think are important.
-5-
With just three exceptions the President's ratings on his handling
of issues have held fairly constant and positive since January.
Between January and June his ratings on the change issue increased
significantly and his ratings on inflation and taxes dropped markedly.
His rating on Vietnam remains high with 35% more people rating him
positively than negatively.
McGovern's ratings are fairly positive but not very well defined
as yet. This, however, may not change for the majority of the
issues in the short time between now and the election.
ISSUE HANDLING
Nixon
McGovern
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Vietnam
65%
30%
42%
26%
Inflation
47
'46
41
42
General Unrest
57
33
43
20
Crime
56
36
46
17
Unemployment
50
43
43
20
Drugs
53
36
44
18
Taxes
46
48
40
24
Bussing
46
40
35
24
Health Care
69
21
50
12
National Defense
73
18
43
23
Environment
60
30
50
11
Racial Problems
60
31
43
20
Foreign Policy
81
11
40
22
Welfare
52
39
43
22
Conclusions
One of the unique things in this set of data is its consistency
across the various states particularly with the perception of the
President. His strong and weak points in terms of personal per-
ception is very similar in all of the priority states. The major
issue concerns are also fairly uniform across states but there is
some significant variance in the importance of the secondary issues.
In the top priority states the President's pattern of support is
very close to that which Republicans have won with before,
that is to get 90-95% of the Republicans, 15-20% of the Democrats,
and a large enough majority of the ticket-splitters to win.
Assuming we get 95% of the Republicans and 15% of the Democrats;
the following table lists the percentages of the ticket-splitters
we must get in each of the priority states to win a two-way race.
-6-
Minimum Percentage of Ticket-Splitters
Needed to Win State
California
70%
Connecticut
60
Illinois
60
Michigan
75
Missouri
75
New Jersey
60
New York
65
Ohio
55
Oregon
60
Pennsylvania
70
Washington
65
Wisconsin
70
Our first priority is to re-create what has been the proven winning
coalition in those states before. This means we need to get majorities
among those who have traditionally split their ticket. Our next
priority should then be to go after the Democrats who have just
begun to split their tickets. We also should go after those Democrats
who have not yet split their tickets but are similar demographically
to those who have. Past experience indicates that some campaign
effort directed at these people will cause some new ticket-splitting.
In terms of issues we should concentrate on the major national issue
Vietnam, the economy, taxes, drugs, and crime. These are the issues
that are going to decide the most Presidential votes and it is to
our advantage to keep the campaign directed to them and not on the
minor issues of abortion and marijuana.
While the data on the President is generally optimistic there are
two soft spots or potential problems that need attention. His
ratings on inflation and taxes are poor and down sharply from January.
These issues are closely related and important to Presidential vote.
We have some weakness in the general issues of change. A large
majority think we need fairly drastic change and they do not see
the President as being for this change. I think it is important
that we show the President as an innovator and as one who is for
responsible change as opposed to McGovern who is for radical and
irresponsible change.
We should move as soon as possible to harden up these soft spots
while they don't appear to be costing us any sizable groups of votes
now, they are points at which we are vulnerable to attack. We
should move before McGovern has a chance too.
-7-
There are several elements that I think should be present in the
general thrust or image of the campaign. First, it should have a
central idea or theme. We know from the first wave data that the
President is viewed as a tactican and as one without a master plan
or strategy for the country. A theme or central idea would give
us the common thread with which to tie together all of his accomplish-
ments and give the voters a reason to vote for the President.
Second, the campaign should show the breath and complexity of the
President's accomplishments and proposals. One of the elements of
his support is that he is doing a good job in a very difficult or
impossible job. This would take advantage of that feeling.
Third, it should show the President as an innovator and for responsible
change for the reasons discussed earlier.
Fourth, it should show him as being concerned about improving the
lives of the citizens. We need to emphasize that the ultimate pur-
pose behind all the President's trips, programs, and actions is to
help our citizens enjoy better lives. We need to communicate how
him program is going to help "you" not some special interest group
or institution.
Fifth, we should emphasize those plus qualities which the President
is seen as having and which are believable - knowledgeable, wise,
competent - and not try to make him something he isn't.
The campaign should have the element of hope. The voters have got
to believe that things are going to improve over the next four years
with Richard Nixon as President or they have no reason to vote for
him. They are not going to reward him for the past four years.
One of the basic elements of the American attitude and of American
politics has always been hope for better times. People don't like
negativism.
We should work to the people's desire for a more calm, orderly, and
peaceful life style. Even though we may be on the side of the
majority, it does not serve our purpose to become strident or
increase the acrimony in the country. One of the problems with
the '70 campaign was that while people were against long hair
hippies, marijuana, permissiveness, etc. what they were for was
a return to a peaceful, orderly life style and while our campaign
was on the majority side, we were seen as making the fight two sided
but adding to the acrimony.
We now have a fairly large lead which will probably decline, at
least partially. However, as long as we have a substantial lead
it is to our advantage to keep things calm and on the high road.
We should take as few chances as possible and not let it get close.
-8-
This is not to say, however, that we should not do anything to
introduce some negatives on McGovern. We do need to have a fairly
regular flow of negative material on him while his perception is
being set but we should take full advantage of his own problems
and let the press do as much of it as they will without our help.
However, if McGovern's negative press does taper off, we should
be very careful about how we attack him. We simply cannot take
a chance of damaging the President's respect and trust which are
not yet particularly deep or well set. Any attacks on McGovern
should be directed at the extreme nature of his positions and not
at him personally.
DETERMINED BEAN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By AN NARA, Date 3/13/95
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 31, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By omp
Date
8-19-81
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
RUT
SUBJECT:
Panel Interview Results
As you know, we paneled (re-interviewed) approximately 50% of the
respondents from our Wave I national poll as part of our Wave II national
study.
Attached is a table which shows the direction and amount of vote
switching between January and June. As Muskie was the strongest
Democratic candidate at that time, the most meaningful comparisons
are between the January Nixon-Muskie race and the June Nixon-McGovern
race. The distribution of the Wallace and Kennedy votes in the
Nixon-McGovern race is also interesting.
The President retains significantly more of his January support than
any of the Democrats, picks up as much or more of the undecided vote
as McGovern and gets more of the Wallace vote than McGovern.
He loses 12% of his January support to McGovern but picks up 19%
of the January Muskie support. Moreover, the January undecided
vote splits 51% for Nixon, 23% for McGovern, with 26% remaining
undecided.
The January Wallace vote now splits 40% for Nixon, 37% for McGovern,
and 21% undecided on the two-way ballot. On the three-way ballot 64%
stays with Wallace, 13% goes to Nixon, and 14% to McGovern.
It is also interesting that he gets 25% of the January Kennedy vote to
McGovern's 58%. This is a further indication that Kennedy appeals to
a unique coalition which is not transferable to any other Democrat.
During this period the President clearly gained more than he lost and
he did not lose any specific group of supporters. This period was
more of a shaking down period and the switching away from the President
has no pattern and appears to be simply a random switching.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
Wave II Trial Heats
Q22
Q23
Un
weight-
Weight-
ed
ed
Nixon
McGovern
Undecided
Nixon
McGovern
Wallace
Undectded 9
TOTAL U.S. VOTERS
508
513
50
33
17
44
28
19
A
NIXON
271
262
77
12
11
64
11
21
4
MUSKIE
211
224
19
60
21
20
49
17
14
UND
26
27
51
23
26
37
25
29
9
B
NIXON
292
276
77
13
10
63
11
21
5
HUMPHREY
194
216
18
58
24
20
49
17
14
UND
22
21
29
40
31
22
42
27
9
Wave I Ballots
C
NIXON
286
261
74
13
13
64
13
18
5
KENNEDY
188
220
25
58
17
20
46
22
12
UND
34
32
29
29
42
32
29
17
22
D
NIXON
243
228
79
10
11
73
11
12
4
MUSKIE
192
199
21
59
20
22
52
12
14
WALLACE
56
68
42
37
21
13
14
64
9
UND
17
18
49
29
22
28
31
28
13
E
NIXON
266
246
80
12
8
71
12
12
5
HUMPHREY
175
185
16
61
23
17
52
14
17
WALLACE
50
59
45
28
27
13
14
71
2
UND
17
22
27
50
23
34
52
7
7
F
NIXON
256
233
77
12
11
71
13
11
5
KENNEDY
179
202
24
58
18
23
49
16
12
WALLACE
45
52
42
29
29
5
11
75
9
UND
28
27
34
35
31
33
37
14
16
G
NIXON
216
202
85
8
7
75
9
13
3
MUSKIE
140
151
21
58
21
24
51
14
11
WALLACE
42
51
41
33
26
16
16
66
2
McCARTHY
48
42
33
47
20
29
39
18
14
CHISHOLM
16
18
6
49
45
9
37
9
45
UND
46
50
37
44
19
29
35
19
17
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 31, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISIRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.O. 120.5, Section 6-102
By EMP
NARL, Date 8-19-87
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
RMT
SUBJECT:
Inflation and Taxes
While the second wave data is generally very optimistic, two potential
problems are apparent. The President's ratings on inflation and taxes
have fullen sharply since January and he appears to be vulnerable
on the more general issue of change against McGovern. This memorandum
summarizes the data on inflation and taxes. The change issue will be
covered in a subsequent memorandum.
In all states surveyed the President has experienced a substantial
decline in his ratings on his handling of inflation.
Percentage Rating the Preisdent's
Selected
Handling of Inflation as Positive
States
Wave I
Wave II
Change
California
62%
45%
-17%
Illinois
*
47
N/A
Maryland
69
48
-21
Missouri
64
45
-19
New Jersey
65
37
-28
New York
62
43
-19
Ohio
69
47
-22
Oregon
59
40
-19
Pennsylvania
70
47
-23
Texas
68
52
-16
Wisconsin
63
49
-14
In January, approximately two-thirds of the voters gave the President
positive ratings on handling inflation while today equal numbers of
voters give him positive ratings as give him negative ratings.
Overall the President's ability to handle inflation has dropped about
17%, across the priority states. A similar decline is also evident in
the percentage approving of the way the President handled all economic matters.
* Comparable data on Wave I is not available.
- 2 -
This decline results from the feeling that the problem has worsened
durign the past six months and that his programs have not slowed
rising prices. Half of all voters and more significantly half of the
ticket-splitters now share this view. The problem is especially
acute with respect to food prices. Seventy-two percent of the voters
hold. the opinion that rising food prices have not been slowed. This
belief is held consistently by all demographic groups and in all
geographic regions, although it is particularly pronounced in several
large metropolitan areas.
Nearly two-thirds of the voters give the President negative inflation
ratings in Chicago, Philadelphia, New York City, St. Louis, Detroit,
Newark, Northern California, Milwaukee and Tacoma.
At the same time only 8% of the voters blame the President directly
for causing inflation. The greatest mention went to unions blamed
by 37% as most responsible for rising prices. Business is seen as the
next greatest cause being mentioned by 36%.
0
In terms of solutions, 66% would favor more drastic measures such as
a total freeze on food prices similar to Phase I.
Taken together the above data may indicate that although the voters
do not blame the President for causing inflation, they do not think he
has been effective in solving it.
Similar to the situation in inflation, the President's perceived
ability to handle taxes has declined significantly in most states
since the first wave.
Percentage Rating President's
Handling of Taxes as Positive
Selected
States
Wave I
Wave II
Change
California
53%
44%
- 9%
Illinois
*
48
N/A
Maryland
65
48
-17
Missouri
61
53
- 8
New Jersey
48
36
-12
New York
50
43
- 7
Ohio
62
50
-12
Oregon
54
39
-15
Pennsylvania
57
44
-13
Texas
68
56
-12
Wisconsin
54
42
-12
*Taxes not included on Wave I Illinois poll.
- 3 -
Tax reform may be especially important in the campaign because it
is an issue on which McGovern's perceived position is closer to
the general population's position than Nixon's and one which is
related to the change issue. The data from the seven large states
is almost identical to Illinois which is demonstrated below.
Self
T-S
D
R
Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do not need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self:
2.4
Total Rating Nixon:
4.4
Total Rating McGovern:
3.0
Rep.
2.6
Rep. Rating Nixon
3.6
Rep. Rating McGovern:
2.9
T-S:
2.4
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.2
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.9
Dem.
2.0
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.9
Dem. Rating McGovern:
3.2
(See Attachment for other states)
In Illinois 77% of the voters favor tax reform with only 11% opposed.
The important point is not so much that a large majority favor major
tax reform as it is that the President is seen as being opposed to
tax reform. Although McGovern enjoys a better position overall than
Nixon on tax questions, 63% of the voters specifically oppose the
McGovern proposal to give direct financial aid to those with less than
$12,000 income and thereby resulting in higher taxes for those with
incomes over $12,000.
With regard to local property taxes, 51% favor continuation of it
as the means to finance public education compared to 40% who are
opposed. Those opposed would favor a national sales tax to replace
local property taxes followed by federal income tax and sales tax
as alternatives.
Conclusions
Inflation and taxes are clearly related in the minds of the voters
and are the greatest potential problems evident in the data. While
we do not appear to be losing any significant number of votes on
these issues now, it is definitely a potential problem and one we
should act to solve soon. I have seen instances where this kind of
attitude shift has not immediately resulted in loss of ballot strength
but later caught up with the candidate and cost him votes. Should
McGovern begin to gain strength and segments of the Democratic coalition
begin to come back together, inflation and taxes appear to be the issues
that could be most effectively be used against us.
-4-
We should keep in mind that while inflation is related to all
elements of the rising cost of living, including taxes, most
voters relate it directly to food prices.
I think that the President should take some action dealing with
the inflation problem immediately and that the tax reform problem
should be handled some time early in the campaign before McGovern
has a chance to get a hold of it. If the President can boost his
rating on inflation near the January level, it should carry through
the election. While I do not think tax reform is as urgent as
inflation, it is an important issue and one on which we are
especially vulnerable to McGovern. Tax reform seems to be related
to the general issue of economic and social change and to the con-
centration of power issue on which McGovern appears to have an
advantage.
Inflation and tax reform are problems the President should handle
persorally. They are important with virtually every significant group
in the electorate and he should get the direct benefit of any action
he takes. The key criteria of whatever action he takes should be
that it be clearly seen as being in the interests of the individual
worker and consumers and not for any special interest group.
The surrogate program should then continue to communicate the President's
action on inflation and taxes in those geographic areas of the country
where they are particularly important and where the President receives
low ratings on his ability to handle these issues.
I believe that the President would gain in overall strength if he
were to take strong action against rising food prices, even though
there might be some temporary decline in strength from the farm belt.
However, there are simply many more food purchasers than farmers,
particularly in the top priority states.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
ATTACHMENT
(Tax Reform)
CALIFORNIA
Self
D T-S
R
N
Mc
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self: 2.2
Total Rating Nixon:
4.4
Total Rating McGovern:
2.8
Rep:
2.8
Rep. Rating Nixon:
3.5
Rep. Rating McGovern:
2.6
T-S:
2.2
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.4
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.9
Dem:
1.9
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.9
Dem. Rating McGovern:
2.8
NEW JERSEY
Self
T-S
R
D
Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self: 2.2
Total Rating Nixon:
4.5
Total Rating McGovern:
2.7
Rep: 2.7
Rep. Rating Nixon:
4.0
Rep. Rating McGovern:
2.5
T-S:
2.1
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.4
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.9
Dem:
2.1
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.8
Dem. Rating McGovern:
2.6
NEW YORK
Self
D
T-S
R Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self: 2.0
Total Rating Nixon:
4.4
Total Rating McGovern:
2.7
Rep: 2.4
Rep. Rating Nixon:
3.5
Rep. Rating McGovern:
2.7
T-S:
2.1
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.2
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.6
Dem: 1.8 Dem. Rating Nixon: 5.0 Dem. Rating McGovern: -2.6
Attachment Cont'd.
OHIO
Self
T-S
R
D
Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self: 2.3
Total Rating Nixon:
4.3
Total Rating McGovern:
2.7
Rep:
2.8
Rep. Rating Nixon:
3.7
Rep. Rating McGovern:
2.4
T-S:
2.3
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.2
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.7
Dem:
2.0
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.7
Dem. Rating McGovern:
2.9
PENNSYLVANIA
Self
T-S
D
R
Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self:
2.2
Total Rating Nixon:
4.2
Total Rating McGovern:
2.9
Rep:
2.5
Rep. Rating Nixon:
3.6
Rep. Rating McGovern:
3.1
T-S:
2.1
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.2
T-S Rating McGovern:
2.7
Dem:
2.1
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.5
Dem. Rating McGovern:
2.9
TEXAS
Self
T-S
D
R
Mc
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Need Tax
Do Not Need
Reform
Tax Reform
Self:
2.7
Total Rating Nixon:
4.4
Total Rating McGovern:
3.4
Rep:
3.1
Rep. Rating Nixon:
4.0
Rep. Rating McGovern:
3.2
T-S:
2.6
T-S Rating Nixon:
4.4
T-S Rating McGovern:
3.4
Dem:
2.6
Dem. Rating Nixon:
4.4
Dem. Rating McGovern:
3.3
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
June 29, 1972
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
one
CONFIDENTIAL
8-19-81
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
1960 and 1968 Elections
This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of
the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in
the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an
analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-
Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign.
I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I
was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.
The following campaign polls taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate
great differences between the two races:
Date
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
(1960)
March
47%
47%
5%
June
48
46
5
Late Sept.
47
46
7
Early Oct.
45
49
6
November
48
49
3
Date
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
(1968)
April
43%
34%
9%
14%
Early May
40
36
14
10
Late May
36
42
14
8
Early June
37
42
14
7
Early Sept.
43
31
19
7
Late Sept.
44
29
20
7
Early Oct.
43
31
20
6
Late Oct.
44
36
15
6
November
42
40
14
4
It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Callup
vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are,
however, making arrangements to get this information.
-2-
The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The
undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The
undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial
Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and
eventually won the election.
In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters
unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until
the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then
Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until
after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there
was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently,
the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from
traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign
the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup,
Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted
from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning
to their traditional Democratic vote.
It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly
constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years.
Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.
There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968
which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was
more effective than the 1968 campaign:
1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was
a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final
decision and increase switching simply because of more choices pre-
sented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with
more than two candidates and we have observed this in primary elec-
tions and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American
voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy
caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for
Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why
more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters.
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968.
It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that
basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which
divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united
party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united
party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on
both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular person-
ality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and
dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change
and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey
had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular
-3-
administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame
the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the
time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of
Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the
successes of his administration.
5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in
terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific
areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was rela-
tively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely
negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at
peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime,
drug problems had not become critical and there was no major
environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was
frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation,
frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environ-
ment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and
that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country
a very negative pessimistic attidude.
There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to
conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and
most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique
in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude
of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972
election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern
will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I
suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The
reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incum-
bent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote
earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted
had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the conven-
tion. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage
deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled.
George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major
shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of
a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage
now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote
by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an inter-
national event to change their minds.
There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident
throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving
the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly
more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the
declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that
we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed
vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they
are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.
-4-
Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we
have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely
through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates
and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything
to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The
shorter the actual campaign, the better for US.
Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing
Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning
the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
John l. Whiteker
SUBJECT:
Reply to your memo of June 12 (Tab A)
1. Between conventions, I see no change in the President's
posture -- avoid the semblance of campaigning -- particularly the
temptation of large rallies, Astrodome, etc.
He is still owed a CBS head-to-head or what have you, following
ABC's Howard K. Smith interview and NBC's Day in the Life of a
President. I assume a format with CBS is an option up to the GOP
Convention. If it is, I've always liked (1) the idea of a satellite
press conference with CBS correspondents worldwide. This will
tend to keep the questions in his strongest suit - foreign policy, or
(2) riskier, but all the great elements of a "put down" students
in auditoriums in London, Bonn, Tokoyo, Mexico City and
Washington, etc. -- the CBS moderator at each site selects the kids
to ask the questions from a forest of hands. The questions will be
radical, and if we are lucky, insulting. As I recall, Reagan and
Bobby Kennedy did this once and Reagan came off great -- just as
V.P. Agnew did on the Frost Show. Only he just had the opportunity
for a few nasty kids in the same studio.
Immediately after the Democrats nominate a candidate, the President
might call him and offer a briefing. There is a two-way pull here.
Brief the hell out of him -- President, CIA, individual Cabinet
officers and play the "splendid-good-sport-but, gee-we-are-
competent-and-should-stay-in-office' game, versus our desire not
to overexpose the candidate -- hard to have it both ways.
- 2
2. From the convention to the election. I think the key
question is will COPE, labor, etc., congeal behind say McGovern
or a Kennedy. If we get any early reading that they won't then by
all means run a low risk campaign. If its a HHH, Muskie type, i. e.,
a candidate labor can enthusiastically endorse, then a higher risk
campaign is in order. Or if McGovern bows to the pressure and
sponsors a mid-road platform at Miami, then COPE may pitch in
and again I vote a higher risk campaign. Like you, I come from
the generation that lived those awful five or six weeks when RN
dropped from a 15 point lead over HHH to a near dead heat --
because the Democrats "healed (which we can't control) and RN ran
a low risk campaign (which we can control). The combination was
near fatal.
a. His posture ? Issue-oriented meetings. Just as he
has been doing for the last three years (low risk, right on through
the election).
b. When should he start campaigning? Right now as
long as they are issue-oriented stops.
C. How much travel should he do ? Not much. One day a
week is plenty through Labor Day, but even after that, two days a
week at most as long as when we are in Washington he is more
active, i. e., instead of a blizzard of hand-out statements by the
President (as we have done for the last three years) he walks out
into Ziegler's shop and says it himself. He is on the tube three
nights a week for two minutes (about what you get after a full day
on the road) running the Government himself instead of some Cabinet
officer that the public doesn't recognize talking for the President.
d. Where should he go? I'm tempted to say just the key
15 states, but something off beat is okay if only to throw off the
press a bit. I'm even in favor of him leaving the country for a week
in the middle of the campaign if it is very substantive . -- but I think
the surrogates should rigidly stick with the key states.
e. Activities he might engage in (see my memo to Dave
Parker -- Tab B on farm events and Tab C on environment events).
Beyond my own areas of substance, I'd recommend (1) regional
press conferences -- let the national press scream that they are in
competition with local press and let's see who asks "dumb and flabby
- 3 -
questions" -- we both know he will get more home run balls from
local press (medium to low risk); (2) Domestic Council briefings
where he comes in at the end and does the "round-the-world"
speech. No risk; (3) in key states, invite editorial (TV and papers)
into Washington. Start now -- he will sell the hell out of them.
He would need to do one standup press conference to get the animals
off Ziegler's back (high risk) and then rapid fire he could knock off
10 editorial boards before the press would call foul and do the New
York Times early. Once you start playing these ground rules, see
the columnists as well, two or three at a time. Libs and conserva-
tives together, Kraft and Kirkpatrick, then a Wilson and Reston, etc.
(4) continue to use his, in my mind, most successful format from 1968,
five or six radio think pieces on the years ahead -- not just the next
four years -- the liberal press loves them and writes about them
(no risk); (5) as his juices thirst for a good old rally, satisfy them
like LBJ did -- don't go to the damn auditorium for the rally, stop
the car a block from the place where the substantive meeting is to
take place and just hold it -- a five minute, not a 25 minute talk -- a
crowd around the car fills just as much of the TV set as a crowd in
the Astrodome. I can't see him using a horn like LBJ -- there must
be a better electronic answer.
3. Any thoughts on issues, timing, points of attack? No matter
who the candidate is:
a. Make no tax reform until next year a virtue -- just how
I don't know. Its so simple to play McGovern's line of "soak the rich. 11
Above all, we need "one liners" to combat this - very good ones.
b. Work very hard on busing -- come with a constitutional
amendment approach to busing as late in the campaign as you can,
i. e., when we are credible that Congress won't pass his busing
moratorium.
c. Think of the exchange visits to Russia on implementing
the trade, space, health, environment, etc: agreements as picture
stories. We can whack off good wire photo if we send colorful people
to Russia. Secretary Butz on a grain deal. Risk turning a Wally
Hickel loose in Russia on our environment negotiating team -- not
- 4 -
faceless technicians. Get pictures of him looking at Arctic oil pipe-
line technology, etc. Peterson will be drab on trade negotiations --
would Connally fit? VonBraun on the space team with Frank Borman --
I can't even recall without looking it up in a book who runs NASA.
Similarily, if it is in the realm of possibility to send name people
to China between now and the election, I'm for it.
d. Do more on drugs -- a great issue -- unlike the
environment you don't win on one side and lose on the other with
every move you make.
4. The opposition's strategy will be tax reform, the economy,
too much money for defense, busing (if our timing is not careful),
ties to big business (ITT, pushing consumerism, environment) --
not much unless we make a mistake. Our greatest vulnerability is
tax reform. I also worry about food prices, but not enough to throw
the farm belt away with a food freeze now until I know I'm in worse
trouble than I think we are with the consumer. Vietnam: even without
a resolution, I'm not overly concerned as long as there is not a lot of
killing going on in South Vietnam during the fall.
If McGovern is the candidate, there is a real question in my mind
that the President should try to personally go after him. The press
is doing such a good job of undermining McGovern's proposals, I'm
not sure there is anything to be gained by the President himself going
after McGovern. Admittedly, HHH has been taking McGovern apart.
That may die down after the nomination but let's look before we
leap on this one. Maybe the press and our surrogates can cut up
McGovern and leave the President above him and ignoring him.
Lastly, let's not be too defensive -- everything we have done doesn't
have to be perfect -- certainly the economy isn't. A "well, we'll do
better' posture is always disarming.
cc: John D. Ehrlichman
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes Only Only
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. WHITAKER
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
1. What should the President's posture be
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How much
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it.
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
May 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE PARKER
FROM:
John C. Whitsker
SUBJECT:
Presidential Farm Sconario (writton on
the accumption there is a Russian grain doal)
JUNE 12: Midday event after Houston. Bondurant, Iowa, farm of
Ray Elson, selected 08 one of four outstanding young farmers by
U.S. Jaycees. Secretary Duty does Carm media briefing on this
farm before Procident arrives. Theme - farm exports and the
details of the Ruosian grain negotiations. Governors from corn
and whent belt - both Republican and Democret invited:
John Gilligun, D - Ohio
Richard Ogilvie, R any Illinois
William Millikon, R - Michigan
Edgar Whiteemb, R - Indiana
James Exon, D - Nebraska
Patrick Luccy, D - Wisconsin
Wendell Anderson, D - Minnecota
Robert Docking, D - Kansas
Warren Hearnes, D - Missouri
William Guy, D - North Dakota
Richard Kneip, D - South Dakota
President arrives dnd dods "how-it-was-in-Russia"" speech with
modorato focus of grain negotiation and maximum focus on what the
Brain export means to corn and whent belt. One option would be to
also include remarks by Secretary Rogers as "bait" to get form
media to come. President does tour of form for photo opportunity.
Republican Governors return to their states. Coloou's operation
programs local TV talk show foaturing Governor and USDA spokesman
JUNE 15-16: When President Echoverria la in Washington, have
olgning ceremony on the U.S. /Menican agreement on oradicating the
scrowworm from conthwest United States and Mexicon cattle. Invito
Senator Tower and cattle lobby -- morning nows lead proforable.
Press briefing by Secretary Duts on ocrewworm - followup Buts/
Tower TV talk show in Texas the nomt day.
JULY 6; Bakersfield California - late afternoon (after Gateway Wost
III Colles for p.m. cast coast news load). Visit farm between
Bakersfield dirport and downtown, Color event - receive fruits,
vegetables. Maybe motarcade last fove blocks to dovntown conference.
Again, farm exports would be punhed because California benefits
from our form exports 97 exclusive of 13 Rucsian dout. We will have
to take a last minute reading on the Chaves picket problem before
we commit.
MID-AUGUST Farm Family of the Year from Arkansas - Oval
Office photo opportunity. The Carlos Dearl Dixon family - wife
and three children - Asknnoas milk farmer (See tab A for details)
SEPTEMBER 26-20: Galesburg, Illinois (40 miles from Peorie)
Form Progress Show " Would probably turn out to be shout like the
Springfield, Illinois event. Color photo shot - probably drop farm
policy plank white paper. 11 serious piece which won't any too
much on purpose.
OCTOBER 11-13: National Convention of Future Farmers of
America. Municipal Auditorium, Kansas City, Miscouri. I think
a G&A by the President wather than a speech would be for superior.
If perchance this to an overnight stop, mayba an unheralded stop
at & grain elevator or river grain barge to talk to a man who works
there and what form exports moon to keep his job.
This to planty for the President to do between now and the election.
I might want to try a rural development event - depends on how the
logislation turns out this summer.
WASHINGTON
May 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE PARKER
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
gew
SUBJECT:
Presidential Environment Scenario
JUNE: Visit Franklin, Ohio, or St. Louis, Missouri, recycling
technology demonstration (only viable if we can reach internal
agreement on submission of legislation to provide a tax credit
for recycling -- that decision should be made within two weeks).
The event would be centered on the substantive initiative, tied in
with the federal funding which has brought these demonstration
programs into being. Either one would be a short event with a
few remarks by the President, a substantive factual handout, and
wire and TV pictures of the President inspecting the facility.
JULY 6: Visit Point Reyes, Gateway West and attend meeting of
President's Citizen Advisory Committee on the Environment and
perhaps others to discuss domestic and international environmental
progress. The itinerary suggested by the Committee looks fine for
the tour portion of the event (begin at Pt. Reyes, chopper over
National Seashore, continue air tour over Gateway West area and
land at Presidio). We could set up the conference to follow the tour
at an appropriate place, like Ft. Point. Train would carry the ball
on the domestic and international briefing, and the President would
merely make an appearance or perhaps kick it off. Get film of
Laurence Rockefeller, Arthur Godfrey and Charles Lindberg with
the President -- three members of the Citizen's Advisory Committee
on Environmental Quality.
3 -
SEPTEMBER: Visit Yellowstone for brief participation on the
100th anniversary of the National Parks celebration. Maybe an
overnight with the President hosting a breakfast meeting to
initiate the ceremonics in any event, a relatively brief
appearance at an early hour to get some film for the evening news.
Just use "Old Faithful" in the background -- suggest you have the
advance man move the President to Old Faithful, not visa versa.
OCTOBER: Visit EPA clean car test facility at Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Accompanied by Bill Ruckelshaus, brief tour of the laboratory
facilities, photos with technicians in white coats and Buck Rogers
test gear. Maybe drive a clean car around the test track. Trip
would highlight Administration attention to developing both uncon-
ventionally powered clean cars and strict adherance to tough emission
standards presently required of the internal combustion engine.
Bill signings as they come up June to September: In addition to
the foregoing events, we are certain that at least a few of the
President's major pieces of environmental legislation will be sent
down for signature over the next few months. We would like signing
ceremonies for the following probable candidates:
Water Quality Improvement Act Probably July -- this is the
biggest bill both in terms of public perception and in terms of money.
Ocean Dumping: June or July -- will probably be the first major
Presidential environmental initiative sent down from the Hill.
National Land Use Policy: August -- presently the crown jewel
of our environmental legislation and the most innovative initiative.
In addition, we may get bills in a number of other arcas such as
pesticides, noise, endangered species or others which WC would like
to substitute for the foregoing if our Congressional crystal ball is
clouded.
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Bob:
There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened
insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer
share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right
along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe
that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all,
knowing you will get really useful information from associates
with access to the current state of things across the country.
But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever
they are worth.
First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now
on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the
Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its plat-
form. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between
now and then any political judgments have to be no better than
sheer speculation.
Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our
people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to
concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne
out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first,
the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have
convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever
for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how
long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy;
and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the
Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the
upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President
has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,
- 2 -
these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in
the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients
are present in the President's achievements for a victory of land-
slide proportions.
Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's
enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief
that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expe-
diency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public
assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his
traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years
that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on
his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact
being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as
a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican
Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking
between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that
the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world
statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would
pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive
political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible,
one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears
of the American people. That's the best politics there could pos-
sibly be.
Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate
to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested
by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential
stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September
or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any dif-
ferently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should
he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until
he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when
campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and
ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts,
would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's
minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential
far more than political --- again, on the premise that a Presidential
stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume,
in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be inter-
larded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American
people that the President is President first and only reluctantly,
and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.
- 3 -
Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the cam-
paign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed
by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political
leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the Pres-
ident will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the
country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he
will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast
trying to visit every state.
I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at spe-
cific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agricul-
ture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using
key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaign-
ing. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of
late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presi-
dential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or
Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential
appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appear-
ance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why
I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the
traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a re-
gional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the
1960 style.
Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can
change much from now through Election Day, though I must again con-
fess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge
this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956
cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant
concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's
favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls
isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environ-
mentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought
to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, pros-
perity and progress.
Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the
key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena
or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will
be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by
election time will have degenerated into character assassination.
I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving
it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would
be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday,
to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country
- 4 -
that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives
of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT,
is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply con-
vinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that
his major political overlay will be the charge of big business
corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the
average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government
and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce
lots of people.
But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will
be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side
is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential
stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful
campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President
is determined above all else to do only the right things for America,
will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but
also the road to a landslide.
Darlow
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 17, 1972
Emp
E.O. 12085, Section 8-19-81 6-102
By
Date
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
'72 CAMPAIGN
BETWEEN CONVENTIONS
The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above
the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his
innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met
with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this
very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party
platform planks for ammunition -- althought never publicly
identified as such -- the President should focus on his
compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why
they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates
as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should
draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats
have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused
to pass.
I think the President can remain above the partisanship
involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related
events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen
responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress
during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.
POST GOP CONVENTION
I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period,
the President should, as much as is politically possible,
maintain the posture of the professional, business-
like Chief Executive going about his very important duties;
and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain
this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at
no time should the President drop to the level of the
contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.
-2-
I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can
lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him,
that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.
That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of
the President be maintained regardless of how much or how
little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition.
That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought
to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function
that would be politically desirable.
After the Convention, it seems to me that the President
ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting
with key national, regional and local Party officials to
give them his personal marching orders. This should be
done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate
the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely
about what is going on, thereby providing for our own
Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may
be in the wind.
Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest
that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of
interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick
to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated
and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions.
However, I still think that as much as possible, the image
of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained
as long as possible.
To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the
President should be highly selective of the activities
involving himself and that they should have a broader
gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as
long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates
and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most
intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.
-3-
CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there
is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats
will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment.
The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and
even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason
to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional
stress on the economic issue.
I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last
six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving
although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that
this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling
the concept that economic conditions in this country are
good and that the economy will actually be better than our
ability to convince the public of this fact.
I propose that we seriously create an almost separate,
well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will
be solely to create an image of economic well-being in
this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising
of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it
be done.
Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that
this government has itself caught in a position where
mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on
a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling
on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly
career civil servants. This routine economic reporting
is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that
the economy is better than it seems to them.
As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought
to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are
better off economically at this particular time than at any
other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should
ask their audiences to look inward and make their own
judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer
to that question is that indeed most people are better
off now than ever before.
-4-
If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must
subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny.
With the resources of this government, there is no excuse
for there existing a single miniscule detail about George
McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff
and/or his mistress escaping us.
I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators
who have already compiled everything there is to know about
George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate.
If there isn't, one should be established immediately.
There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout
the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson
in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value
in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish
areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should
be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we
should do everything within our power to woe the American
trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany
that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on
congressional, state and local campaigns and should not
be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is
not even ideologically compatible with the principles of
trade unionism.
To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its
manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election.
I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support
from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly
disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise
to see him deny labor's resources.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY
It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets:
(1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an
instinctive support from the liberal news media.
With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused
by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend
it all in every area.
Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major
effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability
of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions
-5-
just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore
ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going
to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard,
I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee
should be established to hold regular press conferences
and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.
We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel
who commit documentable instances of being McGovern
"sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is
productive, but every time we can prove media bias or
inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should
be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very
specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the
specific error or article to which we are addressing.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Campaign Strategy of
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Point 1: What should be the President's posture between
conventions?
In my mind, there is no question but that the President
should remain "the President" not only between conventions
but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late
in the campaign as possible, the President should be a
"working President," remain mostly in Washington attending
to the business of the nation.
From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must
be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their
platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The
tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be
ripened for Administration support. Careful use of
Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the
stage to capture these dissaffected voters.
Point 2: What should be the President's posture during
the campaign?
Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe
should be the keystone of most of the early campaign.
Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the
President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney."
The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that
President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided.
We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President
out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President
does move, it will have a heightened impact.
-2-
Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the
President's position -- up to a point. In order to
orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have
better communication with campaign headquarters and the
White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must
have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking
world events.
As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates"
should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that
will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic
nominees will be formulating their strategy during that
period and the Administration will have an opportunity to
capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups
can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three
million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will
hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter
college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin
college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher
percentage of their votes.
These early efforts should be limited to specific constituen-
cies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early,
especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type
campaign, are all too real.
With the base already established, we should use the Republican
Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's
re-election. With special mailings, highly structured
organizations, vertically and horizontally, We can generate
an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President,
building in momentum, until the President himself does decide
to enter the lists.
Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?
To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong
leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs
and issues sort out under these two broad headings.
The media would have us believe many Americans are totally
dissatisfied with the "old Politics.' It is now the fashion
to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists.
That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are
exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment,"
i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class
-3-
Americans have obtained a standard of living that their
parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the
midst of their success many middle class (and especially
lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled
by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse,
busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health
care. For many of these voters irritation has led to
frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a
visceral reaction against the "ins."
These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or
the security of strong leadership. The President has laid
the groundwork brilliantly for this case.
An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration
achievements and proposals can advance the image of
responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans
and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education
Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the
fullest.
The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract
support. We should not be seduced into attempting a
"charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is
substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength
and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the
President accurately display the courageous and bold
qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real
results because the President bargains from strength.
Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food"and
"unemployment." The food cost affects every American family
and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we
can do about food costs except what has been done and
obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to
solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting
the voters to think about other issues.
Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy.
Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not
already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and
imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts
offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.
-4-
Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.
A McGovern candidacy W 11 cause divisions in his party that
even an attractive runding mate will not repair. The South,
for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the
McGovern organization the South will admit.
A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive
element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending
upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace
could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes
in industrial states where the election might be close. But
some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help
the re-election of the President where he does appear on
the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away
from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that
angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters
will support Wallace.
As we saw in the televised debates during the California
primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful
manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed
radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems
of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total
lack of ability to lead this nation.
Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that
makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for
example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package.
The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's
programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration
can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push
him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the
onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for
the President.